Field Marshal Montgomery & the Commonwealth
nick....@lycos.com
in the UK whereas historians and enthusiasts in the the USA tend to be
extremely critical of him. But how is he viewed in other Commonwealth
countries (e.g. Canada, Australia, New Zealand etc.)?
William Black
news:9f65276f-7da1-491e...@c19g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
I don't think he's idolised in the UK.
Indeed Churchill made at least one disparaging remark about him in
parliament during the war.
These days he just another rather obscure historical figure.
--
William Black
I've seen things you people wouldn't believe.
Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland
I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate
All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach
Time for tea.
Mike Piacente
Normandy" and "Tank Tactics: From Normandy to Lorraine" for starters.
<nick....@lycos.com> wrote in message
news:9f65276f-7da1-491e...@c19g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
Michael Emrys
9f65276f-7da1-491e...@c19g2000prf.googlegroups.com,
nick....@lycos.com at nick....@lycos.com wrote on 3/20/08 1:00 PM:
> I know that Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery is (or was) idolised in the
> UK whereas historians and enthusiasts in the the USA tend to be extremely
> critical of him.
On the other hand, aren't some of his most severe critics British
historians? I've heard rumors along those lines but admit I haven't looked
very far into the matter.
Michael
David Thornley
<nick....@lycos.com> wrote:
>I know that Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery is (or was) idolised
>in the UK whereas historians and enthusiasts in the the USA tend to be
>extremely critical of him.
I think that's "was" idolized, and US accounts are more mixed than
extremely critical.
He was a very easy person to misunderstand, much of that being his
own fault. For example, he was flexible and well able to change
plans fast when warranted, but maintained the reputation that
everything went according to his plan. That cost him a certain
amount of respect.
My opinion is that he was very good, although not the best of the
Western generals.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
nick....@lycos.com
> I don't think he's idolised in the UK.
>
> Indeed Churchill made at least one disparaging remark about him in
> parliament during the war.
>
> These days he just another rather obscure historical figure.
That's certainly the case today which was why I added in the "was"),
but I don't really think that it can be doubted that during the War
and in the decades following it, he was very familiar to the general
public in the UK and they held him in extremely high estime.
When I posted, I was hoping to learn more about how he was perceived
in other Commonwealth countries (then, if not now) rather re-opening
the old arguments between British and American posters about how good
general he really was and what his reputation is/was/should be in
those two countries.
Don Phillipson
news:9f65276f-7da1-491e...@c19g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
> I know that Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery is (or was) idolised
The biography of Bert Hoffmeister (OC 5th Cdn. Armoured Div.)
by Douglas Delaney (soldier/historian) says (2005):
1. Montgomery was the best trainer of soldiers for WW2 combat
(as distinct from barracks life) in the British army;
2. Hoffmeister (best Cdn. commander in WW2, a militiaman who
rose from company commander to div. commander) modeled his
methods on (a) Montgomery's as GOC defence of Britain in 1941
(b) Montgomery's as commander in North Africa (whose Eighth
Army went on to Sicily and Italy where Hoffmeister first saw combat.)
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Cubdriver
<willia...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>>I know that Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery is (or was) idolised
>> in the UK whereas historians and enthusiasts in the the USA tend to be
>> extremely critical of him. But how is he viewed in other Commonwealth
>> countries (e.g. Canada, Australia, New Zealand etc.)?
>>
>
>I don't think he's idolised in the UK.
You should read Max Hastings' two histories of the European campaign,
and more especially the one about D-Day. You would be surprised to
discover that Eisenhower did nothing right, or if he did it was by
accident; whereas Montgomery was never wrong, unless by accident, and
for that he can be forgiven because he was a genius at "reading the
battlefield."
The second volume (Armageddon) is more even-handed, because not even
Hastings can pretend that the heavy lifting was done by the British.
Blue skies! -- Dan Ford
Claire Chennault and His American Volunteers, 1941-1942
new from HarperCollins www.FlyingTigersBook.com
YMC
news:613cc072-f119-487c...@s50g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...
> When I posted, I was hoping to learn more about how he was perceived
> in other Commonwealth countries (then, if not now) rather re-opening
> the old arguments between British and American posters about how good
> general he really was and what his reputation is/was/should be in
> those two countries.
I'm not too sure about now. But when I was a kid in Singapore in the 1970s,
he was considered a hero among young school boys for beating the Desert Fox.
But I think part of that image was cultivated by our parents/ uncles etc..
who watched British propaganda films - and the UK produced penny war comics
like Commando etc..
Mike Piacente
pages into it), Monty isn't made out to be a god.
"Cubdriver" <usenet.AT.da...@giganews.com> wrote in message
news:7npau3lv2td01drjb...@4ax.com...
L2008
news:13u6b2t...@corp.supernews.com...
> In article
> <9f65276f-7da1-491e...@c19g2000prf.googlegroups.com>,
> <nick....@lycos.com> wrote:
>>I know that Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery is (or was) idolised
>>in the UK whereas historians and enthusiasts in the the USA tend to be
>>extremely critical of him.
>
> I think that's "was" idolized, and US accounts are more mixed than
> extremely critical.
>
> He was a very easy person to misunderstand, much of that being his
> own fault. For example, he was flexible and well able to change
> plans fast when warranted, but maintained the reputation that
> everything went according to his plan. That cost him a certain
> amount of respect.
>
> My opinion is that he was very good, although not the best of the
> Western generals.
I don't know of one better. Please don't say Patton, he was not on the same
level as Monty.
L2008
news:9f65276f-7da1-491e...@c19g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
I recall meeting a guy in a bar in Rush St, Chicago. He picked up on our
accents and started to talk to us. He was studying history and started on
about the war a bit. I was expecting the incorrect, "we saved yours asses
bit" most Americans come out with eventually when they have too many Jack
Daniels. He spoke highly of Monty and said the US just did not have that
level of general in their ranks - he also put great emphasis on motivation,
of which Monty was supreme at. Monty could motivate a whole army. He would
wear a beret like the men, was an assortment of tank badges on it. He gave
men belief. He said the US was OK at the lower level of general who
commanded a small army or large units.
Bob Martin
>On Thu, 20 Mar 2008 17:43:21 -0400, "William Black"
><willia...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>>I know that Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery is (or was) idolised
>>> in the UK whereas historians and enthusiasts in the the USA tend to be
>>> extremely critical of him. But how is he viewed in other Commonwealth
>>> countries (e.g. Canada, Australia, New Zealand etc.)?
>>>
>>
>>I don't think he's idolised in the UK.
>
>You should read Max Hastings' two histories of the European campaign,
>and more especially the one about D-Day. You would be surprised to
>discover that Eisenhower did nothing right, or if he did it was by
>accident; whereas Montgomery was never wrong, unless by accident, and
>for that he can be forgiven because he was a genius at "reading the
>battlefield."
What makes *you* think that Monty's opinion of Eisenhower was wrong?
Hal Hanig
As you may have noticed, Americans come in a wide variety of sizes, shapes
and sounds. Thinking back to those days and, from the perspective of
someone already in uniform at the time rather than a history student, most
Americans (at least those that I came into contact with) thought Monty was
(1) a pompous sawed-off runt with a monumental and unwarranted ego, (2) an
unfailing pain in the ass to get along with, (3) a flag officer with little
vision or spirit of adventure and (4) excessively cautious in his approach
to missions or operations he'd undertake with less than an overwhelming
surplus of whatever was needed to achieve success. And when he ran into
such situations, he more or less regularly sloughed them off on others to
deal with rather than risk besmirching his name and reputation with the
possibility of failure.
There probably are a few other features of the way we saw him that my
failing memory has missed, but I think that it's probably pretty accurate.
I guess the only way to find out if I have it right or not is to ask our
super-attenuated readers who were around in those days if they remember him
the way I do.
Die Whigphilosophie der Geschichte im Hefeweizen
<usenet.AT.da...@giganews.com> wrote:
>You should read Max Hastings' two histories of the European campaign,
>and more especially the one about D-Day. You would be surprised to
>discover that Eisenhower did nothing right, or if he did it was by
>accident; whereas Montgomery was never wrong, unless by accident, and
>for that he can be forgiven because he was a genius at "reading the
>battlefield."
One of the first joint references in "Overlord" to Montgomery and
Eisenhower (p.38 on my edition), credits Eisenhower with recognising
the importance of strengthening the initial assault while going on to
criticise the "worm of self-destruction" in Montgomery which made him
"disparage the contribution of his peers" and "shamelessly to sieze
the credit for the achievement of others".... The picture Hastings
actually paints of Montgomery is considerably more critical than you
give him credit for, even if he seeks to blame the institutional and
tactical shortcomings of the British army more than anything else for
any of Montgomery's perceived shortcomings.
Gavin Bailey
--
"We went to Beccles for the weekend. Just before luncheon the butler
blew his brains out which was rather distressing. We came back to London
in the afternoon." - The Duff Cooper Diaries, 15 May 1933.
William Black
news:f5LFj.4$OW...@newsfe02.lga...
> As you may have noticed, Americans come in a wide variety of sizes, shapes
> and sounds. Thinking back to those days and, from the perspective of
> someone already in uniform at the time rather than a history student, most
> Americans (at least those that I came into contact with) thought Monty
> was (1) a pompous sawed-off runt with a monumental and unwarranted ego,
> (2) an unfailing pain in the ass to get along with, (3) a flag officer
> with little vision or spirit of adventure and (4) excessively cautious in
> his approach to missions or operations he'd undertake with less than an
> overwhelming surplus of whatever was needed to achieve success. And when
> he ran into such situations, he more or less regularly sloughed them off
> on others to deal with rather than risk besmirching his name and
> reputation with the possibility of failure.
How many of these people had either actually met him or were of sufficient
rank and ability to question his ability?
Hans Christian Hoff
minds of WWII (on the allied side at least) were not commanders in the
field; Marshall and Brooke spring immediately to mind. Brooke had the
highest opinion of Montgomery, and regarded him as the best of all British
field commanders, he was fond of Alexander, but had very little respect for
his intellect.
Regards
Hans
"William Black" <willia...@hotmail.co.uk> skrev i melding
news:fs8ijf$3rq$1...@registered.motzarella.org...
Hal Hanig
> "Hal Hanig" <halh...@charter.net.nospam> wrote in message
> news:f5LFj.4$OW...@newsfe02.lga...
>
>> As you may have noticed, Americans come in a wide variety of sizes,
>> shapes
>> and sounds. Thinking back to those days and, from the perspective of
>> someone already in uniform at the time rather than a history student,
>> most
>> Americans (at least those that I came into contact with) thought Monty
>> was (1) a pompous sawed-off runt with a monumental and unwarranted ego,
>> (2) an unfailing pain in the ass to get along with, (3) a flag officer
>> with little vision or spirit of adventure and (4) excessively cautious in
>> his approach to missions or operations he'd undertake with less than an
>> overwhelming surplus of whatever was needed to achieve success. And when
>> he ran into such situations, he more or less regularly sloughed them off
>> on others to deal with rather than risk besmirching his name and
>> reputation with the possibility of failure.
>
>
> How many of these people had either actually met him or were of sufficient
> rank and ability to question his ability?
If that's the game we're going to be playing, let's then discount every
favorable word we ever heard about him from anyone other than his superiors.
The problem there would probably be that, if you listened to what Monty
himself might have to say on that subject, he undoubtedly had no peers or
betters, so one would be stuck with taking him at his word there being no
others to consider.
Anyway, to answer your question, I already stated at the outset that these
were people I came in contact with who voiced their opinions and I neither
got their pedigrees nor did I record the conversations. You can discard
their opinions if you wish for whatever reason you may wish, but that
doesn't change those opinions.
Hal Hanig
statement made about the high regard in which he was held by his fellow
Brits. I have yet to hear from anyone from what was the Commonwealth in
those days, i.e. - Canada, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, etc.
on the subject.
William Black
No, but it affects their validity.
Montgomery was certainly difficult to get on with but the people who he
worked for, and who worked directly for him, seem to have had a reasonably
high opinion of him.
The view of him held by a sergeant in the US Army of the day of the are of
little interest to anyone.
David Thornley
L2008 <removemebay...@removemeeasy.removemecom> wrote:
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
>news:13u6b2t...@corp.supernews.com...
>>
>> Western generals.
>
>I don't know of one better. Please don't say Patton, he was not on the same
>level as Monty.
>
I agree Patton wasn't on the same level as Montgomery. He was better.
There were commanders in other theaters of war (although I'm not about
to claim that Alexander, Leese, or Clark were anywhere near as good
as Montgomery) that were also quite good.
David Thornley
Hal Hanig <halh...@charter.net.nospam> wrote:
>
>If that's the game we're going to be playing, let's then discount every
>favorable word we ever heard about him from anyone other than his superiors.
One thing Montgomery was not good at, at least later in the war, was
being a good subordinate. He worked well with Alexander, in that
Alexander basically let Montgomery do whatever he wanted and simply
supported him. (Not a bad thing to do with a very good field general.)
He gave Eisenhower a great many problems.
>The problem there would probably be that, if you listened to what Monty
>himself might have to say on that subject, he undoubtedly had no peers or
>betters, so one would be stuck with taking him at his word there being no
>others to consider.
>
Another thing he wasn't good at was modesty.
Donald White
> The view of him held by a sergeant in the US Army of the day of the are of
> little interest to anyone.
It just so happens that my father was a sergeant in the US Army of the
day. I was a little interested in what he said to me. He only
mentioned Montgomery once. He said the only time the division (82nd
ABN) ever yielded ground to the Germans was when ordered to do so by
Montgomery in order to tidy the line. In this case Montgomery was a
demotivator of men.
Don
Hal Hanig
No, it doesn't because I never claimed them to be anything other than their
opinions. If you have some reason for doubting me, stop beating around the
bush and spell it out. Until then, their opinion are valid because I've
reported them as accurately as I can.....they're only invalid if I've
reported them wrong, and I know that I haven't done that. I'm not saying
that those opinions are accurate, merely that I've reported them accurately.
