Japan, US, Russians
Marlock
First of all, are all of you communicating on the thread Americans
(and/or British)?
I have a few questions:
1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
air?
1a. How long do you think that the "will" to fight to the bitter
end would survive then.
1b. How much damage could the sorrounded Japan do to anyone?
1c. How much Japanese troops were still active in China and elsewhere on
on Asian mailand? And how much potential did they have for
furhter survival againt Russian, Chinese, British and American
combined efforts?
2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
down at the end of the war?
Was there a same kind of a competition over Japan as over Germany?
(how will enter first, race for Berlin)
Could it be that since Russian scored the mortal struck over Germans,
that the US desperately wanted to be the winner of the Pacific war?
(even though the D-Day and further operations were mainly
successful, the main strugle was on the East)
(additionaly, how much do the bombs have to do with simple REVENGER
over Pearl Harbour)
(keep in mind that the attack could have been prevented, or minimized
if the intelligence gathered was taken seriously, but this really
is of no importance for the discussion, what is important is that
Japanese gave no warning, so perhaps the US decided to give no
warning as well regarding the nuclear power).
3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
knew what it would do, depsite the tests in the desert).
4. If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
the Japan)?
I rembember reading (I will remember the source) that the Russian
armies pretty much gave the final death punch to the Japanese
might before the bombs were dropped. Somebody here mentioned a
number of 670.000 Japanese soldiers surrendering to the Russians.
--
oNe buTTon keyBOARd To RuLe tHeM All
Lloyd Olson
news:PM00047A5...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> This is a continuation of the previous thread.
>
> First of all, are all of you communicating on the thread Americans
> (and/or British)?
American.
>
> I have a few questions:
>
> 1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
> What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
> air?
If you mean blockade, that would have dragged on forever. The young and old
Japanese starving would be the most effected.
>
> 1a. How long do you think that the "will" to fight to the bitter
> end would survive then.
Long enough, after the second A bomb, the war cabinet was going to continue.
> 1b. How much damage could the sorrounded Japan do to anyone?
Since most of their armies were not in Japan, and the mini subs they were
making in great numbers, I think they could have inflicted considerable
damage.
>
>
> 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> down at the end of the war?
Insignificant since they declared war late in it, at a time decided on
earlier by Churchill, Rosevelt, and Stalin.
> Was there a same kind of a competition over Japan as over Germany?
> (how will enter first, race for Berlin)
Wasn't a race. Churchill, Rosevelt, and Stalin I believe agreed on this
plan, so they didn't have three armies shooting at each other over one city.
> Could it be that since Russian scored the mortal struck over Germans,
> that the US desperately wanted to be the winner of the Pacific war?
No.
> (additionaly, how much do the bombs have to do with simple REVENGER
> over Pearl Harbour)
None. We were geared up and heading towards Japan with a fairly large war
machine.
>
> 3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
> targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
> knew what it would do, depsite the tests in the desert).
Tokyo.
>
>
> I rembember reading (I will remember the source) that the Russian
> armies pretty much gave the final death punch to the Japanese
> might before the bombs were dropped. Somebody here mentioned a
> number of 670.000 Japanese soldiers surrendering to the Russians.
>
Russia hadn't really entered the war with Japan yet. The Japanese that
surrendered to them, were ordered to. Probably because the Russians were the
closest to surrender to.
Marlock
>> 1b. How much damage could the sorrounded Japan do to anyone?
>
> Since most of their armies were not in Japan, and the mini subs they were
> making in great numbers, I think they could have inflicted considerable
> damage.
>
Can u please give some data about the the armies outside of Japan.
What was their source of logistical support? Were they connected?
Were the Allied forces aware of the sights were the mini subs were
being produced?
>> 3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
>> targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
>> knew what it would do, depsite the tests in the desert).
>
> Tokyo.
Was that also a vital military target?
Don Phillipson
news:PM00047A5...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> First of all, are all of you communicating on the thread Americans
> (and/or British)?
British/Canadian
> I have a few questions:
>
> 1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
> What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from air?
Chiefly casualties (as mentioned in previous posts):
-- Continuing US military casualties (kamikaze attacks on US
fleets at Okinawa etc.)
-- Continuing British military casualties (Burma/Malaya)
-- Chinese casualties (civilian as well as military)
Cf. also orders to Japanese forces (in Thailand, Malaya etc.) to
murder PoWs rather than let them be liberated by advancing Allies.
> 1a. How long do you think that the "will" to fight to the bitter
> end would survive then.
See narratives of Japanese cabinet discussions of surrender
in August 1945. Several leading figures (e.g. War Minister
Anami) literally proposed that the whole Japanese population
should be armed (with spears if necessary) and die fighting.
> 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> down at the end of the war?
Small, in practice, since the atomic bombs precipitated total
surrender. But the USSR had earlier offered to go to war
against Japan three months after VE Day, so this was a cheap
way for Stalin to demonstrate willingness to co-operate with
the USA and UK.
> Was there a same kind of a competition over Japan as over Germany?
> (how will enter first, race for Berlin)
There was no "race for Berlin." The Yalta Conference (Feb. 1945)
mapped postwar occupation zones in Germany (Russian, British and
American,) with 3-power control of the capitals (Berlin and Vienna).
Eisenhower (SHAEF) was unwilling to take casualties on ground
he would later have to leave, thus ordered Allied armies not to
advance beyond the zone boundaries (i.e. not to attempt to capture
Berlin, Leipzig, etc.)
> 3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
> targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
> knew what it would do, depsite the tests in the desert).
You have been misinformed . . .
1. There was only one test (of the Plutonium bomb, because no one
was sure this complicated mechanism would work, unlike the simpler
Uranium bomb.)
2. Top-level US planners debated in detail the various alternatives
(e.g. dropping the bomb on an uninhabited island, with or without
first advising the Japanese government). The Potsdam Declaration
threatened Japan with an (unidentified) new weapon unless Japan
surrendered. Planners decided the best use of the atomic bomb
was against a regular military target. (Five Japanese target cities
had been reserved for this purpose. Kyoto was also listed, but
removed from the list because of its cultural importance, and
remained off-limits for all US bombing.) Books have been written
about these decisions.
> If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
> where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
> was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
> the Japan)?
The League of Nations had no resources to provide military to help
(although asked, e.g. by Ethiopia 1937.) Japanese expansion
happened to resume at the depths of the Depression in the 1930s,
when no power had military resources to spare.
> I rembember reading (I will remember the source) that the Russian
> armies pretty much gave the final death punch to the Japanese
> might before the bombs were dropped.
The Russian theatre of war with Japan was along the
Russian border with Manchuria, where before Russia
declared war there was a big garrison but no fighting and
no casualties. By contrast Allied forces were heavily
engaged in SE Asia, the central Pacific Ocean and
many parts of China. There was no hint that Allied victories
in these distant places stimulated Japan to surrender or
even offer to negotiate an armistice. This was why US
bomber forces were reorganized in early 1945 to attack
the Japanese Home Islands and armies were prepared
to invade the Home Islands in late 1945 or early 1946, cf. #1 above.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Chris
> What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
> air?
Well, that had been the status quo for some time, with no observable
progress towards ending the war. The UN was not really any closer to
ending the war on August 5th than they were in April (after the
Cabinet reshuffling that brings Suzuki into the PM). How much more
time should the Japanese be given, especially given that every month
of delay kills many tens of thousands?
The UN knew, in fact, (because they were reading Japanese codes) that
the Japanese peace faction had started putting out feelers for peace.
The Japanese Ambassador in Moscow kept being ordered to try and get
the Soviets to intercede on behalf of Japan to end the war. He kept
sending back telegrams stating that Japan had no choice but to
surrender on the Allied terms, but Japan's foriegn minister, by far
the most dovish man on the War Council, seemed dead set on the plan of
the Soviet's forcing the US and Britain to settle for peace on
somewhat pro-Japanese terms. And the war council was divided, 3-3, on
whether they should pursue even that approach, with the other three
wanting to wait until after the Japanese had inflicted a major defeat
on the American-led invasion of Japan before they *started*
negotiations.
Hirohito, in May 1945, started advocating for peace on terms that were
completely unacceptable to the Allies: Japanese possession of all
territory as of 1937, Japanese trials of their own war criminals, etc.
And remember, he's Japan's notable dove!
> 1c. How much Japanese troops were still active in China and elsewhere on
> on Asian mailand? And how much potential did they have for
> furhter survival againt Russian, Chinese, British and American
> combined efforts?
Once the Soviets became involved they wiped the floor with the
Kwantung Army Group. This was something of a surprise, and only
possible because many of the best units of the KAG had withdrawn to
Japan to prepare for an invasion. But this was not clear beforehand.
The actual ability of the Japanese army in China hadn't really been
tested in such a long time that no one had a good handle on how strong
or effective they were. The Soviets knew that they had won a smashing
victory at Khalkin Gol back in 1939, but both sides armies had changed
dramatically since then.
> 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> down at the end of the war?
A role. From my study of the Japanese political process, it appears to
me that the critical point in the War Council meeting on the 14th of
August was Hirohito's intervention (with the setup by Suzuki). So, the
key question has to be, what was Hirohito thinking? What was affecting
his mind that day that caused his unprecedented intervention into the
meeting, pushing in favor of peace. (Recall that even after his
intervention there was a coup attempt that narrowly failed, but that's
another issue for another day.) Well, like all political figures, one
should examine his words. One should never put one's whole faith in a
politicians words, but they are often the best insight we have into
their thoughts. Hirohito gave a speech announcing Japan's surrender.
What does that speech say?
The speech as a whole is available here: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450814c.html
I will quote the key paragraphs here:
"But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best
that has been done by everyone-the gallant fighting of the military
and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of our servants of the
State and the devoted service of our 100,000,000 people-the war
situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while
the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.
Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the
power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll
of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only
result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese
nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human
civilization.
Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of our subjects,
or to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial
ancestors? This is the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of
the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers. "
Notice that the entire conventional aspect of the war, the Battle of
Midway, the submarine blockade, the firebombing of Tokyo, the defeat
of the Kwantung Army Group and everything else you want to mention, is
hidden inside the phrase 'the war situation has developed not
necessarily to Japan's advantage'. The USSR intervention (and the
defeat of her fellow Axis members Germany and Italy) gets a part of a
sentence: "the general trends of the world have all turned against her
interest." But the Atomic bomb gets two full sentences.
This suggests that the bomb was at least as important in Hirohito's
mind as the intervention of the USSR.
> Was there a same kind of a competition over Japan as over Germany?
> (how will enter first, race for Berlin)
Errr, you do know that the US deliberately turned down the 'race for
Berlin' and left it to the Soviets without any attempt to seize it,
right? This would not be a good argument that the US was in any sort
of competition with the Soviets, seeing as we have a clear cut case
where the US turned down a prestige prize that they had a decent
chance to grab, feeling that it was not worth the cost. (At one point
the US front line was closer to Berlin than the Soviet front line, but
the US halted at the Elbe rather than let any Americans die for land
that they would just be giving back to the Soviets. Churchill
disagreed, but this was Truman and Eisenhower's decision. And
Churchill played no part in the decision to drop the bomb, that was
purely Truman.)
> Could it be that since Russian scored the mortal struck over Germans,
> that the US desperately wanted to be the winner of the Pacific war?
One of Truman's main goals at the Potsdam Conference was to be sure
that the Soviets would enter the war, as promised, within three months
of the end of the European war: round about August 7th, 1945. The US
was very concerned that the Japanese government would flee to the
Asian mainland and that without a large army to defeat it they would
hold their for quite some time. This would seem to suggest that the
answer to your question is no.
Now, some people further down the chain might have been anxious to
pronounce TEH US R WINN3R!, but it doesn't seem to have entered
Truman's calculations, for the reasons I stated above. And Truman is
the man who ultimately authorized the drop: Truman said yes, so the
bomb was dropped. If Truman had said no, the bomb wouldn't be dropped.
No other man had the level of responsibility for the decision to
drop.
> (keep in mind that the attack could have been prevented, or minimized
> if the intelligence gathered was taken seriously, but this really
> is of no importance for the discussion, what is important is that
> Japanese gave no warning, so perhaps the US decided to give no
> warning as well regarding the nuclear power).
The US did give a warning. The Potsdam Declaration, among other
things, warned Japan that "The might that now converges on Japan is
immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting
Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the
method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our
military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and
complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as
inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland."
