Turning Point of East: Stalingrad or Kursk? (from both political military of view)
LustyI3oy
whenever i read books about russo-german war 1041~45, i always being told that
battle of stalingrad was the turning point of eastern front. the mighty
wehrmacht suffered its biggest defeat since the war. but indeed germans lost
their greatest battle not in stalingrad but 1 year later at the slient of
kursk. that battle not only cost germany's panzer reserve in th east but also
gave the soviet the stratagical initialtive to conduct the rest of war. so my
question is: which battle has more significant place in the history? and how
come stalingrad given more famous status by historians than kursk?
Gregory J Cebelinski
In a previous article, lust...@aol.com (LustyI3oy) says:
>gave the soviet the stratagical initialtive to conduct the rest of war. so my
>question is: which battle has more significant place in the history? and how
>come stalingrad given more famous status by historians than kursk?
Hmm, I think that Stalingrad was the more significant battle. It marked
a change in the entire philosophy of the German General Staff. From this
point on, the Germans were primarily on the defensive in the East. The
Germans did conduct a fantastic offensive maneuvre to re-capture Kharkov.
Basically, the Germans were pushed into a defensive state of mind.
Stalingrad was also important in a psychological way. It showed the
world that Germany could be stopped cold. This feeling is like seeing
the class bully getting his lunch. Others start to say that this is not
impossible. There are ways to beat Germany. Psychologically, this was
also damaging to the German foot soldier. Defeat is not lost on the
loser of a battle. Questions arise, in both purpose and ability.
Stalingrad is 'romaticized' because of the nature of the battle, a group of
soldiers completely cut-off from supplies and relief. Due to the length
of the battle, Nov 19th to Feb 3rd, suspense was constantly building.
Plus, there seems to be greater amount of information about the human
factor of the battle. The Hoffmann (I hope I am spelling his name
correctly) letters give great insight to the thoughts of the average
German soldier. The early fall letters, telling his wife that he may be
home for xmas. The late fall letters, describing the desperation of the
situation. Implying that the Russians used 'gangster methods'. The most
illuminating piece of information about that battle may be the paragraph
about the nights in Stalingrad. You know the piece, about the dogs
jumping onto the Volga to escape the violence. Something to the tune of
'the hardest stones cannot withstand it, only men endure'. [Sorry, about
the butchering of the quote, but I think that this written blurp sums up
the entire battle for Stalingrad.] The relief efforts, it goes on and on.
That is why Stalingrad gets the 'pub'. It is something that will always
endure in the history books in terms of determination and sacrifice. [To
those Russophiles out there, the Soviets did a great job. They showed
courage (they always did this) and the showed discipline. If an order
was passed down from STAVKA, the officers at the front didn't panic.
They stuck to the plan. This was truly a maturation process for the
Soviets.]
It should be noted that after the capitulation of the troops in the
Stalingrad pocket, Hitler seemed to give a little. From this point to
the beginning of the battle for Kursk, the German seemed to recover from
their crisis. This was due to the abilities of two men, Guderian and
Manstein. Both knew that the war out East was a war of defensive maneuvre.
Guderian was building up the panzer arm, and Manstein was busy saving
Army Group A as well as re-capturing Kharkov. Unfortunately for the
Germans, and fortunately for the Soviets these men didn't exercise
complete control for long.
Bob Tiernan
On 16 Jan 1998, LustyI3oy wrote:
> whenever i read books about russo-german war 1041~45, i always being told
> that battle of stalingrad was the turning point of eastern front. the
> mighty wehrmacht suffered its biggest defeat since the war. but indeed
> germans lost their greatest battle not in stalingrad but 1 year later at
> the slient of kursk.
Well, there's one school of thought (that I agree with) which has
it that Kursk was the turning point because despite Stalingrad,
the Germans showed with the Kursk offensive that they had the
initiative, or at least the confidence to take their turn at it,
and after Kursk they never really had the initiative at all.
Sounds more like a turning point to me than Stalingrad, tho'
that was a major first step in the process.
Bob T.
M E Rapier
In article <69ma6s$his$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>, lust...@aol.com says...
