"Japanese quote" - is this real?
freddo
to it... I'm suspicious. An internet search on "Robert Menard"
doesn't come up with anything related to the USN.
Anyone have info?
Thanks in advance.
~~~
"In 1960, Robert Menard was a Commander aboard the
USS Constellation when he was part of a meeting between
United States Navy personnel and their counterparts in
the Japanese Defense Forces. Fifteen years had passed
since VJ day. Most of those at the meeting were WWII
veterans, men who had fought each other to the death
at sea were now comrades in battle who could confide
in one another.
Someone at the table asked a Japanese admiral why,
with the Pacific Fleet devastated at Pearl Harbor
and the mainland U.S. forces in what Japan had
to know was a pathetic state of unreadiness, Japan
had not simply invaded the West Coast.
Commander Menard would never forget the crafty look
on the Japanese commander's face as he frankly
answered the question.
"You are right", he told the Americans. "We did indeed
know much about your preparedness. We knew that probably
every second home in your country contained firearms. We
knew that your country actually had state championships
for private citizens shooting military rifles. We were not
fools to set foot in such quicksand."
--
Chris Manteuffel
electrons in an arbitrary pattern familiar to all as:
> "You are right", he told the Americans. "We did indeed
> know much about your preparedness. We knew that probably
> every second home in your country contained firearms. We
> knew that your country actually had state championships
> for private citizens shooting military rifles. We were not
> fools to set foot in such quicksand."
Not trying to get into a gun control debate, but if a Japanese officer
did say this, he was lying, his memory was playing tricks on him, or
he was trying to please a pro-gun advocate.
American gun ownership had nothing to do with the Japanese decision
not to invade Hawaii or the West Coast. The actual reason they didn't
was simple logistics. Japan could not get her six fleet carriers to
the West Coast from the Home Islands. Not even with all seven of their
tankers that were fast enough to operate with the carriers. The only
way they could get their six carriers to the US West Coast involved
capturing Oahu first, stocking oil on it, and using it to refill the
tankers. However...
The Japanese were not in the war to try to invade the US. Their goal
was to secure the Dutch East Indies, and access to the oil and other
resources in those islands. Sending lots of troops halfway across the
Pacific ocean and then supplying them would use almost all the fuel
the Japanese had for a strategic dead end. They only had enough
merchant ships to support one major offensive at a time, so they were
faced with a choice between invading Oahu or the DEI at the beginning
of the war. The choice between the two was a no-brainer. The DEI was
rich in oil and other strategic resources. Hawaii had lots of sugar
and pineapple.
Admiral Ugaki, Yammammoto's Chief of Staff, admitted in the
discussions before the Battle of Midway, that the Japanese could not
hold onto Midway. He said they would have to give it back after a few
months, because it was too far away to supply, given the limited
Japanese resources. Midway is a small island with no civilians on it.
The Hawaiian islands are large (more garrison required to control
them), have over 400k civilians on them (have to feed them too, and
require further garrison), are a net food importer (and all indigenous
food is cash crops that don't make a full diet), and are almost 1000
miles further from Tokyo than Midway is (so you need more ships going
a longer distance, vastly more strain on the Japanese logistic net
which couldn't handle the easier job). Japan could not hope to hold
Oahu even if Alien Space Bats gave them the island on a silver
platter. So launching carrier raids against the US west coast is out
of the question, leave alone invasions.
The US was protected during the war by the tremendous distances
involved in the Pacific combat. They were able to bridge those
distances only by building the largest fleets ever assembled and
building a logistic chain which was enough to start religions.
Chris Manteuffel
"...the war situation has developed not necessarily
to Japan's advantage..."
-Emperor Hirohito, August 14, 1945
--
W. Lydecker
want to make Hitler's mistake of a two front war. Remember,
the Army was quite heavily engaged in China-Burma, etc.
--
Rich Rostrom
>... I'm suspicious.
> Someone at the table asked a Japanese admiral why,
> with the Pacific Fleet devastated at Pearl Harbor
> and the mainland U.S. forces in what Japan had
> to know was a pathetic state of unreadiness, Japan
> had not simply invaded the West Coast.
Because (as every reasonably informed person knew then
and later) Japan did not have the capacity to invade
the U.S. - they did not have the shipping, the amphibious
craft, or the logistical power to project even a commando
raid across the whole Pacific. Where would they get the
fuel? Until the East Indies were secured they were
running on very scanty reserves.
