Vindication of Sherman Tanks
Hillbrath
Jay wrote:
> It seems that the discussion has wandered off of that point, and I'm
> as guilty as any other when it comes to that drift. However, that
> point was the one that I wanted to establish. The Sherman was not a
> survivable tank. It's irrelevant if there were other tanks less
> survivable on the German side, there were.
That is not entirely irrelevant. For one thing, it shows that at the particular
time in question, the continually moving pendulum of armor vs. anti-armor
weapon was swinging toward offense. In the next phase, *no* tanks were going to
be survivable and it was a while before armor caught up.
> There were also tanks that could at least withstand a frontal hit
> from most Allied anti-tank guns a reasonable number of times.
> The Sherman was grossly outclassed by guns that were common in
> German service.
There were only a handful of Tiger IIs that had a good chance of surviving any
number of hits by the best Allied anti-tank guns (the 17 pounder, and the 90mm)
and, contrary to "conventional wisdom" there were a lot of those guns in
relation to the total number of panzers that needed their services. There were
also a lot of other AT weapons, the bazooka, all those captured PanzerFausts,
the 60 lb Rocket Projectile, and a lot of others, that were capable of dealing
with *any* panzer.
I made the analogy that using lightly armored, but reliable and robust tanks
was somewhat like using lightly armed airborne troops. You (or someone)
objected, based on nothing thinking airborne troops were "economical." That is
true, but, sometimes there is no other way, at least that was the theory behind
the development of airborne operations.
If you want to fight on the other guys continent, and you are going to have to
get there by amphibious operations, you don't have any choice but to use
amphibious capable (with what ever infrastructure you have available) tank you
have. The M4 was capable of amphibious operations, and the war in Europe was
still in the amphibious stage (tanks were still going in over the beach)until
Antwerp was captured and operational, which was not until around the first of
December 1944.
Another analogy, for those that don't like the airborne one, is that the M4 was
sort of an early version of the armored personnel carrier. A type of vehicle
that was not much in evidence at this time, and those that were used were not
that effective.
If the Allies had had no tanks, they might well have chosen to have carried out
the invasion, anyway, and it probably would not made that much of a difference.
As it was, they had a large number of armored vehicles, that even if they were
totally vulnerable to every AT weapon were still effective against a lot of
threats (small arms, artillery, the Luftwaffe, [everything was], etc.). And,
they were quite useful in defeating many enemy threats, like machine guns for
example. The use of armored vehicles from which their crews could fight, and
survive, was not a bad idea, even if they were under protected against some
specific threat.
Or, take yet another analogy. There were plenty of fortifications in Europe
that had guns and protection that were superior to any tank or panzer, Tiger
IIs, the IS-II, the Maus, or whatever. There were two obvious choices, either
fight these fortifications with what was available, or give up. Tanks were not
necessarily very effective in this role, but, they were better than using ones
bare hands, or whatever. If the M4s were good enough for fighting the Atlantic
Wall, West Wall, etc. I don't see why they shouldn't have been used to fight
mere rolling pill boxes (which is all the panzers were good for), and even less
AT guns, which were pill boxes with out the boxes.
Not perfectly survivable, but, somewhat survivable, and not totally effective
on offense, but not totally ineffective, either. I don't, and hope I never
have, said that the M4 was the perfect tank, but, I do claim that it was the
right tank, at the right time, until well after D-Day, and that no other WW II
tank would have done better under the circumstances.
I have also said that by late '44, the M4 was undergunned, and I wouldn't have
objected to having used the six months between D-Day and the Ardennes to have
done something about that. Much could have been done with out disrupting the
whole war effort, which is what stopping and waiting for new tanks, or new
infrastructure, would have done.
Henry Hillbrath
Jeff Heidman
> There were also tanks that could at least withstand a frontal hit
> > from most Allied anti-tank guns a reasonable number of times.
> > The Sherman was grossly outclassed by guns that were common in
> > German service.
> There were only a handful of Tiger IIs that had a good chance of surviving any> number of hits by the best Allied anti-tank guns (the 17 pounder, and the 90mm)
You aree doing this again. THe comparison he is trying to make is between
Shermans and "guns that were common in German service." This presumably means
the 50L60 and 75L46 which were the msot common German AT guns. Note he is not
comparing Shermans to the much more effective 88L56 and 88L71 guns. You reply
that panzers could not stand up to 17lber and 90mm AMerican guns, but these
were not the American (or Allied) guns commonly encountered by Panthers.
Rather, the Panthers commonly encountered the 57mm, 75mm, and 76mm guns,
which the Panther could stand up to with little concern.
> and, contrary to "conventional wisdom" there were a lot of those guns in
> relation to the total number of panzers that needed their services.
Once again, it is not a numebrs game. You engage with what happens to be there,
adn teh number of 17lb or 90mm weapons in service through much of the Western
European theater was small compared to the number of other AT weapons.
> There were
> also a lot of other AT weapons, the bazooka, all those captured PanzerFausts,
> the 60 lb Rocket Projectile, and a lot of others, that were capable of dealing> with *any* panzer.
Bazookas are nearly useless against the frontal armor of any German tank.
Panzerfausts are nice, but there aren't many of them, and they have a very shortrange. I have no idea what the Rocket Projectile is. Perhaps you could enlightenme as to their effectiveness and employment.
> If you want to fight on the other guys continent, and you are going to have to> get there by amphibious operations, you don't have any choice but to use
> amphibious capable (with what ever infrastructure you have available) tank you> have. The M4 was capable of amphibious operations, and the war in Europe was
> still in the amphibious stage (tanks were still going in over the beach)until
> Antwerp was captured and operational, which was not until around the first of
> December 1944.
This may surprise you, but most M4s were unloaded onto the beach. A very few
"swam" ashore on DDay, with mixed results.The British managed to unload the 40
ton Churchill over the beach. I have little reason to believe that the US could
not have done the same.
> Another analogy, for those that don't like the airborne one, is that the M4 was
> sort of an early version of the armored personnel carrier. A type of vehicle
> that was not much in evidence at this time, and those that were used were not
> that effective.
That is an even worse analogy. An APC is designed to transport troops in a
hostile environment, not fight tanks. Shermans fought enemy tanks regularly,
with predictable results.
> If the Allies had had no tanks, they might well have chosen to have carried out
> the invasion, anyway, and it probably would not made that much of a difference.
Really? How would they have effected the encircling attacks you are so proud of
without tanks? How would they have raced through most of France without tanks? Ithink the idea that they did not need tanks is preposterous to say the least.
> As it was, they had a large number of armored vehicles, that even if they were> totally vulnerable to every AT weapon were still effective against a lot of
> threats (small arms, artillery, the Luftwaffe, [everything was], etc.). And,
> they were quite useful in defeating many enemy threats, like machine guns for
> example. The use of armored vehicles from which their crews could fight, and
> survive, was not a bad idea, even if they were under protected against some
> specific threat.
This is true. Certainly Shermans are better than nothing. But noone is making
that argument. Please toss the strawman.
> Or, take yet another analogy. There were plenty of fortifications in Europe
> that had guns and protection that were superior to any tank or panzer, Tiger
> IIs, the IS-II, the Maus, or whatever.
So? What is your point? We are arguing whether the Sherman was or was not a verygood tank for its time. Whether you wish to accept it or not, the primary methodin WWII of engaging an enemy armored force is with your own armor. It happened
often in Western Europe, and the results where consistently unfavorable to the
Sherman tanks that were tasked with engagin those forces. Not to mention the
inability of the Sherman to engage non-armored AT guns without unacceptable
losses.
> I don't see why they shouldn't have been used to fight
> mere rolling pill boxes (which is all the panzers were good for), and even less
> AT guns, which were pill boxes with out the boxes.
They should have been used for that task. They were used for that task. No-one
has argued any differently. You are creating a complete strawman. The point is
that Shermans could have been better suited for those tasks.
> Not perfectly survivable, but, somewhat survivable, and not totally effective
> on offense, but not totally ineffective, either.
Mediocrity. The hallmark of the Sherman tank. Thank you for elucidating that so
succintly.
>Much could have been done with out disrupting the
>whole war effort, which is what stopping and waiting for new tanks, or new
> infrastructure, would have done.
Only if you presume that the only time the US could have designed a better tank
was in 1944.
Jeff Heidman
Jay
>That is not entirely irrelevant. For one thing, it shows that at the particular
>time in question, the continually moving pendulum of armor vs. anti-armor
>weapon was swinging toward offense. In the next phase, *no* tanks were going to
>be survivable and it was a while before armor caught up.
No tanks survivable? What phase is that? I do, for the record, agree
that guns had outstripped armour, however those guns were _not_
usually in common use in mid-'44 by the Allies (see more below).
>> There were also tanks that could at least withstand a frontal hit
>> from most Allied anti-tank guns a reasonable number of times.
>> The Sherman was grossly outclassed by guns that were common in
>> German service.
>
>There were only a handful of Tiger IIs that had a good chance of surviving any
>number of hits by the best Allied anti-tank guns (the 17 pounder, and the 90mm)
But I said, and I left it in so you can see it again, "common in
German service." The 17lb and 90mm guns were _not_ common in Allied
service until the end of '44, and even then they weren't the easiest
to come by unless tank?SPAT mounted.
>and, contrary to "conventional wisdom" there were a lot of those guns in
>relation to the total number of panzers that needed their services. There were
>also a lot of other AT weapons, the bazooka, all those captured PanzerFausts,
>the 60 lb Rocket Projectile, and a lot of others, that were capable of dealing
>with *any* panzer.
The most common Allied AT guns, in the period which I defined in the
first post to this thread, were the 57mm/6lb and the 75mm. The others
may have been abundant in relation to the numbers of panzers, but
abundancy may not reflect actual use against panzers. The British, by
the nature of their place in the Normandy battles, and the luck of
panzer unit placement and rail lines, came up against panzers much
more often.
The Bazooka dealt with the panzers from a certain aspect. The 2.57"
rocket simply didn't have the explosive to deal with a Panther on the
front. The Sherman, however, was defeated by any German ATG of 75mm or
better (which were quite common), and any hollow-charge projectile
that the Germans had in common use (the Panzerfaust frex).
>I made the analogy that using lightly armored, but reliable and robust tanks
>was somewhat like using lightly armed airborne troops. You (or someone)
>objected, based on nothing thinking airborne troops were "economical." That is
>true, but, sometimes there is no other way, at least that was the theory behind
>the development of airborne operations.
Sometimes there is no other way, however, what if there _is_ another
way? The analogy is misleading because it deals with vastly different
circumstances. Airborne troops may well be the only means of dealing
with a problem. Tank types are defined by different criteria, of which
manufacture is one, and portability is another.
>The M4 was capable of amphibious operations, and the war in Europe was
>still in the amphibious stage (tanks were still going in over the beach)until
>Antwerp was captured and operational, which was not until around the first of
>December 1944.
The M4's amphib capability was improvised, adn could have been adapted
to whatever tank was deemed needed.
>Another analogy, for those that don't like the airborne one, is that the M4 was
>sort of an early version of the armored personnel carrier. A type of vehicle
>that was not much in evidence at this time, and those that were used were not
>that effective.
Bad analogy. The M$ was certainly a type of vehicle in common use at
the time. The APC had it's roots in the halftrack.
>As it was, they had a large number of armored vehicles, that even if they were
>totally vulnerable to every AT weapon were still effective against a lot of
>threats (small arms, artillery, the Luftwaffe, [everything was], etc.). And,
>they were quite useful in defeating many enemy threats, like machine guns for
>example. The use of armored vehicles from which their crews could fight, and
>survive, was not a bad idea, even if they were under protected against some
>specific threat.
A jeep with machineguns can be a threat to the examples given above
(as the SAS showed), the tank was a different story, and the Sherman
was underprotected against _most_ of the AT-capable threats it
encountered. Even the venerable 50mm PaK had a credible kill chance
against the Sherman, though the former was well on it's way out of
service by mid-44.
>Not perfectly survivable, but, somewhat survivable, and not totally effective
>on offense, but not totally ineffective, either. I don't, and hope I never
>have, said that the M4 was the perfect tank, but, I do claim that it was the
>right tank, at the right time, until well after D-Day, and that no other WW II
>tank would have done better under the circumstances.
I hope I have never said that it was totally ineffective either. I
have said, though, that it was not necessarily the ideal tank for the
allies by '44. That the ideal hadn't been produced doesn't, to me,
indicate that it _couldn't_ have been produced given the capabilities
demonstrated by the Allies in other endeavours.
> Much could have been done with out disrupting the
>whole war effort, which is what stopping and waiting for new tanks, or new
>infrastructure, would have done.
I've never suggested "stopping and waiting" though. While I concede
that R&D and tooling up of new factories would have reduced the
numbers of Shermans produced, I see no evidence that the potential
reduction would have been a significant detriment to the Allies, if it
would be any detriment at all.
It's understandable why the Soviets were reluctant to develop and put
into service, new tanks. They lost between 60 and 90% of each year's
production, after all. The Western Allies didn't lose anywhere near
that number of tanks, so they could have developed something new,
without a serious disruption to the supply of the forward units (if
there would be any disruption at all).
Jay
Ottawa, Ontario
Remove the * when replying.
John D Salt
Jeff Heidman <jheidman@What_should_you_docs.arizona.edu> wrote:
> [Huge snippery everywhere]
> Whether you wish to accept it or not, the primary method in WWII
> of engaging an enemy armored force is with your own armor.
Well, no; but lots of people made the same mistake during the
war, especially, but not only, the Brtitish in the Western Desert.
The "primary method" in WW2 of engaging an enemy armoured force
is with your anti-tank guns (think Halfaya, think Snipe, think
Hunt's Gap, think Pakfronts at Kursk).
>Not to mention the inability of the Sherman to engage non-armored
>AT guns without unacceptable losses.
The reason for the British initially liking the 75mm so much was
its very useful HE capability against ATk guns and other soft
targets. The 17 pounder and US 76mm both had a noticeably inferior
HE performance, and for this reason the 75mm remained the main
armament of most of the tank forces of both nations right up to
the war's end.
All the best,
John.
--
John D Salt Dept of IS & Computing,| Barr's Law of Recursive Futility
Brunel U, Uxbridge, Middx UB8 3PH | [BLORF]: If you are smart enough
Disclaimers: I speak only for me. | to use one of these... you can
Launcher may train without warning.| probably manage without one.
Martin Rapier
>Hillbrath wrote:
>
>> There were also tanks that could at least withstand a frontal hit
>> > from most Allied anti-tank guns a reasonable number of times.
>> > The Sherman was grossly outclassed by guns that were common in
>> > German service.
>
>> There were only a handful of Tiger IIs that had a good chance of surviving
any> number of hits by the best Allied anti-tank guns (the 17 pounder, and th
{snip}
>Rather, the Panthers commonly encountered the 57mm, 75mm, and 76mm guns,
>which the Panther could stand up to with little concern.
Where exactly did this take place? Where the _bulk_ of the German armour
was concentrated, against the British and Commonwealth forces, the
standard divisional AT weapon was the 17pdr, either towed or on SP mounts.
In addition the armoured units also had a resonable allocation of 17pdr
armed vehicles down to a squadron/troop level. When the Germans attacked
these units with tanks, they were shot to bits.
Neither the Germans (who just classified them as Medium Tanks) nor the
British
treated Panthers as wonder weapons - probably due their weak side armour.
If I may requote from Lt John Foley (about when the Churchill squadron he
was serving in was largely destroyed by the 12th SS Panzer Div). "The SS
were equipped with Panthers, which weren't too bad, as by playing a
fantastic game of touch it was possible to catch them in the side and
knock them for six. The Tigers of the heavy tank company were another
matter, they just rolled forward taking everything we could throw at them"
Bear in mind this game of 'touch' is being played by 40+ ton Churchills,
hardly the fastest tanks on the battlefield... In this case the Germans
had screened off the British AT guns with a smoke screen, but the SS
attack was eventually repulsed.
Perhaps the US experience was different, but in real warfare (as opposed
to wargames), flank shots were relatively common, which did not make the
Panther that formidable. The same consideration applied to the JagdPanther
(again, surprising numbers knocked out by 75mm armed Churchills). However
this does not mean it was easy or desirable to take on Panthers with 75mm
armed tanks, much better to fall back and let the AT boys have a go.
{snip}
>Only if you presume that the only time the US could have designed a
>better tank was in 1944.
Just out of interest, how surviveable was a Panther (frontally) against
another Panther? My very strong feeling around this issue is that in
1943/44 (which I've said time and time again) gun technology had overtaken
armour technology. The only way to build a 'shell proof' tank at that time
was an unreliable monstrosity like the Tiger II, and even that was
vulnerable from the flanks at quite long ranges.
The Sherman needed a bigger gun, so it could also play at 'point, shoot,
kill' with Panthers & Tigers in the same way it did with Pz IVs, Stugs,
Marders etc. An extra 20mm of armour on the front would not have gone
amiss, but there was little point as even that could be penetrated with
ease - the 152mm armoured Churchill VII could be KO'd frontally by 75L70s
at normal combat ranges.
Cheers.
Martin.
--
Martin Rapier, Database Administrator
Corporate Information & Computing Services.
University of Sheffield Tel 0114 222 1137
The opinions expressed here may be those of my employer, or they may not.
http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/
Dana L Marek
I need help! I've lost track of what this thread was about.
Would someone please tell me what the original topic of
discussion was?
Dana
--
Dana L. Marek
Never eat at a place called "EATS".
Never play poker with a man called Doc.
Never sleep with a woman who has more problems than you do.
Jeff Heidman
> In article <35A27FD0...@gemini.edu>,
> Jeff Heidman <jheidman@What_should_you_docs.arizona.edu> wrote:
> > [Huge snippery everywhere]
> > Whether you wish to accept it or not, the primary method in WWII
> > of engaging an enemy armored force is with your own armor.
>
> Well, no; but lots of people made the same mistake during the
> war, especially, but not only, the Brtitish in the Western Desert.
>
> The "primary method" in WW2 of engaging an enemy armoured force
> is with your anti-tank guns (think Halfaya, think Snipe, think
> Hunt's Gap, think Pakfronts at Kursk).
That may be the *prefered* method, but in reality it was not the case,
especially when on the offensive. It is very difficult to engage an
enemy tank with a towed AT gun unless he comes to you.
> >Not to mention the inability of the Sherman to engage non-armored
> >AT guns without unacceptable losses.
>
> The reason for the British initially liking the 75mm so much was
> its very useful HE capability against ATk guns and other soft
> targets. The 17 pounder and US 76mm both had a noticeably inferior
> HE performance, and for this reason the 75mm remained the main
> armament of most of the tank forces of both nations right up to
> the war's end.
The 75mm HE round was certainly adequate for its role, but what I was
referring to was the inability of the Sherman to withstand hits from
those guns it was designed to engage. The lowly German 50L60 AT gun
could often penetrate the SHerman, to say nothing of the ease with which
the 75L46 brewqed them up.I have heard that the 76 and 17lber where not
as effective as the 75mm, but from what I have seen the difference in
effect was relatively minimal. The net effect of the Sherman being
unable to take even one shot from the typical german AT gun was that
when they ran into them, a few Shermans died, the rest withdrew, and the
position was punded with artillery. It works, but is not particularly
ideal.
If the Sherman was designed just for infantry support, then I would
prefer an M7 Priest anyway. Much larger HE round. Sure the armor is
thinner, but then tanks aren't supposed to have thick armor...right?
Jeff Heidman
v
>another Panther? My very strong feeling around this issue is that in
>1943/44 (which I've said time and time again) gun technology had overtaken
>armour technology. The only way to build a 'shell proof' tank at that time
>was an unreliable monstrosity like the Tiger II, and even that was
>vulnerable from the flanks at quite long ranges.
That is eminently not true. By May 1945, the Russians had introduced the IS-3
tank. This was invulnerable at normal combat ranges frontally to all weapons
and vulnerable at pointblank range only to a 17-lbr finding APDS, and even then
only through the turret. The frontal glacis had a RHA equivalence of 230mm -
4mm more than max penetration of 88L71. Frontal turret was slightly, very
slightly lower. The flanks I am not sure about, but following Russian WW2 heavy
tank practise would probably be around 2/3 as thick or so (relying on KV and
IS-2)
Jay
M.Ra...@sheffield.ac.uk (Martin Rapier) wrote:
>The only way to build a 'shell proof' tank at that time
>was an unreliable monstrosity like the Tiger II, and even that was
>vulnerable from the flanks at quite long ranges.
Just for the record I'd like to point out that from my perspective
there's been no suggestion of creating a "shell proof" tank.
