Second Battle of El Alamein
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
Rommel and the Africa Korps (not having
the resources to advance and capture the
Suez Canal nor being able to withdraw)
other than the morale/propaganda value
of fighting/winning such a battle, what
was the reason for having the battle?
In my view, Rommel could have been
contained due to his resupply problems.
He is unlikely to ever get enough men
and materials to mount an effective
breakout threat.
Hans Christian Hoff
necessary, not only because of Rommel's disastrous supply situation, but
also because operation "Torch" was to be launched in a short time. The
answer may be that the English badly needed a victory to boost public moral.
Regards
Hans
"Malcom "Mal" Reynolds" <atlas-...@invalid.invalid> skrev i
nyhetsmeldingen: atlas-bugged-F8FA...@aries.ka.weretis.net ...
Don Phillipson
news:4b3df115$1...@news.broadpark.no...
> I believe it is fair to raise the question if the second Alamein was
really
> necessary, not only because of Rommel's disastrous supply situation, but
> also because operation "Torch" was to be launched in a short time. The
> answer may be that the English badly needed a victory to boost public
moral.
This seems to ignore the point that armed forces need
to learn how to fight effectively, and generals know no
way to learn except by experience.
Theoreticians might tell us that RAF offensive operations
(night bombing and day fighter sweeps) were obviously
unsuccessful and wasteful in 1941-42, thus ought not
to have been attempted. But no way is known of
reaching the competence of 1944 except by fighting
through the tactical failures for a year or two beforehand.
Similarly, we cannot assume that inaction after Torch
would have laid the way for successful invasion later
of Sicily and Italy, let alone the application in Normandy
of both army and air support methods that had been
invented in North Africa. Combat from Alamein to the
Mareth Line became the foundation on which later
victories were constructed. The men actually in
command appear to confirm that merely waiting
until Rommel starved or gave up (or was strongly
reinforced) could not have provided the experience
(and thrown up the effective unit commanders)
to win in Italy or France.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Haydn
> Considering the resources at hand for
> Rommel and the Africa Korps..... what
> was the reason for having the battle?
The reason was that the alternative course was staying put and awaiting 8th
Army's unavoidable attack.
Attacking - even just a limited local attack, if not a huge sweep a la
Rommel - with the mobile and armored force gathered by the end of August
1942 was deemed more sensible than simply digging in and letting the British
eventually come on with zillion tanks and guns.
However, it would be wrong to think that Rommel was all for the offensive.
He was skeptical and hesitating, knew how slim the chances of success were,
and resisted the pressure from Kesselring. In fact the decision whether to
go, how far to go, or not to go and abort the offensive, was the issue of a
debate until virtually hours before the start.
Simply put, the amount of supplies (especially fuel) delivered to the Panzer
army was insufficient, and any offensive larger in scope and size than a
merely local shove would have required the capture of vast British supply
dumps to continue. In other words the British should have graciously filled
the tanks of the Axis tanks for the latter to get to Alexandria.
Even keeping British airpower and British knowledge of Axis strength and
plans in fine detail out of the picture, it was a gamble if there ever was
one. Rommel knew it and grudgingly took the risk. The Italians knew it but
closed their eyes and crossed their fingers.
Haydn
William Black
> I believe it is fair to raise the question if the second Alamein was
> really necessary, not only because of Rommel's disastrous supply
> situation, but also because operation "Torch" was to be launched in a
> short time. The answer may be that the English badly needed a victory to
> boost public moral.
Both US and British 1st Army performance at the start of TORCH was not
stellar.
8th Army performance was good.
--
William Black
"Any number under six"
The answer given by Englishman Richard Peeke when asked by the Duke of
Medina Sidonia how many Spanish sword and buckler men he could beat
single handed with a quarterstaff.
Rich Rostrom
> "Malcom "Mal" Reynolds" <atlas-bug...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
>
> > Considering the resources at hand for Rommel and the Africa Korps...