The comments about private ownership of firearms are
nothing that any Japanese would have known or cared
about.
This is clearly an 'urban legend' among firearms-rights
enthusiasts.
I happen to be a 2nd Amendment supporter myself, but
the cause is not aided by repeating obvious fantasies.
--
Never consume legumes before transacting whatsoever | Rich Rostrom
even in the outermost courtyard of a descendant of |
Timur the Terrible. | rrostrom@dummy
--- Avram Davidson, _Dr. Bhumbo Singh_ | 21stcentury.net
--
tim gueguen
"freddo" <fre...@home.com> wrote in message
news:9krqbl$o68$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> Got this from a friend in email but with no cites attached
> to it... I'm suspicious.
You have good right to be. It sounds like more anti gun control propaganda.
The Japanese didn't invaded the US West Coast because they didn't have the
resources to. How could they land troops thousands of miles away from the
nearest Japanese base in sufficient numbers to seize any notable amount of
US territory, and keep them supplied to hold that territory? The answer is
they couldn't. Doing what they did do in late 1941 and early 1942 required
them to spread themselves very thin. Furthermore I have trouble believing
that the Japanese would have seen unorganised armed civilians as a threat,
especially "Western barbarians."
tim gueguen 101867
--
Al Brennan
>Got this from a friend in email but with no cites attached
>to it... I'm suspicious. An internet search on "Robert Menard"
>doesn't come up with anything related to the USN.
>
>Anyone have info?
>
>Thanks in advance.
<snip>
First let me suggest you invest a little more effort into your
internet searches. I found this very quickly:
http://www.reagan.com/HotTopics.main/HotMike/document-7.1.2001.5.html
Second, might I suggest you give a little thought to the
logistics of invading the west coast, even with a completely
unarmed citizenry? Taking even Hawaii was probably next to
impossible.
The story you quote appears on the referenced page, an
apparently right-wing organization obviously supporting gun
ownership. The site also purports that Hitler did not invade
Switzerland because its citizenry was armed, IMO a similarly
dubious assertion.
Other related hits showed pages with a similar far right wing,
pro-gun attitude. My take? It's completely fabricated.
--
Al
--
V-Man
> fools to set foot in such quicksand.
This is bogus. If they were so wise, then why didn't they pay
attention to
Yammamoto going on aobut our resources, on industrial capacity, and
our resolve
when angered?
It's a made up story.
Wish you were here! V-Man
<*> A Knight is sworn to Valor, His Heart knows only Virtue
=/\= His Blade defends the Weak, His Word speaks only Truth
(-o-) His Wrath undoes the Wicked
Bill Shatzer
On 8 Aug 2001, freddo wrote:
> Got this from a friend in email but with no cites attached
> to it... I'm suspicious. An internet search on "Robert Menard"
> doesn't come up with anything related to the USN.
-story snipped-
The "quote" and story are, of course, impossible to verify - or
refute, for that matter. They do, however, sound remarkably
similar to some of the fanatasies concocted by the more
extreme National Rifle Association-types from time to time.
According to one story, Khrushev (or various Soviet generals)
allegedly muttered something remarkably similar as to the reasons
the Soviets didn't invade the USofA - as if the Strategic Air
Command alone was not sufficient incentive to refrain from
landing Russian marines on the shores of the Chesapeake.
Still, even if the story and quote were true, they are historically
inaccurate. The Japanese, from the beginning, recognized that
they lacked the troops, shipping, and logistics to undertake such
an adventure - regardless of the state of American "preparedness"
or the number of rifles above American mantles. No serious
planning or even consideration of a west coast invasion was
ever undertaken. They never even got to the stage of considering
such things as hunting rifles among the civilian population.
After all, the Japanese planners -were- requested to undertake an
examination of a possible Australian invasion - a country with
a smaller population, fewer defensive troops, and (most importantly)
much closer to Japan and Japanese bases. They soon concluded
that the necessary forces, shipping and logistics were simply
unavailable and quickly dropped the entire idea.
If the Japanese couldn't find the resources to even begin credible
planning for an Australian invasion, it sure wasn't the threat
of a bunch of deer rifles which deterred 'em from invading the
US west coast.
