"Battle Line: The USN 1919-1939"

[Alan Nordin]

I've just completed this book by Thomas & Trent Hone, a father/son team.
I think it's worth the effort if you're interested in the USN.

===

They make several points about the way in which the USN trained in the
inter-war period.

1) The annual fleet problems were an excellent training tool.

2) Small unit {ie ship division / ship squadron} training was neglected.

3) Ship vs ship competition was over emphasized.

The authors felt the lack of small unit training was the main reason for
the losses in the lower Solomon Islands and they also said the lack of
night training contributed. They fail to mention that for most of these
engagements, the task forces were thrown together without maintaining
division integrity.

Ship vs ship competition came to be the overriding measure of
performance in the inter-war navy with officer's and enlisted men's
promotions riding on the outcome. They saw this as detrimental since
other than the fleet problems, very little time was spent training for war.

===

The book goes into other areas as well and I think does a good job. I
focused on training since I don't think I've ever seen any other
treatment of the subject.

Alan

[Alan Nordin]

One thing I forgot ...

In 1926 the USN tested operating float planes from submarines. S-1 was
fitted with a small hangar and float plane but the USN felt the effort
wasn't worth the return.

When did the IJN test this same concept? and when did it become operational?

Alan

[Rich]

On Apr 22, 10:29 am, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> They fail to mention that for most of these
> engagements, the task forces were thrown together without maintaining
> division integrity.

Alan,

The problem was not the failure to maintain division integrity, since
that could not be helped, it was that there was no universal doctrine
for squadron and division small ship operations. Instead, doctrinal
SOP was individual to the division and/or squadron. Thus, when combat
inevitably caused ships to be interchanged between divisions the
result was often tactical chaos. It wasn't until late 1942 and early
1943 that the mistake was realized and Navy-wide doctrine was
introduced.

Cheers!

[Michael Emrys]

On 4/22/12 7:29 AM, Alan Nordin wrote:
> The authors felt the lack of small unit training was the main reason
> for the losses in the lower Solomon Islands and they also said the
> lack of night training contributed.

Lack of night training was a huge factor. Another was lack of proper
equipment. The shorter ranged and unreliable torpedoes have been
mentioned many times. Also the lack of flashless propellant for guns and
torpedo tubes meant that the US ships were visible from greater
distances as soon as they fired. Finally, the Japanese seem to have been
more lavishly supplied with high quality optical equipment and their
lookouts better trained in night warfare. Prior to the improvement in
surface radar, that was a critical advantage.

Michael

[Chris Morton]

In article <jn12k6$v8p$1...@dont-email.me>, Alan Nordin says...

>The authors felt the lack of small unit training was the main reason for
>the losses in the lower Solomon Islands and they also said the lack of
>night training contributed. They fail to mention that for most of these
>engagements, the task forces were thrown together without maintaining
>division integrity.

The Japanese were probably the best in the world at night operations. That was
later largely negated by vastly superior American radar, experience and improved
training.


--
Gun control, the theory that 110lb. women have the "right" to fistfight with
210lb. rapists.

[Alan Nordin]

On 4/22/2012 1:42 PM, Rich wrote:

> The problem was not the failure to maintain division integrity, since
> that could not be helped, it was that there was no universal doctrine
> for squadron and division small ship operations. Instead, doctrinal
> SOP was individual to the division and/or squadron. Thus, when combat
> inevitably caused ships to be interchanged between divisions the
> result was often tactical chaos. It wasn't until late 1942 and early
> 1943 that the mistake was realized and Navy-wide doctrine was
> introduced.
>
> Cheers!

Yes, a common thread to the Lower Solomons encounters was the tying of
the destroyer forces to whichever main force was employed. The DDs
didn't operate independently.

The Hones go into the tactical planning done by the USN inter-war, and
like the IJN, this planning dwelt mostly with the Mahan style single
decisive battle.

Alan

[Mario]

Michael Emrys, 19:44, domenica 22 aprile 2012:

Italians too were not trained for night fighting so they lost
ships at Cape Matapan.

BTW:
http://snipurl.com/filippoww2



--
H

[Bill]

In article <jn16l5$o6l$1...@dont-email.me>, alan_...@comcast.net says...