>whenever i read books about russo-german war 1041~45, i always being told
{snip}
>question is: which battle has more significant place in the history? and how
>come stalingrad given more famous status by historians than kursk?
Some more recent authors have argued that the turning point of the War in the
East was the failure of Typhoon and that the German effectively lost the war
in 1941. More specifically, the battles in the Yelnia salient so weakened Army
Group Centre that Typhoon could not have succeeded, so the Germans lost the
war in August 1941! A bit far fetched IMHO.
Both Stalingrad and Kursk are significant in their own way - Stalingrad being
the final nail in the coffin of any hopes of German victory, as well as being
the first time an entire German Army had been forced to surrender. Kursk
obviosuly spelt ruin for the painstakingly rebuilt PanzerWaffe, but whether at
that point he Germans had any chance of achieving a stalemate (let alone a
victory) on the Eastern Front or were doomed to defeat whatever they did is a
matter of conjecture. Manstein of course thought he could have stabilised the
front with the units destroyed at Kursk, but whether he really could have, I
don't know.
I guess a shattering defeat and undeniable capture of hundreds of thousands of
men made more impact in the West than an offensive which was called off after
a few days and whose long term effects were not so obvious.
Cheers.
Martin.
--
Martin Rapier, Database Administrator
Corporate Information & Computing Services.
University of Sheffield Tel 0114 222 1137
http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/
TiborVari
One can argue that once the battle of Moscow was over during the winter of
41/42 that Germany could no longer win in the east. 1941 was a throw the dice
affair for the Germans who were quite confident they could take the Russians
out before the winter arrived.
The 1942 campaign culminating in Stalingrad could be termed the turning point
in that the Russians now knew they were not going to lose the war both
politically and from a military viewpoint. Kursk not only reinforced that
view, but moved the confidence level for the Russians to where they knew they
were going to win (not just survive), now that the initiative had turned to
them. The rest of the war in the east moved to the beat of Russian dictates.
Even if Germany won the battle of Kursk. What could the Germans have done?
March towards Moscow? Not likely, the Russians launched massive assaults after
the battle that ended up with the Germans virtually pushed out of the Ukraine.
This even though they suffered massive losses.
Russia would still have won the war if they lost Kursk. Coupled with lend
lease, they simply outproduced the Germans by vast quantities in weapons, men,
and supply. They simply would have taken longer to achieve it and the western
allies might have linked up with them somewhere in Poland. By 1943, the issue
was over for the Germans. It was just simply a matter of time and body count
cost.
Personally, I think the turning point in the East was when Hitler sent the
panzers to encircle Kiev in the summer of 41. After that, there was no real
chance for the Germans to take Moscow (despite coming damn close), before the
mud, snow, and Siberian reserves stopped them cold. Had Army Group Center
stopped to regroup after Smolensk in July for a couple of weeks. Then pushed
forward towards Moscow in early August (vs October). Germany might have had a
chance to win in the East if Moscow could have been captured. Remember,
Germany was geared to fighting lightning short duration wars. She did not even
adopt a war economy till after Stalingrad. By then it was way too late. The
combined economies of the west and the Soviets would have buried Germany in a
war of attrition as they did. The only question after 41 was how long it was
going to take and at what cost.
Tibor Vari
VP Technology
Coalition Web Inc (MagWeb)
www.magweb.com
Where Military History Meets the Web!
Barry, Jon A.
In article <69ma6s$his$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>, lust...@aol.com (LustyI3oy) writes:
>whenever i read books about russo-german war 1041~45, i always being told that
>battle of stalingrad was the turning point of eastern front. the mighty
>wehrmacht suffered its biggest defeat since the war. but indeed germans lost
>their greatest battle not in stalingrad but 1 year later at the slient of
>kursk. that battle not only cost germany's panzer reserve in th east but also
>gave the soviet the stratagical initialtive to conduct the rest of war. so my
>question is: which battle has more significant place in the history? and how
>come stalingrad given more famous status by historians than kursk?
>
The key words here are "turning point". There may be many turning points
in a war but in the definitive sense it is where it became clear that one
side or the other would either win or not win a crucial campaign or war.
