American torpedos/Naval R & D in WWII
Andrew M. Carroll, Esquire
and, in my opinion, practically criminal incompetence of the
Department of Navy for sending submariners into harm's way with
torpedoes that had a less much than stellar track record. While that
is bad (they actually tested the dummy torpedoes w/o the added weight
of the actual explosive, thus making the true torpedo run about four
feet deeper than it should have; they also had a faulty trigger which
sometimes just did not work and caused the torpedo to bounce off the
target) what makes it even worse is the fact that when submarine
commanders reported these problems, the Department of Navy's
acquisition and R & D (or whatever subdepartment) instead chose to
believe that these commanders were wrong, fools for not being able to
make it work or just flat out ignored and glossed over. It is just as
bad as the Department of Army's bureacratic pinheads who chose to bury
Colonel Chennault's critical intelligence on the zero - simply because
Chennault bucked the system (I am far from a fan of Chennault - but, a
spade is a spade and must be called as much - Chennault is a hero for
fighting the Japanese when no one else would - including Chennault's
sponsor - the irascible and fascist Chiang Kai-sheck).
As such, my question is has anyone ever learned who was responsible
for this bureaucratic incompetence and if anything was done to shuffle
these incompetents out of the service (and hopefully strip them of
their honor and pension).
thanks
Brad Meyer
<ACar...@gmail.com> wrote:
>I was wondering if anyone had any information on the pathetically,
>and, in my opinion, practically criminal incompetence of the
>Department of Navy for sending submariners into harm's way with
>torpedoes that had a less much than stellar track record.
To be perfectly fair, this isn't exactly true. O'Kane in his books on
Wahoo and Tang makes mention of the fact that the torpedoes problem
didn't surfae until a few months into the war and that a large part of
the problem was with post PH torpedos that were manufactured with many
mass assembly components rather been being more or less hand built by
one Naval Torpedo Station. The quality control hadn't caught up with
prewar specs. The warheads and exploders were more nearly naval and
design problems, but there is also a trail of years worth of documents
from BuWeps (or whatever it was called then) requesting testing and
targets and being turned down for lack of funding.
Louis C
> As such, my question is has anyone ever learned who was responsible
> for this bureaucratic incompetence and if anything was done to shuffle
> these incompetents out of the service (and hopefully strip them of
> their honor and pension).
The US torpedo failure is well-documented. The following sources may
be of use:
Clay Blair: "Silent Service"
Robert Gannon, "Hellions of the Deep-Development of American Torpedoes
in World War II,"
Buford Rowland and William B. Boyd, "The U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance
in World War II" (this is the official history of BuOrd)
And then there's a series of authoritative articles which can be found
online here:
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1592/torpedos.html
LC
Michael Emrys
brad...@gmail.com wrote on 11/25/07 2:16 PM:
> BuWeps (or whatever it was called then)
BuOrd, wasn't it?
Michael
wjho...@aol.com
wrote:
> .... my question is has anyone ever learned who was responsible
> for this bureaucratic incompetence and if anything was done to shuffle
> these incompetents out of the service (and hopefully strip them of
> their honor and pension).
That's the old American spirit. Look for a few scapegoats and hang
'em, posthumously if necessary. However, as with many of the current
conventional myths surrounding episodes in the history of WWII,
wouldn't it be more more reasonable to learn more about the facts and
the circumstances?
For instance, the distinguished Harvard Historian (and WWII Naval
officer) Samuel Eliot Morison had a few things to say on the matter of
defective torpedoes. Here's a summary from his book "The Two Ocean
War--A short history of the United States Navy in The Second World
War":
1. Poor design and performance of our torpedoes was due partly
to obsolescence (leftover stock from World War I).
2. Economy (this was the era of the great depression and it was
a major offense to lose a live torpedo).
3. between-wars inefficiency of the Bureau of Ordnance.
4. politics in the torpedo factory at Newport, R.I. where, as
Morison wrote: "politicians regarded civilian labor as part of their
patronage, and supported the local union in resisting efficiency. As
one United States naval officer remarked ruefully, 'if I fired an
incompetent or insubordinate workman, the Secretary of the Navy was
visited next day by both Rhode Island senators and a congressman
insisting that he be reinstated.'"
WJH
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
<ef825626-de65-42f7...@w40g2000hsb.googlegroups.com>,
> practically criminal incompetence of the
> Department of Navy for sending submariners into harm's way with
> torpedoes that had a less much than stellar track record.
