Cairncross on Kursk & Ultra Security
SEN...@argo.rhein-neckar.de
posthume published autobiography he wrote his main contribution was
regarding the battle of Kursk. Prior to operation Zitadelle he gave Ultra
data on Luftwaffe (dislocation ?) to his spy handler "Henry". Near end of
May 1943, well before the actual launch of Zitadelle (5 July), Henry told
him that the Red Airforce achieved a big victory and destroyed 600 aircraft
by help of his Ultra information. For me that sounds like a first strike on
Luftwaffe airfields.
Of what I know about Zitadelle at first I dismissed it. I never heard about
this. Contrary I know about a faild SU first strike hours before Zitadelle.
The SU forces were detected by radar and successful intercepted by German
fighters. So Luftwaffe kept airsuperiority during Zitadelle. But I only know
the German writings about Zitadalle, some much biased. I know that Zitadelle
was delayed several times to get the German tank force better prepared. So
from that perspective it could be that Luftwaffe was ready well before and
got this losses Cairncross mentioned. But is it realy true?
Besides, he mentioned an intersting episode on Ultra security breach I
never heard before:
However, if Montgomery had excessive recourse to ENIGMA, it was in a
good cause. The same could not be said of certain other offenders: one
of the most flagrant lapses in security was committed by General Gatehouse,
who had also played an important part in the crucial battle of El Alamein.
In a talk to the National Press Club in Washington DC, he revealed that the
British had broken the German code. Fortunately, most of the American
journalists did not grasp the significance of his blunder, but it was
forwarded to London by Reuters. Prompt action at both ends resulted in the
leak being suppressed, but Gatehouse's career was blighted, and he was
retired at the early age of fifty-two. Imprudence of this gravity occurred
with horrifying frequency. For instance, an Allied officer, though not
entitled to knowledge of ENIGMA, was initiated into it, and even entered
details in his diary which he carried into battle. Clearly, but for the
unremitting watch kept by Stewart Menzies on the danger, the Germans would
have soon learned that their most sensitive signals were being read by the
Allies, with incalculable effects on the war effort. And so it seems that
ENIGMA was safer in the hands of the security conscious Russians than in
those of all-too-communicative Anglo-Saxons.
(John Cairncross: The Enigma spy, London 1997)
This remarks of Cairncross may be intended to downplay his spy activity.
But it seems that even he was until his death in 9/1995 not aware of the
main break in Ultra security. It was in the US too and such extreme treason
that in hindsight the UK decision to share Ultra with the US may be
questionable.
## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##
David Thornley
<SEN...@argo.rhein-neckar.de> wrote:
>
>Besides, he mentioned an intersting episode on Ultra security breach I
>never heard before:
>
> of the most flagrant lapses in security was committed by General Gatehouse,
>
> British had broken the German code.
This wasn't the only time something like this was done. I don't
remember the details offhand, but IIRC a Chicago journalist published
an article claiming that the US had broken Japanese codes before
the battle of Midway.
> with horrifying frequency. For instance, an Allied officer, though not
> entitled to knowledge of ENIGMA, was initiated into it, and even entered
> details in his diary which he carried into battle.
That's more serious. Wild-sounding claims in press releases are likely
to be taken with some skepticism, but carrying a diary with details
into action was a real, real bad idea.
> unremitting watch kept by Stewart Menzies on the danger, the Germans would
> have soon learned that their most sensitive signals were being read by the
> Allies, with incalculable effects on the war effort.
If they believed it.
During the Battle of the Atlantic, Doenitz started suspecting that the
Allies were reading Enigma traffic. He went to his crypto people, and
they assured him that that was impossible. They gave him another wheel,
which did keep German naval transmissions secure until the Allies
figured out how to break that.
Top Nazis, in particular, seem to have been very adept in believing
what they wanted to believe.
And so it seems that
> ENIGMA was safer in the hands of the security conscious Russians than in
> those of all-too-communicative Anglo-Saxons.
>
>
Any secret was going to be better held by the Soviets than anybody
else. The Soviets went to great lengths not to tell anybody anything.
I've read that the British found out about the IS-2 heavy tank from
the Germans.
>This remarks of Cairncross may be intended to downplay his spy activity.
>But it seems that even he was until his death in 9/1995 not aware of the
>main break in Ultra security.
There was no break in Ultra security. There were a few problems, but
the only real tipoff seems to have been Doenitz getting the feeling
that the British were reading naval transmissions, and that's rather
hard to avoid.