Cheers and all,
Andrew Clark
"Al Brennan" <owl...@IDLETIME.hotmail.com> wrote
> The story you quote appears on the referenced page, an
> apparently right-wing organization obviously supporting gun
> ownership. The site also purports that Hitler did not invade
> Switzerland because its citizenry was armed, IMO a similarly
> dubious assertion.
It's worth remembering that AFAIK there was no gun control in
France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark or Poland, all of which nations
were successfully invaded by Hitler.
In 1938, the British War Office actually made a study of the
effectiveness of civilian militias against modern combat troops,
taking into account the Spanish civil war and the fact that
southern England in particular was packed with ex-veterans with a
high ownership of sporting weapons and WW1-era rifles and
revolvers. The study concluded that purely civilian militia
groups, however well-armed and numerous, could be no more than a
very short-lived local irritant to trained troops with automatic
weapons, mortars, artillery, armour and air support. The study
also felt that even military-style training, leadership,
communication systems and most importantly larger ammunition
stocks would create no more than a "buffer" which might slow a
German advance for a few hours. That conclusion underpinned the
formation of the War Office Local Defence Volunteers, originally
and cold-bloodedly conceived by the British as an expendable
network of small militias in key vulnerable points like airfields
and ports and road junctions (1).
Goebbels' version of the Home Guard, the Volkssturm, was a
similar organisation: boys and old men given rudimentary military
training and old weapons, and sent out to die bravely and
ultimately uselessly against real troops.
I'm sure that, had the Japanese had the power to invade
California, the local American armed civilians and militias would
have similarly fought and died bravely without making the
slightest permanent impact on the progress of the Japanese
divisions.
(1) It was Churchill for morale reasons who expanded that vision
into a mass armed people's militia: the Home Guard. However, the
Home Guard was never intended to do any real fighting, and after
September 1940 it was not really needed in any case.
--
Mason Cooper
others taking place in those early months of the war would shock the US into
a negotiated settlement.
This mis-reading of the Amerocan mindset was their biggest mistake.
--
Rick
> The site also purports that Hitler did not invade
> Switzerland because its citizenry was armed, IMO a similarly
> dubious assertion.
>
Well, I doubt that this was indeed the case, but anyone who beleives
the
Swiss are a pushover should take a look at Mcphee's book, "La Place de
la
Concorde Suisse," (I believe the spelling is right, but the book is in
a box
somehwere in the garage). The Swiss have been always been prepared for
war
and their defenses are not limited to regular training for their
universal
army (yup, universal, according to Mcphee - along with manditory
service,
every able man is trained and most of the women as well). While I
don't
believe that this was enough to halt Hitler by itself, the lack of
real gain
of invasion and the highly defendable terrain should have been.
Rick
Charles K. Scott
Bill Shatzer <bsha...@OregonVOS.net> writes:
> If the Japanese couldn't find the resources to even begin credible
> planning for an Australian invasion, it sure wasn't the threat
> of a bunch of deer rifles which deterred 'em from invading the
> US west coast.
>
> Cheers and all,
Besides, we're talking about the WWII era. Sure there were lots of
people living in the country who owned deer rifles but the majority of
the people of the US did not. I can't believe this was ever a
consideration and only comes up now as a pseudo historical fact to
defend 2nd ammendment rights.
You had good sense to be sceptical.
Corky Scott
Free
Japanese
Occupation Force public notice board outlining the rules for the population
of the Phillippines. The notice made a point of stating that privately owned
guns
could be retained by the citizenry, although any use of those weapons
against Japanese occupiers was
a death penalty offense.
Plenty of our own stateside politicians don't trust us that much.
tim gueguen wrote in message <9ksl6r$kfo$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
--
Lawrence Dillard
real interview.
Shortly following the end of the Pacific War, Roger Pineau, working with Adm
Morison, interviewed several ranking Japanese about the PH attack. He asked
them why they had concentrated only on attacks on vessels and airfields
there and hadn't thought to destroy the fuel tank farms there, reminding
them that Adm Nimitz was able to engage on offensive combat operations
shortly because of the fuel remaining available to him.
The several officers pondered Pineau's implicit suggestion at some length,
in silence, before recognition dawned, apparently at the same moment for all
of them.
In truth, the Japanese never had any intention of invading the US mainland,
having in truth insufficient merchant marine or military supply ships to
conduct even the PH raid, except at the expense of other task forces. And,
the japanese were convinced that their soldiers could shoot, too.
