Strategic Bombing - Electrical Power System Targets
John Phillips
System Engineering. I have been reading submissions to this newsgroup
for more than five years relative to what Harris called "panacea
targets" Apparently, the consensus is that the "oil plan" had, at the
very least, a significant effect on the outcome of the war.
I contend that if the bombing program had concentrated on the electric
power system that it would have had a much more immediate and dramatic
impact on Germany.
With the current power system in the United States, a few conventional
and incisive bombing attacks could totally shut down, for at least a
short time, much of the United States electrical system. Our
civilization stops when the lights go out. If the bombing continued
on a more sustained basis, the system would irrecoverably collapse. It
takes many months to repair or replace a large power transformer for
example. This would totally stop industrial production in the US.
There are alternatives to oil but not to electricity.
I admit that the current US power system is much more integrated than
that which existed in Germany during the war and therefore that it is
more unstable and sensitive to major disruption witness the 1965, 1977
and other blackout incidents where no outside factors were involved.
The electic power system targets in Germany were very identifiable.
All you had to do was follow the power lines to find them. A few
well-placed bombs could have been much more effective than hundreds of
thousands of tons of bombs on German civilians. The 105th and 109th
Mosquito Squadrons demonstrated that the RAF could succeed with
squadron sized precision bombing. Four five hundred pound bombs could
shut down the Northeastern US. This is the load of one Mosquito. Can
you imagine the outcome if the whole RAF and USAAF had concentrated
on electric power system targets in Europe.
Regards,
John Phillips
John Halliwell
<jhphi...@adelphia.net> writes
>I contend that if the bombing program had concentrated on the electric
>power system that it would have had a much more immediate and dramatic
>impact on Germany.
It was considered and adopted by Bomber Command but in a haphazard and
uncoordinated way. The usual approach was to bomb with conventional
bombs and then strafe the transformers with machine gun fire (hits
indicated by blue sparks).
The Dams raid was also planned to be effective in this way as well
(remove a massive source of hydro-electric power and flood electrical
installations).
Bomber Command had a go at everything used extensively in Germany
(mining canals, oil, railways, power plants etc.), maybe there was
just
too much to cover and too many 'effective' targets to take effect?
--
John
Preston, Lancs, UK.
ArtKramr
>From: jhphi...@adelphia.net (John Phillips)
>Date: 12/25/00 2:53 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: <3a4ecfd6...@news.pacific.net.au>
>
>
>I contend that if the bombing program had concentrated on the electric
>power system that it would have had a much more immediate and dramatic
>impact on Germany.
Everything you say is true. However power facilites ar every easily
and quickly
repaired. In many cases overnight. If you hit an oil refinery and cut
its
production by 30% you have denied the enemy millions of barrels of
fuel and
immediately curtailed fighter and tank operation for a significant
period of
time. A good example of "repairability" can be shown by the bombing
of
railroad facilites. We started by hittng marshalling yards. But
marshalling
yards were in cities where you had the labor and material for very
rapid
repair. This was eventually changed to hitting tracks in the remote
countryside. where repair crews had to be trained out to repair these
points
and fighters would destroy the repair crews. You could keep an entire
rail line
shut down indefinitley by constant P-38 strikes against rail lines
remotely
located. And a single P-38 could cut a rail line and there would be
no need
to send in 56 B-26's against a marshalling yard, yet the results would
be
better and longer lasting with lower losses.. An example of long
lasting
results were the destruction of the Autobahn bridges many of which
were not
repaired until almost 1949. Also the bombing of dams which did
decrease power
production. And in europe power lines ran along side roads and over
bridges.
And bridges were a prime target of the mediums and when bridges and
road
crossings were hit, power lines were also destroyed. Power generating
stations
were almost always located in the middle of cities, so when BC hit a
city with
carpet bombing, those power sources were almost always knocked out.
One more
point in favor BC operations.
Arthur Kramer
Las Vegas NV
Michael Emrys
> I contend that if the bombing program had concentrated on the electric
> power system that it would have had a much more immediate and dramatic
> impact on Germany.
Somewhat astonishingly, it is only in the last year ago that I have come
across this argument. I look forward to hearing much more about it. In the
first discussion I came across, it was stated that the Allied air forces
neglected the German power grid for the simple reason that they
underestimated its vulnerability to aerial bombing. It was not explained how
this could be or who was responsible for the mistake. If true, it must be
counted as one of the major blunders of the war.
Michael
--
silen...@iflint.com
Phillips) wrote:
>The electic power system targets in Germany were very identifiable.
