The Dresden bombing raid on Feb. 13, 1945
arto k eskelinen
Exactly 60 years ago the Allied bomber planes knocked off
totally the city of Dresden in eastern Germany killing
estimated 30-50 000 civilians.
Some questions:
What were the strategic objectives of this raid? Why was
it done on the very eve of German defeat? What did this
raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
[Just curious]
-arto k eskelinen
Jyvaskyla, Finland.
Dave Gower
"arto k eskelinen" <artokes...@yaho.co.uk.invalid> wrote
> What were the strategic objectives of this raid? Why was
> it done on the very eve of German defeat? What did this
> raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
It was hoped that this would hasten the final collapse of the Third Reich.
At the time, the Red Army was on the Oder, virtually in the outskirts of
Berlin, and the Western Allies were approaching the industrial heartland of
the Ruhr. There was real hope that Germany was on its last legs.
Dresden was also a major regional military and civilian headquarters area,
and one of the least damaged centres in a Third Reich where profitable
bombing targets were becoming scarce. So it was a legitimate bombing target.
In the light of hindsight, one can say that the attack was excessive,
especially with the huge number of refugees huddled there, but at the time
it was just business as usual in a war that everyone in the Allied command
felt had gone on far too long. In addition, the liberation of death camps
had reduced whatever sympathy might remain for the fate of Germany or
Germans, no matter who they might be.
--
Briarroot
>
> Exactly 60 years ago the Allied bomber planes knocked off
> totally the city of Dresden in eastern Germany killing
> estimated 30-50 000 civilians.
>
> Some questions:
>
> What were the strategic objectives of this raid? Why was
> it done on the very eve of German defeat? What did this
> raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
>
Dresden was a major transportation nexus of roads, rail and river
traffic. It was a sluice gate to and from the Eastern Front - troops
and supplies flowed east, and civilian refugees flowed west through
Dresden. It was also a center of light industry, such as optics and
electronics, with more than 127 factories engaged in making ammunition
and parts for weapons and other military equipment. The necessity to
impede that traffic and destroy those industries made it an obvious
target for Allied air attacks.
Why do you suggest the Dresden raids occurred "on the very eve of
German defeat?" The war in Europe was far from over, and it was
appropriate that the Allied policy of round the clock bombing be
continued until such time as the Germans were ready to capitulate.
The German army was far from defeated in February '45 and was still
capable of inflicting major casualties on the Allied armies as they
did in April, when the Russians suffered about 80,000 killed and
250,000 wounded in the final battles for Berlin. It would have been
foolish indeed, to let up on such a potent enemy.
It's hard to pinpoint the specific effects of the Dresden raids on the
overall Allied war effort, but when you consider how much wasted
manpower and money the Germans had to expend on air defense,
industrial dispersion, and repairing bomb damage to the transportation
system, then the Allied bombing campaign of which Dresden was a
typical example (despite post-war propaganda to the contrary) can be
considered an important contribution to final victory.
Suggested reading:
"Dresden" by Frederick Taylor, 2004 Harper-Collins, ISBN 0-06-000676-5
--
Admiral Sir Francis Haddock
<artokes...@yaho.co.uk.invalid> wrote:
>Exactly 60 years ago the Allied bomber planes knocked off
>totally the city of Dresden in eastern Germany killing
>estimated 30-50 000 civilians.
>
>Some questions:
>
>What were the strategic objectives of this raid?
To attack railway yards and communications centres behind the German
eastern front. It was also believed that the progress of the land war
against Germany would make the morale of the German population and
administration particularly vulnerable to a heavy series of bombing
attacks on major urban areas. In both cases, the aim was to end the
war more quickly.
> Why was
>it done on the very eve of German defeat?
To bring about German defeat more quickly. In February 1945 the
Allies hadn't crossed the Rhine and the Russians hadn't moved beyond
their initial bridgeheads over the Oder. The war was still going on.
>What did this
>raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
There was more than one raid. Dresden was bombed once by Bomber
Command, on 13/14th February, and then three times by the USAAF (14th
& 15th February and 2nd March 1945). None of these raids were
decisive in of themselves, and probably did little to hasten German
defeat, but then the same could be said about almost all individual
bombing raids. The cumulative effect of such raids, however, was
strategically important and did contribute to German defeat.
Gavin Bailey
--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>Exactly 60 years ago the Allied bomber planes knocked off
>totally the city of Dresden in eastern Germany killing
>estimated 30-50 000 civilians.
The death toll, according to Dresden's reports, is probably
around the 25 to 35,000 mark.
>What were the strategic objectives of this raid?
Disrupt or destroy the transportation facilities in Dresden,
disrupt or destroy war industries located there, disrupt or
destroy military headquarters and civilian government
offices.
>Why was it done on the very eve of German defeat?
Very eve of defeat is defined as nearly 3 months from the surrender.
Why were the German armies still defending on the very eve of
defeat?
What could justify the allied air forces withdrawing their considerable
firepower while the armies were still on the west bank of the Rhine
for example?
>What did this raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
Not a great deal. Just like most divisional level attacks, it was
the cumulative effect.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
--
Cub Driver
<artokes...@yaho.co.uk.invalid> wrote:
>What were the strategic objectives of this raid? Why was
>it done on the very eve of German defeat? What did this
>raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
Most German cities were railway hubs, therefore chokepoints;
destroying any one of them would certainly degrade German military
capabilities, as would the hordes of refugees thus sent on the road.
Feburary 15 was hardly the eve of German defeat, as seen by the
western allies, especially the Americans, who had so recently been
humiliated in the Battle of the Bulge.
Still, the reason for blitzing Dresden was probably no more than that
it was there, a target that could be destroyed, so it was. A lot of
what went on in both Germany and Japan in 1945 was merely making the
rubble bounce. You had a war machine going, and it was not going to
stop until the war did, and that was difficult for both sides. If the
allies knew in February that Germany was beaten, well, so did Germany,
but it kept on fighting. The same was true of Japan in the summer of
1945. It is easier to start a war than finish one, a truism which the
we seem to re-learn in every generation.
-- all the best, Dan Ford
email war...@mailblocks.com (put Cubdriver in subject line)
Warbird's Forum: www.warbirdforum.com
Piper Cub Forum: www.pipercubforum.com
the blog: www.danford.net
--
Thomas Bollmeier
> Dresden was a major transportation nexus of roads, rail and river
> traffic. It was a sluice gate to and from the Eastern Front - troops
> and supplies flowed east, and civilian refugees flowed west through
> Dresden. It was also a center of light industry, such as optics and
> electronics, with more than 127 factories engaged in making ammunition
> and parts for weapons and other military equipment. The necessity to
> impede that traffic and destroy those industries made it an obvious
> target for Allied air attacks.
>
Correct. However the main objective of the RAF's night attacks was not to
destroy those industrial capabilities but to burn down the homes of the
people in Dresden. It was simply a terror attack ("shock and awe").
> [...]
> It's hard to pinpoint the specific effects of the Dresden raids on the
> overall Allied war effort, but when you consider how much wasted
> manpower and money the Germans had to expend on air defense,
> industrial dispersion, and repairing bomb damage to the transportation
> system, then the Allied bombing campaign of which Dresden was a
> typical example (despite post-war propaganda to the contrary) can be
> considered an important contribution to final victory.
Of course the bombing raids forced Germany to engage large portions of her
forces in the air defence. However the question is whether the allies
wasted much more manpower and money.
Regards,
Thomas
--
Michele Armellini
"Cub Driver" <war...@mailblocks.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:cuvt3p$pq7$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> >What were the strategic objectives of this raid? Why was
> >it done on the very eve of German defeat? What did this
> >raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
>
> Most German cities were railway hubs, therefore chokepoints;
> destroying any one of them would certainly degrade German military
> capabilities, as would the hordes of refugees thus sent on the road.
>
Right,
> Feburary 15 was hardly the eve of German defeat, as seen by the
> western allies, especially the Americans, who had so recently been
> humiliated in the Battle of the Bulge.
>
right,
> Still, the reason for blitzing Dresden was probably no more than that
> it was there, a target that could be destroyed, so it was. A lot of
> what went on in both Germany and Japan in 1945 was merely making the
> rubble bounce.
Well, wrong. The Soviet offensive was going on not so far away, and choking
that chokepoint meant facilitating that offensive, because German
reinforcements to that front had to go through Dresden and its Elbe bridges.
Other attacks may have been rubble bouncers, but not this one. The Soviets
were going to spend a few tens of thousand lives for the final offensive,
and anything that the Western Allies could do to reduce that bill was good.
--
asp...@pacific.net.au
<TBoll...@web.de> wrote:
>Am Wed, 16 Feb 2005 16:41:18 +0000 schrieb Briarroot:
>
>> Dresden was a major transportation nexus of roads, rail and river
>> traffic. It was a sluice gate to and from the Eastern Front - troops
>> and supplies flowed east, and civilian refugees flowed west through
>> Dresden. It was also a center of light industry, such as optics and
>> electronics, with more than 127 factories engaged in making ammunition
>> and parts for weapons and other military equipment. The necessity to
>> impede that traffic and destroy those industries made it an obvious
>> target for Allied air attacks.
>>
>
>Correct. However the main objective of the RAF's night attacks was not to
>destroy those industrial capabilities but to burn down the homes of the
>people in Dresden. It was simply a terror attack ("shock and awe").
If you are claiming that Dresden contained no legitimate military
targets, with respect, your claim is complete rubbish.
It was a major transport hub, for a start, and contained important and
still functioning factories producing goods that directly supported
the war effort.
Furthermore, workers in factories directly supporting a nation's war
effort are, under the then extant Hague Conventions (the "Laws of Land
Warfare"), *entirely* legitimate targets for their enemies.
Said "Laws of Land Warfare" and other treaties made it perfectly plain
that even the presence of civilians was *no reason at all* for an
attacker to, *in any way* moderate an attack and that any casualties
to such civilians were *entirely* and *completely* the responsibility
of the defender who had chosen not to evacuate them.
For those who cannot understand what Hague IV (1907) says on this, one
can only recommend the *commentaries* on said treaty that are
available on the ICRC website, which make it clear that nothing the
allies did to Dresden was in any way illegal or, indeed, within the
strict meaning of the word, immoral.
>Of course the bombing raids forced Germany to engage large portions of her
>forces in the air defence. However the question is whether the allies
>wasted much more manpower and money.
The Allies won.
That would seem to indicate that it was a success.
Phil
Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: asp...@pacific.net.au
--
Emmanuel Gustin
> Exactly 60 years ago the Allied bomber planes knocked off
> totally the city of Dresden in eastern Germany killing
> estimated 30-50 000 civilians.
>
> Some questions:
>
> What were the strategic objectives of this raid?
The major objective was simply destroying a major German
city. Bomber Command's Arthur Harris had long pursued a
policy of 'morale' bombing; he tought he could end the war
by the destruction of Germany's 60 most important cities.
This had little to do with conventional military objectives
as we understand them today; the concept was simply to
destroy buildings and kill people, and destroy the German
will to fight. It was a controversial idea, but one that
was accepted by part of Bomber Command, and accepted by
the British government for as long as there was no real
alternative strategy. But by 1945, Harris was running into
serious opposition, because planners had at last identified
oil and transport as the real weak points of the German war
machine, and they regarded Harris' city raid as a diversion
from the main task.
Of course there were some military objectives in Dresden;
every industrial city has some. However, if Dresden had
been an important military objective, it would have been
heavily bombed much earlier in the war. The relatively
undamaged condition of the city and its reputation as a
'safe haven' from bombing both contributed to the scale
of the destruction and the large number of casualties.
> Why was it done on the very eve of German defeat?
Bomber Command was working down its target list in order
of priority, and as the war neared its end, they reached
the lesser-priority targets. But besides that, Bomber
Command wanted to have a final go at ending the war by
bombing. Operation 'Thunderclap' planners were thinking
about what today would be called "shock and awe", but
by considerably more crude means --- they were considering
that if they targeted a concentration of 500,000 people,
they would kill about 110,000.
Dresden was selected for this operation, in part, simply
because it would burn well -- planners wanted a repeat
of the firestorm created by the bombardment of Hamburg
in July 1943 (significantly called 'Operation Gommorah')
and they knew they needed sufficient flammable material
to achieve that.
> What did this raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
Highly controversial, even at the time itself -- as said,
there were many military planners who regarded Harris'
city raids as a waste of effort. But the destruction of
Hamburg in 43 certainly shook the Germans; the Nazi
leadership considered to themselves that the German people
would not accept more destruction of this kind. But by 1945,
large scale destruction like this had become almost the
norm, and Dresden was probably just one more disaster.
--
Emmanuel Gustin
Emmanuel d0t Gustin @t skynet d0t be
--
Darrell Criswell
This event will be debated until the end of time.
However Frederick Taylor's book gives the best analysis of this
horrific event.
Probably between 25,000-40,000 people were killed in the raid.
Strategic objectives of the raid? The raid was part of the massive,
predominantly British, dehousing campaign. Many will state the major
target were the marshalling yards of the town, but that wasn't where
the Brits aimed. They aimed for the city area. Some of the later
American raids were directed at the marshalling yards, but our bombing
accuracy wasn't good enough even in daytime to surgically take out a
specific area of the city.
Contrary to many statements made by historians, Dresden had many
industries which contributed to the German war effort. However, it
wasn't as target rich as many cities attacked previously by the
allies. But remember the Brits bombed at night and their intent was
to destroy areas or sectors. Their intent in the case of Dresden was
to start a firestorm which would ravage the town.
The contribution of the allied bombing effort to the war effort has
been extensively studied, but historians have not come to any
consensus. Taylor points out in his book that many of the analysises
focused just on war production and didn't look at the devastating
effect on the German economy and the massive effort required of by the
Germans to defend themselves from the bombers. However the German War
machine survived this massive onslaught on bombing better than most
would have guessed.
It may seem to us the bombing of Dresden came close to the end of the
war effort, but to the people doing the fighting, particularly the
Russians, things didn't seem so close to being over, and the Germans
were still putting up quite a fight in many instances.
On 15 Feb 2005 16:57:04 -0600, arto k eskelinen
<artokes...@yaho.co.uk.invalid> wrote:
al kirke
"arto k eskelinen" <artokes...@yaho.co.uk.invalid> wrote in message
news:cutuo0$i...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
Incindiary bombing of cities was practiced by both the British
and the United States. The most successful raid of the war
wasn't Dresden. It was the March 19(?) 1945 fire raid on Tokyo,
which killed many more people than the Dresden raid, or the
atomic bombing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki for that matter. The
developed technique was to mix high explosive bombs with the
much smaller incindiaries, such that the high-explosive bombs
would break the houses into small pieces that would then catch fire
more readily. The other thing done was to remove the machine-
guns and armor from the B-29s so they could carry more bombs.
The guns and armor could be removed because by the dates of
those raids the Japanese didn't enough fighter interceptors to
worry about.
Marvelous, isn't it?
Al
Corky Scott
<don'tspam....@tin.it> wrote:
>> Still, the reason for blitzing Dresden was probably no more than that
>> it was there, a target that could be destroyed, so it was. A lot of
>> what went on in both Germany and Japan in 1945 was merely making the
>> rubble bounce.
>
>Well, wrong. The Soviet offensive was going on not so far away, and choking
>that chokepoint meant facilitating that offensive, because German
>reinforcements to that front had to go through Dresden and its Elbe bridges.
>Other attacks may have been rubble bouncers, but not this one. The Soviets
>were going to spend a few tens of thousand lives for the final offensive,
>and anything that the Western Allies could do to reduce that bill was good.
>--
I'm just not sure how wrong it is to think that Dresden was not a
vital military target. I tend to take the hammer point of view when
regarding the military's use of weapons. That is, when the only tool
you have is a hammer, eventually everything around you begins to look
like a nail.
Bombing Command, by the time of Dresden was a formidable military
weapon that was specifically designed to obliterate city centers. The
types of bombs and the type of attack, plus the nature of the
formations tended to favor the concept of burning out parts of cities,
the more the better. Harris really did think that gutting cities was
an effective war shortening tactic. After the firestorm of Hamburg,
Bombing Command did actively attempt to start more such
conflagurations. *Side note* When Ira Eaker came to England he
visited Harris and maintained a congenial relationship with him and
visited frequently. One of the things that Harris did right away was
show Eaker his selection of steroscopic photos of burned out German
cities. It was obvious to Eaker that Harris took enormous pride in
the photos and suggested strongly that he, Eaker, should join him in
this quest, bombing at night.
Bomber Command could (and did) at times attack pinpoint targets, but
on the whole Harris believed that wiping out cities was the key to
shortening the war. In that, I believe he was mistaken, but it
doesn't matter, he was calling the shots and he ordered cities be
attacked, for the most part.
So by the time of the Dresden attacks, we have a force that has been
developed to bomb cities, and few cities left to attack that had not
already been gutted.
It's possible that the rational for causing a transportation
disruption was a consideration, but I think it's probably more likely
that Harris simply wanted Dresden wiped off the map because it was a
German city and all German cities were legitimate targets to him. I'm
not sure he needed much of a rational to attack any city, but having
an actual purpose probably did not hurt.
It's also important to remember that at the time, the British had been
fighting for a long time against a seemingly remorseless enemy and
they wanted the war over. It was not known then that the bombing was
really not that effective in terms of shortening the war as they
thought at that time, although it did have some effect especially when
the bombers attacked oil and transportation targets. But oil and
transporation targets were not city centers.
Corky Scott
--
Roman Werpachowski
> Of course there were some military objectives in Dresden;
> every industrial city has some. However, if Dresden had
> been an important military objective, it would have been
> heavily bombed much earlier in the war. The relatively
Wasn't it because Dresden was unreachable for Allied bombers earlier in
the war?
The German death camps were in operation as long as possible. This
speaks volumes about the "justification for the bombing raids".
--
Roman Werpachowski
/--------==============--------\
| http://www.cft.edu.pl/~roman |
\--------==============--------/
--
mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net
> every industrial city has some. However, if Dresden had
> been an important military objective, it would have been
> heavily bombed much earlier in the war. The relatively
Dresden had been out of range of the bombers until late in the war.
Mike
--
asp...@pacific.net.au
>atomic bombing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki for that matter. The
>developed technique was to mix high explosive bombs with the
>much smaller incindiaries, such that the high-explosive bombs
>would break the houses into small pieces that would then catch fire
>more readily. The other thing done was to remove the machine-
I"m sure you forgot to mention it, Al, but the reason for this US fire
bombing of Japanese cities was the simple fact that what passed for
Japanese industry in the pre-war period (and during the war, of
course) was in two parts ... major factories in concentrated areas
that relied on the *second* part ... lots of little workshops
scattered throughout residential neighbourhoods.