It was in the US too and such extreme treason
>that in hindsight the UK decision to share Ultra with the US may be
>questionable.
>
If the British had a Soviet spy in Bletchley Park, and a general
who'd spill the beans in public, why worry about US security?
It would have been impossible to keep Ultra intelligence away from
Eisenhower, as he would have demanded to find out the source of
the mysterious intelligence his subordinates had. It would have
lost the considerable technical help the US provided, particularly
with the additional rotor on the naval Enigmas, and help from the
US with Japanese codes and ciphers.
The Japanese diplomatic cipher was a good source of information
on the Germans, since the Japanese military observers transmitted
information to Japan in that cipher. (Much like the US observer
in North Africa, sending excellent reports in a code the Germans
had stolen.)
Cooperation was a good idea, and paid off, even if it did increase
the potential number of leaks.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Louis C
> Near end of
> May 1943, well before the actual launch of Zitadelle (5 July), Henry told
> him that the Red Airforce achieved a big victory and destroyed 600 aircraft
> by help of his Ultra information. For me that sounds like a first strike on
> Luftwaffe airfields.
I don't think that anyone ever destroyed 600 aircraft on the ground
against a warned opponent in WWII.
The only instances that I can think of where an air force lost that
amount of aircraft to air attacks were the Soviets in the first days
of Operation Barbarossa, and the Japanese during the late-war USN
sweeps (e.g. over Formosa).
600 planes would represent almost half of the available German planes
in Russia, and I strongly doubt that this would be a hard to find
episode if that many had indeed been destroyed in May.
As far as I can tell, either he got the date wrong in his memoirs and
he means Soviet claims for the battle of Kursk, or the information he
received was mistaken.
> Of what I know about Zitadelle at first I dismissed it. I never heard about
> this. Contrary I know about a faild SU first strike hours before Zitadelle.
> The SU forces were detected by radar and successful intercepted by German
> fighters. So Luftwaffe kept airsuperiority during Zitadelle.
Actually, the Luftwaffe got air superiority *over the southern sector*
and *during the first week or so of Zitadelle*. By July 14, air
superiority was contested over the battlefield as opposed to being
German, with the effect that Soviet AT screens were no longer being
systematically wrecked from the air. That played a part in the
hardening of Soviet resistance, and the fact that Soviet air reserves
were arriving meant that the situation would continue to worsen which
puts Manstein's claim that he could have pushed on in a different
light.
LC
Rich Rostrom
>(Much like the US observer in North Africa, sending
>excellent reports in a code the Germans had stolen.)
That would be Colonel Bonner Fellers, U.S. Military
Attache to the Embassy in Egypt.
The code he used was stolen by _Italian intelligence.
Though one source says that the Germans also broke
the Black Code themselves.
--
| Decapitation is, in most instances, associated |
| with a decline in IQ. |
| |
| -- Professor Raymond Tallis |
William Black
news:AYBZs...@argo.rhein-neckar.de...
>
> This remarks of Cairncross may be intended to downplay his spy activity.
> But it seems that even he was until his death in 9/1995 not aware of the
> main break in Ultra security. It was in the US too and such extreme
> treason
> that in hindsight the UK decision to share Ultra with the US may be
> questionable.
What was that?
The big breach, as far as I'm aware, was giving Philby access to ULTRA.
--
William Black
I've seen things you people wouldn't believe.
Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland
I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate
All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach
Time for tea.
bernardZ
says...
> During the Battle of the Atlantic, Doenitz started suspecting that the
> Allies were reading Enigma traffic. He went to his crypto people, and
> they assured him that that was impossible. They gave him another wheel,
> which did keep German naval transmissions secure until the Allies
> figured out how to break that.
>
> Top Nazis, in particular, seem to have been very adept in believing
> what they wanted to believe.
Is that really something you can blame Doenitz for? He goes to his
experts repeatably and they tell him it is secure. Just in case Doenitz
on his own initiative gets them to add an extra wheel.
What is unbelievable is the German experts would have known that B-
Dienst had cracked the British naval cypher No 3 but somehow they
choice to believe that their own communication was secure.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> posthume published autobiography he wrote his main contribution was
> regarding the battle of Kursk. Prior to operation Zitadelle he gave Ultra
> data on Luftwaffe (dislocation ?) to his spy handler "Henry". Near end of
> May 1943, well before the actual launch of Zitadelle (5 July), Henry told
> him that the Red Airforce achieved a big victory and destroyed 600
> aircraft
> by help of his Ultra information. For me that sounds like a first strike
> on
> Luftwaffe airfields.