To sum up, I never claimed that what we thought of Monty was necessarily
right, but I do claim that what we thought of him was accurately reported to
you regardless of whether or not you agreed with it......that's the way we
felt at the time.
>
> Montgomery was certainly difficult to get on with but the people who he
> worked for, and who worked directly for him, seem to have had a
> reasonably
> high opinion of him.
>
> The view of him held by a sergeant in the US Army of the day of the are of
> little interest to anyone.
Well, aren't you the clever one......sergeant indeed! If you think that
your comment will denigrate the effect of what was said, I'll have you know
that the United States Army and the rest of its military arms functioned
quite effectively during WWII thank you primarily due to the quality of its
sergeants and other non-commissioned officers. Without their understanding
and efforts, our officers could have accomplished nothing and, having been
one, I can attest to that from personal knowledge and experience.
Furthermore, I don't much appreciate you reducing this to a UK vs. US
situation.....we were talking about one individual who was British and the
subject was raised by a fellow Brit. If it offended you that I, an
American, had something to say on the subject, perhaps it should have been
raised in some forum other than the Internet where access is available to
everyone with a computer. If that's the case, then your complaint should be
directed to the compatriot who raised the issue and you can spare me the
snide digs. It doesn't make you look more than just petty and doesn't do a
positive thing for the generally good relations our respective nations have
enjoyed since WWII.
So, thank you for your input, Colonel Blimp. Regards to Her Majesty from
one of her irreverant colonists once removed.
Louis C
> Montgomery was certainly difficult to get on with but the people who he
> worked for, and who worked directly for him, seem to have had a reasonably
> high opinion of him.
Some he got along with well enough, others not.
As Hal put it, these people came in a variety of sizes, flavors etc.
Everybody seems to have decided that he was a competent general, how
good he was being debatable. Note the lack of an easy yardstick to
assess competence, particularly in one's superior.
> The view of him held by a sergeant in the US Army of the day of the are of
> little interest to anyone.
It is of interest to me.
The view of him held by US troops of the day is a historical data
point.
That doesn't mean that this view was correct, nor did Hal imply that
it was a more correct view than that of Montgomery's biographers who
had access to a greater range of materials, but it's part of the
picture.
LC
Louis C
> I agree Patton wasn't on the same level as Montgomery. He was better.
Was he, now?
I'd agree he was better at thinking on the move, but that's about it.
For everything else, Patton shot himself in the foot about as often as
Montgomery did.
Patch and Devers were good, too. Also some of those PTO fellows who
rarely make it to a discussion of the top Allied ground commanders.
I agree that Patton was way above Leese and Alexander, though. I'll
even toss in Dempsey and Crerar for good measure...
LC
David Thornley
Louis C <loui...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>David Thornley wrote:
>
>> I agree Patton wasn't on the same level as Montgomery. He was better.
>
>Was he, now?
>
>I'd agree he was better at thinking on the move, but that's about it.
>For everything else, Patton shot himself in the foot about as often as
>Montgomery did.
>
He did mess up at times; so did Montgomery. Overall, I'm more
impressed with Patton (although I do have to allow for the
difference in commanding an army and an army group).
>Patch and Devers were good, too. Also some of those PTO fellows who
>rarely make it to a discussion of the top Allied ground commanders.
>
Agreed. I'm not familiar enough with Truscott's command of Fifth
Army to make an intelligent statement, except that he was far better
at it than Clark. (Faint praise, of course, as far as it goes.)
>I agree that Patton was way above Leese and Alexander, though. I'll
>even toss in Dempsey and Crerar for good measure...
>
If we're going through ETO/MTO army level commanders and
immediately above, I'd also ask for Hodges and Clark. Bradley
wasn't bad, and did have the good sense to let Patton run wild
at times, thinking he was putting something over on Bradley.
Die Whigphilosophie der Geschichte im Hefeweizen
wrote:
>I agree that Patton was way above Leese
Well, Leese is an easy target. You really had to excel at mediocrity
to get sacked as a British commander in Burma.
>and Alexander, though.
I'd defend Alexander on the following grounds: Despite the assertions
of stupidity and lack of grip made about his style, he was astute
enough to recognise that any attempt at a firm grip on his
subordinates would achieve nothing beyond increased whining and
back-stabbing. Of course, this assumes he was capable of achieving "a
firm grip" if he had decided to... But I advance him as the first
general to successfully grasp the fundamental _political_ reality of
combined Anglo-American operations - benign neglect of jealous and
competitive subordinates.
> I'll
>even toss in Dempsey and Crerar for good measure...
Dempsey seemed to manage positional/attritional battles better than
Patton, and was certainly capable of similar speed of exploitation. I
say this not to extol Dempsey, but to critique Patton. There are
numerous less-celebrated US generals who were considerably better than
Patton IMO - Truscott, Devers, even Simpson. But the whole 'argue
about the personalities of the generals' thing seems a handy way of
avoiding more useful historical debate to me.
Gavin Bailey
--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En
YMC
news:0680f5ec-be7f-47b5-b892-> I'd agree he was better at thinking on the
> For everything else, Patton shot himself in the foot about as often as
> Montgomery did.
What was Patton's "Market Garden"? In other words, Monty made a mess in
Operation Market Garden but what was a similar operation conceived by Patton
that failed?
William Black
news:47E87231...@qwest.net...
I can't tell if you're agreeing with me or disagreeing.
I'm sure your father was a fine sergeant.
I'm also pretty sure that his judgement of the general officers put over him
wasn't either important or valid.
William Black
> William Black wrote:
>> Montgomery was certainly difficult to get on with but the people who he
>> worked for, and who worked directly for him, seem to have had a
>> reasonably
>> high opinion of him.
>>
>> The view of him held by a sergeant in the US Army of the day of the are
>> of
>> little interest to anyone.
>
> Well, aren't you the clever one......sergeant indeed! If you think that
> your comment will denigrate the effect of what was said, I'll have you
> know that the United States Army and the rest of its military arms
> functioned quite effectively during WWII thank you primarily due to the
> quality of its sergeants and other non-commissioned officers.
I'm sure it did.
That's not what we're actually talking about.
Montgomery's reputation is undoubtedly contraversial.
But you seem to be emotionally involved in what should be some sort of
historical debate.
There is absolutly no doubt that the opinion of NCOs of the general officers
placed over them is a complete irrelevance.
The opinion of the general's imediate superiors and subordinates is
important because it relates directly to his effectivness.
Montgomery had a shockingly bad reputation for just about everything but his
soldiering and his private life.
> So, thank you for your input, Colonel Blimp. Regards to Her Majesty from
> one of her irreverant colonists once removed.
You're taking all this far too personally.
Do calm down, it's not that important.
Duwop
wrote:
> "Hal Hanig" <halha...@charter.net.nospam> wrote in message
> How many of these people had either actually met him or were of sufficient
> rank and ability to question his ability?
>
That's unimportant. It changes what the opinions were not one whit,
which is *all* that is being related. You can come to your own
conclusions on what the most likely source of those opinions were. Top
down, or down up? Which would you guess?
William Black
> In article <fs6to3$opb$1...@aioe.org>,
> L2008 <removemebay...@removemeeasy.removemecom> wrote:
>>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
>>news:13u6b2t...@corp.supernews.com...
>>>
>>> My opinion is that he was very good, although not the best of the
>>> Western generals.
>>
>>I don't know of one better. Please don't say Patton, he was not on the
>>same
>>level as Monty.
>>
> Patton! Patton! Patton!
>
> I agree Patton wasn't on the same level as Montgomery. He was better.
>
>
He never achieved the high command Montgomery did.
The only area where their performance is comparable is North Africa.
Patton got thrashed, Montgomery didn't...
Indeed Patton got thrashed by an army Montgomery had already beaten.
narrl...@hotmail.com
wrote:
> "David Thornley" <thorn...@visi.com> wrote in message
>
> news:13ugln0...@corp.supernews.com...
>
>
>
> > In article <fs6to3$op...@aioe.org>,
> > L2008 <removemebayremovemec...@removemeeasy.removemecom> wrote:
> >>"David Thornley" <thorn...@visi.com> wrote in message
> >>news:13u6b2t...@corp.supernews.com...
>
> >>> My opinion is that he was very good, although not the best of the
> >>> Western generals.
>
> >>I don't know of one better. Please don't say Patton, he was not on the
> >>same
> >>level as Monty.
>
> > Patton! Patton! Patton!
>
> > I agree Patton wasn't on the same level as Montgomery. He was better.
>
> Patton never commanded an Army Corps.
II Corps from March, 1943, but only briefly.
> He never achieved the high command Montgomery did.
True.
> The only area where their performance is comparable is North Africa.
Sicily?
> Patton got thrashed, Montgomery didn't...
Please elaborate on this thrashing, which has been overlooked in the
history books I've read, and not all of which were written by Yanks.
> Indeed Patton got thrashed by an army Montgomery had already beaten.
You're talking about Kasserine Pass, perhaps?
Narr
Rich Rostrom
> most
>Americans (at least those that I came into contact with) thought Monty was
>(1) a pompous sawed-off runt with a monumental and unwarranted ego, (2) an
>unfailing pain in the ass to get along with, (3) a flag officer with little
>vision or spirit of adventure and (4) excessively cautious in his approach
>to missions or operations he'd undertake with less than an overwhelming
>surplus of whatever was needed to achieve success.
All of which may have been true,
but none of which determines
whether he was _able_ or not.
IMHO it was all true to a certain
degree - but it was also true
that he was a meticulous organizer,
master of logistical and operational
detail, expert motivator of troops,
and resolute fighter.
Quite probably he was the ideal
commander to plan and execute the
D-Day landings.
--
| People say "There's a Stradivarius for sale for a |
| million," and you say "Oh, really? What's wrong |
| with it?" - Yitzhak Perlman |
Michael Emrys
willia...@hotmail.co.uk wrote on 3/25/08 8:14 AM:
> Patton never commanded an Army Corps.
False. He commanded two of them. I Corps in Morocco and II Corps in Tunisia.
> He never achieved the high command Montgomery did.
The each commanded armies in Sicily.
> The only area where their performance is comparable is North Africa.
> Patton got thrashed, Montgomery didn't...
> Indeed Patton got thrashed by an army Montgomery had already beaten.
And which army would that have been?
And at what time did this "thrashing" take place?
Patton is certainly not above criticism, even searing criticism at times,
but it doesn't appear to me that you have offered any in this post.
Michael
David Thornley
YMC <nospamher...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>What was Patton's "Market Garden"? In other words, Monty made a mess in
>Operation Market Garden but what was a similar operation conceived by Patton
>that failed?
>
First, Patton did not show up well in Lorraine. He had opportunities
for more maneuver and less head-on attacking than he used.
Second, Market-Garden was not just Monty. It was a much more
widespread mess than that. I have this sneaky suspicion that
it might have gone better if Montgomery had run the whole thing.
David Thornley
>He never achieved the high command Montgomery did.
>
One step below. I feel reasonably comfortable comparing people
at adjacent steps. Sometimes I compare them two steps apart
(e.g., Patton would not have worked well in Eisenhower's job).
More than that I get definitely uncomfortable.
>The only area where their performance is comparable is North Africa.
>
Where Montgomery commanded an army, and Patton commanded a
corps. Um.....
>Patton got thrashed, Montgomery didn't...
>
If you're thinking of Kasserine Pass, Patton wasn't there. Patton
was brought in later to fix the damage a few bad commanders of
both nationalities had done. It wasn't a wholly US debacle.
Now, if you want comparable positions, try Sicily. I'm more
impressed by Patton than Montgomery in Sicily. (In fairness,
I don't think it was one of Montgomery's best, while it was
closer to being Patton's best.)
>Indeed Patton got thrashed by an army Montgomery had already beaten.
>
Actually, no. Only part of the forces were from Rommel's army,
the corps commander was Fredendall (who quite properly never
had a combat command again), the army commander was British,
and Patton was quite a distance away.
Now, if you want to pick on Fredendall's ability, I'm afraid you'll
have to wait in a long line to get your turn. He makes some of
the more political SS and Soviet appointments look kinda good.
Donald White
>
> I'm also pretty sure that his judgement of the general officers put over him
> wasn't either important or valid.
>
not argue the "important" part, but would like to understand the basis
for my father being unable to form a valid judgment of the general
officers put over him. This seems for you to be some trivial deduction
from a general premise such the inferiors cannot judge superiors. That
is, your argument is not about my father in particular, but rather, that
no subordinate can form a valid judgment about a superior. You may
possibly hold that this is true in any hierarchical institution. I
wonder if this can possibly be true as a general principle since the
inferiors of today become the superiors of tomorrow perhaps in part
because of their excellent judgment of their superiors.
Don
Michael Emrys
willia...@hotmail.co.uk wrote on 3/25/08 8:13 AM:
> There is absolutly no doubt that the opinion of NCOs of the general officers
> placed over them is a complete irrelevance.
I would hazard to say that it is much less than completely irrelevant. For
one thing, if the soldiers and NCOs of an army or a formation thereof lack
confidence in their leaders, it effects their morale and therefore their
effectiveness in battle. Moreover, it seems to me that nine times out of ten
the men at the sharp end are very good at sussing out how good or bad their
generals are, even when they may ascribe the wrong reasons for that
performance.
Michael
Louis C
> He did mess up at times; so did Montgomery. Overall, I'm more
> impressed with Patton (although I do have to allow for the
> difference in commanding an army and an army group).
Leaving aside the obvious, that Montgomery and Patton are each most
impressive for different things, I'm still interested in how that
opinion is arrived at.
Not that I'm pushing a particularly pro-Monty agenda here, just that
I'm not sure how Patton is all that better overall (though I suppose I
could be convinced). Specifically, Patton's numerous failings with
logistics would have made him a poor army group commander.