Thus making the fire bombing raids perfectly legitimate in both
International Law and as far as morality is concerned.
>Marvelous, isn't it?
Yes it is, marvelous what people forget.
asp...@pacific.net.au
<Emmanue...@skynet.be> wrote:
>Of course there were some military objectives in Dresden;
>every industrial city has some. However, if Dresden had
>been an important military objective, it would have been
>heavily bombed much earlier in the war. The relatively
Really?
That ignores completely the problem of a) range (early war bombers
could not carry a useful load that far) and b) defences (by 1944/45
the Luftwaffe capacity to defend the deep homeland was fatally
compromised).
Neither a) nor b) existed "earlier in the war" for any reasonable
meaning of that phrase.
HlTLER
No I don't think that Allied officer went to Dresden to ask for the
surrender of Germany. This had already been done at the Casablanca
conference. However I don't see what this has to with my question, nor
does I see that the terms of surrender bears any weight at all in this
debate.
The question was how the Allied intention to bomb Dresden (or any
other Germany city) differs from the German intention to bomb
Rotterdam in order to force surrender?
I know very well that Rotterdam was eventually bombed through a
breakdown in communication. This does no however change the Germans
intentions.
Roman Werpachowski
On the Thu, 17 Feb 2005 00:41:37 +0000 (UTC), Thomas Bollmeier wrote:
> Am Wed, 16 Feb 2005 16:41:18 +0000 schrieb Briarroot:
>
>> Dresden was a major transportation nexus of roads, rail and river
>> traffic. It was a sluice gate to and from the Eastern Front - troops
>> and supplies flowed east, and civilian refugees flowed west through
>> Dresden. It was also a center of light industry, such as optics and
>> electronics, with more than 127 factories engaged in making ammunition
>> and parts for weapons and other military equipment. The necessity to
>> impede that traffic and destroy those industries made it an obvious
>> target for Allied air attacks.
>>
>
> Correct. However the main objective of the RAF's night attacks was not to
> destroy those industrial capabilities but to burn down the homes of the
> people in Dresden. It was simply a terror attack ("shock and awe").
As well as attacks on Hamburg, Berlin, Koeln, atc. The terror bombing
was started in response to German bombing of Warsaw, Coventry and
London. And it all started in Guernica...
dil...@pobox.com
To claim that a whole city had to be destroyed in order to take out its
communications is rubbish. By 1945 the brittish and us bombers could
take out any railway station or railway yard without major difficulty
and without much 'collateral damage' (see for example Peenemünde 43,
Merseburg etc and Crossbow 44, Berghof 45), The railway station and
bridges within Dresden was not damaged much by the area attack on the
16 Feb, nor was the overcrowded Dresden-Klotzsche airfield or the
important railway yard Neustadt outside the town. The latter and the
railway station were the target of an successful US raid on 17 Apr.
"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing
German cities, simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though
under other pretexts, should be reviewed. The destruction of Dresden
remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing. I feel
the need for more precise concentrations on military objectives such as
oil and communications behind the immediate battle zone, rather than on
acts of terror and wantom destruction, however impressive."
Churchill in a minute to the Chiefs of Staff from 28 March 1945.
_________________________________________________________________________
What am I, Life ? A thing of watery salt, held in cohesion by unresting
cells, which work they know not why, which never halt, myself unwitting
where their Master dwells. - John Masefield
bottlebleu
"Dave Gower" <davegow.r...@magma.ca> wrote in message news:<cuvt40$pqb$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>...
One wonders if, when May 14 comes around, there will be a similar
fuss over the anniversary of the bombing of Rotterdam. That was
genuinely on the "eve of defeat" of the Dutch by the Germans, not
three months away, and was aimed purely and simply at terrorising
Germany's enemies. "Shock and awe" indeed, although when considering
Dresden the more ancient phrase "as ye sow so shall ye reap" seems
more appropriate.
Emmanuel Gustin
arto k eskelinen wrote:
> Exactly 60 years ago the Allied bomber planes knocked off
> totally the city of Dresden in eastern Germany killing
> estimated 30-50 000 civilians.
>
> Some questions:
>
> What were the strategic objectives of this raid?
The major objective was simply destroying a major German
city. Bomber Command's Arthur Harris had long pursued a
policy of 'morale' bombing; he tought he could end the war
by the destruction of Germany's 60 most important cities.
This had little to do with conventional military objectives
as we understand them today; the concept was simply to
destroy buildings and kill people, and destroy the German
will to fight. It was a controversial idea, but one that
was accepted by part of Bomber Command, and accepted by
the British government for as long as there was no real
alternative strategy. But by 1945, Harris was running into
serious opposition, because planners had at last identified
oil and transport as the real weak points of the German war
machine, and they regarded Harris' city raid as a diversion
from the main task.
Of course there were some military objectives in Dresden;
every industrial city has some. However, if Dresden had
been an important military objective, it would have been
heavily bombed much earlier in the war. The relatively
undamaged condition of the city and its reputation as a
'safe haven' from bombing both contributed to the scale
of the destruction and the large number of casualties.
> Why was it done on the very eve of German defeat?
Bomber Command was working down its target list in order
of priority, and as the war neared its end, they reached
the lesser-priority targets. But besides that, Bomber
Command wanted to have a final go at ending the war by
bombing. Operation 'Thunderclap' planners were thinking
about what today would be called "shock and awe", but
by considerably more crude means --- they were considering
that if they targeted a concentration of 500,000 people,
they would kill about 110,000.
Dresden was selected for this operation, in part, simply
because it would burn well -- planners wanted a repeat
of the firestorm created by the bombardment of Hamburg
in July 1943 (significantly called 'Operation Gommorah')
and they knew they needed sufficient flammable material
to achieve that.
> What did this raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
Highly controversial, even at the time itself -- as said,
there were many military planners who regarded Harris'
city raids as a waste of effort. But the destruction of
Hamburg in 43 certainly shook the Germans; the Nazi
leadership considered to themselves that the German people
would not accept more destruction of this kind. But by 1945,
large scale destruction like this had become almost the
norm, and Dresden was probably just one more disaster.
--
Michele Armellini
"Emmanuel Gustin" <Emmanue...@skynet.be> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:cv56ni$qf6$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>
> The major objective was simply destroying a major German
> city.
However, if Dresden had
> been an important military objective,
> Bomber Command was working down its target list in order
> of priority, and as the war neared its end, they reached
> the lesser-priority targets.
>
> Dresden was selected for this operation, in part, simply
> because it would burn well
>
> > What did this raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
>
> Highly controversial, even at the time itself
I'm really, really impressed by how, throughout these explanations, it never
dawns upon you to acknowledge what others have already pointed out at
lenght - that is, the closing-in Soviet offensive and how 90% of the German
reinforcements against it passed through Dresden. As to the time of its
bombing, Dresden had certainly not been a very important industrial
objective - but the front coming to it, the layout of the German railway
net, and the fact that other nodes of it had already been badly hit made it
an important military objective - right then, much more than before.
Georg Schwarz
> The death toll, according to Dresden's reports, is probably
> around the 25 to 35,000 mark.
this is an ongoing debate among historians (and non-historians). There's
currently an official investigation sponsored by the city into that
question (results are only expected in a few months). The figures you
quote are the ones commonly accepted these days.
> Disrupt or destroy the transportation facilities in Dresden,
> disrupt or destroy war industries located there, disrupt or
> destroy military headquarters and civilian government
> offices.
they way these raids were engineered and conducted was to maximise
structural damage to the city and civilan death toll by skillfully
creating a fire storm (worked very well in case of Dresden). To my
knowledge creating shock and awe was the expressed aim of the British
bombing campaign later in the war. These days one would probably call
such an approach "bringing terror on the enemy population".
In the case of Dresden, I think the British planners also forsaw that
Dresden was soon to be captured by the Soviets, and they wanted to use
it as a demonstration to them of what they were capable of
accomplishing.
--
Georg Schwarz http://home.pages.de/~schwarz/
georg....@freenet.de +49 177 8811442
--
dominik lenné
aspects. To me, the bombardment of city centres has more a taste of
aggression than of cool expedience. But after all, wars are phenomena of
mutually built up aggression, even though started by one side.
So, it was somewhat morally doubtful. On the other hand, it has to be
said, that there has been quite a hefty discussion on that matter on the
allied side at that time, which was simply unthinkable to happen on the
German side. This is the case probably because of the plurality of the
democracies and because the tradition of humane thinking had not been
spoiled, if not rooted out, by a dictatorial and somewhat psychopathic
regime.
An aspect I want to bring to conscience is, that it were not only the
lives of russian soldiers, who were saved by the bombings, but of
germans too, i.e. german jews. In a recent article in "Die Zeit" about
the events, one could read, that Victor Klemperer, german jewish
professor, who had lived in humiliation and fear of death for long
years, used the chaos after the attack to cut the yellow star of david
from his coat and escape together with his wife. So did some other jews.
He saved not only his life, but also his today quite known diary of his
war years and the notes to "lingua tertii imperii", an analysis of the
language of the barbars, who pretended to be the saviours of culture.
At least in Wien happened something similar. According to the testimony
of my mother,the then boyfriend of her, who was a "half-jew" (it was
quite dangerous to have even traces of "jewish blood" in your vanes
those days), was in jail and awaiting his transport to death, when his
files were burned during a bombing attack. Burocratic as the german
authorities were (and btw still are), they didn't kill him and a lot of
his companions, just because they coudn't do it orderly.
It was all a big tragedy, mixed up with crime and a tiny little pinch of
comedy.
There is a quote of Schiller, written some 150 years before those
events, which to me characterize them quite well: "Das eben ist der
Fluch der bösen Tat, daß sie, fortzeugend, immer Böses muß gebären." -
In my own clumsy translation: "This is the very curse of evil deed, to
perpetually give birth to evil."
--
Kitchen Man
>On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 00:41:37 +0000 (UTC), Thomas Bollmeier
>>Correct. However the main objective of the RAF's night attacks was not to
>>destroy those industrial capabilities but to burn down the homes of the
>>people in Dresden. It was simply a terror attack ("shock and awe").
>
>If you are claiming that Dresden contained no legitimate military
>targets, with respect, your claim is complete rubbish.
That does not appear to me to be the intent of the statement you are
responding to. I don't think there's any question, at least among the
participants here, that Dresden was a fair target according to the
then-current rules of warfare. The question posed, as I understand it,
is over the intent of the bombing. Was it a legitimate attack on
military targets within the city, or was it intended to be a terror
attack on the civilian population? Probably, it was both.
It is accepted that Harris of the RAF and LeMay of the USAAF were
proponents of morale bombing. It is accepted that both forces attempted
to duplicate the effects of the Hamburg firestorm of July, 1943, with
little success until Dresden. After Dresden, LeMay actively instituted
a campaign of intentional firebombing against Japanese cities.
So what we know is that the leaders of the Allied forces actively
engaged in practice with the intent of starting a raging inferno; an
inferno that they knew would indiscriminately, without regard to
civilian or military, incinerate everything in its path. It is not
beyond reason for a logical person to deduce that the leaders did indeed
intend to terrorize the civilian population, and it is only left for
history to decide if the action was justified, as a method to hasten the
end of conflict.
"I had blood upon my hands as I did this, but not because I preferred to
bathe in blood. It was because I was part of a primitive world where men
still had to kill in order to avoid being killed, or in order to avoid
having their beloved Nation stricken and emasculated." - General LeMay
--
Al Brennan
--
David Thornley
Roman Werpachowski <r.o.m.a.nNOSPAM@student.+removewithpluses+ifpan.edu.pl> wrote:
>
>London. And it all started in Guernica...
>
by Zeppelin and then by heavy bomber.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
Emmanuel Gustin
>>every industrial city has some. However, if Dresden had
>>been an important military objective, it would have been
>>heavily bombed much earlier in the war. The relatively
>
> Dresden had been out of range of the bombers until late in the war.
Dresden was deep into Germany, but from Bomber Command's
bases in Southern England it was at about the same distance
as Munich (attacked in April 1944) and not actually much
more distant than Berlin, Leipzig, or Nuremberg. Munich
was probably a more difficult target than Dresden, because
it is deeper into the continent.
Even Milan and Turin, considerably farther away than Dresden
(of course their defenses were much inferior) were targets
of Bomber Command in August 1943. Dresden was not an easy
target, but it was within Bomber Command's reach at least
from late 1943.
asp...@pacific.net.au
>
>To claim that a whole city had to be destroyed in order to take out its
>communications is rubbish. By 1945 the brittish and us bombers could
Um. I find it constantly amusing that people who wish to claim that
the attack on Dresden was somehow illegal and/or immoral and/or
naughty conveniently "forget" things.
Such as the fact that, in the very post to which you are responding,
but which you have conveniently snipped in its entirety, it was
pointed out that Dresden was not *JUST* a communications hub, it was
also a key industrial center (and an *undamaged* industrial center).
The factories, of course, were *NOT* co-located with the railway
facilities.
An amusing lapse on your part, one presumes.
The fact is, in any case, that the whole city was a legitimate target
under the then extant laws of land warfare (Hague IV [1907]) and, no,
there were no limitations to attacking a defended city, which Dresden
(according to the specific meaning of the Hague treaty on Naval
Bombardments, which the ICRC and international law at the time
accepted as the relevant treaty covering aerial bombardments).
It is clear from the commentaries on the various Hague treaties of
1907 and later that the *intent* and *meaning* of the treaties was to
allow the unhindered destruction of any defended city ... and that if
there were any civilian casualties it was the responsibility of the
*DEFENDER*, and *NOT* of the attacker.
All arguments to the contrary are simply specious or uninformed.
Geoffrey Sinclair
>arto k eskelinen wrote:
>> Exactly 60 years ago the Allied bomber planes knocked off
>> totally the city of Dresden in eastern Germany killing estimated
>
>The major objective was simply destroying a major German
>city.
Given none of Germany's cities had been "destroyed" it seems
rather a stretch to say that was the aim at Dresden.
>Bomber Command's Arthur Harris had long pursued a
>policy of 'morale' bombing; he tought he could end the war
>by the destruction of Germany's 60 most important cities.
Yes, he inherited the concept and became probably its biggest
advocate. certainly about the only one to continue to defend it
after the end of the war.
>This had little to do with conventional military objectives
>as we understand them today; the concept was simply to
>destroy buildings and kill people, and destroy the German
>will to fight. It was a controversial idea, but one that
>was accepted by part of Bomber Command, and accepted by
>the British government for as long as there was no real
>alternative strategy. But by 1945, Harris was running into
>serious opposition, because planners had at last identified
>oil and transport as the real weak points of the German war
>machine, and they regarded Harris' city raid as a diversion
>from the main task.
The trouble with this analysis is that it ignores the orders for
operation Thunderclap were given to Bomber Command
and the 8th Air Force, it was not a Bomber Command
operation the 8th took up as well. The orders came from
higher up.
With so many people having input to the raid you can find all
sorts of reasons from pure morale, to transport, to help the
USSR, even to warn the USSR as the main reason for the
raid taking place.
The target was put down as Dresden and its railway facilities.
>Of course there were some military objectives in Dresden;
>every industrial city has some. However, if Dresden had
>been an important military objective, it would have been
>heavily bombed much earlier in the war.
Dresden was certainly not a priority target, but the fact it was
not bombed heavily until 1945 had a lot to do with the distance
from Britain and the state of the defences. Dresden was further
than Berlin.
>The relatively
>undamaged condition of the city and its reputation as a
>'safe haven' from bombing both contributed to the scale
>of the destruction and the large number of casualties.
No what really contributed was the fact a firestorm was
created, on top of an air raid defence system that was
not as experienced as those further west. Since the city
had not been heavily attacked until February 1945.
> > Why was it done on the very eve of German defeat?
>
>Bomber Command was working down its target list in order
>of priority, and as the war neared its end, they reached
>the lesser-priority targets.
This is partially true, it also was a factor of the main targets
being assessed as being heavily damaged. Therefore the
bombers went after other targets.
>But besides that, Bomber
>Command wanted to have a final go at ending the war by
>bombing. Operation 'Thunderclap' planners were thinking
>about what today would be called "shock and awe", but
>by considerably more crude means --- they were considering
>that if they targeted a concentration of 500,000 people,
>they would kill about 110,000.
I would like a reference to this, given the usual percentages
of people killed in air raids the idea 20% would be killed is
remarkable. The Hamburg fire raid managed to kill around
3.3% of the population. And now the RAF expected to up
the death rate to 20%?
Again, Thunderclap came from outside Bomber Command
and the 8th Air Force.
>Dresden was selected for this operation, in part, simply
>because it would burn well -- planners wanted a repeat
>of the firestorm created by the bombardment of Hamburg
>in July 1943 (significantly called 'Operation Gommorah')
>and they knew they needed sufficient flammable material
>to achieve that.
So where is the evaluation Dresden was more inflammable
than other German cities? So far the planning was a
standard series of attacks, not one for a particularly
flammable target.
Also while Bomber Command had created firestorms in
1943 they had not done so since, indicating it was something
that rarely happened and appeared outside the control of
the bombers. For example at Hamburg it was considered
the fact it was a very hot dry night after a long dry spell helped.
Add Hamburg was not chosen because it was particularly
flammable, the result of the raid was unexpected.
The flammable title went to Lubek, the proof of concept raid on
28 March 1942, 47% of the tonnage dropped that night was
incendiary. The RAF Dresden raid used 44% incendiaries,
the Hamburg firestorm raid used 53% incendiaries.
>> What did this raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
>
>Highly controversial, even at the time itself -- as said,
>there were many military planners who regarded Harris'
>city raids as a waste of effort.
The reality was by late 1944 the weather forecast largely dictated
the type of attack, officially area or officially against a specific
target. The real weather at the target then determined what the
raid would actually be. It was a bad winter.
>But the destruction of
>Hamburg in 43 certainly shook the Germans; the Nazi
>leadership considered to themselves that the German people
>would not accept more destruction of this kind.
The question being did the allies learn of this discussion?
>But by 1945,
>large scale destruction like this had become almost the
>norm, and Dresden was probably just one more disaster.
To me it was a standard attack that became exceptionally
destructive, bad enough to ignite post war debate even before
the reality it was in the final stage of the war. The final deaths
when it is so obvious what the result will be always look so bad.
Michele Armellini
news:cv61nq$gco$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> >
> >Well, wrong. The Soviet offensive was going on not so far away, and
choking
> >that chokepoint meant facilitating that offensive, because German
> >reinforcements to that front had to go through Dresden and its Elbe
bridges.
