D-Day Casualties and Equipment
Geoffrey Sinclair
the editing is my fault.
Please note one very important detail regarding the comparisons
between the various beaches. The 'beach' designations normally
given (SWORD, JUNO, etc) are actually incorrect, since those
designated beach areas. Each area in turn was divided into a
number of sectors, which were divided into beaches. Thus:
GOLD Area was assaulted in Sector JIG, Beaches Green West
and Green East assaulted by (still filling this in) and Sector KING,
Beaches Green and Red assaulted by 6 Green Howards and
5 E Yorks. A total of four battalions were in the assault echelon.
They were supported by 47 Royal Marine Commando.
JUNO Area was assaulted in Sector MIKE, Beach Green and
Sector NAN, Beaches Green, White and Red. Again a total of
four battalions in the assault echelon, they were supported by
48 Royal Marine Commando.
SWORD Area was assaulted in QUEEN Sector, Beaches White
and Red, assaulted by 1 S Lancs and 2 E Yorks. Only two battalions
were in the assault echelon. They were supported by 4 and 41 Commando.
Thus, a total of about ten infantry battalions and four Commandos.
OMAHA Area was assaulted in DOG Sector, Beaches Green,
White and Red, EASY Sector, Beaches Green and Red, and FOX
Sector, Beach Green. Five battalions (of the 16th and 116th Infantry,
a sixth, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was the assault echelon reserve)
were in the assault echelon. They were supported by the 5th Ranger
Battalion and (as it turned out) about two-thirds of the 2nd Ranger Battalion.
UTAH Area was assaulted in TARE Sector, Beach Green and
UNCLE Sector, Beach Red. Two battalions (of the 8th Infantry) were
in the assault echelon.
Thus, a total of about seven/eight infantry and one and two-thirds
Ranger battalions.
The casualty figures are still a work in progress,
Commonwealth Casualties by Beach:
JUNO:
Only the Canadian casualties on D-Day are well defined (see
"The Victory Campaign," Appendix B, Canadian Army Casualties
^Ö Normandy ^Ö 6 June 1944, p. 650), which help to establish a
lower limit for the casualties incurred on JUNO. The losses of 3
Canadian Division and attached units were:
275 KIA, 65 DOW (died-of-wounds), 539 WIA, 35 IIA (injured-in-action),
47 POW, Total 961, of those, 39 KIA, 1 DOW, 49 WIA, and 4 IIA were
incurred by units attached to 3 Canadian Division (losses of the 1st
Canadian Parachute Battalion were an additional 19 KIA, 6 WIA, 4 IIA,
84 POW, Total 113) Note these paratroop casualties are double
counted in UK 6th Airborne casualties.
These postwar totals are 17 percent higher than those above,
although it is likely the earlier figures may have excluded 26 DOW
who died between 7 and 28 June and the IIA. If that was so, then
the total loss given in the second case was 900, which is 9.6 percent
higher than the September 1944 figures. "The Victory Campaign"
Appendix C, Approximate Casualties of the Allied Armies by
Sectors, Normandy, 6 June 1944, pp. 651-652) also references
"[British] Army Operational Research Group Report No.261,
Casualties and Effects of Fire Support on the British Beaches in
Normandy," dated 21 April 1945. That report gives 805 total
casualties "on the beaches" for 3 Canadian Division. "The Victory
Campaign" also references another AORG report (unidentified),
that gives the casualties of No.48 Royal Marine Commando on
JUNO as 243.
Overall, it appears that the total loss on JUNO for the entire day
was approximately 1,143 (900 Canadians and 243 Royal Marines).
GOLD:
"The Victory Campaign" states that "the only figure found for this
[50th Infantry] division is in a compilation in a report of the (British)
Army Operational Research Group [likely Report No.261], which
concludes on the basis of examination of war diaries that there
were 413 casualties on the beaches." In addition, 47 Royal Marine
Commando suffered a total of 43 men in an unsuccessful attempt
on Port-en-Bessin (which did not fall until 8 June after the Royal
Marines had suffered another 160 casualties). Thus the total
casualties in GOLD sector "on the beaches" was about 456.