>
> The reason was that the alternative course was staying put and awaiting 8th
> Army's unavoidable attack.
I think the OP is asking why the
_British_ attacked. He notes that
Rommel lacked the resources for
a renewed drive into Egypt, or a
rapid withdrawal to the west.
Why not just ignore the Axis force
there?
So - answering the OP:
Well, one reason is that an assessment
of enemy capabilities cannot be certain.
Rommel had a well-earned reputation for
doing a lot more than was expected.
And his resources might grow - he could
be reinforced.
At El Alamein he was dangerously close
to the Nile Delta.
As to the need for a victory - the Allies
needed to defeat the Axis in Egypt in
part to establish once and for all their
control of the region. The Arabs of the
Middle East were mostly pro-Axis, and as
long as Axis forces were in striking
distance, with the Allies unable to beat
them, the Arabs would be thinking about
rebellion.
Finally there was the issue that great
strength had been built up in Egypt.
By using this strength to break the
Panzer Armee Afrika, and then press
westward to join the Allied forces in
NW Africa, the Allies added greatly to
the force they could bring to bear.
Haydn
> I think the OP is asking why the
> _British_ attacked.
If I misunderstood the OP's question, I apologize. In Italy, second Alamein
is usually identified with Alam Halfa. Lightfoot is Third Alamein.
Apparently there is no international standard Alamein battles numbering and
this may generate some confusion.
Haydn
Louis C
> In my view, Rommel could have been
> contained due to his resupply problems.
Rommel - actually, he wasn't in charge at the time the offensive
kicked in - had over 100,000 troops in Egypt, uncomfortably close to
Alexandria. That army had beaten 8th Army before, and was quite
capable of dealing a harsh blow to the TORCH forces if allowed to
redeploy at will.
Simply put, this was war, German armies had to be neutralized for
Germany to be beaten, this was one such army, battle was a way to
destroy it. And it eventually hurt it pretty badly.
So I don't really see an alternative. Of course, 2nd Alamein wasn't
necessary to save Egypt, but not waging it would have meant having to
redo it over the Mareth Line or some such location. The Allies had no
way to know for certain that the Axis was really on the ropes. It had
appeared to be twice, in 1940 and 1941, and both times the British
victory had been cancelled on short notice. Relying on TORCH to do 8th
Army's work was simply too dangerous.
LC
David H Thornley
> way to know for certain that the Axis was really on the ropes. It had
> appeared to be twice, in 1940 and 1941, and both times the British
> victory had been cancelled on short notice. Relying on TORCH to do 8th
> Army's work was simply too dangerous.
>
at El Alamein, it looked to Auchinleck like counterattack time. That
worked a lot less well than the British expected.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Hans Christian Hoff
declared that it would not be launched before September 1942 he was sacked
and replaced by Alexander and Gott/Montgomery, who attacked, but not til
October 23rd.
Regards
Hans
"David H Thornley" <da...@thornley.net> skrev i nyhetsmeldingen:
_cydnaJfjqj-Wt3W...@posted.visi ...
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:atlas-bugged-F8FA...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
> Considering the resources at hand for Rommel and the Africa Korps
> (not having the resources to advance and capture the Suez Canal nor
> being able to withdraw) other than the morale/propaganda value of
> fighting/winning such a battle, what was the reason for having the
> battle?
To destroy Rommel's forces at a time and location chosen by
the allies.
> In my view, Rommel could have been
> contained due to his resupply problems.
Rommel was having enough trouble staying where he was before
the possibility of Tunisia becoming allied controlled became a
reality.
Despite Hitler's no retreat mentality the invasion of French North
Africa meant Rommel's forces had to retreat. The question became
how much of the retreat would be on his timetable or an allied one.
> He is unlikely to ever get enough men and materials to mount an
> effective breakout threat.
On the other hand he could conduct a controlled retreat to
Libya and Tunisia, and then force the allies to dig out his largely
intact forces from some quite strong defensive positions. That
would probably cost more allied lives.