>The Sherman needed a bigger gun, so it could also play at 'point, shoot,
>kill' with Panthers & Tigers in the same way it did with Pz IVs, Stugs,
>Marders etc.
Absolutely, and I mentioned it in an earlier post. The best way to
maek the Sherman viable was to give it a gun with better AT capability
than the 75. This was, in fact, done by the Allies.
> An extra 20mm of armour on the front would not have gone
>amiss, but there was little point as even that could be penetrated with
>ease - the 152mm armoured Churchill VII could be KO'd frontally by 75L70s
>at normal combat ranges.
However, as has been pointed out at length by others in this group,
the 75L70 was not exactly common. An alternative tank to the Sherman
would have had good protection against 75mm (the L48 which was more
common, as the PaK and KwK versions), as well as a good gun. I don't
think it outside the capability of the Allies, especially the US, to
produce a tank that has a better than 5% chance of survival if hit by
a 75mm gun. The Sherman was defeated easily by the 75mm, which was the
most common German anti-tank gun in Normandy in '44.
Bruce Burden
Jay (mjmartino@igs*.net) wrote:
: hill...@aol.com (Hillbrath) wrote:
: >> There were also tanks that could at least withstand a frontal hit
: >> from most Allied anti-tank guns a reasonable number of times.
: >> The Sherman was grossly outclassed by guns that were common in
: >> German service.
: >
: >There were only a handful of Tiger IIs that had a good chance of surviving any
: >number of hits by the best Allied anti-tank guns (the 17 pounder, and the 90mm)
: But I said, and I left it in so you can see it again, "common in
: German service." The 17lb and 90mm guns were _not_ common in Allied
: service until the end of '44,
:
According to Ian Hogg, "British and American Artillery of
World War 2", the 17pdr was approved for service in 1 May 1942.
By August 1944, the discarding sabot round had been introduced,
and was "For immediate provision". Hogg also goes on to note
that the Royal Artilley units (who were the AT folks) were
receiving the 17pdr in 1943.
So, I think you need to rethink your statement that the
17pdr was NOT common in Allied service until the end of 1944.
As for the 90mm, you are correct. The standard towed US
AT gun was the 3", the same as found in the US M-10 SPG. Yes,
it was reaching obsolescense in late '44, when the M-36 Jackson
finally began to reach service. So, your statement about the
90mm is essentially correct.
: >and, contrary to "conventional wisdom" there were a lot of those guns in
: >relation to the total number of panzers that needed their services. There were
: >also a lot of other AT weapons, the bazooka, all those captured PanzerFausts,
: >the 60 lb Rocket Projectile, and a lot of others, that were capable of dealing
: >with *any* panzer.
: The most common Allied AT guns, in the period which I defined in the
: first post to this thread, were the 57mm/6lb and the 75mm. The others
:
What 75mm? Are you referring to the 75mm on the Sherman?
:
: abundancy may not reflect actual use against panzers. The British, by
:
The US 3" guns (all 301 of them) in the US 1st & 3rd Armies
fired 399,834 rounds between "D" Day and VE Day.
:
: The M4's amphib capability was improvised, adn could have been adapted
: to whatever tank was deemed needed.
:
Interesting assertion.
:
: I hope I have never said that it was totally ineffective either. I
: have said, though, that it was not necessarily the ideal tank for the
: allies by '44. That the ideal hadn't been produced doesn't, to me,
: indicate that it _couldn't_ have been produced given the capabilities
: demonstrated by the Allies in other endeavours.
:
Jay, you and I agree on much of the above.
:
: It's understandable why the Soviets were reluctant to develop and put
: into service, new tanks. They lost between 60 and 90% of each year's
: production, after all. The Western Allies didn't lose anywhere near
: that number of tanks, so they could have developed something new,
: without a serious disruption to the supply of the forward units (if
: there would be any disruption at all).
:
Interesting paragraph. Where, then, does that leave the
T-34 in relation to the Sherman? It would seem that you dislike
the Sherman because it was undergunned (in the 75mm versions)
and underarmored (in all widespread flavors). So, if we take the
above and apply it to your numbers to the T-34 (the most common
tanke of WWII), does that mean that the T-34 was also obsolete?
Also, you proposed using the Centurian earlier. Do you have
any objections to the T-26E3, which was what the US proposed to
replace the Shermans with? I can find info on the T-26E3 more
easily than I can on the Centurian, is why I ask.
Bruce
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I like bad!" Bruce Burden Austin, TX.
- Thuganlitha
The Power and the Prophet
Robert Don Hughes
Martin Rapier
In article <6o09b9$ja0$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>, John...@brunel.ac.uk
says...
>In article <35A27FD0...@gemini.edu>,
>Jeff Heidman <jheidman@What_should_you_docs.arizona.edu> wrote:
>> [Huge snippery everywhere]
>> Whether you wish to accept it or not, the primary method in WWII
>> of engaging an enemy armored force is with your own armor.
>
>Well, no; but lots of people made the same mistake during the
>war, especially, but not only, the Brtitish in the Western Desert.
>
>The "primary method" in WW2 of engaging an enemy armoured force
>is with your anti-tank guns (think Halfaya, think Snipe, think
>Hunt's Gap, think Pakfronts at Kursk).
Thank you John, perhaps this is something that should go in the 'common myths
of WWII' FAQ;)
In WWII, tanks were not suposed to engage other tanks, although they obviously
did - tanks were meant to go after soft targets, especially artillery
positions, HQs etc, leaving enemy armour to the tender mercies of the
divisional AT battalion.
It may well be that at a divisional level, armoured divisions engaged other
armoured divisions, but tactically it was found to be far more effective to
draw enemy tanks onto AT gun screens (later in the war, SPAT screens) and
then, if necessary, counterattack the remnants of the enemy armour with your
own tank battalions.
This tactic was used throughout the war, and when the opponent was obliging
enough to assault the guns, worked very well. If I may paraphrase Alistair
Horne (about Arras) "The failure of his AT guns to stop the British forced
Rommel to commit 25th Panzer Regiment against the British tanks, something
they did not normally do. The bulk of the German tank losses that day were
suffered when they ran into the British anti-tank gun screen at Duisans" and
as we know, the 7th Pz Div artillery was busy doing the same to the Matildas
on the other side of the battlefield.
The assertion that the 17pdr was uncommon in 1944 does not hold water, it was
the standard divisional AT gun in British service from 1943 onwards. Initially
on its towed mounting, but by June 1944, half the guns in each regiment were
SP too. The old 6pdrs were offloaded onto the rifle battalion AT platoons, and
issued APDS ammo. The big problem with the towed 17pdr was it took 12 _hours_
to dig in properly, the Germans had a similar problem with the Pak 43, which
was why the towed gun fell into disuse.
Whilst attacking (or counterattacking) with tanks, failure to establish the AT
screen, or an enemy who won't come out of their defensive positions, would
tend to result in tank-to-tank combat. At the tactical level, always a bit of
a lottery for the crews concerned, certainly more so than shooting up the
enemy's soft transport and artillery.
term...@utu.fi
In article <6o2p3i$hhs$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
va...@forfree.at (v) wrote:
> That is eminently not true. By May 1945, the Russians had introduced the IS-3
> tank. This was invulnerable at normal combat ranges frontally to all weapons
> and vulnerable at pointblank range only to a 17-lbr finding APDS, and even
then
> only through the turret.
Do not forget the US 90mm with HVAP, which actually penetrated slightly more
armor than the 17 lbr with APDS. I would say that in 1945 armor and gun
technology were still on par, but the development of HEAT ammunition in the
50s and 60s gave the advantage to guns until the introduction of spaced
ceramic armor and ERA.
Tero P. Mustalahti
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term...@utu.fi
Jeff Heidman <je...@noao.edu> wrote:
> The 75mm HE round was certainly adequate for its role, but what I was
> referring to was the inability of the Sherman to withstand hits from
> those guns it was designed to engage. The lowly German 50L60 AT gun
> could often penetrate the SHerman,
Only with APCR ammunition, which was quite rare in 1944. With APCBC ammo the
50mm L60 could penetrate the frontal armor of the Sherman only at very close
ranges.
> The net effect of the Sherman being
> unable to take even one shot from the typical german AT gun was that
> when they ran into them, a few Shermans died, the rest withdrew, and the
> position was punded with artillery. It works, but is not particularly
> ideal.
Perhaps not ideal, but artillery is the best way to deal with unarmored AT
weapons even if your tank can take a few shots from them.
> If the Sherman was designed just for infantry support, then I would
> prefer an M7 Priest anyway. Much larger HE round. Sure the armor is
> thinner, but then tanks aren't supposed to have thick armor...right?
The M7 Priest would not have been a good direct fire infantry support platform
under any circumstances. The Sherman 105 with the 105mm howitzer on the other
hand was.
Hillbrath
> In article <199807031654...@ladder01.news.aol.com>,
> hill...@aol.com (Hillbrath) wrote:
Hi there Tero! You have been very much missed around here.
I was gone for a while myself. Since I got back, quite a few people have been
trying to keep me straightened out, but, they need your help!
>> Neither could Panthers penetrate the Battleship "Texas" either.
>> What is your point?
> Surely battleships were much rarer than Panthers? The probability
>of a Panther vs. battleship encounter on land was very much
>lower than the probability of a 76mm Sherman vs. Panther encounter.
Well, that was probably not a good analogy. The original poster was making the
point that Panthers had a lot of frontal armor, and I was trying to make the
point that just having a lot of armor was not the whole story (though ships,
including the "Texas" probably had as much or more effect on the fighting in
Normandy than panzers did.)
> In the first place, of course, there was no APCR (a British designation) for
> the 76.
> That is nitpicking, and you know it. APCR is a general designation that is
> used also for Russian and German ammunition. HVAP is a special
> designation used for US ammo only.
Yes, that was nitpicking, I admit it.
> HVAP is a special designation used for US ammo only.
> Considering this his error was not significant.
Well, I didn't make any judgment as to how significant the error was. However,
APCR is (as I said) a British designation. I suppose that the brits might be
as likely to use it for American as any other kind of ammunition, but, it falls
very odd on my ears for American ammo. I suppose that I am not the only person
that objects to the use of foreign terms in preference to native ones. (Though
I understand that all tungsten carbide cores were manufactured by the British,
no matter what ammo they were incorporated into.)
>> In the second place, it was TDs that were expected to fight tanks.
>> So, what is the problem.
> Last time we discussed this in this newsgroup you at least
> partially admitted that the whole TD doctrine was obsolescent.
*I* admitted that? I am not sure what TD doctrine being obsolescent, or not,
has to do with the point. Whatever it was. However, what I think I would have
said was that TD doctrine was to a large extent something supported by Gen.
Leslie MacNair. When MacNair was killed, in the bombing preparation for COBRA,
TDs became somewhat "Non Politically Acceptable" and were neglected. There is
(maybe) a difference in that and being obsolescent.
Exploitation of breakthroughs by tanks was a concept that was incorporated into
US armor doctrine and was included in the training of armored forces, although
it didn't really seem to fit in with other parts of armored doctrine (like
emphasis on infantry support.) Right or wrong, COBRA, and the Falaise
encirclement was an amazing vindication of exploitation doctrine, but, it was
only an accident of war that the circumstances developed so that the concept
could be implemented.
TDs proved their worth on a number of occasions (in their part of defeating the
German attempt to cut off the breakout at Mortain, for example). But, the one
occasion in NW Europe campaign in which TD doctrine could have really been
tested was Ardennes breakthrough. However, by that time, the TD forces had been
dispersed, or disbanded to raise more infantry replacements, and no massed
defense by TDs was possible. If even a small theater reserve of mobile TD
forces had been available, the Battle of the Bulge would have been even more
"nipped in the bud" than it was.
>
>> Why is it better to make an AT gun towed than SP, if you can
>> build a lot of TDs? (Which the Allies could, and the Germans could not?)
>You have also said that apart from the open top turrets, the US TDs
>were really tanks.
I agree with that, and I also agree that the open turrets were a mistake, one
that eventually had to be fixed. Despite a lot of nonsense about the open tops,
the real fact was that in any sort of close in fighting, in forests, towns,
etc. it made the TD very vulnerable to attack by infantry. No need for a
PanzerFaust when all you have to do is lob a grenade over the side.
> Now you compare them to towed AT guns. Should
> they not be compared to German tanks instead?
It is perfectly possible to compare TDs to tanks, towed AT guns, and SP guns,
as well. There is a lot of overlap in the roles and characteristics of all
these weapons.
> My point is that the US wasted resources on "almost tank" TDs
> when they could have been building more real tanks instead.
> A US style TD was admittedly much better than a towed AT gun,
> but it was also much more expensive, in fact almost as expensive
> as a real tank.
There is a lot of talk about "expense" in relation to weapons. In fact, once
the war began, there was no concern, in the US at least, about expense, only
"resource allocations." American style TDs were probably no cheaper than M4s,
but, they were not bad "resource allocations" because they did provide some
additional tank fighting capability with no additional shipping requirements,
and shipping was the most critical resource to be allocated.
Actually, like a lot of other things, the "TD concept" suffered a bit in the
implementation, especially with regard to the 76mm gun. Initially, the M10 had
the "3 inch Navel gun." Like most WW II tank/AT guns, it had been an AA gun,
and it had to long a recoil stroke to fit the M4. The M10 turret was bigger
than the M4 one, to accommodate the gun, and the open top was partly to
compensate for the added weight, and partly to give the crew better visibility.
The 76mm gun was developed with a more compact recoil system and the same
ballistics as the 3 inch. Once it was fitted to the M4, and the M10 as well,
the M10 really didn't make any sense. Someone figured that out, and fitted the
90mm, (as the M36) which restored the initial concept, same chassis as a tank
but bigger gun.
The M18 was a bit of an odd ball in all this, essentially the idea of a big gun
(but, it was only the 76), little armor and high speed. Although I am not
particularly fascinated by this idea, it seemed to be the most popular of the
TDs with the crews.
No matter what the merits of any particular TD, TD forces had one big
advantage, they were trained, and expected to, fight tanks. Therefore, the
almost always faired better in fights with tanks than infantry support units
that happened to fall into a tank fight by mistake or bad luck.
> The turretless German "Jagzpanzers" and Soviet SUs
> made more sense, because they required less resources than a real
> tank on the same chassis.
I use to think that the turretless design had advantages, too. But, after a lot
of though on the subject, and a lot of reading, I have concluded that
turretless TDs were not a good deal for the US. The reason is that turrets do
have their advantages, they allow the tank/TD to fire (or be ready to fire) in
a different direction than the vehicle is pointing. While the turretless type
may be fine in static defense, it is clumsy in the offense. Since the Americans
were not planning to be (and seldom were) defending, they needed turrets.
The use of less resources, as long as no more shipping was required, was not an
important issue for the Americans, though it may have been for the Russians,
and certainly was for the Germans. However, the Germans didn't use that many
turretless TDs, either.
>> It tells me a lot of things, for one, that the Allies were almost
continually
>> on offense, and that air and artillery dominance, while useful, do not kill
a
>> lot of panzers.
>That is correct, they did not achieve much hard kills. But a tank that has
>been abandoned due to lack of fuel is also killed for all intents and
>purposes. Tac-air and artillery could also disrupt armored attacks and
>separate tanks from their supporting infantry.
I agree with that, but, tac-air didn't kill a lot of panzers, but it did
destroy the environment in which they could operate.
> Good coordination and
>combined arms tactics are both needed for successful deployment of armor.
Lack of any combined arms capability (especially air support) was exactly the
reason that panzers were unsuccessful in all attempts at offensive action in
the ETO in 44/45. Good tanks were worthless with out support.
> Confused cavalry-style tank charges will end badly for the attacker
>if the defenders have any experience on stopping armored attacks.
Or, even if they don't have experience. As they did not at Mortain, the last
best chance for the panzers when they were defeated by a combination of Tac-air
(in the first big use of rockets, an untried weapon) and a "green" infantry
division, with its attached TDs.
[snip]
> The question we should be asking is: would the
> Allied anti-infantry capability have been significantly reduced if
> more tanks had had the 76mm or the 17 lbr gun? I believe the answer is no, >
but it is just my personal opinion.
It is very easy to second guess the guys on the spot, fifty years later. I have
tried very hard to understand their thinking. I can get over the point about
giving up heavy tanks (with heavy armor) in order to get more tanks. But, I
think there was a problem with the 76mm not coming up to expectations that
should have been more actively pursued. And, I would never be happy with tanks
or TDs that didn't have adequate guns. And, that includes giving up some of the
infantry support effectiveness that the field commanders valued so highly.
But, that was not the view of the guys that made the decisions, and it was not
due to any lack of design or production capability on the part of the Allies.
Henry Hillbrath
Tommi Syrj{nen
Jeff Heidman <je...@noao.edu> writes:
[snip]
> especially when on the offensive. It is very difficult to engage an
> enemy tank with a towed AT gun unless he comes to you.
During the Summer 1941 the Finns had an acute shortage of tanks (well,
actually the shortage was quite chronic and lasted through the war)
and had to use AT guns on advance.
Fortunately, the Karelia was (and still is) basicly one big forest and
for most of the time Finns were advancing along winding forest roads.
Generally the advancing infantry was supported by two (37mm or 45mm)
AT guns. When the forward platoon run into a Russian tank one of the
guns would be manhandled into firing position in the cover of woods
and it would fire a couple of shots at the enemy tank. At that point
the tank was either destroyed or it retreated behind the next turn.
Then the other gun would be advanced to a new firing position while
the first gun kept it covered.
I don't remember how big losses the AT gunners had but I suppose they
were quite light since the skill of the Russian tank crews was quite
abysmal at that point of war, the armor of nearly all Russian tanks
could be penetrated by a single hit and the tight space enabled only
one tank fight at a time.
- Tommi
Bruce Burden
Hillbrath (hill...@aol.com) wrote:
:
: The M18 was a bit of an odd ball in all this, essentially the idea of a big gun
: (but, it was only the 76), little armor and high speed. Although I am not
: particularly fascinated by this idea, it seemed to be the most popular of the
: TDs with the crews.
:
The M-18 was also McNair's pet project. He hated being forced
to accept the M-10, which he saw as too slow and big. I think the
crews like the speed of the M-18, but they also disliked the "German"
flavor if its appearance. They were generally festooned with stars.
:
: However, the Germans didn't use that many
: turretless TDs, either.
:
Henry, please explain this. The Germans used few (zero?) turreted
TD's. I can't think of any German TD's (Panzerjeagers or Jagd
panzers) that were turreted. The early ones were open topped,
later ones were completely enclosed, but turreted? That was
simply a gun tank.
George F. Hardy
<7640...@CompuServe.COM> says:
> I need help! I've lost track of what this thread was about.
>Would someone please tell me what the original topic of
>discussion was?
Sure. In short. Did the Americans short their GIs by
staying with the Sherman instead of substituting a
heavier (armor, cannon whatever) tank? To offset the
Panther, Tiger, whatever.
Numbers count:. Does five Shermans offset 1 Tiger?
Time counts: A troubled, problem-plagued design
with no spare parts counts.
So, sort of a war game.
GFH
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The Anchor Stone Building Set (Anker-Steinbaukasten) Home Page
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Frank Copeland
>>There were only a handful of Tiger IIs that had a good chance of surviving any
>>number of hits by the best Allied anti-tank guns (the 17 pounder, and the 90mm)
>
>But I said, and I left it in so you can see it again, "common in
>German service." The 17lb and 90mm guns were _not_ common in Allied
>service until the end of '44, and even then they weren't the easiest
>to come by unless tank?SPAT mounted.
Where do your facts come from? Every British and Canadian division in
Normady had an anti-tank regiment of 48 17pdrs. In the infantry divisions
all were towed, in the armoured divisions half were SP. In addition one tank
in 4 mounted a 17pdr. This applied not only to the armoured divisions, but
also to the independant armoured brigades attached to the infantry
divisions. Not to mention that there was usally an additional AT regiment
as corps troops. There was *no* shortage of effective AT guns in the
Anglo-Canadian sector, where most of the German armour was.
Not to mention that the bulk of the German armour was Pz IVs and StuG IIIs
that were easy prey to the 75mm and 6pdr guns that were available in even
greater numbers.
Things weren't so good in the American sector, as they only had the less
powerful 3"/76mm to call on. Then again they faced far less of the German
armour, and the 3"/76mm was just as good as the German 75mm Pak 40. Once
more every division had a battalion of 3" tank destroyers to call on in
addition to the numerous 75mm and 57mm AT guns that were adequate to deal
with the bulk of the German armour.