No more incompetent than most other nations involved. The Germans had
problems with magnetic detonators and depth keeping. The RN had problems
with magnetic detonators. German air dropped torpedoes were actually
worse than the US ones, they ended buying a 1000 torpedoes from Italy
while they tried to get one that worked.
Even the Japanese had problems. The second air bottle used for starting
tended to leak and if the pressure dropped to low pure O" was present
when combustion started. This usually resulted in an explosion.
All things considered while your Department of Navy was incompetent it
was not markedly worse than others. You could probably have a bigger go
at it for the 1.1 inch AA gun.
Ken Young
Louis C
> No more incompetent than most other nations involved.
Everyone tried the magnetic torpedo idea, and practically everyone had
problems with it. One possible exception is Italian torpedoes which
were superb, and I know that the Italians had worked on a magnetic
torpedo but I don't know if that one worked.
The difference is that other countries fixed their problem. When
German submarine skippers complained about defective torpedoes after
the Norway campaign, Doenitz took immediate steps to have the matter
investigated, and the Germans submarine arm replaced its own
detonators by copies of the British contact exploder: the German
equivalent to BuOrd was not offered the opportunity to say "it's not
our fault" or play the "not invented here" angle.
British magnetic exploders didn't work, so the RN reverted to contact
detonators.
It seems therefore that US torpedoes were particularly bad (instead of
just the magnetic detonator, the contact fuse didn't work either, on
top of a depth-keeping problem) which can't be solely blamed on
Depression budgets. After all, the USN may not have been spending a
large share of US national income, but given how large the US economy
was (even with the Depression) that still amounted to a hefty sum
compared to what smaller countries had (e.g. Italy, Germany,
France...). And of course, the USN seems to have been more or less
unique in having to fight a two-front war against both the Japanese
and its own Bureau of Ordnance.
Other countries had similar horror stories with other weapons: the
Italians, partly because of very successful lobbying by Fiat, kept
producing 3 different types of fighters throughout the war. The
Germans wasted resources building mammoth guns and tanks because Krupp
knew how to play on the Fuehrer's fantasies and the Wehrmacht was
unable to prevail. Etc.
LC
Don Phillipson
> <ACar...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >I was wondering if anyone had any information on the pathetically,
> >and, in my opinion, practically criminal incompetence of the
> >Department of Navy for sending submariners into harm's way with
> >torpedoes that had a less much than stellar track record.
"Brad Meyer" <brad...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:fjsjk31f6kr0fmjlt...@4ax.com...
> To be perfectly fair, this isn't exactly true. O'Kane in his books on
> Wahoo and Tang makes mention of the fact that the torpedoes problem
> didn't surfae until a few months into the war and that a large part of
> the problem was with post PH torpedos that were manufactured with many
> mass assembly components rather been being more or less hand built by
> one Naval Torpedo Station. The quality control hadn't caught up with
> prewar specs. . . .
British archives might shed some light on this, because
mutual technical aid was one of the main purposes of the
liaison agreement concluded in Washington in August 1940
by the Tizard Mission. You would expect RN liaison officers
to know the quality (good or bad) of US torpedoes. (But
Adm. King's hostility to British liaison could not have helped:
and if no British liaison officer in Washington was experienced
in torpedoes there would have been no opportunity to help.)
Quality control in manufacturing was a major problem in
arms production throughout North America, demonstrated
by the low quality of Canadian GLIII radar sets and delays
in the B-29 program for lack of reliable engines.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Rich Rostrom
>Everyone tried the magnetic torpedo idea, and practically everyone had
>problems with it. One possible exception is Italian torpedoes which
>were superb, and I know that the Italians had worked on a magnetic
>torpedo but I don't know if that one worked.
The Italian navy had the "Silvrifici Italiano Calosi",
designed by Professor Carlo Calosi of the University
of Bologna, which was supposedly very effective.
This according to Stanley Lovell in _Of Spies and
Stratagems_. He devotes a chapter to the story.
Lovell stated that the Germans ordered 12,000 SICs.
In January 1944, an OSS mission extracted Professor
Calosi from German-occupied Italy. He was brought
to America, where he reconstructed the SIC and
developed effective countermeasures.
The OSS handed Calosi and his team over to the Navy,
which sent him to Newport - where he was _not_
welcome. It took direct orders from Vice CNO Horne
to get the Newport staff to cooperate.