> >Other attacks may have been rubble bouncers, but not this one. The
Soviets
> >were going to spend a few tens of thousand lives for the final offensive,
> >and anything that the Western Allies could do to reduce that bill was
good.
> >--
> I'm just not sure how wrong it is to think that Dresden was not a
> vital military target.
Nobody said anything about "vital". "Valid" is the adjective you are looking
for.
I tend to take the hammer point of view when
> regarding the military's use of weapons. That is, when the only tool
> you have is a hammer, eventually everything around you begins to look
> like a nail.
Definitely agree. However, if your hammer is big enough you can ram that
screw into the plank. It's not the best way to do it, and the result won't
be ideal, but you can do it.
>
> Bombing Command, by the time of Dresden was a formidable military
> weapon that was specifically designed to obliterate city centers. The
> types of bombs
The RAF dropped more HE bombs than incendiaries on Dresden. If you take into
account the American attacks, the proportion of HE bombs goes even higher.
>
> It's possible that the rational for causing a transportation
> disruption was a consideration, but I think it's probably more likely
> that Harris simply wanted Dresden wiped off the map because it was a
> German city and all German cities were legitimate targets to him. I'm
> not sure he needed much of a rational to attack any city, but having
> an actual purpose probably did not hurt.
Possible? Likely? Have you ever considered actually researching the
documents? There's plenty that is available on-line, so that you don't even
have to buy books. There was a strategic-level need, and, indeed, a
strategic-level request that the rail network in the area be bombed - a
request by the Soviets, who were the ones expending a few tens of thousand
soldiers' lives in those months.
You are right in one matter: defended German cities were legitimate targets
to Harris - and to anybody on the Allies' side. And rightly so.
> transporation targets were not city centers.
Are you suggesting that marshalling yards were built in open country, far
from cities?
--
Dave Gower
<asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote
> Yes it is, marvelous what people forget.
Or strive mightily to ignore in pursuit of twisted agendas.
--
Cub Driver
>The question was how the Allied intention to bomb Dresden (or any
>other Germany city) differs from the German intention to bomb
>Rotterdam in order to force surrender?
This gigantic difference: Germany attacked Holland in order to conquer
it, a peaceful nation with no aggressive intent.
The Allies attacked the German homeland in order to liberate those
conquered nations, to extirpate the Nazi regime, to punish the German
people for launching an aggressive and cruel war, and to ensure that
it did not happen again.
The difference, essentially, is the difference between a robber who
shoots his victim and the policeman who shoots the robber to bring him
down. They commit similar acts for radically different reasons.
-- all the best, Dan Ford
email war...@mailblocks.com (put Cubdriver in subject line)
Warbird's Forum: www.warbirdforum.com
Piper Cub Forum: www.pipercubforum.com
the blog: www.danford.net
--
Thomas Bollmeier
>
> On the Thu, 17 Feb 2005 00:41:37 +0000 (UTC), Thomas Bollmeier wrote:
>> [...]
>> Correct. However the main objective of the RAF's night attacks was not to
>> destroy those industrial capabilities but to burn down the homes of the
>> people in Dresden. It was simply a terror attack ("shock and awe").
>
> As well as attacks on Hamburg, Berlin, Koeln, atc. The terror bombing
> was started in response to German bombing of Warsaw, Coventry and
> London. And it all started in Guernica...
Of course there have been terror attacks on Guernica, on Warsaw during the
siege, on London and - maybe - on Coventry. However I don't think that the
British attacks where simply a response to preceeding German ones.
>From the British point of view "moral bombing" was thought of to be the
most effective strategy to fight the war against Germany - and it was almost
the only way to fight it in an offensive manner after the British
expedition forces had to retreat from continent.
Or in Winston Churchill's words:
"When I look around to see how we can win the war, I see that there is
only one sure path," Winston Churchill wrote to Lord Beaverbrook at the
ministry of aircraft production on July 8, 1940. "We have no Continental
army which can defeat the German military power. The blockade is broken
and Hitler has Asia and probably Africa to draw from. Should he be
repulsed here or not try invasion, he will recoil eastward, and we have
nothing to stop him.
"But there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down, and
that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy
bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland. We must be able to
overwhelm him by this means, without which I do not see a way through."
Regards,
Thomas
--
yaakov_...@hotmail.com
> conquered nations, to extirpate the Nazi regime, to punish the German
> people for launching an aggressive and cruel war, and to ensure that
> it did not happen again.
>
seem to ignore. There is no question in my mind that one of the
major motivations for the strategic bombing campaign was to
bring home to the German people the consequences of their
aggression, something that did NOT happen after the end of
the First World War. I have read numerous books and articles
by people who justify the area bombing campaign by the RAF.
This includes one by Dr Noble Frankland who IIRC was the
official historian of the bombing campaign for the RAF and
while he lists damaging morale, disrupting arms production, and
keeping Stalin happy before the Second Front is established as
justifications for the bombing, he does not mention the "teaching
a lesson" factor. I think this is because it was not considered
"politically correct". Yet, everyone realized that Germany had
invaded France 3 times in 70 years and had started two world wars
and something had to break this pattern of aggression. The German
people had convinced themselves that their suffering after the
First World War was not due to their leaders bringing them
to defeat, but rather they were the victims of a "stab-in-the
back" and of imaginary "malevolent enemies who wanted to destroy
Germany". Thus, they refused to face the consequences of their
own follies. The leaders of the Allies in the Second War realized
that, just as General Sherman said in the US Civil War, it was
not enough to defeat the Confederacy, they must be taught a lesson
not to try it again so he would show them "war is hell!"
--
Cub Driver
>"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing
>German cities, simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though
>under other pretexts, should be reviewed.
Churchill's statement was wise, and it reinforces his reputation as a
statesman beyond the demands of his job as a wartime leader.
But "reviewing" the tactic (can strategic bombing be a tactic?) is a
long way from condemning it as a war crime, which is where this
question is meant to lead. (That is, the question posted by the
thread's title.)
I don't think anyone would argue in 2005 that the Dresden raid was a
military necessity, or that the military goals achieved by it were
worth the civiian casualties on the ground. But that is not the same
as saying it was criminal. And who knows? It may indeed have hastened
the end of the war, and thus saved lives in the end.
Geoffrey Sinclair
>To claim that a whole city had to be destroyed in order to take out its
>communications is rubbish. By 1945 the brittish and us bombers could
>take out any railway station or railway yard without major difficulty
>and without much 'collateral damage' (see for example Peenemünde 43,
>Merseburg etc and Crossbow 44, Berghof 45),
In the final 4 months of 1944 the 8th Air force measured its accuracy
as, under the best conditions, 82.4% of bombs within 1 mile of the
aiming point. Under the worst conditions 5.6% of bombs within 1
mile of the aiming point. The best conditions were obtained on
14% of the raids, the worst on 35% of the raids.
As for the oil refineries the USSBS went out and counted the bombs
from both the day and night heavy bombers that hit for 3 of them,
including the large Leuna plant at Merseburg, that analysis came
back with 12.8% hits, that is within the plant fences.
This is the sort of accuracy the heavy bombers had over a series of
raids in various weather conditions. The weather at Dresden was
such the USAAF raid was delayed one day, so the RAF raid
occurred first.
The RAF raid was in two waves, an initial attack of 244 aircraft
rated as moderately successful as the weather was still cloudy,
and the devastating second wave attack was made in clear weather.
If the rail yards could be "taken out" without "major difficulty" can it be
explained why it took so long to stop the rail system in western Germany?
The one under attack not only by heavy bombers but the more accurate
medium, light and fighter bombers?
Fundamentally the heavy bomber forces were blunt clubs. There are
always the exceptions, but that is the reality of trying to bomb in
WWII conditions and with the technology of the day.
>The railway station and
>bridges within Dresden was not damaged much by the area attack on the
>16 Feb, nor was the overcrowded Dresden-Klotzsche airfield or the
>important railway yard Neustadt outside the town.
Yes, the point being how much of this was due to the planning and
how much due to the weather for the first raid or to errors in marking
the aiming point in the second raid?
>The latter and the
>railway station were the target of an successful US raid on 17 Apr.
So what does the German raid report say about this 17 April raid?
As opposed to the US assessment at the time?
>"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing
>German cities, simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though
>under other pretexts, should be reviewed. The destruction of Dresden
>remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing. I feel
>the need for more precise concentrations on military objectives such as
>oil and communications behind the immediate battle zone, rather than on
>acts of terror and wantom destruction, however impressive."
>Churchill in a minute to the Chiefs of Staff from 28 March 1945.
Yes, the Churchill memo that is often quoted, note it was written 6 weeks
after the Dresden attack, when Germany was clearly going to be defeated
soon, given the western allies were across the Rhine and the Red Army
about to attack Berlin.
Note Churchill actually took a hand in the Dresden bombing plan, see
The Strategic Bombing Offensive Against Germany volume IV, pages
112 and 113.
Geoffrey Sinclair
>Geoffrey Sinclair <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>> Disrupt or destroy the transportation facilities in Dresden,
>> disrupt or destroy war industries located there, disrupt or
>> destroy military headquarters and civilian government
>> offices.
>
>they way these raids were engineered and conducted was to maximise
>structural damage to the city and civilan death toll by skillfully
>creating a fire storm (worked very well in case of Dresden).
The RAF created firestorms at Hamburg in July 1943 and Kassel
in October 1943. That was it until Dresden in February 1945.
So is the claim the RAF could turn firestorms on and off at will and
chose not to do so for around 3 months then for around 16 months?
Firestorms were a possible but rare event of the bombing campaign.
The RAF raid planners did not expect one at Dresden. That a raid
was designed to do maximum structural damage was the planners
doing their job.
>To my
>knowledge creating shock and awe was the expressed aim of the British
>bombing campaign later in the war. These days one would probably call
>such an approach "bringing terror on the enemy population".
The British bombing policy late in the war was being pulled in
different directions by commanders with strong personalities.
The area bombing policy was introduced in 1942, before Harris
took command, it was superseded as the main policy in 1944,
with the decisions to bomb communications and oil.
Harris wanted to continue area bombing, his commanders wanted
more specific target raids. The winter weather often dictated what
the raid looked like to those on the ground. For example one raid
that was officially after an oil refinery, the master bomber ordered a
general area attack given the weather at target. By the end of 1944
area raids were allowed if the weather ruled out to be unsuitable
for a designated target. Harris would make the decision.
To really bring terror to the enemy population drop AP bombs to
break open bunkers, attack the areas outside the city where
people had fled to, then drop large numbers of fragmentation
bombs, including with delayed action or movement fuses. The
latter to ensure plenty of people killed or wounded as they
tried to clean up.
>In the case of Dresden, I think the British planners also forsaw that
>Dresden was soon to be captured by the Soviets, and they wanted to use
>it as a demonstration to them of what they were capable of
>accomplishing.
Please understand the Dresden raid idea came to the 8th Air Force
and Bomber Command, not the air forces asking for the raid.
The warning to Stalin explanation is one that has largely grown
out of the cold war. This is because by the end of 1945 the allied
heavy bomber forces had been significantly reduced, and this started
in April 1945, which makes the deterrence idea less credible.
I have no doubt someone in the allied system thought in terms of
what effects this will have on Stalin post war, but the planning
process does not support the claim it was part of the reasons for
the raid.
Michele Armellini
<asp...@pacific.net.au> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:cvb76h$9ti$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> On 20 Feb 2005 09:49:25 -0600, dil...@pobox.com wrote:
>
> >
> >To claim that a whole city had to be destroyed in order to take out its
> >communications is rubbish. By 1945 the brittish and us bombers could
>
> Um. I find it constantly amusing that people who wish to claim that
> the attack on Dresden was somehow illegal and/or immoral and/or
> naughty conveniently "forget" things.
>
> Such as the fact that, in the very post to which you are responding,
> but which you have conveniently snipped in its entirety, it was
> pointed out that Dresden was not *JUST* a communications hub, it was
> also a key industrial center (and an *undamaged* industrial center).
>
> The factories, of course, were *NOT* co-located with the railway
> facilities.
Apart from that, if one can make the educated guess that the general damage
inflicted on the city did to a certain extent delay the repair and
maintenance work in the marshalling yards and on the bridges, then the
general damage can be considered as an indirect attack on the transportation
network. Admittedly, this may be akin to the "hammer mentality" referred to
by another poster, but if it works, it works.
--
E.F.Schelby
>
>On the Thu, 17 Feb 2005 00:41:37 +0000 (UTC), Thomas Bollmeier wrote:
>> Correct. However the main objective of the RAF's night attacks was not to
>> destroy those industrial capabilities but to burn down the homes of the
>> people in Dresden. It was simply a terror attack ("shock and awe").
>
>As well as attacks on Hamburg, Berlin, Koeln, atc. The terror bombing
>was started in response to German bombing of Warsaw, Coventry and
>London. And it all started in Guernica...
No, it started before Guernica. Since we are looking at the interwar
period, a sampling follows. Shock and Awe bombing was used against
unhappy native populations in:
Afghan War, 1919: bombing of Dacca, Jalalabad, Kabul. Squadron
chief Arthur Harris destroyed Afghani royal palace with one 10 kg
bomb.
Operations of "control without occupation" (occupation was too
costly in men and money):
Egypt 1919: demand for independence. RAF sends 3 squadrons of
bombers to suppress rebellious crowds.
Iran 1919: town of Enzeli bombed.
Iraq 1920: Baghdad -- report states that civilians terrorized by
bombing jumped into a lake, "making good targets for machine
guns." After reading the report, Winston Churchill remarked that
he was "extremely shocked at the reference to bombing which I
have marked in red. If it were to be published it would be
regarded most dishonouring to the air force...".
South Africa: bombs against Hottentots, 1922, 1925, 1930,
1932....
Syria 1925: uprising against French. Bombing of Damascus
neighborhoods 10/18/25. Claims of 1000 civilian deaths.Syria
protested, pointing to protection of undefended cities under
the laws of war. The French said they were dealing with
"bandits," therefore the laws of war didn't apply.
1925: bombing of the undefended town of Sheshuan by a squadron
of volunteer American airmen with the French Flying Corps. All
males able to bear arms were known to be absent. Women and
children were killed, and also maimed and blinded.
The Germans? A demand had been made to put German pilots on trial
for war crimes (bombing London) at the end of WW I. The British
objected. According to the Air Ministry, that sort of "trial would
be placing a noose round the necks of our airmen in future wars."
The information is from Sven Lindquest's _A History of Bombing._,
published in Sweden in 1999, and in the US in 2001.
Regards,
ES
--
Briarroot
> To claim that a whole city had to be destroyed in order to take out its
> communications is rubbish. By 1945 the brittish and us bombers could
> take out any railway station or railway yard without major difficulty
> and without much 'collateral damage' (see for example Peenemünde 43,
> Merseburg etc and Crossbow 44, Berghof 45), The railway station and
> bridges within Dresden was not damaged much by the area attack on the
> 16 Feb, nor was the overcrowded Dresden-Klotzsche airfield or the
> important railway yard Neustadt outside the town. The latter and the
> railway station were the target of an successful US raid on 17 Apr.
Not at all. It was not only quite common, it was far more effective
than simply excising a small portion of the cities. What would be the
point of destroying the rail yards while leaving the repair facilities
intact? What would be the point of destroying one transportation
axis, while leaving the rest of the city's network open? Likewise,
the one irreplaceable component of any industry is trained workers.
Damaged factories may be repaired in a matter of weeks (although loss
of production for several weeks can be quite important in wartime),
but a skilled worker takes years to 'grow.' In World War 2,
"collateral damage" meant accidentally killing one's allies, it did
not refer to enemy civilian dead. Who was it, do you suppose, that
staffed those factories? Certainly not soldiers. The task facing the
Germans after the Dresden raids was made *far* more difficult because
of the destruction of the city center than it would have been if the
Allies had merely taken out of few bridges and rail yards. If there
was any failure on the Allies part, it was that the immolation of
Dresden remained incomplete.
> "It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing
> German cities, simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though
> under other pretexts, should be reviewed. The destruction of Dresden
> remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing. I feel
> the need for more precise concentrations on military objectives such as
> oil and communications behind the immediate battle zone, rather than on
> acts of terror and wantom destruction, however impressive."
> Churchill in a minute to the Chiefs of Staff from 28 March 1945.
You left out two key sentences. The actual quote includes, (after
"...should be reviewed"): "Otherwise we shall come into control of an
utterly ruined land. We shall not, for instance, be able to get
housing materials out of Germany for our own needs because some
temporary provision would have to be made for the Germans themselves."
It seems that Churchill was really more interested in post-war
pillaging than in saving the lives of German civilians. And of course,
the policy of area bombing of German cities was a high level decision
of the Air Staff, it was not just a bloody-minded whim of Harris,
although he was certainly an ardent proponent. Area bombing was
undertaken not only with Churchill's full approval, but with his full
support.
Churchill to Lord Beaverbrook, 8 July 1940: "One sure path to a
British victory was a bomber offensive against Germany. If Hitler
were repulsed on the beaches of Britain, or did not try to invade at
all, he would recoil eastward. Although Britain could do nothing to
stop him going east, there is one thing that will bring him back and
bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating
attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland."
(quotation from Martin Gilbert's biography "Churchill" p668)
Churchill to Stalin in August 1943: " We sought no mercy and we would
show no mercy. Britain hoped to shatter twenty German cities, as
several had already been shattered: if need be, as the war went on, we
hoped to shatter almost every dwelling in almost every German city."
(Gilbert p727)
The British Air Staffs quite naturally reacted with outrage to
Churchill's minute of 28 March 1945. After all they had been
following *his* orders all along, and he withdrew that minute the very
next day. Churchill was a politician, and he phrased his memos and
speeches as a politician would. They were frequently designed to
provoke an emotional response in order to sway opinion to his side,
and as in this case, facts were sometimes irrelevant or inconvenient.
How much damage the Allied bomber offensive succeeded in inflicting on
the capacity of Nazi Germany to wage war is a subject of intense
debate, even after six decades. In my opinion, the bombing campaign
was a considerable success. Others may disagree, or quibble about the
*amount* of success measured against Allied resource allocation.
20-20 hindsight is a marvelous thing! There should be little debate,
however, about the morality of the Allies' wartime bombing. Bringing
a halt to Nazi tyranny, bringing a halt to the war in Europe, was the
paramount objective. Unlike the Nazi practice, it was not based on a
desire for conquest. The decision to bomb city centers was arrived at
by the British Air Staff, after reviewing the results of early war
bombing, which were so abysmally poor that it was thought that aiming
at individual targets was useless so long as bombing by night remained
preferable to daylight bombing. It may not have been the best
solution, but it did produce far better results than had been
previously obtained. It thus became cemented in the minds of those
responsible for taking the offensive against Germans via the air. The
chief obstacle to larger successes was thought to be the available
number of heavy bombers, the rapid building of which became a top
priority.
