Alternatives to Market Garden
joh...@my-deja.com
cancelled. How and where would you deploy the
combined forces, champing at the bit, with the
view of ending the war in 1944?
John.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Martin Rapier
> Imagine that Operation Market Garden was
> cancelled. How and where would you deploy the
> combined forces, champing at the bit, with the
> view of ending the war in 1944?
I would do exactly the same as Montgomery, but
a) replace Horrocks with O'Connor (or maybe Patton!)
b) give the capture of Nijmegen equal priority with that of Arnhem
d) drop the 101st at Arnhem and the less experienced 1st Airborne at Eindhoven
e) provide facilities for the paras to call in air support
f) make sure that Divisional and Corps commanders were given a regular
kicks from behind so they got a move on.
Once the Allies broke out onto the north German plain, there would be no
stopping them, unlike the somewhat unpleasantly hilly Alsace, Ardennes etc.
Cheers
Martin.
Maplefoo1
against the Germans.
Maple
mvil...@my-deja.com
>
> a) replace Horrocks with O'Connor (or maybe Patton!)
> b) give the capture of Nijmegen equal priority with that of Arnhem
> d) drop the 101st at Arnhem and the less experienced 1st Airborne at
> Eindhoven
With a division of panzers in the area I doubt any paratrooper division
has a chance in arnhem. The 101st might have rallied and cosolidated
their forces quicker and faster since they learned from their mis-drops
right before D-Day, and this might have an overall effect of slowing
down their demise, but I don't think a paratrooper division could hold
out indefinately in the arnhem area.
They would have a ton of things to do, some of which are:
1-Keep their landing zones, or else you don't get fed.
2-Take the two bridges in the area, which was no easy feat regardless of
suprise. I'll admit they might have a better chance of taking them
since they would consolidate quicker. But once the panzers push, they
will push, and bazookas aren't gonna stop them that much.
Keep in mind that their radios were broken( or somethign like that) so
the Brits in arnhem couldn't get in touch outside. I'm sure if the
radios functioned they might have had some help in getting supplies
delivered correctly and maybe some air support.
Either way, 30th Corps would still have a hell of a time making it to
Arnhem. Then again maybe Patton would've done better. :)
Bernie Worral
<joh...@my-deja.com> wrote in message news:866toj$9qp@beast...
> Imagine that Operation Market Garden was
> cancelled. How and where would you deploy the
> combined forces, champing at the bit, with the
> view of ending the war in 1944?
Good question, no easy answers.
Montey convinced SHAEF exactly because the alternatives weren't any better.
I would have stuck with a more conservative approach and secured the port of
Antwerp and perhaps given Patton the nod for more fuel.
Better yet, ask the German Panzer division at Arnheim to kindly move to
another spot and give the 1st Airborne (or 101st) some real radios and try
Market Garden again. Air support would have made a difference with good
ground control.
Worr, out
The Johnstons
> a) replace Horrocks with O'Connor (or maybe Patton!)
Slander! Horrocks was an outstanding formation commander, probably the
best (certainly the most successful) corps commander in the British
Army. In fact, he had recently been called in by Monty to replace the
(sacked) previous GOC XXX Corps. By the way, Patton was an Army not a
Corps commander, replacing Horrocks with Patton would have been a
demotion for Patton.
But that does bring up the real question about MARKET GARDEN, which is
why did the major Allied push come down to a single corps? Monty
originally spoke of a "40 division" push through ARNHEM, or maybe the
AACHEN gap. That probably was unrealistic, and Monty probably knew it,
but still, why did it come down to just a corps. Remember too, that
MARKET GARDEN is only weeks after closing the FALAISE pocket and the
resulting pursuit to the SEINE. Powerful Allied forces, including all
of 21st Army Group and most of 12th Army Group are generally disposed
along the South bank of the SEINE between ROUEN and PARIS. So why not
push North with as much of that as possible?
Logistics! I can hear the newsgroup answering. Well, yes, that was a
real problem not to be slighted, but on the other hand what resistance
were the Germans capable of mounting at that time? This is hindsight of
course, and a healthy respect for German fighting prowess prevailed in
the Allied command (for good reason). What is clear is that Ike was
extremely cautious about a bold thrust deep into the German rear (a
sickle cut as the Germans would have put it). He feared that indulging
in manoeuvre warfare like that was playing to German strengths and
Allied weaknesses. Far better to maintain pressure and a broad front.
A single thrust could (he feared) be cut off and decimated, with
disasterous consequences.
> b) give the capture of Nijmegen equal priority with that of Arnhem
Well, they did. Both cities got one Airborne div each.