Given the information that we have now it was not clear who would come out
on top on the eastern front until Stalingrad. After Stalingrad it is
generally accepted that Soviet Union would not fall to the German Invasion
because now it was a matter of bringing the greater Soviet industrial and
manpower resourses to bear. Some might even make a case that the
initiative switched during the winter of 41-42 but I don't think it's as
clear as after Stalingrad. Kursk didn't have the same high stakes. A
German success at Kursk would only have bought a little time.
- Jon
Alan Wilson
On 16 Jan 1998 00:38:52 GMT, lust...@aol.com (LustyI3oy) wrote:
>whenever i read books about russo-german war 1041~45, i always being told that
>battle of stalingrad was the turning point of eastern front. the mighty
>wehrmacht suffered its biggest defeat since the war. but indeed germans lost
>their greatest battle not in stalingrad but 1 year later at the slient of
>kursk. that battle not only cost germany's panzer reserve in th east but also
>gave the soviet the stratagical initialtive to conduct the rest of war. so my
>question is: which battle has more significant place in the history? and how
>come stalingrad given more famous status by historians than kursk?
Well, I guess I just have to join in this one:
Much as I would like to be able to say "Kursk", I have to take the
view that each one was another nail in the coffin. Without any one of
the major German defeats (including Stalingrad and Kursk), the war in
the East would have lasted a bit longer.
You could start with the halting of the Germans outside Moscow in the
winter of 41/42 if you liked - that was the first time anyone actually
stopped them going where they wanted to in the war.
You would have to add in all sorts of situations - the destruction of
Army Group Centre in '44, the defeat(s) in the Kuban - take your pick.
Stalingrad gets a lot of the publicity now because it did then. Kursk
didn't - I don't know why - maybe because BOTH sides took huge losses.
Who knows ?
On that point - does anyone have any press material from the time to
compare ?
Alan Wilson
The Kursk Website: http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/avenue/vy75/
KWeiler854
The German's defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943 was more than just a lost
battle. For in this one engagement the Ost Heer lost some of it's best units
and leaders. Not only that; remove 220,000 to 330,000 (depending on whose
estimates your using) from an Army that was ALREADY streached thin on this
largest of frontages and you truly have the makings of a serious ability to
wage war. Germany was no Russia, United States or China; take away that many
top flight soldiers from a nation of only 87 million and they stay gone. It
was one of the top reasons why the Waffen SS began recruiting foreign nationals
into it's newly formed divisions.
This battle has great symbolic implications as well. The was the farthest east
the Whermacht got, on the banks of the Volga. The city in contention was named
after no other than the arch enemy of Hitler and he was determined to have it.
This was one of the chief anchors to the planned "eastern line" extending from
the port of Archangel in the north to Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea in the
south. Stalingrad was also the "hinge" on the economic "doorway" to the
desperately need oil in the fields at and around Baku.
Kursk is mostly noted for the German's ability to make up the losses (mens,
tanks, artillery primarily; the bomber and transport fleet of the Luftwaffe was
never made whole again) in the east (especially at Stalingrad six months
earlier). Kursk really signaled the end of the German's most reliable ability
in the field in the east: Summer panzer campaigning.
The things that went wrong with this offensive are legion and I'm sure you
don't want to hear them now suffice to say that from July1943 on the whermacht
never went on the offensive again on such a scale. There were other attacks to
be sure, but these mostly were relief efforts of surrounded units and cities
and attempts to repair rents in the front lines.
I hope this helps answer your question.
Ken Weiler
Sterling, Virginia
Bob Wartburg
On Fri, 16 Jan 1998 16:53:35 -0500, kweil...@aol.com (KWeiler854)
wrote:
>
>
>The German's defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943 was more than just a lost
>battle. For in this one engagement the Ost Heer lost some of it's best units and leaders.
Judging by Paulus' performance at Stalingrad, I'd say Germany was glad
to be rid of at least one leader.
Remove NOSPAM to reply by e-mail.