"freddo" <fre...@home.com> wrote in message
news:9krqbl$o68$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> Got this from a friend in email but with no cites attached
> to it... I'm suspicious. An internet search on "Robert Menard"
> doesn't come up with anything related to the USN.
--
MMerzzee
america. I have several such bills so they must have had given it some
consideration
--
Bill Shatzer
If what you have says, in English, "The Japanese Government Promises
To Pay To The Bearer On Demand [insert appropriate amount]", what
you have is Japanese Occupation currency used in Malaya and NOT
currency intended for use in the United States.
Malayan currency was denominated in dollars and cents prior to
the Japanese conquest and the Japanese continued this practice
with their occupation currency notes.
The Malayan occupation notes I've seen all have rather tropical
themes - banyan trees, tropical birds, and the like - which is a
give-away that they were intended for a climate considerably
south of Seattle.
The Japanese printed similar occupation notes (with appropriate
changes in design, language, and denominations) for Hong Kong,
the Phillipines, and the East Indies - perhaps others
as well but those are the ones I am familiar with. But -none-
for the United States.
Cheers and all,
--
W.J.Hopwood
<rros...@21stcentury.net> writes:
>Because (as every reasonably informed person knew then
>and later) Japan did not have the capacity to invade
>the U.S. - they did not have the shipping, the amphibious
>craft, or the logistical power to project even a commando
>raid across the whole Pacific. Where would they get the
>fuel? Until the East Indies were secured they were
>running on very scanty reserves.
But they did (or at least thought they did) have the capacity
to occupy Hawaii and that could have changed the whole picture.
After their success at Pearl Harbor, Japanese naval planners led
by Yamamoto worked on a plan to seize Hawaii. Thinking
strategically, Yamamoto believed that Imperial Navy squadrons
based at Pearl Harbor could be used to harass U.S. sea lanes and
attack the U.S. West coast, leading the U.S. to agree to a
negotiated peace.
At first objecting to the plan, the Japanese Army acquiesced after
the Doolittle raid on Japanese cities demonstrated a need for Japan
to control the central Pacific. The plan was to first draw the
U.S.fleet,
still suffering from the Pearl Harbor disaster into a decisive battle
which would end advantageously for the Japanese. This to be
followed by the occupation of Midway, Johnston and Palmyra Islands.
Next would be the occupation of Hawaii itself.
Figuring largely in the Imperial Navy's planning was the large
Japanese community in Hawaii, the "doho" (their compatriots).
Resident Japanese had enthusiastically greeted invading Japanese
forces in other areas of Japanese occupation and the Japanese
had no reason not to expect similar cooperation in Hawaii.
In that connection, Professor John J.Stephan of the University
of Hawaii wrote in his 1984 book "Hawaii Under the Rising Sun."
"Japanese forces in the Phillipines received a tempestuous
welcome from resident compatriots in Davao on Mindanao
on 20 December 1941, and the Macassar Japanese assisted
Imperial Navy units occupying Celebes in February 1942."
All such plans collapsed with the Japanese defeat at Midway on
June 5, 1942, but without the success of U.S. cryptanalysts
who pinpointed Midway as the Japanese target, there could
well have been a different ending. As Stephen wrote: "Could Hawaii
have been successfully invaded during the Greater East Asia War?
Yes, and it nearly was. Only the unexpected reverse at Midway
aborted 'Eastern Operations.'"
W.J.Hopwood
Andrew Clark
"Rick" <rjd...@yahoo.com> wrote
> While I don't believe that this was enough to halt
> Hitler by itself, the lack of real gain of invasion and
> the highly defendable terrain should have been.
IIRC, OKW (Oberkommando Wehrmacht: the German armed forces
command) had a plan for the invasion of Switzerland and expected
to occupy and subdue the whole nation within three weeks. The
plan envisaged mass bombing of the cities and lines of
communication (Switzerland had only a tiny air defence force)
followed by airborne and glider attacks to secure the passes
followed by and advance by mountain troops to secure the urban
areas. I don't recall OKW or OKH being much worried about the
Swiss militia, and half a minute thought indicates why that was
the case.
MMerzzee
from a
marine in the solomons. i will dig them out and give you an exact
discription.