With the point the allied supply situation was far worse in western
Libya and beyond.
Alamein was fought because it was a good place to defeat the
axis forces in North Africa. The size of the defeat and the threat
to Tunisia meant Rommel could not make any sort of major stand
between Egypt and Tunisia.
An extra reason was the allies needed the airfields in Libya to
cover a supply convoy to Malta which was again in danger of
running out of supplies.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<580fe20b-c87d-40d4-96f3-13ebc99babe4@26
g2000yqo.googlegroups.com>,
Louis C <loui...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Malcom Reynolds wrote:
> > In my view, Rommel could have been
> > contained due to his resupply problems.
>
> Rommel - actually, he wasn't in charge at the time the offensive
> kicked in - had over 100,000 troops in Egypt, uncomfortably close to
> Alexandria. That army had beaten 8th Army before, and was quite
> capable of dealing a harsh blow to the TORCH forces if allowed to
> redeploy at will.
I believe the British had over 200000
men and about 1000 tanks plus no
shortage of supplies.
>
> Simply put, this was war, German armies had to be neutralized for
> Germany to be beaten, this was one such army, battle was a way to
> destroy it. And it eventually hurt it pretty badly.
>
> So I don't really see an alternative. Of course, 2nd Alamein wasn't
> necessary to save Egypt, but not waging it would have meant having to
> redo it over the Mareth Line or some such location. The Allies had no
> way to know for certain that the Axis was really on the ropes. It had
> appeared to be twice, in 1940 and 1941, and both times the British
> victory had been cancelled on short notice. Relying on TORCH to do 8th
> Army's work was simply too dangerous.
I understand that there was no absolute
way of knowing how bad it was for the
Germans, but the mucks had to know how
badly they were interdicting German
supplies, which should have painted a
pretty good picture of their offensive
potential.
They couldn't go south, East wasn't too
good of a choice unless they could get
the Egyptians to stage uprisings and
going West would have been harder than
going East.
The possibility of long range artillery
and/or bombing might have set the
pattern for a long bout of attrition.
The German morale sinks and Rommel is
too good of a commander to sacrifice his
entire force.
At least this is how I see it
>
>
> LC
Bay Man
news:atlas-bugged-F8FA...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
What you are saying is just sit it out and Rommel can't do anything as he
was not big enough and far from supply. Then the Allies could come up behind
Rommel after the Torch landings. Rommel with an inferior force in numbers
had previously overwhelmed larger British forces. The British forces also
had to be released to fight elsewhere.
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<oI-dnc4gzeIDKN3WnZ2dnUVZ_o-dnZ2d@westne
t.com.au>,
"Geoffrey Sinclair"
<gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
> On the other hand he could conduct a controlled retreat to
> Libya and Tunisia, and then force the allies to dig out his largely
> intact forces from some quite strong defensive positions. That
> would probably cost more allied lives.
Conversely the Allies have the time to
prepare strong defensive positions that
Rommel has attack but having limited
manpower, supplies and resupply
capabilities, he really can't?
David H Thornley
> Well; Auchinleck planned a counterattack; ironically enough it was when
> he declared that it would not be launched before September 1942 he was
> sacked and replaced by Alexander and Gott/Montgomery, who attacked, but
> not til October 23rd.
>
then looked like he was in dire straits. Auchinleck counterattacked,
didn't accomplish a whole much, then nothing happened until Alam Halfa
(or Second El Alamein for the Italians).
Geoffrey Sinclair
> In article
> <oI-dnc4gzeIDKN3W...@westnet.com.au>,
> "Geoffrey Sinclair"
> <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>
>> On the other hand he could conduct a controlled retreat to
>> Libya and Tunisia, and then force the allies to dig out his largely
>> intact forces from some quite strong defensive positions. That
>> would probably cost more allied lives.
>
> Conversely the Allies have the time to
> prepare strong defensive positions that
> Rommel has attack but having limited
> manpower, supplies and resupply
> capabilities, he really can't?