Tristrim Peter Murnane
LustyI3oy (lust...@aol.com) wrote:
: whenever i read books about russo-german war 1041~45, i always being told that
: battle of stalingrad was the turning point of eastern front. the mighty
: wehrmacht suffered its biggest defeat since the war. but indeed germans lost
: their greatest battle not in stalingrad but 1 year later at the slient of
: kursk. that battle not only cost germany's panzer reserve in th east but also
: gave the soviet the stratagical initialtive to conduct the rest of war. so my
: question is: which battle has more significant place in the history? and how
: come stalingrad given more famous status by historians than kursk?
:
I think they were BOTH descive. After Stalingrad, Germany couldn't
win the war (if they'd gone to Moscow again, it might have worked).
After Kursk, they couldn't get a draw and negotiated peace. Afetr
all, from the german side at any rate, that was he whole POINT of kursk.
Ralph Zuljan
LustyI3oy wrote in message <69ma6s$his$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>battle of stalingrad was the turning point of eastern front. the mighty
>wehrmacht suffered its biggest defeat since the war.
Stalingrad is associated with the first serious defeat for German arms in
WWII. The 6th Army was surrounded and destroyed during the battle. As well,
the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian armies on the Eastern Front were mauled
(if not outrightly destroyed in the process of the Soviet offensives
producing the German defeat at Stalingrad). The statistics speak for
themselves. This was the largest loss the Nazi German had suffered since war
began, but greater losses would occur later and still the Germans remained
capable of recovery.
Furthermore, a moderately successful German summer campaign turned
into a bloody retreat because of the Soviet counteroffensive. Certainly this
was a turning point in the sense that something happened which had not
happened before. With hindsight one could say that from here on the German
armed forces suffered one defeat after another (both on the Eastern Front
and in the war more generally). The Germans never launched another offensive
that would gain the enormous space that the summer campaign of 1942 had
done. But in terms of the situation in February 1943 (when the last remnants
of 6th Army surrendered), it was far from clear that this operational defeat
would lead to military, or even political defeat for Nazi Germany.
>but indeed germans lost
>their greatest battle not in stalingrad but 1 year later at the slient of
>kursk.
Kursk will be remembered as the largest armored engagement in history. It
also serves as an excellent example of how far the strategic and operational
thinking of the German high command had degenerated. Had Kursk been fought
three or four months earlier, i.e., shortly after Manstein's successful
counterattack around Kharkov, it might have produced a tactical victory for
the Germans. As it was, the very conception of this offensive should have
been rejected by the German generals involved since, contrary to all the
lessons provided by nearly four years of campaigning, an incredibly well
defended geographical space was attacked at its strongest points.
The German Army failed to achieve the operational objectives for this
campaign and in that sense they lost the battle of Kursk. They also lost a
significant number of panzers in this fight (which were impossible to
replace given the poor preparation of the German wartime economy). The
Soviets followed up with an effective counteroffensive that caused the
Germans to fall back even further. In this sense, the SU won the battle of
Kursk. Nazi Germany never launched another operational offensive, on the
scale of Kursk, on the Eastern Front. In this sense, this battle can also be
considered a major turning point in the war (with hindsight).
Victory at Kursk
>gave the soviet the stratagical initialtive to conduct the rest of war.
The initiative on the Eastern Front was "given" to the Soviets on November
3, 1943. On this date, Hitler issued Directive No. 51 which stated rather
explicitly that danger of an Allied invasion in western Europe precluded
drawing any more forces away from the France until the anticipated invasion
was defeated (which it never was). In fact, it required a building up of
forces in the west. For all intents, this directive therefore required
German forces on the Eastern Front in 1944 to maintain a defensive posture.
>so my question is:
>which battle has more significant place in the history?
Both are very significant battles. Both, in some respects, can be considered
turning points on the Eastern Front. The campaign that ended with Stalingrad
was the last serious attempt at a blitzkrieg offensive. And no German
offensive after that was even marginally successful (compared to the
successes of 39-41). Kursk was the last big offensive the Germans
launched on the Eastern Front.
As an aside, it should be noted that the plan for the summer campaign of
1942 shows pretty clearly that the German high command (many of the senior
generals as well as Hitler) had a limited at best understanding of what made
the German blitzkrieg of the early years successful.