This sounds like the attempted first strike and a rather exaggerated
idea of what was achieved. Not to mention crediting Cairncross in
May with supplying a date even the Germans did not know.
Sounds like the agent was being "rewarded", rather than being told
what really happened. Which was the Kursk attack preparations
took so long and were so obvious it was relatively straight forward
to work out where and then when. Hence the air strike.
> Of what I know about Zitadelle at first I dismissed it. I never heard
> about
> this. Contrary I know about a faild SU first strike hours before
> Zitadelle.
Failed presumably means unable to do significant damage to the
Luftwaffe on the ground.
> The SU forces were detected by radar and successful intercepted by German
> fighters. So Luftwaffe kept airsuperiority during Zitadelle.
Try again, the great problem for the Luftwaffe at Kursk was for the
first time it could not achieve air superiority in the east when and
where it wanted. Both air forces were able to intervene in the land
battle, neither dominated the air space.
This was a step backwards for the Wehrmacht but a step forward
for the Soviet forces.
> But I only know
> the German writings about Zitadalle, some much biased. I know that
> Zitadelle
> was delayed several times to get the German tank force better prepared. So
> from that perspective it could be that Luftwaffe was ready well before and
> got this losses Cairncross mentioned. But is it realy true?
Simply put with memoirs like Cairncross you have the maze of lies
of the intelligence world. Even the biographies being used to try and
gain or keep advantages.
The reality is at Kursk the Red Air Force did try for a pre emptive
attack on the Luftwaffe that failed to catch it on the ground, but this
did not hand air superiority to the Luftwaffe.
And the Luftwaffe took a long time to be ready for the attack, it
was not in position in May.
> Besides, he mentioned an intersting episode on Ultra security breach I
> never heard before:
>
> However, if Montgomery had excessive recourse to ENIGMA, it was in a
> good cause. The same could not be said of certain other offenders: one
> of the most flagrant lapses in security was committed by General
> Gatehouse,
> who had also played an important part in the crucial battle of El
> Alamein.
General Alec Gatehouse was in charge of the 10th Armoured Division,
at Alamein where he ran foul of Montgomery
As a result General C W Norman took over command of the 10th
Armoured Division in December 1942.
On the other hand the division did not long survive Alamein as a
front line formation.
> In a talk to the National Press Club in Washington DC, he revealed that
> the
> British had broken the German code. Fortunately, most of the American
> journalists did not grasp the significance of his blunder, but it was
> forwarded to London by Reuters. Prompt action at both ends resulted in
> the
> leak being suppressed, but Gatehouse's career was blighted, and he was
> retired at the early age of fifty-two.
His career was apparently so blighted he was made ADC to the
King in 1946 and served in British embassy to the USSR as well.
Cairncross seems to be basically fitting his "revelation" to a pre
existing set of facts, Montgomery did not like Gatehouse, which
meant Gatehouse was going to be in trouble while Montgomery
was in the army and senior to him.
As for the "code breaking" Gatehouse was too junior to be initiated
into Ultra, he was aware of the raid that destroyed Rommel's radio
intercept unit and the gist of what they were able to do. The British
did crack low level German codes in the desert, just as British low
level codes were cracked, they were meant to be simple to use
systems for quick transmission of information.
> Imprudence of this gravity occurred with horrifying frequency.
Yes Cairncross is busy telling us the allied intelligence service
was bad. How strange a Soviet agent would do that. Perhaps
more than two claimed breaches are needed?
> For instance, an Allied officer, though not
> entitled to knowledge of ENIGMA, was initiated into it, and even entered
> details in his diary which he carried into battle.
I note no name is given here.
> Clearly, but for the
> unremitting watch kept by Stewart Menzies on the danger,
Ah the red flag for a propaganda line, we have found "The Lone
Saviour" (trademark).
> the Germans would
> have soon learned that their most sensitive signals were being read by
> the
> Allies, with incalculable effects on the war effort.
The short answer here is of course the answer is no. One of the
best examples is when Doenitz set up an investigation into whether
the allies had cracked the U-boat codes the investigation seems to
have started from the idea the codes were safe, what was the real
reason. Increases in allied escorts, better radars and direction
finding were good excuses.