SWORD:
"The Victory Campaign" states that the only figures found for the
3rd British Infantry Division were those in AORG Report No.261.,
which gave a total of 630.
Overall Casualties:
WO 205/405 "British Casualties During the First Month of
Operation OVERLORD." (This document was undated, except
for a pencilled notation: "unofficial, produced by Lt.Col. Trencher[?]
another paper to follow, 12 Sep," presumably ^Ö from the context ^Ö
1944. The follow-up, if it ever existed, has not been found.) It gives
"^ÑD^Ò Day" casualties as:
British 420 KIA, 869 WIA, 405 MIA, Total 1,694
Canadian 222 KIA, 490 WIA, 109 MIA, Total 821
Commonwealth Total 642 KIA, 1,359 WIA, 514 MIA, Total 2,515
However, the report carefully notes that the totals excluded
"Airborne Troops and RM [Royal Marine] personnel^Å.in order to
give a fair basis of comparison with the [pre-invasion] estimated
casualties which did not include these arms." That estimate was
7,750, which total included 1,500 drowned a figure that was 3.1
times the actual reported figure (above). The report also
remarked that "it is striking and perhaps co-incidental that the
US estimate was approximately 3.1 times their actual reported
figure^Å.These figures must of course be linked to the ^ÑD^Ò Day
operational picture. Opposition on the British beaches was *less
than anticipated*, and at the same time, *the rate of advance was,
in many cases, slower than planned*. [emphasis added]"
A second source for D-Day casualties are the collected "A"
SITREP reports found in the 21 Army Group files. However,
the earliest reports of any of the units engaged in D-Day was for
the ^Ò24 hours ending 0600 hours 8 June.^Ò These losses as
recorded were:
3 Canadian ID (as of 0600 8 June) ^Ö 89 KIA, 256 WIA, 297 MIA
(note that excessive numbers of WIA were reported on 10 June,
they may be a "catch-up" from D-Day)
3 British ID (as of 0600 8 June) ^Ö 124 KIA, 635 WIA, 237 MIA
6 British AbnD (as of 0600 7 June) ^Ö 61 KIA, 349 WIA, 612 MIA
(although apparently as many as 259 MIA returned during 7 June)
50 (N) ID (as of 0600 8 June) ^Ö 123 KIA, 557 WIA, 315 MIA
1 Special Services Brigade (as of 0600 7 June) ^Ö 13 KIA, 189 WIA, 87 MIA
4 Special Services Brigade (as of 0600 8 June) ^Ö 34 KIA, 126 WIA, 219 MIA
1 Corps (as of 0600 7 June) ^Ö 14 KIA, 56 WIA, 106 MIA
30 Corps (as of 0600 8 June) ^Ö 13 KIA, 33 WIA, 2 MIA
It appears that in terms of casualties, JUNO was the most intense.
At minimum, at least 805 casualties were suffered "on the beaches"
there, and the days total in that sector was at least 1,143. SWORD
was apparently second, with at least 630 casualties "on the beaches."
Finally, GOLD, with at least 456 casualties "on the beaches" was third.
Overall Commonwealth losses, excluding 6 Airborne Division, were
between 2,515 and 3,380.
US Losses:
OMAHA:
The 1st Division recorded 1,190 casualties in the V Corps History.
However, the 1st Division G-1 recorded losses for D-Day and D+1
as 1,036 on 8 June, but in the AAR for June recorded 186 KIA, 620
WIA and 358 MIA. In the same report the number of MIA RTD in
June was 70. Internal evidence indicates that the "actual" number
MIA on 6 June was about 312. The likely total casualties for the 1st
Division on 6 June was 1,118. (Postwar accounting show only 60
men actually captured between 6 June and 24 July.)
The 29th Division recorded 743 casualties in the V Corps History.
V Corps Troops recorded 441 casualties in the V Corps History.
Losses for the 2nd Rangers was 72 KIA, 127 WIA and 37 MIA, for
the 5th Rangers it was 26 KIA, 84 WIA and 2 MIA - although some
of the losses may have been incurred on 7 June.