>The most common Allied AT guns, in the period which I defined in the
>first post to this thread, were the 57mm/6lb and the 75mm. The others
>may have been abundant in relation to the numbers of panzers, but
>abundancy may not reflect actual use against panzers.
Why do you say that? Have you any reason to believe that the British held
back their 17pdrs? Does not the fact that one tank in every troop mounted a
17pdr suggest that they were always around when they were needed?
>The British, by
>the nature of their place in the Normandy battles, and the luck of
>panzer unit placement and rail lines, came up against panzers much
>more often.
And they were much better prepared to deal with them than the Americans.
Which is another way of saying they were a greater threat, and may explain
why the Germans concentrated 80% of their armour against them.
--
Home Page: <URL:http://thingy.apana.org.au/~fjc/>
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Keep it in Usenet. E-mail replies and 'courtesy' copies are not welcome.
If you're selling, I ain't buying.
Jay
> So, I think you need to rethink your statement that the
> 17pdr was NOT common in Allied service until the end of 1944.
Well, in a desperate attempt to salvage my credibility: I _did_ say
"Allied" use, so it wasn't in common use by American forces. That
being said, I will concede that I misspoke. The 17lb AT gun was common
(relatively, anyway) in Commonwealth service.
>: The most common Allied AT guns, in the period which I defined in the
>: first post to this thread, were the 57mm/6lb and the 75mm. The others
>:
> What 75mm? Are you referring to the 75mm on the Sherman?
Yes.
> The US 3" guns (all 301 of them) in the US 1st & 3rd Armies
> fired 399,834 rounds between "D" Day and VE Day.
That's a wonderful statistic, but hardly relevant if some of those
rounds were fired at targets other than tanks.
>: The M4's amphib capability was improvised, adn could have been adapted
>: to whatever tank was deemed needed.
>:
> Interesting assertion.
What's so interesting. The Sherman, by virtue of it's height (which is
a disadvantage in other situations) was perhaps more adaptable to
amphibious kludges, but _no_ Allied tank was produced with an
amphibious capability built in. Had there been no Shermans, I'm sure
something else would have been adapted.
> Interesting paragraph. Where, then, does that leave the
> T-34 in relation to the Sherman? It would seem that you dislike
> the Sherman because it was undergunned (in the 75mm versions)
> and underarmored (in all widespread flavors). So, if we take the
> above and apply it to your numbers to the T-34 (the most common
> tanke of WWII), does that mean that the T-34 was also obsolete?
The T-34 was obsolescent (as was the Sherman, I think you may want to
note my syntax here, since I've never said "obsolete") by June of '44
as well, and this was well recognized by the Soviets.
> Also, you proposed using the Centurian earlier. Do you have
> any objections to the T-26E3, which was what the US proposed to
> replace the Shermans with? I can find info on the T-26E3 more
> easily than I can on the Centurian, is why I ask.
I have the opposite problem, since I have some info on the Centurion,
but none ready to hand on the T-26E3. However, from what little I can
remember about it, I have no objection to that tank.
Jay
Ottawa, Ontario
Remove the wildcard when replying by email.
Hillbrath
Jay wrote:
>bru...@bga.com (Bruce Burden) wrote:
>> So, I think you need to rethink your statement that the
>> 17pdr was NOT common in Allied service until the end of 1944.
> Well, in a desperate attempt to salvage my credibility:
> I _did_ say "Allied" use, so it wasn't in common use by
> American forces. That being said, I will concede that
> I misspoke. The 17lb AT gun was common
> (relatively, anyway) in Commonwealth service.
AFAIK, the 17 pounder was never used by the Americans, at all.
>>: The most common Allied AT guns, in the period which
>: I defined in thefirst post to this thread, were the 57mm/6lb
>: and the 75mm. The others
>> What 75mm? Are you referring to the 75mm on the Sherman?
>Yes.
>> The US 3" guns (all 301 of them) in the US 1st & 3rd Armies
>> fired 399,834 rounds between "D" Day and VE Day.
>That's a wonderful statistic, but hardly relevant if some of those
>rounds were fired at targets other than tanks.
The 3inch "Naval" gun on towed AT mount was the American equivilant to the 17
pounder (though not as effective). The 3 inch had the same performance as the
76mm used in some TDs and some M4 tanks but had a longer recoil stroke. The 76
was probaby the most common American AT gun in late '44/'45.
In addition, there were quite a few 90mm AA guns, which were as suitable for AT
work as the 88, but seldom used in that role. There was an experimental AT
mount for it, but it was decided that it was a bit heavy for that role, and
that towed guns were not of much interest, anyway. After that, all the 90mm AT
guns were put in M36s. It is always said that the M36 was just fine, but there
were not enough of them. There were around 2000 built before the end of the
war, about as many as Fireflies, so they were not all that rare.
[snip]
> What's so interesting. The Sherman, by virtue of it's height
> (which is a disadvantage in other situations)
I recently made a brief stop at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. They have a very
impressive display of various tanks that has been put together in the last 10
years or so.
With them all lined up in rows, it is pretty hard to tell that the Sherman is
any higher than other common WW II tanks, but it does seem to be, by a couple
of inches. Which is in conflict with some of the sources that I have seen,
including some published by APG, which say the M4 is a few inches *shorter*
than the Tiger an Panther.
> was perhaps more adaptable to amphibious kludges, but _no_
> Allied tank was produced with an amphibious capability built in. > Had there
been no Shermans, I'm sure something else would
> have been adapted.
No doubt that the DD scheme, which is what I think you are talking about, would
have been adapted to other tanks. The height of the Sherman had nothing to do
with it.
I think that I started the talk about being adapted for "amphibious"
operations, and what I was thinking of was that it was the right size for the
landing craft available, which is an amphibious capability of its own. Panthers
and Tigers (Or IS-IIs) had the been available would not have fit.
[snip]
Henry Hillbrath
Zhivan
>The T-34 was obsolescent (as was the Sherman, I think you may want to
>note my syntax here, since I've never said "obsolete") by June of '44
>as well, and this was well recognized by the Soviets.
The T-34, obsolete in June 1944 ? The T-34/85 had more armour frontally than a
Tiger (counting the effect of slope), the firepower of a M4A3E8(76), and the
mobility of a Cromwell ! And you call it obsolete ???
<shakes head>
Zhivan
Hillbrath
> Hillbrath (hill...@aol.com) wrote:
>: However, the Germans didn't use that many
>: turretless TDs, either.
:
> Henry, please explain this. The Germans used few (zero?)
> turretedTD's. I can't think of any German TD's (Panzerjeagers
> or Jagd panzers) that were turreted. The early ones were
> open topped, later ones were completely enclosed,
> but turreted? That was simply a gun tank.
Well, I didn't say that very well, for sure.
I didn't mean to imply that they used any turreted TDs, at all. I don't know of
any either.
What I was trying to get at was that the reason for the Jagd panzers was said
to be that they were much easier to build, and therefore, more could be
produced. But, actually, few were. At least, in the west, there were not that
many. Only about 200, maybe, out of 1800, maybe, in France on D-Day. (sources
vary, some think it was 1800 plus 200.)
I can only assume that the Germans didn't really find the Jagd panzers that
useful, and, they would have been much better for the circumstances they found
themselves in that those the Allies had to deal with. (or, Defense vs.
Offense, to put it simply.)
Henry Hillbrath
John D Salt
>
>> Jeff Heidman <jheidman@What_should_you_docs.arizona.edu> wrote:
>> > Whether you wish to accept it or not, the primary method in WWII
>> > of engaging an enemy armored force is with your own armor.
>>
>> Well, no; but lots of people made the same mistake during the
>> war, especially, but not only, the Brtitish in the Western Desert.
>>
>> The "primary method" in WW2 of engaging an enemy armoured force
>> is with your anti-tank guns (think Halfaya, think Snipe, think
>> Hunt's Gap, think Pakfronts at Kursk).
>
I suppose it depends on what you meant by "primary method". I meant
the method that most frequently occurred on the battlefield, and the
method that resulted in the destruction of most tanks. How you can
say that this "in reality ... was not the case" is quite beyond me,
as I have cited four instances of it occurring, very famously, in
reality. It should not be a very hard task to come up with a long
list of other such instances.
>especially when on the offensive. It is very difficult to engage an
>enemy tank with a towed AT gun unless he comes to you.
True, by and large. But remember that tanks are, at least in the
tactical doctrines of all the pricipal armour-using powers of WW2,
primarily offensive weapons. This means that large tank-versus-tank
fights are comparatively rare, occurring either by accident or
as a result of a tank-led local counterattack. The latter was,
admittedly, a keystone of German tactics; but the Germans had a
lot more ATk-capable guns on SP and field mountings than they
had tanks, especially in NW Europe in 1944. Simply, what Shermans
faced from D-Day onwards was, as Henry has already pointed out,
much more likely to be an HE target than an AP one.
> [snips]
>the 75L46 brewqed them up.I have heard that the 76 and 17lber where not
>as effective as the 75mm, but from what I have seen the difference in
>effect was relatively minimal.
It was enough of a difference for the troops using the weapons and
the staffs administering their equipment to notice.
> The net effect of the Sherman being
>unable to take even one shot from the typical german AT gun was that
>when they ran into them, a few Shermans died, the rest withdrew, and the
>position was punded with artillery. It works, but is not particularly
>ideal.
If you are claiming that Shermans did not engage ATk guns with direct
fire, you are plain wrong.
>If the Sherman was designed just for infantry support, then I would
>prefer an M7 Priest anyway. Much larger HE round.
Indeed! At one point, there was a proposal for US tanks to be equipped
75% with the 105mm howitzer and 25% with the 90mm. Nothing came of
it, which seems rather a shame. Similarly, I've seen a memo from
(IIRC) Brigadier Hinde immediately after his embarrassment at Villers-
Bocage, asking for the immediate development of a sabot round for the
75mm, and again it seems a shame that this does not seem to have
been pursued with any vigour.
> Sure the armor is
>thinner, but then tanks aren't supposed to have thick armor...right?
Wrong -- which, of course, is why I've never suggested anything of
the sort.
DBSDESIGN
> AP shot 40 percent
> Hollow charge 25
> Mines 16
> High explosive 8
> Air attack 6 (Ooops, missed on that one)
> Abandonment 5
> There are still a lot of questions that can be asked, even with
> those precise numbers, like, "what does it mean."
That's for sure. Those estimates are not consistent with
how the German tank crews feared Allied airpower. They
sure didn't spend all their time hiding from Allied tanks.
Unlike tanks, aircraft didn't have to score a direct hit to
knock out AFVs. Besides, it's not uncommon for statistics
to be inaccurate. I think this is a good example.
> It says that these are "a fair estimate of the reasons for most
> tanks being knocked out" before "abandonment became the rule."
I wonder who conducted the survey and examined the AFVs.
The Army or the Air Force? Maybe Both?
Looks like an Army job to me :-) Burned-out or abandoned
vehicles is a gray area. Why were they abandoned? Because
they broke down or got hit with napalm? Ditto for tanks
damaged by high explosives. Unless it's a direct hit, only
a ballistics expert could tell if a tank was hit by artillery,
bombs, or rockets. I doubt if there were too many qualified
people floating around Normandy. And they probably didn't
spend much time investigating individual hulks either.
Jeff Heidman
Well, that was probably not a good analogy. The original poster was making the
> point that Panthers had a lot of frontal armor, and I was trying to make the
> point that just having a lot of armor was not the whole story (though ships,
> including the "Texas" probably had as much or more effect on the fighting in
> Normandy than panzers did.)
The point I was trying to make was that the Panthers armor had the ability to take
almost anything the allies could throw at it. This is ONE facet of a good tank
design. It also had an excellent gun that could penetrate any vehicle its enemies
chose to come at it with, from almost any range, and any side. It has reasonable
speed, and reasonable reliability (once the kinks were worked out. That whole
bursting into flames when you turn the engine on bit was not so good). All around
I think it was the finest tank of the war. Except, of course, when it had to take
on the Texas... :-)
> Well, I didn't make any judgment as to how significant the error was. However,
> APCR is (as I said) a British designation. I suppose that the brits might be
> as likely to use it for American as any other kind of ammunition, but, it falls
> very odd on my ears for American ammo. I suppose that I am not the only person
> that objects to the use of foreign terms in preference to native ones. (Though
> I understand that all tungsten carbide cores were manufactured by the British,
> no matter what ammo they were incorporated into.)
As the original poster, I thought it was a little nitpicky. It has been my
experience to refer to all allied advanced AT ammunition as APCR. I think everyone
knows what you mean. For instance, rarely does anyone refer to standard AP ammo as
APCBC (I think that is the correct designation.) But who really cares on way or
the other.
> Exploitation of breakthroughs by tanks was a concept that was incorporated into
> US armor doctrine and was included in the training of armored forces, although
> it didn't really seem to fit in with other parts of armored doctrine (like
> emphasis on infantry support.) Right or wrong, COBRA, and the Falaise
> encirclement was an amazing vindication of exploitation doctrine, but, it was
> only an accident of war that the circumstances developed so that the concept
> could be implemented.
You have no argument here. I would just contend that exploitation was not
prediacted on the Sherman. A better tank could exploit as effectively as the
Sherman. In fact, it was lack of supplies that eventually stopped the Allied drive
into France and Belgium, not lack of tanks.
> >> Why is it better to make an AT gun towed than SP, if you can
> >> build a lot of TDs? (Which the Allies could, and the Germans could not?)
>
> >You have also said that apart from the open top turrets, the US TDs
> >were really tanks.
>
> I agree with that, and I also agree that the open turrets were a mistake, one
> that eventually had to be fixed. Despite a lot of nonsense about the open tops,
> the real fact was that in any sort of close in fighting, in forests, towns,
> etc. it made the TD very vulnerable to attack by infantry. No need for a
> PanzerFaust when all you have to do is lob a grenade over the side.
>
> > Now you compare them to towed AT guns. Should
> > they not be compared to German tanks instead?
>
> It is perfectly possible to compare TDs to tanks, towed AT guns, and SP guns,
> as well. There is a lot of overlap in the roles and characteristics of all
> these weapons.
Certainly fair if you compare them fairly. Comparing one M10 to the number of AT
guns you could produce with the same resources is fair, comparing them one-one is
not, which is what you (I thjnk it was you) were doing. Something along the lines
of "A Sherman is superior to an AT gun since a SHerman can kill any AT gun since
it has no armor." Which is true, but a little unfair.
> > My point is that the US wasted resources on "almost tank" TDs
> > when they could have been building more real tanks instead.
> > A US style TD was admittedly much better than a towed AT gun,
> > but it was also much more expensive, in fact almost as expensive
> > as a real tank.
>
> There is a lot of talk about "expense" in relation to weapons. In fact, once
> the war began, there was no concern, in the US at least, about expense, only
> "resource allocations."
Expense in these terms is interchangeable with "resource allocation". Almost all
of the combatants economies were soley dedicated towards the war effort, hence
currency cost is largely irrelevant, although can be used to represent resource
allocation. Presumably the US government paid GM some dollar amount for each M4
produced, and that dollar amount had some sort of relation to the amount of
resources necessary to produce the vehicle. I imagine the other combatants worked
in some similar fashion, with the probable exception of the USSR.Given that, it is
interesting to note that the stated DM cost of the Panther was very similar to the
cost of the PzIVH. Presumably the IVH construction facilities were supposed to be
converted to Panther production at some point, but inefficienceies in the German
economy never allowed this to happen. It has been a long time since I did any
reading on that subject, so I could be off.
> American style TDs were probably no cheaper than M4s,
> but, they were not bad "resource allocations" because they did provide some
> additional tank fighting capability with no additional shipping requirements,
> and shipping was the most critical resource to be allocated.
Given that the M4 was so inept when it ran upa gainst most German armor, I would
agree that the TD was not a bad idea. A better idea would have been to just make a
better tank in the first place.
But you want to compare tanks with AT guns. It is certainly MUCH easier to build
and ship AT guns than tanks. So if the Germans can trade AT guns for Shermans,
they are coming out ahead in the resource department. Now, in reality, the
Americans could actually afford this trade (or whatever the number actually is),
but that does not mean it was the best way to go.
The 76mm gun was developed with a more compact recoil system and the same
> ballistics as the 3 inch. Once it was fitted to the M4, and the M10 as well,
> the M10 really didn't make any sense. Someone figured that out, and fitted the
> 90mm, (as the M36) which restored the initial concept, same chassis as a tank
> but bigger gun.
And the M36 was a pretty decent weapon system, for its role. Would have been nice
a lot earlier though...
> The M18 was a bit of an odd ball in all this, essentially the idea of a big gun
> (but, it was only the 76), little armor and high speed. Although I am not
> particularly fascinated by this idea, it seemed to be the most popular of the
> TDs with the crews.
Well, if the armor you have (M10) isn't going to stop anything anyway, you might
as well be real fast instead...
> No matter what the merits of any particular TD, TD forces had one big
> advantage, they were trained, and expected to, fight tanks. Therefore, the
> almost always faired better in fights with tanks than infantry support units
> that happened to fall into a tank fight by mistake or bad luck.
The Sherman was not soley designed to be an infantry support weapon. This was the
mistake made by the French in 1940, dispersing their tanks in infantry support
roles. The US certainly used Sherman in infantry support roles, but they also used
them in armored divisions that were designed to be able to take on anything that
gets in their way. Sometimes the things in their way was more tanks, and quite
opften it was AT guns. SHermans faired poorly against both of these.The idea that
tanks should not/would not/could not fight other tanks is a pipe dream. Look at
the design of tanks since the early part of WWII up until today. There is a
constant evolution driven by the attempt to make my tank better than your tank.
According to the Sherman lobby, the last 50+ years of tank design has somehow
missed the whole point.
> I use to think that the turretless design had advantages, too. But, after a lot
> of though on the subject, and a lot of reading, I have concluded that
> turretless TDs were not a good deal for the US. The reason is that turrets do
> have their advantages, they allow the tank/TD to fire (or be ready to fire) in
> a different direction than the vehicle is pointing. While the turretless type
> may be fine in static defense, it is clumsy in the offense. Since the Americans
> were not planning to be (and seldom were) defending, they needed turrets.
Agree completely. The SP gun/TD concept as created by the Germans was uniquely
suited to their circumstance. It would not have been a good idea for the
Americans.
> The use of less resources, as long as no more shipping was required, was not an
> important issue for the Americans, though it may have been for the Russians,
> and certainly was for the Germans. However, the Germans didn't use that many
> turretless TDs, either.
I think one of the driving factor for turretless TDs for the Germans was the
desire to mount more powerful guns on old chassis like the PzIII/IV and Czech
desgns. This then grew into purpose-built chassis for TDs.
I agree that as far as the Americans are concerned, shipping is the issue. I do
not agree that the Sherman was the best compromise however. Quantity is certainly
important, but only up to a point. You can saturate an area only so much. I think
that the US could create the ability to ship just about anything in the quantity
necessary to get the job done, especially since we had several years to truck all
that stuff across the Atlantic. The real shipping problem comes when you need to
supply that force. And two Panthers probably need less supply than six Shermans
(using the 3 for 1 analogy, which I think is bunk anyway).
Lack of any combined arms capability (especially air support) was exactly the
> reason that panzers were unsuccessful in all attempts at offensive action in
> the ETO in 44/45. Good tanks were worthless with out support.
Agreed. The lack of succes from the Panzers offensively had little to do with the
intrinsic abilities of the machines themselves.
> [snip]
>
> > The question we should be asking is: would the
> > Allied anti-infantry capability have been significantly reduced if
> > more tanks had had the 76mm or the 17 lbr gun? I believe the answer is no, >
> but it is just my personal opinion.
>
> It is very easy to second guess the guys on the spot, fifty years later. I have
> tried very hard to understand their thinking. I can get over the point about
> giving up heavy tanks (with heavy armor) in order to get more tanks. But, I
> think there was a problem with the 76mm not coming up to expectations that
> should have been more actively pursued. And, I would never be happy with tanks
> or TDs that didn't have adequate guns. And, that includes giving up some of the
> infantry support effectiveness that the field commanders valued so highly.
>
> But, that was not the view of the guys that made the decisions, and it was not
> due to any lack of design or production capability on the part of the Allies.
I think that once again I agree. The reason we had Shermans instead of something
better had nothing to do with production or shipping capabilities, but with poor
(in hindsight) decision making by the people who had the ability to choose a
different route for American tank design in WWII.
Jeff Heidman
Hillbrath
> So what was so impossible about getting heavier tanks ashore -
It was not impossible. However, the invasion planners had a lot of stuff to
figure out how to move, and made a decision that tanks had to go in the
existing landing craft. There was a severe shortage of landing craft, the
availability of landing craft was driving strategy all over Europe.