Area bombing was not aimed *solely* at German morale, that was only a
part of its mission. The Point Blank Directive makes that very clear:
"Your primary object will be the progressive destruction and
dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system,
and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point
where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."
(Issued to the British and American Air Forces by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff after the Casablanca Conference in January 1943)
--
asp...@pacific.net.au
<nann...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 16:52:34 +0000 (UTC), asp...@pacific.net.au wrote:
>
>>On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 00:41:37 +0000 (UTC), Thomas Bollmeier
>
>>>Correct. However the main objective of the RAF's night attacks was not to
>>>destroy those industrial capabilities but to burn down the homes of the
>>>people in Dresden. It was simply a terror attack ("shock and awe").
>>
>>If you are claiming that Dresden contained no legitimate military
>>targets, with respect, your claim is complete rubbish.
>
>That does not appear to me to be the intent of the statement you are
>responding to. I don't think there's any question, at least among the
>participants here, that Dresden was a fair target according to the
>then-current rules of warfare. The question posed, as I understand it,
>is over the intent of the bombing. Was it a legitimate attack on
>military targets within the city, or was it intended to be a terror
>attack on the civilian population? Probably, it was both.
<sigh> We have had this argument before. Personal belief and personal
opinion masquerading as fact.
Provide specific cites *from OPERATIONAL orders* to the RAF and
Commonwealth squadrons assigned to the bombing of Dresden that the
*specific purpose* of the raid was a "terror attack."
People with the *unsupported* *opinion* you are asserting as fact
(well, *they* have, and perhaps you are not, and are simply not well
enough informed) have *NEVER* been able to provide such information or
proof.
The best that they have been able to do is to provide vague general
references by people like Bomber Harris that in no way are specific to
the attack on Dresden or, indeed, to *any* specific attack against an
Axis city.
Dresden was a fair, legal, and legitimate target ... and there is NO
evidence that your assertion that it was attacked as a terror target
is true.
If it were, there would be a paper trail ... and not even David Irving
has managed to create *that*.
Specific cites from operational orders *only*, please.
Kari T Seppänen
> In article <cv9f2h$i...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu>,
> Roman Werpachowski <r.o.m.a.nNOSPAM@student.+removewithpluses+ifpan.edu.pl> wrote:
>>
>>London. And it all started in Guernica...
>>
> Really? I'd trace it back to the WWI Germans bombing London, first
> by Zeppelin and then by heavy bomber.
Really? I'd trace it back to the Royal Navy bombing Copenhagen by
ships and rockets during Napoleonic wars.
--
Kari Seppänen k...@iki.fi http://www.iki.fi/~kse/
--
Michele Armellini
"Thomas Bollmeier" <TBoll...@web.de> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:cvb7a4$a4j$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> Or in Winston Churchill's words:
>
> "When I look around to see how we can win the war, I see that there is
> only one sure path," Winston Churchill wrote to Lord Beaverbrook at the
> ministry of aircraft production on July 8, 1940. "We have no Continental
> army which can defeat the German military power. The blockade is broken
> and Hitler has Asia and probably Africa to draw from. Should he be
> repulsed here or not try invasion, he will recoil eastward, and we have
> nothing to stop him.
>
> "But there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down, and
> that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy
> bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland. We must be able to
> overwhelm him by this means, without which I do not see a way through."
Which is totally relevant to the 1940 situation - when there were no actual
resources to wage a land campaign against Germany. As you know, that changed
later on, and Churchill's ideas on strategic bombing changed too, and all in
all the quote is irrelevant to 1945.
--
Emmanuel Gustin
> Given none of Germany's cities had been "destroyed" it seems
> rather a stretch to say that was the aim at Dresden.
"You refer to a plan for the destruction of the sixty
leading German cities, and to your efforts to keep up
with, and even exceed, your average of two and a half
such cities devastated a month; I know that you have
long felt such a plan to be the most effective way of
bringing about the collapse of Germany. Knowing this,
I have, I must confess, at time wondered whether the
magnetism of the remaining German cities has not in the
past tended as much to deflect our bombers from their
primary objectives as the tactical and weather difficulties
which you described so fully in your letter of 1 November."
Portal, in a memorandum to Harris, 12 November 1944.
Cited by Max Hastings in "Bomber Command".
> The trouble with this analysis is that it ignores the orders for
> operation Thunderclap were given to Bomber Command
> and the 8th Air Force, it was not a Bomber Command
> operation the 8th took up as well. The orders came from
> higher up.
That is not entirely correct; like many other plans, this
one was passed back and forth a few times. During the
Malta/Yalta set of conferences, Harris was asked his opinion
by the deputy chief of the air staff, Bottomley, about an
attack on centres behind the Eastern Front; the Russians
had asked for an all-out attack on Berlin. It was Harris
who added Chemnitz, Leipzig and Dresden; the plan was then
approved by Portal and the "Big Three." Thus Harris had
indeed orders to bomb communications centers, including
Dresden; which was not quite the same as an all-out attack
on the city centre. When they realized the scale of the
destruction, Churchill and other Allied leaders immediately
sought to distance themselves. Churchill at first described
it as "terror" bombing in a memorandum, but a furious Portal
forced him to change it to "so called 'area bombing'."
>>The relatively
>>undamaged condition of the city and its reputation as a
>>'safe haven' from bombing both contributed to the scale
>>of the destruction and the large number of casualties.
>
> No what really contributed was the fact a firestorm was
> created, on top of an air raid defence system that was
> not as experienced as those further west. Since the city
> had not been heavily attacked until February 1945.
Yes, but these factors were related. The relatively
undamaged state of the city provided the flammable
material for a firestorm, and the unpreparedness of
the air raid system had something to do with the naive
belief that Dresden was not on the target list.
> I would like a reference to this, given the usual percentages
> of people killed in air raids the idea 20% would be killed is
> remarkable. The Hamburg fire raid managed to kill around
> 3.3% of the population. And now the RAF expected to up
> the death rate to 20%?
Even worse...
"If we assume that the daytime population of the area
attacked is 300,000, we may expect 220,000 casulaties.
50 per cent of those or 110,000 may expect to be killed.
It is suggested that such an attack resulting in so many
deaths, the great proportion of which will be key personnel,
cannot help but have a shattering effect on political and
civilian morale all over Germany."
Note of the Directory of Bomber Operations, on operation
Thunderclap; summer 1944. Cited again by Max Hastings.
Note that this does not refer to the population of the
entire city, only to the area attacked.
> Add Hamburg was not chosen because it was particularly
> flammable, the result of the raid was unexpected.
>
> The flammable title went to Lubek, the proof of concept raid on
> 28 March 1942, 47% of the tonnage dropped that night was
> incendiary. The RAF Dresden raid used 44% incendiaries,
> the Hamburg firestorm raid used 53% incendiaries.
I think I indeed mixed up Hamburg with Lubeck.
>>But the destruction of
>>Hamburg in 43 certainly shook the Germans; the Nazi
>>leadership considered to themselves that the German people
>>would not accept more destruction of this kind.
>
> The question being did the allies learn of this discussion?
Probably not. If so, it would have been hard to repeat
this type of operation frequently enough anyway.
> To me it was a standard attack that became exceptionally
> destructive, bad enough to ignite post war debate even before
> the reality it was in the final stage of the war.
I agree that in planning and execution, it was largely
a standard attack, except for being split into two. The
firestorm was not predictable. However, I still strongly
feel that what attracted Harris and his staff to Dresden
was less its importance, as the attraction of a "fresh"
target to destroy. At this stage they gave relatively
little attention to more attacks on bombed-out Berlin.
Dresden was, as the briefing notes put it, "far the largest
unbombed built-up area the enemy has got" and just too
tempting a target. And although this was only a secondary
goal, there was a sinister theatrical aspect to the raid,
a desire to show the Russians and the world what Bomber
Command could do. Actually less, I suppose, because of a
recognition of the impending Cold War, as out of a desire
to convince the Soviets than Bomber Command had done its
share to defeat Germany.
Let me finish by saying that I fully agree with those
who argue to in judging the morality of RAF Bomber Command
operations, one must consider the conditions of the
time; such as the nature of the German regime, the lack
of effective alternative means to fight the war, the
limitations of the available equipment, etc. I have no
sympathy at all for those who seek to condemn all bomber
crews as war criminals. However, it is equally foolish
to pretend that nothing dubious was happening, and that
Allied bombers were concentrating exclusively on military
targets. The reality of 1943-1945 was that both the RAF
and the USAF were involved in the indiscriminate bombing
of populations centres, in Germany and Japan, in the full
knowledge that they were primarily hitting civilian targets,
and often without any substantial effort to maximize
damage to military targets. Whatever one may think about
"Bomber Harris", at least one can say about him that he
(almost alone) was not hypocritical about what he had done;
so why should we be?
asp...@pacific.net.au
Of course Mr Kirke only forgot to post the full facts.
Surely you do not believe that he left them out deliberately?
Kitchen Man
>On Sun, 20 Feb 2005 23:40:47 +0000 (UTC), Kitchen Man
><nann...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>>On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 16:52:34 +0000 (UTC), asp...@pacific.net.au wrote:
>>
>>>On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 00:41:37 +0000 (UTC), Thomas Bollmeier
>>
>>>>Correct. However the main objective of the RAF's night attacks was not to
>>>>destroy those industrial capabilities but to burn down the homes of the
>>>>people in Dresden. It was simply a terror attack ("shock and awe").
>>>
>>>If you are claiming that Dresden contained no legitimate military
>>>targets, with respect, your claim is complete rubbish.
>>
>>That does not appear to me to be the intent of the statement you are
>>responding to. I don't think there's any question, at least among the
>>participants here, that Dresden was a fair target according to the
>>then-current rules of warfare. The question posed, as I understand it,
>>is over the intent of the bombing. Was it a legitimate attack on
>>military targets within the city, or was it intended to be a terror
>>attack on the civilian population? Probably, it was both.
>
><sigh> We have had this argument before. Personal belief and personal
>opinion masquerading as fact.
Maybe your sigh indicates that you are frustrated that people don't
automatically accept your point of view as fact? Indeed, the way you
present your argument impresses me as overbearing.
>Provide specific cites *from OPERATIONAL orders* to the RAF and
>Commonwealth squadrons assigned to the bombing of Dresden that the
>*specific purpose* of the raid was a "terror attack."
It isn't as simple as you say. Terror bombing was a strategy. The
names given to it could alternately be area bombing or morale bombing.
The fact that this doctrine existed is not in doubt. The fact that it
is a strategy by nature eliminates the presence of such intent on
operational orders.
>People with the *unsupported* *opinion* you are asserting as fact
>(well, *they* have, and perhaps you are not, and are simply not well
>enough informed) have *NEVER* been able to provide such information or
>proof.
You sound like you are requiring proof of something that is not likely
to exist. If all you will accept is a specific cite on an operational
order, such as "today nth Bomber Squadron will terrorize Dresden by
burning people to death," well, you're not likely to find that. You
will find with absolutely no doubt that strategic bombing of civilian
centers was a legitimate doctrine of airpower between the wars, with
adherents in high places.
>The best that they have been able to do is to provide vague general
>references by people like Bomber Harris that in no way are specific to
>the attack on Dresden or, indeed, to *any* specific attack against an
>Axis city.
Here, you appear to characterize strategic planning as making "vague
general references." I wonder to what you refer?
>Dresden was a fair, legal, and legitimate target ... and there is NO
>evidence that your assertion that it was attacked as a terror target
>is true.
You're overly focused on this point. I never stated that it was not a
legitimate military target, it most certainly was. Neither did the
poster you first responded to. That was the point of my response.
>If it were, there would be a paper trail ... and not even David Irving
>has managed to create *that*.
>
>Specific cites from operational orders *only*, please.
Again, I'll note that you are asking for operational orders concerning
the carrying out of a strategic doctrine. Because you ask for that
only, you firm yourself in your arguments by accepting only that which
is unlikely to exist as proof. That's a poor approach for a historian.
Since I, obviously (after all, I'm just another ranter on a newsgroup),
am not in a position of authority to state that strategic policy is not
likely to appear on operational orders, I'll let a more legitimate
source make the point:
"Such decisions of policy are not made by commanders in chief in the
field, but by ministries, by the Chiefs of Staff committee and by the
War Cabinet." - Sir Arthur Harris.
Note well please, that the commanders-in-chief in the field are the ones
who draft operational orders.
It's obvious you're single minded, and fine for you. I prefer to keep
open to the big picture of the overall situation of that terrible time,
to try to understand the motives and the desperation of it all. I don't
think you can deny that the civilian populations of the participant
nations suffered grievously, on all sides, with the fortunate exception
of the United States.
The fact is that the strategic captains of the bomber missions knew what
could happen with the horrific combination of HE and incendiaries. I do
not argue that these combinations were not effective in suppressing
military and industrial targets. After July 1943, it was known that
this combination could also create a devastating ruin of the civilian
areas. This is legitimate under the then-existing rules of warfare, as
the civilian population was the work force which carried out the
military aims of the belligerent nations.
It cannot be denied that many great cities lay in ruin in 1945. This
was a horrible slaughter of humanity, justified or not. The strategy of
mixing incendiaries with HE did not stop when it became first known that
the end result could be terror inflicted on the population. Rather I
suspect that the Hamburg firestorm was viewed as a great success. Will
you argue that point? Then argue with these men:
"Killing Japanese didn't bother me very much at the time... I suppose if
I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal... every
soldier thinks something of the moral aspects of what he is doing. But
all war is immoral and if you let that bother you, you're not a good
soldier." - Curtis LeMay
"All this is founded on the great and terrible fallacy that ends justify
means. They never do. Is there no pity in the whole world? Are all our
hearts hardened and coarsened by events?" - George Bell, Archbishop of
Canterbury
"The ultimate aim of the attack on a town area is to break the morale of
the population which occupies it. To ensure this we must achieve two
things; first, we must make the town physically uninhabitable and,
secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger.
The immediate aim, is therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i)
destruction, and (ii) the fear of death."- Air Staff Paper, 23 Sept 1941
"My primary authorised task was therefore clear beyond doubt: to inflict
the most severe material damage on German industrial cities. This, when
considered in relation to the force then available, was indeed a
formidable task. Nevertheless, it was possible, but only if the force
could be expanded and re-equipped as planned, and if its whole weight
could be devoted to the main task with the very minimum of diversions."
- Sir Arthur Harris, commenting on the Air Staff Paper.
"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of
German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under
other pretexts, should be reviewed... The destruction of Dresden remains
a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing... The foreign
Secretary has spoken to me on this subject, and I feel the need for more
precise concentration upon military objectives... rather than on mere
acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive." - Sir
Winston Churchill
Now, as I typed those words, I came to the conclusion that your
requirement - terror bombing being mentioned by name in an operational
order - is absurd. I do not mean that to be insulting, but it's the
best word I think I can use to describe the situation as I see it.
--
http://www.xmission.com/~tiger885/motorbike/NART/nart.html
--
yaakov_...@hotmail.com
> events, which to me characterize them quite well: "Das eben ist der
> Fluch der bösen Tat, daß sie, fortzeugend, immer Böses muß
gebären." -
> In my own clumsy translation: "This is the very curse of evil deed,
to
> perpetually give birth to evil."
I read a comment recently about this subject. During the pogrom
in Germany on the night of 9-10 November 1930 (called euphemistically
by the
Nazis "The Night of the Broken Glass" in spite of the fact that dozens
of Jews were murdered and thousands arrested) hundreds of synagogues
were set on fire. Someone in Dresden, watching the flames destroy
the local synagogue is quoted as saying something to the effect
"this fire is going to come back up all of us Germans". Remarkably
prophetic.
--
asp...@pacific.net.au
<nann...@yahoo.com> wrote:
<sigh>
Was it too hard to find those specific operational orders?
Must be, since no one who tries to peddle the particular line in
question have ever been able to.
If it was strategic doctrine, fine ... then it would be reflected in
specific operational orders.
The fact that you, and others preceeding you in the same unsupported
claims, have always dodged the issue and refued to or failed to
provide the operational orders that show this was the case for Dresden
is indicative of the bankruptcy of the assertions you have made and
the complete lack of specific proof.
Cub Driver
>The RAF created firestorms at Hamburg in July 1943 and Kassel
>in October 1943. That was it until Dresden in February 1945.
There was, of course, the awful March 1945 firebombing of Tokyo by the
U.S. 21st Air Force. I'm not sure how many of the ensuing incendiary
raids led to firestorms, but several or many of them must have.
Indeed, I read a personal account of a fire raid on the last day of
the war, August 14, that demonstrated that this woman at least had
been overtaken by a firestorm.
Of course the "wood and paper cities of Japan" (a phrase used by
several American planners in 1941) were a much easier target in this
respect than the hard-shelled cities of Germany.
Michele Armellini
news:cvdi23$2rk$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
And although this was only a secondary
> goal, there was a sinister theatrical aspect to the raid,
> a desire to show the Russians and the world what Bomber
> Command could do. Actually less, I suppose, because of a
> recognition of the impending Cold War, as out of a desire
> to convince the Soviets than Bomber Command had done its
> share to defeat Germany.
While the rest of your remarks are supported by quotes, I notice these are
your own suppositions.
However, it is equally foolish
> to pretend that nothing dubious was happening, and that
> Allied bombers were concentrating exclusively on military
> targets. The reality of 1943-1945 was that both the RAF
> and the USAF were involved in the indiscriminate bombing
> of populations centres, in Germany and Japan, in the full
> knowledge that they were primarily hitting civilian targets,
> and often without any substantial effort to maximize
> damage to military targets.
The only problem with this distinction being that it meant something, on the
legal plan, only after 1949. During WWII, no convention made distinctions
between "military targets" and "civilian targets".
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>> Given none of Germany's cities had been "destroyed" it seems
>> rather a stretch to say that was the aim at Dresden.
>
>"You refer to a plan for the destruction of the sixty leading German cities,
>and to your efforts to keep up with, and even exceed, your average of two
>and a half such cities devastated a month; I know that you have long felt
>such a plan to be the most effective way of bringing about the collapse of
>Germany. Knowing this, I have, I must confess, at time wondered whether
>the magnetism of the remaining German cities has not in the past tended
>as much to deflect our bombers from their primary objectives as the
>tactical and weather difficulties which you described so fully in your letter
>of 1 November."
>Portal, in a memorandum to Harris, 12 November 1944.
>Cited by Max Hastings in "Bomber Command".