In Sicily, Patton captured a lot of ground, most of it useless. Both
Patton and Montgomery failed to nail their targets. Montgomery is
guilty of tunnel vision, as well as thinking that the Americans were
"our Italians" (though I would be enclined to cut him some slack over
the latter, given how it mostly takes hindsight to know how wrong that
was. Atkinson hadn't written his books, yet).
In similar situations, Patton also seems to have been fixated on his
immediate target - e.g. Metz. So this isn't a matter of score but a
question of whether each of them behaved better in different
circumstances. Patton seems to have been more willing to throw caution
to the winds, and would have been hurt badly had he commanded, say,
8th Army against Rommel.
> Agreed. I'm not familiar enough with Truscott's command of Fifth
> Army to make an intelligent statement, except that he was far better
> at it than Clark. (Faint praise, of course, as far as it goes.)
I think that Clark could have been a good army commander had he
remained under Eisenhower. There would have been none of the pressure
to outdo the main theater and less opportunities for bickering with
allies. Truscott was considered a very good commander, though in the
circumstances it was hard for him to demonstrate brilliance.
> If we're going through ETO/MTO army level commanders and
> immediately above, I'd also ask for Hodges and Clark.
I don't have a problem with rating Patton over Hodges. The latter
seems to have mainly been the kind of non-obstrusive character that
Bradley felt comfortable with. And then we have 9th Army, whose
commander seems not only to have done a good job but to have worked
reasonably well under Montgomery. That alone deserves credit.
> Bradley
> wasn't bad, and did have the good sense to let Patton run wild
> at times, thinking he was putting something over on Bradley.
Bradley wasn't bad, but he wasn't exactly stellar either. His main
advantage seems to have been that Eisenhower saw him as no
competition. Appart from being easy to get along with, which hid some
simmering resentment (very much like Clark in that respect) he wasn't
much of a team player. Neither am I impressed with his handling of
Patton: he seems to have failed to find a middle ground between
cutting him loose and micro-managing him.
I'd definitely rate Montgomery as a better general than Bradley.
LC
Louis C
> I'd defend Alexander on the following grounds: Despite the assertions
> of stupidity and lack of grip made about his style, he was astute
> enough to recognise that any attempt at a firm grip on his
> subordinates would achieve nothing beyond increased whining and
> back-stabbing.
He was supposed to be a war-fighting general. War is a nasty business,
there can be casualties, and a general's peace of mind is usually one
of them.
I like Alexander and consider him a fairly good general myself. On the
other hand, managing prima dona's is definitely part of the job when
you reach high rank, if for no other reason that the people likely to
reach the kind of rank that an army group & theater commander will
have to manage are going to be prima dona's. Alexander failed at that,
period.
Eisenhower did achieve a firm grip on his subordinates, including
Montgomery. So did Montgomery and the German army group commanders.
Alexander didn't, so he fails to make the A team.
> But I advance him as the first
> general to successfully grasp the fundamental _political_ reality of
> combined Anglo-American operations - benign neglect of jealous and
> competitive subordinates.
He was well-aware of the political reality, but his handling of it was
suboptimal.
In all fairness, a British army group commander with Clark as a US
Army commander would have faced a very difficult task. I do believe
that Montgomery would have managed it better: Clark would doubtless
have written volume upon volume of pure hatred directed at him in his
postwar memoirs, but at least he would have been made to play as part
of a team.
> Dempsey seemed to manage positional/attritional battles better than
> Patton, and was certainly capable of similar speed of exploitation.
Dempsey wasn't truly bad, but he failed too many times IMO. Even when
as e.g. during Goodwood some of the blame can be laid at Montgomery's
feet for interfering with the battle plan, it was part of Dempsey's to
take a firmer stand (no easy matter against Montgomery, I know, but
see my comments on Alexander: war is hell).
> There are
> numerous less-celebrated US generals who were considerably better than
> Patton IMO - Truscott, Devers, even Simpson.
I'm not sure that they were "considerably better" but they were
clearly contenders for the "better than Montgomery" award, not to
mention the coveted "best WWII Allied general" one.
> But the whole 'argue
> about the personalities of the generals' thing seems a handy way of
> avoiding more useful historical debate to me.
Having fun can be useful, too.
LC
Louis C
> What was Patton's "Market Garden"? In other words, Monty made a mess in
> Operation Market Garden but what was a similar operation conceived by Patton
> that failed?
Actually, Market Garden largely failed because 21st Army Group seems
to have been running pretty much on autopilot at the time (which is of
course no excuse) as opposed to Montgomery actually making a mess of
things.
I'm not claiming that Montgomery was perfect or never failed - he
wasn't and did - just that I'm not comfortable with rating Patton as
clearly better than him. I'm not that great a fan of Patton, in fact.
And as to an answer to your question, hm... Metz?
LC
Hal Hanig
It's been said that a good leader is he who is able to, by virtue of the
quality of his leadership, inspire his subordinates to follow him to and
through the gates of hell. If that's true, how can any subordinate so
inspired not know it? Isn't he rating his leader when he's following him
through those gates?
Bob Martin
That's true, but surely it is obvious that NCOs under Monty's command are better
placed to judge him than are NCOs who never got nearer to Monty than a newspaper
report? Most NCOs who served under Monty were full of admiration for him.
William Black
Because a general may well have to sacrifice large numbers of soldiers in
things like diversionary attacks.
The opinion of the soldiers put into such attacks may be very different from
those used in a successful defensive operation.
Gort and Ironside were very popular with their men, but were not terribly
good generals.
William Black
news:C40F2AA3.1AA13%em...@olypen.com...
They don't seem to be.
Gort was hugely popular.
So was Auchinleck <sp>
Montgomery had to work very hard to become popular with the 8th Army in
North Africa and pretty obviously found it a strain.
If you read Spike Milligan's first book on the war you'll see that
Montgomery was deeply unpopular with just about everyone when he was in
command in Southern England earlier in the war.
Die Whigphilosophie der Geschichte im Hefeweizen
wrote:
[re Alexander]
>He was supposed to be a war-fighting general. War is a nasty business,
>there can be casualties, and a general's peace of mind is usually one
>of them.
Oh, I think it's pretty clear Alexander could maintain his peace of
mind in the most stressful circumstances, to the point that his
critics make this one of the main charges against him.
>I like Alexander and consider him a fairly good general myself. On the
>other hand, managing prima dona's is definitely part of the job when
>you reach high rank, if for no other reason that the people likely to
>reach the kind of rank that an army group & theater commander will
>have to manage are going to be prima dona's. Alexander failed at that,
>period.
I tend to feel that comes from his experience with Clark to a great
extent, and Clark was going to be a problem for any British superior.
I think he mishandled Juin, or more correctly the capabilities of
Juin's forces, but then it would have taken an exceptional
Anglo-American general not to do so.
>Eisenhower did achieve a firm grip on his subordinates, including
>Montgomery.
Only thanks to de Guingand's diplomacy. Absent that and all bets are
off (imagine Monty with Wigglesworth as a Chief of Staff? OK, he was
RAF, but there were no shortage of British officers with a Pattonesque
or even Stillwellesque approach to inter-allied diplomacy).
Eisenhower's performance in North Africa wasn't that good, although I
tend to blame Anderson for much of that at the operational level.
>> But I advance him as the first
>> general to successfully grasp the fundamental _political_ reality of
>> combined Anglo-American operations - benign neglect of jealous and
>> competitive subordinates.
>
>He was well-aware of the political reality, but his handling of it was
>suboptimal.
I'd agree Eisenhower was better, but then I think he was an order of
magnitude better than anybody else (including Tedder when you consider
his anti-Monty venom) and he's therefore not a particularly valid
yardstick for determining equivalents.
>In all fairness, a British army group commander with Clark as a US
>Army commander would have faced a very difficult task.
Indeed, and this is the crux of Alexander's perceived failings IMO.
> I do believe
>that Montgomery would have managed it better: Clark would doubtless
>have written volume upon volume of pure hatred directed at him in his
>postwar memoirs, but at least he would have been made to play as part
>of a team.
Possibly; but I really do think Clark's vanity and ego issues were
even worse than Patton's. And that's saying something.
>> Dempsey seemed to manage positional/attritional battles better than
>> Patton, and was certainly capable of similar speed of exploitation.
>
>Dempsey wasn't truly bad, but he failed too many times IMO. Even when
>as e.g. during Goodwood some of the blame can be laid at Montgomery's
>feet for interfering with the battle plan, it was part of Dempsey's to
>take a firmer stand (no easy matter against Montgomery, I know, but
>see my comments on Alexander: war is hell).
I think he comes out relatively well from Goodwood, in a manner I
don't think the much-vaunted O'Connor does. The real problem with
Goodwood was managing the level of expectation involved, and the
guilty parties there were Montgomery and then the anti-Monty
partisans, led by Tedder. The operation itself, when judged within
narrower limits, was a failure but not particularly badly (or well)
handled as one of a series of offensives required to drive into the
density of the defences behind Caen. Of course, that's not how Monty
sold it, but I think Dempsey's excessive reliance on armour is
explicable, while his decision to shut it down and try again elsewhere
- no matter what controversy this caused subsequently - was justified.
>> There are
>> numerous less-celebrated US generals who were considerably better than
>> Patton IMO - Truscott, Devers, even Simpson.
>
>I'm not sure that they were "considerably better" but they were
>clearly contenders for the "better than Montgomery" award, not to
>mention the coveted "best WWII Allied general" one.
Sure; the real secret of this debate is that the binary Patton/Monty
fixation distorts the reality.
>> But the whole 'argue
>> about the personalities of the generals' thing seems a handy way of
>> avoiding more useful historical debate to me.
>
>Having fun can be useful, too.
I think that requires something more original than the usual
Patton-vs-Monty tramlines myself, though. Which I expect this thread
will soon revert to as soon as I've defended Alexander's neglect as
superior generalship which allowed him to concentrate on the more
important qualities of a commander, such as conducting agreeable
dinner conversation about the campaigns of Belisarius over a
suprisingly palatable light Italian white wine.
Gavin Bailey
--
Solution elegant. Yes. Minor problem, use 25000 CPU cycle for 1
instruction, this why all need overclock Pentium. Dumbass.
- Bart Kwan En
Rich
> And as to an answer to your question, hm... Metz?
>
> LC
Okay, Louis, I'll bite....what was done wrong with the operation at
Metz that could have been solved by some operational/tactical
brilliance? :) The problems, as I see them, were similar to those that
affected Market-Garden and were just as insoluable in the context of
what was happening at the time: logistics, troop strength (see
logistics), terrain, and weather (remind me to tell you of my Dad's
experience crossing the Moselle with the 90th Division :) ). Oh, and
to paraphrase someone else, "I think the Germans had something to do
with it?" In both cases. :)
narrl...@hotmail.com
> In article <fsava4$l7...@registered.motzarella.org>,William Black <william.bl...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
> >Patton never commanded an Army Corps.
> Briefly.
For that matter, and not that the issue is of prime importance, Monty
never commanded a corps in combat that I recall.
Narr
Michael Emrys
bob.m...@excite.com wrote on 3/26/08 8:05 AM:
> ...but surely it is obvious that NCOs under Monty's command are better placed
> to judge him than are NCOs who never got nearer to Monty than a newspaper
> report? Most NCOs who served under Monty were full of admiration for him.
Yes, but how does this enter the argument? The statement I was responding to
was:
>> ...the opinion of NCOs of the general officers placed over them is a complete
>> irrelevance.
This clearly limits the discussion to those subordinated to the general in
question. No mention was made in that post of "NCOs who never got nearer to
Monty than a newspaper report" nor did I mention them.
Michael
Michael Emrys
der Geschichte im Hefeweizen at g.j.b...@delete.me.dundee.ac.uk wrote on
3/26/08 8:07 AM:
> I think that requires something more original than the usual Patton-vs-Monty
> tramlines myself, though.
Couldn't agree more. The Patton/Montgomery debate is a black vortex into
which discussions are drawn, never to see the light of day again!
Michael
Haydn
>> The only area where their performance is comparable is North Africa.
>
> Sicily?
Overrunning the practically undefended western half of the island instead of
cutting across its "midriff" and harassing the retreating Axis where it
might hurt them made the media at home happy. It is debatable whether it
also was sound generalship.
>> Indeed Patton got thrashed by an army Montgomery had already beaten.
>
> You're talking about Kasserine Pass, perhaps?
You mean Fredendall?
Haydn
Haydn
> Now, if you want comparable positions, try Sicily. I'm more
> impressed by Patton than Montgomery in Sicily. (In fairness,
> I don't think it was one of Montgomery's best, while it was
> closer to being Patton's best.)
An autopilot in stead of both Patton and Montgomery would have achieved more
or less the the same result as the historical outcome of the campaign.
Nay, an autopilot might have performed better than Patton - by giving up the
glitzy Patton ride to Palermo and seriously helping Montgomery by closing in
on the retreating Axis and try bagging some Germans before they could be
shifted to the east.
Sicily was too small and narrow a theater with too limited maneuver space,
and too brief a campaign, to let any army commander ability shine. The
sensible, unimaginative Allied invasion plan didn't open up vast horizons of
operational glory. On both sides, it mostly was a regiment and battalion
commander battle. The Allies had several good division commanders, none
awesome. Hube's campaign management was solid - not that he had many
operational choices - , and culminated in the outstanding Axis evacuation
over the Straits to the mainland, without comparison the best piece of the
campaign.
Haydn
narrl...@hotmail.com
> >> The only area where their performance is comparable is North Africa.
I replied:
> > Sicily?
This is "Haydn" (may I call you Papa? ;-))
> Overrunning the practically undefended western half of the island instead of
> cutting across its "midriff" and harassing the retreating Axis where it
> might hurt them made the media at home happy. It is debatable whether it
> also was sound generalship.
