What is the feasibility of a Japanese invasion of northern Australia?
Group Captain Lionel Mandrake
in 1942?
There might be the I Corps under Eichelberger or something American
there.
MacArthur had his forward HQ there for a while. The RAAF doesn't
stand much of
a chance if the IJNAF gains air superiority. Australia wasn't well
populated
back then, probably some 10 million. Most of its military in Africa
fighting
the Korps. Then again, logistics might be like a rubberman holding
two freight
cars together from running down a hill: too long and burdened. The
military is
running on low on the offensive gas and starts to feeling the sting of
American
military might by Guadalcanal. Oh, well.
Regards,
Tom
Phillip McGregor
>What is the feasibility of a Japanese invasion of northern Australia in 1942?
A snowball would have had a better chance in Hell.
The Japanese could have landed some troops ... not very many, perhaps
a couple of Regiments, maybe a Division, at best ... but *supplying*
them would have been impossible.
The Japanese logistic situation was disastrous from Day #1 of the
Pacific War, and went downhill from there.
It would have been a race to see whether the troops they landed
starved in the rainforests of Cape York or died of tropical diseases.
At the time, Australia had several Divisions of Militia ... lacking
much of their heavy equipment ... which were, in reality, Regular Army
units (composed of conscripts) that, because of a quirk in Australian
history, were not (theoretically) usable for combat outside of
Australia (the 2nd AIF - all Volunteers, many of them ex-Militia, were
for that). These units, when committed to combat in New Guinea in the
absence of any AIF units and in the face of the Japanese invasion
there, performed *extremely* well, outperforming the US Divisions
committed there, and doing at least as well (and in many cases,
better) than the 2nd AIF troops returning from the Middle East.
So, there was no shortage of troops ... in the face of any
realistically possible Japanese "invasion" force.
The best the Japs could have done would have been to die slowly and
cause a general nuisance.
>There might be the I Corps under Eichelberger or something American there.
>MacArthur had his forward HQ there for a while. The RAAF doesn't stand much of
>a chance if the IJNAF gains air superiority. Australia wasn't well populated
Unfortunately, again, for logistical reasons, the IJN is simply not
going to gain air superiority.
>back then, probably some 10 million. Most of its military in Africa fighting
About 7-8 million, IIRC/
>the Korps. Then again, logistics might be like a rubberman holding two freight
See above. At the height of the war (1943/44) there were some 14
Militia Divisions in Oz, including an Armoured Division.
In 1942 there were 6-8, IIRC.
>cars together from running down a hill: too long and burdened. The military is
>running on low on the offensive gas and starts to feeling the sting of American
>military might by Guadalcanal. Oh, well.
Logistics is the key. The Japs simply don't have it.
Phil
Dave Gower
"Group Captain Lionel Mandrake" <blue...@aol.comfaber> wrote in message
news:3ae5d2f6...@news.pacific.net.au...
> What is the feasibility of a Japanese invasion of northern Australia
> in 1942?
In addition to Phillip's reply one might add that even if the Japanese had
managed to establish a presence in Northern Australia, their tenure would
have been limited to the time it took for the first Sherman tanks to arrive
from the U.S. Although we tend to think of them as medium-performance
machines (in comparison to Tigers for example), in the Pacific war they were
giants. The Japanese had nothing to rival them, and only limited ability to
defend against them. Operating in the open north country, they would have
quickly driven any Japanese troops into the coastal jungles.
Shermans were arriving in North Africa by the Fall of 1942, so could have
been sent to OZ in that time frame.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Group Captain Lionel Mandrake wrote in message
<3ae5d2f6...@news.pacific.net.au>...
>What is the feasibility of a Japanese invasion of northern Australia
>in 1942?
This would presumably be after a Japanese win at Coral
Sea and Midway. If they had such an invasion capability
why not try for Pearl harbour or even the US west coast,
better targets and a win is much more likely to help the
war effort.
Invading something like Darwin in say August obtains
a minor port and a road leading south. Some 2,000
miles later you hit Adelaide. In between is lots of
spectacular desert. The Japanese would be walking
or bicycling, the Australians would have the desert
experience and any short delay means high summer.
And Japan would have secured the Solomons and
Fiji to guard the flank first, as was planned historically.
The Japanese were very deficient in the firepower
needed for open terrain.
The Darwin garrison was around 6,600 men in
December 1941.
Given the usual standard of Japanese logistics the
result would make the efforts of some of the early
non aboriginal explorers look positively competant.