>All you had to do was follow the power lines to find them. A few
>well-placed bombs could have been much more effective than hundreds of
>thousands of tons of bombs on German civilians. The 105th and 109th
>Mosquito Squadrons demonstrated that the RAF could succeed with
>squadron sized precision bombing. Four five hundred pound bombs could
>shut down the Northeastern US. This is the load of one Mosquito. Can
>you imagine the outcome if the whole RAF and USAAF had concentrated
>on electric power system targets in Europe.
I think that people are begriming to consider the implications of
this, although I have yet to come across an authoritative source that
covers this issue.
Speer said in his book "Inside the Third Reich" that, because of the
way the power grid developed, german power generation tended to
primarily consist of small and medium sized power plants that provided
electricity to a locality rather than large centralized power plants
that supply power to a region.
I'm speculating here, but it may have been felt that to seriously
damage the power grid the number of target that would have to be
struck would be too numerous to be practicable.
Also, based on my personal experience of living in a city where lots
of heavy production was and still is taking place I find that most of
the large factories have their own power generation systems. So
damaging the power grid that supplies the city may not stop production
in the factories.
Another thought is that in the time frame of the second world war
manufacturing may have been less dependent on electricity than it is
now. While machinery is almost exclusively driven by electricity now,
it may have been a lot more common back then to have a steam power
plant in each individual factory. This steam engine would drive a
shaft that ran through the factory. The machines would draw their
power through a system of belts connected to the main shaft. If this
is the case, and again I'm speculating because while I know that this
sort of setup was used I don't know how common it was at that time,
then damaging the power grid would, again, not stop production in the
factories.
However, I must admit I have long thought about your ideas and would
be interested to see a definitive answer to the question. Logic does
seem to be on your side that electrical generation should have been
vulnerable and would have had a serious impact if it had been
successfully attacked.
Geoffrey Sinclair
<3a4ecfd6...@news.pacific.net.au>...
>I am retired with 38 years of experience in Electrical and Power
>System Engineering. I have been reading submissions to this newsgroup
>for more than five years relative to what Harris called "panacea
>targets" Apparently, the consensus is that the "oil plan" had, at the
>very least, a significant effect on the outcome of the war.
>
>I contend that if the bombing program had concentrated on the electric
>power system that it would have had a much more immediate and dramatic
>impact on Germany.
This is one of the alternative targets postulated instead of oil.
>With the current power system in the United States, a few conventional
>and incisive bombing attacks could totally shut down, for at least a
>short time, much of the United States electrical system. Our
>civilization stops when the lights go out. If the bombing continued
>on a more sustained basis, the system would irrecoverably collapse. It
>takes many months to repair or replace a large power transformer for
>example. This would totally stop industrial production in the US.
>There are alternatives to oil but not to electricity.
Oil is needed for aircraft and tanks, the main point for maximum
effect is to quickly create a significant shortfall of whatever is
considered the vital item.
>I admit that the current US power system is much more integrated than
>that which existed in Germany during the war and therefore that it is
>more unstable and sensitive to major disruption witness the 1965, 1977
>and other blackout incidents where no outside factors were involved.
>
>The electic power system targets in Germany were very identifiable.
>All you had to do was follow the power lines to find them. A few
>well-placed bombs could have been much more effective than hundreds of
>thousands of tons of bombs on German civilians. The 105th and 109th
>Mosquito Squadrons demonstrated that the RAF could succeed with
>squadron sized precision bombing. Four five hundred pound bombs could
>shut down the Northeastern US. This is the load of one Mosquito. Can
>you imagine the outcome if the whole RAF and USAAF had concentrated
>on electric power system targets in Europe.
Ellis in the book Brute Force gives the numbers.
8257 generating plants in Germany in 1939. As usual a few
plants supplied most of the power, slightly more than 100
supplying 56.3% of supply, and the 400 or so biggest
supplying 81.9% of supply, 79% of stations burnt coal, the
rest were water powered.
The grid was stretched by wartime demands and Ellis indicates
the Germans were unable to increase capacity during the war.
His words are "It was impossible either to build the plants,
redistribute or increase coal supplies, or build hydroelectric
facilities." People who have read the various plans to bomb
Germany tend to cringe when the word impossible appears,
much more is possible in an emergency.
The electricity industry appears as a possible target in both RAF
and USAAF plans.
A main advantage to attacking electricity is the inability to
store it, no ability for a reserve to cover a shortfall.