It certainly is, and I haven't said anything at all about sound
generalship
(and likely won't). I was trying to establish that there was indeed a
period
when Patton and Montgomery were at the same command level, a fact
that the OP seemed unaware of.
> >> Indeed Patton got thrashed by an army Montgomery had already beaten.
>
> > You're talking about Kasserine Pass, perhaps?
>
> You mean Fredendall?
I, Narr, was asking the OP to clarify what thrashing he was talking
about, and theorized that he had Kasserine in mind. No other event
came to my mind, and yes, I knew that Fredendall was in charge, not
Patton.
Narr
Walt
> I know that Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery is (or was) idolised
> in the UK whereas historians and enthusiasts in the the USA tend to be
> extremely critical of him. But how is he viewed in other Commonwealth
> countries (e.g. Canada, Australia, New Zealand etc.)?
Hopefully as the gross incompetent he was.
Walt
Hal Hanig
who identified himself as being a member of the Commonwealth, something the
original poster was looking for. Have they all been struck dumb or was it
that none of them survived the experience of fighting for Monty?
ErrolC
> And for all of the conversation on this thread, I've still not noted anyone
> who identified himself as being a member of the Commonwealth, something the
> original poster was looking for. Have they all been struck dumb or was it
> that none of them survived the experience of fighting for Monty?
Freyberg (NZEF GOC) was much more impressed with Monty than his
earlier commanders. Given how those earlier commanders had treated him
and the NZ troops, that wasn't that difficult. Issues with theatre
commanders continued e.g. use of NZers in the LRDG Aegean operations
--
Errol Cavit | "Auchinleck...decided that Tobruk could not be relieved.
[... Gen.] Blamey said 'Australia is an independent nation. She came
into the war under certain definite agreements. Now, gentlemen, in the
name of my Government, I demand the relief of these troops.'"
Don Phillipson
news:dhVFj.2582$gx....@newsfe07.lga... (March 24)
> That may well be true, and it would be consistent with the original
> statement made about the high regard in which he was held by his fellow
> Brits. I have yet to hear from anyone from what was the Commonwealth in
> those days, i.e. - Canada, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
etc.
> on the subject.
My post in this thread dated March 21 cites a recent Canadian source.
> Hans Christian Hoff wrote:
> > One from time to time get the impression that some of the best military
> > minds of WWII (on the allied side at least) were not commanders in the
> > field; Marshall and Brooke spring immediately to mind.
HCH seems wrong about Brooke. He commanded a
division or corps in France in 1940 and because of his
performance there (compared with other British generals)
was in charge of the land defence of England 1940-41,
later becoming CIGS (equivalent to Marshall.) Brooke
thought he had been promised command of the Normandy
invasion and was initially hurt that that post went to
Eisenhower, who had not Brooke's field experience: but
came to agree SHAEF had to be an American since
the USA was providing most of the men and munitions,
no one was suitable to replace him as CIGS (i.e. no British
general had both Brooke's status and the personality to
moderate Churchill's passions on a daily and continuous
basis) thus accepted his lot (blowing off steam only in
his private diary, later published. This interesting document
suggests the main function of a top-level i.e. political
commander is selecting which generals to place in
command of armies and corps.)
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Hans Christian Hoff
evacuation, and therefore did not command troops in battle on any larger
scale, even though he must have (as you point out) had both the ability and
seniority to do so. He never exercised command under circumstances like
those of Monty or Patton.
Regards
Hans
"Don Phillipson" <e9...@SPAMBLOCK.ncf.ca> skrev i melding
news:fseeva$ktg$1...@theodyn.ncf.ca...
Michael Emrys
mrbrid...@hotmail.com wrote on 3/26/08 1:00 PM:
> Overrunning the practically undefended western half of the island instead of
> cutting across its "midriff" and harassing the retreating Axis where it might
> hurt them made the media at home happy. It is debatable whether it also was
> sound generalship.
Agreed. But Montgomery and Alexander get the blame for that one. The II
Corps of 7th. Army intended to cut more or less directly north from the
invasion beaches, but Montgomery demanded and Alexander approved that 8th.
Army get the use of the only highway along that route. In which case, there
was nothing for 7th. Army to do but sit on the beaches or go around to the
west.
Michael
David Thornley
Haydn <mrbrid...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote:
>
>> Now, if you want comparable positions, try Sicily. I'm more
>
>or less the the same result as the historical outcome of the campaign.
>
>Nay, an autopilot might have performed better than Patton - by giving up the
>glitzy Patton ride to Palermo and seriously helping Montgomery by closing in
>on the retreating Axis and try bagging some Germans before they could be
>shifted to the east.
>
Now, what do you mean by this?
Should Patton have attacked east, into Montgomery? Northeast, over
Mt. Etna? North to the coast? Well, actually, he did that.
Palermo was a bit to the west of the best route to the north,
but it was a strategic target in itself, being useful later on
as a port.
Montgomery had no choice but to attack east of Etna, Patton no
choice but to go north, and the Germans were in a superb position
to manage a fighting retreat.
David Thornley
Louis C <loui...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>David Thornley wrote:
>
>> He did mess up at times; so did Montgomery. Overall, I'm more
>> impressed with Patton (although I do have to allow for the
>> difference in commanding an army and an army group).
>
>Leaving aside the obvious, that Montgomery and Patton are each most
>impressive for different things, I'm still interested in how that
>opinion is arrived at.
>
Reading about Montgomery's campaigns leaves me feeling a bit
unsatisfied. There's something that seems to be missing about
attitude and results. In the Ardennes, he did an excellent
job of stabilizing the situation, and didn't seem to see
possibilities beyond that. Patton wanted to cut off all
the Germans he could, and Patton attracted quite a bit of
force from the north.
Montgomery erred on the side of caution, and Patton erred on
the side of aggressiveness. Under the circumstances, I'm going
with overaggression, since that's what the Allies needed at
the time.
No Western Allied WWII commander had the sort of varied
experiences that would allow us to consider the range of
talents. It's possible I'm focussing too much on the
historical, but I hate dinging commanders for what they
might have failed at in hypothetical circumstances.
>could be convinced). Specifically, Patton's numerous failings with
>logistics would have made him a poor army group commander.
>
It may have turned out differently in practice, but a US army
group commander was not supposed to mess with logistics.
>In Sicily, Patton captured a lot of ground, most of it useless.
The question is what fighting power he did. Pretty much everything
west of Palermo and the road just east of Palermo was useless,
but that's not where his main forces went.
Both
>Patton and Montgomery failed to nail their targets.
I'm not sure it was possible to do so.
Montgomery is
>guilty of tunnel vision, as well as thinking that the Americans were
>"our Italians" (though I would be enclined to cut him some slack over
>the latter, given how it mostly takes hindsight to know how wrong that
>was. Atkinson hadn't written his books, yet).
>
Montgomery learned differently, which not all Brits seemed to do.
Montgomery was very good.
>In similar situations, Patton also seems to have been fixated on his
>immediate target - e.g. Metz.
Not much room to maneuver, but attacking more to the south would
have been a better idea. The frontal attacks on Metz were some
of Patton's worst performances.
>circumstances. Patton seems to have been more willing to throw caution
>to the winds, and would have been hurt badly had he commanded, say,
>8th Army against Rommel.
>
Maybe. Maybe he wouldn't have been as aggressive. Maybe he would
have gotten his troops to work better on the offensive. He was
a good teacher, and seemed to get the best out of people. Maybe
he would have screwed up big-time (although as bad as Cunningham
or Ritchie, I'd think).
Again, I am uncomfortable putting a person in an ahistorical
situation and criticizing them on that part.
>I think that Clark could have been a good army commander had he
>remained under Eisenhower.
Could be, but Fifth Army did seem to pick up the pace after he
was kicked upstairs.
>Bradley felt comfortable with. And then we have 9th Army, whose
>commander seems not only to have done a good job but to have worked
>reasonably well under Montgomery. That alone deserves credit.
>
Simpson was good, as was Patch. They were not in opportunities
to excel.
>I'd definitely rate Montgomery as a better general than Bradley.
>
Agreed. My opinion is that Montgomery was an excellent commander,
just not as good as Patton.
Briarroot
>
> Montgomery had no choice but to attack east of Etna, Patton no
> choice but to go north, and the Germans were in a superb position
> to manage a fighting retreat.
>
And a good argument could be advanced that German resistance on Sicily
would have lasted much longer had Patton confined his activities to
meekly clinging to Monty's left flank.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> And for all of the conversation on this thread, I've still not noted
> anyone who identified himself as being a member of the Commonwealth,
> something the original poster was looking for. Have they all been struck
> dumb or was it that none of them survived the experience of fighting for
> Monty?
Fundamentally if you look at the numbers it is quite possible more
US formations served under Montgomery for longer than the
combined total of the commonwealth units, if you measure things
in division months.
The South African, New Zealand and Australian divisional commanders
liked Montgomery at Alamein. They finally felt they had an army
commander, rather than a remote figurehead who did not seem to be
in control. On the personal side for example Montgomery "noted" to
the Australian divisional commander the Australian troops were not
doing much saluting, and was told to wave as the troops would then
wave back, this Montgomery did.
The 4th Indian division was commanded by a British general, was
lightly engaged at Alamein and did not see action again as a division
until Tunisia, if you are counting India as a Commonwealth nation.
Post battle the Australians went home, the South Africans moved from
8th Army (and ultimately formed the core of 6th South African Armoured
division training in South Africa), leaving the New Zealanders who
served for the remainder of the campaign and then rested until October
1943. Then add the 4th Indian, which appears to be the only Indian
formation that served under Montgomery.
Simply put Montgomery earned credit in the Commonwealth because
he basically kept winning during his stay in the desert, the controversy
comes from whether he could have done more, but he is rated as an
improvement on many of the British generals the Commonwealth dealt
with in North Africa. This and since he did keep winning helps his
reputation.
In Sicily there were the Canadian units, and again in North West Europe.
So the Canadians would be the members of the Commonwealth with the
most direct exposure, followed by the New Zealanders. The rest of the
Commonwealth really only has the news stories and the histories to use,
apart from the successful attack at Alamein, and as we know there is a
large mixed bag of Montgomery related histories out there.
The general rule for Montgomery is most of the praise comes from
subordinates and most of the criticism comes from those parallel or
senior to him in the chain of command. Since the Commonwealth
formations were junior I would expect the above ratio to mean they
would overall be favourable to Montgomery. There is also the point
Montgomery is a peripheral figure for much of the Commonwealth,
Nimitz and MacArthur loom larger for the Pacific for example, so
the debates about him are not as important as it seems to be for
the British and US. For the Indians I would expect generals like
Slim to be more important.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Bill Baker
> ...Montgomery is
> guilty of tunnel vision, as well as thinking that the Americans were
> "our Italians" (though I would be enclined to cut him some slack over
> the latter, given how it mostly takes hindsight to know how wrong that
> was. Atkinson hadn't written his books, yet).
And yet if you are inclined to cut him such slack, you'd be just as
dramatically wrong as he was.
Not that I'm just another Brit-bashing, Patton-lauding Ami. Far from
it. But to claim that any British general officer required post-facto
hindsight in 1942 to recognize that the US armed forces were not, and
would never be again, "our Italians" is grossly inaccurate. The moment
for any--and every--British professional officer to recognize that fact
was September 1918, not July of '43. By then, in every respect
_except_ for professional skill at the general officer and seasoned NCO
levels, the US armed forces ranged from on par to vastly superior to
Commonwealth forces. Unquestionably, in broad terms.
(Had WWII broken out in 1936, of course, things would have been very
different.)
So there's no question that Monty would be rightly damned for the
hubris--and, having read Thucydides, I am using the Greek correctly--of
dismissing those wayward, Jacobite colonials as "our Italians" whence
sailing for Salerno. That still leaves Patton as Monty's "Italian," in
theory. And yet, Monty was there when the cream of the American
professional officer corps made its mark at Saint-Mihiel, proving upon
a European battlefield that the professional, institutional core of the
United States Army was unquestionably on par with that of the German or
British general staffs in terms of quality (but not quantity).
It's not just that Montgomery was a rather difficult subordinate as a
general officer: he was, due to cultural bias, a bloody awful peer to
his battlefield peers among the American officer corps--not just
Patton. And by doing so he caused countless unnecessary Allied
casualties.
Hal Hanig
> In article
> <83651d1c-8e3a-435b...@m44g2000hsc.googlegroups.com>, Louis
> C
> <loui...@yahoo.com> wrote:
(Snipped for brevity)
>> I think that Clark could have been a good army commander had he
>> remained under Eisenhower.
>
> Could be, but Fifth Army did seem to pick up the pace after he
> was kicked upstairs.
Clark wasn't too highly thought of by his own troops. The Rapido River
crossings weren't very well executed and cost the 36th Division considerable
and what some considered to be needless casualties. The Anzio beachhead was
pretty generally considered to have suffered from excessive caution by its
field commanders and Clark did little if anything to inspire them to explore
alternate options. Towards the end of the war in Italy, he acquired the
companionship of a female Romanian who managed to offend just about
everybody she met.
>
(Snip)
Michael Emrys
thor...@visi.com wrote on 3/27/08 6:04 AM:
> Maybe he [Patton] would have screwed up big-time (although as bad as
> Cunningham or Ritchie, I'd think).
Assuming that you meant to write "...not as bad...", I tend to agree. I
don't think he would have made the same mistakes, although he might well
have made others. But I don't think he would have dispersed his forces,
especially his armor, in the manner that those two generals did.
Michael
Louis C
> Okay, Louis, I'll bite....what was done wrong with the operation at
> Metz that could have been solved by some operational/tactical
> brilliance? :)
I'm not saying that there was an operational or tactical rabbit that
Patton could or should have pulled out of his helmet to capture Metz
on the run.