Continual diddling around with "better" designs, rather than standardizing on a
workable design and producing and delivering it in large quantities was a
characteristic difference in the way the Germans and the Americans did things.
In this case, IMO, the Americans were right.
>they managed with Churchills,
I don't know much about Churchills, except that there were not many of them,
they were not well armed, and they seem to have done no better than Shermans in
any engagements that I know about. I don't know how they were landed, perhaps
by way of the Mulberry harbor, which the Americans didn't have a lot of
confidence in.
> and if there had been heavier tanks coming
> through, no doubt a specification for a landing craft that could take
> them would have come through as well. You build capacity for
> what you've got.
I don't know all the details about the landing craft. Steven Ambrose has a book
about Higgins, the landing craft builder, I haven't had a chance to read it.
But, as I understand Ambrose's story, the Navy had been unsuccessful at getting
landing craft that worked, but, somehow, Higgins got into the picture, and
built boats that did work, but, pretty much on his own terms.
Given the choice of going with the existing landing craft, which meant the
existing tanks, or shutting down Higgins, who was building something useful,
the decision was apparently made to stick with what worked. Which probably
wasn't dumb. A typical "programmatic" decision.
> There was no shortage of shipping capacity to get them across the
> Atlantic - it would have meant a few less Shermans parked in the South
> of England waiting for enough space to get them into the beachhead,
There was a shortage of shipping space, because so much stuff was being
shipped. Bigger tanks would have made the problem more severe.
It all came down to a matter of priorities. And, it is true that tanks did not
rank very high in the priorities. Especially not heavier tanks. And, it turned
out that was the right priority, at least for the invasion, and for months
thereafter.
If heavier tanks were needed, the Germans would have made this clear, and
adjustments would have been made. They did not until the Ardennes, at which
time things were already pretty much over with, and there was no time for
adjustments.
> well worth it to get some tougher tanks out there where they
> were needed.
Tougher tanks would have made very little difference to the Americans in
Normandy, except maybe if they had heavier belly armor. The right solution to
bocage was the "Rhino" and didn't require tougher tanks.
The British thought they needed tougher tanks, and some blamed their failure in
GOODWOOD to the failure of the Americans to supply them with Tiger IIs. I think
that the tactical plan for GOODWOOD was insane, and that if the British wanted
better tanks, they were welcome to build them, themselves.
I agree that by the time of the Ardennes, the Americans should have gotten more
heavy guns out there. More armor wasn't required, but would have been nice. M36
TDs were all that were required.
> It's not as if they had to be dropped from an aircraft!
There is no difference, in principal, in being weight constrained by an
aircraft and a landing craft.
[snip]
Henry Hillbrath
Jeff Heidman
> Interesting paragraph. Where, then, does that leave the
> T-34 in relation to the Sherman? It would seem that you dislike
> the Sherman because it was undergunned (in the 75mm versions)
> and underarmored (in all widespread flavors). So, if we take the
> above and apply it to your numbers to the T-34 (the most common
> tanke of WWII), does that mean that the T-34 was also obsolete?
The T-34/76 was initially released in 1941. At the time it was an amazingly
advanced tank. The upgrade to the 85mm gun extended its service life, but by
1944 it was getting near the end of its ability to be effective. The difference
is that the Soviets had designed more potent tanks all along, like Stalin
series. I think it a little unfair to compare a tank that was designed and
released in 1941, was upgraded , and by 1944 was supplated by more appropraite
designs (although it probably remained the most common tank) by 1944, with a
Sherman that was about as good as the T-34/76c released in 1942.
Jeff
Bruce Burden
Jay (mjma...@joker.igs.net) wrote:
: bru...@bga.com (Bruce Burden) wrote:
: >: The M4's amphib capability was improvised, adn could have been adapted
: >: to whatever tank was deemed needed.
: >:
: > Interesting assertion.
: What's so interesting. The Sherman, by virtue of it's height (which is
: a disadvantage in other situations) was perhaps more adaptable to
: amphibious kludges, but _no_ Allied tank was produced with an
: amphibious capability built in. Had there been no Shermans, I'm sure
: something else would have been adapted.
:
The Sherman had slab sides, which helped in mounting things
to the sides. It also was of moderate weight, which made things
easier as well.
Something like the T-26E3, whose hull was the basis for the
M-47/48 family, would have been a bitch to attach floatation
skirts to it, but you are likely right, it COULD have been done.
Whether it would have been worth a damn, on the other hand...
:
: The T-34 was obsolescent (as was the Sherman, I think you may want to
:
Okay. I was just curious, that is all.
:
: I have the opposite problem, since I have some info on the Centurion,
: but none ready to hand on the T-26E3. However, from what little I can
: remember about it, I have no objection to that tank.
:
Okay, good. The only problem with the T-26E3 was its lack
of HP. It used the same Ford V-8 as the M4A3 Sherman, but was
23,000 odd pounds heavier. So, lets assume that the US could
have come up with, say, a 750 HP motor for the Pershing. I will
work on the problems the Pershing would have had with landing
craft and bridges.
And, earlier, I asked for something that would resist a
88mm round from 100 meters. There was a reason - one of the
T-26E3's sent to Europe as part of the Zebra Mission took a
88mm round from 100 meters - it penetrated the mantlet, and
buzzed around the circumference of the turret. So, the only
thing likely to resist such hits would have been the massive
Tortoise and T-26/95 vehicles - wildly impractical to get off
of a landing craft, let along be the primary Allied tanks in
the west.
David Thornley
In article <35A27FD0...@gemini.edu>,
Jeff Heidman <jheidman@What_should_you_docs.arizona.edu> wrote:
>Hillbrath wrote:
>
>> There were also tanks that could at least withstand a frontal hit
>
>> > from most Allied anti-tank guns a reasonable number of times.
>> > The Sherman was grossly outclassed by guns that were common in
>> > German service.
>
>> There were only a handful of Tiger IIs that had a good chance of surviving any> number of hits by the best Allied anti-tank guns (the 17 pounder, and the 90mm)
>
>You aree doing this again. THe comparison he is trying to make is between
>Shermans and "guns that were common in German service." This presumably means
>the 50L60 and 75L46 which were the msot common German AT guns. Note he is not
..[snip]
>Rather, the Panthers commonly encountered the 57mm, 75mm, and 76mm guns,
>which the Panther could stand up to with little concern.
>
This applies only to the U.S. sector, so let's consider the state of
anti-tank guns there.
U.S. organizations were set by Army Ground Forces, which until Normandy
meant General McNair. McNair believed that mobility was all-important,
and seemed to like the idea of a mobile weapon rather than an effective
one. He only reluctantly abandoned the 37mm AT gun, and was certainly
not going to permit those big 3" to be used in U.S. divisions.
The result was that there were a large number of mostly useless 57mm
anti-tank guns in the U.S. armies, and therefore a lot of American
AT guns were ineffectual.
By your argument (much Allied AT guns were ineffectual against many
German tanks vs. the Sherman's vulnerability to most German AT guns),
this means that the Sherman was a bad tank partly because McNair
short-changed U.S. infantry in their anti-tank guns. This does not
seem to me to make sense.
If we consider adequate AT guns, then the 3" with HVAP is certainly
a threat to any German tank.
>> and, contrary to "conventional wisdom" there were a lot of those guns in
>> relation to the total number of panzers that needed their services.
>
>Once again, it is not a numebrs game. You engage with what happens to be there,
>adn teh number of 17lb or 90mm weapons in service through much of the Western
>European theater was small compared to the number of other AT weapons.
>
This depends on what you call an AT weapon, doesn't it? If we count the
..50 caliber machine gun (originally meant as an AT gun), then the
proportion of good U.S. AT weapons goes way down. If we get ridiculous
and count toenails as AT weapons, we find that almost all American AT
weapons are useless against German tanks. If we forget about the silly
57mm guns, then the AT guns look more effective, on the average.
The proportion of effective to ineffective weapons doesn't matter, since
we can play counting games to get different results on the same
equipment basis. What does matter is the number of effective
weapons, either compared to enemy tanks or to friendly forces.
In the ETO, there were usually more tank destroyer battalions around
than divisions. Usually, a division would have one TD battalion more
or less permanently assigned to it, and would frequently have two.
This gives each U.S. division three or six dozen 3" or 76mm guns
which are authorized to use HVAP rounds. This is a significant
number of guns that even Tigers have to take seriously.
>> There were
>> also a lot of other AT weapons, the bazooka, all those captured PanzerFausts,
>> the 60 lb Rocket Projectile, and a lot of others, that were capable of dealing> with *any* panzer.
>
>Bazookas are nearly useless against the frontal armor of any German tank.
>Panzerfausts are nice, but there aren't many of them, and they have a very shortrange. I have no idea what the Rocket Projectile is. Perhaps you could enlightenme as to their effectiveness and employment.
>
The nice thing about the bazooka is that you can sneak up on enemy tanks.
One very common practice in close fighting was to use U.S. artillery to
separate the panzers from the panzergrenadiers, and then stalk the
panzers with bazookas. In this situation, the infantry can usually get
a flank shot. The Panther was very vulnerable to the flank and rear;
even the maligned 75mm or 57mm would have no problem with a Panther
at fairly close range provided they were in the 270-degree arc not
facing the frontal armor. Tigers were better armored all the way
around, but they were few.
I still don't know why bad Allied anti-tank weapons make the Sherman
a lousy tank, other than of course the 75mm gun, but Allied anti-tank
weapons were better than you're giving them credit for.
--
David H. Thornley | These opinions are mine. I
da...@thornley.net | do give them freely to those
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | who run too slowly. O-
Jeff Heidman
Zhivan wrote:
> >
> >The T-34 was obsolescent (as was the Sherman, I think you may want to
> >note my syntax here, since I've never said "obsolete") by June of '44
> >as well, and this was well recognized by the Soviets.
>
> The T-34, obsolete in June 1944 ? The T-34/85 had more armour frontally than a
> Tiger (counting the effect of slope), the firepower of a M4A3E8(76), and the
> mobility of a Cromwell ! And you call it obsolete ???
I think he was talking about the T-34/76, which some in the Sherman
Lobby have compared the "vanilla" M4 to. Of course, the T-34/76 was in
service in 1941, and by 1944 had been largely replaced by the very
decent T-34/85, which was not obsolecent, but was certainly being
surpassed by other designs by then (although none that were
American/British...)
Jeff
term...@utu.fi
rus...@ihug.co.nz (Zhivan) wrote:
> >
> >The T-34 was obsolescent (as was the Sherman, I think you may want to
> >note my syntax here, since I've never said "obsolete") by June of '44
> >as well, and this was well recognized by the Soviets.
>
> The T-34, obsolete in June 1944 ? The T-34/85 had more armour frontally than a
> Tiger (counting the effect of slope), the firepower of a M4A3E8(76), and the
> mobility of a Cromwell ! And you call it obsolete ???
He wrote *obsolescent*, not obsolete! I have to agree with him -- all other
medium tanks were obsolescent compared to the Panther from a purely technical
point of view.
Still, obsolescent and even obsolete tanks can be effective if the enemy does
not have anything better or is numerically inferior. For example in Korea the
UN forces had large numbers of M4A3(76) Shermans, which were clearly obsolete
by then. However, the North Koreans and the Chinese had only T-34/85s, and
against them the Shermans did quite well. We must not forget that crew
quality and tactical considerations are very important as well.
Martin Rapier
{snip}
>I can only assume that the Germans didn't really find the Jagd panzers that
>useful, and, they would have been much better for the circumstances they
found
>themselves in that those the Allies had to deal with. (or, Defense vs.
>Offense, to put it simply.)
Consider doctrine again, JagdPanzers and Panzerjagers were for equipping
divisional/corps/army anti-tank units, not for equipping Panzer Battalions
(although some found their way there).
In 1941 PanzerJagers were the only expedient way of getting a large calibre
gun on a tracked, armoured chassis, and by 1944 even the Volksgrenadier Divs
offically had at least one company of such guns in their AT battalions. It is
much more efficient to fight tanks with dedicated AT units, the Germans
problem was their establishment of AT units was too low (something Rommel
commented on) with only a single battalion per division, when really they
needed a full regiment. The Germans compensated with hand held weapons intead.
It is not surprising however that there were fewer JagdPanzers and Stugs than
Panzers in France in 1944 - different units, different tasks, and the Germans
were trying to concentrate their 'best' units against the Allies. In contrast,
Army Group Centre at this time had 400+ assault guns and JagdPanzers, and only
50+ tanks, as it was thought that its task would be mainly defensive (right
there!) but no major Russian attack would be forthcoming (wrong!). The Panzers
in Normandy were supposed to counterattack (hence the large complement of
tanks), not be used as armoured pillboxes (which is what many of them ended up
as).
Playing 'Panzer Commander' with a jammed turret makes me realise why having a
fully turreted gun is so useful for offensive operations....
Zhivan
>useful, and, they would have been much better for the circumstances they found
>themselves in that those the Allies had to deal with. (or, Defense vs.
>Offense, to put it simply.)
The long gunned StuG-III accounted for more OstFront.tank kills than any other
German vehicle of the war. That seems to indicate the turretless TD/StuG was
very, very useful.
Hillbrath
> That's for sure. Those estimates are not consistent with
> how the German tank crews feared Allied airpower.
In order for that to make any sense, you would first have to establish that the
German panzer crews were rational. Do you have any evidence for that?
[snip]
> Besides, it's not uncommon for statistics
> to be inaccurate. I think this is a good example.
I think the most inaccurate statistics that I can think of off hand are those
for panzers killed by air attack. I think that I have seen one claim for over
1000 in one day!
[snip]
> I wonder who conducted the survey and examined the AFVs.
> The Army or the Air Force? Maybe Both?
The most systematic attempts to determine the causes of panzer kills was by the
British Army, and the most urgent reason they were doing it was to convince the
RAF that seeing a panzer and firing a rocket or dropping a bomb somewhere in
the general area didn't constitute a kill.
> Looks like an Army job to me :-) Burned-out or abandoned
> vehicles is a gray area. Why were they abandoned? Because
> they broke down or got hit with napalm?
I have never heard of a confirmed case of any panzer every being hit with
naplam. None.
> Ditto for tanks
> damaged by high explosives. Unless it's a direct hit, only
> a ballistics expert could tell if a tank was hit by artillery,
> bombs, or rockets. I doubt if there were too many qualified
> people floating around Normandy. And they probably didn't
> spend much time investigating individual hulks either.
That is quite true, there were not many, but, there were some.
So, since you don't want to believe what the found, you want to go with some
*really* subjective data, what the panzer guys were afraid of.
Actually, it is true that they were afraid of airplanes. And there was some
justification.
In GOODWOOD, and COBRA, the heavy bombers were used to try to make a hole in
the line before hand. For various reasons, that was not entirely successful in
GOODWOOD. In COBRA, there were some shortfalls, and quite a few Allied
casualties. The Americans were certainly afraid of airplanes, which were amost
all friendly.
The main target was the Panzer Lehr Division. Some versions claimed that there
was not much effect of the bombardment, and some claimed that only a very few
panzers were destroyed. But, after a day or two of probing, it was found that
only the very most forward elements of Panzer Lehr were left and the rest of
the division had virtually vanished.
Somewhere I read that the German's called those endless streams of tight bomber
boxes "Party Rallies" after the famous parades fo the Thirties. I can not now
find where I read that.
It seems that Party Rallies were a more effective way of breaking through
panzer formations than Tigers were of breaking through Allied formations. And,
"Jabos" were effective, on occasion. So, the Germans were justified in
"Airplane Fright." But, airplanes still didn't directly kill a lot of panzers.
Henry Hillbrath
term...@utu.fi
hill...@aol.com (Hillbrath) wrote:
> I can only assume that the Germans didn't really find the Jagd panzers that
> useful, and, they would have been much better for the circumstances they found> themselves in that those the Allies had to deal with. (or, Defense vs.
> Offense, to put it simply.)
You are forgetting that the StuGs, although infantry support vehicles in
theory, were used increasingly as TDs towards the end of the war. The StuG
IIIg was produced in larger quantity than any other German armored vehicle. I
do not know how common they were in the West, but they surely were very
common in the East, where most of the tank battles took place.
Tero P. Mustalahti
-----== Posted via Deja News, The Leader in Internet Discussion ==-----
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Jay
>>
>>The T-34 was obsolescent (as was the Sherman, I think you may want to
>>note my syntax here, since I've never said "obsolete") by June of '44
>>as well, and this was well recognized by the Soviets.
>
>The T-34, obsolete in June 1944 ? The T-34/85 had more armour frontally than a
>Tiger (counting the effect of slope), the firepower of a M4A3E8(76), and the
>mobility of a Cromwell ! And you call it obsolete ???
You failed to read the whole exchange. The individual to whom I
replied was clearly speaking of the T-34/76 variants, and they were
certainly obsolescent by '44. The T-34/85 was acknowledged by the
Soviets as a stop-gap because the T-44 (I think it was, with the 85mm
gun) was proving less than successful in the design stage, and the
heavies, JS-series, were not yet available either.
term...@utu.fi
hill...@aol.com (Hillbrath) wrote:
> Tero P. Mustalahti wrote:
> I suppose that I am not the only person
> that objects to the use of foreign terms in preference to native ones. (Though
> I understand that all tungsten carbide cores were manufactured by the British,
> no matter what ammo they were incorporated into.)
Well, that is a question I can not comment. English is not my native
language, so all English terms are foreign for me. However, when referring
to German or Soviet ammunition the British terminology seems to be the
standard.
> *I* admitted that? I am not sure what TD doctrine being obsolescent, or not,
> has to do with the point. Whatever it was. However, what I think I would have
> said was that TD doctrine was to a large extent something supported by Gen.
> Leslie MacNair. When MacNair was killed, in the bombing preparation for COBRA,
> TDs became somewhat "Non Politically Acceptable" and were neglected. There is
> (maybe) a difference in that and being obsolescent.
Perhaps, but then again perhaps it was only MacNair's person that kept the
already obsolescent doctrine in favor before he was killed.
> TDs proved their worth on a number of occasions (in their part of
> defeating the German attempt to cut off the breakout at Mortain, for
> example). But, the one occasion in NW Europe campaign in which TD
> doctrine could have really been tested was Ardennes breakthrough.
I did not claim that the TDs were worthless, but I think that the concept
of a separate TD force was inferior to the modern doctrine, which is that
tanks are the primary anti-tank force.
> I use to think that the turretless design had advantages, too. But, after a
> lot of though on the subject, and a lot of reading, I have concluded
> that turretless TDs were not a good deal for the US. The reason is that
> turrets do have their advantages, they allow the tank/TD to fire (or be
> ready to fire) in a different direction than the vehicle is pointing.
> While the turretless type may be fine in static defense, it is clumsy in
> the offense. Since the Americans were not planning to be (and seldom
> were) defending, they needed turrets.
I did not mean to suggest that the US should have produced turretless TDs;
the US should have produced more real tanks instead of open turret TDs.
The turretless designs made sense for the Germans and the Soviets, but the
"almost tank" TDs in separate units were not the best solution for the US.
The M10s should have had an enclosed turret and more armor from the
beginning and they should have been incorporated in the regular tank units
much in the same way as the British incorporated Fireflys and Challengers
to Sherman and Cromwell units, respectively. All this with a perfect 20/20
hindsight, of course...
Jay
>It all came down to a matter of priorities. And, it is true that tanks did not
>rank very high in the priorities. Especially not heavier tanks. And, it turned
>out that was the right priority, at least for the invasion, and for months
>thereafter.
Just to do some hair-splitting: it turned out that it worked, which is
not the same as being the right priority. We don't have enough data,
it seems, to draw any absolute conclusion (the old "proving a
negative" problem). Personally, I think it could have been done, but
I'm not thinking in absolutist terms of replacing _all_ of the
Shermans.
Jay
>>> The US 3" guns (all 301 of them) in the US 1st & 3rd Armies
>>> fired 399,834 rounds between "D" Day and VE Day.
>
>>That's a wonderful statistic, but hardly relevant if some of those
>>rounds were fired at targets other than tanks.
>
>The 3inch "Naval" gun on towed AT mount was the American equivilant to the 17
>pounder (though not as effective). The 3 inch had the same performance as the
>76mm used in some TDs and some M4 tanks but had a longer recoil stroke. The 76
>was probaby the most common American AT gun in late '44/'45.
Which really has naff-all to do with the number of rounds fired.
>> What's so interesting. The Sherman, by virtue of it's height
>> (which is a disadvantage in other situations)
>
>I recently made a brief stop at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. They have a very
>impressive display of various tanks that has been put together in the last 10
>years or so.