> And so it seems that
> ENIGMA was safer in the hands of the security conscious Russians
> than in those of all-too-communicative Anglo-Saxons.
> (John Cairncross: The Enigma spy, London 1997)
Now how about that, a Soviet agent announces his side was better
than the other.
> This remarks of Cairncross may be intended to downplay his spy activity.
Or alternatively keep hitting a British establishment he did not care for,
providing fodder for the conspiracy theory crowd.
> But it seems that even he was until his death in 9/1995 not aware of the
> main break in Ultra security.
Who was not aware of what main break?
> It was in the US too and such extreme treason
> that in hindsight the UK decision to share Ultra with the US may be
> questionable.
Oh yes, the Soviets have always been upset by the Echelon system, the
combined efforts of the various English speaking countries using their
expertise and territory to good effect in the message intercept and code
breaking areas. No wonder Cairncross wants to damage the idea of
them sharing information.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Don Phillipson
news:AYBZs...@argo.rhein-neckar.de...
> John Cairncross was a Soviet spy in the Luftwaffe-Hut in Bletchley. In his
> posthume published autobiography he wrote his main contribution was
> regarding the battle of Kursk. Prior to operation Zitadelle he gave Ultra
> data on Luftwaffe (dislocation ?) to his spy handler "Henry". . . I only
know
> the German writings about Zitadalle, some much biased. I know that
Zitadelle
> was delayed several times to get the German tank force better prepared. So
> from that perspective it could be that Luftwaffe was ready well before and
> got this losses Cairncross mentioned. But is it realy true?
Before assessing, we should need to know exactly what
Enigma information the British government supplied to the
Soviet government preparing for the battle of Kursk. Historians
have told us there was some (ever since 1941 when Churchill
began supplying disguised Enigma information directly to
Stalin, e.g. warning in advance of Barbarossa) but we do not
know exactly what information was provided in 1943. This
is probably still classified. We cannot evaluate Cairncross's
role unless we can compare what he sent with what the
USSR got officially from London. (We recognize one of his
functions as a spy may have been deliberately to duplicate
official information, as a monitor of its suitability for Russian
purposes.)
Cairncross is notable as the "Cambridge spy" who got away
with it. Although suspected as early as approx. 1950, he
continued his career as a bureaucrat in Whitehall up to
pensionable age, when he retired to Italy presumably in
order to attenuate surveillance by MI5.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
lesliem...@netscape.net
(stuff deleted)
> What is unbelievable is the German experts would have known that B-
> Dienst had cracked the British naval cypher No 3 but somehow they
> choice to believe that their own communication was secure.
The British didn't use an Enigma-type cypher; they used a code book
with a "one-pad" offset system. Consequently, the approaches to
breaking them differed slightly, particularly when the Germans had no
knowledge of the British "Bombes", nor how they exploited lax German
procedures.
What I found interesting was the fact the Germans didn't treat the
space as a character, thus allowing the British to be able to guess
the correct words via length. If the Germans coded the space, I
wonder how big a setback Allied decoding would suffer?
Robert Sveinson
news:af29126e-c2da-41f7...@l1g2000hsa.googlegroups.com...
>
> The British didn't use an Enigma-type cypher;
The British had their own version of the Enigma machine.
It was called Typex. It was patterned after the Enigma machine
and they were in a quandry before the war about whether they
would have to pay the patent holder for the use of the machine.
When the war started the point became moot.
Ref: The Right Of The Line by John Terraine
For "code making" read Between Silk and Cyanide by Leo Marks.
Books on Bletchly Park and the code breaking are:
Ultra Goes To War by Ronald Lewin
and
The Battle For The Code by Hugh Sebag-Montrfiore
Enjoy
Robert Sveinson
news:fo6gg1$gsi$1...@registered.motzarella.org...
>
> The big breach, as far as I'm aware, was giving Philby access to ULTRA.
Kim Philby did not have access to ULTRA decrypts. He was a soviet spy
who was attached to SOE, part of SIS (MI-6)
David Thornley
attribute Italian successes to the Germans.
David Thornley
bernardZ <Bern...@nospam.com> wrote:
>In article <13qd27e...@corp.supernews.com>, thor...@visi.com
>says...
>> what they wanted to believe.
>
>Is that really something you can blame Doenitz for?
No; does Doenitz really qualify as a top Nazi?
Doenitz was acting intelligently and rationally. Lots of top Nazis
were not nearly so rational.