> d) drop the 101st at Arnhem and the less experienced 1st Airborne at Eindhoven
More slander! The problem with MARKET GARDEN wasn't Brit 1st Airborne's
performance at ARNHEM. They held out (against a Panzer Corps no less)
far longer than anyone anticipated.
> e) provide facilities for the paras to call in air support
A clear failure, the causes of which has been the subject of some debate.
> f) make sure that Divisional and Corps commanders were given a regular
> kicks from behind so they got a move on.
Thats a bit glib. "Kicks" so they got a move on? How does that clear
Germans out of the way? Yelling and exhortions are for NCOs or movie
portrayals of Patton. At echelons above corps, the real question is
what additional resources can be made available. Are you really
suggesting that XXX Corps wasn't really trying, and that someone
distracting them by yelling at them over their shoulders would have made
a difference?
Paul Johnston
DBSDESIGN
>With a division of panzers in the area I doubt any paratrooper
>division has a chance in arnhem.
There was no division of panzers in Arnhem except in name.
Tanks don't work well in urban areas except in the movies.
>But once the panzers push, they will push, and bazookas
>aren't gonna stop them that much.
There is photographic evidence from same battle that says
otherwise.
>The 101st might have rallied and cosolidated their forces
>quicker and faster since they learned from their mis-drops
>right before D-Day
1st Airborne knew all about mis-drops from their previous
experience in North Africa and Sicily. I doubt if they could
consolidate more efficiently unless they landed all glider
lifts in one day instead of three.
>I don't think a paratrooper division could hold out indefinately
>in the arnhem area.
Not with the supply landing zones under enemy control.
Louis Capdeboscq
> cancelled. How and where would you deploy the
> combined forces, champing at the bit, with the
> view of ending the war in 1944?
By the time Operation Market Garden was cancelled, there weren't all that
many alternatives available to end the war in 1944.
Possible candidates:
1. Montgomery doesn't have supply priority anymore, his job is to clear the
port of Antwerp and that's that. Instead, give supply priority to Patton or
more probably Devers. I'm not sure this would be decisive, but both did
better than Montgomery at retaining momentum.
2. Launch Market-Garden anyway, but
a/ the air transports are ordered to make more than one round trip a day.
b/ UK-based air forces are specially briefed not to shoot friendly
aircraft,
so 2nd TAF can be used to support the advance of XXX Corps, using CABRANK
and similar other means.
c/ Horrocks is told "Darn the torpedoes, full speed ahead !" or something
to
that effect.
d/ Uhrquart (sp ?) is allowed to plan the operation the way he wants, and
given more radio assets to call for air support.
a/ and b/ will probably result in some more losses to transport aircraft,
and some friendly fire, but I believe that would be worth it.
As soon as 21st Army Group has broken through the Rhine, tell Monty that
he's fired if he ever stops.
trekk...@mailcity.com
The Johnstons <john...@istar.ca> wrote:
> Slander! Horrocks was an outstanding formation commander, probably the
> best (certainly the most successful) corps commander in the British
> Army. In fact, he had recently been called in by Monty to replace the
> (sacked) previous GOC XXX Corps
Don't you think that Montgomery himself is underrated?
> but still, why did it come down to just a corps. Remember too, that
> MARKET GARDEN is only weeks after closing the FALAISE pocket and the
> resulting pursuit to the SEINE.
Should Montgomery be chided or commended for his plan? Although
MARKET GARDEN wasn't a success- what if it had worked?
Wasn't it kind of a radical conception for Montgomery? Shouldn't
it have been a surprise for the Germans?
> Logistics! I can hear the newsgroup answering. Well, yes, that was a
> real problem not to be slighted, but on the other hand what resistance
> were the Germans capable of mounting at that time?
What was the status of clearing Antwerp at the time of MARKET GARDEN?
> This is hindsight of
> course, and a healthy respect for German fighting prowess prevailed in
> the Allied command (for good reason).
Since closing the Falaise pocket- there was the expectation of
imminent collapse of the Third Reich.
> The problem with MARKET GARDEN wasn't Brit 1st Airborne's
> performance at ARNHEM. They held out (against a Panzer Corps no less)
> far longer than anyone anticipated.
Their performance I think was adequately represented in the movie
"A Bridge Too Far."
>
> > e) provide facilities for the paras to call in air support
Gosh darn. Tac Air was still in its infancy.
Dave Gower
trucked from Normandy. Without a successful Market Garden, the only hope of
winning the war by the end of the year was for Monty to concentrate on
opening Antwerp to the sea. This could have started immediately after
British forces took the city at the beginning of September.