I have 4-5 of them in various denominations. I do remember that at
least one
does in fact have some sort of tropical type landscape i donot
remember what
is on the others. I seem to remember that they also were in a couple
of
different colors. would that be of any help in identifying them
further?
JCarew
>This has the sound of a propaganda piece made up of elements
>borrowed from a real interview.
>Shortly following the end of the Pacific War, Roger Pineau,
>working with Adm Morison, interviewed several ranking Japanese
>about the PH attack. He asked them why they had concentrated
>only on attacks on vessels and airfields there and hadn't thought to
>destroy the fuel tank farms there, reminding them that Adm Nimitz
>was able to engage on offensive combat operations shortly because
>of the fuel remaining available to him.
>
>The several officers pondered Pineau's implicit suggestion at
>some length, in silence, before recognition dawned, apparently at the
>same moment for all of them.
>
>In truth, the Japanese never had any intention of invading the
>US mainland,
It all depends in what time frame your talking about.
After 1 March 1942, the Japanese military leadership decided
their war plans had been too conservative and pessimistic. They
had expected to suffer a loss of one-fourth of all their forces
in their offensives to date. In fact, the losses had been
negligible. There offensives had been successful beyond there
wildest expectations. Accordingly, Tojo and Yamamoto worked
out a compromise agreement to extend the strategic objectives
of the war plans to encompass an even larger area for the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Manchester 293-294).
Yamamoto's task was to advance Japan's control of the Pacific
onwards to Alaska and Midway..... Yamamoto was to advance
from the Aleutian Islands and move down the coast of Alaska
through Dutch Harbor and Juneau towards Washington, capture
Hawaii, and use Alaska and Hawaii as bases for further raids
upon the Pacific Coast from British Columbia to California
(Manchester 293-294; Garfield, 4-8,44, Layton, 383) Japanese
air bases in Alaska would be within three hours bombing
distance of the Boeing aircraft plant and Bremerton Naval
Shipyard in the Seattle, Washington region (Garfield, 16) At
the time 60-70% of the total US Military aircraft production
was here on the West Coast within 50 miles of the coastline.
BTW Japanese submarine-launched scouting type aircraft were
sent over Seattle(Craven, 277-286)
References:
Manchester William: American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur
1880-1964. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co.; 1978.
Garfield Brian: The Thousand-Mile War: World War II In
Alaska and the Aleutians, 1st edition. New York;
Ballantine; 1969.
Layton Edwen: And I was There
Craven Frank Wesley & Cate James Lea, The Army Air Forces
in World War II, Vol. 1, p 277-286
>having in truth insufficient merchant marine or
>military supply ships to conduct even the PH raid, except at the
>expense of other task forces. And, the japanese were convinced
>that their soldiers could shoot, too.
Agreed the Japanese at the time possessed neither the
naval nor mercantile assets to move, place across the
beach, and supply enough troops to mount more
than a minor "Dieppe" type demonstration. Theoretically
had Midway and Hawaii been captured, ships refueled
there could have come and gone from California beaches,
remaining on station long enough to off load and recover a
small scale invasion party(raiding party).
Other than when forced to adapt by necessity (Guadalcanal),
Japanese efforts were amazingly clumsy and owed much of their
success to the ineptness, misapprehension, limited numbers,
unsuitable equipment of Allied forces in Asia. All though
the US Military did see fit take some precautions just
before the Battle of Midway in early June 1942 just in case.
"That night our armed forces were on maximum alert on the West
Coast and in the Hawaiian Island. California's radio stations
closed down early to prevent enemy bombers from homing in their
transmitters. Standing out to sea from Seattle to San Diego, a
long line of requisitioned motor yachts and fishing boats,
manned by naval reservists, patrolled the dark waters to give
early warning of any Japanese attempt to raid the mainland"
Source: And I was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway-Breaking the
Secrets, by Rear Admiral Edwin Layton USN Ret, Page 437
Jim Carew
Andy O'Neill
<acl...@cedar-consultancy.co.uk> writes
>I don't recall OKW or OKH being much worried about the
>Swiss militia, and half a minute thought indicates why that was
>the case.
I reckon it'd have been pretty uneven.
There's a relevent documentary which was screened a while back.
The thrust of the programme was that the Swiss were far too useful to
Nazi Germany as "neutral" to go and invade.
A whole bunch of evidence was presented showing the Swiss procuring
materiel, returning Jews etc.