>There might be the I Corps under Eichelberger or
>something American there. MacArthur had his
>forward HQ there for a while.
In April 1942 1 and 1/3 AIF divisions had returned
(46,000 men) plus 63,000 AIF men that had not
yet been out of Australia, plus 280,000 militia. The
US Army was around 25,000. There were a nominal
8 infantry divisions (1 US) 2 Motor divisions and
1 Armoured divisions plus detatched brigades. A
Second US infantry division was on the way.
>The RAAF doesn't stand much of a chance if the
>IJNAF gains air superiority.
Using all 6 carriers yes, but they cannot stay on station
long enough, instead look at the small number of aircraft
the Japanese committed to New Guinea and maybe Rabaul.
>Australia wasn't well populated
>back then, probably some 10 million.
7 Million
>Most of its military in Africa fighting the Korps.
Not quite, the Australian divisions (and New Zealand
divisions and maybe Canadian divisions) that served
in Europe were composed of volunteers. Australian
conscripts went into the militia, three divisions of which
ultimately fought in New Guinea, backed by the three
AIF formations. New Guinea malaria was a factor in
the size of the Australian army.
>Then again, logistics might be like a rubberman holding
>two freight cars together from running down a hill: too long
>and burdened.
Historically this is what happened. At the time the number
of invasions the Japanese launched and the apparently
small amount of shipping needed made the allies think the
Japanese had found a way to more efficiently launch
invasions. Hence the overestimates (plus the hysteria).
Much of the shipping the Japanese used in the intial
offensives had to be returned to civilian use as quickly
as possible for example.
>The military is running on low on the offensive gas and
>starts to feeling the sting of American
>military might by Guadalcanal. Oh, well.
If Australia is invaded it is after the USN has been
heavily defeated and after the flank is secured,
Fiji taken for example.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
John Lansford
>This would presumably be after a Japanese win at Coral
>Sea and Midway. If they had such an invasion capability
>why not try for Pearl harbour or even the US west coast,
>better targets and a win is much more likely to help the
>war effort.
Invading Australia was more feasible than invading Hawaii, and
certainly much more possible than invading the West Coast. The IJN
didn't have the logistics capability to mount a three division
invasion of Hawaii without stopping every other operation they had
going in early 1942, including getting the Dutch oilfields back in
operation. The Japanese high command did speculate about the
possibility of landing troops in northern Australia, but to what
purpose? They could neutralize the airfields that were capable of
bombing Rabaul, but not much else. This operation would quickly become
a sink for both troops and shipping as well.
>Invading something like Darwin in say August obtains
>a minor port and a road leading south. Some 2,000
>miles later you hit Adelaide. In between is lots of
>spectacular desert. The Japanese would be walking
>or bicycling, the Australians would have the desert
>experience and any short delay means high summer.
>And Japan would have secured the Solomons and
>Fiji to guard the flank first, as was planned historically.
An invasion of Darwin gains the Japanese nothing except a useless port
and a massive drain on their logistics capability. Their ground troops
would rapidly find themselves bottled up just outside the city by
Australian ground troops called back from the Mediterreanean, complete
with armor.
>Using all 6 carriers yes, but they cannot stay on station
>long enough, instead look at the small number of aircraft
>the Japanese committed to New Guinea and maybe Rabaul.
The Japanese would still have to keep planes on New Guinea and Rabaul
to guard the eastern approaches. They would also need planes at Darwin
and the islands north of Australia to protect their shipping lanes,
port and troops. More draining of their slender resources.
A better strategy would have been to invade both Rabaul and Port
Moresby simultaneously instead of sending the entire Combined Fleet to
cover the Rabaul invasion force. Port Moresby wasn't heavily defended
initially and could have been taken fairly quickly. Alternatively, a
landing in the southern Solomon Islands at the same time as the Rabaul
operation gains them a forward airbase capable of forcing the supply
lines to Australia further to the south.
>If Australia is invaded it is after the USN has been
>heavily defeated and after the flank is secured,
>Fiji taken for example.
That wasn't the plan. After Rabaul was taken the IJN planners
considered assaulting Port Moresby and Australia. Their problem was
they waited too long by sending the carriers to hit Darwin (a useless
operation) and then into the Indian Ocean (successful, but not
necessary). By the time the carriers were ready to deploy again, the
Allies had recovered and the Coral Sea battle took place, and then
Guadalcanal.
John Lansford
The unofficial I-26 Construction Webpage:
http://users.vnet.net/lansford/a10/
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