And ended with: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now
the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to
provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such
action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
That is a much stronger warning of what was to come than anything
related to Pearl Harbor.
Keep in mind that explicitly using the word 'nuclear' wouldn't have
been a big warning in July 1945. It was only after the war that
'nuclear' and 'radiation' became synonymous with 'death' and
'destruction.' It is claimed, though I'm not sure how much I believe
it, that the MIT Radiation Lab (a secret radar lab) was given that
name to suggest it was focused on harmless atomic research, rather
than cutting edge radar research in the run up to World War Two. But
it is a fact that there wouldn't really be a serious reaction to
warnings of 'uranium' the way there would be today. One of the things
that the world learned from Japan's experience.
> 4. If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
> where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
> was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
> the Japan)?
The US (and the nations that became the UN) was/were clearly unwilling
to *start* a war to protect China. But why should that affect their
willingness to *continue* a war already started to protect China? It
seems to me that the two are fundamentally different things, with
different levels of moral responsibility. It seems obvious to me that
starting a war, ensuring that many people will meet an early death and
causing grave destruction, is something that requires a great deal of
acceptance of the terrible moral burdens imposed. Continuing a war
already started does not impose nearly as many burdens of conscience.
So the moral burden of the sufferings of the Chinese might easily have
fit into that realm: not enough to start a war, but enough to continue
a war.
> I rembember reading (I will remember the source) that the Russian
> armies pretty much gave the final death punch to the Japanese
> might before the bombs were dropped.
Whatever source you read that in was wrong, because it's timelines are
off.
(Note: I think all dates are Europe/US, not Tokyo)
July 26th, 1945: Potsdam Declaration announced
July 28th, 1945: Japan replies, using the phrase
'Mokusatsu' (translated by the UN as 'treat with contempt': despite
the argument over the translation, it is certainly clear that it was
not an acceptable answer to the Potsdam Declaration, which was only
immediate unconditional surrender)
August 2nd, 1945: End of Potsdam Conference
August 6th, 1945: Little Boy destroys Hiroshima
August 8th, 1945: USSR declares war on Japan, invades
August 9th, 1945: Fat Man destroys Nagasaki
August 14th, 1945: The Imperial Rescript announcing Japan's surrender
is broadcast
This is all from memory, and one of those might be in Tokyo time, but
that is certainly the correct order of events. The first atomic bomb
was dropped *before* the Soviets entered the war. The second, the day
after, before it was obvious that the Japanese had no answer for
them.
Chris Manteuffel
Marlock
/cut
I appreciate the anwers and information!
Cheers!
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> This is a continuation of the previous thread.
> 1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
> What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
> air?
Obviously they didn't have to invade; Japan surrendered, though Okinawa
is part of Japan.
> 1a. How long do you think that the "will" to fight to the bitter
> end would survive then.
They can be pretty stubborn.
> 1b. How much damage could the sorrounded Japan do to anyone?
Forces stationed in Japan and SE Asia could do a lot of damabe.
> 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> down at the end of the war?
Negligible.
> Could it be that since Russian scored the mortal struck over Germans,
> that the US desperately wanted to be the winner of the Pacific war?
It could be that the US (and UK) bore the brunt of the fighting in the
Pacific so they already WERE the winner of the Pacific war.
> (additionaly, how much do the bombs have to do with simple REVENGER
> over Pearl Harbour)
None. They were originally developed to be dropped on Germany and Japan
was given the chance to surrender before the first was dropped.
> (keep in mind that the attack could have been prevented, or minimized
> if the intelligence gathered was taken seriously, but this really
> is of no importance for the discussion, what is important is that
It was taken seriously, and a full "warning of war" went out to ALL
commanders in the Pacific, before the PH attack.
> Japanese gave no warning, so perhaps the US decided to give no
> warning as well regarding the nuclear power).
The Japanese were warned, at Potsdam.
> 4. If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
> where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
> was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
> the Japan)?
Hunh? Sorry, makes no sense.
> I rembember reading (I will remember the source) that the Russian
> armies pretty much gave the final death punch to the Japanese
> might before the bombs were dropped.
Then you read wrong; the first bomb was dropped prior to the Russian
entry.
> Somebody here mentioned a
> number of 670.000 Japanese soldiers surrendering to the Russians.
And millions surrendered to the US.
Mike
Marlock
/cut
Thank You Chris! The best and most informative posting since the
disussion started.
Thanks for the effort!
Miso.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> The UN knew, in fact, (because they were reading Japanese codes) that
> the Japanese peace faction had started putting out feelers for peace.
Actually, they were making efforts to obtain Soviet help on their
behalf, but had no actual plan to put forward; whether peace terms,
acting as an intermediary, or whatever.
> Hirohito, in May 1945, started advocating for peace on terms that were
> completely unacceptable to the Allies: Japanese possession of all
> territory as of 1937, Japanese trials of their own war criminals, etc.
> And remember, he's Japan's notable dove!
No, Hirohito did nothing of the sort; it wasn't his role to do so. These
were possibilities discussed by various Cabinet members, and were of a
"if worse comes to worst" variety.
> > 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> > down at the end of the war?
> A role. From my study of the Japanese political process, it appears to
> me that the critical point in the War Council meeting on the 14th of
> August was Hirohito's intervention (with the setup by Suzuki). So, the
> key question has to be, what was Hirohito thinking? What was affecting
> his mind that day that caused his unprecedented intervention into the
> meeting, pushing in favor of peace.
Actually, Suzuki approached Kido, who approached Hirohito about it prior
to the Cabinet meeting. At the meeting, Suzuki then asked Hirohito
directly for a decision.
Mike
Marlock
/cut
Fair enough. Thanks Mike for all the patience and effort
in replying to my questions.
I really appriciate ur input and perspective, and agree with 95%
of it!
Best,
Miso.
David H Thornley
> First of all, are all of you communicating on the thread Americans
> (and/or British)?
>
> 1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
> What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
> air?
>
Except that we didn't invade the Japanese Home Islands, although
we were preparing to. We surrounded them, destroyed their economy,
and bombed them. Eventually, they surrendered.
It's anybody's guess as to how long they would have continued
to resist without the nukes.
> 1a. How long do you think that the "will" to fight to the bitter
> end would survive then.
There was no obvious slackening while we were doing this.
> 1b. How much damage could the sorrounded Japan do to anyone?
The Japanese on the Home Islands could starve, and were in the
process. In the meantime, they were hitting the USN with the
occasional kamikaze, and causing a steady loss of ships.
> 1c. How much Japanese troops were still active in China and elsewhere on
> on Asian mailand?
Lots. There were about a million and a half in Manchuria and Korea
at the start of the Soviet offensive in 1945. There were a lot
more in China and other areas.
And how much potential did they have for
> furhter survival againt Russian, Chinese, British and American
> combined efforts?
>
For how long? They occupied China, Indochina, Malaya, and large
parts of the Dutch East Indies at the time of surrender, and
were causing death and disruption to an awful lot of people.
My guess is that, if surrender were delayed two months, the
excess deaths in Japanese-occupied territories would definitely
have exceeded those in the nuclear bombings. There was no way
Allied military action could have changed this. The British
were preparing an attack into Malaya, which would have taken
some time. The US and other allies were attacking in the Dutch
East Indies, but I don't know when they would have hit Java.
China was far too large to be liberated at all fast.
The Japanese never did have what it took to stand up against
the much more heavily armed Western divisions in open battle,
but they could have held onto a lot of territory for a long time.
> 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> down at the end of the war?
Unknown. We don't know what went on in the minds of the Emperor,
Privy Seal, and Liaison Council. The general war situation was
probably important, but the nuclear weapons seem to have been
more decisive.
This is speculation, but I find it reasonable: the Japanese
government wasn't going to surrender against conventional force,
and the nuclear weapons provided a sort of excuse to do the intelligent
thing. Feel free to speculate about the Soviet offensive.
> Was there a same kind of a competition over Japan as over Germany?
> (how will enter first, race for Berlin)
There wasn't much of a race in Germany. Eisenhower wanted to
occupy the lands allotted to the Western Allies, not trusting the
Soviets to keep to their word, and wasn't really interested in
going beyond the Yalta demarcation line. He could have made
a race for Berlin, but thought that since it was going to be in
the Soviet area that he'd let the Soviets take the casualties (and
the Soviet casualties in taking Berlin were not much less than the
US casualties for the war).
I don't know that the US was racing in Japan, but the Soviets might
well have been. They took Manchuria and the southern half of
Sakhalin, invaded in the Kuriles (and botched the job), and
prepared to invade Hokkaido, the northernmost of the Japanese
home islands.
> Could it be that since Russian scored the mortal struck over Germans,
> that the US desperately wanted to be the winner of the Pacific war?
> (even though the D-Day and further operations were mainly
> successful, the main strugle was on the East)
The US had won the Pacific war. All that was left to do was to make
Japan surrender.
Also, you're projecting attitudes backwards. In 1945, the general
US opinion wasn't that the Soviet Union had defeated Germany, although
it was known that the Soviets did quite a bit. There weren't any
good reasonably popular histories. Heck, it wasn't until 1969 or so
that Seaton published "The Russo-German War", which was the first
history I ran into that had some clue as to the Soviet point of view
(and I was haunting the libraries for military history books at that
time).
> (additionaly, how much do the bombs have to do with simple REVENGER
> over Pearl Harbour)
Aside from the fact that the US decided on defeating Japan on December
7, 1941, nothing much.
> (keep in mind that the attack could have been prevented, or minimized
> if the intelligence gathered was taken seriously, but this really
> is of no importance for the discussion, what is important is that
> Japanese gave no warning, so perhaps the US decided to give no
> warning as well regarding the nuclear power).
>
There wasn't enough air power in the Hawaiian Islands to stop the
Japanese attack, although it obviously could have been reduced.
The intelligence gathered was in general taken seriously, but there
was no organization tasked with putting the pieces together.
A modern intelligence agency, like the one the Secretary of War
set up in January 1942 in reaction to Pearl Harbor, would have
put the pieces together. At which point General Short, the Army
commander in Hawaii, would doubtless have done the wrong thing, but
that's another story.
> 3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
> targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
> knew what it would do, depsite the tests in the desert).
>
The US had a pretty good idea what would happen. Note that Japanese
cities were built much differently from Western cities, and so dropping
a nuke on a Japanese city wouldn't give the US all that much
useful information.
> 4. If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
> where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
> was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
> the Japan)?
>
Hoping for continued peace. By 1937, the League was pretty well
dead, and that was obvious, given its reaction to the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia
in 1935.
Frankly, the Western powers didn't take all that much care to save
Chinese people, and were unwilling to take any care to save Japanese.
> I rembember reading (I will remember the source) that the Russian
> armies pretty much gave the final death punch to the Japanese
> might before the bombs were dropped. Somebody here mentioned a
> number of 670.000 Japanese soldiers surrendering to the Russians.
>
The Soviets certainly destroyed the Kwantung Army, but that
was hardly the only large Japanese force abroad. The US wiped
out the Japanese navy, after all, and that was even more important.
The British inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese in Burma.
The Soviet attack was important, constituting the single greatest
land defeat the Japanese ever suffered, but the land war was never
decisive, and the Japanese had other armies elsewhere.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
WaltBJ
> This is a continuation of the previous thread.
>
> First of all, are all of you communicating on the thread Americans
> (and/or British)?
>
> I have a few questions:
>
> 1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
> What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
> air?
First, why are you asking us? There are any number of books in the
libraries you can read and figure out for yourself.
Obviously you have not done so.
If all you want is to have us refute your statements - so you can re-
refute ours - forget it.
Walt BJ
Rich Rostrom
> This is a continuation of the previous thread.
>
> First of all, are all of you communicating on the thread Americans
> (and/or British)?
I am an American.
Who (or what) are YOU?
>
> I have a few questions:
>
> 1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
> What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
> air?
It is not clear that it _was_ necessary
to invade Japan. On the other hand, the
Japanese state was controlled by fanatic
militarists who were prepared to see the
entire population perish rather than
surrender. Many of these men were also
war criminals who faced execution for
their crimes if they were captured.
Thus there was no sure way of ending
Japan's war except by conquering Japan.
> 1a. How long do you think that the "will" to fight to the bitter
> end would survive then.