He goes to his
>experts repeatably and they tell him it is secure. Just in case Doenitz
>on his own initiative gets them to add an extra wheel.
>
Right. Doenitz was doing things right. Goering didn't, although
the British found it much easier to read Luftwaffe transmissions
than Kriegsmarine.
>What is unbelievable is the German experts would have known that B-
>Dienst had cracked the British naval cypher No 3 but somehow they
>choice to believe that their own communication was secure.
>
Sadly, I find that completely believable.
There are too many experts who are too convinced that they're the
experts, and the most knowledgeable people (just ask them). These
sound like some of them.
Sarah White
news:kiAJKC.A....@sol01.ashbva.gweep.ca...
> Is that really something you can blame Doenitz for? He goes to his
> experts repeatably and they tell him it is secure. Just in case Doenitz
> on his own initiative gets them to add an extra wheel.
One of the ways to find out whether the code was broken - was to issue a
series of fake orders and see whether the enemy does something about them.
It seems the Axis did none of these counter-measures - which seems to
indicate a major flaw in their intelligence.
bernardZ
says...
> >What is unbelievable is the German experts would have known that B-
> >Dienst had cracked the British naval cypher No 3 but somehow they
> >choice to believe that their own communication was secure.
> >
> Sadly, I find that completely believable.
>
> There are too many experts who are too convinced that they're the
> experts, and the most knowledgeable people (just ask them). These
> sound like some of them.
In his book "War beneath the sea by Peter Padfield" it states p166 when
the German experts were asked
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
the possibility of a break in the U-boat cipher had been discounted time
after time by the expert cryptologists, and a recent extended
investigation led by the signals expert Rear-Admiral Erhard Martens had
led to the same conclusion. Mathematically, the Enigma M-3 cipher was
safe. Moreover, even if the enemy had captured some papers, so it was
argued, the safeguards built into the procedure for establishing the
message key meant that besides the tables of rotor settings, which were
changed each month, they would also need the indicators' list and bigram
tables, which were also changed from time to time. The idea that the
enemy could have seized all three elements of the cipher system as well
as the eight different rotors, and could continue to do so each month as
the tables were changed was rejected. This response of the cryptologists
and communications branch of the Naval Staff showed some lack of
imagination; they failed to envisage the scale of effort the British
would put into seizing the keys, or the speed and sophistication of the
machines they would develop to crack new settings, or the possibility of
access via more easily readable codes like 'Dockyard' duplicating some
messages, or by the recognition of often repeated forms of signal. No
doubt they also suffered from the experts' disease of infallibility
which had afflicted the torpedo department earlier, and was to show up
again in the US Navy's torpedo establishment.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Andrew Clark
> No; does Doenitz really qualify as a top Nazi?
Certainly. He was ideologically committed to Nazism, an exterminist
anti-Semite and a personal follower of Hitler. He was also a 'honorary'
member of the NSDAP and owed his position to Nazi influence over the armed
forces.
William Black
news:47a84eef$0$10313$afc3...@news.optusnet.com.au...
> One of the ways to find out whether the code was broken - was to issue a
> series of fake orders and see whether the enemy does something about them.
>
> It seems the Axis did none of these counter-measures - which seems to
> indicate a major flaw in their intelligence.
>
It's known as 'slipping in a marked fiver'.
If you get it wrong not only do your cypher systems remain compromised, you
are convinced you're safe.
It worked at Midway and people are still talking about it.
SEN...@argo.rhein-neckar.de
>> main break in Ultra security.
>
>Who was not aware of what main break?
>
>> It was in the US too and such extreme treason
>> that in hindsight the UK decision to share Ultra with the US may be
>> questionable.
>
>Oh yes, the Soviets have always been upset by the Echelon system, the
>combined efforts of the various English speaking countries using their
>expertise and territory to good effect in the message intercept and code
>breaking areas. No wonder Cairncross wants to damage the idea of
>them sharing information.
>
>Geoffrey Sinclair
That break was not known by Cairncross as I wrote. I got it not from
his book but elesewhere. As others here were not aware of it too I will
dig my notes and present it here. But in another thread as it is in no
relation with Cairncross or Kursk.
Further, about your Echelon remark, let me be clear that I`m in no way
Soviet related our with any agenda you intimated. Quite far from it.
I came uppon the book because of its subtitle: "The Story of the Man
Who Changed the Course of World War Two." That seems inserted by his
family because there is no such claim in the book by Cairncross himself.