Transformers are vulnerable to blast effects and the USSBS
quotes a 1944 German document that concentrated attacks
on 30 transformer stations could "paralyse decisively the
German power grid". There were 4 factories producing
transformers.
So the above report looks good. The trouble is so did
other target types, on paper.
The problems with electricity would be firstly how vulnerable
the equipment proved to be, how much was repairable
after a strike, how much sandbagging and blast walls could
reduce the damage? How small were the targets, power
plants and transformers? The pylons would be reasonably
safe, like the radar aerials proved to be.
Secondly most of the 8,000 plants would be for the larger
factory complexes, so a large percentage of war industry
would be able to continue, as long as they could receive
the relevant raw materials.
Thirdly people were less dependant on electricity in
the 1940's, no wide spread refridgeration, gas lighting
and candles still within living memory, indeed still in
use in some areas. I doubt agriculture would be
affected by an electricity shortage, unlike a modern
farm with milking machines and so forth.
Fourthly how easy was it to either hook up to the French
etc grids or simply strip them of the vital components
and relocate them to Germany? The French economy
was very underused by the Germans. For that matter
how integrated was the German system, could enough
power from one region be sent to another?
Fifthly allied economic intelligence was much poorer than
military intelligence, there is the chance vital sites or
infrastructure suppliers would be missed, enabling some
recovery. Let alone knowing how effective the bombing
had been and when the plants were back in service.
Finally you have to know how much of the supply is
discretionary, what happens if all civilian supply is
discontinued for example? And how much power
does this give for vital plants? Speer claims reducing
supply to 40% of normal would have brought German
industry to a standstill.
The advantage with oil was if it worked then the allied
air forces would face a significant reduction in Luftwaffe
opposition making them more effective. Loss of
electricity would not have the same effect on combat
readiness as a lack of fuel for training.
I doubt a sustained attack on the electricity industry
could have started before mid 1944, the need to
suppress the Luftwaffe and the need to improve
night bombing accuracy in particular would stop
earlier efforts.
Even in 1944 the allied bombers could only heavily
suppress oil production, it took an even greater weight
of attack, capture of areas of the German economy by
the armies and a smaller target area in 1945 (Germany
alone) to eliminate production, and the transport plan
also hurt electricity production by stopping coal shipments.
Even in 1944/45 around 13% of the bombs aimed at the
Leuna plant hit, even though it was nearly 1.5 square miles
in size.
In late 1944 the allies had surveyed the results of the
strikes on French factories and transport targets, they had
a good idea of what was required to damage them and
how big the effects would be. The plan then was to
effectively switch to as near a pure transport target list
as possible, since transport paralysis leads to near
complete economic paralysis. It would have been possible
to wind down the oil strikes since the Germans could not
deliver the raw materials and transport away the products
created. The allied armies arrived during this to end the matter.
The Germans were able to work around a severe oil
shortage to continue to offer strong resistance. For a
shortage of electricity to have a greater effect than the
loss of oil we need to find something the Germans
needed, and that would have run out quickly if the
electricity supply was stopped. Something that would
have had a more profound effect than a lack of oil,
something reserves or rationing would not be able to
compenstate for. The question then becomes what
sections of German industry would have stopped with
electricity supplies, and how long before this would
feed into the plants which had their own supply.
One story I have is of a university that had a boiler room
to supply hot water to the campus, they found a small
turbine using what would be waste heat could generate
enough power for the campus, and even make a profit
selling back to the grid (mind you when a car hit a pole
or a small furry creature immolated itself and that section
of the city tried to draw all its power from the university
the results were not good).
Targetting electricity might have been more cost effective,
but, of course, we will never know for sure.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Kennedy
> Everything you say is true. However power facilites ar every easily
> and quickly repaired. In many cases overnight.
<snip>
> repaired until almost 1949. Also the bombing of dams which did
> decrease power
> production. And in europe power lines ran along side roads and over
> bridges.
> And bridges were a prime target of the mediums and when bridges and
> road
> crossings were hit, power lines were also destroyed. Power generating
> stations
> were almost always located in the middle of cities, so when BC hit a
> city with
> carpet bombing, those power sources were almost always knocked out.
> One more point in favor BC operations.
I think you really need to flatten a power generating station in order to
really have an effect on the electrical grid. I don't necessarily think
that carpet bombing a city will do that. Sure, you're going to hit the
plant, but a more concentrated effort to really destroy it would be more
useful. Since most of these types of plants are coal fired, maybe a
setting that pile of coal on fire would help delay getting the plant up and
running.