That gives a total of 2,650 on OMAHA, which is one of the common
figures quoted. And the intensity can be better judged if it is realized
that virtually all of the 1st and 29th Division losses were in their assault
echelons -- in effect, six battalions with about 700 men each committed
to the assault, a total with divisional engineer contingents of perhaps
4,800 men, suffered over 1,800 casualties, about a 37 percent rate.
UTAH:
The 4th Division lost 12 KIA, 125 WIA, 60 MIA, Total 197
The 1st Engineer Special Brigade lost 21 KIA, 96 WIA, Total 117
Elements, 4th Cavalry Group (Isle St. Marcouf) lost 2 KIA and 17 WIA
Total of 314 including 35 KIA, 238 WIA, 60 MIA
It is actually difficult to judge what was included as part of the Corps
Troops losses. It appears that it may actually only comprise the losses
of the Engineers. But this is a work in progress, so no definitive
answer yet. The total losses on UTAH and OMAHA, with their
associated operations, may have been as high as 3,500.
Note some published loss figures include USN and Coast Guard losses.
Airborne Landings:
The 82nd Division recorded losing 229 KIA, 824 WIA, 2,307 MIA as
of 2400 hours 9 June. On 13 August a revised calculation resulted in
a report of 156 KIA, 347 WIA, 756 MIA for D-Day itself.
The 101st Division recorded losing 182 KIA, 557 WIA, 501 MIA on
D-Day after reconciliation^Òs completed 13 August 1944.
Total of 2,499 casualties in the airborne landings.
The shingle on the Norman beaches tended to build up most heavily
along the high water mark, especially when there was a sea wall
present. So the effect was variable. Most accounts talk about the
tanks maneuvering on the beaches, often getting in the way of the
engineer demolition teams they were trying to support. But the
shingle made it difficult to find easy exits, slowed the tanks, and
made them easy targets (and had much the same effect for everything,
including men, trying to cross the stuff -- it really is a remarkably difficult
ground surface to cross). And the effect was much the same on all the
beaches, and was the main source of the delay in getting 27 Armoured
Brigade off of SWORD and into CAEN (it certainly wasn't the resistance
on the beaches, SWORD was cleared faster than any).
If you note photos of beach operations early on D-Day you will often see
vehicles jammed up at what appears to be a limited number of exit points,
which is precisely what they are. And the hessian and wire mats were
evidently fairly durable over the short run, over succeeding days the
shingle was bulldozed and more permanent roadways were put in.
As for the various 'Bobbin' carpet laying devices designed to mount on
the AVRE. The problem was not a 'First Army rejection' since there was
neither an offer or a rejection ever made to my knowledge. As usual, it is
a case of the cart before the horse, there simply were not enough AVRE
completed by June 1944 to fully equip 1st Assault Brigade RE, why
should any of these scarce equipments have been offered to the
Americans? So of the 120 available (plus spares) out of the 180-odd
required, how many do you want to give to the Americans? Especially
considering that 22 were lost? The American solution as planned
depended upon armored bulldozers, tank dozers and manually emplaced
matting (which by all accounts was also heavily depended upon by the RE).
Any LVTs would have mostly become bogged somewhere between
the low and high tide marks. Making them effectively just another landing
craft, unable to at least give some cover over part of the open beach.
You would also expect their tracks to rapidly tear up any hessian/canvas
matting as well.
They also did not have landing ramps in the early versions, troops had to
disembark over the sides. But, the side sponsons were hollow and
compartmented, providing additional buoyancy, as did the gasoline in
the tanks. Each sponson also had a bilge pump, which operated
continuously. Overall unless they suffered a large caliber direct hit the
LVT was pretty seaworthy.