I noted that regarding Kursk Cairncross mentioned the UK intel liason
in the Moscow embassy and another Soviet Ultra spy, Leo Long of MI14.
But this sources gave no raw material like he gave in considerable
ammount. But he did nowhere mentioned Rudolf Rösler (sp?), known
as "Lucy" and his source "Werther". He was since the 1950s known as
the main source for SU intel on Kursk - at least in Germany. As far as
I know, the iddentity of "Werther", a source inside Germany, was never
reveald.
David Thornley
Andrew Clark <acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote:
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote
>
>> No; does Doenitz really qualify as a top Nazi?
>
>Certainly. He was ideologically committed to Nazism, an exterminist
>anti-Semite and a personal follower of Hitler.
I'm not claiming he wasn't a Nazi, and in some respects an unusually
competent one, but whether he was really a "top" Nazi before 1945.
The Kriegsmarine was not a particularly prestigious organization.
He was also a 'honorary'
>member of the NSDAP and owed his position to Nazi influence over the armed
>forces.
>
And had some influence with Hitler, and of course had no compunctions
about whatever evil the Nazis were up to. I'm just not sure he comes
into the same class as Goering and Goebbels, et al.
William Black
news:AYG4p...@argo.rhein-neckar.de...
But he did nowhere mentioned Rudolf Rösler (sp?), known
> as "Lucy" and his source "Werther". He was since the 1950s known as
> the main source for SU intel on Kursk - at least in Germany. As far as
> I know, the iddentity of "Werther", a source inside Germany, was never
> reveald.
>
It has been suggested that 'Werther' never existed.
The whole thing may well have been a British operation to feed ULTRA
information to Stalin in a way that he would find acceptable.
Research after the war seems to indicate that no single member of the German
staff had access to all the information that was passed, but that certainly
most, if not all of it was available from ULTRA intercepts.
The conditions laid down by Roessler to the Soviets, and the treatment of
Foote after his return to the UK, certainly seems to indicate that something
odd was going on.
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:AYG4p...@argo.rhein-neckar.de...
>>> But it seems that even he was until his death in 9/1995 not aware of the
>>> main break in Ultra security.
>>
>>Who was not aware of what main break?
> That break was not known by Cairncross as I wrote. I got it not from
> his book but elesewhere. As others here were not aware of it too I will
> dig my notes and present it here.
It would be good to present it, even the basic outline would
be nice, like when and where.
>But in another thread as it is in no
> relation with Cairncross or Kursk.
So please present it.
>>> It was in the US too and such extreme treason
>>> that in hindsight the UK decision to share Ultra with the US may be
>>> questionable.
>>
>>Oh yes, the Soviets have always been upset by the Echelon system, the
>>combined efforts of the various English speaking countries using their
>>expertise and territory to good effect in the message intercept and code
>>breaking areas. No wonder Cairncross wants to damage the idea of
>>them sharing information.
Firstly I presume agreement on everything else that was deleted
from the reply.
> Further, about your Echelon remark, let me be clear that I`m in no way
> Soviet related our with any agenda you intimated. Quite far from it.
Tell me something, how does
"No wonder Cairncross wants to damage the idea of them sharing
information."
become
"No wonder Seneca wants to damage the idea of them sharing
information."
You were reporting the claims of Cairncross, and I was replying
to those claims.
> I came uppon the book because of its subtitle: "The Story of the Man
> Who Changed the Course of World War Two." That seems inserted by his
> family because there is no such claim in the book by Cairncross himself.
So the sub title alone is another clue about motivations and possible
sensationalising of the information. The family, as reported, seem to
have wanted a major impact.
> I noted that regarding Kursk Cairncross mentioned the UK intel liason
> in the Moscow embassy and another Soviet Ultra spy, Leo Long of MI14.
So it is not Cairncross alone.
> But this sources gave no raw material like he gave in considerable
> ammount.
As opposed to providing summaries and having the usual effect,
people are likely to believe a conversation they overheard about
them as more true than one in which they participated.
>But he did nowhere mentioned Rudolf Rösler (sp?), known
> as "Lucy" and his source "Werther". He was since the 1950s known as
> the main source for SU intel on Kursk - at least in Germany. As far as
> I know, the iddentity of "Werther", a source inside Germany, was never
> reveald.
I suggest some simple searches on the web for the Lucy etc. ring.
It would help putting the Cairncross claims in perspective.