>and
>how come stalingrad given more famous status by historians
>than kursk?
IMHO, Stalingrad is "more famous" than Kursk because it was a clear-cut
defeat for the German Army (which up to then had never been defeated in such
a definite manner). Stalingrad involved drama that Kursk just did not have.
For example, the self-sacrificing struggle of both the Soviet defenders (in
the early stages) and the cut-off German soldiers (in the later stages)
generated hundreds (if not thousands) of individual war stories (of courage,
heroism, etc) worth remembering. There was the airlift effort, the relief
attempt, the aborted plans for a breakout, and all sorts of other features
which just have no equal at Kursk. Furthermore, the battle lasted longer
(months as opposed to days) and was just about the only really big thing
happening in WWII during that period.
Ralph Zuljan
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1084
Timothy Honke
Ralph Zuljan wrote:
SNIP
> As an aside, it should be noted that the plan for the summer campaign of
> 1942 shows pretty clearly that the German high command (many of the senior
> generals as well as Hitler) had a limited at best understanding of what made
> the German blitzkrieg of the early years successful.
SNIP
Heck, you could say the same about the plans for the summer campaign of
1941! Most of the German high command (including Hitler) were infantry
or artillery men. It is amazing, though, that as smart as they were
otherwise, they still failed to realize how important it was to allow
the panzers to exploit the full potential of their mobility. You can
already see this in the invasion of France. After a close call at
Arras, they were afraid that the panzers might get so far ahead of the
infantry that they could both be seprated and destroyed. Otherwise, the
British might not have made it out of Dunkirk, and Hitler might have
been able to knock them out of the war. Then, he could have fought
Russia without having to worry about a Western Front. But the mistake
was repeated in Barbarossa anyway, when the panzers were ordered to halt
in order to wait for the infantry (more trucks than halftracks, and more
HORSES than you might believe) to catch up! And, of course, it hardly
helped that Hitler started Barbarossa with the panzer generals under the
authority of the infantry.
Timothy Honke
tj_ho...@voyager.net
Yevgeniy Chizhikov
Ralph Zuljan wrote:
> As an aside, it should be noted that the plan for the summer campaign of
> 1942 shows pretty clearly that the German high command (many of the senior
> generals as well as Hitler) had a limited at best understanding of what made
> the German blitzkrieg of the early years successful.
Interesting. It is sort of true. While Germans successfully used Blitzkrieg at
the start of the war(when no body use it), they fail to repeat it against both
East and West in latter years. It seams that by the end of the war, Soviets
could teach any Germans general about Blitzkrieg. Tragically for Soviets, they
DID invented Blitzkrieg, but Stalin shoot marshall Tuhachevsky and Bluher before
they could put it in use.
In eyes of the Soviets/Russians Stalingrad is bigger. Stalingrad was turning
point. In Stalingrad Soviets did not fall, and after that ALL people believed
that war would be WON.
Yevgeniy Chizhikov.
Flerg
>IMHO, Stalingrad is "more famous" than Kursk because it was a clear-cut
>defeat for the German Army (which up to then had never been defeated in
such
>a definite manner).
Guderian: How many people do you think even know where Kursk is? It's a
matter of profound indifference to the world whether we hold Kursk or not...
John M. Atkinson
Timothy Honke <tj_ho...@voyager.net> wrote:
>Russia without having to worry about a Western Front. But the mistake
>was repeated in Barbarossa anyway, when the panzers were ordered to halt
>in order to wait for the infantry (more trucks than halftracks, and more
Tanks who race on ahead completely bereft of infantry support tend to
end up very, very dead. This is called combined arms, and has been
very important since Alexander the Great invented it. IMHO, the great
weakness of the German Army was the duality in the nature of it's
motorization. Fine all-motorized Panzer/PanzerGrenadier punch, but
the followthrough with the infantry was limited to the speed of a
horse-drawn artillery limber or a tired Infantryman. Not a good
idea--and IMHO one of the most overlooked factors about the Western
allies was that once they got going, they could concentrate forces and
follow through easily. Battle of Bulge, when Patton disengaged,
turned, and marched to fight in a short time. Could a German
formation, limited by it's men's feet and horsepower, have sent more
than their (few and far between) mechanized units?