The above makes no sense to me. The axis would need to put
another army into Africa to counter the new allied army there.
Allied airbases in French North Africa are going to make it
easier to interdict axis supply lines, and the extra axis troops
were going to require more supplies. If Rommel's supply
situation was bad before Torch it was worse afterwards. So
no attacks by Rommel unless the defence of Tunisia really
works for the axis. In the mean time he pins the largest western
allied field and air force actually in contact with European axis
troops.
The allies had the need to clear the Mediterranean, so they could
route shipping through and attack Italy. The axis brief was to delay
the allies as long as possible.
Sitting around waiting for Rommel to attack is not a winning strategy,
and it is not going to happen before the situation in Tunisia is stable.
Allowing the axis forces to withdraw in good order prolongs the
campaign. Again, The size of the Alamein defeat and the threat
to Tunisia meant Rommel could not make any sort of major stand
between Egypt and Tunisia.
>From the axis point of view the occupation of Egypt gave little benefit,
certainly it cost more than it gained. A withdrawal to say the Libyan
border would have made it easier for the axis and harder for the allies.
>From the allied point of view why not defeat an axis army that was
beyond where logistics said it should be? Especially as that fitted
with allied strategy.
Perhaps you can answer the question, where would it be easier to
defeat Rommel?
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<hhot3o$v35$1...@news.eternal-september.org
>,
"Bay Man"
<xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospa
m> wrote:
> "Malcom "Mal" Reynolds" <atlas-...@invalid.invalid> wrote in message
> news:atlas-bugged-F8FA...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
> > Considering the resources at hand for
> > Rommel and the Africa Korps (not having
> > the resources to advance and capture the
> > Suez Canal nor being able to withdraw)
> > other than the morale/propaganda value
> > of fighting/winning such a battle, what
> > was the reason for having the battle?
> >
> > In my view, Rommel could have been
> > contained due to his resupply problems.
> > He is unlikely to ever get enough men
> > and materials to mount an effective
> > breakout threat.
>
> What you are saying is just sit it out and Rommel can't do anything as he
> was not big enough and far from supply. Then the Allies could come up behind
> Rommel after the Torch landings.
Something like that, although I would
add in constant artillery and air
attacks to attrite his forces.
> Rommel with an inferior force in numbers
> had previously overwhelmed larger British forces.
But by this time he isn't getting enough
supplies and reinforcements and is
largely isolated. Still dangerous, but
if put in a situation where he can't do
anything other than needlessly sacrifice
his forces, he might consider surrender.
> The British forces also
> had to be released to fight elsewhere.
My position is that the fight could be
seen as largely unnecessary and
therefore the loss of troops/equipment
is likewise unnecessary.
pbromaghin
>
> But by this time he isn't getting enough
> supplies and reinforcements and is
> largely isolated. Still dangerous, but
> if put in a situation where he can't do
> anything other than needlessly sacrifice
> his forces, he might consider surrender.
And these are precisely the reasons why it was the right place and
time to attack. They describe an extremely vulnerable opponent -
weakened force, little supply, his only line of supply and retreat
being along the coast.
> My position is that the fight could be
> seen as largely unnecessary and
> therefore the loss of troops/equipment
> is likewise unnecessary.
I see a recipe for the complete rout and/or destruction of your
opponent. that can be worth a quite a bit of troops and equipment.
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<tfGdnW_sWovueNzWnZ2dnUVZ_u2dnZ2d@westne
Were the German forces in Aftrica at
that time capable of much in the way of
affecting Mediterranean shipping?
>
> Sitting around waiting for Rommel to attack is not a winning strategy,
> and it is not going to happen before the situation in Tunisia is stable.
Can't speak to Tunisia, but forcing
Rommel to attack in his "current"
situation is not a winning strategy for
Rommel
>
> Allowing the axis forces to withdraw in good order prolongs the
> campaign. Again, The size of the Alamein defeat and the threat
> to Tunisia meant Rommel could not make any sort of major stand
> between Egypt and Tunisia.