SEN...@argo.rhein-neckar.de
> > as "Lucy" and his source "Werther". He was since the 1950s known as
> > the main source for SU intel on Kursk - at least in Germany. As far as
> > I know, the iddentity of "Werther", a source inside Germany, was never
> > reveald.
> >
>
> It has been suggested that 'Werther' never existed.
>
> The whole thing may well have been a British operation to feed ULTRA
> information to Stalin in a way that he would find acceptable.
>
> Research after the war seems to indicate that no single member of the German
> staff had access to all the information that was passed, but that certainly
> most, if not all of it was available from ULTRA intercepts.
>
> The conditions laid down by Roessler to the Soviets, and the treatment of
> Foote after his return to the UK, certainly seems to indicate that something
> odd was going on.
>
> --
> William Black
Yes, even at lot of odd I see too. I heard such speculation about an Ultra
link quite some time ago. A leading person from Bletchley denied it with
emphazise. But this speculation had some base. In 1944 German counter
intelligence was able read some messages of "Lucy". From that they assumed
"Werther" may rather be a technical source or a person with access to top
secret radio/wire communication.
Now, I strongly doubt the UK would feed amounts of Ultra info to a German /
Swiss spy network. Even in a concealed way the risk seems just to high. I
heard that in the 1970s the CIA was still in search of traces and links of
"Rote Kapelle", the big SU spynet of WWII what Lucy was part of. They
thought there were still active parts of it. Lucy himself was active against
NATO in the 1950s and got caught. In the 1990s some revelations came up that
indeed some persons of Rote Kapelle went undetected in Germany.
And, strangely, at least one person of the Berlin section of Rote Kapelle
had at least for some time a link with OSS or tried to get one. But most
interesting was the revelation that Rote Kapelle had for some time a spy
in the cipher section of Army High Command (OKH). You see, there are a lot
of faint links without solid prove anywhere. At least one thing is certain -
the last book of espionage in WWII is still not written yet.
William Black
news:AYKGx...@argo.rhein-neckar.de...
> Yes, even at lot of odd I see too. I heard such speculation about an Ultra
> link quite some time ago. A leading person from Bletchley denied it with
> emphazise.
It's very doubtful the people at Bletchley would have been told.
Such an operation would be run by a very few people at MI-6 with political
authorisation being of the 'Would you object if ULTRA information was fed to
Stallin in a form he'd accept without compromising the source Prime
Minister?'
Churchill wouldn't have been informed of the mechanism.
> Now, I strongly doubt the UK would feed amounts of Ultra info to a German
> /
> Swiss spy network. Even in a concealed way the risk seems just to high. I
> heard that in the 1970s the CIA was still in search of traces and links of
> "Rote Kapelle", the big SU spynet of WWII what Lucy was part of. They
> thought there were still active parts of it. Lucy himself was active
> against
> NATO in the 1950s and got caught. In the 1990s some revelations came up
> that
> indeed some persons of Rote Kapelle went undetected in Germany.
What actually constituted the different parts of the Rote Kapelle is still a
matter of some decate.
Parts of the huge powerful networks organised and run by Trepper certainly
survived the war, but the rather pathetic gang of students and youngsters
the East Germans later chose to turn into saints seem to ahve all come to
very sticky ends.
Where they all fit together, along with 'Lucy' and 'Dora' and the rather
odd Foote is still something of a mystery.
They certainly plug into three different organisations of the Communist
Party and the Soviet Union.
I assume that one day the various organisations will release their files,
but I doubt it will be in our lifetimes.
Andrew Clark
> I'm not claiming he wasn't a Nazi, and in some respects an unusually
> competent one, but whether he was really a "top" Nazi before 1945.
> The Kriegsmarine was not a particularly prestigious organization.
It was one of the three armed forces and Doenitz was one of the three
commanders-in-chief. That can't be translated into less than a top
management position.
> And had some influence with Hitler, and of course had no compunctions
> about whatever evil the Nazis were up to. I'm just not sure he comes
> into the same class as Goering and Goebbels, et al.
There isn;t a lot of practical difference, IMO. Goering, after all, was
against the Holocaust for practical reasons after the mid-war...
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk (Andrew Clark) wrote:
> It was one of the three armed forces and Doenitz was one of the three
> commanders-in-chief. That can't be translated into less than a top
> management position
Doenitz was commander of the submarine force in 1939, Raeder was C in
C. It was the comparative failure of the surface fleet that got Doenitz
the top post not his contacts with the Nazi party. Dates matter here.