Still, these plants may be geared toward supplying the populace with power,
with the rest of the grid (and industry) as a side benefit. In order to
really disrupt industry, you need to target those plants who's capacity is
to suppy the electrical grid as a whole, and where important industries are
located. That may be difficult to identify.
Kennedy
--
-------------------- http://NewsReader.Com/ --------------------
Usenet for the Web
--
Rich Rostrom
>I contend that if the bombing program had concentrated on the electric
>power system that it would have had a much more immediate and dramatic
>impact on Germany.
Attacks were made on electric power system targets,
but the results were not decisive nor likely to prove
so.
First, the power stations were mostly small targets,
not easy to hit. A US B-17 mission was considered
successful if 50% of the bombs landed within 1,000
feet of the aiming point. Most power stations were
much smaller than 2,000 feat across. And US bombers
attacked by day, while British bombers attacked by
night with even less discrimination.
Second, while some elements of a power station are
vulnerable, others are heavy metal structures that
resist damage. Anything less than a direct hit might
not affect a generator, for instance.
Aircraft factories are big structures, with a lot
less steel and a lot more wood or light construction.
Oil refineries and synthetic-oil plans are highly
flammable. So these were more attractive targets.
Third, while a successful attack could cause some
temporary disruption of the electric power system,
the Germans could repair the damage, shift to
alternative energy forms (i.e. non-electric lighting),
build up dispersed back-up generators... The power
stations were not irreplaceable.
--
Never consume legumes before transacting whatsoever | Rich Rostrom
even in the outermost courtyard of a descendant of |
Timur the Terrible. | rrostrom@dummy
--- Avram Davidson, _Dr. Bhumbo Singh_ | 21stcentury.net
--
Brad Meyer
Phillips) wrote:
>I contend that if the bombing program had concentrated on the electric
>power system that it would have had a much more immediate and dramatic
>impact on Germany.
(snip of most excellent argument)
I think the one point against your argument is that Germany was not
"electrified" to anything like the US is today or even as it was in WW
II. Most people in those days, if they didn't live without electricity
at the time, they could remember when they did. Also, many fewer
industrial processes were "electrified" and many of those that were
were powered locally with single purpose equipment rather then off a
grid.
While I don't dispute any of the points you make, the above makes me
wonder if removing electricity would have been as effacious as
removing oil.
Brad Meyer
"It is history that teaches us to hope"
-- R E Lee
--
ferrante formato
"ArtKramr" <artk...@aol.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
>Power generating
> stations
> were almost always located in the middle of cities, so when BC hit a
> city with
> carpet bombing, those power sources were almost >always knocked out.
part of the urban area, has no factory at all.
Ferrante Formato
--
John Phillips
wrote:
>jhphi...@adelphia.net (John Phillips) wrote:
>
>
>Most power stations were
>much smaller than 2,000 feat across.
I am not sure where this statistic came from but 2,000' x 2,000' is
still a pretty sizable target. Day and low level bombing Mosquito
squadrons such as the RAF's 104th consistently hit much smaller
targets. Witness the destruction of the Gestapo headquarters building
in Oslo in 1942.
>
>Second, while some elements of a power station are
>vulnerable, others are heavy metal structures that
>resist damage. Anything less than a direct hit might
>not affect a generator, for instance.
I never suggested generators as a target. Transformer and switching
stations are very vulnerable to destruction. Tranformers and circuit
breakers are large oil tanks. The oil is an electrical insulating
fluid but it burns much more readilly than the crude oil in a refinery
especially when exposed to a high energy electical arc or short
circuit. All it takes is a puncture in the tank to cause an explosion
when the oil drains to a level to expose internal high voltage
components. The porcelain bushings on these devices are essentially
glass and can be fatally damaged with one swing of a small hammer. The
oil of course can ignite and the failures can cascade from one device
to the next. It takes in excess of six months to repair or construct a
large power tranformer.
>
>Oil refineries and synthetic-oil plans are highly
>flammable. So these were more attractive targets.
As I said, a transformer and/or swithching station is an oil farm.
They are easy to find from the air. If you are lost, follow the power
lines and bomb where they intersect.
>
>Third, while a successful attack could cause some
>temporary disruption of the electric power system,
>the Germans could repair the damage, shift to
>alternative energy forms (i.e. non-electric lighting),
>build up dispersed back-up generators... The power
>stations were not irreplaceable.