--
| Decapitation is, in most instances, associated |
| with a decline in IQ. |
| |
| -- Professor Raymond Tallis |
Andrew M. Carroll, Esquire
> On 25 Nov, 15:29, "Andrew M. Carroll, Esquire" <ACarr...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > .... my question is has anyone ever learned who was responsible
> > for this bureaucratic incompetence and if anything was done to shuffle
> > these incompetents out of the service (and hopefully strip them of
> > their honor and pension).
>
> That's the old American spirit. Look for a few scapegoats and hang
> 'em, posthumously if necessary. However, as with many of the current
> conventional myths surrounding episodes in the history of WWII,
> wouldn't it be more more reasonable to learn more about the facts and
> the circumstances?
>
> For instance, the distinguished Harvard Historian (and WWII Naval
> officer) Samuel Eliot Morison had a few things to say on the matter of
> defective torpedoes. Here's a summary from his book "The Two Ocean
> War--A short history of the United States Navy in The Second World
> War":
> 1. Poor design and performance of our torpedoes was due partly
> to obsolescence (leftover stock from World War I).
> 2. Economy (this was the era of the great depression and it was
> a major offense to lose a live torpedo).
> 3. between-wars inefficiency of the Bureau of Ordnance.
>
> patronage, and supported the local union in resisting efficiency. As
> one United States naval officer remarked ruefully, 'if I fired an
> incompetent or insubordinate workman, the Secretary of the Navy was
> visited next day by both Rhode Island senators and a congressman
> insisting that he be reinstated.'"
>
> WJH
Doesn't this prove my point exactly?
As for hanging people posthumously - my opinion was that they should
have been hung at the time.
As for the visits, I am sure Admiral King (chief of naval staff) would
have had an earful to any politcian who visited him.
I think you miss the point. American torpeadoes sucked and caused
unnecessary deaths in American ranks, only because American
paperpushers and bureacrats didn't have the courage that was necessary
to argue that the American submariner deserved the best torpedo out
there, if not at least a better torpedo. Perhaps if they only had a
fraction of the courage of what they asked of the average American
submariner cook, things would have been different. You prove my point
exactly - the bureacrats couldn't muster the courage to admit that
they were wrong.
Andrew M. Carroll, Esquire
Thank you - I think this proves my point exactly - the Naval
bureacrats would not even accept that they were incompetent when it
meant the loss of lives and property. I didn't realize it was so bad.
thanks
Andy
Justin
On Nov 25, 1:29 pm, "Andrew M. Carroll, Esquire" <ACarr...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> I was wondering if anyone had any information on the pathetically,
> and, in my opinion, practically criminal incompetence of the
> Department of Navy for sending submariners into harm's way with
> torpedoes that had a less much than stellar track record. [...]
>
Though the episode is certainly a black mark on USN history, it was
more the failure of an ineffective and somewhat corrupt institution
that evolved in peacetime, rather than any blatant incompetence or
malfeasance by a few individuals. The navy's sole torpedo supplier
was the navy itself, and the Newport RI Torpedo Station was a
insulated, self-sustaining bureaucratic enclave with no competition
and powerful political protection. Its development and testing
doctrines were restricted by Depression economies, and were often
tailored to meet its officers' desired outcomes. The Torpedo Station
was run by the Bureau of Ordnance, a powerful bureaucracy that was
largely independent of the navy's top leadership, with its own network
of congressional influence. It was called the "Gun Club," and indeed
was largely staffed by insider officers who did repeated tours
there.
Perhaps not surprisingly, this environment created a mind set that was
very resistant to admitting fault or accepting criticism of the
Bureau's technical accomplishments. When submarine action experience
began to accumulate, it began to appear that the torpedoes had three
faults: The magnetic influence exploder worked only sporadically, the
contact exploder likewise, and the torpedoes ran deeper than set
depth. BuOrd responded, basically, "It can't be," and it must be the
crews' fault. Submarine COs became increasingly vocal, eventually
convincing ComSubPac Admiral Charles Lockwood that something had to be
done. He got some sub officers with war experience transferred to
BuOrd to work on the problem, but they were pretty much ignored as
outsiders.
Meanwhile, RAdm Ralph Christie, a torpedo expert who had served three
tours at Newport and was one of the principal developers if the
magnetic pistol, was commanding US submarines in Australia. He
refused to acknowledge any torpedo defects, and reacted defensively as
criticism became more vocal. After VAdm Lockwood ordered SubPac
submarines to deactivate their magnetic feature, Christie insisted
that any boats transferring to his command reactivate it.