Ken Young
Andrew Clark
> Doenitz was commander of the submarine force in 1939, Raeder was C in
> C. It was the comparative failure of the surface fleet that got Doenitz
> the top post not his contacts with the Nazi party. Dates matter here.
Indeed they do, and thank you for pointing this out. However, the previous
discussion was not date-limited, and commander of the U-boat arm is still a
very important military command position.
Doenitz's political soundness (read doglike devotion to Hitler and his Nazi
policies) was a prerequisite to his being appointed C-in-C KM, not a bonus.
Only a small handful of the German senior military commanders in WW2 were
not Nazis, and none by the late war.
Andrew Clark
> Such an operation would be run by a very few people at MI-6 with political
> authorisation being of the 'Would you object if ULTRA information was fed
> to Stallin in a form he'd accept without compromising the source Prime
> Minister?'
> Churchill wouldn't have been informed of the mechanism.
This is contradicted by everything we do know about ULTRA in WW2 (and there
are very few files still restricted).
We know Churchill took personal control over ULTRA security and the
relationship with Stalin, so the idea that SIS organised this matter without
Churchill being closely and personally involved is very unlikely indeed.
SEN...@argo.rhein-neckar.de
>Foote after his return to the UK, certainly seems to indicate that
>something odd was going on.
>
>--
>William Black
I was aware of Foote but I never read his book. I had no interest to
read a "Handbook for Spies" ;) But maybe you or someone can comment on
a text I found in the web about it. Its a book review and that book
may be the main english source of the Werther-Ultra link. I heard of
this link before in Germany in the 1970s. The text is on a french website
but written in english. I dont know its author but he seems knowledgable:
Read, Anthony. Fisher, David: Operation Lucy: Most Secret Spy Ring of
the Second World War Hodder and Stoughton, London - 1980.
By 1980 the notion of a British link to LUCY would be further investigated
by the two English TV writers, Anthony Read & David Fisher, with the
publication of their book "Operation Lucy". Their angle was through one
of Roessler's W/T operators - the English expatriate communist who had
fought with the International Brigade in Spain, Alexander Foote.
Unfortunately, the weak link in their argument was that both Foote and
his supposed contact at MI6, Colonel (Sir) Claude Dansey, were both long
dead by the time they concocted their hypothesis, and Read & Fisher had
only circumstantial evidence with which to prove their assertion that
Foote, through Dansey, fed LUCY, and thus Moscow, with selective ULTRA
intercept information; thereby claiming that the main Soviet espionage
network in Switzerland during the war was, for all intents and purposes,
a mere puppet of Hut 3, Bletchley Park.
(This of course does not explain the (ignored) dispatches from LUCY from
as early as 1939 [well before ULTRA] fed gratuitously to the Western
European powers concerning German offensive intentions - furtively passed
on by Swiss Intelligence to the appropriate attache's at the Embassy
level.)
Possibly some form of British nationalistic conceit altered the
journalistsÆ accuracy: there is no doubt that Ultra rendered
incalculable services but it cannot explain every aspect of the
secret war. According to West's deconstruction, Foote's less than
savory treatment by MI5 in their post-war de-briefing of him, and their
manipulation of his purported biography called "Handbook for Spies"
(1949)*, belies any sort of MI6 allegiance or involvement with the
hapless English Bolshevik, who would later die in relative ignominy in
the late '50's.
According to West, Bletchley insiders closely associated with Col.
Dansey, refuted any connection with Foote and operations in Switzerland
during the war. So, while Read & Fisher's hypothesis is never once
confirmed- it stands, without confirmation, as unfounded speculation.
*(It was actually no more than a dimly-editorialized version of Foote's
MI5 interrogation filled with easily refutable inaccuracies - one
especially glaring that LUCY was actually a Czech named Selzinger!)
The mentioned book by West seems:
West, Nigel & Muller, Marcia. A Thread of Deceit: Espionage Myths of
WWII. Random House, New York - 1985. Chapter titled "Who Was WERTHER?"
SEN...@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Unfortunately I have no access to JSTOR.
Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle': Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk, 1943
Timothy P. Mulligan
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 22, No. 2, Intelligence Services
during the Second World War (Apr., 1987), pp. 235-260
This article consists of 26 page(s).
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0094(198704)22%3A2%3C235%3ASCA'IA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z