>
> >From the axis point of view the occupation of Egypt gave little benefit,
> certainly it cost more than it gained. A withdrawal to say the Libyan
> border would have made it easier for the axis and harder for the allies.
>
> >From the allied point of view why not defeat an axis army that was
> beyond where logistics said it should be? Especially as that fitted
> with allied strategy.
Although it's not exactly the same
thing, I see it as analogous to the
Allied island hopping campaign in the
Pacific...isolate island strongholds and
let them wither from lack of supplies
>
> Perhaps you can answer the question, where would it be easier to
> defeat Rommel?
I can't answer that question, but is it
not possible that if Rommel can be put
in a position where all that is likely
is the slow and painful attrition of his
force and that he sees the wisdom of
surrendering? He wasn't that much of an
ardent Nazi and it's pretty obvious that
he was willing to participate in the
July plot
David H Thornley
>
> Although it's not exactly the same
> thing, I see it as analogous to the
> Allied island hopping campaign in the
> Pacific...isolate island strongholds and
> let them wither from lack of supplies
>
In the Pacific, the Japanese Army had units on islands.
Destroy all the aircraft and boats on the island, and they're
helpless to do anything. Moreover, it was impossible to
supply those islands with reasonable quantities of stuff.
On larger land masses, the tendency was to destroy all Japanese
forces that could interfere, and if that was impractical to make
sure the remainder was locked up. For example, the US Army
built a fortified line across New Britain near Rabaul, rather
than taking the place, and held it in force until the end of
the war.
In this case, Rommel's forces were still dangerous. All they needed
was some supplies, and there was no a priori reason they couldn't
get them. A large British army was watching to make sure Rommel
didn't do anything, and was unavailable for other roles.
If the British could have carefully dug around Panzerarmee Afrika
and floated it off into the Mediterranean, that would
probably have been better than attacking it.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> In article
> <tfGdnW_sWovueNzW...@westnet.com.au>,
Put it this way, how many end to end Mediterranean convoys were
done June 1940 to mid 1943?
The Luftwaffe and Italian Air Force had combat units in North Africa.
More importantly the axis forces in Africa were denying the allies the
air bases needed to cover convoys. There were bigger axis air forces
in Italy, Sicily and Greece, no allied air cover gave them plenty of
opportunities to attack any convoy.
You do know one of the first fall outs between Montgomery and the
airmen was over the advance into Libya, the supply situation in Malta
was bad, the convoy had to sail as soon as possible. The airmen
therefore wanted their airbases as soon as possible, and they thought
Montgomery was taking too long.
>> Sitting around waiting for Rommel to attack is not a winning strategy,
>> and it is not going to happen before the situation in Tunisia is stable.
>
> Can't speak to Tunisia, but forcing Rommel to attack in his "current"
> situation is not a winning strategy for Rommel
Then why propose he will do it?
>> Allowing the axis forces to withdraw in good order prolongs the
>> campaign. Again, The size of the Alamein defeat and the threat
>> to Tunisia meant Rommel could not make any sort of major stand
>> between Egypt and Tunisia.
>>
>> >From the axis point of view the occupation of Egypt gave little benefit,
>> certainly it cost more than it gained. A withdrawal to say the Libyan
>> border would have made it easier for the axis and harder for the allies.
>>
>> >From the allied point of view why not defeat an axis army that was
>> beyond where logistics said it should be? Especially as that fitted
>> with allied strategy.
>
> Although it's not exactly the same thing, I see it as analogous to the
> Allied island hopping campaign in the Pacific...isolate island strongholds
> and let them wither from lack of supplies
The Japanese ground forces that were bypassed were usually small and
had almost zero mobility, they could not meaningfully threaten allied bases.
Even so a large number of allied air units in particular spent the war
keeping the bases suppressed, as well as allied ground units kept back
just in case.