Actually the problem with the DD turns out not to have been freeboard,
which explains many things. The critical problem was the rigidity and
strength of the screen supports. It appears that what happened in most
cases, was that the inexperienced tankers, not being sailors, did not
realize what the effects of a quartering sea would be. For the 741st
Tank Battalion this was devastating, since they were launched too far
east. Having been carefully briefed to use the church steeple at
Colleville as their steering reference, they did so. The consequence
was that they steered sharply south-southwest, against the strong
west-to-east tidal current and the northeast-to-southeast surf. The
result was that the up-current screen and supports was overstressed,
causing the supports to buckle and quite simply driving the tank
underwater, which is why so many accounts speak of them driving into
the water and simply disappearing. The LVT would not have had this
problem in any case, since they had flotation tanks built into the side
sponsons, which made them difficult to sink. But that still doesn't answer
the question of how they are somehow magically superior to other
vehicles at crossing an obstacle field, a shingle embankment, a mix of
ditches and walls, steep dunes, and an even steeper bluff.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
--
Haydn
> Most Information from Richard Anderson, Dupuy Institute,
> the editing is my fault.
Interesting. Is there any detailed list of Allied casualties and
losses on
Sicily D-Day, July 10th, 1943, available? Or can they be
"reconstructed"
from various sources?
Haydn
Louis Capdeboscq
> Most Information from Richard Anderson, Dupuy Institute,
> the editing is my fault.
Great information.
If you really want to be picky, I think there were non-British troops as
part of the Commonwealth forces who were engaged during D-Day, including a
Free French commando which IIRC took fairly high casualties.
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
Haydn wrote in message <3dce3149...@news.pacific.net.au>...
>Interesting. Is there any detailed list of Allied casualties and
>losses on Sicily D-Day, July 10th, 1943, available? Or can
>they be "reconstructed" from various sources?
I have no knowledge of any in depth casualty figures for
the first day of the invasion of Sicily.
I expect some of the histories would give an overall total,
but not detailed lists for all units involved.
If you have a look at the sources given you can gain an idea
of where to look, after finding a detailed OOB for the first
24 hours, and it should be possible to do a similar list for
Sicily. The difference being more people have studied
D-day and so the casualty lists are more available.
Rich
"Detailed" is a loaded word in connection with battle casualty
analysis, since in the short-term we are often talking about imperfect
estimates, rather than closely defined mathematical data.
So, for the period 10 July to 17 August, casualties in Sicily may be
estimated as:
US: 1,171 KIA, 3,909 WIA, 1,813 MIA (of the MIA, 598 were captured,
the rest either returned, were found to be killed, wounded, injured,
or sick, or were declared dead postwar)
UK: 2,062 KIA, 7,137 WIA, 2,644 MIA (the number captured is unknown)
Axis: 6,561 KIA, 18,532 WIA, 143,623 Captured (122,204 captured by US
forces, 21,419 captured by UK forces, the total number MIA is unknown,
but likely not much more than the total captured).
The Axis total includes at least 4,561 KIA (the number buried on
Sicily), 13,532 WIA (the number evacuated to the mainland), and 6,623
Captured Germans. At least 662 of those captured Germans were wounded,
injured or sick.
Hope this helps.
Richard Anderson
The Dupuy Institute
--
Haydn
"Rich" <Rich...@msn.com> wrote:
> So, for the period 10 July to 17 August, casualties in Sicily may be
> estimated as:
[figures follow]
Correct Allied casualties data, for which I thank you and to which we
should
add US Navy's 546 KIA and 484 WIA, Royal Navy's 314 KIA and 411 WIA,
RAF's
345 KIA/MIA and 391 WIA, USAAF's 28 KIA, 88 MIA, 40 WIA.
Estimating Axis casualties is a tougher proposition. Figures available
are
quite incorrect. Many of the 40,655 Axis missing in action were in
fact
killed and buried in mass graves or left unburied on the ground.
Official
figures for the KIA refer only to the regularly buried soldiers.
However, my question was not about the whole campaign, but just D-Day,
because I would like to draw a comparison between Normandy D-Day
landings
casualties and those of the Sicily landings. I have read that the
total US
Army casualties on Sicily's D-Day were around 200, which sounds
acceptable
though most likely somewhat rounded down. Commonwealth losses were
lighter
due to the lighter opposition they encountered. Of course we can sum
all
sparse figures given here and there in published sources, but even so,
the
amount of information is largely unsatisfactory.
Haydn