So what we have is Portal replying to Harris, and it was Harris
using the terms destruction as part of one of Harris' plans. The
famed correspondence where both men are trying to persuade
the other their plan is the better one to follow for the remainder
of the war.
So it was Harris advocating his area bombing plan to Portal and
using language implying it would succeed.
The acreage table Harris published in his report indicates about
half the area in the towns listed was classified as destroyed by
the RAF.
The results of some 370 attacks on 70 towns with a total pre war
population of around 23,200,000 people. Some 49% of the built
up areas, or 50,327 acres listed as destroyed.
>> The trouble with this analysis is that it ignores the orders for
>> operation Thunderclap were given to Bomber Command
>> and the 8th Air Force, it was not a Bomber Command
>> operation the 8th took up as well. The orders came from higher up.
>
>That is not entirely correct; like many other plans, this
>one was passed back and forth a few times.
The idea behind Thunderclap had, in October 1944 resulted
in Operation Hurricane, maximum effort against the Ruhr, one
aim was an attempt to hurt morale, the effect of that many
bombers in such a short time.
>During the Malta/Yalta set of conferences, Harris was asked his opinion
>by the deputy chief of the air staff, Bottomley, about an attack on centres
>behind the Eastern Front; the Russians had asked for an all-out attack
>on Berlin. It was Harris who added Chemnitz, Leipzig and Dresden; the
>plan was then approved by Portal and the "Big Three."
So in other words the "Big Three" decided they wanted an attack
to help the Red Army and asked Harris about what targets he
considered suitable for such an attack?
I presume Spaatz was also asked? Since it was meant to be
a joint attack.
On receiving a target list the "Big Three" then approved the attack.
So it still seems to me the idea of such an attack came from outside
the air forces that did the raid, it was not one that they decided to do.
Or is the idea Bottomley initiated the idea himself?
>Thus Harris had indeed orders to bomb communications centers,
>including Dresden; which was not quite the same as an all-out attack
>on the city centre.
According to the Bomber Command records the official target
that night was rail facilities as well as Dresden itself. The idea
being to damage the rail facilities and the city's ability to repair
them quickly.
>When they realized the scale of the destruction, Churchill and other Allied
>leaders immediately sought to distance themselves. Churchill at first
>described it as "terror" bombing in a memorandum, but a furious Portal
>forced him to change it to "so called 'area bombing'."
Yes, the famed Churchill memo. Though it was written 6 weeks
later and it was at a time when the question had to be asked
as to what bombing was actually helping the allies.
Churchill's use of words was poor, and has lead to all sort of
accusations being made, from him trying to distance himself
from the campaign to him knowingly putting the main aim as
terror from day one of the bombing.
>>>The relatively undamaged condition of the city and its reputation as a
>>>'safe haven' from bombing both contributed to the scale
>>>of the destruction and the large number of casualties.
>>
>> No what really contributed was the fact a firestorm was
>> created, on top of an air raid defence system that was
>> not as experienced as those further west. Since the city
>> had not been heavily attacked until February 1945.
>
>Yes, but these factors were related. The relatively undamaged state of
>the city provided the flammable material for a firestorm, and the
>unpreparedness of the air raid system had something to do with the
>naive belief that Dresden was not on the target list.
Yet, since firestorms were not a predictable outcome, I come
back to the idea the firestorm was the reason for so many
casualties. Which is cause and which is effect?
Hamburg had been repeatedly attacked before the firestorm
raid, undamaged German cities had not had firestorms when
heavily attacked.
One point Speer makes in his post war interrogations is that
the best area attacks were to return a couple of days later,
because the original raid's damage to the water system would
not have been repaired. Leaving little water pressure to fight
any new fires. This seems to be the way Hamburg burned.
The RAF effectively did three raids that night, the first against
Dresden was rated as a moderate success thanks to the cloud,
three hours later the cloud had cleared and the attack was made
in clear conditions with devastating results, meantime in Bohlen,
around 60 miles away, the RAF attack on the oil refinery there
was badly affected by 10/10 cloud and icing at 15,000 feet.
There was not a great deal you need to change for Dresden to
escape that night.
>> I would like a reference to this, given the usual percentages
>> of people killed in air raids the idea 20% would be killed is
>> remarkable. The Hamburg fire raid managed to kill around
>> 3.3% of the population. And now the RAF expected to up
>> the death rate to 20%?
>
>Even worse...
>
>"If we assume that the daytime population of the area
>attacked is 300,000, we may expect 220,000 casulaties.
>50 per cent of those or 110,000 may expect to be killed.
>It is suggested that such an attack resulting in so many
>deaths, the great proportion of which will be key personnel,
>cannot help but have a shattering effect on political and
>civilian morale all over Germany."
>
>Note of the Directory of Bomber Operations, on operation
>Thunderclap; summer 1944. Cited again by Max Hastings.
>Note that this does not refer to the population of the
>entire city, only to the area attacked.
The summer of 1944? That would imply operation Hurricane
in October 1944, not Thunderclap in early 1945.
An interesting comment, rather along the lines of the early
ideas of how damaging the bombs would be. It seems to
be assuming an unwarned population who did not have
shelters hit by a "perfect" attack. The figures bear no
resemblance to reality when it came to air raid casualties
on either side in Europe in WWII.
Any idea of the author, or is it an anonymous staff officer?
(snip)
>> To me it was a standard attack that became exceptionally
>> destructive, bad enough to ignite post war debate even before
>> the reality it was in the final stage of the war.
>
>I agree that in planning and execution, it was largely
>a standard attack, except for being split into two.
I think you will find by February 1945 Bomber Command was
doing such split attacks, see the raid on Leuna on 14 January
1945 as an example.
It was part of the new tactics to try and maximise the damage.
>The firestorm was not predictable. However, I still strongly feel that what
>attracted Harris and his staff to Dresden was less its importance, as the
>attraction of a "fresh" target to destroy. At this stage they gave relatively
>little attention to more attacks on bombed-out Berlin.
Quite possibly, since we know Harris believed in area
bombing, leaving Dresden alone would not be in accord
with his preferred strategy.
As for Berlin Harris could have returned to it from around
October 1944 onwards but did not, the closest the main
force came after March 1944 was Potsdam in April 1945.
Having tried the bomb Berlin to win the war he seems to have
decided it was not the answer. In any case the USAAF was
bombing Berlin.
>Dresden was, as the briefing notes put it, "far the largest unbombed
>built-up area the enemy has got" and just too tempting a target.
Yes the habits of war, this is what we do so this is the next
target on the list, this is war, the operations stop when the war
is over. Sort of the habits of peace when suddenly confronted
with war in reverse.
The reality people are creatures of habit, coupled with the ability
to make the previously abnormal completely normal.
>And although this was only a secondary goal, there was a sinister
>theatrical aspect to the raid, a desire to show the Russians and the
>world what Bomber Command could do. Actually less, I suppose,
>because of a recognition of the impending Cold War, as out of a desire
>to convince the Soviets than Bomber Command had done its
>share to defeat Germany.
That is a more reasonable idea, to show the Soviets what
the western allies had done to help them. Rather than what
the western allies could do if the Soviets were an enemy.
It fits much more correctly into the mood of the times than the
cold war ideas of deterring Stalin. Which in any case ran into
the fact the bomber forces were rapidly wound back in 1945.
(snip) Points of basic agreement.
Klaus Petrat
<artokes...@yaho.co.uk.invalid> wrote:
>Exactly 60 years ago the Allied bomber planes knocked off
>totally the city of Dresden in eastern Germany killing
>estimated 30-50 000 civilians.
>
>Some questions:
>
>What were the strategic objectives of this raid? Why was
>it done on the very eve of German defeat? What did this
>raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
This question is not asked for the first time. There are a lot of
answers and the normal result is a discussion full of hate. You see,
answers like - This was murder - produce normaly answers like - All
germans should have been killed, they startet the war and therefore it
was everybodies duty to kill as much germans as possible. One of the
main problems here in Germany is, that we are not allowed to ask such
questions, since you are called Nazi for this immediatly. So
discussions in Germany were nearly impossible up to now. As a result,
you normaly got answers from people, who can't see any problems in
killing thousends of germans, but it is a very fixed view, I think,
from the winning side.
The last days here in Germany started real discussions about this for
the first time after 60 years. I'll try to give you some ideas about
articles in news papers and other sources.
There were to strategic targets during the war. The british prepared a
so called morale bombing and produced heavy bombers for that purpose
already before beginning of ww-ii. The US seems to prefer traffic
systems and oil indutry, especially after mid of 1944.
Morale bombing was aimed mainly against civilians. So targets were
very often the crowded centres of towns, like Dresden. Industry
targets were of second priority at best. Dresden is a good example for
this morale bombing. The target area had a large castle, severel
museums, an old opera and large churches, the Frauenkirche for
instance. The industry were and is in other regions of this town. The
only factory which was hit during the firestorm attack on Dresen
produced toothpaste, according to actual news paper reports. The main
railway station got severel hits, but damages were fixed within days.
So you got the situation, that german industry had its most output of
tanks and fighter planes in the mid and autumn of 1944, after years of
morale bombing. In the german industry mininsterium ran discussions
during the war, what wood happen, if the british would change targets
from morale bombing to industry targets. It became clear already 1943
for the responsible minister Speer, that such a changing woud shorten
the war seriously. He estimated one or maybe two years.
The british morale bombing was a waste of men and materiel. The bomber
command suffered losses of 55,000 men, about 50% of its personel,
AFAIK, for minor damages in german industry.
When the US bombers started their attacks from mid 1944 on against
traffic systems and oil industry, the german war production broke down
within months. You can't produce without material and you can't get
the produced tanks to the front without a railway system. You can
produce a tank in a bunker, as the germans did, but you have to
transport them by an open railway. That's the reason, why the attacks
against traffic systems were so efficient.
Speer, the german minister for industy and production made 1943 a
jeering remark about his friend in the allied general staff, who
directed the bombing to the wrong targets.
The same with oil industry. These plants were too large to get them
under concrete. When the US started on 8. Mai 1944 bombing the oil
industry, output came down within days to 5% of its normal output. It
was the end of war, as Speer stated after the war. The question is,
why didn't the british attacked this target 1941 or at least 1942?
Speer expressed it very clearly during interrogations after the war:
The british wounded as severly, but the US shot us down (Die Engländer
fügten uns blutige Wunden zu, aber die Amerikaner schossen uns durch
die Brust). And I think, he was right.
--
Best regards
Klaus Petrat
--
David Thornley
Georg Schwarz <georg....@freenet.de> wrote:
>Geoffrey Sinclair <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>
>creating a fire storm (worked very well in case of Dresden). To my
>knowledge creating shock and awe was the expressed aim of the British
>bombing campaign later in the war.
If it was the expressed aim, then it had to be expressed somewhere,
and somebody should be able to quote authoritative contemporary
documents to me. So far, nobody has.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
David Thornley
Klaus Petrat <kla...@t-online.de> wrote:
>On 15 Feb 2005 16:57:04 -0600, arto k eskelinen
><artokes...@yaho.co.uk.invalid> wrote:
>
>>What were the strategic objectives of this raid? Why was
>>it done on the very eve of German defeat? What did this
>>raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
>
>This question is not asked for the first time. There are a lot of
>answers and the normal result is a discussion full of hate.
Not that I've seen. It tends to result in a discussion of
economics and tactics.
You see,
>answers like - This was murder - produce normaly answers like - All
>germans should have been killed, they startet the war and therefore it
>was everybodies duty to kill as much germans as possible.
Not in my observation. Claims that this was murder tend to be
answered by claims that it was war. There is a difference between
the two.
The closest I've seen is the claim that, given extensive German
atrocities, it was a very good thing to defeat the Germans as fast
as possible, without being too fussy as to means. (It's not as
if the Germans were fussy about means, in either World War.)
>discussions in Germany were nearly impossible up to now. As a result,
>you normaly got answers from people, who can't see any problems in
>killing thousends of germans, but it is a very fixed view, I think,
>from the winning side.
>
As it happens, lots of people get killed in wars. This one of the
bad things about them. I see no more problems in killing thousands
of Germans than in Germans killing thousands of Russians, for example.
>There were to strategic targets during the war. The british prepared a
>so called morale bombing and produced heavy bombers for that purpose
>already before beginning of ww-ii. The US seems to prefer traffic
>systems and oil indutry, especially after mid of 1944.
>
Your descriptions are inaccurate.
Early RAF raids were against military targets only, and I've seen
no evidence that "morale bombing" was an intended strategy.
For most of the war, though, the RAF had a choice between aiming
at city-sized targets or bombing nothing at all, and preferred to
take the course that might have some effect on the course of the
war.
For the USAAF, it was constantly used against various targets, not
just oil and transportation. If the British bombing effort had
problems in that it was focussed on a target type that wasn't
going to end the war fast, the US effort had very little focus.
Hitting synthetic rubber and ball bearings to lower the supply of
both has less effect than hitting one target type hard enough
to cut into production.
>Morale bombing was aimed mainly against civilians. So targets were
>very often the crowded centres of towns, like Dresden.
This is not true; it was against worker housing. If the intent
had been to kill civilians, the RAF would have done things
differently. The intent was to demoralize the German civilians
and hurt German productivity, and it was accepted that a good
many would be killed in the course of this.
Part of the evidence is that the RAF did not go after refugees
per se, but rather continued to attack cities.
Industry
>targets were of second priority at best. Dresden is a good example for
>this morale bombing. The target area had a large castle, severel
>museums, an old opera and large churches, the Frauenkirche for
>instance. The industry were and is in other regions of this town. The
>only factory which was hit during the firestorm attack on Dresen
>produced toothpaste, according to actual news paper reports. The main
>railway station got severel hits, but damages were fixed within days.
>
Why in the world would I believe contemporary German newspaper reports?
I don't particularly believe modern US ones, and they're a lot more
credible than the German ones. Goebbels, or his subordinates,
thought it best to print that lie about factories hit.
One issue about Dresden is that Bomber Command was not capable of
hitting it with any accuracy, since it was too far from Britain to
use the best navigational aids. Therefore, Bomber Command had no
hope of picking and choosing its targets within the city.
>So you got the situation, that german industry had its most output of
>tanks and fighter planes in the mid and autumn of 1944, after years of
>morale bombing.
Right. The significance of this is still debated, and it is generally
considered that such bombing was a lot less effective than Harris
thought.
This, of course, is 20/20 hindsight, since Harris did not have access
to the USSBS and other postwar documents.
In the german industry mininsterium ran discussions
>during the war, what wood happen, if the british would change targets
>from morale bombing to industry targets. It became clear already 1943
>for the responsible minister Speer, that such a changing woud shorten
>the war seriously. He estimated one or maybe two years.
>
This is preposterous. Ending the war two years earlier would amount
to ending the war in May 1943, and even if this were credible Bomber
Command was not capable of hitting specific industrial targets at
that time. (Heck, the USAAF had enough trouble, and they bombed
during the day.)
>The british morale bombing was a waste of men and materiel. The bomber
>command suffered losses of 55,000 men, about 50% of its personel,
>AFAIK, for minor damages in german industry.
>
It wasn't minor damage, not in 1944. All evaluation of the effect
of Bomber Command on German production is rather speculative, but
certainly it was cutting into production pretty heavily in 1944.
Destroy enough of a city and you hit the factories pretty hard.
>When the US bombers started their attacks from mid 1944 on against
>traffic systems and oil industry, the german war production broke down
>within months.
It would be a mistake to assume that this was all USAAF bombing;
Bomber Command hit transportation targets very hard and oil targets
somewhat less hard. Harris didn't want to do this, but he had his
orders.
>Speer, the german minister for industy and production made 1943 a
>jeering remark about his friend in the allied general staff, who
>directed the bombing to the wrong targets.
>
The remark I remember is that he thought the USAAF was bombing
too many different targets. When the USAAF started hitting oil
targets, he thought they'd go to another target type before they
did too much damage.
>The same with oil industry. These plants were too large to get them
>under concrete. When the US started on 8. Mai 1944 bombing the oil
>industry, output came down within days to 5% of its normal output.
That does not agree with what I've read of German oil output, unless
"days" means "hundreds of days" and we include the effects of
Soviet occupation of German oil sites.
It
>was the end of war, as Speer stated after the war. The question is,
>why didn't the british attacked this target 1941 or at least 1942?
>
The simplest answer is that they couldn't. In 1942, Bomber Command
accuracy was very bad. They'd try to attack a city at night, and
the Germans would experience it as scattered bombing over western
Germany. It was that bad.
Harris worked hard to make Bomber Command able to hit a specific
city. That was the best they could do in 1942.
>Speer expressed it very clearly during interrogations after the war:
>The british wounded as severly, but the US shot us down (Die Engländer
>fügten uns blutige Wunden zu, aber die Amerikaner schossen uns durch
>die Brust). And I think, he was right.
>
Speer said all sorts of things, some of which are even truthful.
He's very popular in debates of this sort, since everybody can find
their own favorite Speer quote.
David Thornley
>
>To claim that a whole city had to be destroyed in order to take out its
>communications is rubbish. By 1945 the brittish and us bombers could
>take out any railway station or railway yard without major difficulty
>and without much 'collateral damage' (see for example Peenemünde 43,
>Merseburg etc and Crossbow 44, Berghof 45),
This is something of an exaggeration, but there's something else I'd
like to point out.
Bomber Command flew at night. It's dark at night. Therefore, Bomber
Command was not generally able to pick out targets by sight. Given
that, the British developed an array of navigation aids to help the
bombers hit the right spot.
The most generally useful of these aids were radio beams from
Britain, and these had a limited range (due to the curvature of
the Earth). Late in the war, Bomber Command was surprisingly
accurate near Britain.
Dresden is a long way from Britain, and so we shouldn't expect
Bomber Command to hit with precision.
dominik lenné
| >>
| > Really? I'd trace it back to the WWI Germans bombing London, first
| > by Zeppelin and then by heavy bomber.
|
| Really? I'd trace it back to the Royal Navy bombing Copenhagen by
| ships and rockets during Napoleonic wars.
Or the Harris-led RAF bombing raids against tribes people in Iraq,
complete with delayed action bombs an poison gas, for that matter.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/air_marshall_arthur_harris.htm
--
Dominik Lenné, Berlin
--
Michele Armellini
"Klaus Petrat" <kla...@t-online.de> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:cvfo49$m3u$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>
> There were to strategic targets during the war. The british prepared a
> so called morale bombing and produced heavy bombers for that purpose
> already before beginning of ww-ii.
Such as. Mention a couple of models. And explain how they were specifically
built for the purpose of morale bombing. Thank you.
The target area had a large castle, severel
> museums, an old opera and large churches, the Frauenkirche for
> instance.