>
>With them all lined up in rows, it is pretty hard to tell that the Sherman is
>any higher than other common WW II tanks, but it does seem to be, by a couple
>of inches. Which is in conflict with some of the sources that I have seen,
>including some published by APG, which say the M4 is a few inches *shorter*
>than the Tiger an Panther.
Since we didn't have Tigers and Panthers you aren't making a point.
Having recently done a course at CFB Borden, where the Worthington
Park museum is (the CF Tank museum), I noted that the Sherman had a
higher profile than everything in the park except the Panther, the
M-60A3 and the Whippet. I don't imply that any of those three would
have been better for D-Day (well, the M-60 would, but the quantum
problems of getting one there outweigh any problems with fitting it in
a Higgins landing craft).
>I think that I started the talk about being adapted for "amphibious"
>operations, and what I was thinking of was that it was the right size for the
>landing craft available, which is an amphibious capability of its own. Panthers
>and Tigers (Or IS-IIs) had the been available would not have fit.
I don't see either the Sherman being completely replaced in Allied
service, or the need to have heavy tanks on the beach. An LST could
adequately carry a heavier tank, in smaller numbers of course, to the
beach in order to fight the breakout battles.
I think the problem is that we are both looking at this from different
angles. I think in terms of it being desireable to have a tank that
doesn't die 95% of the time when hit by 75mm shot.
Bruce Burden
: The T-34/76 was initially released in 1941. At the time it was an amazingly
:
No, it made its combat debut in 1941. The T-34 first left
production lines in September, 1940, as the 1940 model. It was
equipped with the L-11 gun, which was a waste of a vehicle.
They were quickly upgraded to the F-34 gun.
:
: series. I think it a little unfair to compare a tank that was designed and
: released in 1941, was upgraded , and by 1944 was supplated by more appropraite
: designs (although it probably remained the most common tank) by 1944, with a
: Sherman that was about as good as the T-34/76c released in 1942.
:
It is only "unfair" if you are willing to overlook the
fact that the Sherman (M4) was a direct descendent of the
M3 Medium tank, which was standardized on 11 July 1940.
There is essentially no difference between the M3 and M4
below the upper hull.
And, I will argue that the Sherman was more effective
in combat than the T-34/76 series due to the latters 2
man turret crew. The T-34/85 corrected this problem, and
at that time I would say things were a draw between the
T-34/85 and the M4 with the 76mm gun.
And, as for the JS-II, well, yeah, it was a decent tank.
As long as you didn't run out of ammo. You only had 28
rounds of ammo! And it was a split type, so loading was a
bit "slow". Not to mention that about 3800 JS-II's were
produced, as opposed to approximately 65,000 T-34's. So,
I would be hard pressed to call the T-34 "supplanted" in
production in WWII.
Martin Rapier
hill...@AOL.COM says...
>chris wrote:
{snip}
>>they managed with Churchills,
>
>I don't know much about Churchills, except that there were not many of
>them, they were not well armed, and they seem to have done no better than
>Shermans in any engagements that I know about. I don't know how they were
>landed, perhaps by way of the Mulberry harbor, which the Americans didn't
>have a lot of confidence in.
They were landed by LSTs and LCTs just like all the other tanks. They were
sealed to wade in 7 feet of water.
Fair numbers were landed (six regiments of dedicated I tanks, plus all the
support variants of 79th Armoured Div) but obviously not as many as
Shermans, Cromwells etc.
The advantages of the Churchill were its thick armour (very very thick for
the mark VII, enough to keep out 75L48s, and even 88s on occasion) and
extremely good cross country and hill climbing performance. The approach
of Churchill Crocodiles was often enough to get defenders to surrender
without a shot fired. It was still underamed with 6pdr or 75L40 gun though
(enough to take on the vast majority of German tanks apart from the Tiger
though).
term...@utu.fi
hill...@aol.com (Hillbrath) wrote:
> It is always said that the M36 was just fine, but there
> were not enough of them. There were around 2000 built before the end of the
> war, about as many as Fireflies, so they were not all that rare.
I think the armor of the M36 was a little too light for the whole vehicle to
be "just fine". Even the German 75mm L48 could easily penetrate the armor of
the M36 from any angle. Unlike the M18, the M36 was not that fast either so
it could not rely on hit and run tactics.
Jeff Heidman
> chris wrote:
>
> > So what was so impossible about getting heavier tanks ashore -
>
> It was not impossible. However, the invasion planners had a lot of stuff
> to figure out how to move, and made a decision that tanks had to go in
> the existing landing craft. There was a severe shortage of landing
> craft, the availability of landing craft was driving strategy all over
> Europe.
> Continual diddling around with "better" designs, rather than
> standardizing on a workable design and producing and delivering it in
> large quantities was a characteristic difference in the way the Germans
> and the Americans did things. In this case, IMO, the Americans were
> right.
I think that there is probably a lot of room to improve on the Sherman
without having to go to the other extreme of the German model. You seem to
think that it was either a) build the Sherman, or b) build 50 marginally
different designs in a futile effort to build the perfect tank.
I think there is a c) use a little forsight and apply some of that
American inguenuity in 1942 to design a superior vehicle instead of making
something that is marginally effective.
I find it difficult to believe that it was not possible in 1942/43 to
project that the SHerman designed right now was going to be outdated in
another year and a half. All you had to do was look at the progression of
armor/armament between 1939 and late 1942/early 1943 to see what was
happening.
> >they managed with Churchills,
>
> I don't know much about Churchills, except that there were not many of
> them, they were not well armed, and they seem to have done no better
> than Shermans in any engagements that I know about. I don't know how
> they were landed, perhaps by way of the Mulberry harbor, which the
> Americans didn't have a lot of confidence in.
ALl you have to know in relation to this argument is that they were wmuch
heavier than Shermans. They could have been 40 ton blocks of steel, and
that isn't relevant. You are bringing in a completely different issue in
an effort to obscure the point that the ALlies could (and did) land heavy
tanks over the beach. Churchills supported the British ariborne at
Pegasus Brudge on day one, so they where brought in over the beach.
Whether they were good tanks or not is another issue entirely.
> I don't know all the details about the landing craft. Steven Ambrose has
> a book about Higgins, the landing craft builder, I haven't had a chance
> to read it. But, as I understand Ambrose's story, the Navy had been
> unsuccessful at getting landing craft that worked, but, somehow, Higgins
> got into the picture, and built boats that did work, but, pretty much on
> his own terms.
AFAIK the Higgins boats did not carry tanks anyway, so this is a red
herring at best.
> Given the choice of going with the existing landing craft, which meant the
> existing tanks, or shutting down Higgins, who was building something useful,
> the decision was apparently made to stick with what worked. Which probably
> wasn't dumb. A typical "programmatic" decision.
No, because again you are assuming that the only time the decisions to
build something more capable than the SHerman could be made was in 1944.
If a more capable tank had been designed from the start, certaintly a LST
that could handle it would also have ben designed. This is assuming that
the current LSTs could not, which has not been established anyway.
> > There was no shortage of shipping capacity to get them across the
> > Atlantic - it would have meant a few less Shermans parked in the South
> > of England waiting for enough space to get them into the beachhead,
>
> There was a shortage of shipping space, because so much stuff was being
> shipped. Bigger tanks would have made the problem more severe.
We had well over two years to get the necessary troops and equipment to
England. That was not the problem, or at least not the major one.
> If heavier tanks were needed, the Germans would have made this clear, and
> adjustments would have been made. They did not until the Ardennes, at which
> time things were already pretty much over with, and there was no time for
> adjustments.
They did make it abundantly clear by destroying a lot of Shermans by AT
guns, other tanks, etc. Personally, I do not feel that it is necessary for
the US forces to ever settle for "adequate" tanks. With our technology and
resources we could/should and can/do build the finest equipment in the
world. We did in WWII for many, many weapons systems. Tanks should not
have been any different.
> > well worth it to get some tougher tanks out there where they
> > were needed.
>
> Tougher tanks would have made very little difference to the Americans in
> Normandy, except maybe if they had heavier belly armor. The right
> solution to bocage was the "Rhino" and didn't require tougher tanks.
Not all Normandy is bocage, and not all Shermans were lost to belly hits
trying to breach it. Many where were lost to AT guns and enemy armor. You
do not by any means have to achieve a belly hit to knocj out a Sherman.
You seem to be trying to say that the only fighting the Americans did
until the Bulge was in the bocage. Not to mention the British who also
had inferior tanks to the Germans. One tank in four capable of taking out
an enemy vehicle is small consoloation when ALL of the enemies vehicles
can take out your own.
> The British thought they needed tougher tanks, and some blamed their
> failure in GOODWOOD to the failure of the Americans to supply them with
> Tiger IIs. I think that the tactical plan for GOODWOOD was insane, and
> that if the British wanted better tanks, they were welcome to build
> them, themselves.
Not sure what the point is here. I think if the British wanted better
tanks, they were right. Having fought the Germans for quite a bit longer
than the AMericans, perhaps there opinion had some merit.
> I agree that by the time of the Ardennes, the Americans should have
> gotten more heavy guns out there. More armor wasn't required, but would
> have been nice. M36 TDs were all that were required.
The M36 was a good design, but it was not a tank. It did not have the
armor or protection to completely fulfill the tanks role.
> > It's not as if they had to be dropped from an aircraft!
>
> There is no difference, in principal, in being weight constrained by an
> aircraft and a landing craft.
There is a slight difference in that no WWII aircraft could carry even one
Sherman. And we have already determined that there where landing craft
that could carry larger tanks, and that more could have been built if the
need existed.
I stand by my assertion that there was no reason that the US could not
have designed, built, and deployed a tank that could have been as good as
if not better than the Panther. The Germans were not magician, and had
considerably less resources than the US. Hell, the Soviets managed to make
a tank equal to the 1944 Sherman in 1941/42!
Jeff
Hillbrath
> Let's not forget that in operations Epsom and Goodwood, the Shermans
> (and Cromwells, no better for the break-in role) *did* die in their
> hundreds.
Certainly that many in GOODWOOD, but that seems high for EPSOM.
> Having, a couple of weeks ago, walked these battlefields
> with some friends, I was very forcibly struck by the extreme openness
> of the approaches the British armour was more or less obliged to use.
> In front of Bourgebus ridge, for example, there is not a scrap of
> cover useable by tank-height targets out to well over a kilometre;
> standing in some of the positions the British armour moved through
> feels like standing in the middle of a suacer, being overlooked by
> rising ground on all sides.
Sounds a lot like the descriptions of Anzio, where it seemed that all the
American survivors who had the chance to see it from the German side afterward
were "blown away."
Well, as I keep saying, panzers or AT guns that could see a kilometer didn't
have enough WP rounds on them.
> "Good tank country" it may be, but it's
> also extremely good anti-tank country. In these conditions, one of
> our group wondered out loud how much better things might have gone
> had the main tank type been, say, the Churchill Mk VII instead of
> the Sherman. However, I don't imagine Vauxhalls were ever likely
> to be able to produce the number of Churchills an operation like
> "Goodwood" would have needed.
There have been a lot of second guessing on GOODWOOD, but, what the heck, lets
do a little more.
There is the basic question, was it a reasonable expectation that tanks, any
tanks, were going to go up that ridge under the circumstances?
Monty was under a lot of pressure from Ike to make some show of activity, and a
lot of people have suggested that it was easier for him to sacrifice a lot of
American supplied tanks, of which he had a plenty of, maybe too many, than to
lose any more British infantry.
I would suggest myself that it has always been easy for British sources (and I
am not trying to pick any fights, especially with JS) to blame their problems
on the poor tanks that the Americans had supplied them than to look for reasons
closer to home.
Another problem was that attack was very poorly coordinated. The ridge was
heavily attacked by bombers, but, there was only one tank that could talk to
the Tac Air support, and naturally, and, of course, it was one of the first to
go. The infantry wasn't even assigned the ridge as an objective on the first
two days. And, the close artillery support was left behind in a giant traffic
jam.
It is usually said that GOODWOOD was a failure, and abandoned when the weather
got bad. However, after the first couple of days, and the loss of several
hundred tanks, the infantry was assigned to complete the taking of the ridge,
and they did take it (at least part of it). However, there was no follow up,
and events rapidly ensued.
If it is true that the original idea was to just throw tanks at an impossible
goal to save the infantry, then it was a very bad idea indeed. Because after
the tanks were already lost, the infantry was sent in, anyway. And, just as
the tanks had no infantry support, the infantry didn't have the tank support
they could have had. Although around 400 tanks were in the first two days, the
loss of tankers (maybe 500) in the first couple of days was almost negligible
in relation to the number of infantrymen (around 5000) that were lost in the
aftermath. The loss of tanks was of no great importance to the British, as
there were replacements for most of them, and many of the ones "destroyed" were
back in action in a few days, anyway.
I think that it is interesting to compare Bourgebus Ridge with Elsenborn Ridge
on the northern "shoulder" of the "bulge." Elsenborn was also very heavily
fortified, with a heavy concentration of Artillery, most of which was general
purpose stuff not specialized AT but there was a lot of AT as well. (There were
also a lot of 90mm AA guns, which had been massed on the ridge to defend
against V-1s being launched at Antwerp. This may have been one occasion when
they were used in an AT role, but there doesn't seem to be much agreement among
sources on that.)
There is a lot of debate on whether the Germans should have bothered with
Elsenborn, but, they seemed to think it was important. What had originally been
planned to be five "rollbahnen" in the north were essentially collapsed into
one by the Elsenborn positions, and that one, the one taken by Kampfgruppe
Peiper was being squeezed from both ends. Peiper couldn't go ahead, and could
neither back out, nor could he be relieved.
12th SS Panzer Division was assigned the task of expanding the northern
corridor, and in the process relieving Peiper. It had no more success at that
than the British had at Bourgebus, actually not as much. And, they were not
helped by the fact that they were equipped with some Panthers. (All the Tiger
IIs seem to have been following Peiper. Estimates vary as to how many there
were, maybe as few as 7. And, they seem to have been stuck somewhere in the
middle, where they had no effect on the course of the battle at all. So much
for "break-in," "breakthru" or "breakout" panzers.)
12th SS Panzer didn't take the ridge, but, they didn't lose as many tanks as
the British did. But, they did lose most of the ones they had. Between 50 and a
100. If they had had more, they might have gotten through, but, they almost
certainly would have lost more panzers too.
I think that if the British had been able to swap tanks with the Germans at
Bourgebus they would have not done a lot better, there would still have been
all those dug in, towed 88s on the ridge. The Germans lost were said to have
lost about 200 panzers, although how many to what cause no one I have seen
wants to speculate on.
There has been a lot of speculation as to what would have happened had the
tanks have been better, but, I think it is more pertinent to speculate on what
would have happened had there been better coordination, in particular, if there
had been infantry and artillery support, and "what-if" the British had taken
advantage of the concentration, in a known position, of the German armor and AT
guns, and followed up with more heavy bomber raids. (I know that Bomber Command
was not willing to do that. Some one could have forcefully explained to them
about insubordination, and the penalties for it. That would have seemed to be
WSC's job, and Ike's to remind him of it.)
If tanks could not be counted on to break through heavily defended positions
(and they never had much luck doing that for either side in '44 in the ETO) how
could it be done? Well, the British tried using heavy bombers at Bourgebus with
no success, and the Americans did the same in COBRA. Short bombing killed quite
a few Americans, but, effectively destroyed Panzer Lehr and left a gaping hole
in the line. Nothing like that was tried on that scale again, but, bombers seem
to have accomplished one out of two break throughs, unsupported tanks or
panzers, none for however many one tries wants to say there were.
I read somewhere that the Germans called those endless streams of tightly
bunched boxes of Allied heavy bombers "Party Rallies" (after the famous
Nuremberg Parades of the thirties.) I cannot now find where I read that. Some
Allied tankers were said to have developed "Tiger Fright" at some points in the
war. "Party Rally Fright" must have been at least as terrifying, and probably
with better reason.
> "We make war as we must, not as we would wish".
I totally agree with that.
Henry Hillbrath
Hillbrath
> I do not know how common they were in the West,
> but they surely were very common in the East, where
> most of the tank battles took place.
I always try to remember to put in a disclaimer, but, let me make it clear,
what ever I said, or say, about tanks only applies to the West, unless
otherwise stated.
There are still quite a few things I don't know about armor in the West, and I
am going to finish learning that (and get everyone to agree to my views) before
I take on the East!
<g>
Henry Hillbrath
Zhivan
>The point I was trying to make was that the Panthers armor had the ability to take
>almost anything the allies could throw at it. This is ONE facet of a good tank
>design. It also had an excellent gun that could penetrate any vehicle its enemies
>chose to come at it with, from almost any range, and any side. It has reasonable
>speed, and reasonable reliability (once the kinks were worked out. That whole
>bursting into flames when you turn the engine on bit was not so good). All around
>I think it was the finest tank of the war. Except, of course, when it had to take
>on the Texas... :-)
Let's look at a point by point comparison of the Panther and T-34/85:
Panther T-34/85
DOI 7/43 1/44
Weight 46000kg 33000kg
Armament Better Worse
Frontal Arm Better Worse
Side Armoure Worse Better
Rear Armour Worse Better
Speed Worse Better
Silhouette Worse Better
ProductionCost Worse Better
The Russki comes out on top. It could absorb anything short of a 75 Pak-40 with
relative ease.
It had the armour of a Tiger, the firepower of a Pz-IVH, and the speed of a
Cromwell.
Zhivan
DBSDESIGN
John...@brunel.ac.uk (John D Salt) wrote,
DBSDESIGN <dbsd...@aol.com> wrote:
>> no, 17 pdr. tanks weren't always around when needed.
> Factually incorrect.
> 1. Sherman "Fireflies" were present in Cromwell troops, too.
> 2. 17-pdr guns were also present in RA ATk batteries, both
> towed and self-propelled (Archer or Achilles).
I said tanks. Not tank destroyers and towed guns. Both were
intended as defensive weapons because the gun crew was
exposed. Meaning they couldn't often be used in offensives.
So how could they always be around when needed?
> I would love to hear what you would have done instead
> of what the British and Canadian armies actually did.
Focus less on attacks across a broad front. Not spend
so much time trying to cook up the "ultimate" push.
Smaller holes sink ships too. Local assaults can mount
faster and more often, re-deploy or withdraw faster.
Many people (including British soldiers) think a good
plan now is better than a perfect one later.
As I understand it, the British Army's usual policy was
caution, a constant worry of running low on supplies
and waiting for ideal conditions to attack. The Germans
were running out of supplies too (possibly faster). Why
wait to build up your supplies to ideal levels, when it
obviously allowed the Germans to do the same thing and
dig in deeper too? Self-defeating, like trench warfare.
The British seemed to like broad fronts more than the
Americans did. It uses up more precious time to plan,
marshall and coordinate resources. Progress is usually
slower since everbody is trying move at the same pace.
Someone said the Germans spread out most of their AT
assets in the British sector. Probably another strike
against hitting them on broad fronts.
Only a general statement about general policy, IMO.
It's not a reflection on most British officers or the
troops, who were as good (or maybe better) than the
Germans and the Americans. I mean that sincerely.
> Please pay particular attention to the ground in the
> British sector when giving your answer.
The British were at a disadvantage much of the time.
So were the Americans. They had greater distances
to travel before reaching The Rhine too.
Martin Rapier
In article <6ogdq9$smi$1...@nntp3.u.washington.edu>, je...@noao.edu says...
{snip}
>tanks should not/would not/could not fight other tanks is a pipe dream. Look
at
>the design of tanks since the early part of WWII up until today. There is a
>constant evolution driven by the attempt to make my tank better than your
tank.
Yes, but from 1916 until the mid 1940s, the primary enemy of the tank was seen
as the AT gun. Technolgical developments rendered this approach obsolete (the
size of the towed guns grew so much that they had to be self propelled).
Obviously some tank-tank combat had to be anticipated too, but dealing with
enemy armour was the job of the AT boys (in the absence of air/artillery), why
do you think the Russians had entire anti-tank divisions?
>According to the Sherman lobby, the last 50+ years of tank design has somehow
>missed the whole point.
Since the end of the war the development of ATGMs and the relative power of
gun/armour have made desirable the development of MBTs which can combine the
role of tank and tank destoyer in one. Modern doctrine is to use tanks in an
AT role rather than using different weapon systems. For a brief time in the
1970s it loked like ATGMs may have eclipsed the tank altogether, but reactive
armour etc has reasserted its dominance.
It is quite different situation now, although it is interesting to consider
that the primary role of the M1A2 is now anti-tank, its entire ammo loadout
being AP of one variety or another. Where does the infantry support fire come
from? Is the M1 the new Ferdinand??