>--
The destruction of the substations discussed above would render the
transmission system inoperable and make any change in generation
patterns mute. The US has been trying to reduce its dependence on
foreign oil since 1974 with little success.
Is six months temporary? As I stated, the Northeastern US could
probably be severely disrupted if a select four substations were put
out of service. Since the German power system was more decentralized
and less interconnected, this number might rise to ten. Very few
manufacturing processes can proceed without electricity. With no
motors, lights, controls, or other equipment not much can happen
including transformer repair.
Regards,
John Phillips
--
John Phillips
wrote:
>jhphi...@adelphia.net (John Phillips) wrote:
>
>
>Most power stations were
>much smaller than 2,000 feat across.
I am not sure where this statistic came from but 2,000' x 2,000' is
still a pretty sizable target. Day and low level bombing Mosquito
squadrons such as the RAF's 104th consistently hit much smaller
targets. Witness the destruction of the Gestapo headquarters building
in Oslo in 1942.
>
>Second, while some elements of a power station are
>vulnerable, others are heavy metal structures that
>resist damage. Anything less than a direct hit might
>not affect a generator, for instance.
I never suggested generators as a target. Transformer and switching
stations are very vulnerable to destruction. Tranformers and circuit
breakers are large oil tanks. The oil is an electrical insulating
fluid but it burns much more readilly than the crude oil in a refinery
especially when exposed to a high energy electical arc or short
circuit. All it takes is a puncture in the tank to cause an explosion
when the oil drains to a level to expose internal high voltage
components. The porcelain bushings on these devices are essentially
glass and can be fatally damaged with one swing of a small hammer. The
oil of course can ignite and the failures can cascade from one device
to the next. It takes in excess of six months to repair or construct a
large power tranformer.
>
>Oil refineries and synthetic-oil plans are highly
>flammable. So these were more attractive targets.
As I said, a transformer and/or swithching station is an oil farm.
They are easy to find from the air. If you are lost, follow the power
lines and bomb where they intersect.
>
>Third, while a successful attack could cause some
>temporary disruption of the electric power system,
>the Germans could repair the damage, shift to
>alternative energy forms (i.e. non-electric lighting),
>build up dispersed back-up generators... The power
>stations were not irreplaceable.
>--
Martin Clements
This may be the case now, but it wasn't in the last war. For example,
Parnalls, makers of the Frazer-Nash turret used in Lancasters and
others, had a factory in Bristol less than half a mile from the
Cathedral (the sort of clearly-defined landmark often used by Bomber
Command as an aiming-point). Most city centres would have had a
mixture of shops, offices, homes and components factories, plus larger
factories, one of the main reasons being the fact that the transport
system acted as spokes to a hub, so workers could get into city
centres, but found it more difficult to get across them.
Whilst there was a "doughnut" effect, with some factories moving to the
edge of towns in the twenties and thirties, these factories became
surrounded by further residential growth, and so came to be within the
town or city, rather than on the edge of it. Finally, BC raided towns
with industrial or military significance, so city centres were not
always the aiming point - often particular suburbs and industrial areas
were the target with industrial premises as the aiming point - if they
were easily identifiable.
Whilst power stations (apart from substations) usually weren't in the
centre of cities, they were usually within the industrial areas which
were frequently the target of bombers.
Regards,
Martin Clements
--
Never argue with an idiot.They drag you down to their level, then beat
you with experience.
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
--
Nightjar
"Brad Meyer" <br...@ibm.net> wrote in message
news:92ie15$hv6$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> ....Also, many fewer
> industrial processes were "electrified" and many of those that were
> were powered locally with single purpose equipment rather then off a
> grid.
In one of the Berlin museums is a reconstruction of a machine workshop of
around that era. It is very similar to the description my father gave me of
the British workshop he was trained in shortly before WW2. All the machines
were powered by flat belt drives from overhead drive shafts which were, in
turn, powered by a free-standing steam engine at the end of the workshop. In
my father's case, the only use made of electricity was 40 watt incandescent
light bulbs at each work station and those could only be turned on after
dusk.
My father's workshop also had some treadle operated metal turning lathes. On
those the metal parts would be turned using hand held tools only, resting on
a T shaped tool rest, much as many woodworkers do today. I am not as good as
he was at that technique. However, I can take a 5/8" bar down to 0.2"
diameter, getting the diameter right to within +0.01" and the turned part
parallel to within 0.002" over 3/4" before I need to start measuring. You do
not need a lot of sophisticated equipment to make precision parts.
Colin Bignell