The ground and paratroop forces not used for Market garden could have been
supported by commandos landed from the sea to clear the Sheldt. If the
operation was wide and quick enough it might have bagged almost the entire
15th Army, which at that time was retreating up the coast and still mainly
west of Antwerp. This would have torn a huge gap in what remained in German
defenses.
Another important precursor to early victory was the upper Roer River with
its dams. These not only controlled the flow of water downstream (a
priceless defensive advantage) but overlooked Cologne and the Ruhr. At that
time the Seigfried Line was barely defended, and a quick drive by the
Americans might have taken it on the run.
After Market Garden both of these objectives had to be taken by slow and
costly campaigns, because the Germans had time to prepare defenses (indeed
the dams were not taken until 1945).
If both could have been secured by the end of September the situation of the
Germans would have looked very grim indeed. The allies would be within sight
of the Rhine, and supplied through an undamaged Port of Antwerp.Whether they
would have then won by the end of the year we will never know.
Cheers
<joh...@my-deja.com> wrote in message news:866toj$9qp@beast...
Martin Rapier
<3888E6B2...@istar.ca>...
> Martin Rapier wrote:
> > a) replace Horrocks with O'Connor (or maybe Patton!)
> best (certainly the most successful) corps commander in the British
Horrocks had still not recovered from wounds he received in North Africa
and was tired and ill throughout the NWE campaign. O'Connor had lost some
of his drive whilst in captivity, but was still very energetic and capable.
After the failure of the main thrust Montgomery charged O'Connors VIIth
Corps with keeping the offensive alive, but it petered out against the
defences of the Reichswald. See 'The Arnhem Campaign' (Osprey, ed. David
Chandler).
> Army. In fact, he had recently been called in by Monty to replace the
> (sacked) previous GOC XXX Corps. By the way, Patton was an Army not a
> Corps commander, replacing Horrocks with Patton would have been a
> demotion for Patton.
Yes, I wasn't being entirely serious.
> But that does bring up the real question about MARKET GARDEN, which is
> why did the major Allied push come down to a single corps? Monty
{snip}
It didn't, the entire 2nd Army attacked with three Corps in line
(otherwise, how exactly did 7th Armoured Div get to the Rhine?), plus the
three para divisions.
> > b) give the capture of Nijmegen equal priority with that of Arnhem
> Well, they did. Both cities got one Airborne div each.
1st Airbornes priority was capture of the bridges. 82nds priority was
securing their eastern flank against an expected German armoured
counterattack from Kleves, then taking the bridge. Intelligence errors
misplaced german armoured reserves, as Middlebrook put it 'The 82nd fought
the battle of Nijmegen with one arm tied behind its back'. The 82nd also
had to secure Grave bridge (which it did) and the intervening canal
bridges.
> More slander! The problem with MARKET GARDEN wasn't Brit 1st Airborne's
> performance at ARNHEM. They held out (against a Panzer Corps no less)
{snip}
101st had more recent combat experience than 1st Airborne, as well as
having four organic regiments rather than having to be reinforced with a
Polish para brigade. It makes more military sense to put the two best
divisions (82nd & 101st) on the most critical objectives. This was
politically unacceptable of course.
> > f) make sure that Divisional and Corps commanders were given a regular
> > kicks from behind so they got a move on.
>
> Thats a bit glib. "Kicks" so they got a move on? How does that clear
> Germans out of the way? Yelling and exhortions are for NCOs or movie
Montgomery even mentions this failing himself in his memoirs. He also
blames himself for not forcing the issue about landing a para brigade close
to the end of Arnhem bridge.
> Are you really
> suggesting that XXX Corps wasn't really trying, and that someone
> distracting them by yelling at them over their shoulders would have made
> a difference?
Yes. Contrast Montgomery and Dempseys (who is invisible in most accounts of
Arnhem) input into the battle with that of Model. What do you think the
outcome of Operation Crusader would have been if Auchinleck hadn't yelled
at his Corps commanders? Whilst Models tactical input was
counterproductive, he at least galvanised the defence into a more rapid
response than the Allied planners had believed possible.
Cheers
Martin.
'Triathlon' Steve
>
> Martin Rapier wrote:
>
> > a) replace Horrocks with O'Connor (or maybe Patton!)
>
> Slander! Horrocks was an outstanding formation commander, probably the
> best (certainly the most successful) corps commander in the British
Too right! It would be far more sensible to give offensive priority to
Patton than Monty, as the former is a FAR superior offensive leader.