Andy O'Neill
www.l-25.demon.co.uk/index.htm
Liverpool Wargames Association
www.l-25.demon.co.uk/LWA.htm
Cub Driver
>areas. I don't recall OKW or OKH being much worried about the
>Swiss militia, and half a minute thought indicates why that was
>the case.
Well, nobody worried about the militia, since its primary task was to
have been to delay the Germans at the border while the army took up
positions in the Alpine retreat. Your scenario for occupying
Switzerland seems feasible on its face, but the fact remains that
Germany didn't conclude that taking Switzerland was worth the effort
it would cost, and Swiss defensive plans and of course its geography
were central in that. Have you read "Target: Switzerland"? I found its
presentation convincing, though to be sure it was written from a very
pro-Swiss perspective.
No doubt Germany could have subdued Switzerland, but even when this
seemed most profitable (when the German army in Italy was backed up
against the Swiss border) it drew back from the task. I think it was a
case of: we've got enough grief already; why mess with the Swiss?
Besides, for most of the war, a neutral Switzerland was an asset to
both sides.
all the best -- Dan Ford (email: let...@danford.net)
see the Warbird's Forum at http://danford.net
and message board at http://forums.delphi.com/annals/start/
Andrew Clark
"Andy O'Neill" <An...@l-25.dont-spam-me.demon.co.uk> wrote
> There's a relevant documentary which was screened a while back.
> The thrust of the programme was that the Swiss were far too
useful to
> Nazi Germany as "neutral" to go and invade.
I think politically this is probably true. Hitler got nearly all
he wanted from Switzerland without military conquest (just as he
did from Sweden and Spain) and it was this co-operation rather
than their heroic militias or anything else that avoided
invasion. Certainly OKW/OKH never trembled at the military
problems of invasion of Switzerland or any other neutral country.
Bill Shatzer
On Sat, 11 Aug 2001, W.J.Hopwood wrote:
-snips-
> All such plans collapsed with the Japanese defeat at Midway on
> June 5, 1942, but without the success of U.S. cryptanalysts
> who pinpointed Midway as the Japanese target, there could
> well have been a different ending. As Stephen wrote: "Could Hawaii
> have been successfully invaded during the Greater East Asia War?
> Yes, and it nearly was. Only the unexpected reverse at Midway
> aborted 'Eastern Operations.'"
Without putting to fine a point on it, Stephan is a fool
Ignoring the fact that Oahu is a perfect defensive position (big enough to
be defensible in depth, small enough that offensive manuevering is
restricted and with lots of defensible terrain), and ignoring the fact
that the Japanese could not have maintained air superiority over Hawaii
for more than three or four days (after that, the carriers are out of
av-gas and munitions and must withdraw to at least the Marianas to
resupply), and ignoring the fact that the Japanese lacked suitable landing
craft, by the spring of '42, the US had three infantry divisions in Hawaii
plus assorted armored, anti-aircraft, coastal artillery, and Hawaiian
National Guard units - say something in the neighborhood of 75,000 combat
troops. Plus a couple of tens of thousands support soldiers and sailors
which could have performed at least adequately as defensive infantry.
Something approaching 100,000 troops available for defensive purposes.
Given any reasonable ratio between attackers and defenders, there is
simply no way the Japanese could have transported and supplied the
required number of troops to Hawaii. Or have landed them and supplied
them across the beaches. The Japanese simply lacked the required
transports and landing craft to even seriously contemplate such
an adventure.
It is well to remember that the abortive Midway Occupation Force numbered
some 3,000 troops and required a substantial portion of the Japanese
transport resources. A hypothetical Oahu Occupation Force would have to
be 30 to 50 times larger (at the least!) and would be operating more than
1,000 miles further from Japanese bases. There is simply NO way the
Japanese could have pulled off such an operation and NO way any sane
Japanese commander would have attempted such an undertaking.
Had Japan actually been successful at Midway, they might have held the
atoll for three to six months. After that, they would have either been
forcibly ousted by US forces or (more likely) have simply abandoned it
as they did Kiska and Guadacanal when it became apparent that the game
was no longer worth the candle.