In 1943, or course, the torpedo defects had been identified and
diagnosed mostly by the operating forces in-theater, and Admiral King
in Washington had the Navy Inspector General's office investigate
BuOrd and NTS Newport, resulting in major changes. It was also found
that Newport had hampered development of Westinghouse's promising
electric torpedo in favor of their own less effective design.
> As such, my question is has anyone ever learned who was responsible
> for this bureaucratic incompetence and if anything was done to shuffle
> these incompetents out of the service (and hopefully strip them of
> their honor and pension).
Not really. This bit of dirty linen was pretty effectively suppressed
by the navy for years. Christie was eventually fired as Commander
Submarines Seventh Fleet, but it was over disagreements with his boss,
Adm Kinkaid, and nothing to do with the torpedo issue. The chief of
BuOrd for the first years of the war, RAdm William H. P. "Spike"
Blandy, despite the bitter feelings of some in the Pacific, had no
career setback from the torpedo scandal. He went on to command an
amphibious group in the Pacific, and after the war became Deputy CNO
(Special Weapons) and was in charge of the Bikini atomic tests. He
was one of the top three candidates to become CNO in 1947, and when he
didn't get that job he got four stars as CinC Atlantic.
The torpedo scandal really came to public attention after the
publication of Clay Blair's "Silent Victory" in 1975. It has
extensive accounts of the back and forth on the subject during the
war, including Lockwood telling Blandy personally to get BuOrd "off
its duff," and a pretty remarkable correspondence between Christie and
Lockwood. After criticizing crews for daring to question the
torpedoes, Christie objects to Lockwood copying his communications to
another sub commander. Lockwood, after a withering response, says
that he will communicate however he sees fit, and if Christie doesn't
like it he can "read them or stuff them." [!]
--Justin
David Thornley
Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote:
>
>The Italian navy had the "Silvrifici Italiano Calosi",
>designed by Professor Carlo Calosi of the University
>of Bologna, which was supposedly very effective.
>
magnetic trigger, and says that the Italians stopped using it.
He doesn't give further details on why. That suggests to me that
it wasn't all that successful.
A real, working, magnetic trigger would have been an exceedingly
effective weapon, allowing large explosions to take place
directly under ships, where the blast would not vent to air,
and the only thing that could give would be the ship. I don't think
anybody would have given up on a truly effective version.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Tero P. Mustalahti
> In article <rrostrom.21stcentury-...@news.isp.giganews.com>,
> Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote:
>> The Italian navy had the "Silvrifici Italiano Calosi",
>> designed by Professor Carlo Calosi of the University
>> of Bologna, which was supposedly very effective.
>>
> Campbell ("Naval Weapons of World War Two") describes the Italian
> magnetic trigger, and says that the Italians stopped using it.
> He doesn't give further details on why. That suggests to me that
> it wasn't all that successful.
Stopped when? According to this source:
http://www.regiamarina.net/subs/weapons/torpedoes/torpedo_us.htm
they only started to use the S.I.C. (correct spelling, I believe is:
Silurificio Italiano Calosi) in 1942. Does not give them too much time
to stop using it... Interestingly Campbell's "Naval Weapons of World War
Two" is given as a source in that article, but it also lists an Italian
source ("Le Armi delle Navi Italiane Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale" by
Erminio Bagnasco).
It does not say anything about stopping the use of the S.I.C., but of
course it is possible that it wasn't considered important by the writer.
A more likely explanation is, however, that it is not mentioned by the
Italian source and was therefore not considered reliable information.
I suppose we can only hope that Haydn still reads this group and checks
the facts for us ;-) I also took the liberty to email this message to
his last known email address.
Tero P. Mustalahti
Davide Pastore
> I suppose we can only hope that Haydn still reads this group
He's not the only Italian here.
This is what Bagnasco ("Le Armi delle Navi Italiane nella
Seconda Guerra Mondiale") has to say about the magnetic
device:
"This kind of fuze [impact type] remained the standard
one for nearly all the lenght of the conflict; only in 1942
weapons fitted with 'S.I.C.' type magnetic fuze produced
by Silurificio Italiano, mainly of the 450mm type, began
to be introduced." [page 128]
The reference to the 450mm calibre is interesting. The
same sources says that many Italian ships and subs had
one or more 533mm torpedo tube fitted with a device
able to fire an *old* 450mm weapon (large stores being
in existence). However, being the S.I.C. a newly-built
weapon, it is obvious the caliber was chosen for some
reason.