Hillbrath
> The M10s should have had an enclosed turret and more armor
> from the beginning
>All this with a perfect 20/20 hindsight, of course...
Well, as I said, I agree about the turret lid, and, I explained what my reasons
are. But, I am curious as to why you think that.
Many people think that the enclosed turret had something to do with tank
fighting, I tend to think it was more of a problem in the infantry support
role, which is of course, what they were not suppose to do.
As far as more armor, some one decided what the max weight for a tank or TD
could be. Right or wrong. Given that, if you all more weight one place, you
have to take it out somewhere else. Since the turret was bigger to accomidate a
"bigger" gun (longer stroke in the case of the original M10) it had to be
thinner.
The hull armor was exactly the same as the M4, AFAIK.
Henry Hillbrath
John D Salt
David Thornley <thor...@visi.com> wrote:
>
>U.S. organizations were set by Army Ground Forces, which until Normandy
>meant General McNair. McNair believed that mobility was all-important,
>and seemed to like the idea of a mobile weapon rather than an effective
>one. He only reluctantly abandoned the 37mm AT gun, and was certainly
>not going to permit those big 3" to be used in U.S. divisions.
As the saying goes "In peace time, everyone wants mobility; in war-
time, weight of shell".
>The result was that there were a large number of mostly useless 57mm
>anti-tank guns in the U.S. armies, and therefore a lot of American
>AT guns were ineffectual.
The US 57mm Anti-tank guns were copied from the British 6-pounder,
and very similar in construction and performance. I always find
it odd that what was essentially the same gun was a favourite of
British forces, and yet has a lousy reputation in US service.
One explanation is that the 6-pounder made its reputation in the
Desert in actions like "Snipe", and so earned a store of goodwill
with the British troops using it that outlasted its ability to
perform. The problem with this argument is that no similar
consideration seems to apply to the 75mm M3 in the Sherman, which
was introduced later, but sooner felt to be a poor tank-killer.
The other side of the coin is that some US units were perhaps felt
not to have turned in a sparkling anti-tank performance in the
Ardennes, and the easiest excuse was to blame "the impuissant 57mm"
[I happen to think that both points are mistaken, but some people
might believe them].
The technical question that would explain the difference in perceived
performance is that of the ammunition natures issued by each army.
The American fondness for AP shell instead of solid shot would
account for a slight reduction in performance. Far more important,
the British used APDS from D-Day onwards, and this ammunition
transforms the gun's performance -- a 6-pounder firing APDS is
roughly as good at drilling holes in armour plate as a 17-pounder
with APCBC. The conventional wisdom has it that the US Army did
not issue 57mm APDS. However, Al Vannoy and Jay Karamales' very
thoroughly-researched "Against the Panzers" cites several occasions
where APDS was successfully used by US units. The American
reputation for improvisation notwithstanding, I imagine that this
must have been an official issue.
Still, "mostly usesless" seems a wildly inaccurate characterisation
of the 6-pounder in the anti-tank role. It was a 6-pounder of the
Queen's Regiment that bagged Wittman's Tiger at Villers-Bocage,
remember.
All the best,
John.
--
John D Salt Dept of IS & Computing,| Barr's Law of Recursive Futility
Brunel U, Uxbridge, Middx UB8 3PH | [BLORF]: If you are smart enough
Disclaimers: I speak only for me. | to use one of these... you can
Launcher may train without warning.| probably manage without one.
John Waters
<6ojei5$9...@gazette.bcm.tmc.edu>...
> If we consider adequate AT guns, then the 3" with HVAP is certainly
> a threat to any German tank.
I think to many tend to overate the performance of US APCR-T ammunition Ie:
M93 APCR-T @ 30 ^ vs 240 BHN plate
500yrds - 157mm
1000yrds - 135mm
1500yrds - 116mm
Looks good doesn't it, but German plate was 10% more resistant then either
US or UK plate.
The US 1st Army conducted Live fire tests in July & August 1944 vs 3
captured Panthers, all rounds were fired at 200yrds and in the tests with
the 76mm M93 APCR-T round; only 1 out of 4 rounds fired penetrated the
Panthers glacis. Frontaly the Panther glacis was totaly immune to the M61
76mm APCBC round, and for most practical intents & purposes, immune to the
76mm APCR-T round on the glacis area. The areas the Panther was vulnerable
to the 76mm APCR-T round was the turret ring, mantlet, & underside mantlet
apex area.
And its important to remember that even though the TD's had priority on
APCR-T ammunition it was still in short supply througout the war, due to
tungsten shortages, as aircraft production had priority on tungsten. The
most common rounds available were the M61 & M79 APCBC rounds, of which both
were hard pressed to defeat the Panther or the Tiger1 frontaly, but were
capable of defeating the Panther's side armor at combat ranges. But clearly
the 76mm APCR-T round was not the all in one solution to defeating all
German tanks.
Regards, John Waters
Tero P. Mustalahti
thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote:
> The result was that there were a large number of mostly useless 57mm
> anti-tank guns in the U.S. armies, and therefore a lot of American
> AT guns were ineffectual.
The American 57mm towed AT-gun was actually a copy of the British 6 pdr
AT-gun. With APDS ammunition the 6 pdr had quite respectable penetration
characteristics; better than the US 76mm with APCBC ammo and better than the
75mm with any type of ammunition. Unfortunately the US 57mm guns were never
issued with APDS ammo. However, even with APCBC ammunition the 57mm was still
better than the 75mm M3! Therefore I would not assert that it was completely
ineffectual.
The British did not switch from the 6 pdr to the 75mm OQF gun because they
needed better armor penetration. They needed a useful HE capability, which
the 6 pdr could not provide, and were ready to sacrifice some armor
penetration in order to achieve that.
term...@utu.fi
mjma...@joker.igs.net (Jay) wrote:
> The T-34/85 was acknowledged by the
> Soviets as a stop-gap because the T-44 (I think it was, with the 85mm
> gun) was proving less than successful in the design stage, and the
> heavies, JS-series, were not yet available either.
I do not think the Soviets ever intended the JS-series to replace the T-34.
The JS-series was a development and successor of the KV-series of heavy
tanks, which was quickly becoming obsolescent in late 1943. The Soviets could
not have produced enough JS-IIs to fully replace the T-34/76, and they knew
Jeff Heidman
> >You aree doing this again. THe comparison he is trying to make is between
> >Shermans and "guns that were common in German service." This presumably means
> >the 50L60 and 75L46 which were the msot common German AT guns. Note he is not
> ..[snip]
> >Rather, the Panthers commonly encountered the 57mm, 75mm, and 76mm guns,
> >which the Panther could stand up to with little concern.
> >
> This applies only to the U.S. sector, so let's consider the state of
> anti-tank guns there.
>
> U.S. organizations were set by Army Ground Forces, which until Normandy
> meant General McNair. McNair believed that mobility was all-important,
> and seemed to like the idea of a mobile weapon rather than an effective
> one. He only reluctantly abandoned the 37mm AT gun, and was certainly
> not going to permit those big 3" to be used in U.S. divisions.
>
> The result was that there were a large number of mostly useless 57mm
> anti-tank guns in the U.S. armies, and therefore a lot of American
> AT guns were ineffectual.
>
> By your argument (much Allied AT guns were ineffectual against many
> German tanks vs. the Sherman's vulnerability to most German AT guns),
> this means that the Sherman was a bad tank partly because McNair
> short-changed U.S. infantry in their anti-tank guns. This does not
> seem to me to make sense.
That apeears to be your rather convoluted arguemnt, not mine. My point was
quite simple:
German tanks could stand up to the AT weapons they commonly encountered
much better than Sherman could stand up to the AT weapons they
encountered.. By this I mean ALL German tanks.
> If we consider adequate AT guns, then the 3" with HVAP is certainly
> a threat to any German tank.
You are correct. The 76/HVAP was a potent weapon system. HVAP was not as
common as you would like though. But certainly the dedicated AT weapons
had them sometimes.
> >> and, contrary to "conventional wisdom" there were a lot of those guns in
> >> relation to the total number of panzers that needed their services.
> >
> >Once again, it is not a numebrs game. You engage with what happens to
> >be there, adn teh number of 17lb or 90mm weapons in service through
> >much of the Western European theater was small compared to the number
> >of other AT weapons.
> >
> This depends on what you call an AT weapon, doesn't it? If we count the
> ..50 caliber machine gun (originally meant as an AT gun), then the
> proportion of good U.S. AT weapons goes way down. If we get ridiculous
> and count toenails as AT weapons, we find that almost all American AT
> weapons are useless against German tanks. If we forget about the silly
> 57mm guns, then the AT guns look more effective, on the average.
Uhhh, I guess. If you throw out all the ineffective AT weapons, I suppose
the remainder would look pretty good. UNfortuantely, the US did not throw
out all those ineffective AT weapons, and the .50 cal at this time was not
an AT weapon.
> The proportion of effective to ineffective weapons doesn't matter, since
> we can play counting games to get different results on the same
> equipment basis. What does matter is the number of effective
> weapons, either compared to enemy tanks or to friendly forces.
WHat matter sis the probability of a given weapon system being avaialable
when you need it. The majority of Allied AT assets where only marginally
able to deal with enemy AT threats, and at worst inadequate. Comapred to
the situation for the Germans, where almost any of their commonly
available AT assets could kill the ALlied tanks available (including the
vaunted Firefly, which still had crummy armor), the Allied situation was
delporable.
> In the ETO, there were usually more tank destroyer battalions around
> than divisions. Usually, a division would have one TD battalion more
> or less permanently assigned to it, and would frequently have two.
> This gives each U.S. division three or six dozen 3" or 76mm guns
> which are authorized to use HVAP rounds. This is a significant
> number of guns that even Tigers have to take seriously.
And I am sure that they did. But HVAP was not as common as many would like
us to believe. Whether authorized or not, it was not always available. The
Germans designed a 75mm gun that could kill almost anything in its class
without special ammo. I have trouble believeing that the Allies could not
do the same. (Of course they did. The 17lber had comparable performance to
the 75L70 with standard AP. It just wasn't used by the British enough, and
the AMericans at all).
> >Bazookas are nearly useless against the frontal armor of any German
> >tank. Panzerfausts are nice, but there aren't many of them, and they
> >have a very shortrange. I have no idea what the Rocket Projectile is.
> >Perhaps you could enlightenme as to their effectiveness and employment.
> >
> The nice thing about the bazooka is that you can sneak up on enemy tanks.
> One very common practice in close fighting was to use U.S. artillery to
> separate the panzers from the panzergrenadiers, and then stalk the
> panzers with bazookas. In this situation, the infantry can usually get
> a flank shot. The Panther was very vulnerable to the flank and rear;
> even the maligned 75mm or 57mm would have no problem with a Panther
> at fairly close range provided they were in the 270-degree arc not
> facing the frontal armor. Tigers were better armored all the way
> around, but they were few.
I think you make it sound a lot easier than it actually is. I for one
would not be very keen on "sneaking" up on a panzer on foot, and I would
guess that the number of Panzers destroyed by bazookas was probably not
particulary significant.
Once again, the German weapon (both Panzerfaust and PznaerSchreck) could
destroy any allied vehicle from any target facing.
> I still don't know why bad Allied anti-tank weapons make the Sherman
> a lousy tank, other than of course the 75mm gun, but Allied anti-tank
> weapons were better than you're giving them credit for.
See my previous point. I was comparing the ability of Allied AT weapons to
engage the Panther with the ability of German AT weapons to engage the
Sherman. Not a direct comparison surely, but then I never intended it to
be.
Jeff
Patrick C Miller
: The conventional wisdom has it that the US Army did not issue 57mm APDS.
: However, Al Vannoy and Jay Karamales' very thoroughly-researched
: "Against the Panzers" cites several occasions where APDS was
: successfully used by US units.
I read the same book and remember a statement in it saying that all US
57mm guns were issued 10 rounds of APDS ammo just before D Day. Many of
those guns still had their 10 APDS rounds by the time of the Ardennes
Offensive and put them to good use. The book recounts an incident in
which a 57mm gun knocked out a Jagdpanther from the front, although I
belive it was from very close range.
*****************************
Patrick C. Miller
pami...@plains.NoDak.edu
*****************************
Jay
bru...@bga.com (Bruce Burden) wrote:
> Okay, good. The only problem with the T-26E3 was its lack
> of HP. It used the same Ford V-8 as the M4A3 Sherman, but was
> 23,000 odd pounds heavier. So, lets assume that the US could
> have come up with, say, a 750 HP motor for the Pershing. I will
> work on the problems the Pershing would have had with landing
> craft and bridges.
The HP problem could have been overcome I'm sure. The problem with
landing craft and bridges in another issue. The landing craft problem
is unlikely to be solved, assuming Henry's explaination about Higgins
and the boats is the best one. However, I never intended to imply that
the Sherman should be completely replaced, so they could have served
in the early stages of the beach assault, and also in the later
breakout (as they were intended). The heavier tanks could be put
ashore by LST.
Bridges are a problem, but not insurmountable.
> And, earlier, I asked for something that would resist a
> 88mm round from 100 meters.
I've never asked for such a requirement, only that the tank be able to
resist 75mm shot on something more than the Sherman's 5% capability.
Tero P. Mustalahti
In article <6ok1m2$vmk$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
hill...@aol.com (Hillbrath) wrote:
> Tero P. Mustalahti wrote:
>
> > The M10s should have had an enclosed turret and more armor
> > from the beginning
>
> >All this with a perfect 20/20 hindsight, of course...
>
> Well, as I said, I agree about the turret lid, and, I explained what my
reasons
> are. But, I am curious as to why you think that.
>
> Many people think that the enclosed turret had something to do with tank
> fighting, I tend to think it was more of a problem in the infantry support
> role, which is of course, what they were not suppose to do.
From what I have read the biggest problem with the open turret was that it
did not provide full protection against artillery shell fragments. Even
though the Germans did not have proximity fuses, there was still a good
chance that a shell fragment would enter the turret an kill or wound some of
the crew. Also there must have been situations, where it was not easy to keep
the enemy infantry away from the TDs. In tank fighting the open turret
probably was not a problem, as you said.
> As far as more armor, some one decided what the max weight for a tank or TD
> could be. Right or wrong. Given that, if you all more weight one place, you
> have to take it out somewhere else. Since the turret was bigger to accomidate
a
> "bigger" gun (longer stroke in the case of the original M10) it had to be
> thinner.
That is principally correct, but I still wonder if the M10 really had as much
turret armor that was possible. Most Shermans did not, because the Jumbo
Sherman had significantly heavier turret armor than the "standard" versions.
Jay
>German tanks could stand up to the AT weapons they commonly encountered
>much better than Sherman could stand up to the AT weapons they
>encountered.. By this I mean ALL German tanks.
Now why didn't I say that in the first place. This is one of the
points I've been trying to get across. Add to that John Waters' recent
post about how effective the 3" HVAP (or APCR-T, or whatever it was
called) was.
>Uhhh, I guess. If you throw out all the ineffective AT weapons, I suppose
>the remainder would look pretty good. UNfortuantely, the US did not throw
>out all those ineffective AT weapons, and the .50 cal at this time was not
>an AT weapon.
Here's an interesting tidbit from the study that originally sparked my
interest in this thread: because of crew complaints about the low
resistance of Sherman armour, REME of the Guards Armoured div tested
it by firing various weapons. They found that .50-calibre ball
penetrated 1.5 inches into the turret armour at 100 yards, and .30-cal
.5 inches.
Maybe the .50 was an AT weapon after all? <sarcasm, of course>
Jay
>I do not think the Soviets ever intended the JS-series to replace the T-34.
>The JS-series was a development and successor of the KV-series of heavy
>tanks, which was quickly becoming obsolescent in late 1943. The Soviets could
>not have produced enough JS-IIs to fully replace the T-34/76, and they knew
>that.
You're absolutely right, and I guess I wasn't clear in my post. The
medium T-44 had been intended to replace the T-34, while the JS-series
were to replace the heavies. However, at the time of the intorduction
of the 85mm gun neither was ready, so the T-34/85 and KV-85 were
introduced as stop-gaps. The T-44 never did appear as intended, but
became the T-54 of post-war fame.
Zhivan
under license. Preferably the T-34/85 model, but the T-34/76 regunned with the
American 3" would be just as good a choice. Tha they didn't istheir own problem
;-)
Zhivan
>replied was clearly speaking of the T-34/76 variants, and they were
>Soviets as a stop-gap because the T-44 (I think it was, with the 85mm
>gun) was proving less than successful in the design stage, and the
>heavies, JS-series, were not yet available either.
The T-34/85 was produced in larger numbers than the entire T-34/76 series, so
by 1944 the majority of Russian mediums were the 85mm gun tanks, unlike in the
US forces with the 76mm gun tanks.
The JS-series entered service _before_ the T-34 series. Both the IS-85,
IS-1/100 entered service before the end of 1943. The T-34/85 saw very minor
employment in very late 1943, and only entered real service in January 1944.
IS-2s were in service by 3/44..
Kennedy How
> What I was trying to get at was that the reason for the Jagd panzers was said
> to be that they were much easier to build, and therefore, more could be
> produced.
I think that's more of an extrapolation from the production of StuGs
than anything specific to Jagdpanzers in general. To me, the
Jagdpanther and Hetzer were basically assault gun type vehicles that
mounted a really, really good AT gun. Maybe it's more of a melding of
the PzJr Is, IIs and Marders with the StuG line (low silhouette, good
gun), and diverging back to sloped armor and bigger AT gun.
> I can only assume that the Germans didn't really find the Jagd panzers that
> useful, and, they would have been much better for the circumstances they found
> themselves in that those the Allies had to deal with. (or, Defense vs.
> Offense, to put it simply.)
I'm not sure one can make that conclusion. StuG production continued,
while the development of the Jadgpanther and Hetzer came later in the
war. In the West, the Jadgpanther probably wouldn't be as needed as in
the East, where the need was greater (and the ranges were longer, to
take advantage of the 88L71). Too, the hulls were shared by regular
Panther production, and the Hetzer hulls came from Skoda? while the StuG
hulls were basically coming from the places that used to churn out Mark
IIIs.
I know that when I play historical miniatures, I always had a StuG unit
somewhere, and I tended to use them more to kill tanks than against
infantry.
Kennedy
Martin Rapier
>Still, "mostly usesless" seems a wildly inaccurate characterisation
>of the 6-pounder in the anti-tank role. It was a 6-pounder of the
>Queen's Regiment that bagged Wittman's Tiger at Villers-Bocage,
>remember.
Yes, the 6pdr/57mm was a perfectly good gun, although by 1944 it needed to
operate at fairly close range against Panthers & Tigers.
Assaulted by the Panther battalion of 12th SS Panzer Div in Normandy, the AT
platoon of the Winnipeg Rifles managed to knock out six of them and the SS
Panzers withdrew.
Apart from the Snipe action (50+ German tanks and SP guns, plus Italian
knocked out), the other main claim to fame of the 6pdr was knocking out the
first two Tigers encountered by the British in Tunisia.
I am also unsure as to why towed guns in US service seem to have such a bad
rep, statements like Charles B MacDonalds "The towed tank destoyers were
terribly vulnerable..." (he was talking about the crews of some 3" guns
abandoning their weapons in the Ardennes). Some enlightenment would be
welcome.
Jeff Heidman
Let's look at a point by point comparison of the Panther and T-34/85:
> Panther T-34/85
>
> DOI 7/43 1/44
> Weight 46000kg 33000kg
> Armament Better Worse
> Frontal Arm Better Worse
> Side Armoure Worse Better
> Rear Armour Worse Better
> Speed Worse Better
> Silhouette Worse Better
> ProductionCost Worse Better
I would rate them more like this:
Armamnet
Panther
Able to destroy almost any vehicle, from any facing, at long ranges
T-34/85
decent, but inadequate to engage Panther (or any other advanced German vehicle)frontally
Frontal Arm
Panther: Able to shed rounds from almost any weapon it is likely to face
T-34/85: Decent, but again vulnerable to Panthers gun
Side Armor
Panther: Very poor. Major weakness
T-34/85: Decent, but still vulnerable to almost any German AT gun, but then what WWII
(or post WWII tank for that matter) wasn't vulenerable from the side ort rear?
Speed
Panther: Adequate for its role. Not really a problem, unlike the Tiger or JS series.
T-34/85: Very good for a medium tank
Production Cost: Difficult to compare. Certainly the Panther is more expensive,
but by
how much? What does that mean anyway? A T-72 is alot cheaper than an M-1, but I'll
take the M-1 any day of the week, and twice on Sunday.