John M. Atkinson
"Being intelligent is not a felony. But most societies evaluate
it as at least a misdemeanor."
--L. Long
Ralph Zuljan
Yevgeniy Chizhikov wrote in message <6ag0lt$n6a$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>Ralph Zuljan wrote:
(snip)
>It seams that by the end of the war,
>Soviets could teach any Germans general about Blitzkrieg.
Well, I would not go that far. Heinrici, for example, gave Zhukov's forces a
bloody nose before being overwhelmed on the Oder front. I would say that by
the end of the war (say from January 1945), the material imbalance alone
made the military results inevitable.
>Tragically for Soviets, they DID invented Blitzkrieg,
And the telephone, the automobile, etc.
Nonsense. If you must credit someone other than the Germans then thank the
French since it was an officer in the French Army of WWI that first proposed
the idea of "infiltration" tactics in a pamphlet published in 1916, IIRC.
The Germans captured the document, thought about it, and produced the highly
successful "Stormtroop" tactics used in the spring 1918 offensive. This is
the tactical doctrine that formed the basis of the Blitzkrieg of WWII.
Mechanization was a post-WWI addition which was heavily debated within the
German military establishment and the conclusions they came to were
essentially correct. That is, they ultimately chose to concentrate
mechanized forces in panzer and motorized divisions. These were the
stormtroops of WWII. The tactics were basically the same. So was the command
structure that emphasized individual responsibility and therefore allowed
commanders on the spot to take the initiative necessary for successful
Blitzkrieg operations. This is something they more or less lost as the war
progressed but no one else ever adopted it either.
Every great power in Europe had a group of military thinkers who argued for
the adoption of concentrated mechanized units and battle tactics comparable
to the German model. The Soviets in particular are reputed to have carefully
studied the German spring offensive of 1918. However, the Germans were the
only ones to actually implement it. They may not have understood it all that
well, but the recent claims that others learned and understood it better is
dubious at best.
>but Stalin shoot marshall Tuhachevsky and Bluher before
>they could put it in use.
In all fairness, it is true that the Soviets did produce an interesting
theory that had elements of Blitzkrieg in it -- Glantz and others refer to
it as "Deep Battle" tactics. They also built up an army designed to make use
of such ideas, up to about 1937-38. Concentrated mechanized forces existed,
etc. However, Stalin changed his mind (probably on the advice of other
military experts) to put it mildly and the armored units were dispersed into
infantry support roles while the thinkers were shot. So, by 1940 the Soviet
army had little in the way of Blitzkrieg left in its force structure. (Not
to mention that the individual initiative necessary for the success of a
Blitzkrieg was utterly missing due to the politicized nature of the Red
Army.) The point to keep in mind here is that there were valid reasons for
developing force structures rather incompatible with Blitzkrieg and most of
the great powers, including the USSR, chose to do so.
>
>In eyes of the Soviets/Russians Stalingrad is bigger. Stalingrad was
>turning point. In Stalingrad Soviets did not fall, and after that ALL
>people believed that war would be WON.
Interestingly, the Germans did not feel the same way. Yes they lost the
battle of Stalingrad, but they still were confident that they could defeat
the SU. (Hitler was rather shaken by Stalingrad and did let the Army have
its own way at Kursk as a result.)
Ralph Zuljan
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1084
Flerg
<snip>
> And, of course, it hardly
>helped that Hitler started Barbarossa with the panzer generals under the
>authority of the infantry.
This is not true. The German panzer units were concentrated in four
independent Panzer Gruppen, commanded by Kleist, Guderian, Hoth and Hoepner;
all excellent panzer generals chosen for their vigour and skill.
The German High Command had learnt from France, but this was not France. The
rail system was not intact, many roads were just dirt tracks, distances were
immense, and there were many areas behind the front controlled by the enemy.
To strike further into enemy territory involved great risk. With just ten
divisions across the Dneiper, insecure crossings, and four Soviet armies on
their flanks.