On the other hand, the Metz position was an attack (at the operational
level) too far, just as Arnhem was for Montgomery.
Where I agree my comparison is flawed is that Market-Garden could have
captured Arnhem if managed properly while it's difficult to imagine
Patton capturing Metz on the fly. I'll accept the correction and
compare Patton's attitude with that of Haig at Paschendaele rather
than with that of Montgomery at Arnhem if you feel there's a
significant difference :)
Note that Market-Garden could have been rescued at the tactical level
(Arnhem captured) but at the operational level (Allies are home free
east of the Rhine) the Allied wetdream wasn't going to happen IMO.
LC
ErrolC
wrote:
<snip>
> On the personal side for example Montgomery "noted" to
> the Australian divisional commander the Australian troops were not
> doing much saluting, and was told to wave as the troops would then
> wave back, this Montgomery did.
>
The version of this story that I've heard most often involves Freyberg
and an earlier British General (or Colonel). See for instance
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,16905970-1702,00.html
I've seen versions that give the General's name and a rough date, I'll
see if I can dig it out.
<snip>
Errol Cavit | General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence, Aug 1940:
"I wish the people of New Zealand could know the wonderful effect the
presence of our men had upon the people at Home here. I also wish they
could have seen the fine sight of 6000 bronzed New Zealanders marching
across the Sussex Weald."
Rich
> I'm not saying that there was an operational or tactical rabbit that
> Patton could or should have pulled out of his helmet to capture Metz
> on the run.
Indeed, by that time there was very little running being done on the
Allied side, from mid-September on it was mostly slogging.
> On the other hand, the Metz position was an attack (at the operational
> level) too far, just as Arnhem was for Montgomery.
In that sense you could say that practically all Allied ground
operations during the fall of 1944 were "attacks too far"?
Insufficient means and over-optimistic objectives was something of the
order of the day for the Allies in this period. The sensible thing to
do was to push matters in a maximum effort in Holland and Belgium, but
unfortunately the Allied disposition of forces made that a little
impractical and I'm not clear that a massive reshuffling of forces
would have solved much in the long run? But anyway, I think it would
have been impractical and impolitic, not to mention not militarily
wise, for 12th Army Group to have reverted primarily to a defensive
while letting the Commonwealth solve the problem?
> Where I agree my comparison is flawed is that Market-Garden could have
> captured Arnhem if managed properly while it's difficult to imagine
> Patton capturing Metz on the fly. I'll accept the correction and
> compare Patton's attitude with that of Haig at Paschendaele rather
> than with that of Montgomery at Arnhem if you feel there's a
> significant difference :)
Well, "Metz" *was* pretty much captured on the fly, but the
fortifications surrounding it and controlling the lines of
communication were not, nor should they realistically have been
expected to have been. That was kind of the major problem. :)
But eliminate that and it still becomes a matter similar to that
experienced by the Allies all along the front, their transitory
massive superiority in virtually everything during August-September
had devolved down to a material superiority and even there the
superiority was bedeviled with problems (rationed artillery
ammunition, insufficient replacements and spares for tanks, and poor
weather negating airpower).
> Note that Market-Garden could have been rescued at the tactical level
> (Arnhem captured) but at the operational level (Allies are home free
> east of the Rhine) the Allied wetdream wasn't going to happen IMO.
Quite true. OTOH I don't think the same could be said for Metz, since
it was unlikely the Germans could have been "bounced" out of their
prepared fortifications. But even if it had been the reality was that
Allied logistical limitations would have put paid to any ambitions for
an exploitation beyond the Saar. However, again in that sense, that
was no different than anywhere else for the Allies; blaming the
logistical situation on the army commander is a bit naive (BTW, nor do
I blame Monty for the situation either, the assumption that Antwerp
"should" have been cleared earlier simply ignores the reality of the
situation the Allies were in by mid September).
ThePro
>
> Montgomery had no choice but to attack east of Etna,
John Keegan wrote in "The Second World War", page 348:
"While Patton occupied the western half, Montgomery was to advanced
each side of Mount Etna and secure Messina at the north-eastern tip,
thus cutting off the Axis garrison's line of retreat into the toe of
Italy. In the event, Patton made rapid progress against light
resistance, but Montgomery, opposed by the Hermann Goering Division,
found it impossible to pass east of Mount Etna on the short route to
Messina and was forced to redeploy his divisions to pass to the west."
So it appears he passed to the *west" after all.
Pierrot Robert
Chicoutimi, Canada
David Thornley
Die Whigphilosophie der Geschichte im Hefeweizen <g.j.b...@delete.me.dundee.ac.uk> wrote:
>
>I tend to feel that comes from his experience with Clark to a great
>extent, and Clark was going to be a problem for any British superior.
Granted, but Alexander had other opportunities to show some
firmness. In North Africa, he let Montgomery do what he wanted,
which was actually a pretty good choice. In Sicily, he
let his subordinates fight their own wars, although he did
have authority (Patton didn't fight when Alexander removed
a road from his sector).
To me, it doesn't look like just Clark. Alexander looks
inadequate for high command, since "command" just wasn't
what he did.
I believe that Montgomery was the best British general
above the position of army commander in Europe and
Africa, and I don't think it's all that close.
David Thornley
Rich <Rich...@msn.com> wrote:
>
>Quite true. OTOH I don't think the same could be said for Metz, since
>it was unlikely the Germans could have been "bounced" out of their
>prepared fortifications.
Which doesn't make one try a bad idea. Maybe Patton could have gotten
lucky, maybe not. The problem with trying to bounce a potentially
defended position is not so much that it's unwise, but that either
the commander looks bad, or the commander looks like he got away
with something by sheer luck.
>logistical situation on the army commander is a bit naive (BTW, nor do
>I blame Monty for the situation either, the assumption that Antwerp
>"should" have been cleared earlier simply ignores the reality of the
>situation the Allies were in by mid September).
>
Well, there's the question of whether it could have been cleared
earlier than it actually was. Clearly, it wasn't going to be in
September. The Allies were unable to advance north of the canal
at first, due to German resistance.
Robert Sveinson
news:b0fcd400-1b55-4ddf...@2g2000hsn.googlegroups.com...
As opposed to the very competent Patton?
http://www.thetroubleshooters.com/br/br059.html
On 15 Jan. 45 (approx) we were evacuated from Oflag 64 because of the
Russian advance from Warsaw and we made about 350 miles on foot to Parchim,
northwest of Berlin. Starting with some 900+ POW's sleeping in haylofts
along the way through snow across Pomerania and westward, about 425 of us
were entrained (box cars again) to Hammelburg where we met up with several
[hundred] POW's captured in the Battle of the Bulge.** Gen. Patton's
son-in-law,** Lt. Col. John Waters, was one of us and whether or not that
had anything to do with events, a rescue attempt was launched from
Acheffenburg by the 4th Armored. They got us out, but Lt. Col. Waters was
wounded and had to be left in the Hammelburg Medical facility. However,
the
whole rescue failed the next morning and we POW's and the "rescuers" were
all captured and transported by rail to Nuremburg
http://www.hesperianbeacon.com/111050news.htm
In the final stages of the war Colvin participated in "Task Force
Baum", also known as "Patton's secret mission". The mission, which was
personally approved by Patton, was a daring operation in which an American
task force of the 4th Armored Division attempted to advance 50 miles into
enemy territory to liberate the prisoner-of-war camp OfLag XII in
Hammelburg. The task force was named after it's commander, Cpt. Abraham
Baum.
The prison camp was known for housing many American officers,
including Patton's son-in-law Lt. Col. John Knight Waters.
According to Military Magazine.com among the prisoners at Oflag were a
group of captured officers from the Battle of the Bulge, North Africa, and
the Normandy Invasion--a total of about 1,500 American officer prisoners of
war.
Colvin says he was part of an advance patrol sent to look for the
prison camp and "get **Patton's son-in-law** out". "We were on a patrol
ahead of the front lines," said Colvin. "When we got to the camp where we
thought they were, there was no one there. They had been moved. We
(approximately 200) were subsequently captured, on March 26, 1945, while on
this patrol, and spent 34 days as Prisoners of War
http://www.pitt.edu/~rice/april02.htm
Carlo D'Este's recent biography of General George Patton relates
another rescue attempt. **Patton's son-in-law** was a POW in a
German stalag not too far
behind the lines during the last months of the war. Against the advice of
his staff, and his own better judgment, when Patton found his army within
striking distance of the stalag, he detailed a task force to liberate the
camp. The mission was a fiasco. The task force was destroyed with all
elements killed or captured. The force even made it to the gates of the
camp
where the final fire fight ensued. In the melee, Patton's son-in-law was
wounded in the buttocks as he scrambled towards the approaching column. The
end result was that the son-in-law, and the remnants of the task force, had
to wait for VE day for their liberation.
Would Patton have risked his combat machine, had a close
relative not been in that stalag? Of course not, because he never did it on
any other occasion and he knew it was a waste of his precious combat
strength and contributed nothing to the ultimate destruction of the enemy.
The logic of combat is no different in '03. Unfortunately, neither is human
stupidity. So, as happened in 1945, the two cancelled each other out again
this week.
>
Louis C
> [re Alexander]
>
> >He was supposed to be a war-fighting general. War is a nasty business,
> >there can be casualties, and a general's peace of mind is usually one
> >of them.
>
> Oh, I think it's pretty clear Alexander could maintain his peace of
> mind in the most stressful circumstances, to the point that his
> critics make this one of the main charges against him.
And somewhat unoriginally, so do I even though my general assessment
is favorable.
I'm not aware of Alexander telling one of his subordinates "you can't
talk to me like that, I'm your boss", let alone "you can't act like
that, I'm your boss".
As far as I know (which isn't very far), Alexander wasn't appointed
because of his perceived hands off approach to leadership. So there
was no implicit assumption that he would keep people like Montgomery
and, later, American subordinates on a very loose rein. Therefore,
that he ended up doing so was his own personal choice.
> >I like Alexander and consider him a fairly good general myself. On the
> >other hand, managing prima dona's is definitely part of the job when
> >you reach high rank, if for no other reason that the people likely to
> >reach the kind of rank that an army group & theater commander will
> >have to manage are going to be prima dona's. Alexander failed at that,
> >period.
>
> I tend to feel that comes from his experience with Clark to a great
> extent, and Clark was going to be a problem for any British superior.
> I think he mishandled Juin, or more correctly the capabilities of
> Juin's forces, but then it would have taken an exceptional
> Anglo-American general not to do so.
No, his management of Montgomery was similarly nonexistant.
It turned out all right in North Africa because Montgomery was
basically doing the right thing and Alexander only had the one
important subordinate to manage so no personality clashes. But what
this means is that Alexander essentially lucked out, not that this is
evidence of sound "human resources management".
Further note that Montgomery feeling that he could essentially ignore
Alexander's guidance was one of the reasons behind Allied
disappointments in Sicily (though I would agree with Rich here that
the Germans also had something to do with it, and would have had
regardless of the Allied plan).
In Tunisia, Montgomery was too much a professional to play against his
own team (as Clark would have done) so after his own offensive had
essentially failed he cooperated by sending his best units north. But
again that is a case of Alexander lucking out with Montgomery, not one
of his successfully managing him.
> >Eisenhower did achieve a firm grip on his subordinates, including
> >Montgomery.
>
> Only thanks to de Guingand's diplomacy. Absent that and all bets are
> off (imagine Monty with Wigglesworth as a Chief of Staff?
Can't, I don't know him.
My impression is that de Guingand saved Montgomery's job, not
Eisenhower's. Absent his diplomacy, Monty would probably have been
kicked upstairs to another posting. A British Stillwell would
definitely have accomplished that.
> Eisenhower's performance in North Africa wasn't that good, although I
> tend to blame Anderson for much of that at the operational level.
Eisenhower's performance wasn't stellar in North Africa, though he did
get things his way regarding the management of his top subordinates.
Which seems to have been Alexander's main failing.
Additionally, if you decide that Eisenhower was an ordinary - if
gifted - human being as opposed to God of inter-Allied cooperation
then he becomes a valid yardstick to compare others with.
Let's bring this one step further. How many instances were there
during WWII of managing international forces? I'll consider British &
Commonwealth nationalities to be the same, and will also consider
minor allies (Poles, Belgians, Free French, Brazilians etc) as not
worth bothering with either. What I'm interested in is leadership at
army/ army group level where a significant part of the force under
command is from another nationality.
Here are some of the entrants, though I may be missing some and
readers are free to supply other examples.
French Army Group 1, with the BEF as one of the subordinate armies.
Management was generally poor. Things went very smoothly because both
Paris and London made it extra clear that things had to go smoothly,
also Gort was the kind of subordinate that anyone except a committed
sado-masochist would pick over Clark or Montgomery. On the other hand,
once things became awry and the need arose for a firm grip at army
group level, Gort found himself essentially on his own. So Billotte
was a lousy army group commander, which I'm sure will come as no great
scoop.
Panzerarmee Afrika. Rommel doesn't seem to have done a particularly
good job, though he treated his Italian subordinates only marginally
worse than he did his German ones. He did get the Italians to do what
he wanted them to (except the Regia Marina which wasn't his to
command) so I'd count that as successful, if not particularly
diplomatic, management.
Then we have Alexander's record in North Africa, Sicily and Italy:
generally not very satisfactory.
Clark as Alexander's successor was no better, but as with Billotte
this will come as no surprise.
Not sure how Montgomery rates as an army group commander in Normandy.
He didn't really try to manage Bradley, on the other hand Bradley
wasn't someone like Clark or Patton he just bid his time until he
could be free. I think that if Clark had been Montgomery's main
American subordinate then Monty wouldn't have shirked from a fight,
but that may be optimistic of me.
Eisenhower's management is generally described as good.