Unfortunately, it was the Germans' responsibility to prevent damage to such
buildings, not the Allies'. The Germans shunned such responsibility.
The
> only factory which was hit during the firestorm attack on Dresen
> produced toothpaste, according to actual news paper reports.
You mean actual newspapers of the time? Newspapers published in Nazi
Germany? Those newspapers that on September 2, 1939, yelled that Poland was
attacking Germany?
You wouldn't be quoting them as some kind of evidence, would you?
The main
> railway station got severel hits, but damages were fixed within days.
>
Well, the USAF Historical Office thinks the railway bridges across the Elbe
were damaged seriously enough to prevent any rail traffic over them for the
next few weeks - that is, enough to make the German situation East of the
Elbe hopeless.
> The british morale bombing was a waste of men and materiel. The bomber
> command suffered losses of 55,000 men, about 50% of its personel,
> AFAIK, for minor damages in german industry.
Minor. Says who?
>
> When the US bombers started their attacks from mid 1944 on against
> traffic systems and oil industry, the german war production broke down
> within months.
Then on with the usual story about how the Americans did well and the
British did not. Have you ever read the numerous past threads on this? You
can find them quite easily.
--
Kari T Seppänen
> Such as. Mention a couple of models. And explain how they were specifically
> built for the purpose of morale bombing. Thank you.
Well, the idea of morale bombing was certainly not new to British
military thinkers, e.g., B.H. Liddell Hart said in his book about
Scipio Africanus (B.H. Liddell Hart, Scipio Africanus - Greater Than
Napoleon, 1st print 1926, pg. 37):
[capture of Cartagena and massacre of its citizens...]
If the massacre of the townspeople is revolting to modern
ideas, it was the normal custom then and for many centuries
thereafter, and with the Romans was a deliberate policy
aimed at the moral factor rather than mere insensate
slaughter. The direct blow at the civil population, who are
the seat of the hostile will, may indeed be revived by the
potentialities of aircraft, which can jump, halmawise, over
the armed "men" who form the shield of the enemy
nation. Such a course, if military practicable, is the
logical one, and ruthless logic usually overcomes the
humaner sentiments in a life and death struggle.
I think that it would be best to just say that the operations
conducted by Bomber Command cannot be morally justified and they might
not be very efficient considered the resources used. However, at the
time, they were seen as the best (or only) way to confront the Nazi
Germany. Claiming anything else, in my opinion, is plain stupid - it
just gives more fuel for Nazi apologizers - as it is quite easy to
find counter examples to any "But Germans did it first" etc. claims.
Thomas Bollmeier
> [...]
> Yet, everyone realized that Germany had
> invaded France 3 times in 70 years and had started two world wars
> and something had to break this pattern of aggression.
> [...]
Well, when German troops entered France in 1870 it was because
the armies of Napoleon III. lost the opening battles after France had
declared war on Prussia.
The First World War was triggered by the Serbs. After the assasination of
Franz Ferdinand the Austrians started their "War against Terror" by
declaring war to Serbia which was supported by Russia. And so on... I
think there is a whole bunch of reasons that led to WW I. It is far too
simple to blame a single nation for it.
And World War II? Hitler's aggressive politics obviously plays a dominant
role in the prewar history. However there were more players in the game:
Poland that had her dreams of Danzig and Silesia, Stalin's Sovjet Union
that wanted to provoke a "clash" of the capitalist powers, Britain that
played its "balance of power"-game or Roosevelt's USA that were preparing
for their role as the world's super power.
Regards
Thomas
--
Kitchen Man
soc.history.war.world-war-ii, asp...@pacific.net.au wrote msg
<cvfo3t$m35$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>:
>On Tue, 22 Feb 2005 05:28:37 +0000 (UTC), Kitchen Man
><nann...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
><sigh>
>
>Was it too hard to find those specific operational orders?
As soon as you can convince me why I should expect to find mention of
strategic policy in operational orders, that question might become
relevant. So far, that's your only point. I crushed it. It's up to
you to pop the dents out.
>Must be, since no one who tries to peddle the particular line in
>question have ever been able to.
I suppose I should resent my well constructed reply being considered
"peddling," but I'll consider that you might be overly emotional about
your stand, whatever it might be. I wonder what you mean by that
statement? What line is it, exactly, that you think I'm peddling? You
snipped EVERY line of my post, and yet here you are accusing me of
peddling a line. I'm going to challenge you to use your mind to figure
out what my point is, then I'll ask you to explain why you interpret it
so. Then, we might understand each other. Right now, all I see is a
person very upset about something that is not entirely clear.
>If it was strategic doctrine, fine ... then it would be reflected in
>specific operational orders.
Why? (You get extra credit for this answer, because it requires a hell
of an essay, and a sound refutation of the quote of Sir Harris that I
supplied.)
>The fact that you, and others preceeding you in the same unsupported
>claims, have always dodged the issue and refued to or failed to
>provide the operational orders that show this was the case for Dresden
>is indicative of the bankruptcy of the assertions you have made and
>the complete lack of specific proof.
Again, what is it that you imagine my unsupported claims are? You keep
saying that, yet you have not laid out one single specific piece of data
that you disagree with! It's almost pythonesque in its absurdity.
--
http://www.xmission.com/~tiger885/motorbike/NART/nart.html
--
bernard3
--
Michele Armellini
"dominik lenné" <dle...@web.de> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:cvg76t$3p6$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> | >>London. And it all started in Guernica...
> | >>
> | > Really? I'd trace it back to the WWI Germans bombing London, first
> | > by Zeppelin and then by heavy bomber.
> |
Yes.
> | Really? I'd trace it back to the Royal Navy bombing Copenhagen by
> | ships and rockets during Napoleonic wars.
>
First, that was not aerial bombing (as it's evident). Second, it is a
mistake to apply the same standards to ages in which different laws existed.
The Hague Conventions had been signed in 1907, so London, an (initially)
undefended city, should not have been bombed in WWI. But the same
Conventions wouldn't apply a century earlier.
However, it's very interesting to point out that the Copenhagen bombardment
was carried out in perfect compliance with the Hague standards, even though
they'd come into being a century later. That's a proof, if anybody wanted
any, that the Hague Convetions did indeed organize and set forth what
already were the laws and customs of war.
There were military objectives in the city, the city was defended, an
opportunity to surrender and a warning about the bombardment had been given.
The Danes did not want to give up their fleet, just like the Poles did not
want to give up their capital in 1939. Both cities, unfortunately, were
legitimate targets, like Dresden, but unlike Belgrade in WWII and London at
the beginning of the WWI German raids over it.
> Or the Harris-led RAF bombing raids against tribes people in Iraq,
> complete with delayed action bombs an poison gas, for that matter.
> http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/air_marshall_arthur_harris.htm
>
If we are "tracing back", the older example wins - that would be Zeppelins
over London.
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>On 15 Feb 2005 16:57:04 -0600, arto k eskelinen
><artokes...@yaho.co.uk.invalid> wrote:
>
>>Exactly 60 years ago the Allied bomber planes knocked off
>>totally the city of Dresden in eastern Germany killing
>>estimated 30-50 000 civilians.
>>
>>Some questions:
>>
>>What were the strategic objectives of this raid? Why was
>>it done on the very eve of German defeat? What did this
>>raid contribute to the Allied war effort?
>
>This question is not asked for the first time. There are a lot of
>answers and the normal result is a discussion full of hate.
The Dresden discussions I have taken part in have not ended
up full of hate.
>You see,
>answers like - This was murder - produce normaly answers like - All
>germans should have been killed, they startet the war and therefore it
>was everybodies duty to kill as much germans as possible.
In other words we have the two extreme beliefs being paraded out
but not much else. Neither being correct.
>One of the
>main problems here in Germany is, that we are not allowed to ask such
>questions, since you are called Nazi for this immediatly. So
>discussions in Germany were nearly impossible up to now. As a result,
>you normaly got answers from people, who can't see any problems in
>killing thousends of germans, but it is a very fixed view, I think,
>from the winning side.
The Germans have been asking questions about the bombing for
decades, for very good reasons given the destruction and loss of
life.
The decision to make the air raid deaths murder is one of the neo
Nazi lines. If the deaths were murder then as long as all the air
forces are accused of murder it is at least consistent.
>The last days here in Germany started real discussions about this for
>the first time after 60 years. I'll try to give you some ideas about
>articles in news papers and other sources.
No, what is happening is the more popular media have decided to
run stories about it, there have been real discussions for decades.
>There were to strategic targets during the war. The british prepared a
>so called morale bombing and produced heavy bombers for that purpose
>already before beginning of ww-ii. The US seems to prefer traffic
>systems and oil indutry, especially after mid of 1944.
Yes, this sounds like the popular media. The RAF, like every other
air force pre WWII assumed it could bomb definite targets accurately
and destroy them, at least by day and probably by night.
The heavy bombers had nothing to do with the area attack directive,
like Germany Britain ordered these new types in the late 1930s.
The area attack directive was made in early 1942, after the results of
the first year to 18 months of the campaign had been analysed.
The neo Nazis tend to run the line the only thing a heavy bomber is
good for is attacking civilians.
>Morale bombing was aimed mainly against civilians.
Neat circular argument actually, once you define the bombing as
"morale" you automatically make it against civilians.
To really go after civilians drop AP bombs to bust shelters, bomb
the out of town refugee areas and drop fragmentation bombs,
some with delayed action or movement sensitive fuses.
>So targets were
>very often the crowded centres of towns, like Dresden.
As opposed to the fact the centres of large towns were about the
accuracy level in 1942 and 1943.
The raids that caused the firestorm at Hamburg was about average
accuracy for Bomber Command in mid 1943, 325 of the 722 bombers
claiming to attack dropped their bombs within 3 miles of the target.
Also the markers were 1.75 miles ESE of the official aiming point.
These errors increased with range, the errors over Berlin were
greater.
>Industry targets were of second priority at best.
No, industry was not an "at best" second priority, bombs on
built up areas were the priority of area bombing, preferably
on industry but the method realised this would not happen
regularly without improvements in bombing accuracy.
>Dresden is a good example for
>this morale bombing. The target area had a large castle, severel
>museums, an old opera and large churches, the Frauenkirche for
>instance. The industry were and is in other regions of this town. The
>only factory which was hit during the firestorm attack on Dresen
>produced toothpaste, according to actual news paper reports. The main
>railway station got severel hits, but damages were fixed within days.
So the news papers are saying the target area, which effectively means
everything within about 3 miles given normal night time accuracy plus
the systematic error of any target marking, the area was totally devoid
of industry except a toothpaste factory?
The fundamental cause of the Dresden firestorm was concentrated
bombing, this required everything to go right whereas the planners
assumed the usual dispersion around the aiming point. See the
effect of cloud on the first wave.
>So you got the situation, that german industry had its most output of
>tanks and fighter planes in the mid and autumn of 1944, after years of
>morale bombing.
Which has a great deal to do with the Nazi way of running things early
in the war, the excess of factory space and machine tools during the
war which meant easy replacement of lost equipment and finally the
fact it took months to convert things like iron ore to steel to a weapon.
The Nazis handicapped German industry for most of the war, the
peaks in late 1944 were on borrowed time, thanks to the reduction
in stockpiles.
Note also the increases in British production under the 1940 and
1941 bombing. It was more than just the type of bombing that
mattered.
>In the german industry mininsterium ran discussions
>during the war, what wood happen, if the british would change targets
>from morale bombing to industry targets. It became clear already 1943
>for the responsible minister Speer, that such a changing woud shorten
>the war seriously. He estimated one or maybe two years.
This fundamentally ignores the reality of the accuracy of the bombing.
It simply assumes the required targets would be hit and destroyed more
or less as required. This did not happen even in daylight.
So where are these discussions documented?
>The british morale bombing was a waste of men and materiel. The bomber
>command suffered losses of 55,000 men, about 50% of its personel,
>AFAIK, for minor damages in german industry.
Then you need to understand the reality that for a start around 1/4
of the above losses were taken after the effects on German industry
were becoming obvious (June 1944 for oil), instead of taking the
entire campaigns losses and putting them against the times of
poor results.
Secondly the losses have to be offset against the losses the Luftwaffe
took in order to shoot down the bombers.
The reality is until mid 1944 the main effect of the allied bombers was
military, the cost of the defences, not economic. It takes a lot to stop
a large economy. Otherwise the Luftwaffe could have paralysed
Britain in 1940 and 1941.
>When the US bombers started their attacks from mid 1944 on against
>traffic systems and oil industry, the german war production broke down
>within months.
This rather ignores the fact Bomber Command was also being used
against transport targets and is ignoring the other factors involved,
like the loss of raw materials and the deployment of all types of allied
airpower.
>You can't produce without material and you can't get
>the produced tanks to the front without a railway system. You can
>produce a tank in a bunker, as the germans did, but you have to
>transport them by an open railway. That's the reason, why the attacks
>against traffic systems were so efficient.
The transport attacks worked quite well but they were hardly perfect.
In any case to stop a rail system you need the following
Fighter bombers to go after the rolling stock.
Medium bombers to go after rails, bridges, tunnels and so forth.
Heavy bombers to go after marshalling yards.
With some overlap between the various aircraft types and their target
types.
Only the heavies were available to strike German rail system before
around October 1944 and they were often in use for strikes in France.
The Reichsbahn weekly rail wagons loaded figure starts declining
from around late September 1944 on.
It was down to 2/3 the peak by December 1944 and 1/3 of peak by
the end of January 1945.
So it took the allies around 4 months to achieve this, with the heavy
bombers dropping something like 36,800 short tons (Bomber Command)
and 102,200 tons (8th Air Force) in the 4 months, total around 139,000
short tons.
Bomber Command reached 139,000 short tons of Bombs dropped
on Germany during July 1943, the 8th Air force at the end of July 1944.
Understand many of the 8th air force transportation strikes were
undertaken in weather conditions that meant accuracy equivalent of
that the night bombers had in 1943. Marshalling yards were generally
in the middle of German towns.
>Speer, the german minister for industy and production made 1943 a
>jeering remark about his friend in the allied general staff, who
>directed the bombing to the wrong targets.
These wrong targets included most of the targets tried by the allies
before mid 1944 because the allies lacked the ability to sustain a
campaign against a specific set of targets.
>The same with oil industry. These plants were too large to get them
>under concrete. When the US started on 8. Mai 1944 bombing the oil
>industry, output came down within days to 5% of its normal output. It
>was the end of war, as Speer stated after the war.
The USSBS has a whole report about the effects on the German
oil industry, from a peak of just over 700,000 tons pre month in
March 1944, around 650,00 tons in April and 600,000 tons in
May it dropped to around 275,000 tons per month in the final
quarter of 1944, and was still around 175,000 tons, or around
1/4 the March 1944 peak, in February 1945.
What was really cut dramatically was avgas production, down
to around 5% of its peak by September 1944. Then a revival
to around 20% of peak in November 1944 before a steady
decline.
So for oil industry read avgas, for days read around 150 days.
Big difference.
To reach the September levels of damage the allies had dropped
some 85,504 tons of bombs on oil industry targets. This is slightly
greater that the 8th Air Force bomb tonnage on Germany from
the start of the campaign to the end of April 1944. It is slightly
greater than the tonnage Bomber Command dropped on Germany
from the start of the war to the end of February 1943.
This is why it could not be done before 1944 even without taking
into account the scale of the defences.
The halfway point for bombs dropped on Germany was in early
October for Bomber Command and mid November 1944 for the
8th Air Force.
>The question is,
>why didn't the british attacked this target 1941 or at least 1942?
Because of the same reasons the US could not do so before May
1944, lack of firepower and the need to weaken the defences before
starting a systematic and therefore predictable strategy.
Bomber Command officially dropped 2,295 long tons of bombs on
German oil targets in 1940 and 1941. Very comparable to the
tonnage the 8th Air force dropped in May 1944, 2,873 short tons.
The major difference was accuracy, many more RAF bombs missed
and the fact the bombing was not concentrated in a 1 month period.
>Speer expressed it very clearly during interrogations after the war:
>The british wounded as severly, but the US shot us down (Die Engländer
>fügten uns blutige Wunden zu, aber die Amerikaner schossen uns durch
>die Brust). And I think, he was right.
I think you will find that is a quote from Milch.
Yes we have a US good British bad theme, with the effects of specific
strikes being over rated.
Roman Werpachowski
> There were to strategic targets during the war. The british prepared a
> so called morale bombing and produced heavy bombers for that purpose
> already before beginning of ww-ii. The US seems to prefer traffic
> systems and oil indutry, especially after mid of 1944.
Why do you choose to omit that Germans carried out terror bombing
already in 1939?
--
Roman Werpachowski
/--------==============--------\
| http://www.cft.edu.pl/~roman |
\--------==============--------/
--
jer...@autograf.pl
> role in the prewar history. However there were more players in the game:
> Poland that had her dreams of Danzig and Silesia,
1. I find whitewashing the III Reich disgusting.
There are thousands German documents.
I understand that you don't like what your greatfathers did
so you try to put the blame on someone other.
2. Poland wasn't invided because of her dreams
(if they existed, which you haven't proved)
but because it was situated on the way to Russia.
--
Michele Armellini
"Thomas Bollmeier" <TBoll...@web.de> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:cvgjjf$dpg$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> Am Mon, 21 Feb 2005 20:57:19 +0000 schrieb yaakov_macales:
>
> > [...]
> > Yet, everyone realized that Germany had
> > invaded France 3 times in 70 years and had started two world wars
> > and something had to break this pattern of aggression.
> > [...]
> And World War II? Hitler's aggressive politics obviously plays a dominant
> role in the prewar history. However there were more players in the game:
> Poland that had her dreams of Danzig and Silesia, Stalin's Sovjet Union
> that wanted to provoke a "clash" of the capitalist powers, Britain that
> played its "balance of power"-game or Roosevelt's USA that were preparing
> for their role as the world's super power.
An original, if false, picture.
The USA, starting with the easiest subject, were preparing for a quiet
isolationism. If you have anything in the way of supporting your claim that
before WWII they were preparing for their role as the world's super power,
go ahead and show it.
Poland had dreams about protecting its minorities in the free city and in
Western Silesia, yes - which were trampled over by the Germans (that is not
to say that the Poles were softer on their own minorities, of course). At
the same time it had a non-aggression pact with Germany and respected it.
When Germany made quite clear offers for waging a war of aggression against
the USSR as allies, Poland rejected them. If you can show any evidence of
Poland wanting a war, go ahead and show it.
Britain pursued its usual policies. It pursued them peacefully. So
peacefully that it had indeed believed Hitler's claim that the Sudentenland
was his last demand! If you have any evidence of Britain wanting a war, show
it.