This restricts the circle to only three candidates:
1) the single large sub 'Ammiraglio Cagni' at Betasom
2) the many MS and MAS boats [better known, alas, as
'E-Boats' to most Anglo-Saxon writers...]
3) R.A. Aerosiluranti (S.79 & Co.)
Old ships had 450mm too but I believe they were not
the intended receivers.
Bagnasco says nothing about Germans buying S.I.C.,
nor about post-1942 developments.
R.M. Official histories say absolutely nothing about S.I.C.
--
Davide
"Solo se la vostra visione va oltre quella del vostro maestro,
siete adatti per ricevere e tramandare la trasmissione."
(Massima Zen)
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
<95c6391e-e8b4-4b67...@n20g2000hsh.googlegroups.com>,
wjho...@aol.com () wrote:
> 1. Poor design and performance of our torpedoes was due partly
> to obsolescence (leftover stock from World War I).
Actually the left over torpedoes worked better than the new ones. That
is they actually performed to specification. Though of course they
lacked range and speed compared with new designs.
Ken Young
Haydn
> Louis C <loui...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>>...I know that the Italians had worked on a magnetic
>>torpedo but I don't know if that one worked.
>
> The Italian navy had the "Silvrifici Italiano Calosi",
> designed by Professor Carlo Calosi of the University
> of Bologna, which was supposedly very effective.
Indeed. "S.I.C." was the magnetic exploder model produced by the Silurificio
Italiano di Baia-Napoli. In 1942 a limited number of torpedoes, mostly 450
mm, were equipped with S.I.C. exploders. No malfunction worth reporting is
known, although few such torpedoes were supposedly used in real attacks.
> This according to Stanley Lovell in _Of Spies and
> Stratagems_. He devotes a chapter to the story.
Interesting story. Thank you for sharing it.
Haydn
Mark Sieving
>
> The torpedo scandal really came to public attention after the
> publication of Clay Blair's "Silent Victory" in 1975.
I doubt that it's ever been high in the public's attention, but I
remember an old John Wayne movie, I think "Operation Pacific" (1951),
where defective submarine torpedoes was a significant plot device (and
of course, "The Duke" solved the problem). I suspect that more people
saw "Operation Pacific" than have read Blair's book, as good as it is.
Tero P. Mustalahti
> "Tero P. Mustalahti" <term...@utu.fi> ha scritto
>
>> I suppose we can only hope that Haydn still reads this group
>
> He's not the only Italian here.
I am sorry, he was the first one I could remember. Thank you for the
reply in any case. Haydn wrote in his reply to Rich Rostrom that the
S.I.C. does not seem to be used all that much. Could that be simply
because the fuel shortage ristricted R.M. operations to the bare minimum
by 1942? Or was the contact exploder still preferred? It seems that the
Italian contact exploder was also a very good design.
Tero P. Mustalahti
Rich Rostrom
>A real, working, magnetic trigger would have been an exceedingly
>effective weapon, allowing large explosions to take place
>directly under ships, where the blast would not vent to air,
>and the only thing that could give would be the ship.
Lovell specifically mentions that
the SIC detonated under the target
ship's keel. This would break the
keel. He further asserts that this
was the cause of heavy shipping
losses in the Murmansk convoys,
wrongly ascribed to faulty ship-
building.
Davide Pastore
> S.I.C. does not seem to be used all that much. Could that
> be simply because the fuel shortage ristricted R.M.
> operations to the bare minimum by 1942?
There may have been other reasons: for example, the
magnetic fuze was quite probably more costly and more
difficult to produce. Or maybe the Germans got most of
the production. Lacking sources, I can only guess.
Michael Emrys
0958f3df-b277-4f46...@e23g2000prf.googlegroups.com, Mark
Sieving at mark_s...@yahoo.com wrote on 11/29/07 12:35 PM:
> I suspect that more people saw "Operation Pacific" than have read Blair's
> book, as good as it is.
And I suspect that even more people have either read *Run Silent, Run Deep*
and/or seen the movie made from it. The torpedo problem was a very big part
of that story.
Michael
Padraigh ProAmerica
"Submarine!" [published 1955, I think]. He had first-hand experience
with the Mark XIV and it's problems. (ANd apparently the torpedo carried
by navy torpedo bombers had even greater problem than the Mark XIV).
AMATEUR RADIO: A National resource!
For more information about amateur radio go to
<www.arrl.org>