It's not clear. One point often overlooked
is that the militarists had persuaded
themselves that the "weak", "soft" Americans
could be shocked into negotiating peace by
heavy casualties. By 1945, the only way
Japanese forces could inflict such casualties
was if Americans landed in Japan. The
Japanese army (never really effective) was
almost helpless by this time (no vehicles,
no fuel, crappy guns, little ammo) but the
militarists pinned their faith on superior
willpower. They would conscript the whole
population, even women and children, for
great banzai charges, most armed with
primitive weapons, such as spears. Millions
would die, but by sheer disregard for their
own lives, they would kill many Americans
and the shock would make the U.S. back off.
If the U.S. didn't invade, the Japanese
would have no way to reach them.
> 1b. How much damage could the surrounded Japan do to anyone?
Japan could still harass its neighbors,
and kamikaze aircraft and suicide boats
could sink or damage blockading ships.
In addition, Japan held hundreds of
thousands of Allied prisoners who
could be murdered. (Not all in Japan
itself.)
> 1c. How much Japanese troops were still active in China and elsewhere on
> on Asian mainland?
There were on the order of 2M Japanese
troops still in the field in various
places outside Japan. The largest number
was in mainland Asia - in Manchuria,
China, Indochina, Thailand, and Malaya.
Also, Japanese garrisons still held most
of the Netherlands East Indies and British
North Borneo. There were isolated Japanese
garrisons on many Pacific islands, such as
at Rabaul.
In addition, there were tens of thousands
of Japanese "holdouts" in the jungles of
the Philippines and New Guinea, and even
on some liberated islands. These men were
a continuing threat to Allied soldiers
and civilians - they sometimes came out
and raided Allied positions.
> And how much potential did they have for
> furhter survival againt Russian, Chinese, British and American
> combined efforts?
None of these Japanese garrisons was going
to win any battles to speak of. On the other
hand, they still had guns, ammo, and shovels
to dig bunkers. Cleaning them out of all the
places they infested would be long and bloody.
Furthermore, they inflicted much suffering
on the civilian populations under their control.
It is probable that thousands of people died
every day.
> 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> down at the end of the war?
Japan was completely defeated before the Soviets
fired a shot.
> Was there a same kind of a competition over Japan as over Germany?
> (how will enter first, race for Berlin)
No. The USSR had no interest or hope of invading
Japan, except perhaps with U.S. assistance.
> Could it be that since Russian scored the mortal struck over Germans,
That's an opinion.
> that the US desperately wanted to be the winner of the Pacific war?
No.
> (even though the D-Day and further operations were mainly
> successful, the main strugle was on the East)
The main land war. But the air war was mainly
in the west, the sea war was mainly in the
west, the Soviets were not even in the war
till almost two years in (unlike Britain).
> (additionaly, how much do the bombs have to do with simple REVENGER
> over Pearl Harbour)
Nothing.
> (keep in mind that the attack could have been prevented, or minimized
> if the intelligence gathered was taken seriously...)
The possible ability of the U.S. to thwart
Japan's planned action does not reduce
Japan's culpability, nor should it diminish
U.S. anger.
> so perhaps the US decided to give no
> warning as well regarding the nuclear power).
The U.S. did in fact warn Japan that if Japan
did not surrender, weapons of unprecedented
destructive power would be used against her.
Warnings were also issued to the residents of
target cities. (Though of military necessity,
these warnings were general, not giving dates
or specific targets.)
> 3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
> targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
> knew what it would do, depsite the tests in the desert).
The U.S. already knew that the Bomb was
enormously powerful. TRINITY proved that.
Effects on actual targets could be predicted
from TRINITY and from other tests on structures,
vehicles, underground installations...
> 4. If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
> where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
> was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
> the Japan)?
ISTR that Japan was expelled from the League.
But the League had no power to do anything
concrete about a country's aggression. The
U.S. objected, but Japan ignored that too.
What was the U.S. supposed to do, declare
war? We had no army to speak of anyway.
When Japan's barbarous actions became
sufficiently obvious and offensive, the U.S.
acted by refusing to sell Japan more oil,
and by inducing other exporters to refuse
also. This of course led to Japan's attacking
the U.S.
> I rembember reading (I will remember the source) that the Russian
> armies pretty much gave the final death punch to the Japanese
> might before the bombs were dropped.
The USSR declared war on Japan on 8/8/1945,
two days _after_ the Hiroshima bomb. They
invaded Manchuria on 8/9, the same day as
the Nagasaki bomb. Japan surrendered on 8/14.
Before this time, the U.S., Britain, and
the Commonwealth/Empire had annihilated
Japan's navy, crushed Japan's airforce,
sunk nearly all of Japan's merchant fleet
(essential to an island nation), bombed
most of Japan's cities into flaming rubble,
and inflicteed numerous crushing defeats
on the Japanese army, including successive
captures of heavily defended island fortresses,
and the destruction of large field armies
in the Phillipines and Burma.
> Somebody here mentioned a
> number of 670.000 Japanese soldiers
> surrendering to the Russians.
Yes, because the Japanese government
had announced the surrender of Japan
to the Allies. Something like 1.5
_million_ Japanese soldiers surrendered
to the U.S, Britain, Australia, an
China, in China, SE Asia, and the
Pacific.
Michele
news:PM00047A5...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> This is a continuation of the previous thread.
>
> First of all, are all of you communicating on the thread Americans
> (and/or British)?
>
Obviously, that is not important at all. With a few well-known exceptions,
most everybody around here is interested in a better knowledge and
understanding of the topic at hand, and his/her nationality is irrelevant.
If you really feel you need to know, OTOH, I have no reason to hide my
nationality, and I'm Italian.
> I have a few questions:
>
> 1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
> What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
> air?
>
What was wrong is that it would have taken more time. More time means
hundreds of thousands of Chinese casualties on the mainland, tens of
thousands of murders among the Allied POWs in areas still under Japanese
control, and probably civilian casualties in the order of millions among the
Japanese in the home islands.
Because what you are calling for is not "sanctions", it is a blockade. A
blockade would have meant widespread starvation. You obviously do not know
that in 1945, the weaker Japanese civilians, say those weakened by
illnesses, were already dying by a combination of their illness and
malnutrition. By the summer, it was not uncommon for the elderly citizens to
deliberately choose death by starvation, in order to let the younger members
of their families have something more to eat. A tight ring of a blockade
around Japan would have meant nothing short of a catastrophic famine.
Besides, you still have not addressed the issue of hitting "military forces"
or "military objectives" _without_ hitting the cities they were deployed in
and built into. You have not addressed it because you can not. In other
words, the destruction of military forces would have implied the continued
bombing of cities, adding to the civilian death toll.
Given such a situation for an additional three months, I would not rule out
epidemics.
All that said, frankly the US decision makers weren't moved about Japanese
casualties at all, be they civilian or military. And I have no idea whether
they were worried about Chinese casualties. But they were certainly worried
about their own troops' casualties, and even the blockade you propose, as
opposed to an invasion, would have meant a steady rate of naval losses to
kamikazes and perfectly pointless massacres of Western POWs by the Japanese.
Plus, the British were staging an offensive in Burma, and they would have
taken casualties there. Nothing of that was necessary when one had the
bombs.
> 1a. How long do you think that the "will" to fight to the bitter
> end would survive then.
A lot. We can't know for sure, but what we do know is that half of the
decision makers were against surrendering _after the second A-bomb_. Got
that?
> 1b. How much damage could the sorrounded Japan do to anyone?
A lot. There were enormous swaths of Chinese and Manchukuo territory still
under Japanese control, plus assorted islands here and there, plus of course
the wretched Korean vassals. As you have been told, though you try very hard
to ignore it, tens of thousands of Chinese civilians were dying per month,
under the Japanese occupation.
> 1c. How much Japanese troops were still active in China and elsewhere on
> on Asian mailand?
A lot. In the order of millions.
And how much potential did they have for
> furhter survival againt Russian, Chinese, British and American
> combined efforts?
>
Not a lot. By which, I mean they would lose - eventually, at a very high
cost to themselves and to the attackers and to the Chinese civilians these
battles would take place around.
> 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> down at the end of the war?
A contribution. Not so much on the ground, but rather because it meant that
the negotiations with the Soviets - often incorrectly referred to as "peace
feelers" by the Japanese "through" the Soviets - were shown to be a waste of
time and hope. Now there was not even that hope.
> Was there a same kind of a competition over Japan as over Germany?
> (how will enter first, race for Berlin)
No. The Soviets obviously wanted to lay claim to territory, say Southern
Sakhalin and border areas on the mainland, but that has nothing to do with
the home Japanese islands.
> Could it be that since Russian scored the mortal struck over Germans,
> that the US desperately wanted to be the winner of the Pacific war?
> (even though the D-Day and further operations were mainly
> successful, the main strugle was on the East)
No.
> (additionaly, how much do the bombs have to do with simple REVENGER
> over Pearl Harbour)
> (keep in mind that the attack could have been prevented, or minimized
> if the intelligence gathered was taken seriously, but this really
> is of no importance for the discussion, what is important is that
> Japanese gave no warning, so perhaps the US decided to give no
> warning as well regarding the nuclear power).
>
No more than the rest of the war. Note that the A-bombs had been developed
in a supposed race with Nazi scientists and with a mind to use them in
Europe. So, if at all possible, even _less_ than the rest of the war against
Japan.
> 3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
> targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
> knew what it would do, depsite the tests in the desert).
>
Another city. Alternatives were considered and ruled out as militarily
insignificant and not providing any certainty of really impressing the
Japanese (and given that half of the War Cabinet was not impressed enough by
the second bomb on a city, that assessment was certainly correct).
One of the many things you seem to be ignoring is that it's not as if the
USA had a hundred bombs, so that they could drop a handful on isolated
atolls, and then escalate if (when) that had not worked.
> 4. If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
> where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
> was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
> the Japan)?
>
They were there wringing their hands. They tried very hard using diplomatic
means, then diplomatic negotiations coupled with economic pressure, then the
same coupled with overt sanctions. Nothing doing.
Anyway, the reference to the League of Nations is irrelevant when one thinks
about the US behavior.
Besides, you seem to think that the mention of Chinese civilian casualties
in the summer of 1945, which you were utterly unaware of, was made by
several posters here as a reference to a motivation for the US decision to
drop the bombs.
It was not, and nobody here claimed it was.
The reason why it was mentioned is that you took the stock position of
considering the bombs a horrible unjustified deed. It wasn't the US decision
makers who took in consideration, at the time, the Chinese civilian
casualties. It's _you_ who should take them in consideration, now.
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:PM00047A5...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
>
> First of all, are all of you communicating on the thread Americans
> (and/or British)?
Why does this matter? What nationality do you claim to be?
> I have a few questions:
>
> 1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
Because the Japanese Government was making it clear that was the
price of a Japanese surrender.
The Japanese strategy had always been to win the one decisive
battle that would force the enemy to negotiate. Originally it was
winning early and expanding the Empire, by 1945 it was winning
to stop the enemy occupying Japan.
> What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
> air?
The hundreds of thousands of lives lost by the war dragging on for
a longer period, particularly in China but also in Japan from
starvation and allied attacks.
>From the allied point of view in 1945 the continued cost in
men and material to enforce the blockade. Think of what
people could have been using steel and chemicals for in
1945 instead of making weapons and munitions.
> 1a. How long do you think that the "will" to fight to the bitter
> end would survive then.
A very long time given the attitudes displayed at Saipan and Okinawa.
People killing themselves and their children rather than allow the
barbarians to rule them. Better dead than red was a cold war slogan,
better dead than US was something many Japanese truly believed.
Japan as a race (Or in modern terms as a culture) would be destroyed
if it were ever successfully invaded and so it was not worth living beyond
the destruction. After all only the Japanese had a living God in charge
of the place, want to be thrown out of paradise? Life would not be
worth living.
Seen how the Japanese of the time treated other races, including the
Ainu? That was part of the template of how surviving Japanese
thought they would be treated.
> 1b. How much damage could the sorrounded Japan do to anyone?
They controlled lots of territory and were doing considerable damage,
the IJA had always acted as locusts, the fewer supplies from Japan the
more they took from the local area. The areas around Indonesia also
had good fuel supplies.
You are aware of the rice offensives in China? Attack an area, grab
the rice harvest, leave and the starving population becomes someone
else's problem?