The British did it with M2 at about the same time.

The French did it with Surcouf

But both had big guns as well. Not sure if M2 retained hers after the
hangar was fitted but it didn't matter anyway, it was a rebuilt K
Class...

The famous Japanese I-100 class submarines carried three aircraft and
were designed to attack the US mainland, but I doubt they ever did so.

There's actually a Wikipedia article about Japanese submarine aircraft
carrying vessels.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine_aircraft_carriers_of_Japan

--
William Black

When you hear the words 'Our people are our greatest asset' then it's
time to leave.

[Bill]

In article <4f94552e$0$1391$4faf...@reader1.news.tin.it>,
ack...@ack.ack says...

It's a great deal more complicated than that.

For a start Vitorio Venito fired several salvos that straddled but did
no damage because of excessive spread.

She was hit by a torpedo in broad blue daylight.

In the subsequent night action the Italians didn't even identify the
British an an enemy until they opened fire.

The Italians lost two big cruisers before they could even work out they
were in a fight.

[Mario]

Bill, 23:07, domenica 22 aprile 2012:

> In article <4f94552e$0$1391$4faf...@reader1.news.tin.it>,
> ack...@ack.ack says...
>>
>> Michael Emrys, 19:44, domenica 22 aprile 2012:
>>

>> > Lack of night training was a huge factor. Another was lack
>> > of proper equipment. The shorter ranged and unreliable
>> > torpedoes have been mentioned many times. Also the lack of
>> > flashless propellant for guns and torpedo tubes meant that
>> > the US ships were visible from greater distances as soon as
>> > they fired. Finally, the Japanese seem to have been more
>> > lavishly supplied with high quality optical equipment and
>> > their lookouts better trained in night warfare. Prior to
>> > the improvement in surface radar, that was a critical
>> > advantage.
>>
>>
>> Italians too were not trained for night fighting so they lost
>> ships at Cape Matapan.
>
>
> It's a great deal more complicated than that.
>

> For a start Vittorio Veneto fired several salvos that

> straddled but did no damage because of excessive spread.
>
> She was hit by a torpedo in broad blue daylight.
>
> In the subsequent night action the Italians didn't even

> identify the British as an enemy until they opened fire.


That I was referring to.

> The Italians lost two big cruisers before they could even work
> out they were in a fight.

No objection, only adding that Italians had no radar.

There has been a lot of debate on that battle.


--
H

[Alan Nordin]

On 4/22/2012 11:21 AM, Alan Nordin wrote:
> When did the IJN test this same concept? and when did it become
> operational?

The IJN first tested this in 1923. When it became operational in the
IJN is still unknown to me. The German Navy used the concept
operationally in 1916 but the plane was strapped to the subs deck not in
a hangar.

Alan

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Apr 22, 10:29 am, Alan Nordin wrote:
> I've just completed this book by Thomas & Trent Hone...
> ....They make several points about the way in which the
> USN trained in the inter-war period....I focused on training

> since I don't think I've ever seen any other treatment of the
> subject.