We should also hear it for Devers who had to manage a very difficult
French subordinate. De Lattre wanted equal status for his army though
he lacked most of the support assets that an American army had, and as
such the man was a pain. 6th Army Group was successfully managed,
though. Some of the credit should go to Patch who was very sympathetic
to the plight of his French counterparts and went out of his way to
help them out when he could. De Lattre, like Montgomery, also
benefited from staff members with greater diplomatic skills. In that
case, the language barrier was actually helpful.
I'm not sure that Burma should count here, though anyone wishing to
compare Slim / Stillwell with Alexander / Clark would be welcome.
Then we have MacArthur with his Australians, but then again there was
no Australian Clark or Montgomery to manage so he had it easy.
The bottom line is that few Allied commanders had to manage inter-
Allied forces with difficult subordinates. It seems clear that
military leaders were not prepared for that kind of task, as
illustrated by the attitude of those like Billotte, Stillwell and
Clark to mention but the better-known though the list of suspects is a
long one. A lot of the commanders who did have a successful record
lucked out thanks to easy to command subordinates (Billotte until 15
May 1940, MacArthur), so we can't know if someone like MacArthur would
have done a better job than Alexander. I would tend to say the same of
Devers because even De Lattre was no Clark, more like a Montgomery:
the man was a pain but ultimately he was still a team player.
So there are really two ways to look at it. According to the score
card, there were 5 Allied commanders at army level and above and based
on his success Alexander ranks fourth, before Billotte but behind
Eisenhower, Devers and MacArthur. Another point of view is to assume
that Clark was a one of a kind proposition, only Eisenhower and
Alexander ever had to manage him though Eisenhower didn't have to deal
with battlefield friction and he, too, was a one of a kind
proposition. Unsurprisingly, this leads to more favorable an
assessment of Alexander :)
I don't subscribe to the generous view, but I agree with you that
Alexander was one of the few generals to grasp that multi-national
commands were not the same as traditional ones.
> Possibly; but I really do think Clark's vanity and ego issues were
> even worse than Patton's. And that's saying something.
You'll find no argument from anyone that Clark was worse than Patton
on almost every count (logistics being a likely exception).
On the other hand, Bradley managed Patton while Alexander didn't
manage Clark. As I like Alexander better than Bradley, please don't
drive me to the conclusion that Bradley was the better army group
commander of the two.
> I think he comes out relatively well from Goodwood, in a manner I
> don't think the much-vaunted O'Connor does.
He comes out fairly well from Goodwood, what I blamed him for wasn't
his conduct of the battle but his allowing Montgomery to interfere
(with negative consequences, as it turned out) with his battle plan.
Dempsey doesn't come out nearly as well from other Normandy
engagements like the various attempts to outflank the Germans. I'm not
sure that successful management of a tactical situation with very few
options (i.e. frontal attritional attack) is sufficient to rate as a
good general.
> Sure; the real secret of this debate is that the binary Patton/Monty
> fixation distorts the reality.
I think that Montgomery was the better army group commander, Patton
was the better corps commander.
The interesting comparison would be between Patton and Rommel. Patton
would have been a very successful panzer commander had he served in
Wehrmacht uniform. He had the proper operational worldview.
> Which I expect this thread
> will soon revert to as soon as I've defended Alexander's neglect as
> superior generalship which allowed him to concentrate on the more
> important qualities of a commander, such as conducting agreeable
> dinner conversation about the campaigns of Belisarius over a
> suprisingly palatable light Italian white wine.
This is a clever defense, the only problem with it is that it pits
Alexander against another high level commander who was excellent at
making cultured conversation over a good dinner with good wines.
I'm not sure that demonstrating that Alexander was the same kind of
person as Gamelin is going to help your case, though...
LC
Louis C
> But to claim that any British general officer required post-facto
> hindsight in 1942 to recognize that the US armed forces were not, and
> would never be again, "our Italians" is grossly inaccurate. The moment
> for any--and every--British professional officer to recognize that fact
> was September 1918, not July of '43.
With respect, this is silly.
Montgomery was guilty of thinking that, in Sicily, 8th Army was
significantly better as a fighting formation than 7th Army.
None of this has to do with how the British & Americans behaved in
relation to one another in 1918. You might even want to throw in 1812
and 1777 while you're at it.
For that matter, the Italians had a very effective army in September
1918. So had the British and the French, whose armies by then were far
better than the AEF. So when I quoted the "our Italians" bit, this
wasn't a claim about the American gene pool being more or less warlike
than the British one. It was in reference to the situation as of
mid-1943. A lot of British officers thought that US troops were no
good, which had nothing to do with their having been good before or
their having the potential to become good later. The French army had
been rated as excellent by the British in 1918, and then as near
worthless after May 1940.
LC
Hal Hanig
> In article <u7lku395q8m8f1m9e...@4ax.com>,
> Die Whigphilosophie der Geschichte im Hefeweizen
> <g.j.b...@delete.me.dundee.ac.uk> wrote:
>>
>> I tend to feel that comes from his experience with Clark to a great
>> extent, and Clark was going to be a problem for any British superior.
>
> Granted, but Alexander had other opportunities to show some
> firmness. In North Africa, he let Montgomery do what he wanted,
> which was actually a pretty good choice. In Sicily, he
> let his subordinates fight their own wars, although he did
> have authority (Patton didn't fight when Alexander removed
> a road from his sector).
>
> To me, it doesn't look like just Clark. Alexander looks
> inadequate for high command, since "command" just wasn't
> what he did.
If you can use the words "command" and "lead" interchangeably, it has been
variously said that good leadership is the ability to get others to do as
you wish without having to order them to do so. IOW, they do as you wish
because they wish to please you, not because they fear being imprisoned or
shot because of their failures. Under that definition, wouldn't Alexander
fare a bit better than he did in your initial assessment?
I served in Italy during his tenure (albeit at a modest commissioned level)
and I don't remember that we Americans who tend to be jingoistic about such
matters were particularly unhappy about his performance.
L2008
news:085c7e97-5891-4678...@s37g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
> A lot of British officers thought that US troops were no
> good,
That is disingenuous. They may have perceived them as "green", which they
were initially. As time went on and they became battle hardened that view
of course changed. However no matter how experienced they were, US troops
tended to shoot at anything that moved - even their own :)
Die Whigphilosophie der Geschichte im Hefeweizen
wrote:
>I'm not aware of Alexander telling one of his subordinates "you can't
>talk to me like that, I'm your boss", let alone "you can't act like
>that, I'm your boss".
The fact that he didn't have to is a reflection on his capacity;
Eisenhower may deserve some credit for diplomatically drawing a line
in front of Monty verbally, but he doesn't deserve any for letting the
situation get to that point to start with (neither does Monty; in fact
he deserves far more criticism than Ike for that situation). Meanwhile
Alexander played a decisive role in in the removal of Fredendall,
Dawley and Lucas; so he was entirely capable of sacking subordinate
commanders. He was just more skillful at arranging for others to
actually do the deed while retaining plausible deniability after the
fact.
>As far as I know (which isn't very far), Alexander wasn't appointed
>because of his perceived hands off approach to leadership. So there
>was no implicit assumption that he would keep people like Montgomery
>and, later, American subordinates on a very loose rein. Therefore,
>that he ended up doing so was his own personal choice.
I definitely believe his appointment to North Africa was partially in
response to Auckinleck's failure to find somebody other than himself
to manage the operational battle against Rommel. In other words, the
loose rein was a deliberate option in tandem with the appointment of a
subordinate commander to manage the distasteful necessity of winning
the land battle without excessive disruption of the Army-Group-level
staff's dinner menu in the Cairo restaurants.
>No, his management of Montgomery was similarly nonexistant.
Yes. Although to be fair Monty's boasts to US colleagues about
ignoring his orders shouldn't be taken at face value. One aspect of
that situation (at least in Tunisia and then Sicily) is that
subordinate American commanders such as Patton felt they couldn't
openly jockey against Monty (or perviously, Anderson) under a British
superior. Monty had no such qualms, so Alexander's indulgence of him
was - in part - due to the relatively less-assertive approach of the
US commanders involved, who were making a sincere attempt to make
integrated combined allied command work, regardless of the spleen they
vented to one another at the time or in later memoirs.
>It turned out all right in North Africa because Montgomery was
>basically doing the right thing and Alexander only had the one
>important subordinate to manage so no personality clashes. But what
>this means is that Alexander essentially lucked out, not that this is
>evidence of sound "human resources management".
It becomes sounder when the ability of commanders in his position to
actually influence their subordinates into doing (convincingly) what
they didn't want to do comes into question; Anglo-American commanders
had considerably more autonomy and capacity to 'do their own thing'
than either the Germans or Russians did. Alexander's failings (and
they are failings) take place at the intersection of these
responsibilities, where most allied commanders made more obvious
efforts than Alexander, but were rewarded with similar problematic
results.
>Further note that Montgomery feeling that he could essentially ignore
>Alexander's guidance was one of the reasons behind Allied
>disappointments in Sicily (though I would agree with Rich here that
>the Germans also had something to do with it, and would have had
>regardless of the Allied plan).
Well, I think you're aware of my opinion on this, but I will re-state
it here; the subsequent inter-allied and inter-commander bickering
fueled by self-righteous post-war memoirs has less to do with the
speed of the allied advance than the resistance the Germans put up on
the ground. In Sicily whoever took on the main German defence lines
south of Etna was going to have a hard time, while whoever over-ran
the country to the west was going to have an easier job, and and
easier time making subsequent speculation about what they could have
done if only the situations had been reversed. Who had access to what
road before butting into the German defences was, in my view,
irrelevant, and only useful to determine the nature of the personal
antagonisms between the commanders involved at the time.
>In Tunisia, Montgomery was too much a professional to play against his
>own team (as Clark would have done) so after his own offensive had
>essentially failed he cooperated by sending his best units north. But
>again that is a case of Alexander lucking out with Montgomery, not one
>of his successfully managing him.
And yet Alexander did make decisions against Monty's interests; e.g.
opting for using the First Army rather than the Eighth for VULCAN and
STRIKE.
>> >Eisenhower did achieve a firm grip on his subordinates, including
>> >Montgomery.
>>
>> Only thanks to de Guingand's diplomacy. Absent that and all bets are
>> off (imagine Monty with Wigglesworth as a Chief of Staff?
>
>Can't, I don't know him.
Described as '...a blunt Yorkshireman quite without charm..' by one of
his subordinates at AEAF HQ in 1944, and openly detested by some of
his US counterparts. For once that detestation does seem to be based
on the actual (as opposed to the assumed) attitude of the British
officer in question.
>My impression is that de Guingand saved Montgomery's job, not
>Eisenhower's.
That de Guingand could save Monty (according to his memoir, at any
rate) speaks volumes about the nature of the Ike-Monty relationship
absent the presence of such subordinates.
> Absent his diplomacy, Monty would probably have been
>kicked upstairs to another posting.
If Eisenhower had thought his authority could have standed it, I
expect he would have been kicked upstairs anyway.
> A British Stillwell would
>definitely have accomplished that.
A British Stillwell would certainly have been relieved or pushed into
the background by then; but I really don't think there was one,
despite Anderson's best efforts to challenge him for that particular
crown.
>Eisenhower's performance wasn't stellar in North Africa, though he did
>get things his way regarding the management of his top subordinates.
>Which seems to have been Alexander's main failing.
Eisenhower was deliberately pushed into the stratosphere by deliberate
British policy concerning the appointment of his immediate
subordinates. This is not a recommendation for his personal genius at
the time.
>Additionally, if you decide that Eisenhower was an ordinary - if
>gifted - human being as opposed to God of inter-Allied cooperation
>then he becomes a valid yardstick to compare others with.
My point is not that Eisenhower was divine, but that I think he was
the best general, American or British, at that aspect of the job
despite the ability of some British commanders to combine inter-allied
diplomacy with operational ability (Tedder) and inter-allied diplomacy
with agreeable dinner-party conversation (Alexander). Which means
anybody judged against him will come up short.
>Let's bring this one step further. How many instances were there
>during WWII of managing international forces? I'll consider British &
>Commonwealth nationalities to be the same, and will also consider
>minor allies (Poles, Belgians, Free French, Brazilians etc) as not
>worth bothering with either. What I'm interested in is leadership at
>army/ army group level where a significant part of the force under
>command is from another nationality.
>
>Here are some of the entrants, though I may be missing some and
>readers are free to supply other examples.
Billotte = 'lousy'. No disagreement here. Two reasons the BEF and
French got along reasonably well before 10 May 1940 were the
realisation at all levels on both sides of the political importance of
working together (regardless of the relative military unimportance of
the BEF), and the fact that there was no major operational strain
until the Germans put some pressure on the relationship.
Rommel = 'successful'. Within limits, agreed. Although he did
irritate the Italians considerably at times, and exploit them for the
benefit of the DAK more than once.
>Then we have Alexander's record in North Africa, Sicily and Italy:
>generally not very satisfactory.
And yet he still did better than Rommel.....
>Clark as Alexander's successor was no better, but as with Billotte
>this will come as no surprise.
I'd say Clark was significantly worse; his relationships with his own
American subordinates could be poisonous in a manner that Alexander's
never seem to have been.
>Not sure how Montgomery rates as an army group commander in Normandy.
>He didn't really try to manage Bradley,
The Alexander approach in action; you say incompetence, I say
'intelligent understanding of the limitations present in the context
of inter-allied command'. Except I suspect Alex's dinner parties were
more convivial than Monty's.
> on the other hand Bradley
>wasn't someone like Clark or Patton he just bid his time until he
>could be free.
As they could/should have (although to be fair, Patton in Tunisia was
an uncharacteristically good boy on that front).
> I think that if Clark had been Montgomery's main
>American subordinate then Monty wouldn't have shirked from a fight,
>but that may be optimistic of me.
Which US commanders did Monty play any role in sacking? He certainly
was prepared to sack his own; Alex went one stage further and directly
facilitated the US removal of at least three Corps commanders.