> 1c. How much Japanese troops were still active in China and elsewhere on
> on Asian mailand? And how much potential did they have for
> furhter survival againt Russian, Chinese, British and American
> combined efforts?
See below.
Not much ability to really hurt anyone except the Chinese and the
citizens of territory the IJA still controlled. Until the mass Kamikazes
reappeared to defend against an invasion of Japan.
> 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> down at the end of the war?
It must be considered a factor but the reality is in the deliberations
about what to do for much of 1945 the "big six" stayed deadlocked
at 3 to 3, even after the Soviet declaration of war and the second
nuclear attack, only the Emperor changed his vote, from abstain to
peace and in his speech the bomb is highlighted.
> Was there a same kind of a competition over Japan as over Germany?
> (how will enter first, race for Berlin)
There was no competition over Germany, occupation zones had
been agreed well in advance. Eisenhower could have tried for
Berlin, Churchill wanted it, but decided to minimise his casualties
and ensure the western allies occupation zones were under his
control before doing further advances.
Note in March 1945 the western allies were coming from the
Rhine and their supply lines were being stretched, the Red Army
was starting much closer to Berlin.
> Could it be that since Russian scored the mortal struck over Germans,
> that the US desperately wanted to be the winner of the Pacific war?
In 1945 the idea was the Soviets had been part of an alliance, not
the dominant part of the alliance. The Soviets were responsible for
largely defeating the German Army, a considerable accomplishment,
the western allies had largely defeated the German Navy and Air Force.
No one was in any doubt the US had been responsible for the majority
of Japan's losses.
> (even though the D-Day and further operations were mainly
> successful, the main strugle was on the East)
You seem to forget the Germans had a navy and air force, as did the
Italians.
> (additionaly, how much do the bombs have to do with simple REVENGER
> over Pearl Harbour)
None. It was a new weapon that was tried as a way of forcing a
Japanese surrender.
> (keep in mind that the attack could have been prevented, or minimized
> if the intelligence gathered was taken seriously, but this really
> is of no importance for the discussion, what is important is that
> Japanese gave no warning, so perhaps the US decided to give no
> warning as well regarding the nuclear power).
The attack could not have been prevented based on the intelligence
the US knew at the time.
The simplest way of reducing the losses would have been to install
torpedo nets, rather than decide they were not worth it. Next
comes abandoning the idea of acts of mass sabotage as the most
likely form of attack.
I presume you have read The Magic Background to Pearl
Harbor, it includes a mixture of intercepted Japanese diplomatic
cables, phone calls and US state department reports.
The Japanese were expected to take a strong interest in Pearl
Harbor. They were also known to be incapable of mounting a
large attack on the base since their carriers lacked the range and
the IJN did not know how to refuel at sea. As it turned out three
carries carried extra fuel as cargo (bad move in bad weather) 2
carriers participated as part of their advanced training and they
all learned enough to do basic refuelling at sea.
The IJN was also expected to either hold the carriers in reserve
against any US moves or to provide air cover for any invasions
in South East Asia. In basic accordance with its long established
doctrine of staying in the Western Pacific. The news of the radical
recast of IJN strategy, from strategic defence to attack, made by
Yamamoto, had yet to reach the US.
The message usually cited as a give away is the one that asks
for details of where in the harbour the ships were moored.
Consider ships in unusual positions indicates unusual activities.
That the information could also be used for sabotage. It was
only AFTER the attack the message was tagged with the title
"Bomb Plot" and even that is wrong, a bomb plot is where the
bombs landed, not what areas to attack.
On another note the Bomb Plot message gave a way to reduce
the size of messages sent to Japan, and therefore their cost. An
important point given the freezing of finances.
> 3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
> targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
> knew what it would do, depsite the tests in the desert).
In Japan, given the idea was to devastate an area of importance
to the enemy war economy. The Trinity test gave a good idea
on the expected area of destruction.
There is having the weapon and then demonstrating you are
willing to use it.
> 4. If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
> where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
> was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
> the Japan)?
They were largely supporting the Chinese case, and deciding how much
aid to give China or withdraw from Japan. Whether verbal, financial,
trade or military.
You seem to think at least the US was out to attack Japan but now
question why there was no immediate attack on Japan as soon
as Japan attacked China.
Remember there had been a whole series of China Japan clashes
over the past 40 or so years, all had been resolved, why would the
latest one be any different?
> I rembember reading (I will remember the source) that the Russian
> armies pretty much gave the final death punch to the Japanese
> might before the bombs were dropped. Somebody here mentioned a
> number of 670.000 Japanese soldiers surrendering to the Russians.
The port war repatriation of Japanese military and civilians from parts
of Asia was one of the biggest movements of people ever.
As for the Soviet Union it largely destroyed the IJA forces in
Manchuria, once they were the best of the IJA by 1945 they were
largely new, poorly trained troops.
According to the UK official history as of mid June 1945 the IJA
had 53 infantry and 2 armoured divisions on the 3 southern main
Japanese islands, 5 infantry divisions on Hokkaido and islands north,
7 infantry divisions in Korea, 12 in Manchuria, 7 infantry and 1
armoured divisions in North China, 23 infantry divisions in the
rest of China, what was left of 5 divisions in the Central Pacific,
3 divisions in the Ryuku islands, basically Okinawa, 5 divisions
on Formosa, some 26 infantry and 1 armoured divisions in the
Pacific islands, Malaya and Indonesia, many understrength, 3
weak infantry divisions in Indo China, 2 weak infantry divisions
in Thailand, and what was left of 9 reinforced divisions in Burma.
Nominally 160 infantry and 4 armoured divisions.
So no, the USSR did not destroy the Japanese army, or inflict
its death punch, let alone Japanese might, which includes air and
sea power.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Marlock
> Who (or what) are YOU?
Croatian (I already stated this before).
> Before this time, the U.S., Britain, and
> the Commonwealth/Empire had annihilated
> Japan's navy, crushed Japan's airforce,
> sunk nearly all of Japan's merchant fleet
> (essential to an island nation), bombed
> most of Japan's cities into flaming rubble,
> and inflicteed numerous crushing defeats
> on the Japanese army, including successive
> captures of heavily defended island fortresses,
> and the destruction of large field armies
> in the Phillipines and Burma.
This part here contradicts the first part of yout post, where
u are saying that the Japanese army and navy still caused a
great threat to everyone.
Marlock
> My guess is that, if surrender were delayed two months, the
> excess deaths in Japanese-occupied territories would definitely
> have exceeded those in the nuclear bombings. There was no way
> Allied military action could have changed this. The British
> were preparing an attack into Malaya, which would have taken
> some time. The US and other allies were attacking in the Dutch
> East Indies, but I don't know when they would have hit Java.
> China was far too large to be liberated at all fast.
>
> The Japanese never did have what it took to stand up against
> the much more heavily armed Western divisions in open battle,
> but they could have held onto a lot of territory for a long time.
A fair estimation.
>
> I don't know that the US was racing in Japan, but the Soviets might
> well have been. They took Manchuria and the southern half of
> Sakhalin, invaded in the Kuriles (and botched the job), and
> prepared to invade Hokkaido, the northernmost of the Japanese
> home islands.
When exactly did they manage to do this? According to the information
given in previous replies, the Soviets officially invaded a day
before or a on the day of the second bombing. Japans officially
surrender some 5 days later. Are u saying that the Soviets
took all that territory in 5 days? Or did they continue with their
territorial grabbing even after the formal surrender (I am aware
of the fact that no formal peace trety between the USSSR and Japan
was signed). Did Japanese Army resist the Soviets, and how
successful were they?
> Frankly, the Western powers didn't take all that much care to save
> Chinese people, and were unwilling to take any care to save Japanese.
>
Finally someone with a realistic view!
>> The Soviet attack was important, constituting the single greatest
> land defeat the Japanese ever suffered, but the land war was never
> decisive, and the Japanese had other armies elsewhere.
OK, tnx for the good information and ur thoughts!
cheers!
Marlock
If this was the case, then most of discussion what be pointless...
since u can read about it in books.
plus, different authors write differently.
J.P. Talyor e.g. writes differently then most of the authors
mentioned in previous posts.
Therefore, even if u read books, there's still room for discussion.
Alan
> 1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
> air?
There was never a consensus in the US on what was required to win the
war in the Pacific. FDR and Leahy believed an invasion was
unnecessary. How Arnold, King, Marshall and the various Secretaries
stood on the issue I don't know. In general, but with exceptions, the
Navy and AF were against invading and the Army for it. Once FDR died
and Truman took office, the scale tipped in the other direction and
the decision to invade Japan was made sometime in June 1945 with
confirmation coming in July.
> 1a. How long do you think that the "will" to fight to the bitter
> end would survive then.
The Japanese would not have surrendered even after the A-bombs and the
Soviet attacks had not Hirohito demanded it. Three of the Six members
of the Japanese war counsel were in favor of continuing the war in
hopes that some nebular turn of fortune would aid them in peace
negotiations. IIRC Hirohito's demand was unprecedented. The Emperor
very rarely even spoke when decisions were made.
> 3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
> targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
> knew what it would do, depsite[sic] the tests in the desert).
The original list of A-bomb targets {chosen by General Arnold} was
Kyoto, Hiroshima, Niigata & Kokura in order of size. Kyoto was later
dropped because of it's religious & cultural significance, at the
insistence of Secretary Stimson. Nagasaki was then added, apparently
by General LeMay. The US wanted only undamaged or mostly undamaged
cities used as targets, for psychological reasons and so that the
effects of the bombs could be judged. So, in some respects the word
"tested" is accurate, however, in most it is not.
Alan
The invasion decision time line, the Japanese decision to surrender
circumstances and the target list information are from "The USAAF in
WWII - Volume V - The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki" Craven & Cate.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> All that said, frankly the US decision makers weren't moved about Japanese
> casualties at all, be they civilian or military.
A note here: while not their primary concern, Truman is known to have
delayed any 3rd a-bombing in part because he "didn't like the idea of
killing all those children".
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> You are aware of the rice offensives in China? Attack an area, grab
> the rice harvest, leave and the starving population becomes someone
> else's problem?
This would be part of the "3 Alls" campaign.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> When exactly did they manage to do this? According to the information
> given in previous replies, the Soviets officially invaded a day
> before or a on the day of the second bombing. Japans officially
> surrender some 5 days later. Are u saying that the Soviets
> took all that territory in 5 days? Or did they continue with their
> territorial grabbing even after the formal surrender
The latter.
> > Frankly, the Western powers didn't take all that much care to save
> > Chinese people, and were unwilling to take any care to save Japanese.
> >
> Finally someone with a realistic view!
Who claimed otherwise?
Mike
Don Phillipson
news:PM00047A5...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> plus, different authors write differently.
> J.P. Talyor e.g. writes differently then most of the authors
> mentioned in previous posts.
This is the second time you have cited this author.
Do you mean the British historian A.J.P. Taylor? If so,
it is worth noting (anent his accounts of Japanese
events) that not speaking Japanese he could not read
the Japanese records of those events, and did not in
fact read US records of those events (mostly public in
US government archives.) Taylor's focus of interest was
Europe, not Japan or the USA.
Marlock
>
> You seem to forget the Germans had a navy and air force, as did the
> Italians.
>
Again, German navy except the uboats was of no much use, whereas
after the failure over Britan, Luftwaffe was mainly employed on the
Eastern front.
Thnx for great info overall!
Miso.
Rich Rostrom
> after the failure over Britan, Luftwaffe was mainly employed on the
> Eastern front.
Wrong again.
This was probably true in late 1941 and early
1942 only.
The primary activity of the Luftwaffe in 1943-45
was defense of the German homeland against the
escalating Anglo-American bombing campaign.
Besides the huge numbers of day and night fighters
devoted to this effort, Germany expended huge sums
and put large numbers of personnel into ground-
based air defense function under Luftwaffe control.
These included the Kammhuber Line, an immense
network of radars, observers, and control centers,
all staffed by elite technicians, and tens of
thousands of anti-aircraft guns, manned by hundreds
of thousands of personnel and consuming (by some
estimates) one third of German ammunition production.
Rich Rostrom
On Dec 10, 3:21 am, Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.21stcent...@rcn.com> wrote:
> ...the militarists [[thought]]... "weak", "soft" Americans
> could be shocked into negotiating peace by heavy casualties. By 1945, the only way
> Japanese forces could inflict such casualties was if Americans landed in Japan. The
> ... the militarists ... would conscript the whole population... for...