Reliability:
Panther: Good in production models
T-34/85: So-so at best.
Fire control / Accuracy
Panther is superior here, although it is difficult to differentiate between
actual weapon accuracy and crew skill.
I would say another telling stat is that American M4A3E8 had a lot of trouble
with Panthers in the last part of WWII, but successfully engaged T-34/85s
consistently in Korea. Again, crew abilities play a roll, although the US had
some problems their in Korea also.
> The Russki comes out on top. It could absorb anything short of a 75 Pak-40 with
> relative ease.
And the Panther could absorb anything the T-34 could dish out with ease. The
T-34 could not absorb a shot from the Panther however. The only real advantage
the T-34 had was in speed, and even that was not a decisive advatage. What is
the actual difference in speeds between the 34/85 and the Panther?
Jeff
Kennedy How
> Maybe the .50 was an AT weapon after all? <sarcasm, of course>
Of course! Wasn't the Boys AT rifle a .5in?
Kennedy
John D Salt
Hillbrath <hill...@aol.com> wrote:
>John Salt wrote:
>
>> Let's not forget that in operations Epsom and Goodwood, the Shermans
>> (and Cromwells, no better for the break-in role) *did* die in their
>> hundreds.
>
>Certainly that many in GOODWOOD, but that seems high for EPSOM.
I should have made my meaning clear with brackets; hundreds in
(Epsom and Goodwood).
> [snips]
>Well, as I keep saying, panzers or AT guns that could see a kilometer didn't
>have enough WP rounds on them.
A fair point; but the ground provides just that annoying kind of cover
that's not obvious. Bourgebus ridge itself, for example, is a very
low ridge, far more insignificant than I had ever imagined. This
makes it very hard to smoke off all potential enemy fire positions
short of arranging a complete screen around yourself, like a personal
cumulo-nimbus.
This also raises the point, which I hadn't considered, of how generously
British tanks were issued with main-armament smoke. ISTR the 2-in
bomb thrower only had 14 rounds stowed for it.
>There have been a lot of second guessing on GOODWOOD, but, what the heck, lets
>do a little more.
It'll probably be a demonstration sport at the next Olympics. ;-)
>There is the basic question, was it a reasonable expectation that tanks, any
>tanks, were going to go up that ridge under the circumstances?
>
[A number of well-considered points snipped because they show a very
sound understanding of the factors affecting GOODWOOD and I don't
disagree with them.]
>
>There has been a lot of speculation as to what would have happened had the
>tanks have been better, but, I think it is more pertinent to speculate on what
>would have happened had there been better coordination, in particular, if there
>had been infantry and artillery support, and "what-if" the British had taken
>advantage of the concentration, in a known position, of the German armor and AT
>guns, and followed up with more heavy bomber raids. (I know that Bomber Command
>was not willing to do that. Some one could have forcefully explained to them
>about insubordination, and the penalties for it. That would have seemed to be
>WSC's job, and Ike's to remind him of it.)
H'mmmyes, remember that Goodwood *was* preceded by a humungous "tactical"
airstrike by heavies and mediums -- the tonnages dropped still amaze
me, and are of the order of tac nuke yields -- which effectively
obliterated the Luftwaffe division in the front line. Trying to recall
the maps of the operation I've seen, it seems to me that the way the
British armour started spreading out just after the railway embankment
indicated that they thought they were through "to the green fields
beyond". It's a bit of a downer, at that point, to come face-to-face
with an unexpected SS Panzer Division that missed the carpet-bombing,
knows the ground, and is tremendously skilled in the art of the quick
counter-attack.
As Henry pointed out, the British artillery was not up to its usual
standard in Goodwood because of the choke-points of bridges across
the Orne. The point I made earlier about excellent observation from
the German positions applies pretty much to the whole Brtish bridgehead
area, putting the Germans a step ahead in the artillery battle right
at the outset.
Henry's point about infantry co-ordination is well made, and I think
pretty much agrees with the views expressed by our host, Colonel
Mike Chilcott, when we walked the battlefield. A motor company up
and into Hubert-Folie early could have made a world of difference.
So, yes, paradoxically the right way to conserve infantry was probably
to put more infantry in the firing-line.
Andy O'Neill
Except perhaps in the Fireflies the Brits were good enough to give em?
Andy O'Neill
Remove the x for email, similar to below
Wargames site at www.l-25.demon.co.uk/index.htm
Tero P. Mustalahti
mjma...@joker.igs.net (Jay) wrote:
> Maybe the .50 was an AT weapon after all? <sarcasm, of course>
As has been stated here before, the .50 was originally an AT weapon. It was
also the *main* armament of most American 1930s tanks (or combat cars, as
they were called). Even in WWII the .50 could penetrate the armor of
halftracks, many armored cars and light tanks; especially the Japanese ones.
Tero P. Mustalahti
In article <6olp7i$2...@dgs.dgsys.com>,
Jeff Heidman <je...@noao.edu> wrote:
> Once again, the German weapon (both Panzerfaust and PznaerSchreck) could
> destroy any allied vehicle from any target facing.
Not entirely true. The maximum penetration of the Panzerschreck was about
150mm, and the practical penetration was usually somewhat less. This means
that it could not penetrate the frontal armor of the Churchill VII, and even
a Sherman Jumbo had a decent chance of surviving a frontal hit. It must also
be noted that if a HEAT warhead has a penetration of, let's say 120mm, and
the armor plate is 110mm thick, the effects behind the armor will be minimal
and the tank and the crew will probably remain operational.
Zhivan
>
>He wrote *obsolescent*, not obsolete! I have to agree with him -- all other
>medium tanks were obsolescent compared to the Panther from a purely technical
>point of view.
That is quite simply, not true. Power to weight remained on the T-34s side, as
did sloping of armour and low silhouette. The T-34 had better rear and flank
armour. The Panther's technical advantages consisted soly of a potent cannon
and decent frontal armour. At the price of a 15 ton weight penalty. As it's
been said, if the Panther _was_ a medium tank it still is only equal to the
T-34/85.
Bruce D. Sinclair
Martin Rapier wrote:
>
> I am also unsure as to why towed guns in US service seem to have such a bad
> rep, statements like Charles B MacDonalds "The towed tank destoyers were
> terribly vulnerable..." (he was talking about the crews of some 3" guns
> abandoning their weapons in the Ardennes).
IIRC, US Tank Destroyer doctrine (and the 3in towed guns belong to TD
battalions) held that you went out looking for enemy tanks. Now, would
you feel comfortable "looking" for a Panther with a _towed_ antitank
gun?
BDS
Jay Karamales
> I am also unsure as to why towed guns in US service seem to have such a bad
> rep, statements like Charles B MacDonalds "The towed tank destoyers were
> terribly vulnerable..." (he was talking about the crews of some 3" guns
> abandoning their weapons in the Ardennes).
Part of the reason is because of their lack of mobility, particularly on
the offense. I have interviewed several veterans of towed TD battalions
who bemoaned the fact that once their gun was in place, it was no easy
task to reposition it, particularly if it came under enemy fire.
On the defense, there was often little the crews could do but abandon
the gun in place. One TD captain I interviewed, who was involved in
defending against the German counterattack at Mortain, had to abandon
one gun when it was overrun by the Leibstandarte (first sabotaging the
gun by removing the firing pin), make his way back to the battalion
assembly area on foot through the bocage, and get another gun with which
to block the road down which the Germans were advancing.* This was not
an uncommon type of action when the Germans counterattacked against
ill-prepared American positions.
*Full story in "Against the Panzers," (McFarland), chapter 2
Jay Karamales
Chief Cartographer
Olórin Press
Jay Karamales
> I am also unsure as to why towed guns in US service seem to have such a bad
> rep, statements like Charles B MacDonalds "The towed tank destoyers were
> terribly vulnerable..." (he was talking about the crews of some 3" guns
> abandoning their weapons in the Ardennes).
Part of the reason is because of their lack of mobility, particularly on
the offense. I have interviewed several veterans of towed TD battalions
who bemoaned the fact that once their gun was in place, it was no easy
task to reposition it, particwlarly if it came under enemy fire.
Jay
>In article <6onq21$ft4$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
> mjma...@joker.igs.net (Jay) wrote:
>
>> Maybe the .50 was an AT weapon after all? <sarcasm, of course>
>
>As has been stated here before, the .50 was originally an AT weapon. It was
>also the *main* armament of most American 1930s tanks (or combat cars, as
>they were called). Even in WWII the .50 could penetrate the armor of
>halftracks, many armored cars and light tanks; especially the Japanese ones.
<sigh>
Evidentally my humour is in need of some exercise.
In any case, the origins of the .50 are well known to me, however, I
was under the impression that by '44 it was considered to be an HMG,
and not some sort of anti-tank weapon. That it could achieve the
penetration it did in the armour of a Sherman surprised me, though
maybe such penetration was common. Does anyone know of a tank with
about 1"=1.5" of armour that was actually penetrated by one of these
puppies?
DBSDESIGN
> So, such studies are not reliable? On what do you
> base that?!
It's human nature for people to exaggerate their
accomplishments. Or exaggerate to help sell an
idea. Look at the average person's resume, or a
typical TV ad, and tell me this isn't so... :-)
> While he asked for your source, you don't give it.
> and yet you choose to ridicule his. Not the most
> reliable of debating tactics IMO.
I didn't ridicule his source, I just questioned the
reliability of battlefield statistics. I don't have
as much faith in them as others, that's all. I 've
read several of Mr. Halbraith's posts, and I think
he's one of the most intelligent and well informed
guys in this newsgroup. I respect him, and all of
his opinions, even though I'm generally skeptical
about wartime statistics. I do think that joint
reports by both services would be more credibile
than analysis by one or the other.
I didn't give him a source of TAC air stats because
I don't believe them, and neither does he. I wish
I had the time to dig out quotations from books and
videotapes, but I don't. Looking up references from
many sources takes a lot longer than just pulling
up a chart, wouldn't you agree?
> Incidentally, I have one such report in front of me. It
> clearly indicates methodology and includes raw data.
> It may not be the most perfect example of scientific
> method (it has only a realtively small sample), but
> it's quite clear and convincing.
Okay, I believe you. Is there any place I could buy a copy?
When I was in college (about ten years ago) I read this
Army report on enemy troop levels in Vietnam. It seemed convincing enough,
until I read a news article about the
CIA. They claimed this report was basically pure fantasy.
I'm starting to wonder about the Gulf War statistics too,
which have come under fire from the press in the past
few years. Like I said, some people can't seem to avoid
the temptations of exaggerating numbers.
Jay
dbsd...@aol.com (DBSDESIGN) wrote:
>The British seemed to like broad fronts more than the
>Americans did. It uses up more precious time to plan,
How do you explain Mongomery's objection to Eisenhower's broad front
approach?
What evidence do you have to support your contention?
David Thornley
In article <6ohfum$hg6$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>, <term...@utu.fi> wrote:
>In article <6ofts9$8...@dgs.dgsys.com>,
> rus...@ihug.co.nz (Zhivan) wrote:
>> >
>> >The T-34 was obsolescent (as was the Sherman, I think you may want to
>> >note my syntax here, since I've never said "obsolete") by June of '44
>> >as well, and this was well recognized by the Soviets.
>
>He wrote *obsolescent*, not obsolete! I have to agree with him -- all other
>medium tanks were obsolescent compared to the Panther from a purely technical
>point of view.
>
All other "medium tanks"? The Panther was clearly in the heavy tank
weight range, being almost exactly the weight of a KV or JS. By
increasing the weight of the tank by 50% over the Sherman, it was
possible to provide a superb gun, superb front armor, and good speed.
Should this come as a surprise?
It had its downsides also. The Panther's turret traverse was slow, and
its side armor weak. When, say, the Fourth U.S. Armored Division was
able to create a confused, smoky, battle area, the Shermans cleaned up.
They could kill a Panther quite nicely from the side or rear, and
would get in the first shot, likely the first three or four.
The Sherman was (with the 76mm gun, HVSS suspension, and wet storage)
pretty much the equal of anything in its weight class. It demonstrated
in Korea that it could match the T-34/85; are there any Comet fans out
there?
--
David H. Thornley | These opinions are mine. I
da...@thornley.net | do give them freely to those
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | who run too slowly. O-
Jeff Heidman
> Yes, but from 1916 until the mid 1940s, the primary enemy of the tank
> was seen as the AT gun. Technolgical developments rendered this approach
> obsolete (the size of the towed guns grew so much that they had to be
> self propelled). Obviously some tank-tank combat had to be anticipated
> too, but dealing with enemy armour was the job of the AT boys (in the
> absence of air/artillery), why do you think the Russians had entire
> anti-tank divisions?
You are making an argument based on WHY the Sherman was not well-designed,
not whether it was well-designed. I would tend to agree with most of your
points, although I think it was clear from the Eastern Front and Africa
battles that that thinking was obsolete by 1942/43. Of course, that is
much easier for me to say now then it was then.
But point is that the Sherman was a poor tank in 1944. Why it was designed
in spite of what apearred to be plenty of evidence that it would be
ineffective is another issue entirely.
> Since the end of the war the development of ATGMs and the relative power of
> gun/armour have made desirable the development of MBTs which can combine the
> role of tank and tank destoyer in one.
ATGM did not come into wide use until several decades ofter WWII. The
writing was on the wall in the latter stages of WWII that the concept of
the MBT was the future of armored warfare. Both the Germans and Soviets
saw this quite clearly.
> Modern doctrine is to use tanks in an
> AT role rather than using different weapon systems. For a brief time in the
> 1970s it loked like ATGMs may have eclipsed the tank altogether, but reactive
> armour etc has reasserted its dominance.
Just another swing in the more armor / bigger gun pendulum. I do not doubt
that we will see the emergence of new weapons that can penetrate even the
vaunted M1A2.
> It is quite different situation now, although it is interesting to consider
> that the primary role of the M1A2 is now anti-tank, its entire ammo loadout
> being AP of one variety or another. Where does the infantry support fire come
> from? Is the M1 the new Ferdinand??
Getting off of WWII a bit, but I agree. I find it amazing that the M1A2
does not carry an HE round, especially in light of todays preponderance of
man-portable, effective ATGMs. What does an M1 do when it is engaged by a
man-portable ATGM beyond effective .50 range?
Jeff Heidman
Jay
>The T-34/85 was produced in larger numbers than the entire T-34/76 series, so
>by 1944 the majority of Russian mediums were the 85mm gun tanks, unlike in the
>US forces with the 76mm gun tanks.
I wasn't talking about the T-34/85 originally though. Still, the
numbers produced only indicate factory capacity, not whether the tank
was a stop-gap or not. Incidentally, the lack of the T-44 ('till the
advent of the T-54 some years after the war) doesn't make the T-34/85
less of a stopgap, it just illustrates the problems the Soviets had
with tank production.
>The JS-series entered service _before_ the T-34 series. Both the IS-85,
>IS-1/100 entered service before the end of 1943. The T-34/85 saw very minor
>employment in very late 1943, and only entered real service in January 1944.
>IS-2s were in service by 3/44..
The JS series entered service _after_ the T-34 series. I know you
probably mean something different, but I'll slam you anyways: the T-34
series is a 1941 tank. In any case, the T-34/85 was in service in
numbers before the JS-2 was in service in numbers.
Incidentally, you're trying to salvage your earlier statements with
information that is irrelevant to what I originally posed. If you have
any info that shows that the T-34/76 was _not_ obsolescent by mid-'44
I'd like to hear it.
Tero P. Mustalahti
Kennedy How <howl...@tir.com> wrote:
> Jay wrote:
>
> > Maybe the .50 was an AT weapon after all? <sarcasm, of course>
>
Nope; .55 inches.
There are modern anti-materiel sniper rifles in .50 inch caliber, but this is
not the right group to discuss them and I am not the right person to tell
about them ;-)
Tero P. Mustalahti
jheidman@What_should_you_docs.arizona.edu wrote:
> Armamnet
> Panther
> Able to destroy almost any vehicle, from any facing, at long ranges
Except the IS-II, Churchill VII and M4A3E2 Jumbo Sherman. The production of
IS-IIs alone almost equalled the production of Panthers.
> T-34/85
> decent, but inadequate to engage Panther (or any other advanced German
vehicle)frontally
True. The 85mm was not the Tiger/Panther killer the Soviets hoped it to be;
instead it "only" provided an almost certain penetration against PzKpfw IV H
and StuG III G at long ranges.
> Frontal Arm
> Panther: Able to shed rounds from almost any weapon it is likely to face
Well, how likely encounters with Fireflys or IS-IIs were for Panthers? Fairly
likely, I would say. The frontal armor of the Panther was good, but not
invincible.
> Side Armor
> Panther: Very poor. Major weakness
The problem with the side armor of the Panther was that at close ranges it
was vulnerable even to obsolete Allied AT-guns, such as the 2 pdr, the
American 37mm and the Soviet 45mm. This meant that most armored cars and
light tanks could destroy a Panther if they were able to surprise it from the
flank.
> Speed
> Panther: Adequate for its role. Not really a problem, unlike the Tiger or JS
series.
The IS-series was not that slow. Even though the maximum road speeds of the
Tiger I and IS-II were almost identical and the late Tiger Is had a slightly
better power-to-weight ratio, the IS-II had a much better cross-country
mobility because it was 10 metric tons lighter and had smaller ground
pressure. In fact the IS series had better mobility than the early KV-series
tanks.
> T-34/85: Very good for a medium tank
>
> Production Cost: Difficult to compare. Certainly the Panther is more
expensive,
> but by
> how much? What does that mean anyway? A T-72 is alot cheaper than an M-1, but
I'll
> take the M-1 any day of the week, and twice on Sunday.
The NATO forces expected to gain at least a local air superiority over the
critical areas in case of a conflict between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
The Germans did not have that luxury. The M-1 is a notorious resource hog
that places a great strain on logistics; keeping them operational while
Soviet planes attack your supply columns would have been nearly impossible.
That is exactly what the Germans had to face.
> Reliability:
> Panther: Good in production models
> T-34/85: So-so at best.
The T-34/85 could be quite reliable if properly maintained. The Soviet
T-34/85s made much longer road marches successfully than the Panthers ever
even tried. Neither one could compete with the Sherman in this area, however.
> And the Panther could absorb anything the T-34 could dish out with ease. The
> T-34 could not absorb a shot from the Panther however. The only real advantage
> the T-34 had was in speed, and even that was not a decisive advatage. What is
> the actual difference in speeds between the 34/85 and the Panther?
About 5 km/h on road. Cross-country speed depends on so many factors that it
is harder to evaluate. Both tanks had roughly identical power-to-weight
ratios.
Phil Mc Carty
>
> David Thornley wrote:
>
The nice thing about the bazooka is that you can sneak up on enemy
tanks.
> One very common practice in close fighting was to use U.S. artillery to separate the panzers from the panzergrenadiers, and then stalk the
panzers with bazookas. In this situation, the infantry can usually get
a flank shot.
> I think you make it sound a lot easier than it actually is. I for one
> would not be very keen on "sneaking" up on a panzer on foot, and I would
> guess that the number of Panzers destroyed by bazookas was probably not
> particulary significant.
>
> Indeed; this underlines why the Germans had a 'Tank Destruction' award for infantrymen. 'Tank stalking' certainly was practised (several accounts of it by the British in Normandy, even with the gawd-awful PIAT).
I would not overestimate the impact of tank stalking by infantry; it
makes good cinema but bad tactics except where vitally necessary.
(With memories of lugging a Carl Gustav RCL around numerous training
areas...)
Phil
Zhivan
>decent, but inadequate to engage Panther (or any other advanced German
vehicle)frontally
T-34/85 had a better, heavier HE round. And it was easier to supply -
logistically, it could use the divisional AA ammo, while the Panther was
specialised.
>Panther: Able to shed rounds from almost any weapon it is likely to face
>T-34/85: Decent, but again vulnerable to Panthers gun
Not true. The Panther was vulnerable to 122s, 76s and 85s (long 76s). The
armour difference is in the order of 20mm or so.
>Panther: Very poor. Major weakness
>T-34/85: Decent, but still vulnerable to almost any German AT gun, but then
what WWII
>(or post WWII tank for that matter) wasn't vulenerable from the side ort rear?
Ahh, but you cannot deny the T-34/85 had much better.
>Panther: Adequate for its role. Not really a problem, unlike the Tiger or JS
series.
>T-34/85: Very good for a medium tank
Panther was not as fast as T-34/85, simple.
>Production Cost: Difficult to compare. Certainly the Panther is more
expensive,
>but by
>how much? What does that mean anyway? A T-72 is alot cheaper than an M-1, but
I'll
>take the M-1 any day of the week, and twice on Sunday.