Timothy Honke
John M. Atkinson wrote:
> >was repeated in Barbarossa anyway, when the panzers were ordered to halt
> >in order to wait for the infantry (more trucks than halftracks, and more
> Tanks who race on ahead completely bereft of infantry support tend to
> end up very, very dead. This is called combined arms, and has been
> very important since Alexander the Great invented it.
My fault, once again, for being unclear. ;) The spearheading armored
divisions -- which included some infantry support -- were often told to
halt their advances and wait for infantry divisions following to catch
up. The principle of combined arms is valid, but my point wa that
Hitler was playing it much safer than he needed to. \
Likewise, when I commented on how the panzer generals were under the
authority of the infantry. This was not true for the entire campaign,
but only for the initial invasion.
Ralph Zuljan
John M. Atkinson wrote in message <6al2lq$q...@gazette.bcm.tmc.edu>...
>Timothy Honke <tj_ho...@voyager.net> wrote:
>>Russia without having to worry about a Western Front. But the mistake
>>was repeated in Barbarossa anyway, when the panzers were ordered to halt
>>in order to wait for the infantry (more trucks than halftracks, and more
>
>Tanks who race on ahead completely bereft of infantry support tend to
>end up very, very dead.
(Note that this response assumes you refer to panzer and motorized units in
the context of a partiallty mechanized army such as the German Army of WWII.
Such units did have infantry attached.)
This assumes that the enemy is sufficiently organized to mount
counterattacks against the relatively undefended flanks of the advancing
armor. In France, 1940, this was not the case. Of course, it also requires
that there are combat units that are available for such engagement. During
Barbarossa, this did happen on occassion. IIRC, Manstein got caught like
this while a corps commander with AG North. However, it is worth noting that
awaiting the infantry follow-up is not necessarily a good idea either. Doing
so generally gives the enemy a respite which allows for the reformation of a
continuous front and thus slows the pace of the advance because of the need
to break through again. The primary goal of the rapid advance in the
Blitzkrieg is to interrupt supplies and command and control. Local
counterattacks will not seriously affect this function but the results can
be rather unnerving and from a sufficiently high command perspective it can
imply undue risk.
>This is called combined arms, and has been
>very important since Alexander the Great invented it. IMHO, the great
>weakness of the German Army was the duality in the nature of it's
>motorization. Fine all-motorized Panzer/PanzerGrenadier punch, but
>the followthrough with the infantry was limited to the speed of a
>horse-drawn artillery limber or a tired Infantryman.
IIRC (and it has been a while), "Supplying War" by Van Creveld makes the
point that the general pace of advance has not really changed all that much
since Napoleonic times even though one would think that it should given the
potential speed of mechanized units. This is attributed to the fact that
mechanization increases the amount of logistical support required.
Even looking at the first phase of Barbarossa, the tempo of operations was
into seriously interrupted because of the inability of the infantry to keep
up. It tended to be the case that the huge masses of potential POWs could
not be effectively encircled and destroyed if the infantry was also required
to maintain the advance. The issue tended to come down to this: Do you
effectively encircle pockets and reduce them or do you limit that effort and
push ahead?
>Not a good
>idea--and IMHO one of the most overlooked factors about the Western
>allies was that once they got going, they could concentrate forces and
>follow through easily. Battle of Bulge, when Patton disengaged,
>turned, and marched to fight in a short time. Could a German
>formation, limited by it's men's feet and horsepower, have sent more
>than their (few and far between) mechanized units?
Probably yes. If you look at the pace at which Patton moved, it wasn't all
that different from the normal rate expected from a forced march. IIRC he
moved at around 20-25 miles per day.
Ralph Zuljan
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1084
Zhivan
>My fault, once again, for being unclear. ;) The spearheading armored
>divisions -- which included some infantry support -- were often told to
>halt their advances and wait for infantry divisions following to catch
>up. The principle of combined arms is valid, but my point wa that
>Hitler was playing it much safer than he needed to. \
>
>Likewise, when I commented on how the panzer generals were under the
>authority of the infantry. This was not true for the entire campaign,
>but only for the initial invasion.