> banzai charges... with... primitive weapons... Millions... would die, but...they
> would kill many Americans and the shock would make the U.S. back off.
>
> If the U.S. didn't invade, the Japanese would have no way to reach them.
... and there was no possibility of
causing any really heavy casualties
to U.S. forces. No amount of sacrificial
fanaticism would enable the Japanese to
do anything more: what the militarists
had convinced themselves was their last
trump card could not even be played.
Under those circumstances, it is
_possible_ that the militarists would
have given up.
Idunno. The young fanatics who attempted
to stop the Emperor's surrender broadcast
probably didn't think in these terms.
Rich Rostrom
> Rich Rostrom wrote:
> > Before this time, the U.S., Britain, and
> > the Commonwealth/Empire had ... [defeated Japan]...
> This part here contradicts the first part of yout post, where
> u are saying that the Japanese army and navy still caused a
> great threat to everyone.
I never wrote that. What I wrote was
that the Japanese military was still
capable of inflicting significant
bloodshed. And it is a peculiar fact
of the Pacific War that while Japan
was defeated and its homeland ruined,
its largest land army was left intact,
and other large armies were bypassed.
Michele
news:hfr85v$h06$1...@usenet.stanford.edu...
I did not know that, thank you. But is this known as having been put down in
writing at the time - or later? Thank you in advance if you can make that
clear.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>>
>> You seem to forget the Germans had a navy and air force, as did the
>> Italians.
>
> Again, German navy except the uboats was of no much use,
And the U-boats were quite effective. They were responsible
for almost all of the around 14,000,000 GRT of allied merchant
shipping lost to submarines in WWII, plus another 1,000,000
GRT of neutral shipping. The world had around 56,000,000
GRT of merchant shipping in 1939, ships of 1,600 GRT or larger,
of which the axis powers held around 14,000,000 GRT.
Remembering the shipping was largely committed to keeping
the economies going, there was no military reserve and convoying
cut merchant ship efficiency.
The available merchant shipping was the first major brake on
western allied power, then comes the invasion shipping.
Apart from the direct cost of the losses there were the indirect
costs.
Imagine if that shipping had not been lost. Imagine if the allied
escort building programs could have concentrated on larger
warships, or other shipping.
Essentially the US invasion shipping program had to be cut back,
lots of LSTs cancelled, so DEs could be built, then when the DE
program was cut back the LST program went into fast forward.
This translated into fewer ships built as yards changed over.
Imagine the possibilities the allies had if the invasion shipping was
available 6 to 12 months earlier.
> whereas
> after the failure over Britan, Luftwaffe was mainly employed on the
> Eastern front.
One study of Luftwaffe combat losses I have seen indicates for the
period March 1942 to December 1944 35% of the losses were in
the east, the rest in the South and West. These figures exclude
transport units and maybe reconnaissance units.
Williamson Murray in his Luftwaffe losses by month by theatre
indicates in the period January to November 1943 the losses
were, South 3,963, West 4,225, East 3,773. These appear to
be losses to all causes. The losses in the east declined in 1944
and really increased elsewhere.
By the way the Luftwaffe was forced to reduce its fighter forces
in the east dramatically in 1943 thanks to the fighting elsewhere,
this made the Soviet task easier.
> Thnx for great info overall!
You need to learn more about the subject before being so sure
you are correct.
You need to stop the mentality of inserting things that happened
well post WWII into WWII, rather like claiming WWI was started
so WWII could occur. And you need to present evidence, not
continued claims this must be true.
You might consider WWII Japan was rather like modern North
Korea in its outlook and ability to ensure the population would
largely sacrifice itself to save the leaders. Think famine.
And the fundamental reality was the west expected Japan to
back down in 1941, given the relative military power, along
the usual lines. That is Japan had been attacking places but
if strong resistance was met it all suddenly became a mistake
by junior officers.
As 1941 went on it became clearer that Japan was not going
to stop, in which case giving strategic materials to Japan was
a big mistake. Though again if you read the diplomatic traffic
there was always the hope something would happen. The
Japanese pushed hard for a meeting of the leaders, with the
hope that would force the Japanese military into an agreement.
Then the military became the government with General Tojo in
charge.
You should look up the peace proposals Japan presented to the
US over China, the ones the US rejected and decide whether
this was helping the Chinese people or not.
On 4th November 1941 came two offers for the US, proposal A
Non discriminatory trade with China, but Japan has a special
case because it is a neighbour, if the US does not like this
then Japan will give the non proposal of universal free
trade, which we still do not have. In other words Japan
is considered special or nothing.
When to activate the Tripartite pact is for Japan's discretion,
and there will be no explanation of Japan's defence sphere.
Troops to stay in North China, Mongolian Border areas, Hainan
Island, for suitable period (Note ambassador forbidden to
give a firm time figure). Rest of troops to be removed at the
end of the war.
Immediate resumption of trade.
Help Japan obtain needed resources from SW pacific.
Japan will respect Thailand, NEI, the Philippines after independence
the US will "alleviate military measures in the SW Pacific area".
Final point none of the troop proposals are to be allowed into
the draft treaty. The explanatory note to the ambassador notes
Japan will call the troop removals evacuations "but although
it would please the US for us to make it the exception rather
than the rule (to retain garrisons) this would be out of the
question" No more troop concessions. In other words get
out of the way and give us what we need to go conquering.
The other proposal (B) was as follows,
The most generous terms of Japan's solution were
1) Japan would stop were it is, keep French Indo China
2) US helps Japan obtain oil from Dutch East Indies
3) All trade restrictions lifted, US sells oil to Japan according
to Japanese requests.
4) US will engage in no activity which might put an obstacle in the
way of Japan in her efforts to make peace with China. (Japan to
define activity)
5) Japan will withdraw from French Indo China after peace has
been obtained.
6) Non discriminatory trade
7) If the US is involved in a European war Japan will automatically
carry out what she understands to be her obligations under the
agreements with Italy and Germany.
This was the milder of the two requests sent and it was all
of this or nothing as the bottom line.
Don Phillipson
news:6bc098aa-548e-4498...@o9g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
> Churchill played no part in the decision to drop the [atomic] bomb . . .
> Truman is
> the man who ultimately authorized the drop: Truman said yes, so the
> bomb was dropped. If Truman had said no, the bomb wouldn't be dropped.
> No other man had the level of responsibility for the decision to drop.
It seems relevant that Truman delegated tactical decisions to Air
Force Gen. LeMay, i.e. both choice of targets (from the pre-approved
list of five cities) and timing. Thus each mission had two target
cities, first and second priority, depending on visibility (because
of LeMay's orders to bomb only via visual bombsight, not the
radar bombsight.) The timing of the second raid (Nagasaki, the
alternative target because the primary was wholly covered by
cloud) appears to have surprised officials in Washington,
because they expected LeMay to wait a week before the
second raid, so as to review results of the first.(There were
only two atomic bombs on Tinian island, and a third aboard
ship at San Diego.) But bad weather (heavier cloud cover)
was expected so LeMay sent out the second mission only
three days after the first -- as was within his defined discretion.
Truman then ordered that the third bomb be held back on
US territory for the time being.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
I'll have to dig around to find the quote; it was said at the time, but
not publicized. Sympathy for the Japanese was not high on anyone's list.
Mike
SolomonW
>> 1b. How much damage could the sorrounded Japan do to anyone?
>
> A lot. There were enormous swaths of Chinese and Manchukuo territory still
> under Japanese control, plus assorted islands here and there, plus of course
> the wretched Korean vassals. As you have been told, though you try very hard
Large number of Islands in the Pacific too.
> to ignore it, tens of thousands of Chinese civilians were dying per month,
> under the Japanese occupation.
Much more WW2 killed 10,000,000 to 20,000,000 Chinese, assuming 20 years
from 1927嚙碾1945 of war that works out to about 62500 deaths a month.
Assuming 4 years of warfare and taking some figures from the
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties
Dutch East Indies deaths were 3,030,000 to 4,030,000 which works out to
73541 deaths a year
French Indochina 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 works out to 26000 deaths a month
Philippines much of which was still under Japanese control lost 557,000 to
1,057,000 works out to 16,000 a month
So we have for every month, the war continues we have just here almost
180,000 deaths.
Stuart McGraw
> So we have for every month, the war continues we have just here almost
> 180,000 deaths.
I don't think it is valid to assume the death rate was constant
from beginning to end of the war. One might guess that the
curve was peaked, lower and the beginning and end and highest
in the middle, resulting in your numbers being over-estimates.
Biemond
As a boy I was interned in a civilian concentration camp in Java
during the last three years of the Japanese occupation.
In and outside these camps it was the gradually but persistent
worsening of the food
situation that was causing an ever increasing number of victims and it
is in my opinion
safe to conclude that this number would continue to grow each month
that the war lasted.
It is estimated that 50% of the casualies inside these camps died in the
last 6 months of the war,
and this is probably also the case for the local population outside.
If you want to make a curve than that would be an ever steeper upwards line.
Arie Biemond
Middelburg NL.
Steven Schmid
(in article <PM00047A5...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom>):
> This is a continuation of the previous thread.
>
> First of all, are all of you communicating on the thread Americans
> (and/or British)?
American
>
> I have a few questions:
>
> 1. Why was it necessary for the US to INVADE the Japanese mainland?
> What was wrong with just sorrounding them, and forcing them to
> surrender through sanctions and destruction of military forces from
> air?
>
> 1a. How long do you think that the "will" to fight to the bitter
> end would survive then.
> 1b. How much damage could the sorrounded Japan do to anyone?
> 1c. How much Japanese troops were still active in China and elsewhere on
> on Asian mailand? And how much potential did they have for
> furhter survival againt Russian, Chinese, British and American
> combined efforts?
Plan Orange called for blockade and a ruthless war of attrition. Any sensible
country would surrender under the conditions foreseen in Plan Orange. But the
Japanese in WWII showed that they were not going to be sensible. We lose
sight of that 60+ years later.
The US Navy was getting serious attrition by Kamikazes, but that was waning
at the end. The Japanese army was for the most part intact and undefeated.
But waiting around while maintaining a blockade was expensive (and the
Japanese knew that and it was a basis of their strategy - it would get too
expensive for the war to continue).
>
> 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> down at the end of the war?
> Was there a same kind of a competition over Japan as over Germany?
> (how will enter first, race for Berlin)
> Could it be that since Russian scored the mortal struck over Germans,
> that the US desperately wanted to be the winner of the Pacific war?
> (even though the D-Day and further operations were mainly
> successful, the main strugle was on the East)
> (additionaly, how much do the bombs have to do with simple REVENGER
> over Pearl Harbour)
> (keep in mind that the attack could have been prevented, or minimized
> if the intelligence gathered was taken seriously, but this really
> is of no importance for the discussion, what is important is that
> Japanese gave no warning, so perhaps the US decided to give no
> warning as well regarding the nuclear power).
I don't know if you want to diffuse the discussion by introducing the very
complicated European politics or their impact on Asian politics. It's not
that easy.
You actually are raising a lot of points here. But one thing that's clear
from the WWII writings is that the Americans were at war with Japan and were
professionally dismantling the Japanese military, there was no desperation to
beat the Russians to anything - they weren't even in the equation.
The last point in parentheses is confusing to me. Maybe you could restate?
>
> 3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
> targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
> knew what it would do, depsite the tests in the desert).
>
Everyone knew what it would do. But the 1945 bomb wasn't the bomb that
terrified people in the 1950s and 1960s. Everyone knows the Tokyo fire
bombings killed more people ad produced more damage than the atom bombs. The
question you pose only makes sense if you use attitudes that arose later,
based on weapons that were a lot more potent. At the time, the horror of the
atom bomb was felt by some scientists (not many) and very few politicians.
> 4. If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
> where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
> was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
> the Japan)?
The US was isolationist at the time, but imposed crippling sanctions against
Japan. The Japanese went to war against the US for a number of reasons, one
of which was the trade situation. At the time, the US wasn't going to go to
war with anyone unless attacked. Further, your question then leads to
followups: Do we start with Japanese occupation of Taiwan in 1895? The
Japanese invasion of manchuria in 1931? Or the invasion of 1937?
>
> I rembember reading (I will remember the source) that the Russian
> armies pretty much gave the final death punch to the Japanese
> might before the bombs were dropped. Somebody here mentioned a
> number of 670.000 Japanese soldiers surrendering to the Russians.