>Eisenhower's management is generally described as good.
Not by Brooke. But then I'm not sure he admitted anybody was any
good, ever.
[Devers vs De Lattre = good].
OK. But I question the scale and complexity of the problems at hand.
>I'm not sure that Burma should count here, though anyone wishing to
>compare Slim / Stillwell with Alexander / Clark would be welcome.
Well, it doesn't count on the Army/Army Group level, but Stillwell
really did excel himself at alienating the British for pointless
reasons, which is some feat when you consider that alone out of US
commanders, he was logistically dependent upon them. I remain
convinced that's rather special, although he was also effective at
alienating the Chinese so I'm not sure if I can isolate his
Anglophobia for particular attention.
>Then we have MacArthur with his Australians, but then again there was
>no Australian Clark or Montgomery to manage so he had it easy.
I'm not sure the Australians were happy with him after the early phase
of the 'defend Australia' relationship. There were certainly areas
where he got their backs up, and he had disagreements with Blamey for
the use of AIF forces in the Philippines, for example. How this
percolated down or up from the operational level I don't know,
however.
> ... we can't know if someone like MacArthur would
>have done a better job than Alexander.
I substantially doubt that. He may have achieved a greater 'grip' of
his subordinates, at least in terms of inter-allied animosity and
personal conflict to excite later historians, but I think how far this
would have extended into better results on the battlefield is
problematic.
>I would tend to say the same of
>Devers because even De Lattre was no Clark, more like a Montgomery:
>the man was a pain but ultimately he was still a team player.
I like Simpson myself, mainly because the lack of attention his
experience under Monty attracts. Somehow he avoided all the animus
surrounding the other prima donnas, and I can't see any obvious
controversy which can be blamed on his incompetence by jealous British
observers. Based on that limited understanding, he seems to have done
well. I believe he even got Churchill to move back from the front
line during the Rhine crossings by personal intervention, which is
more than Brooke could manage, and that deserves some credit.
>So there are really two ways to look at it. According to the score
>card, there were 5 Allied commanders at army level and above and based
>on his success Alexander ranks fourth, before Billotte but behind
>Eisenhower, Devers and MacArthur.
I really don't think Devers had the scale or complexities of problems
to confront as Alexander did, and there's no evidence of his
discerning palette for Italian wine. Therefore I'm going to rank him
below Alex, whose failures and successes were larger in scale.
MacArthur I flatly disagree with; he had all the benefits of
logistical and force dominance, a compliant allied government as the
Australian administration hooked themselves to his coat-tails, and he
still managed to piss his subordinate force commanders off eventually.
>Another point of view is to assume
>that Clark was a one of a kind proposition, only Eisenhower and
>Alexander ever had to manage him though Eisenhower didn't have to deal
>with battlefield friction and he, too, was a one of a kind
>proposition. Unsurprisingly, this leads to more favorable an
>assessment of Alexander :)
I'm not sure there was that much difference between Patton and Clark
in terms of attitude, although even I am compelled to admit Patton was
a better operational commander.
>I don't subscribe to the generous view, but I agree with you that
>Alexander was one of the few generals to grasp that multi-national
>commands were not the same as traditional ones.
Plus he had a good wine cellar. Or access to some unfortunate
Italian's excellent wine cellar.
>On the other hand, Bradley managed Patton while Alexander didn't
>manage Clark.
Bradley managed a contrite Patton at the critical initial phase of the
first commitment of US troops against the Germans within a larger
British force. They kept their chauvanism and jealousy under tight
control in a manner they (or at least Patton) were unwilling to do
once they believed they had earned the right to relax later on.
>As I like Alexander better than Bradley, please don't
>drive me to the conclusion that Bradley was the better army group
>commander of the two.
I think that's a win for Alexander, although not as comfortably for
him as his demeanour would suggest.
>> I think he comes out relatively well from Goodwood, in a manner I
>> don't think the much-vaunted O'Connor does.
>
>He comes out fairly well from Goodwood, what I blamed him for wasn't
>his conduct of the battle but his allowing Montgomery to interfere
>(with negative consequences, as it turned out) with his battle plan.
Unfortunately superior officers, and direct commanders, often do this;
this is a fault against Monty, not Dempsey.
>Dempsey doesn't come out nearly as well from other Normandy
>engagements like the various attempts to outflank the Germans.
I think Bucknall and Erskine were deservedly sacked for those. I'd
say Dempsey might have been over-sensitive to the need to constrain
offensives by the need to be prepared for the inevitable German
counter-attack, but this was a sensitivity borne of experience and
entirely justifiable. As it happens Dempsey's attacks usually
attained some operational progress even if they were strategic
failures, while he was always able to defeat German counter-attacks
from the strongest forces Rommel had available. This becomes less
impressive when judged against the Holy Grail of achiving the decisive
breakthrough which the US achieved in COBRA, but then I don't think
that's a realistic standard of judgement in the conditions.
> I'm not
>sure that successful management of a tactical situation with very few
>options (i.e. frontal attritional attack) is sufficient to rate as a
>good general.
I think he demonstrated a competence that would have been welcome if
it had been displayed by Ritchie at Gazala or even Patton in Lorraine.
I don't think he was an outstanding general, but I do think he was a
good one.
>I think that Montgomery was the better army group commander, Patton
>was the better corps commander.
But I suspect Monty was a better divisional commander.
>The interesting comparison would be between Patton and Rommel. Patton
>would have been a very successful panzer commander had he served in
>Wehrmacht uniform. He had the proper operational worldview.
I think he lacked Rommel's tactical sensibility, and would have gone
forward to indulge his personal sense of theatrics while Rommel went
forward to achieve less vainglorious and more pragmatic ends, and did
so.
>This is a clever defense, the only problem with it is that it pits
>Alexander against another high level commander who was excellent at
>making cultured conversation over a good dinner with good wines.
>
>I'm not sure that demonstrating that Alexander was the same kind of
>person as Gamelin is going to help your case, though...
Alex's wine menu was nonetheless restricted to the components
available after the French/Italians/Germans had skimmed the best off
the available stock, and he would then be compelled to make something
presentable out of some dubious Italian white and some fiery but
vulgar Algerian red. There's an analogy in there somewhere.
Gavin Bailey
--
Windows OS great advance. When try to use tough app, resource hungry,
like Notepad, give informative message like this one, "int 19H bot error".
What problem here? - Bart Kwan En
Don Phillipson
> And for all of the conversation on this thread, I've still not noted
anyone
> who identified himself as being a member of the Commonwealth, something
the
> original poster was looking for. Have they all been struck dumb
Perhaps you are not looking at all posts. A reply of
March 21 cited a Canadian biography of a Canadian
general who apprenticed under Montgomery, the
poster identifying himself as
Hal Hanig
Rich Rostrom
>Except I suspect Alex's dinner parties were
>more convivial than Monty's.
Is there any doubt about that?
"Poor von Thoma... I too have dined with Montgomery."
--
| People say "There's a Stradivarius for sale for a |
| million," and you say "Oh, really? What's wrong |
| with it?" - Yitzhak Perlman |
Robert Sveinson
news:47ead04e$1...@news.broadpark.no...
> This is correct, but Brooke did not command in the field after the
> Dunkerque evacuation, and therefore did not command troops in battle on
> any larger scale, even though he must have (as you point out) had both
> the ability and seniority to do so. He never exercised command under
> circumstances like those of Monty or Patton.
>
> Regards
>
> Hans
Eisenhower did not command troops in the
field, but his management abilities were sufficienly
good to be chosen as Allied Supreme Commander
for operation Torch, where his abilities were
obvious. And IIRC the choice of Eisenhower
as Supreme Commander for Overlord was not
opposed by the British.
Robert Sveinson
news:47E87231...@qwest.net...
>
> It just so happens that my father was a sergeant in the US Army of the
> day. I was a little interested in what he said to me. He only mentioned
> Montgomery once. He said the only time the division (82nd ABN) ever
> yielded ground to the Germans was when ordered to do so by Montgomery in
> order to tidy the line. In this case Montgomery was a demotivator of men.
>
> Don
Well that is a neat anecdote. You don't supply date time or place.
In all likelyhood the 82nd were farther forward than
the troops on their right and left, sticking out like a sore thumb
and ripe to be attacked from the side where the
manpower was the weakest.
The choice would then have been to have the
troops on the left and the right advance to line up
with the 82nd and eliminate the thumb, or have the 82nd
move back to line up with the troops on the left and right.
Now which would be the most likely to succeed?
Once the troops have pulled back to re-establish
a line without the salient the line could
be called "tidied up"!
I know that the phrase "tidy up" doesn't
sound very "war like" but the message is
understandable.
>
Robert Sveinson
news:47e8f847$0$10472$afc3...@news.optusnet.com.au...> news:0680f5ec-be7f-47b5-b892-> I'd agree he was better at thinking on the
> move, but that's about it.
>> For everything else, Patton shot himself in the foot about as often as
>> Montgomery did.
>
> What was Patton's "Market Garden"? In other words, Monty made a mess in
> Operation Market Garden but what was a similar operation conceived by
> Patton that failed?
To say that it was Montgomery's failure of Market Garden
is to ignore the fact that Eisenhower was the supreme commander
and has to bear his share of the responsibility.
Montgomery didn't just wake up one morning and shout
"all right men lets go to Arnhem."
Much planning (however flawed it may have been)
was done and some snippets of intelligence was ignored.
Eisenhower has stated that:
" I not only approved Market Garden, I insisted upon it!"
http://www.historynet.com/magazines/world_war_2/9216846.html
Ike gave this operation, codenamed Market Garden, his approval on September
10 but was careful to point out that he was not agreeing to a narrow front,
merely a temporary boost to the left wing of his broad front. If it worked,
he thought, the Allies would have gained an extremely valuable crossing over
the Rhine. But if it failed, then at least Montgomery would have been able
to put his preferred strategy to the test. The First Allied Airborne Army,
the new and only Allied strategic reserve, would have been tested as well,
and the Germans further weakened. Indeed, Eisenhower later said, "I not only
approved Market Garden, I insisted upon it."
"I not only approved Market Garden, I insisted upon it."
And quoted in Steven Ambroses' book: The Supreme Commander: The War Years of
General Dwight D Eisenhower page 518 footnote*.
David Thornley
Robert Sveinson <rsve...@mts.net> wrote:
> As opposed to the very competent Patton?
>
Both Patton and Montgomery were very competent.
> Carlo D'Este's recent biography of General George Patton relates
> another rescue attempt. **Patton's son-in-law** was a POW in a
>German stalag not too far
> behind the lines during the last months of the war. Against the advice of
> his staff, and his own better judgment, when Patton found his army within
> striking distance of the stalag, he detailed a task force to liberate the
> camp.
As I remember, according to D'Este, he asked, somewhat sheepishly,
for the raid, and then did nothing about it. Liberating a PoW
camp is not in itself a bad idea, but sending insufficient force
is.
Patton, according to D'Este, exerted no influence over the details,
which is a pity. The local commanders didn't want to not do a raid
that Patton wanted, and they didn't want to send enough force to
do the job right.
> Would Patton have risked his combat machine,
If Patton had risked his combat machine, or a significant part of
it, the raid would likely have been a success.
To repeat, the bad idea was in attempting it with insufficient force,
and that was not directly Patton's fault.
had a close
> relative not been in that stalag?
Certainly not.
Now that you have carefully dissected precisely one highly questionable
act, are you going to offer to let Walt dissect one of Montgomery's
acts of Walt's choosing, and base his opinion of Montgomery
on it?
I can find individual incidents that reflect very badly on pretty
much every high commander in WWII. (Of course, it's easier for
*cough*Clark*cough* some people than others.)
David Thornley
>wrote:
>
>>I'm not aware of Alexander telling one of his subordinates "you can't
>>talk to me like that, I'm your boss", let alone "you can't act like
>>that, I'm your boss".
>
>The fact that he didn't have to is a reflection on his capacity;
What makes you think he didn't have to?
Alexander exerted no grip on the situation in Sicily, except at
Montgomery's request. He completely failed to control Clark,
and was extremely frustrated by the man.
Had Alexander gotten things done in Sicily and Italy according to
his will, without confrontation, that would be impressive. That,
however, is precisely what didn't happen. He let his subordinates
run him and defy him without consequence.
Haydn
> Should Patton have attacked east, into Montgomery? Northeast, over
> Mt. Etna? North to the coast? Well, actually, he did that.
> Palermo was a bit to the west of the best route to the north,
> but it was a strategic target in itself, being useful later on
> as a port.
As Michael Emrys correctly recalled, refreshing my memory on this specific
point, the decision to let 8th Army use the critical Highway 124 for its
northerly drive, thereby turning 7th Army out of its logical axis of
advance, was a mistake to be pinned on Montgomery and Alexander (the latter,
under Monty's clout) rather than Patton.
Regardless of whom should be principally blamed for it, a mistake it was,
and a serious one. To begin with, it made the Allies wander off the Husky
plan, which rationally envisioned cutting across the island right through to
its northern shore. (Ironically, the early CCS Casablanca plan for Husky -
which with the benefit of hindsight would have been a far better plan - had
been radically redesigned to meet Montgomery's remarks).
Apart from that, it allowed the bulk of a German Panzergrenadier division
along with minor mobile units to escape to the east and join up with their
comrades; broadened 8th Army's front, putting further strain on its
logistics, and broadened it to a highly defensible mountain area; last but
not least, the Allied operational tempo slowed down enough for the German
29th PzGren. to enter the fray and prepare more defensive lines. It was a
bad decision altogether and a great bonus for the Axis.
As for the Patton sweep, any map shows you it was to the northwest, not to
the north. The capture of Palermo did help Allied logistics but not
decisively. So, yes, since the northerly push had been given up not to get
Monty into a huff, riding to Palermo was virtually all Patton was left with.
And all Germans were over the other half of the island already.