Barbarossa often saw panzers miles and miles ahead of the infantry, with a
backup fuel tank on the rear plate, a Swastika draped on the roof and maybe
a couple SMG men on the top. By the time they'd broken through the front,
they went for broke until they hit opposition.. either went around it or
through it, or stopped. Many pictures show what seem to be lone platoons of
panzers without support, but without opposition either.
Gregory J Cebelinski
In a previous article, zul...@worldchat.com ("Ralph Zuljan") says:
>(Hitler was rather shaken by Stalingrad and did let the Army have
>its own way at Kursk as a result.)
>
>Ralph Zuljan
>http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1084
I do believe that most of the generals wre opposed to such a move.
(Model, Manstein and Guderian)
M E Rapier
In article <6anl90$1ftq$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>, zul...@worldchat.com
says...
>John M. Atkinson wrote in message <6al2lq$q...@gazette.bcm.tmc.edu>...
>>Timothy Honke <tj_ho...@voyager.net> wrote:
>>>Russia without having to worry about a Western Front. But the mistake
>>>was repeated in Barbarossa anyway, when the panzers were ordered to halt
>>>in order to wait for the infantry (more trucks than halftracks, and more
Any motorised infantry units available were already integral to the
PanzerGruppe or the Panzer Divisions themselves.Panzer divisions were not
simply tanks on their own.
The leg infantry units in the infantry armies would frequently cobble together
mobile composite units to try and fill the yawning gaps between themselves and
the fully mechanised formations - e.g. motorised engineer company, recon
battalion heavy company and a company from the AT battalion.
However, generally (apart from exceptions such as the dash to Dvina) the
mechanised units did not advance that much faster than their leg counterparts.
Over a few days or weeks though ths was sufficient the open up pretty big
gaps.
>>Tanks who race on ahead completely bereft of infantry support tend to
>>end up very, very dead.
Again, this is a gross oversimplification - Panzer dvisions, Corps and Groups
all had integral infantry, artillery, engineer and AT units. The problem was
more that these formations tended to outrun the leg units in the army and were
vulnerable to the actions of cut off units or counterattacks over their LOC.
Equally the job of repelling the inevitable counterattacks fell on the
motorised schutzen who were attrited away rather than the more expendable
regular infantry formations.
>(Note that this response assumes you refer to panzer and motorized units in
>the context of a partiallty mechanized army such as the German Army of WWII.
>Such units did have infantry attached.)
>
>This assumes that the enemy is sufficiently organized to mount
>counterattacks against the relatively undefended flanks of the advancing
>armor. In France, 1940, this was not the case. Of course, it also requires
>that there are combat units that are available for such engagement. During
>Barbarossa, this did happen on occassion. IIRC, Manstein got caught like
>this while a corps commander with AG North. However, it is worth noting that
>awaiting the infantry follow-up is not necessarily a good idea either. Doing
>so generally gives the enemy a respite which allows for the reformation of a
>continuous front and thus slows the pace of the advance because of the need
>to break through again. The primary goal of the rapid advance in the
>Blitzkrieg is to interrupt supplies and command and control. Local
>counterattacks will not seriously affect this function but the results can
>be rather unnerving and from a sufficiently high command perspective it can
>imply undue risk.
Excellent points made by Ralph. The previous strategy of encirclement that
worked so well in the restricted battlefield of France (and to a lesser extent
Poland), failed in Russia as the distances were so much vaster and the
infrastructure so much poorer. The Germans could not project sufficient force
with sufficient momentum to encircle and destroy enough of the Red Army to
wipe it out (although they obviosuly inflicted very heavy losses).
M E Rapier
John M. Atkinson
M E Rapier <M.Ra...@shef.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>Tanks who race on ahead completely bereft of infantry support tend to
>>>end up very, very dead.
>Again, this is a gross oversimplification - Panzer dvisions, Corps and Groups
>all had integral infantry, artillery, engineer and AT units. The problem was
True--but not enough to either pin down or reduce the pockets of
resistance that the Panzers were supposed to be bypassing and
surrounding. And to peel off the PanzerGrenadiers to do this would
leave the tanks butt naked and easy meat for any tough, smart,
infantryman.