"Battle Line" is one of five such books which are reviewed
together in an article titled "Reappraising The Interwar U.S.
Navy" in a long, detailed article in "The Journal of Military
History" Vol.76 No.1 January 2012. These books are:
"Testing America's Sea Power...1923-1940" by Craig T.
Felker; "Battle Line" by Thomas and Trent Hone; "Agents
of Inovation--The General Board and the Design of the
Fleet That Beat Japan" by John T. Kuehn, "War Plan
Orange,The U.S.Stategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945" by
by Edward S. Miller, " and "To Train the Fleet for War: U.S.
Navy Fleet Problems 1923-1940" by Albert A. Nofi.
These books are all of recent vintage
and, althjough they each emphasize one or two main
facets of the Navy's problems following the treaty
restraints imposed upon it by the Washington Naval
Treaty of 1922, the reviewer, Joel I Holwitt, B.A.
Naval Academy, M.A. and PHd, Ohio State, who is
presently Navigator/Operations Officer of the fast
attack nuclear submarine USS New Mexico (SSN 779)
writes that the genesis of all of them is the 1991 book
"War Plan Orange" by Edwin S. Miller.
The reviewer points out that "War
Plan Orange" was the Navy's plan to defeat Japan and
that the Navy considered Japan a potential adversary
from as far back as the beginning of the 20th Century.
He goes into considerable detail to describe two
plans the Navy explored: (1) the so-called "thruster"
method by which the U,S. would concentrate on a
race across the Pacific to the Phillipines which would
be used as a base for the defeat of Japan, or (2)
after the 1922 treaty had restricted our fortification of
Guam, a more realistic so-called "cautionary" method
which, in essence, consisted of abandonment of the
Phillipines followed by an "island hopping" strategy
"which very much approximated the Pacific War from
1941 to 1945. What followed which is detailed in all
of the books is the training, use of new developments
such as aviation, new submarine warfare techniques,
financial planning, and all the rest in order to put the
plan in effect, if and when the time came, which,it did
with the attack on Pearl Harbor. This is a long article
and very detailed. At the end it sums up in these words:
"The interwar U.S.Navy is an unusual success
story, in that the seeds for rhe Navy that won the war
had already been planted well before the conflict
began. Once he war strarted there was no large-scale
purging of the senior leadership. Admirals like Chester
W.Nimitz, Ernest J. King, Raymond Spruance, and
William Halsey had already assumed high levels of
responsibility and command before the war. As the
proof of war, and the books discussed above show,
and despite popular narratives to the contrary, the
interwar Navy deserves a closer look at how a
military can strategize and train for the next war."

WJH

[Bill Shatzer]

It should be noted that the U-boat could not submerge with the aircraft
aboard. Indeed, the seaplane was launched by partially submerging the
U-boat and allowing the aircraft to float off.

Calling this experiment "operational" seems to stretch things a bit.

[Chris Morton]

In article <jn1tu9$egi$1...@dont-email.me>, Alan Nordin says...

There's a LOT of detail in "I-Boat Captain" by Orita(?), including pilot names,
missions, losses, etc.

[Alan Nordin]

On 4/22/2012 11:51 PM, Bill Shatzer wrote:
> Calling this experiment "operational" seems to stretch things a bit.

It was used to bomb a target. Is there another definition of operational?

Alan

[Alan Nordin]

On 4/23/2012 9:11 AM, Alan Nordin wrote:
> It was used to bomb a target. Is there another definition of operational?

Perhaps I should say, "attack an enemy target during war," it didn't hit
anything.

Alan

[Bill Shatzer]

According to my admittedly brief references, the submarine-launched
FF.29 seaplane carried no ordinance and merely flew along the English
coastline before returning to its base at Zeebrugge.

The whole project was subsequently shelved as impractical. A photo of
the lashed up arrangement rather demonstrates why.

http://tinyurl.com/FF-29-U-12

An FF.29 had earlier dropped a couple of small bombs on the outskirts of
London but that aircraft had been launched conventionally and not from
a sub.

[Alan Nordin]

On 4/23/2012 1:15 PM, Bill Shatzer wrote:
> According to my admittedly brief references, the submarine-launched
> FF.29 seaplane carried no ordinance and merely flew along the English
> coastline before returning to its base at Zeebrugge.
>
> The whole project was subsequently shelved as impractical. A photo of
> the lashed up arrangement rather demonstrates why.
>
> http://tinyurl.com/FF-29-U-12
>
> An FF.29 had earlier dropped a couple of small bombs on the outskirts of
> London but that aircraft had been launched conventionally and not from a
> sub.

An equally brief account ....

http://www.navalofficer.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=288:carriersub&catid=44:submarines1&Itemid=80

"The German U-12 sailed from Zeebrugge, Belgium, on 15 January 1915 with
a Friedrichshafen FF-29 seaplane armed with small bombs lashed down on
its foredeck. They intended to close the English coast before launching
the aircraft but the swell was too steep to ensure safe passage of the
delicate aircraft. U-12 submerged shortly after leaving harbour,
allowing the aircraft to float off and fly away. The FF-29 reached the
English coast and returned safely to Zeebrugge without suffering or
inflicting notable damage."