>
>
>
As I recall, the Russian offensive started the day that the Hiroshima bomb
dropped. The Japanese surrender had nothing to do with the Russian
declaration of war. However, as I recall, the Japanese government was putting
out feelers through the Russians to facilitate surrender, and those messages
may or may not have been forwarded to the west.
Best Regards,
Steve Schmid
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> On Wed, 9 Dec 2009 16:05:54 -0500, Marlock wrote
> (in article <PM00047A5...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom>):
> As I recall, the Russian offensive started the day that the Hiroshima bomb
> dropped.
Before Nagasaki, after Hiroshima.
> The Japanese surrender had nothing to do with the Russian
> declaration of war. However, as I recall, the Japanese government was putting
> out feelers through the Russians to facilitate surrender, and those messages
> may or may not have been forwarded to the west.
Actually, the Japanese never came up with a peace feeler. In fact, Sato was
told to ask for a meeting between the Russians and a "special envoy" from
Japan (probably Konoye). The Russians asked what the envoy would discuss;
Tokyo couldn't give Sato an answer.
Mike
Marlock
/cut
Steve, thanx for joining in the discussion, and putting
some sensible tought in it!
Cheers!
Don Phillipson
news:0001HW.C74AB484...@news.giganews.com...
> On Wed, 9 Dec 2009 16:05:54 -0500, Marlock wrote
> (in article <PM00047A5...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom>):
>
> > 4. If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
> > where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
> > was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
> > the Japan)?
>
> The US was isolationist at the time, but imposed crippling sanctions
against
> Japan. .
We need to remind ourselves here:
1. Prewar sanctions (steel and oil embargos) crippled nothing.
They were designed to hinder Japan's war in China (and may
have effectively hindered that war) but did not cripple either the
Japanese economy or even, in general, Japanese production
of munitions.
> The Japanese went to war against the US for a number of reasons, one
> of which was the trade situation. At the time, the US wasn't going to go
to
> war with anyone unless attacked
2. It is peculiar that top Japanese officials knew both points. They
agreed the USA was unlikely to declare war against any power, and
they agreed the main objective of the invasions of Dec. 1941 was the
strategic resources of Indonesia and Malaya (oil, rubber, tin etc.) none
of which was US property. But they feared US Navy "interference" with that
objective, thus added Pearl Harbor to current targets, hoping this would
facilitate
the conquest of SE Asia, even knowing it might risk total war with the USA.
Marlock
> "Steven Schmid" <schm...@nd.edu> wrote in message
> news:0001HW.C74AB484...@news.giganews.com...
>
>> On Wed, 9 Dec 2009 16:05:54 -0500, Marlock wrote
>> (in article <PM00047A5...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom>):
>>
>> > 4. If there was a true interest in protecting the Chinese people,
>> > where were the US and the rest of the Western Powers when China
>> > was asking for help from the League of Nations (protection against
>> > the Japan)?
>>
>> The US was isolationist at the time, but imposed crippling sanctions
> against
>> Japan. .
>
> We need to remind ourselves here:
> 1. Prewar sanctions (steel and oil embargos) crippled nothing.
> They were designed to hinder Japan's war in China (and may
> have effectively hindered that war) but did not cripple either the
> Japanese economy or even, in general, Japanese production
> of munitions.
>
Sry, but this is wrong. The embargos were completely stop the
merchant and navy fleets, this stop 100% of Japanese export/import.
You actually could not be more wrong on this.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> Don Phillipson wrote:
> > "Steven Schmid" <schm...@nd.edu> wrote in message
> > news:0001HW.C74AB484...@news.giganews.com...
> > We need to remind ourselves here:
> > 1. Prewar sanctions (steel and oil embargos) crippled nothing.
> > They were designed to hinder Japan's war in China (and may
> > have effectively hindered that war) but did not cripple either the
> > Japanese economy or even, in general, Japanese production
> > of munitions.
> >
> Sry, but this is wrong. The embargos were completely stop the
> merchant and navy fleets, this stop 100% of Japanese export/import.
> You actually could not be more wrong on this.
No, actually, you are completely wrong on this. You have been given
references to this effect as well. As Beasley (and Feis, and Toland)
and others have indicated, it was the Japanese war effort which was
using up the Japanese scrap reserves. In addition, it was using up their
foreign currency reserves. The NAVY opposed the action in China, even
before the US sanctions, because it cut, not only into the DOMESTIC
fuel supply, but into the Navy's strategic fuel reserves.
This is clear and unambiguous. The Japanese knew this.
Everyone but you seems to know this.
Mike
Michele
news:0001HW.C74AB484...@news.giganews.com...
>
> As I recall, the Russian offensive started the day that the Hiroshima bomb
> dropped. The Japanese surrender had nothing to do with the Russian
> declaration of war.
Actually it was a factor they mentioned.
However, as I recall, the Japanese government was putting
> out feelers through the Russians to facilitate surrender, and those
> messages
> may or may not have been forwarded to the west.
The messages were not forwarded - but the USA read them anyway. They
intercepted and decripted the correspondence between Tokyo and the Japanese
ambassador in Moscow.
So they knew perfectly well that what the Japanese were putting forth were
not "peace feelers" at all, as they are incorrectly described by uninformed
persons today. What the Japanese were trying to do was to set up a top-level
meeting with the Soviets. The Soviets asked what they would be talking
about, and notwithstanding the pressure by the Japanese ambassador onto his
superiors, the Japanese government couldn't come up with a preliminary
proposal for a general settlement. What they came up with were bilateral
agreements _with the Soviets_. In other words, they were thinking about
possible ways to decouple the Soviets from the rest of the Allies, the same
sort of wishful thinking the Germans entertained at times in the later
stages of the war. These are not "peace feelers" at all.
And the US decision makers knew this, as they were reading the mail. They
knew the Japanese were not going to sue for peace.
Michele
news:PM00047AA...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
>> 1. Prewar sanctions (steel and oil embargos) crippled nothing.
>> They were designed to hinder Japan's war in China (and may
>> have effectively hindered that war) but did not cripple either the
>> Japanese economy or even, in general, Japanese production
>> of munitions.
>>
>
> Sry, but this is wrong. The embargos were completely stop the
> merchant and navy fleets, this stop 100% of Japanese export/import.
> You actually could not be more wrong on this.
>
So you will be able to quote a slew of historians stating as much? Because,
you see, Toland wrote that actually, if the Japanese had stopped their
aggressive operations in China, they would not have needed to import all
that oil and scrap iron. Which reputed historian corrected Toland?
Michele
news:6bc098aa-548e-4498...@o9g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
>
> The UN knew, in fact, (because they were reading Japanese codes) that
> the Japanese peace faction had started putting out feelers for peace.
No. What they knew was that the Japanese were talking with the Soviets,
trying to organize a top-level meeting, but also that they did not really
agree on what proposals to put forth at such a meeting - save for some
bilateral agreements with the Soviets, an attempt to bribe the Soviets away
from the alliance.
On August 2, the Japanese government was still "studying the issue" of the
actual terms of any proposal. The idea of withdrawing from the territories
it had conquered during the war had been floated, but Togo was still not
sure they could be accepted by his own government. Besides, one wonders
which war he had in mind. Would he be willing to withdraw only from
territories Japan had conquered from the Western powers? That would have
been out of the question, given that one of the signatories of Potsdam was
the Chinese government.
In any case, if you couple this with the stated Japanese intention to "use"
the Soviets to end the war, and the above mentioned offers to the Soviets,
calling this a "peace feeler" is too much.
Note also that:
1. if the Japanese were ready to accept unconditional surrender, they would
not have needed negotiations.
2. assuming they would not accept unconditional surrender, they had contacts
with the USA in Switzerland, and they could have carried out negotiations
there. Of course the Swiss would not have weight to throw around - which
explains that the Japanese wanted from the Soviets quite much more than
their good offices as intermediaries.
Michele
news:hg0jg1$c70$1...@aioe.org...
Your concept of the curve applicable to this situation is wrong.
Most of the deaths were caused not by the Japanese directly killing
civilians, but by their utter disregard for the needs of the civilian
populations they controlled. As long as things were going relatively well
for the Japanese, and were still relatively organized and orderly, the
civilian populations were on the brink of starvation. As the general
Japanese situation worsened, logistics crumbled, everything went FUBAR, the
civilians moved beyond that brink. So the curve we have to think about is
exploding off the chart in a vertical rise at the end of the war, not
petering out down.
The average figures are gross under-estimations if applied to the end of the
war.
Marlock
No Mike, again, you lack the understanding of importance of the
merchant trade. Regardless of whether a sinlge further resource
would be spent on war in China, eventually (keep in mind eventually
means a relativily short period of time), the Japan would
run of the necessary resources anyway. A good example of this
is merchant and navy oil, which is different from the kind of oil
you use for land vechiles, or something else, and which had no direct
link to the actual spending on the war effort in China.
You see, this is what embargo does. It makes countries dry due to its
own operation.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > No, actually, you are completely wrong on this. You have been given
> > references to this effect as well. As Beasley (and Feis, and Toland)
> > and others have indicated, it was the Japanese war effort which was
> > using up the Japanese scrap reserves. In addition, it was using up their
> > foreign currency reserves. The NAVY opposed the action in China, even
> > before the US sanctions, because it cut, not only into the DOMESTIC
> > fuel supply, but into the Navy's strategic fuel reserves.
> >
> > This is clear and unambiguous. The Japanese knew this.
> >
> > Everyone but you seems to know this.
> No Mike, again, you lack the understanding of importance of the
> merchant trade.
No, actually, you are completely wrong. Too, you have been given references
(Ienaga, Beasley, Toland, etc.) to the effect. In short, Japan had enough
fuel, scrap, and foreign reserves to meet all domestic demand and to
expand her industries, if the war in China stopped.
> Regardless of whether a sinlge further resource
> would be spent on war in China, eventually (keep in mind eventually
> means a relativily short period of time), the Japan would
> run of the necessary resources anyway.
No, they would not, as the Konoye government knew.
> A good example of this is merchant and navy oil,
Yes it is; and in fact this is why the NAVY opposed the war in China. Again,
can you not read the references?
which is different from the kind of oil
> you use for land vechiles, or something else, and which had no direct
> link to the actual spending on the war effort in China.
The fuels used for naval vessels are different. However, they can be
further refined for other uses, and this is what Japan was doing.
> You see, this is what embargo does. It makes countries dry due to its
> own operation.
No, again, slowly, the war did this; please pay attention, and stop making things
up.
Mike
Michele
news:PM00047AA...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
A good example of this
> is merchant and navy oil, which is different from the kind of oil
> you use for land vechiles, or something else, and which had no direct
> link to the actual spending on the war effort in China.
While the difficulties of direct reallocation of resources and raw materials
should never be underestimated, the above is obviously untrue.
Yes, bunker fuel and diesel fuel and gasoline for land vehicles and
high-octane avgas for fighters are all different. Moving along that scale,
they get costlier and more complex to refine and produce.
But they all come from the same raw material, crude oil. Saying that there
is no direct link is ridiculous.
Marlock
>
> So you will be able to quote a slew of historians stating as much? Because,
> you see, Toland wrote that actually, if the Japanese had stopped their
> aggressive operations in China, they would not have needed to import all
> that oil and scrap iron. Which reputed historian corrected Toland?
>
In what referrence is that to the embargo? Would not the stopping
of their aggresive actions reflect on the lessening of the embargo
as well?
And how exactly does the stopping of aggressive LAND operations in
China affect the need of the the OIL for merchant and war SHIPS?
Marlock
> But they all come from the same raw material, crude oil. Saying that there
> is no direct link is ridiculous.
>
What is your point? The point that the merchant and navy fleets will
run out of oil was raised only AFTER the embargo on oil took place.
Priort to this, I haven't heard of any such warning, probably due to
the fact that merchant and navy fleets had PRIORITY in oil supply,
which is natural, since it is them who are enabling the acquiring of
the same in the first place.
Michele
I did not ask for your reasoning. I asked you if you had reputable
historians to quote.
Michele
> Michele wrote:
>
>> But they all come from the same raw material, crude oil. Saying that
>> there
>> is no direct link is ridiculous.
>>
>
> What is your point?
My point is that claiming that there is no direct link between bunker fuel
and high-octane avgas is ridiculous.
That is what you claimed.