The perceived pointlessness of many air operations was a major factor in
the 1945 RAAF mutiny of the aces. General Kenny made the remark he
was afraid to go near come of the rear area air units because of the way
they felt about their operations. Also check out the Marine units left in
the South West Pacific.
MacArthur talked about withering, someone had to apply plenty of
defoliant.
Can you show us where a large Japanese force in direct contact and
near key allied bases (like Alexandria and Suez) were left alone?
Rommel had an army and was in direct contact with allied forces, he
forced a comparable sized force to stay and guard him. That army
could be put to better use.
You seem to be convinced Rommel would not do a staged withdrawal
to Tunisia, why? Instead he will apparently stay in a hopeless position
taking steady losses then surrender, why?
>> Perhaps you can answer the question, where would it be easier to
>> defeat Rommel?
>
> I can't answer that question,
Sorry, you are the one telling us there was a better way and now
you are saying you do not know what the better way was. Answer
the question.
> but is it not possible that if Rommel can be put
> in a position where all that is likely
> is the slow and painful attrition of his
> force and that he sees the wisdom of surrendering?
And how many months and how many allied lives will this slow an
painful attrition take? And what will it cost the allies in terms of
the good weather in 1943? How about can the allies replace
the 8th Army troops and Desert Air Force in operations in Tunisia,
and Sicily.
> He wasn't that much of an ardent Nazi and it's pretty obvious that
> he was willing to participate in the July plot
Rommel's participation in the July 1944 plot largely consisted of
turning a blind eye to the plotters. You seem to have the romantic
Desert Fox idea, rather than reality.
Bay Man
>> Rommel with an inferior force in numbers
>> had previously overwhelmed larger British forces.
>
> But by this time he isn't getting enough
> supplies and reinforcements and is
> largely isolated. Still dangerous, but
> if put in a situation where he can't do
> anything other than needlessly sacrifice
> his forces, he might consider surrender.
The Germans did not surrender, well not without a fight. They were used to
being surrounded and fighting their way out, especially in the USSR. They
had previously beaten larger British forces in North Africa.
What you are saying is use air and artillery to pound them until their
position is untenable. Well they could do the same to a degree.
>> The British forces also
>> had to be released to fight elsewhere.
>
> My position is that the fight could be
> seen as largely unnecessary and
> therefore the loss of troops/equipment
> is likewise unnecessary.
That is too much of a gamble, as the Germans could have had a surprise
attack at any time that suited themselves.
Duwop
wrote:
> The Germans did not surrender, well not without a fight. They were used to
> being surrounded and fighting their way out, especially in the USSR.
Really? In November of 1942? Care to name the battles where they did
so?
Making a guess, are you now reading Hastings' 'Armageddon'?
Dale
Bill Shatzer
> On Jan 5, 4:30 pm, "Bay Man" <xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam>
> wrote:
>
>
>>The Germans did not surrender, well not without a fight. They were used to
>>being surrounded and fighting their way out, especially in the USSR.
>
>
> Really? In November of 1942? Care to name the battles where they did
> so?
The Demyansk and Kholm Pockets?
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<hi0jig$19f$1...@news.eternal-september.org
>,
"Bay Man"
<xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospa
m> wrote:
> The Germans did not surrender, well not without a fight. They were used to
> being surrounded and fighting their way out, especially in the USSR. They
> had previously beaten larger British forces in North Africa.
>
> What you are saying is use air and artillery to pound them until their
> position is untenable. Well they could do the same to a degree.
A much smaller degree. They would never
be able to sustain such a pounding for
very long, given their supply situation
>
> >> The British forces also
> >> had to be released to fight elsewhere.
> >
> > My position is that the fight could be
> > seen as largely unnecessary and
> > therefore the loss of troops/equipment
> > is likewise unnecessary.
>
> That is too much of a gamble, as the Germans could have had a surprise
> attack at any time that suited themselves.
Which would have rapidly run out of
fuel, ammo and possibly men.