Cheers and all,
--
W.J.Hopwood
<bsha...@OregonVOS.net> writes:
>On 10 Aug 2001, MMerzzee wrote:
>
>> but the japanesse did in fact print currency for the occupation of mainland
>> america. I have several such bills so they must have had given it some
>> consideration
>If what you have says, in English, "The Japanese Government Promises
>To Pay To The Bearer On Demand [insert appropriate amount]", what
>you have is Japanese Occupation currency used in Malaya and NOT
>currency intended for use in the United States.
[snip]
>The Malayan occupation notes I've seen all have rather tropical
>themes - banyan trees, tropical birds, and the like - which is a
>give-away that they were intended for a climate considerably
>south of Seattle.
[snip]
Like a climate such as Hawaii, maybe? Actually, I don't believe the
tropical scenes engraved on the occupation currency notes would
have caused the Japanese to restrict the use of such currency
to the tropics if it had suited their purpose to use it elsewhere, even
on the U.S. mainland if Admiral Yamaguchi's plan for carrying the
war to the U.S West Coast had ever come to fruition.
I have photocopies of some such Japanese occupation currency
--one showing the front of a ten dollar note and the other showing the
back of a five dollar note. On the front of the ten dollar note is the
statement in English: "The Japanese Government promises to pay
the bearer on demand 10 dollars" Below this in large caps are the
letters "MP." On the back of the five dollar note is the same
statement followed in large caps by the letters MR. It would seem
a simple matter for the Japanese to mandate the use of such currency
without any changes anywhere in the U.S. or its territories they had
been able to occupy if they had ever been able to do so.
W.J.Hopwood
--
Andy O'Neill
<lo...@my.sig.file> writes
>No doubt Germany could have subdued Switzerland, but even when this
>seemed most profitable (when the German army in Italy was backed up
>against the Swiss border) it drew back from the task. I think it was a
>case of: we've got enough grief already; why mess with the Swiss?
They would have been mad to invade in late 44.
Not only were the troops busy elsewhere, the German leadership wouldn't
have ordered it.
Switzerland was where a bunch of their ill-gotten gains were stashed
away, money which'd possibly come in handy after Germany lost.
Goering (eg) reckoned he knew the writing was on the wall in 1942.
If that wasn't enough, the Swiss were still flogging em ammo.
With a fair few factories in ruins, this was not something to sneeze at.
Andy O'Neill
www.l-25.demon.co.uk/index.htm
Liverpool Wargames Association
www.l-25.demon.co.uk/LWA.htm
--
Andrew Clark
"Cub Driver" <lo...@my.sig.file> wrote
> Well, nobody worried about the militia, since its primary task
was to
> have been to delay the Germans at the border while the army
took up
> positions in the Alpine retreat.
As I recall, the Swiss had no army as such, merely militias of
varying degrees of effectiveness. The best trained and equipped
were men of military age (19-30) formed into company sized units,
with some light automatic weapons, but with little mortar,
anti-tank or artillery support and most importantly little
logistic support outside their home areas. None of the men of
these units, including the officers, had actually ever seen
combat. There were about 2000 such units, each numbering about
150 men, grouped into "regiments" of 10 companies. These
regiments had neither the leadership nor communications to act as
formed combat groups.
In the middle of the scale were men of over-military age
(30-40's) with older mainly rifle weapons and little support.
There were about 900 such companies, again each of about 150 men.
Some of these men were WW1 veterans although Switzerland was not
heavily involved in that war.
At the bottom of the scale was the Swiss Home Guard, old men and
teenagers with hunting rifles. There were about 10,000 platoons
of around 20 men each.
Thus, although Switzerland mobilised around 850,000 men, or about
the manpower of 25 German divisions, it had in fact no formed
combat units above company strength. It was in fact a gigantic
association of small units, each designed - like the British Home
Guard and German Volkssturm- merely to defend its home locality
for a short period. The Wehrmacht, being able to concentrate
forces at the point of contact and to call in artillery and air
support, would roll over such a defence as soon as it made any
response.
And remember that a Swiss hold out in a national redoubt was of
no significance to the Germans. They wanted the cities, the
wealth and the lines of communication - and the Swiss choosing to
starve in the mountains in inaccessible fortresses wouldn't stop
them taking those things.
> Your scenario for occupying
> Switzerland seems feasible on its face, but the fact remains
that
> Germany didn't conclude that taking Switzerland was worth the
effort
> it would cost, and Swiss defensive plans and of course its
geography
> were central in that.