It's like saying that there is no direct link between Pepsi and beer. Go
back along the production processes flowchart and you'll find it.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> Michele wrote:
> > But they all come from the same raw material, crude oil. Saying that there
> > is no direct link is ridiculous.
> What is your point? The point that the merchant and navy fleets will
> run out of oil was raised only AFTER the embargo on oil took place.
This is wrong; in fact, the Naval reserves were being used up prior to
any US embargo.
> Priort to this, I haven't heard of any such warning, probably due to
> the fact that merchant and navy fleets had PRIORITY in oil supply,
Probably, you hadn't heard of this because you hadn't read Feis, Toland,
or Morrison.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> Michele wrote:
> >
> > So you will be able to quote a slew of historians stating as much? Because,
> > you see, Toland wrote that actually, if the Japanese had stopped their
> > aggressive operations in China, they would not have needed to import all
> > that oil and scrap iron. Which reputed historian corrected Toland?
> In what referrence is that to the embargo?
1) If the Army stopped their aggression, the US begins lifting its sanctions
2) If the Army stops their aggression, there is less need for the
raw materials imported by the US.
> Would not the stopping
> of their aggresive actions reflect on the lessening of the embargo
> as well?
See above.
> And how exactly does the stopping of aggressive LAND operations in
> China affect the need of the the OIL for merchant and war SHIPS?
Uh, because the ARMY was tapping the NAVY's strategic reserves to make
fuels for their vehicles?
Mike
Marlock
Mike, you are suggesting somethign that has no economic and military
logic. Army and Navy need oil. Oil is supplied by import. Merchant
ships enable import. Navy ships protect merchant ships.
No flow of merchant and navy ships = no import of oil = ergo,
no oil whatsoever.
How difficult is that to grasp?
Marlock
Why do you need a historian to back up an economically logical point?
And why do I need to refer to a specific historian each time
I make a point. Are we not allowed to have our own views over
affairs?
Marlock
> Uh, because the ARMY was tapping the NAVY's strategic reserves to make
> fuels for their vehicles?
And what famous historian claims this?
Marlock
As I explained, that's not the point of the discussion nor have I
claimed this. YOu, like Mike, just take the parts of the text
u need to refute, and ignore the rest.
The fleet oil was a prime need, even during the aggression on China.
See my other posts for more explanation on this.
Don Phillipson
news:PM00047AB...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> And how exactly does the stopping of aggressive LAND operations in
> China affect the need of the the OIL for merchant and war SHIPS?
Land operations in China required gasoline for trucks and
aircraft. Japan operated refineries but had no significant
crude oil production. Considered in terms of supply, reduced
crude oil supply meant reduced gasoline production, thus
reduced scope for truck-supported and air operations.
Considered in terms of demand, army generals' demands for
fuel in China increased the Japanese refineries demand
for crude oil.
Don Phillipson
news:PM00047AB...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
The OP wrote 14 Dec. at 4.04 p.m.
> Why do you need a historian to back up an economically logical point?
> And why do I need to refer to a specific historian each time
> I make a point. Are we not allowed to have our own views over affairs?
Readers may be surprised when consecutive posts contradict each
other so plainly.
Don Phillipson
news:PM00047AB...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> The point that the merchant and navy fleets will
> run out of oil was raised only AFTER the embargo on oil took place.
> Priort to this, I haven't heard of any such warning, probably due to
> the fact that merchant and navy fleets had PRIORITY in oil supply
What you or I may have "heard of" is irrelevant. Modern governments
constantly monitor the supply of strategic resources, especially those
that must be imported by ship (since not produced in the homeland.)
The government of Japan measured and monitored oil consumption
and availability long before the US embargo on oil. So did US government
officials, which was why they hoped the embargo would impede a
Japanese war the USA deplored.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> Mike, you are suggesting somethign that has no economic and military
> logic.
What would that be?
> Army and Navy need oil. Oil is supplied by import. Merchant
> ships enable import. Navy ships protect merchant ships.
Really? You're pretty unfamiliar with how the Japanese treated their
merchant fleet in WWII, aren't you? You know, Cook & Cook have a whole
chapter dedicated to the Japanese merchant marine, and the navy's
refusal to protect them.
Well, I'm sure you have a reference that suggests otherwise...
> No flow of merchant and navy ships = no import of oil = ergo,
> no oil whatsoever.
OK...
> How difficult is that to grasp?
Not at all. But what does this have to do with anything?
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
How many times do you need the same references? Really, at this point, we
wonder whether you can read.
Does the name Beasley ring any bells? Toland? Feis?
etc.
Mike
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> Michele wrote:
> The fleet oil was a prime need, even during the aggression on China.
Yes, and this was a reason the IJN opposed the IJA action in China.
Is this really that difficult?
> See my other posts for more explanation on this.
We've seen them; they're all nonsensical repititions of incorrect
statements.
Mike
Greg Schuler
(snip)
>
> > I don't know that the US was racing in Japan, but the Soviets might
> > well have been. They took Manchuria and the southern half of
> > Sakhalin, invaded in the Kuriles (and botched the job), and
> > prepared to invade Hokkaido, the northernmost of the Japanese
> > home islands.
>
> When exactly did they manage to do this? According to the information
> given in previous replies, the Soviets officially invaded a day
> before or a on the day of the second bombing. Japans officially
> surrender some 5 days later. Are u saying that the Soviets
> took all that territory in 5 days? Or did they continue with their
> territorial grabbing even after the formal surrender (I am aware
> of the fact that no formal peace trety between the USSSR and Japan
> was signed). Did Japanese Army resist the Soviets, and how
> successful were they?
>
August Storm, by David Glantz, which is available online, provides a
very detailed and concise military history of the operation.
The Japanese force arrayed against the Soviets was light on artillery
and armor, as well as air power. The Soviets transferred a massive
amount of men and material from the West to the East prior to the
invasion. Battle tested and combat proven, the Soviets unleashed a
mechanized fist that simply obliterated the poorly trained and led
Japanese infantry forces. Remember - the Soviets are coming into the
campaign with four years of combat experience against a very tough
opponent. The Soviets possessed an overwhelming firepower advantage
and used it. There was heavy fighting during the campaign, but
essentially, organized resistance ceased after just a few days. The
operational maneuver groups simply pushed on against light opposition
as the second echelon cleaned up the encircled pockets. The Soviets
did to the Japanese in August 1945 what the Germans did to the Soviets
in June 1941.
The Japanese army fought against the Soviets, but aside from dug in
resistance closer to the coast, the main Japanese defenses were
penetrated and destroyed within the first 36 hours if not sooner alone
the entire front. While the individual Japanese soldier fought bravely
and hard, he lacked the firepower to deal with the avalanche of steel
sent against him by the Soviets.
As far as grabbing the territory, the Soviets sent advanced parties as
far afield as possible, even landing paratroopers at points in the
rear, especially at Harbin, to "seize" the territory and accept
surrenders before the formal surrender. Even afterwards, the Soviets
advanced steadily until they had physically occupied the land they
wanted.
The invasions of the Sakhalin and Kuriles are mere footnotes, in my
opinions. Small amphibious operations that suffered numerous technical
and operational flaws that only succeeded because of the paucity of
opposition.
Going forward, it is this operation that the Soviets use as the
template for future combat for planning and doctrinal purposes for
conventional and nuclear combat. The Soviets felt that the tempo of
operations that were sustained in Manchuria would have to be the
benchmark for all future conflicts due to the devastation wrought by
atomic weapons. The Soviets study and detail the timetables and
operational compositions of the invasion forces - which are widely
studied and debated right up to the 1970s.
Greg Schuler
> This is a continuation of the previous thread.
>
(snip)
> 2. What would you say about the Russian role in brining the Japanese
> down at the end of the war?
A minimal role and one that primarily was aimed at getting a piece of
the proverbial pie in terms of land and resources. What is most
important is that the lightning blow struck against the vaunted,
though degraded, Kwantung Army in August 1945 dissipated any remaining
combat power available to the Japanese in that sector. The massive
transport of the veteran mechanized forces from West to East was a
logistical undertaking that stressed the fractured USSR rail system,
but was undertaken despite the strain.
> Was there a same kind of a competition over Japan as over Germany?
> (how will enter first, race for Berlin)
Not at all. The US/UK could not project power into the border regions
or Korea (aside from air power) and there was no Soviet interest that
I am aware of to attempt a landing of the Japanese mainland. The
Soviets were aware of the limits of their amphibious capabilities.
> Could it be that since Russian scored the mortal struck over Germans,
> that the US desperately wanted to be the winner of the Pacific war?
No. The US was the prime combat power in the Pacific, though do be
careful not to underrate the capabilities and actions of the
Commonwealth and Chinese forces. While the USN undoubtedly became the
dominant force in theater by early 1944, without the contributions of
the allied forces, the Japanese may have been able to redeploy
significant assets to sectors under threat.
The Soviets did destroy the majority of combat power of the German
land forces, but without the intervention of the Allies in the West,
the war in Europe would have lasted perhaps a further year. The Red
Army did the heavy lifting, to be sure, but again, do not
underestimate the contributions of the Allies, on a smaller scale, to
the victory over Germany.
> (additionaly, how much do the bombs have to do with simple REVENGER
> over Pearl Harbour)
A key factor, to be sure, but not even among the top five reasons to
drop the atomic weapons on Japan.
> (keep in mind that the attack could have been prevented, or minimized
> if the intelligence gathered was taken seriously, but this really
> is of no importance for the discussion, what is important is that
> Japanese gave no warning, so perhaps the US decided to give no
> warning as well regarding the nuclear power).
>
There was ample warning that was misinterpreted by the US regarding
Pearl Harbor.
> 3. Where else could have the US tested their weapons over live
> targets? (a bomb) To see how it REALLY works (because nobody really
> knew what it would do, depsite the tests in the desert).
>
The scientific community associated with the bombs advocated this
approach, but were overruled. In fact, it took a concerted and
prolonged effort by Groves and Oppenheimer to convince the scientists
to complete the work on the weapons after the German surrender. In
fact, Oppenheimer gave his full support to utilizing the weapons on
targets, not just as demonstrations. It is only after the war that his
regret becomes more pronounced and public. It is also worth noting
that the work proceeded on the weapons due to Oppenheimer's effort and
the esteem with which the group held him.
(snip)
> I rembember reading (I will remember the source) that the Russian
> armies pretty much gave the final death punch to the Japanese
> might before the bombs were dropped. Somebody here mentioned a
> number of 670.000 Japanese soldiers surrendering to the Russians.
>
Largely Soviet myth. The Soviets did destroy large formations of
troops, but the capabilities of those troops were suspect and largely
ineffectual. Remember, the Soviets unleashed a mechanized torrent of
battle-tested troops, doctrine and equipment against the Japanese. In
1939, the Soviets, with far inferior equipment and doctrine, had
bested a much better Japanese force in Mongolia.
For reference, see Nomonhan, by Alvin Coox and August Storm, by David
Glantz - two English language sources that are, in my opinion,
standards for the military questions you may have. Glantz's work is
available online, I believe.
As an aside - it is this Manchurian campaign that spurs Soviet
advancement in the post-war era of their conduct of battle at the
operational and tactical level. While the Soviets spend much time
analyzing and broadcasting the success of their campaigns in the West,
rightly so, the detail study of the Manchurian campaign is embraced by
the military thinkers for the rapidity of action and provides
definitive military planning information, including timetables,
logistical needs and movement tables.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> Regardless of whether a sinlge further resource
> would be spent on war in China, eventually (keep in mind eventually
> means a relativily short period of time), the Japan would
> run of the necessary resources anyway. A good example of this
> is merchant and navy oil, which is different from the kind of oil
> you use for land vechiles, or something else, and which had no direct
> link to the actual spending on the war effort in China.
Japan was importing a mixture of refined oil products and crude oil.
According to the USSBS, using the Japanese fiscal year of April to
March, table is year, refined oil imports, crude oil imports in thousands
of barrels. Indigenous crude production
1937 16,651 / 20,231 / 2,470
1938 14,044 / 18,404 / 2,465
1939 11,818 / 18,403 / 2,332
1940 15,110 / 22,050 / 2,063
Inventories at the beginning of the year went from 5,001,000 barrels
in 1936 to 19,901,000 in 1940.
> You see, this is what embargo does. It makes countries dry due to its
> own operation.