And here ....

http://www.regulus-missile.com/SubmarineWings.htm

"The very first aircraft launched from a submarine is attributed to the
German Imperial Navy during WWI. The German Army had advanced into
Belgium and occupied the Port of Zeebrugge, famous for its giant
breakwater. The German Navy then moved its U-boats into the port. One of
the first to arrive was the U-12 commanded by Kapitanleutnant Walter
Forstmann. A month later, the first contingent of the Imperial Navy's
Air Service arrived, commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Friedrich von
Arnauld de la Perriere. His unit consisted of three other officers, 55
enlisted men and two aircraft. The aircraft, Friedrichshafen FF-29s,
were twin-float biplanes, powered by 120-hp engines.

The mission of the U-boats was simple, to sink enemy shipping. However,
the role of the German Navy's air army had still not been clearly
defined. It had been created at the very beginning of the war, but what
it could or should do had yet to be established.

Friedrich von Arnauld, having received no instructions, decided to
develop his own missions. He reconfigured the unarmed FF -29s to carry
26.5 pound bombs, and on Christmas Day one of his seaplanes flew across
the English Channel, up the River Thames and dropped the bombs
harmlessly on the outskirts of London. Although it was chased by three
British aircraft, it returned safely. The aircraft themselves suffered
more from fuel problems and faulty ignitions than they did from the
British."

Upon rereading the article, it isn't clear that the London raid was
launched/floated-off from the submarine, probably not. Still, the recon
mission cited at the first web site, even though it was from just
outside the harbor, was a combat mission. I guess it's also possible
both accounts are referring to the same mission. Not much, but ...

Alan

[Alan Nordin]

On 4/23/2012 2:32 PM, Alan Nordin wrote:
> I guess it's also possible
> both accounts are referring to the same mission.

No, Zeebrugge was occupied by the Germans in 1914 and the London raid
was apparently within months of the occupation.

Alan

[Padraigh ProAmerica]

A slight correction: it was the I-400 class subs that carried aircraft.

IIRC there was one attack on the US mainland where a couple of firebombs
were dropped to try and start a major forest fire in the Pacific
northwest.

One of these collpasible aircraft has been restore at the Smithsonian.

The real intent was to launch at attack on the Panama Canal; by the time
the subs were ready, there was no point in the attack.



--
"A good march should make a man with a wooden leg want to step out."--

John Phillip Sousa

[cman...@gmail.com]

On Tuesday, April 24, 2012 12:11:40 AM UTC-4, Padraigh ProAmerica wrote:

> A slight correction: it was the I-400 class subs that carried aircraft.

The Japanese had many classes of submarines that could carry aircraft.
The Japanese built 41 submarines that could operate aircraft. Only the
three I-400 class submarines could reach the Panama Canal during a
war, but they had plenty of types that could carry one or two aircraft
to Hawaii, and most of them could reach out all the way to the West
Coast, though so much time was spent in transit that they couldn't
really do effective missions at that range.

> IIRC there was one attack on the US mainland where a couple of firebombs
> were dropped to try and start a major forest fire in the Pacific
> northwest.

The I-25's Glenn seaplane dropped some incendiaries in Oregon. The
I-25 was a B-1 type submarine, the most numerous large submarine the
Japanese built, at 20 completed.

> One of these collpasible aircraft has been restore at the Smithsonian.

The only surviving Seiran (the type intended to attack the Panama
Canal) is on display at the Udvar-Hazy Center. Divers have apparently
discovered a crated up Glenn in a wreck on Kwajlein, according to
Wiki.

The UHC also is one of about half-a-dozen museums with German FA 330
submarine launched rotor-kites on display, for a good cross-Axis
comparison.

> The real intent was to launch at attack on the Panama Canal; by the time
> the subs were ready, there was no point in the attack.

The three I-400's were at sea, heading for their first combat mission-
an attack on the USN base at Ulithi Atoll when the war ended. The
attack (which was also supposed to be coordinated with Kaiten-carrying
submarines) was supposed to happen on August 17th, 1945. It was
expected that they would attack the Panama Canal after their return to
Japan, if they survived.

Chris Manteuffel