As to the Soviet Union, AFAIK, it was the most prudent player of them all -
until Germany showed that all bets were off. Then, yes, it accepted the new
rules, the ones that were set by Germany.
So we're left with Hitler's "aggressive politics". Evidently you believe in
the sentence that war is the continuation of politics with other means,
since that's what Hitlers "politics" amounted to in the end.
--
Cub Driver
<kla...@t-online.de> wrote:
>The british morale bombing was a waste of men and materiel.
That may have been the case, but after all these years no one has
proved it to my satisfaction. For it to have been a waste means that
the Anglo-Americans could have won the war sooner, or at least on the
same day, without it. That seems utterly improbable to me.
Germany and Japan used terror bombing in launching their respective
wars. Britain and America used terror bombing to defend themselves and
roll back the conquerers. If there was a better use of men and
material in 1939-1945, surely somebody would have discovered it and
exploited it to the other side's detriment.
Michele Armellini
"Kari T Seppänen" <k...@cc.hut.fi> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:cvgjjb$dpd$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> "Michele Armellini" <don'tspam....@tin.it> writes:
>
> > Such as. Mention a couple of models. And explain how they were
specifically
> > built for the purpose of morale bombing. Thank you.
>
> Well, the idea of morale bombing was certainly not new to British
> military thinkers, e.g., B.H. Liddell Hart said in his book about
> Scipio Africanus (B.H. Liddell Hart, Scipio Africanus - Greater Than
> Napoleon, 1st print 1926, pg. 37):
And how this, a quotation from a speculative book, by an author who wasn't a
top RAF commander, would reply to my quite clear question?
Which pre-war British bombers were specifically built for the purpose of
morale bombing, and how can we say that they were specifically built for
that purpose? That was, and is, the question.
>
> I think that it would be best to just say that the operations
> conducted by Bomber Command cannot be morally justified
On the contrary, they can be morally justified very easily, in perspective.
There was a war on. The means employed were not against the laws of war.
Today, our modern sensibilities and our international treaties do not allow
the military to put on one pan of the scales the lives of enemy civilians
and on the other pan the lives of friendly soldiers; but at the time, both
moral sensibilities and laws of war were different. Even for Dresden, the
likelihood is that its bombing spared a few Soviet soldiers' lives. That's
justification enough for the standards of the time.
Now, if you try to apply our own modern standards, of course Bomber
Command's operations wouldn't be morally justifiable. Nor would the
Luftwaffe's, or the Crusaders', or the Teutonic Knights'. So it's a rather
pointless exercise.
And all of that doesn't even factor in that one day less in the war was one
day less in the operation of German extermination camps.
and they might
> not be very efficient considered the resources used.
They might. So what? Everybody makes mistakes in war, and we are considering
them not very efficient thanks to our hindsight.
However, at the
> time, they were seen as the best (or only) way to confront the Nazi
> Germany.
That is only true until June 1941. Or even more narrowly, the time between
the Battle of Britain and the first real opportunity of defeating Germany in
land war - its aggression against the USSR. And I'll point out that during
that time, the British were trying to hit military and industrial targets
only, with meager successes if any at all.
as it is quite easy to
> find counter examples to any "But Germans did it first" etc. claims.
I did not make such claims, but if you know examples of city bombing that
are precedent to the Zeppelins' missions in WWI, go ahead and provide them.
Or if you want to provide WWII-only examples, that are precedent to the
German bombing of Wielun, go ahead and provide them.
--
Roman Werpachowski
Poland would never start a war which would bring her shortly to
disaster.
asp...@pacific.net.au
Seppänen) wrote:
>I think that it would be best to just say that the operations
>conducted by Bomber Command cannot be morally justified and they might
*You*, as a single individual, are, of course, entitled to say
anything at all.
The *rest of us* simply disagree with you.
*I*, and many, many, many others ... who are neither USAns or UKans
.... do NOT "think it would be best to just say that the operations
conducted by Bomber Command cannot be morally justified."
People who hold this skewed and unsupported (and unsupportable)
*opinion* are a definite *minority* on this newsgroup and, indeed, in
the real world.
So feel free to state your personal opinion ... just don't do it in a
way that implies anything other than it being a *personal* *opinion*.
Cub Driver
<TBoll...@web.de> wrote:
>or Roosevelt's USA that were preparing
>for their role as the world's super power.
Yes, thank you for clarifying that. Germany invaded Poland in order to
forestall American meddling in Europe. I understand now. How prescient
of Hitler!
asp...@pacific.net.au
<nann...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>On Tue, 22 Feb 2005 16:54:21 +0000 (UTC) in
>soc.history.war.world-war-ii, asp...@pacific.net.au wrote msg
><cvfo3t$m35$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>:
>
>>On Tue, 22 Feb 2005 05:28:37 +0000 (UTC), Kitchen Man
>><nann...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>><sigh>
>>
>>Was it too hard to find those specific operational orders?
>
>As soon as you can convince me why I should expect to find mention of
>strategic policy in operational orders, that question might become
>relevant. So far, that's your only point. I crushed it. It's up to
>you to pop the dents out.
Ah, dodging the issue.
It is plain. *IF* it was strategic *policy* to terror bomb, *then*
there would be specific mentions of it in the operational orders.
Specific orders to bomb civilian housing and nonmilitary targets to
the exclusion of all others. Or with a higher priority than was given
to all others.
No such orders exist for Dresden because no such policy existed.
We expect this sort of disingenuity for all those who believe in the
apologist fantasy of "terrorfliegers".
>>Must be, since no one who tries to peddle the particular line in
>>question have ever been able to.
>
>I suppose I should resent my well constructed reply being considered
"Well constructed" only in the sense that it carefully avoided
answering the specific question(s) asked, and carefully failed to
provide any of the specific evidence asked for.
>"peddling," but I'll consider that you might be overly emotional about
That's it. Well done! Deflect the argument from your complete lack of
fact ... and complete reliance on the apologistically emotional
"terrorflieger" notion (a rose by any other name).
>>If it was strategic doctrine, fine ... then it would be reflected in
>>specific operational orders.
>
>Why? (You get extra credit for this answer, because it requires a hell
>of an essay, and a sound refutation of the quote of Sir Harris that I
>supplied.)
What Sir Arthur Harris might or might not have said, in general terms,
about his theory of how Bomber Command should be used, as opposed to
how it was *actually* used is the key question.
You are being emotional and disingenuous if you believe - and if you
expect *us* to believe that - that it is possible to "nudge, nudge,
wink, wink" orders to "terrorfliegers" without specifically spelling
out, in operational orders to Wings, Groups, and Squadrons, what the
specific targets are. And what the specific purposes of those targets
are.
Your quote of Harris is, therefore, deliberately misleading.
People who support the apologist stance and the terrorflieger fantasy
seem to have a serious problem in this regard.
We await something resembling a relevant fact with barely baited
breath.
Kari T Seppänen
> *I*, and many, many, many others ... who are neither USAns or UKans
> .... do NOT "think it would be best to just say that the operations
> conducted by Bomber Command cannot be morally justified."
After reading this comment, I felt urge to check out that I have
understood words "moral" and "morally" correctly. From Cambridge
Dictionary of American English:
moral
adjective
relating to standards of good behavior, honesty, and fair
dealing, or showing high standards of this type
morally
adverb
considered from a moral position
Thus I still find it quite hard to believe that bombing civilian
targets could be considered "...of good behavior, honesty, and fair
dealing, or showing high standards..." in any imaginable situation.
Those acts may be justified by international rules and laws of war or
just by that they were necessary to win the war. But morally justified
- hardly.
> People who hold this skewed and unsupported (and unsupportable)
> *opinion* are a definite *minority* on this newsgroup and, indeed, in
> the real world.
Well... I think that we, here in the Old Continent, have finally
figured out that it is not very humane to kill civilians during the
war.
Thomas Bollmeier
> Thomas Bollmeier <TBoll...@web.de> wrote in message
>> And World War II? Hitler's aggressive politics obviously plays a dominant
>> role in the prewar history. However there were more players in the game:
>> Poland that had her dreams of Danzig and Silesia,
>
> 1. I find whitewashing the III Reich disgusting.
> There are thousands German documents.
> I understand that you don't like what your greatfathers did
> so you try to put the blame on someone other.
>
I do not intend to excuse any German crimes that were committed during the
occupation of Poland from 1939-1944/45. I am also aware of Hitler's
politics of aggression. But this should not prevent us today from having
a broader view at the pre war history. To find the thruth about the
origins of World War II - if that is ever possible - one has to take
all the main actors into account.
For a complete picture of the events in spring and summer of 1939
it is necessary to include the motivation and ideas of the Polish leaders
as well as the long history of tensions between Germany and Poland since
1919.
Regards
Thomas
--
Roman Werpachowski
> I don't think anyone would argue in 2005 that the Dresden raid was a
> military necessity, or that the military goals achieved by it were
> worth the civiian casualties on the ground. But that is not the same
> as saying it was criminal. And who knows? It may indeed have hastened
> the end of the war, and thus saved lives in the end.
If we single out any allied attack of the WW II, nearly every time we
could, with a little hand waving, prove that it was not a 'necessity'.
However, war had to be fought anyway.
Thomas Bollmeier
> On the Wed, 23 Feb 2005 00:43:27 +0000 (UTC), Thomas Bollmeier wrote:
>> [...]
>> And World War II? Hitler's aggressive politics obviously plays a dominant
>> role in the prewar history. However there were more players in the game:
>> Poland that had her dreams of Danzig and Silesia, Stalin's Sovjet Union
>> that wanted to provoke a "clash" of the capitalist powers, Britain that
>> played its "balance of power"-game or Roosevelt's USA that were preparing
>> for their role as the world's super power.
>
> Poland would never start a war which would bring her shortly to
> disaster.
>
Of course not. But in the summer of 1939 the Polish administration simply
relied its foreign politics on assumptions that later in September proved
to be totally wrong. Foreign secretary Beck felt quite comfortable: Poland
had treaties with Britain and France that promised her immediate military
assistance whenever Poland felt her independence to be in danger.
Therefore Poland seemed to be in a very strong position from Beck's point
of view that allowed him to reject every compromise with Germany regarding
the status of Danzig or the "corridor". In case of a war with Germany Beck
expected the Western Allies to attack immediately at the "Westwall"
thereby forcing Germany to dislocate most of its divisions in the West
which would have given Poland the opportunity to launch offensives against
Prussia, Silesia or even Berlin.
Regards
Thomas
--
Michele Armellini
news:cvj80b$f80$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> > Poland would never start a war which would bring her shortly to
> > disaster.
> >
>
> Of course not. But in the summer of 1939 the Polish administration simply
> relied its foreign politics on assumptions that later in September proved
> to be totally wrong. Foreign secretary Beck felt quite comfortable: Poland
> had treaties with Britain and France that promised her immediate military
> assistance whenever Poland felt her independence to be in danger.
> Therefore Poland seemed to be in a very strong position from Beck's point
> of view that allowed him to reject every compromise with Germany regarding
> the status of Danzig or the "corridor". In case of a war with Germany Beck
> expected the Western Allies to attack immediately at the "Westwall"
> thereby forcing Germany to dislocate most of its divisions in the West
> which would have given Poland the opportunity to launch offensives against
> Prussia, Silesia or even Berlin.
First thing, it is by now a well-established fact that Hitler's demands
about Danzig and the "corridor" were pretexts. Hitler is on record as saying
to his generals that "Danzig is not the issue; our Lebensraum is the issue".
This is further demonstrated by the similar behavior shown in the
Czechoslovakian case. Demands could only escalate, with Hitler. So, please
do not treat Germany's proposed "compromises" as if they were serious
negotiating attempts - it's pathetic.
Secondly, let's suppose for a moment that Germany was seriously only
interested in what it ostensibly asked. Poland refused. So what? Are you
arguing that this peaceful Polish position concerning Polish sovereignty is
somehow a provocation of war? A casus belli? If tomorrow Germany asked
Szczecin back, and Poland refused, and Germany went to war, how would the
Poles be responsible for the war?
Thirdly, coming to the Poles' international relations, you mention the
French and British alliance and very conveniently forget other relations.
Germany had a non-aggression treaty with Poland. Surely, when country A and
B have a non-aggression treaty, and country A denounces it and attacks
country B in a matter of weeks, you won't be blaming country B?
Finally, yes, the Poles expected a war with Germany to go well for them and
their allies - IF Germany started it. Assuming that this somehow proves the
Poles wanted a war is foolish. It only means they thought Germany wouldn't
attack. Their mistake. But the responsibility of the war falls squarely on
Germany.
--
Roman Werpachowski
> Of course not. But in the summer of 1939 the Polish administration simply
> relied its foreign politics on assumptions that later in September proved
> to be totally wrong. Foreign secretary Beck felt quite comfortable: Poland
> had treaties with Britain and France that promised her immediate military
> assistance whenever Poland felt her independence to be in danger.
Yes, we were counting on our allies will to fight and military strength.
Both assertions proved wrong, but it's hardly a proof of warmongering.
> Therefore Poland seemed to be in a very strong position from Beck's point
> of view that allowed him to reject every compromise with Germany regarding
> the status of Danzig or the "corridor". In case of a war with Germany Beck
Gda?sk (or Danzig) already was pretty independent from Poland. What else
could we propose to Germans? What do you suggest?
W/r to corridor, no country which takes it independence seriously can
agree to such things. It would be start of a series of concessions to
Hitler.
> expected the Western Allies to attack immediately at the "Westwall"
> thereby forcing Germany to dislocate most of its divisions in the West
> which would have given Poland the opportunity to launch offensives against
> Prussia, Silesia or even Berlin.
Poland was willing to defence itself, we had no business in taking
Berlin.
Andrew Warinner
Thomas Bollmeier <TBoll...@web.de> wrote:
> Of course not. But in the summer of 1939 the Polish administration simply
> relied its foreign politics on assumptions that later in September proved
> to be totally wrong. Foreign secretary Beck felt quite comfortable: Poland
> had treaties with Britain and France that promised her immediate military
> assistance whenever Poland felt her independence to be in danger.
So you are arguing that in light of Britain and France's actions in the
Czechoslovakian crisis made no impression on Poland? That is, of course,
patently wrong.
> Therefore Poland seemed to be in a very strong position from Beck's point
> of view that allowed him to reject every compromise with Germany regarding
> the status of Danzig or the "corridor".
This assumes that Hitler had the slightest intention to accept some
compromise short of war in his disputes with Poland and that avenue was
open to Britain, France and Poland.
Unfortunately this is contradicted by the numerous statements of Hitler
that he intended to start a war with Poland, not create a crisis that
would be solved by any diplomatic means.
You also ignore the fact Hitler orchestrated the entire 'crisis' to
prevent any attempt at a resolution short of war.
Andrew Warinner
wari...@xnet.com
http://home.xnet.com/~warinner
--
jer...@autograf.pl
> For a complete picture of the events in spring and summer of 1939
> it is necessary to include the motivation and ideas of the Polish leaders
> as well as the long history of tensions between Germany and Poland since
> 1919.
basic data about Germany in 1939 - the invasion of the Czech part of
Czechoslovakia, German invasion of Poland, hatred propaganda against
Poles, which influenced German soldiers degradating them later to
criminals.
The best prove that Hitler had nothing was the Gleiwitz attentat
done by Germans themselves.
What motivations and ideas had the Polish leaders in 1939 between
mentally ill Germany and Soviet Union? To survive. Both criminals
wanted to use Poland against the other, when they failed started
to cooperate against Poland. Poland should have destroied Germany
before 1939, what would have saved millions of German lives.
The only possible partner was the USA.
--
Briarroot
> asp...@pacific.net.au writes:
>
>
>>*I*, and many, many, many others ... who are neither USAns or UKans
>>.... do NOT "think it would be best to just say that the operations
>>conducted by Bomber Command cannot be morally justified."
>
>
> After reading this comment, I felt urge to check out that I have
> understood words "moral" and "morally" correctly. From Cambridge
> Dictionary of American English:
>
> moral
> adjective
> relating to standards of good behavior, honesty, and fair
> dealing, or showing high standards of this type
>
> morally
> adverb
> considered from a moral position
>
> Thus I still find it quite hard to believe that bombing civilian
> targets could be considered "...of good behavior, honesty, and fair
> dealing, or showing high standards..." in any imaginable situation.
>
> Those acts may be justified by international rules and laws of war or
> just by that they were necessary to win the war. But morally justified
> - hardly.
But winning the war *was* moral justification since German
capitulation would put an immediate end to the slaughter. It wasn't
as though the British and Americans sought to defeat Germany in order
to establish their own hegemony over Europe. They were fighting to
end the domination of the Nazis.
Also, tell me this: was it a moral act for those same German civilians
to build the tanks and planes and bombs and bullets that their armies
had used to conquer and enslave all of Europe? Why do you suggest
that there should be some special exemption for the makers of weapons
that does not apply to the wielders?
I could see your point if somehow, the Germans had designated certain
out-of-the-way, non-strategic locations as open cities, to be
populated only with women, children and the elderly, with none but
subsistence industries (no war work). Bombing such a target could
then be considered an immoral act; but clearly, such was not the case
with Dresden in World War 2.
>>People who hold this skewed and unsupported (and unsupportable)
>>*opinion* are a definite *minority* on this newsgroup and, indeed, in
>>the real world.
>
>
> Well... I think that we, here in the Old Continent, have finally
> figured out that it is not very humane to kill civilians during the
> war.
I put it to you: would you order your air forces to bomb cities if it
meant survival for your nation? If by bombing enemy civilians, you
could stop your opponent from enslaving and murdering millions of
people? It's one thing to sit quietly at one's desk and make moral
judgments on historical figures, it's quite another to be forced to
deal with the problems that they had to face.
Off topic side note: I don't think you there "in the Old Continent"
have any claim to the moral high ground, given the facts of recent sad
events in the Balkans.
--
jer...@autograf.pl
> Incindiary bombing of cities was practiced by both the British
> and the United States.
Al, the war didn't start when the USA joined it. The Luftwaffe
bombed Warsaw in 1939 using a mix of inciniary and standard
boms.
--
Roman Werpachowski
> I do not intend to excuse any German crimes that were committed during the
> occupation of Poland from 1939-1944/45. I am also aware of Hitler's
> politics of aggression. But this should not prevent us today from having
> a broader view at the pre war history. To find the thruth about the
> origins of World War II - if that is ever possible - one has to take
> all the main actors into account.
> For a complete picture of the events in spring and summer of 1939
> it is necessary to include the motivation and ideas of the Polish leaders
> as well as the long history of tensions between Germany and Poland since
> 1919.