Haydn
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:bbf011ce-4f06-4667...@d21g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
>> On the personal side for example Montgomery "noted" to
>> the Australian divisional commander the Australian troops were not
>> doing much saluting, and was told to wave as the troops would then
>> wave back, this Montgomery did.
> The version of this story that I've heard most often involves Freyberg
> and an earlier British General (or Colonel). See for instance
> http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,16905970-1702,00.html
>
> I've seen versions that give the General's name and a rough date, I'll
> see if I can dig it out.
Sounds right, it is such a good story I am not surprised it has many
versions, particularly as it is the way the Australians and New
Zealanders tend to like to think that is the way they handled British
officers. The version I reported comes from Barry Pitt's Crucible
of War desert war trilogy, the last volume Montgomery and Alamein.
It will be interesting to see how many versions of the story exist, that
is who the troops were and the officers supposed to be talking to
each other.
Robert Sveinson
news:13usiss...@corp.supernews.com...
> In article <teepu393e4fh7gss6...@4ax.com>,
>
> What makes you think he didn't have to?
>
> Alexander exerted no grip on the situation in Sicily, except at
> Montgomery's request.
The fact that Alexander exerted "no grip" on the situation in
Sicily tells me that his generals had been selected for their
abilities and such was Alexander's confidence in them that
he saw no need to interfere. Clark of course proved that
the selections were flawed.
The above argument is the one others might use
had an American general been in Alexander's position.
> He completely failed to control Clark,
> and was extremely frustrated by the man.
Clark proved to be rather egotistical when he decided
to "relieve" Rome with US forces rather than
continuing the pursuit and defeat of the German forces
in front of him. These German forces escaped
and survived to fight another day.
No wonder Alexander was frustrated by the man!
Robert Sveinson
news:C4084256.1A01E%em...@olypen.com...
> in article
> 9f65276f-7da1-491e...@c19g2000prf.googlegroups.com,
> nick....@lycos.com at nick....@lycos.com wrote on 3/20/08 1:00 PM:
>
>> I know that Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery is (or was) idolised in
>> the
>> UK whereas historians and enthusiasts in the the USA tend to be extremely
>> critical of him.
>
> historians? I've heard rumors along those lines but admit I haven't looked
> very far into the matter.
>
> Michael
Montgomery has been well and truly skewered by British historians
and military colleagues. (not to mention many knowledgable and not so
knowledgable Americans.)
But non of the criticism levelled at Montgomery
held a candle to the criticism of Patton by Omar
Bradley and Carlo D'Este.
>
Robert Sveinson
>
>> Carlo D'Este's recent biography of General George Patton
>> relates
>> another rescue attempt. **Patton's son-in-law** was a POW in a
>>German stalag not too far
>> behind the lines during the last months of the war. Against the advice of
>> his staff, and his own better judgment, when Patton found his army within
>> striking distance of the stalag, he detailed a task force to liberate the
>> camp.
>
> As I remember, according to D'Este, he asked, somewhat sheepishly,
> for the raid, and then did nothing about it. Liberating a PoW
> camp is not in itself a bad idea, but sending insufficient force
> is.
What anticipated military benefit to the Allies
would the rescue of Patton's son in law have been?
Would the rescued POWs have been armed to continue
the fight against Nazi-ism?
What justification can there be for sacrificing approximately
200 US soldiers, who were killed, or
themselves became POWs to unite Patton with his *son in law*?
>
> If Patton had risked his combat machine, or a significant part of
> it, the raid would likely have been a success.
What military benefit would have been achieved even
had the raid been a success?
> To repeat, the bad idea was in attempting it with insufficient force,
> and that was not directly Patton's fault.
Not Patton's fault? Whose son in law was the focus
of this "military" operation?
Who other than Patton was in command?
Does "fault" reside only with subordinates,
and "praise" only with the superior?
> Now that you have carefully dissected precisely one highly questionable
> act, are you going to offer to let Walt dissect one of Montgomery's
> acts of Walt's choosing, and base his opinion of Montgomery
> on it?
There are about 88 posts in this "adoration of Montgomery" thread.
Surely some of these must be narrating one questionable
Montgomery act.
Besides hasn't Walt already had one shot at Montgomery ?
It was also very well supported by credible cites.
See below:
>>On Mar 20, 4:00 pm, nick.cut...@lycos.com wrote:
>> I know that Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery is (or was) idolised
>> in the UK whereas historians and enthusiasts in the the USA tend to be
>> extremely critical of him. But how is he viewed in other Commonwealth
>> countries (e.g. Canada, Australia, New Zealand etc.)?
Walt'post:
>Hopefully as the gross incompetent he was.
>Walt
Now let me quote Carlo D'Este's book: Decision In Normandy:
pages 404-405
"For weeks Patton* had been anxiously waiting in the wings for
an opportunity to redeem himself after the humiliation of his
relief in Sicily; he was determined not to bungle whatever chance
he got. Bradley* was not pleased to have him as a subordinate. The
campaign in Sicily, where Bradley* had been Patton's* subordinate,
had heightened the strong differences in their characters and
their approach to command. The volatile Patton* was given to
sudden fits of anger; his profane manner was often his undoing
and a source of embarrassment to both Eisenhower* and Bradley*,
as it was to Marshall*. Bradley* was repelled by Patton's* tendancy
to swear at his troops and could never understand his need for
crudeness. More importantly, Bradley* felt Patton* had not been
sufficiently familiar with the planning details for HUSKY, that he
had left too much to his deputy commander, and had not
involved himself deeply enough in the logistics and enemy situ-
ations. <He viewed Patton's* insistence on capturing Messina
before Montgomery** as an ego trip at the expense of his troops.>
Though he remained a loyal subordinate, Bradley* had neverthe-
less grown more disenchanted with Patton*, and found
serving under him a great strain, so that by the time he was
appointed by Eisenhower* to command the First Army for the
invasion Bradley* was delighted to be out from under. 'I disliked
the way he worked, upset technical plans, interfered in my
orders. His stubbornness on amphibious operations and his
<parade plans into Messina> sickened me and soured me on
Patton'*(1). Above all else, two events that did most to sour Bradley*
on Patton* occured on 3 August 1943 and again on 10 August,
when the furious Seventh Army Commander slapped a soldier
thought to be malingering in separate incidents at two field
hospitals. For a disgusted Bradley,* this was the last straw.
COBRA admittedly made an awkward situation for both men,
with the one-time superior now the subordinate, but although
their journey together to the end of the war was not always
without difficulty, Bradley* was soon to have ample reason to be
pleased with Patton's* presence in Normandy. Patton* had already
told Bradley;*
'I must get in and do something spectacularly
successful if I am to make good'(2)
Just how spectacularly
success-
ful Patton would be, even he could not perceive at that moment."
(1) Hansen* Papers, US Army Military Institute
(2) Hansen* Diaries, 27 July 1944
* Not British or Commonwealth.
** British or Commonwealth.
Robert Sveinson
news:fsig5d$5ei$1...@aioe.org...
> "Louis C" <loui...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:085c7e97-5891-4678...@s37g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
>
>> A lot of British officers thought that US troops were no
>> good,
>
> That is disingenuous. They may have perceived them as "green", which they
> were initially.
Absolutely they were green. Sadly neither the American soldiers
nor officers could then nor can now accept that fact.
If in doubt just watch their movie or television dramas
The movie about the US Navy capture of the German submarine
there by allowing Bltchley Park to "once again"
read the German Enigma signals.
This movie has been cited to me to prove that very point.
Or the weekly series 12 O'clock High!
After the Dieppe Raid in which 6000 Canadians and British soldiers along
with
50 US soldiers the newspaper headlines in the USA read
Americans land in Europe!
Robert Sveinson
news:3b7fu39on1feu7b0m...@4ax.com...
> On Sun, 23 Mar 2008 16:56:15 -0400, Cubdriver
> <usenet.AT.da...@giganews.com> wrote:
>
>>You should read Max Hastings' two histories of the European campaign,
>>and more especially the one about D-Day. You would be surprised to
>>discover that Eisenhower did nothing right, or if he did it was by
>>accident; whereas Montgomery was never wrong, unless by accident, and
>>for that he can be forgiven because he was a genius at "reading the
>>battlefield."
>
> One of the first joint references in "Overlord" to Montgomery and
> Eisenhower (p.38 on my edition), credits Eisenhower with recognising
> the importance of strengthening the initial assault----
But of course!
From: Decision In Normandy by Carlo D'Este.
Page 62
"During the month of January 1944 Morgan's original OVER-
LORD plan was subjected to drastic revision: surgery *began the
day after Montgomery arrived in London*. On 3 January Mont-
gomery and Bedell Smith met with COSSAC planners to be
briefed on the invasion. Montgomery's reaction was predictably
critical: calling the COSSAC plan an unsound operation of war, he
outlined his ideas about what ought to be done. Emphasizing the
need **for an expanded frontage**, Montgomery defined what he
envisioned as the tasks of the US and British armies:
The American Army will clear the Cherbourg peninsula and
capture the port of Cherbourg. They will subsequently develop
their operations to the south and west. The British Army will
operate to the south to prevent any interference with the
American Army from the east. It is hoped eventually to get a
firm lodgement from Caen to Nantes with the British Army
being built up through the Cherbourg peninsula and the
American Army through Brittany.(1)
In the *days prior to Eisenhower's arrival in London on 15
January* to assume command of SHAEF, Montgomery held
numerous discussions with the planners and the air and naval
commanders to work out details of a *revised* operation. On the
morning of 21 January the *first* Supreme Commander's Confer-
ence took place at Norfolk House in St James's Square, its subject
the OVERLORD plan. When it was his turn to speak, Montgomery,
with his usual bluntness and clarity, got straight to the point. He
began by declaring that in view of enemy strength and the
limitations on the rate of post-landings build up, it was essential
to obtain success against the German defenders of Norm-
andy. The present plan would not achieve this object: The
assault was far to weak and on too narrow a front, making it
easier for the Germans to locate and hold the assault force and far
more difficult for Allied forces to emerge rapidly and strike the
enemy deep and hard."
(1) 'Notes on the Developement of Grand Strategy', by Colonel C. P. Stacey
(the official Canadian historian), PRO (CAB 44/242).
It would appear that D'Este thinks that it was Montgomery
thought that the invasion front should be expanded even before
Eisenhower took command at SHAEF!
Michael Emrys
rsve...@mts.net wrote on 3/30/08 2:06 PM:
> Clark proved to be rather egotistical when he decided to "relieve" Rome with
> US forces rather than continuing the pursuit and defeat of the German forces
> in front of him. These German forces escaped and survived to fight another
> day.
Atkinson in his recent book takes Clark harshly to task for shifting the
axis of his attack from north to northwest in the middle of the battle, but
he ruefully agrees that there was little chance of VI Corps actually being
able to cut off 10th. Armee anyway. Which makes matters a little confusing.
Michael
David Thornley
Robert Sveinson <rsve...@mts.net> wrote:
>But non of the criticism levelled at Montgomery
>held a candle to the criticism of Patton by Omar
>Bradley and Carlo D'Este.
>
Omar Bradley was a fellow general. His opinions are of interest,
but in my opinion he had a considerably worse grasp of how to fight
a war than Patton did.
I am interested in what scathing and comprehensive criticism you
found in D'Este's book "A Genius For War".
David Thornley
Robert Sveinson <rsve...@mts.net> wrote:
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
>news:13usiss...@corp.supernews.com...
>> Alexander exerted no grip on the situation in Sicily, except at
>> Montgomery's request.
>
>The fact that Alexander exerted "no grip" on the situation in
>Sicily tells me that his generals had been selected for their
>abilities and such was Alexander's confidence in them that
>he saw no need to interfere.
Really? He did interfere at Montgomery's request, and it is
usually not a good idea for two competent commanders to fight
their own parallel wars. Alexander simply sat back and watched.
>No wonder Alexander was frustrated by the man!
>
I completely agree with that. Granted that Alexander was
trying for what he probably wasn't going to get, flouting
his orders and throwing away all chance was not a good thing.
ErrolC
wrote:
<snip>
> Sounds right, it is such a good story I am not surprised it has many
> versions, particularly as it is the way the Australians and New
> Zealanders tend to like to think that is the way they handled British
> officers. The version I reported comes from Barry Pitt's Crucible
> of War desert war trilogy, the last volume Montgomery and Alamein.
>
> It will be interesting to see how many versions of the story exist, that
> is who the troops were and the officers supposed to be talking to
> each other.
The versions online involving Freyberg all seem to have Monty or
unspecified as the Brit officer. When I saw the version with the other
named officer, my first thought was 'that might even be true, as the
officer isn't anyone I've heard of, while Monty could be slotted in as
the story spreads'.
I now think I saw that version on paper, so it is unlikely I'll be
able to relocate it promptly. It's just possible that it was in
Freyberg's biograghy (1991), if someone has a copy available.
--
"Somewhere between the bloody ridge of Chunuk Bair in August 1915 and
the black swamp in front of Passchendaele in October 1917, New Zealand
quite definitely found individuality and nationality."
Ormond Burton, 1935
Robert Sveinson
> In article <BiBHj.43944$QC.2...@newsfe20.lga>,
> Robert Sveinson <rsve...@mts.net> wrote:
>
>>But non of the criticism levelled at Montgomery
>>held a candle to the criticism of Patton by Omar
>>Bradley and Carlo D'Este.
>>
> Omar Bradley was a fellow general. His opinions are of interest,
> but in my opinion he had a considerably worse grasp of how to fight
> a war than Patton did.
Bradley was Patton's subordinate, then leap frogged him
to become his superior.
>
> I am interested in what scathing and comprehensive criticism you
> found in D'Este's book "A Genius For War".
Wrong book. My cite is from Decision in Normandy, as my cite states.
See my post 29/03/2008 6:19PM.
I will repost it if you can't find it.