As I think I said in another post, Hitler got nearly all he
wanted from Switzerland without military conquest and it was this
co-operation that saved the Swiss than their army or militia or
pocket knives or anything else . Had Hitler wanted Switzerland
then, even in 1944, he could and would have taken it.
> Have you read "Target: Switzerland"? I found its
> presentation convincing, though to be sure it was written from
a very
> pro-Swiss perspective.
I have glanced through it and I'm afraid I found it ludicrous.
The central premise that Switzerland was a heroic democracy which
resisted the Nazis is almost revisionist: certainly to say, as
the author does, that "After two centuries of mutual respect,
today a media frenzy falsely depicts the Swiss as Nazi
collaborators. It was the opposite" makes one think very poorly
of the author's intelligence.
> I think it was a
> case of: we've got enough grief already; why mess with the
Swiss?
In 1944, I think you may well be right. On the other hand, from
1936 - 1944, it was certainly a case of "we whistle, Switzerland
jumps, why invade?"
casita
> I'm sure that, had the Japanese had the power to invade
> California, the local American armed civilians and militias would
> have similarly fought and died bravely without making the
> slightest permanent impact on the progress of the Japanese
> divisions.
You are discussing the Home Guard - Volksturm of various nations. I wouldn't
dismis them so lightly. Sometimes it's the youngest and oldest men who are
the most politically motivated, particularly when defending their own
streets. All that was required was for them to set booby traps and baricades
and find a protected hiding spot with a rifle or anti tank gun. If
determined, they could greatly delay an advance of trained soldiers. It has
often been pointed out that crudely armed and trained Japanese civilians
were prepared to fight to the death in the event of Invasion.
--
JCarew
>"Andrew Clark"
>>I'm sure that, had the Japanese had the power to invade
>>California, the local American armed civilians and militias would
>>have similarly fought and died bravely without making the
>>slightest permanent impact on the progress of the Japanese
>>divisions.
>You are discussing the Home Guard - Volksturm of various nations.
>I wouldn't dismiss them so lightly.
I was a teenager during that period of this countries
history living about 10 miles from the coast here in Southern
California near one of the beaches that probably would
have been used for a Japanese invasion. At the time we
had no such thing as the "Home Guard-Volksturm" around
here nor any hint that the US military was going to organize one.
>Sometimes it's the youngest and oldest men who are
>the most politically motivated, particularly when
>defending their own streets.
Right after PH a bunch of neighbors on our street got together
to discuss what to do if the Japanese landed on the beach near
where we lived. Of course there was those who said we should
take our deer rifles, shot guns, and 22's(which is all we had at
the time) and catch those "Jap's" as they came across Pacific
Coast Highway.etc: etc: Then someone brought up what
happened in China during the Japanese rape of Nanking,
and that our families would be left unprotected if all the men
were off fighting the Japanese on the beaches. The subject
then switched to letting the military handle it and what
was the best routs for getting our families out of the Los
Angeles basin fast :)
>All that was required was for them to set booby traps
>and barricades and find a protected hiding spot with a
>rifle or anti tank gun.
To begin with none of us had any training in using
the equipment your talking about plus there was none
around under civilian control. As a military force the US
civilians around here would have done more harm than
good to the US cause from a military standpoint doing
what you are talking about. At the time the US Military
had barely enough equipment for its self let alone arming
the civilian population. You might remember Britain asked
for a donation of any military arms the US civilians might
have(around 1940 or so I think it was), and a lot of people
sent what ever military rifles, pistols etc they might have to
England which left us pretty bare in that department.
>If determined, they could greatly delay an advance
>of trained soldiers.
They could also get American woman raped and there children
bayoneted like what happened at Nanking to the Chinese
civilians
>It has often been pointed out that crudely armed and trained
>Japanese civilians were prepared to fight to the death in the
>event of Invasion.
Your comparing apples and oranges, the American people
are not as fanatical to get them selves killed as the Japanese
were. As I recall the Japanese were fanatics about dying for
there emperor which means that if the Japanese military wants
you to die for the emperor you die for the emperor. I never
heard of an American leading a banzi(sp) charge or dying
in a kamikaze attack, to us here on the West Coast at the
time something like that was inconceivable. Something's
are better off left up to the military. At the time your talking
about(early WWII) we here in Southern California were
about as un-military a group of civilians as you could find.
Jim Carew
--