Those tensions arose from the sole fact that an independent Polish state
existed.
asp...@pacific.net.au
Seppänen) wrote:
>asp...@pacific.net.au writes:
>
>> *I*, and many, many, many others ... who are neither USAns or UKans
>> .... do NOT "think it would be best to just say that the operations
>> conducted by Bomber Command cannot be morally justified."
>
>After reading this comment, I felt urge to check out that I have
>understood words "moral" and "morally" correctly. From Cambridge
>Dictionary of American English:
>
> moral
> adjective
> relating to standards of good behavior, honesty, and fair
> dealing, or showing high standards of this type
>
> morally
> adverb
> considered from a moral position
Well, that may be the *American* definition.
Not being an American, I wouldn't know.
Don't assume. As Jack Lemmon says, it makes an ass out of u and me.
Regardless, from Dictionary.com (probably also an American dictionary
at its base, but still ...)
"Conforming to standards of what is right or just in behavior;
virtuous: a moral life."
Which is the third of six (6) possible meanings.
I find it difficult to believe that the dictionary you used was so
deficient as to NOT include that variant definition ... or did you
miss it?
Or was it chosen because it made your argument look, for a second, in
passing, somewhat more valid than it actually is?
>Thus I still find it quite hard to believe that bombing civilian
>targets could be considered "...of good behavior, honesty, and fair
>dealing, or showing high standards..." in any imaginable situation.
Only because you, either through use of an inferior dictionary,
failure to actually read the entire definition entry, or, perhaps,
deliberately, failed to note the definition that fits how I actually
used the word ... as opposed to the way you would have us believe it
was used.
It is entirely easy to understand and believe that the allied bombing
of Dresden was "Conforming to standards of what it right or just in
behaviour" in the strictest legal sense.
That is, since you seem to possibly have some difficulty in grasping
this, under international law as it existed then (and, indeed, since
it has *not* been changed by later treaties, as it *still* exists
today), what the allies did was *legal*. And, since it was "right"
because, obviously, following international law that is *still*
interntional law *today* is, ipso facto, "right" and, therefore,
"moral."
>Those acts may be justified by international rules and laws of war or
>just by that they were necessary to win the war. But morally justified
>- hardly.
Only because you, oh so disingenuously, omitted the key definition of
"moral" to make it appear so.
I refer you to ...
Hague (IX) "Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War"
(1907) which was recognised by all powers concerned as the applicable
treaty for attacks by aircraft on such facilities during WW1 and WW2.
The full text, and the commentaries on it, are available at the ICRC
website and the text only at the Avalon project website.
It might be instructive if you were actually to read it.
"2. Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms
or war ' matériel, ' workshops or plant which could be utilized for
the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the
harbour, are not, however, included in this prohibition. The commander
of a naval force may destroy them with artillery, after a summons
followed by a reasonable time of waiting, if all other means are
impossible, and when the local authorities have not themselves
destroyed them within the time fixed.
He incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable damage which may be
caused by a bombardment under such circumstances."
(It goes on about undefended towns and the circumstances under which
they may be bombarded, which is probably not applicable because it is
purely relevant to naval warfare against ports. Note that the
commentaries at the ICRC makes it clear that "defended" for the
purposes of WW1/2 bombing meant lines of flak guns and fighter
defences between the target and the attacker's bases ... so Dresden
was defended, according to the law as it existed then, and as it still
exists. Since BC followed the law, a law that still applies,
unchanged, the behaviour was *moral* in the sense *I* have used it.)
>> People who hold this skewed and unsupported (and unsupportable)
>> *opinion* are a definite *minority* on this newsgroup and, indeed, in
>> the real world.
>
>Well... I think that we, here in the Old Continent, have finally
>figured out that it is not very humane to kill civilians during the
>war.
Perhaps. However, what you, personally, have figured out is completely
irrelevant and not in any way authoritative as your own government is
a signatory to the relevant conventions and, therefore, one must
assume that they have, on your behlaf, determined that they are legal
and, therefore, moral.
Cub Driver
Seppänen) wrote:
>Thus I still find it quite hard to believe that bombing civilian
>targets could be considered "...of good behavior, honesty, and fair
>dealing, or showing high standards..." in any imaginable situation.
I would agree with you in respect to the German bombing of Warsaw in
1939 and Rotterdam in 1940, and with respect to the Japanese bombing
of Shanghai, Nanjing, and Chongqing in 1937-1941.
By 1941, however, thanks to German and Japanese actions, war had
become much more cruel. Bombing cities was standard practice by 1944,
and certainly by the spring of 1945, when the USAAF undertook the
firebombing of Japanese cities. Before March 1945, the USAAF attempted
to hit "precision targets," in theory if not in practice.
The men who destroyed Dresden and Tokyo were of all sorts, of course,
but the majority were indeed "...of good behavior, honesty, and fair
dealing, or showing high standards..."
The firebombing of those and other cities may have been mistaken,
unforunate, perhaps even pointless (though I don't see how that could
possibly be demosntrated), but it was hardly immoral.
David Thornley
Thomas Bollmeier <TBoll...@web.de> wrote:
>
>I do not intend to excuse any German crimes that were committed during the
>occupation of Poland from 1939-1944/45. I am also aware of Hitler's
>politics of aggression. But this should not prevent us today from having
>a broader view at the pre war history. To find the thruth about the
>origins of World War II - if that is ever possible - one has to take
>all the main actors into account.
If one wishes to go step by step, it is of course necessary to study
what everybody did, carefully.
If one wishes an overall view, it's pretty much enough to notice
Hitler's politics of aggression and observe that all other miitary
plans (except Italy's) were a reaction to those. Besides Germany
and Italy, no European power wanted a war.
Britain, in fact, cooperated with Hitler's desires through the
annexation of Czechoslovakian border territories, and only tried
to stop Hitler's aggression when it was clear that it was unbounded.
>For a complete picture of the events in spring and summer of 1939
>it is necessary to include the motivation and ideas of the Polish leaders
>as well as the long history of tensions between Germany and Poland since
>1919.
>
Those are details. While Polish diplomacy at the time was inept and
unrealistic, Poland was not intending to start a war, and this was
clear to everybody. Nor is the long history of tensions critical,
since it was not these tensions that caused WWII. Plenty of countries
live side by side in unfriendly peace. In fact, that's pretty much
the norm. It takes more than "tensions" to cause a war.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
David Thornley
Thomas Bollmeier <TBoll...@web.de> wrote:
>Am Wed, 23 Feb 2005 16:47:21 +0000 schrieb Roman Werpachowski:
>
>> Poland would never start a war which would bring her shortly to
>> disaster.
>
>Of course not. But in the summer of 1939 the Polish administration simply
>relied its foreign politics on assumptions that later in September proved
>to be totally wrong.
I agree with that, but what does that have to do with starting WWII?
Foreign secretary Beck felt quite comfortable: Poland
>had treaties with Britain and France that promised her immediate military
>assistance whenever Poland felt her independence to be in danger.
>Therefore Poland seemed to be in a very strong position from Beck's point
>of view that allowed him to reject every compromise with Germany regarding
>the status of Danzig or the "corridor".
So, why should Poland be expected to compromise?
Danzig was not Polish. It was an international city, and Poland
had no sovereignity. What was Poland supposed to compromise?
The Polish Corridor was, well, Polish. It was inhabited by both
Poles and Germans. There was no particular reason why it should
be German rather than Polish, and thus not a reason for war.
Not to mention that Germany had demanded the heavily German
parts of Czechoslovakia in 1938, and not that long afterwards had
annexed the heavily Czech parts. Given that, there was no
reason for any neighbor of Germany to think that it was even
safe to relinquish heavily German parts of their territory,
because there was no reason to believe Hitler would stop there.
Djay
Dresden. The Soviet Union WAS to begin an offensive from the east and
the British merly wanted to look good to the Russians. It made no
contribution the the Allied war effort
--
Roman Werpachowski
As Warsaw had practically no air defense, and Luftwaffe used dive
bombers, they could pick targets at ease. My grandmother's sister died
in a bombed hospital, with a large Red Cross on its rooftop.
Kari T Seppänen
> In article <cvj80c$f81$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>,
> Thomas Bollmeier <TBoll...@web.de> wrote:
>>
>>I do not intend to excuse any German crimes that were committed during the
>>occupation of Poland from 1939-1944/45. I am also aware of Hitler's
>>politics of aggression. But this should not prevent us today from having
>>a broader view at the pre war history. To find the thruth about the
>>origins of World War II - if that is ever possible - one has to take
>>all the main actors into account.
>
> If one wishes to go step by step, it is of course necessary to study
> what everybody did, carefully.
I have wondered the impact of the fact that (almost) each country
neighboring Germany had a) much stronger army than the 100 000 men
Weimar Army, b) more or less hostile attitude towards Germany/Austria
(due to pre-WWI situation and/or things that happened during WWI), c)
large ethnic German minorities and d) made some very stupid comments
(like some Polish high ranking officers bragging to their British
and French fellows that the Polish army would be in Berlin within two
week if war would start - however, I am not sure if these words were
ever said...).
I am not saying that it would make the German actions acceptable by
any means, but, I think, that it could have made it easier for Nazis
to get the rest of the nation to support the rearmament and later to
accept starting war.
I think that I understand what Thomas tries to say - there are many
factors that lead to WWII (my opinion is that the major factor was
WWI). However, it does not mean that, e.g., the Poles would have been
responsible for their fate or that the Germans would have been less
guilty. Sometimes it seems to be quite hard for some (most) of the
readers of this newsgroup (and people in general) to understand that
the urge to understand the reasons lead to some historical event does
not mean same as accepting those events.
What comes to Germany and Poland - well, as a Finn, I have no idea
what Poles could have done to avoid their fate. Finland had the same
kind of fate with SU - we did not claim to reach Moscow in few weeks,
we were planning to close the Gulf of Finland together with
Estonians. I guess it pissed the Soviets off as it would have closed
the Red Flag Baltic Navy in Kronstadt. However, the only way to avoid
Winter War would have been either to surrender (and loose 1/4-1/2 of
the population in Siberian slave-labor camps) or to a lift for the
whole population from an UFO to Gamma Taurus 4.
David Thornley
Thomas Bollmeier <TBoll...@web.de> wrote:
>Am Mon, 21 Feb 2005 20:57:19 +0000 schrieb yaakov_macales:
>
>> [...]
>> Yet, everyone realized that Germany had
>> invaded France 3 times in 70 years and had started two world wars
>
>the armies of Napoleon III. lost the opening battles after France had
>declared war on Prussia.
This is off-topic, but the Germans provoked that declaration of war.
Granted, the provocation was miniscule, but the Germans wanted that war.
>The First World War was triggered by the Serbs.
And Austria-Hungary, and Russia, and Germany. Those four countries
had by far the most to do with starting that war.
>And World War II? Hitler's aggressive politics obviously plays a dominant
>role in the prewar history.
Indeed, a decisive role. No European head of state or government
wanted war except for Hitler and Mussolini.
However there were more players in the game:
>Poland that had her dreams of Danzig and Silesia,
Poland wasn't about to start a war.
Stalin's Sovjet Union
>that wanted to provoke a "clash" of the capitalist powers,
No, Stalin wanted peace in the context of collective security. Provoking
a clash between fascists and imperialists was a distinct second choice.
It would be fair to blame Britain for not giving Stalin a chance, but
Stalin did not want a war.
Britain that
>played its "balance of power"-game
Which aimed at a peaceful resolution to European issues. One could
blame Britain for encouraging Hitler for a time, as well as for
rejecting a collective security arrangement with the Soviet Union,
but Britain never pushed anybody to a war.
or Roosevelt's USA that were preparing
>for their role as the world's super power.
>
Huh? Neither Roosevelt nor the US people were planning to become
a superpower, as far as I can tell. If you have any actual credible
references, I'd be interested.
asp...@pacific.net.au
nNOSPAM"@theta1.cft.edu.pl> wrote:
>As Warsaw had practically no air defense, and Luftwaffe used dive
>bombers, they could pick targets at ease. My grandmother's sister died
>in a bombed hospital, with a large Red Cross on its rooftop.
Which probably *was* a warcrime. The Hague Bombardment rules say that,
if buildings are clearly marked (f'rinstance, as Hospitals) they are
*not* to be attacked. Of course, the rider would be "deliberate;y" ...
and proving that would be the problem.
asp...@pacific.net.au
wrote:
>I could see your point if somehow, the Germans had designated certain
>out-of-the-way, non-strategic locations as open cities, to be
>populated only with women, children and the elderly, with none but
>subsistence industries (no war work). Bombing such a target could
>then be considered an immoral act; but clearly, such was not the case
>with Dresden in World War 2.
Such a possibility was suggested at a variety of inter-war conferences
on international law as it related to armed conflict ... but,
according to commentaries on the ICRC website, it was universally
rejected as impractical and impossible in practical terms.
Kari T Seppänen
> By 1941, however, thanks to German and Japanese actions, war had
> become much more cruel. Bombing cities was standard practice by 1944,
>...
>
> The firebombing of those and other cities may have been mistaken,
> unforunate, perhaps even pointless (though I don't see how that could
> possibly be demosntrated), but it was hardly immoral.
Are you saying that retaliation is always moral? Eye for eye, teeth
for teeth?
In a way, I accept some of the German antipartisan actions (there
certainly were many overreactions) as legal and necessary actions of
war - after all, you are supposed to wear an uniform and not to hide
among civilian population to be protected by the laws of war. And, as
far as I know, retaliatory actions against civilians supporting
irregular forces were acceptable according to the international laws
during WWII?
While I accept those actions as legal and necessary in military sense,
I cannot hold them as "moral" actions.
asp...@pacific.net.au
wrote:
Opinions, as opposed to *FACTS* are, sadly, worthless. It doesn't
matter whose opinions they are ... yours, Hitler's or Churchill's ...
or even Bomber Harris's.
The reliance on unsupported personal *opinions* that fly directly in
the face of well established and long understood FACTS is the whole
problem that the Terrorflieger apologists have. And have never
overcome.
Kari T Seppänen
> Also, tell me this: was it a moral act for those same German civilians
> to build the tanks and planes and bombs and bullets that their armies
> had used to conquer and enslave all of Europe? Why do you suggest
> that there should be some special exemption for the makers of weapons
> that does not apply to the wielders?
Would it be morally justified if the Germans would have bolted nerve
gas warheads in V2s? After all - they would have been killing just
the same civilians who were building bombers and bombs that were used
to kill and maim their beloved ones.
> I put it to you: would you order your air forces to bomb cities if it
> meant survival for your nation? If by bombing enemy civilians, you
> could stop your opponent from enslaving and murdering millions of
> people? It's one thing to sit quietly at one's desk and make moral
> judgments on historical figures, it's quite another to be forced to
> deal with the problems that they had to face.
I cannot say what I would do if I had such a choice ("kill 'em all" is
my first thought but fortunately I am not in the position to make such
decisions - however, when I was younger and SU still existed, I
fantacised that, if SU would have conquered Finland, I and my friends
would have captured a large cargo ship transporting fertilizers, pumped
a lot of oil into cargo hold, sailed that ship into the center of
Leningrad and <KABOMMM>...).
I think that we could only consider what Finns have done earlier - we
had a possibility and means to bomb, shell and attack Leningrad (as
well as Murmansk) in WWII but we didn't do it. Why? I think, that it
was quite clear that - eventually - we would have to live next to
large/super power even if our side would have won. That is - like
Germany, SU (or Russia) could have been beaten, but the Russians (like
the Germans) could not have been exterminated... um - that is that you
have to be able to live with them after the war.
> Off topic side note: I don't think you there "in the Old Continent"
> have any claim to the moral high ground, given the facts of recent sad
> events in the Balkans.
We know that messing with Balkans is not necessary very wise... Well -
I think that the main reason was that the EU and other European
countries didn't have coherent idea what to do with the Balkan
crisis. Russia was supporting Serbia and France, if not supporting, at
least understood Serbians quite (too) much. Some countries supported
Slovenia and Croatia because those countries were mainly
Roman-Catholic, some tried to maintain status quo, others though that
every nation has right to independence. Considering these factors -
what we could have done?
David Thornley
in the area and first you say that bombing in that area served no
strategic purpose? At that time, just fouling up the transportation
system in the area would help the Soviets considerably, and the
raid does seem to have done that.
Michele Armellini
news:cvltmt$gqm$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> Cub Driver <war...@mailblocks.com> writes:
> Are you saying that retaliation is always moral? Eye for eye, teeth
> for teeth?
The point was not revenge but ending the war.
And, as
> far as I know, retaliatory actions against civilians supporting
> irregular forces were acceptable according to the international laws
> during WWII?
Sure, if each and every civilian put against a wall and shot had personally
and deliberately supported the irregular forces, in cahoots with the other
civilians. From Convention IV of the Hague, 1907.
Art. 50.
No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the
population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be
regarded as jointly and severally responsible.
In the case of Lidice, for example, each and every inhabitant should have
been an accomplice with the others (jointly and severally) - down to the
kids, mind you, since the Germans sent them to die. An obviously laughable
position.
In general, the Germans just rounded up random hostages and shot them at
will, without even bothering to try and ascertain whether they severally
supported the irregular forces.
See also articles 43, 44, 46, 47 which the Germans as occupiers
systematically violated.
>
> While I accept those actions as legal and necessary in military sense,
> I cannot hold them as "moral" actions.
>
They were neither legal nor moral.
--
Kitchen Man
soc.history.war.world-war-ii, asp...@pacific.net.au wrote msg
<cvj809$f7v$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>:
>On Wed, 23 Feb 2005 16:46:19 +0000 (UTC), Kitchen Man
><nann...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>>On Tue, 22 Feb 2005 16:54:21 +0000 (UTC) in
>>soc.history.war.world-war-ii, asp...@pacific.net.au wrote msg
>><cvfo3t$m35$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>:
>>
>>>On Tue, 22 Feb 2005 05:28:37 +0000 (UTC), Kitchen Man
>>><nann...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>
>>><sigh>
>>>
>>>Was it too hard to find those specific operational orders?
>>
>>As soon as you can convince me why I should expect to find mention of
>>strategic policy in operational orders, that question might become
>>relevant. So far, that's your only point. I crushed it. It's up to
>>you to pop the dents out.
>
>Ah, dodging the issue.
Dodging what issue?
>It is plain. *IF* it was strategic *policy* to terror bomb, *then*
>there would be specific mentions of it in the operational orders.
I don't know what else to say, Phil. Again, I believe that statement of
yours can't be shown to be true. Doesn't matter how many times you say
it, if you can't back it up, it ain't so. I guess that's it, then.
--
http://www.xmission.com/~tiger885/motorbike/NART/nart.html
--