Montgomery's plan is so incredibly flawed it is unbelievable, and even
for the limited success achieved it is dubious whether the investment
was worth it. Driving the entirety of XXX Corps up a single highway is
somewhere between suicide and a prosecutable offense by a war-crimes
tribunal! How he ever expected Horrocks (or anyone else) to storm into
Arnhem in the time frame allowed baffles me.
Steve
Martin Rapier
> > I would do exactly the same as Montgomery, but
> >
> > Eindhoven
> has a chance in arnhem.
Hmm, IInd SS PanzerKorps had an effective strength of somewhat less than a
regiment and was located several miles NW or Arnhem. It did respond very
quickly to the landings however. It was the reinforcements which tipped the
balance so much, 9th & 10th SS panzer were barely capable of holding a
defensive line - and 9th SS best unit (the reinforced recce battalion) was
all but wiped out by a single battalion of 1st Airborne. See Kershaws 'It
Never Snows in September' for a detailed german OB.
>The 101st might have rallied and cosolidated
> their forces quicker and faster since they learned from their mis-drops
> right before D-Day,
The main thing is that the 101st Airbrone had recent drop experience,
whereas 1st Airborne had not made a combat drop since Sicily.
> They would have a ton of things to do, some of which are:
> 1-Keep their landing zones, or else you don't get fed.
> 2-Take the two bridges in the area, which was no easy feat regardless of
> suprise. I'll admit they might have a better chance of taking them
> since they would consolidate quicker. But once the panzers push, they
> will push, and bazookas aren't gonna stop them that much.
OK, but although 1st Airborne suffered catastrophic losses, it still held
out for 10 days and was finally withdrawn, not overrun. The Germans were
just not strong enough to do that. The few armoured units they had suffered
brutally in the close range fighting, especially as poor training and the
heterogenous nature of the combat troops assembled meant they often
attacked unsupported.
> Either way, 30th Corps would still have a hell of a time making it to
> Arnhem. Then again maybe Patton would've done better. :)
Well, as I said, part of the problem was a lack of drive in the senior
commanders, but mainly because of the delay in taking Nijmegen bridge,
which was due to conflicting priorities being assigned to 82nd Airborne.
Martin Middlebrook has a fair amount about this in 'Arnhem 1944'.
O' Connor or Patton could probably have done a better job of keeping the
main attack going than actually happened, although this was partly Dempsey
& Montgomerys fault for losing touch with the tactical battle.
Cheers
Martin.
Brad Meyer
wrote:
>Logistics! I can hear the newsgroup answering. Well, yes, that was a
>real problem not to be slighted, but on the other hand what resistance
>were the Germans capable of mounting at that time?
Retreat. Retreat meant distance, and distance meant POL, which the
motorized and tank formations used whether in combat or not, in order
to maintain the persuit.
FWIW, I think Monty, and the Allies as a whole, would have been better
served if Monty wuold have used those assets, at that thime, to secure
Antwerp and its approaches. At that point in the campaign, the opening
of Antwerp as a supply point was at least as important as any oter
expansion of the lodgement. At best, they weren't going far into
Germany without Antwerp, therefore, IMO, it should have had priority
over a Rhine crossing.
Brad Meyer
"It is history that teaches us to hope"
-- R E Lee
trekk...@mailcity.com
br...@imb.net (Brad Meyer) wrote:
> FWIW, I think Monty, and the Allies as a whole, would have been better
> served if Monty wuold have used those assets, at that thime, to secure
> Antwerp and its approaches.
This is a major criticism of Montgomery- his dallying in securing
Antwerp. When Antwerp was entered by the allies, its approaches
to the sea were left in German hands. And the Canadian forces
sent to secure those approaches were inadequate.
Drazen Kramaric
<m.ra...@sheffield.ac.uk> wrote:
>d) drop the 101st at Arnhem and the less experienced 1st Airborne at Eindhoven
1st Airborne was deliberately picked for Arnhem because they have been
training for drop at Arnhem for some time (other operations that were
cancelled) and its staff studied the local terrain.
Drax
Al Murray
and
Pegasus Bridge [etc] had been forgotten so quickly is a mystery [and those
drops/landings were performed at night]. Then radio failures, resupply
problems, and other woes that beset the Division would have had a far
smaller impact on the operation [also the longer 1st Airborne held out at
the bridge the longer Gavin's men could proceed relatively unmolested by
Panzers - something Gavin acknowledged, saying the time Frost bought him
was
crucial]. I still think the whole thing was a terrbile overstretch though,
and wishful thinking by all concerned.
My tuppence worth
Al