Is this the time to point out much of the world's 1939 merchant fleet
were coal burners? And the Japanese had a million or so tons of
wooden hulled ships, lots of which used wind power? Japan was
90% coal self sufficient in 1937.
That the IJN had no real need to protect the merchant shipping
during peace time?
That the oil embargo hit the high end of the Japanese military,
the aviation and warships?
Oh yes, Australia, with under 10% of the Japanese population, was
importing more oil products.
The Japanese merchant fleet had done a big conversion to oil
burning in the 1930's, going from using 124,000 barrels in 1931
to 1,994,000 in 1937, then declining to 1,405,000 barrels in
1940. The IJN had gone from using 1,573,000 barrels in
1931 to 5,221,000 in 1940.
In 1931 the military used 290,000 barrels of avgas, the civilians
6,000, in 1940 it was military 1,201,000 barrels, civilian 86,000
barrels.
Note the civilian consumption of motor fuel, diesel and lubricating
oils were around 17,845,000 barrels in 1940 versus 2,699,000
barrels by the military.
Japan had not imported avgas until 1940, refining its own
until then. In 1941 it was clear Japan was stockpiling important
refined oil products, imports of around 1.5 million barrels of
avgas and a major jump in lubricating oils, to over a million barrels,
or more than the previous 3 years imports combined. Fuel oil
imports 1941 were around half of 1940 and a quarter of 1939.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
marloc...@gmail.com (Marlock) wrote:
> No Mike, again, you lack the understanding of importance of the
> merchant trade.
The whole UK trading Empire had been built on merchant ships. These
were originally sailing ships and then coal powered steamers. Warships
also used coal the German navy fought the whole of the First World War
with coal fired ships. Now there were technical advantages in using oil
especially for warships but there were UK registered coal burners just
about until diesel replaced steam as a ship power plant. In fact some
minor RN ships were built with coal firing.
As for internal communications, the Japanese used railways and coal was
world wide the main fuel used in steam locomotives.
To sum up there was no reason for an oil embargo to affect the Japanese
merchant fleet. Japan had lots of coal. The oil embargo would affect the
production of petrol or diesel for internal combustion engines and the
oil powered "Combined Fleet". In other words impact most on the Japanese
war capacity not the trade capacity.
Ken Young
Michele
news:PM00047AB...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> Michele wrote:
>> "Marlock" <marloc...@gmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
>> news:PM00047AB...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
>>> Michele wrote:
>>>
>>>> But they all come from the same raw material, crude oil. Saying that
>>>> there
>>>> is no direct link is ridiculous.
>>>>
>>>
>>> What is your point?
>>
>> My point is that claiming that there is no direct link between bunker
>> fuel
>> and high-octane avgas is ridiculous.
>> That is what you claimed.
>> It's like saying that there is no direct link between Pepsi and beer. Go
>> back along the production processes flowchart and you'll find it.
>>
>
> As I explained, that's not the point of the discussion nor have I
> claimed this. YOu, like Mike, just take the parts of the text
> u need to refute, and ignore the rest.
I don't need anything.
Now if you placed within this conversation a statement that the sun sets in
the East, I'd be free to object that that is not the case, and I very
probably would do just that.
As to "ignoring the rest", of course if the "rest" is based on an evidently
wrong assumption, challenging the assumption also deals with the rest.
> The fleet oil was a prime need, even during the aggression on China.
> See my other posts for more explanation on this.
>
Thank you, your posts do not explain anything that I did not already know.
They only explain that this far you have failed to understand what was going
on, probably because of a lack of basic information. You have been pointed
in the right direction and even given plenty of references. My suggestion is
that you stop writing for a while and start reading.
Michele
news:PM00047AB...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
> Michele wrote:
>> "Marlock" <marloc...@gmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
>> news:PM00047AB...@miso-mudrics-macbook-pro.unknown.dom...
>>> Michele wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> So you will be able to quote a slew of historians stating as much?
>>>> Because,
>>>> you see, Toland wrote that actually, if the Japanese had stopped their
>>>> aggressive operations in China, they would not have needed to import
>>>> all
>>>> that oil and scrap iron. Which reputed historian corrected Toland?
>>>>
>>>
>>> In what referrence is that to the embargo? Would not the stopping
>>> of their aggresive actions reflect on the lessening of the embargo
>>> as well?
>>> And how exactly does the stopping of aggressive LAND operations in
>>> China affect the need of the the OIL for merchant and war SHIPS?
>>>
>>
>> I did not ask for your reasoning. I asked you if you had reputable
>> historians to quote.
>>
>
> Why do you need a historian to back up an economically logical point?
Because you are mixing up your own uninformed musings with economical logic.
Vide the idea that there is no direct link between fuel for ships and fuel
for aircraft.
> And why do I need to refer to a specific historian each time
> I make a point.
Because this is a history forum, and you have already shown, as well as
admitted, that you know little of history.
> Are we not allowed to have our own views over
> affairs?
Of course you are allowed, just like you are allowed to think that the earth
is flat. Just don't expect that uninformed views are respected, or that
people will not just tell you that you are wrong.
Marlock
LOOOOL :)
I was being sarcastic!!!!
Since Mike insists then every single claim one makes beeds to be
backed up by a qoute from one book or another :) :) :)
Regarding other claims u make, please read my further replies to Mike's
claims.
Marlock
>
> Really? You're pretty unfamiliar with how the Japanese treated their
> merchant fleet in WWII, aren't you? You know, Cook & Cook have a whole
> chapter dedicated to the Japanese merchant marine, and the navy's
> refusal to protect them.
Well go one, teach us! Are u talking about pre-war period or war-period?
Since during the war period, navy had other priorities.
Les
> mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > Really? You're pretty unfamiliar with how the Japanese treated their
> > merchant fleet in WWII, aren't you? You know, Cook & Cook have a whole
> > chapter dedicated to the Japanese merchant marine, and the navy's
> > refusal to protect them.
> Well go one, teach us!
Some of us are already aware of what Mr. Fester is trying to tell you,
having read a few of the references he has provided.
>Are u talking about pre-war period or war-period?
IJN planning, and I use the word "planning" advisingly here, centered
around achieving a quick, decisive victory against the enemy fleet.
Somehow, this would so shock the enemy US that they'd forget how to
count and sue for peace. Consequently, the IJN did not place any
priority on organizing convoys, and what little protection they did
allocate to their shipping was usually given as a form of punishment
to misbehaving IJN commanders.
I found it odd. The IJN did not seem to realize how their strategic
options were being continuously limited by USN attacks on their
shipping, or if they did, they did an admirable job of ignoring it.
> Since during the war period, navy had other priorities.
Are you stating that the IJN wanted to protect its merchant marine
during times of peace, but *not* during war?
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> >
> > Really? You're pretty unfamiliar with how the Japanese treated their
> > merchant fleet in WWII, aren't you? You know, Cook & Cook have a whole
> > chapter dedicated to the Japanese merchant marine, and the navy's
> > refusal to protect them.
> Well go one, teach us! Are u talking about pre-war period or war-period?
Perhaps the book's title, _Japan At War: An Oral History_ might be construed
as an ever-so-subtle hint.
> Since during the war period, navy had other priorities.
So, before the outbreak of war, the IJN had to protect its merchant marine,
but during the war, they had other things to do than to protect their
troops' supply lines.
Surreal.
Mike
Marlock
Interesting point. If I had my books with me, I would check the
referrences for that meeting that I read about where Hirohito was
presented with the numbers. Perhaps I find it online.
In any case, I was under the impression that the oil embargo
would create a HALT of the fleet in 2 years (in peace) or 6 months
(in war).
Perhaps I misuderstood that information. I will try to look it up.
Regards,
Marlock.
Marlock
> So, before the outbreak of war, the IJN had to protect its merchant marine,
> but during the war, they had other things to do than to protect their
> troops' supply lines.
>
> Surreal.
AS so many times before, you stray from the point of the post by
selecting just a part of the post you need.
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
Here is your ENTIRE post:
"> Really? You're pretty unfamiliar with how the Japanese treated their
> merchant fleet in WWII, aren't you? You know, Cook & Cook have a whole
> chapter dedicated to the Japanese merchant marine, and the navy's
> refusal to protect them.
Well go one, teach us! Are u talking about pre-war period or war-period?
Since during the war period, navy had other priorities."
My response is as above.
Please pay attention to what you write, before you "correct" others.
To repeat: you have claimed that the IJN protected its merchant fleet
prior to the outbreak of war (hence the need for a strategic naval fuel
supply.) In the above, you stated during the war, the IJN had other priorities
than protecting its merchant fleet. This is all stated in support of your
position that it is others who do not understand merchant shipping, what
the Japanese were thinking at the time, etc.
What you wrote is not even remotely logical; can we prevail upon you to
let us know which writer convinced you of all that?
Mike
Michele
news:hg971s$gbm$1...@usenet.stanford.edu...
What I also find surreal in the exchange above is that your message included
a clear time frame: "in WWII". To which the other poster answered by asking
if you were "talking about pre-war".
Rich Rostrom
> ... the German navy fought the whole of the First World War
> with coal fired ships.
Not quite true... Many German
WW I warships, including most
of their dreadnoughts, had
mixed coal/oil firing; and all
destroyers built in 1914 or
later were oil-fired. All of
the roughly 140 fleet minesweepers
built _during_ the war had mixed
firing.
Thus it was _possible_ for a
nation with no domestic oil
production and limited access
to foreign oil to operate oil-
fired warships.
David H Thornley
> Since Mike insists then every single claim one makes beeds to be
> backed up by a qoute from one book or another :) :) :)
>
Most people around here say a lot of things that are generally
accepted as true, so there's not as many sources being thrown
around as you might expect. Moreover, many of our disagreements
are about our analysis of mutually accepted facts.
However, if I say something factual that others disagree with, they
will want to see my source.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Alan
> Not exactly, but you should be prepared to back up what you say.
> Most people around here say a lot of things that are generally
> accepted as true, so there's not as many sources being thrown
> around as you might expect. Moreover, many of our disagreements
> are about our analysis of mutually accepted facts.
I've tried before to try to make the point that "generally accepted as
true" doesn't mean sources shouldn't be cited. But I was shouted down
by nearly everyone who reads the group. "You should be prepared to
back up what you say" should apply to everything you say.
Alan
Michele
news:f0aabb0c-5534-4dd2...@1g2000vbe.googlegroups.com...
Sure - if challenged. If the other poster disagrees with you as to whether
the Lotnictwo Wojskowe was destroyed in the first three days of World War II
or not, but doesn't disagree as to what aircraft that air force was equipped
with, being prepared to quote sources as to the Polish aircraft types isn't
necessary - and filling a message with book-class footnotes about the PZL
production is a waste of time and effort. Instead, one will provide data and
sources as to the Polish air force operations after September 3, or as to
the Polish aircraft that went to internment in Romania.
What is peculiar about this exchange about sources is the following
sequence:
1. poster A makes questionable statements
2. poster B rebuts by quoting relevant sources
3. poster A insists, without providing sources
4. poster B asks for sources
5. poster A counters by complaining that poster B asks for sources but
doesn't provide sources himself!
Maybe poster A missed point 2. above?
Alan
> Sure - if challenged.
I know from personal experience this isn't always the case.
In a much earlier thread, I specifically asked why everything I posted
was required to be cited while the replies were not. I was told, what
they say "sounds right" and what you're saying doesn't. In fact, I
provided a cite which was refuted by saying, in effect, "he doesn't
know what he's talking about", without the refuter providing any cite
at all. This elicited a chorus of, "Oh, I knew that didn't sound
right" comments.
In this same thread there were a large number of posts by one person
that contained very specific data that I asked a citing for and was
completely ignored. Perhaps the poster assumed I was being a smart a$$
or whatever. To a degree, I probably was, but I was also interested in
reading the source of his data myself. The reason I first came to this
group was to find sources that others were aware of but I wasn't and
that still holds true to this day. The first half dozen or so of my
posts were "Does anyone know of a book .....". {I assume that many of
the people who read this group are also looking for sources. So when
asked for a cite, everyone should consider the general audience and
not just who's asking.}
"What sounds right" {or generally accepted or whatever you wish to
say} may or may not be the unofficial rule governing this aspect of
this group, but no one posted a contradiction then.
Alan
PS My previous post was meant in general, which I assumed {possibly
incorrectly} was how Mr. Thornley was speaking.