Depends if it's a M-1 or a M1A2.. and if it's a T-72M1 or a T-72BU, doesn't it
?
>Reliability:
>Panther: Good in production models
>T-34/85: So-so at best.
Really ? is that why the Russians sustained constant blitzes with this
vehicle from 1/44 onwards ? And the fact most Panthers blew their engines
on their first combat deployment ?
>And the Panther could absorb anything the T-34 could dish out with ease. The
>T-34 could not absorb a shot from the Panther however. The only real advantage
>the T-34 had was in speed, and even that was not a decisive advatage. What is
>the actual difference in speeds between the 34/85 and the Panther?
Ahh, but we don't play that game of 'tank versus tank'. We're talking
purely about tank qualities against a lot of things, and the T-34/85 comes
out on top. Like I've said, the Panther is too big and too lightly
armoured.
After all, that T-72BU can torch that M1A2, frontally, at 2000m. Does that
mean it's just as good as the M1A2 ? The Panther could torch the T-34/85
easily. The T-34, however, could get places Panther couldn't. Could
withstand light fire from the flank, which Panther couldn't. Had a fair
chance frontally against most weapons but the long-long-75 and the 88s.
Could torch a Tiger over the frontal arc. Could probably pop the turret of
a Panther, frontally, at a decent range also.
Andy O'Neill
writes
>Fire control / Accuracy
>Panther is superior here, although it is difficult to differentiate between
>actual weapon accuracy and crew skill.
The German optics were a great deal better than Russian.
Jay
>That is quite simply, not true. Power to weight remained on the T-34s side, as
>did sloping of armour and low silhouette. The T-34 had better rear and flank
>armour. The Panther's technical advantages consisted soly of a potent cannon
>and decent frontal armour. At the price of a 15 ton weight penalty. As it's
>been said, if the Panther _was_ a medium tank it still is only equal to the
>T-34/85.
The three factors that make a tank are armour, firepower and mobility.
The T-34 (the one in question, since you invoked the /85, which wasn't
under discussion) had the advantage of the latter over the Panther.
Two out of three ain't bad.
As for Panther vs T-34/85, that's another topic, and not what was
under discussion. Please look back and admit that you were wrong in
your comments, which were directed to mine about the obsolescence of
the T-34.
John Waters
Zhivan <rus...@ihug.co.nz> wrote in article
<6ore5i$e...@gazette.bcm.tmc.edu>...
>
> That is quite simply, not true. Power to weight remained on the T-34s side, as
> did sloping of armour and low silhouette. The T-34 had better rear and flank
> armour. The Panther's technical advantages consisted soly of a potent cannon
> and decent frontal armour. At the price of a 15 ton weight penalty. As it's
> been said, if the Panther _was_ a medium tank it still is only equal to the
> T-34/85.
Power to weight ratio did not remain in the T-34-85s favor Ie, the
T-34-85's power to weight ratio was 14.5 hp/T compared to the Panthers
power to weight ratio of 15.5 hp/T the Panther was also superior to the
T-34-85 in ground pressure, & fording Ie, 1.3 to 1.9. In fact the Panther's
ability to negotiate obstacles & terrain was superior to all medium designs
during the war.
As for the T-34-85 advantages yes its side turret armor was 75mm compared
to the Panther's 45mm @ 25^, and the T-34-85's side hull armor was 60mm
compared to the Panthers 40mm @ 0^ The T-34-85's hull rear armor was 47mm
compared to the Panther's 40mm @ 30^. Both the Panther & T-34-85 could
destroy each other with side hull hits out to 3500ms.
The T-34-85 was not the Panthers equal ,except in numbers. The T-34-85 was
inferior in optics as well, another important aspect of tank warfare is who
see's who first. While you state the Panthers advantage was frontal armor
the point is the Panther's frontal armor was proof against the T-34-85's
gun except under 500ms using BR-365P sub-calibre ammo while the Panther
could knock out the T-34-85 with a front turret hit out to 2000ms another
telling factor was the Soviet tank loss ratio in encounters with Panthers.
But the T-34-85 was as close as the Soviets came during the war to the
Panther.
Regards, John Waters
Zhivan
>In any case, the origins of the .50 are well known to me, however, I
>was under the impression that by '44 it was considered to be an HMG,
>and not some sort of anti-tank weapon. That it could achieve the
>penetration it did in the armour of a Sherman surprised me, though
>maybe such penetration was common. Does anyone know of a tank with
>about 1"=1.5" of armour that was actually penetrated by one of these
>puppies?
The rear of a Pz-IV ;-)
(now my humour is getting a workout..)
Martin Rapier
>Martin Rapier wrote:
>> Yes, but from 1916 until the mid 1940s, the primary enemy of the tank
>> was seen as the AT gun. Technolgical developments rendered this approach
>> obsolete (the size of the towed guns grew so much that they had to be
>You are making an argument based on WHY the Sherman was not well-designed,
>not whether it was well-designed. I would tend to agree with most of your
>points, although I think it was clear from the Eastern Front and Africa
>battles that that thinking was obsolete by 1942/43. Of course, that is
>much easier for me to say now then it was then.
Yes, even whenthe Pak 40 was introduced, the crews complained about it size
and weight. I had a look at a Pak 38 (50L60) recently, and it was so low as to
be almost unbelievable - hard to imagine it slaughtering the serried ranks of
British armour in the desert.
>But point is that the Sherman was a poor tank in 1944. Why it was designed
>in spite of what apearred to be plenty of evidence that it would be
>ineffective is another issue entirely.
As I've said, its main problem was poor firepower compared to the later
generation German vehicles. If all the Shermans taken to France had had 76mm
or 17pdr guns, then it is highly unlikely that it would have such a bad rep
today. The Shermans 75mm was hot stuff in 1942, but I am curious as to why it
hadn't been upgunned completely by 1944.
The crews of all those 76mm armed T34/76s probably asked the same thing
as they saw the T34/85 however...
Tarjei T. Jensen
>
> Jay wrote:
>
> > Maybe the .50 was an AT weapon after all? <sarcasm, of course>
>
> Of course! Wasn't the Boys AT rifle a .5in?
I believe it was .55in.
Greetings,
--
// Tarjei T. Jensen
// tar...@online.no || voice +47 51 62 85 58
// Support you local rescue centre: GET LOST!
Tim Sharpe
>>Production Cost: Difficult to compare. Certainly the Panther is more
>expensive,
>>but by
>>how much? What does that mean anyway? A T-72 is alot cheaper than an M-1, but
>I'll
>>take the M-1 any day of the week, and twice on Sunday.
>
>Depends if it's a M-1 or a M1A2.. and if it's a T-72M1 or a T-72BU, doesn't it
Not really! The armored battalions of the Marine Expeditionary units
during the Persian Gulf conflict were armed with a assortment of
M-60E3s, M-1s, M-1A1s and a few M-1A2s. The were constantly able to
take out T-72M1s, T-72BUs and T-80s. The problem with the Russian
T-72/T-80 series of tanks is the engine is unreliable at times but the
main problem with them is the autoloader for the main gun. This is
notorious for jamming or breaking in combat.
>?
>Ahh, but we don't play that game of 'tank versus tank'. We're talking
>purely about tank qualities against a lot of things, and the T-34/85 comes
>out on top. Like I've said, the Panther is too big and too lightly
>armoured.
>
>After all, that T-72BU can torch that M1A2, frontally, at 2000m. Does that
>mean it's just as good as the M1A2 ?
Yet again I would have to question this. I have personally seen
fotage of T-72s firing at the glacial plates of M1s and not
penetrating. Belive it or not the best weapon to defeat a M-1 with is
actually a older T-55. Since about 1988 these have been stocked with
"slug" type rounds that are very effective against laminated armour
which is found on most all modern MBTs. This shell actually shatters
the armor on the tank, leaving the tank vurnebale to following
strikes.
Jeff Heidman
> >Able to destroy almost any vehicle, from any facing, at long ranges
> >T-34/85
> >decent, but inadequate to engage Panther (or any other advanced German
> vehicle)frontally
>
> T-34/85 had a better, heavier HE round. And it was easier to supply -
> logistically, it could use the divisional AA ammo, while the Panther was
> specialised.
Ohh, ok. The HE round is a relatively big deal. I do not know that being able touse the divisional AA supply is significant since presumably the divisional AA
used some very small fraction of the supply needed by a divisions tank units.
> >Panther: Able to shed rounds from almost any weapon it is likely to face
> >T-34/85: Decent, but again vulnerable to Panthers gun
>
> Not true. The Panther was vulnerable to 122s, 76s and 85s (long 76s). The
> armour difference is in the order of 20mm or so.
The Panther was not particulary vulnerable to either 76s or 85s, unless they were
using relatively rare specialised ammo. THe Panther did not need specialized ammo
to take on its opponents.
> >Panther: Very poor. Major weakness
> >T-34/85: Decent, but still vulnerable to almost any German AT gun, but then
> what WWII
> >(or post WWII tank for that matter) wasn't vulenerable from the side ort rear?
>
> Ahh, but you cannot deny the T-34/85 had much better.
True, but I would argue that the operational difference was minimal.
> >Panther: Adequate for its role. Not really a problem, unlike the Tiger or JS
> series.
> >T-34/85: Very good for a medium tank
>
> Panther was not as fast as T-34/85, simple.
And the T-34 was slower than my motorcycle. So what? The T-34 was not
significantly faster than the Panther. I think Tero posted a difference of 5km/h.
Not an issue.
> >Production Cost: Difficult to compare. Certainly the Panther is more
> expensive,
> >but by
> >how much? What does that mean anyway? A T-72 is alot cheaper than an M-1, but> I'll
> >take the M-1 any day of the week, and twice on Sunday.
>
> Depends if it's a M-1 or a M1A2.. and if it's a T-72M1 or a T-72BU, doesn't it> ?
Sure, but then I would still take the Panther over the T-34. Production costs are
a difficult to pin down number, and almost always not particularly useful in
comparing designs.
> >Reliability:
> >Panther: Good in production models
> >T-34/85: So-so at best.
> Really ? is that why the Russians sustained constant blitzes with this
> vehicle from 1/44 onwards ? And the fact most Panthers blew their engines
> on their first combat deployment ?
Most Panthers did not blow their engines on their first combat deployment. Therewas a problem with the very first PzV that was fixed relatively quickly. That
hardly defines teh entire production run of thousands of vehicles. The Soviets
sustained constant blitzes with vast number of T-34s.
> >And the Panther could absorb anything the T-34 could dish out with ease. The
> >T-34 could not absorb a shot from the Panther however. The only real advantage
> >the T-34 had was in speed, and even that was not a decisive advatage. What is> >the actual difference in speeds between the 34/85 and the Panther?
>
> Ahh, but we don't play that game of 'tank versus tank'. We're talking
> purely about tank qualities against a lot of things, and the T-34/85 comes
> out on top. Like I've said, the Panther is too big and too lightly
> armoured.
You where the one to argue that the T-34 was a better tank than the Panther.
Comparing them certainly seems like a reasonable method of determining which wasbetter, at least you where the one to make a point-by-point comparison. The
Panther has better firepower, protection, and comparable mobility to the T-34. Igive the nod to the Panther for 2 out of 3 of the atributes most people considerto be the key factors on tank design.
> After all, that T-72BU can torch that M1A2, frontally, at 2000m. Does that
> mean it's just as good as the M1A2 ? The Panther could torch the T-34/85
> easily. The T-34, however, could get places Panther couldn't. Could
> withstand light fire from the flank, which Panther couldn't. Had a fair
> chance frontally against most weapons but the long-long-75 and the 88s.
Which is hat the Panther was armed with. I don't believe I ever said that the T-34
was not a good, or even excellent, tank. I said that the Panther was superior when
the two are compared.
> Could torch a Tiger over the frontal arc. Could probably pop the turret of
> a Panther, frontally, at a decent range also.
Yeah, right. I don't think so, not from the front. The 85mm had about equivalentpenetrationto the American 76mm, and it couldn't penetrate a Tiger or Panther
frontally.
Jeff
Per Andersson
>I would rate them more like this:
(snip various comparisons)
And another factor in favour of the Panther is how tiring the vehicle
is to operate. Crew fatigue can be a very desicive factor in combat.
If you crew is completely zonked because of having to work in a too
tiring environment, they'll start making too many mistakes.
Most Sov tanks were said to be fairly crappy in this aspect of design,
and having seen the MTLB and T72 up close I believe they were.
'
Per Andersson
"Some kind of central planning seems to be the object of
most environmental activists. But why is a Politburo expected
to work better for plants and animals than it did for Russians?"
Phocks
<35AF9302...@gemini.edu>...
>
> Armamnet
> Panther
> Able to destroy almost any vehicle, from any facing, at long ranges
Except the IS II/III series, the ISU 122/152 series, or the SU 100 at
medium/long range. In other words, the entire heavy vehivle arsenal of the
Red Army- by my count, at least 9,000 of the above vehicles were built.
> T-34/85
> decent, but inadequate to engage Panther (or any other advanced German
vehicle)frontally
True
>
> Frontal Arm
> Panther: Able to shed rounds from almost any weapon it is likely to face
Well, except anything carried by something larger than the T-34/85- the
100, 122 and 152 guns carried by Soviet heavies.
> T-34/85: Decent, but again vulnerable to Panthers gun
>
> Side Armor
> Panther: Very poor. Major weakness
> T-34/85: Decent, but still vulnerable to almost any German AT gun, but
then what WWII
> (or post WWII tank for that matter) wasn't vulenerable from the side ort
> (or post WWII tank for that matter) wasn't vulenerable from the side ort
rear?
>
> Speed
> Panther: Adequate for its role. Not really a problem, unlike the Tiger or
JS series.
> T-34/85: Very good for a medium tank
Note: the IS series tanks were as fast as the Pz IV, and faster than either
version of the Tiger. More than adequate.
>
> Production Cost: Difficult to compare. Certainly the Panther is more
expensive,
> but by
> how much? What does that mean anyway? A T-72 is alot cheaper than an M-1,
but I'll
> take the M-1 any day of the week, and twice on Sunday.
Sorry, I can't help you here.
>
> Reliability:
> Panther: Good in production models
> T-34/85: So-so at best.
Note, T-34s were "unreliable by choice. It was felt that their life
expectancy was short enough that reliability wouldn't be a problem. The
Panther, on the other hand, while "adequate" in later versions, was
difficult and expensive to maintain, and )in common with all German
vehicles) constantly short of spares. Maybe if the tank was cheaper, they
could afford more parts?
>
> Fire control / Accuracy
> Panther is superior here, although it is difficult to differentiate
between
> actual weapon accuracy and crew skill.
well, I would like to say that the Panther was actually, from a crew
standpoint, MUCH better. More survivability features (large escape
hatches, etc), and roomier. There is a reason for that tall sillouette-
German tankers could stand up (almost) in the turret- a big advantage.
IIRC, the T-34 loader had to remain seated or crouched over. Also, the
Panther had much better optics, though as you say, crew quality plays a
very large factor in accuracy.
> I would say another telling stat is that American M4A3E8 had a lot of trouble
> with Panthers in the last part of WWII, but successfully engaged T-34/85s
> consistently in Korea. Again, crew abilities play a roll, although the US had
> some problems their in Korea also.
Well, with 76mm HVAP and APDS readily available, Shermans would have done
better in 44-45 as well.
> And the Panther could absorb anything the T-34 could dish out with ease.
Frontally, yes. From the side rear, dead at any realistic range.
> T-34 could not absorb a shot from the Panther however. The only real advantage> the T-34 had was in speed, and even that was not a decisive advatage.
What is
> the actual difference in speeds between the 34/85 and the Panther?
Sorry, not sure exactly.
Damien Fox
Tero P. Mustalahti
In article <6ot5kp$k...@dgs.dgsys.com>,
mjma...@joker.igs.net (Jay) wrote:
> The JS series entered service _after_ the T-34 series. I know you
> probably mean something different, but I'll slam you anyways: the T-34
> series is a 1941 tank. In any case, the T-34/85 was in service in
> numbers before the JS-2 was in service in numbers.
Well, the JS-series was a development of the KV-series, and the KV-1 entered
service before the T-34... ;-)
Martin Rapier
In article <6ot5mf$k...@dgs.dgsys.com>, term...@utu.fi says...
>
>In article <35AF9302...@gemini.edu>,
> jheidman@What_should_you_docs.arizona.edu wrote:
>Except the IS-II, Churchill VII and M4A3E2 Jumbo Sherman. The production of
>IS-IIs alone almost equalled the production of Panthers.
The British also produced more Churchills than the Germans did Panthers
(although not the Mark VII and up specifically, but by the end of the war most
of the older models in Europe had been upgaded to Mk VII standards with
applique armour).
OK, quiz question, which model of tank (not specific Mark) did the British
produce the most of during the war?
Jeff Heidman
Tero P. Mustalahti wrote:
> In article <35AF9302...@gemini.edu>,
> jheidman@What_should_you_docs.arizona.edu wrote:
>
> > Armamnet
> > Panther
> > Able to destroy almost any vehicle, from any facing, at long ranges
>
> Except the IS-II, Churchill VII and M4A3E2 Jumbo Sherman. The production of
> IS-IIs alone almost equalled the production of Panthers.
Not that I stated "almost". But the Jumbo could be penetrated
frontally by the Panther.
> > T-34/85
> > decent, but inadequate to engage Panther (or any other advanced German
> vehicle)frontally
>
> True. The 85mm was not the Tiger/Panther killer the Soviets hoped it to be;
> instead it "only" provided an almost certain penetration against PzKpfw IV H
> and StuG III G at long ranges.
Granted. The T-34/85 was an excellent vehicle. But the Panther was better.
> > Frontal Arm
> > Panther: Able to shed rounds from almost any weapon it is likely to face
>
> Well, how likely encounters with Fireflys or IS-IIs were for Panthers? Fairly
> likely, I would say. The frontal armor of the Panther was good, but not
> invincible.
The 17lber was not a sure penetration against the frontal armor of the
Panther. I think test showed about a 25% penetration rate with AP.
> > Side Armor
> > Panther: Very poor. Major weakness
>
> The problem with the side armor of the Panther was that at close ranges it
> was vulnerable even to obsolete Allied AT-guns, such as the 2 pdr, the
> American 37mm and the Soviet 45mm. This meant that most armored cars and
> light tanks could destroy a Panther if they were able to surprise it from the
> flank.
I'm not sure it was quite that bad, but do not have any numbers handy.
> > Speed
> > Panther: Adequate for its role. Not really a problem, unlike the Tiger or JS
> series.
>
> The IS-series was not that slow. Even though the maximum road speeds of the
> Tiger I and IS-II were almost identical and the late Tiger Is had a slightly
> better power-to-weight ratio, the IS-II had a much better cross-country
> mobility because it was 10 metric tons lighter and had smaller ground
> pressure. In fact the IS series had better mobility than the early KV-series
> tanks.
Whatever. The point is that the Panther's speed was not really a
liability, nor was the T-34's significantly greater.
> > T-34/85: Very good for a medium tank
> >
> > Production Cost: Difficult to compare. Certainly the Panther is more
> expensive,
> > but by
> > how much? What does that mean anyway? A T-72 is alot cheaper than an M-1, but
> I'll
> > take the M-1 any day of the week, and twice on Sunday.
>
> The NATO forces expected to gain at least a local air superiority over the
> critical areas in case of a conflict between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
> The Germans did not have that luxury. The M-1 is a notorious resource hog
> that places a great strain on logistics; keeping them operational while
> Soviet planes attack your supply columns would have been nearly impossible.
> That is exactly what the Germans had to face.
How as the Panther such a resource hog? I have never heard that the
Panther took any more supplies than most other vehicles. Not to
metnion the fact that my point was in reference to production costs
anyway. The M-1 is certainly a resource hog compared ot other vehicles
of its type though.
> > Reliability:
> > Panther: Good in production models
> > T-34/85: So-so at best.
>
> The T-34/85 could be quite reliable if properly maintained. The Soviet
> T-34/85s made much longer road marches successfully than the Panthers ever
> even tried. Neither one could compete with the Sherman in this area, however.
Granted, AFA the Sherman goes. The Panther never made long road
marches, but the rate of breakdowns was quite acceptable. T-34s are
often reported to have lost large percentages of their numbers to
breakdown during those road marches. Given that you start off with
enough that having a significant portion break down is not the end of
the world
.
> > And the Panther could absorb anything the T-34 could dish out with ease. The
> > T-34 could not absorb a shot from the Panther however. The only real advantage
> > the T-34 had was in speed, and even that was not a decisive advatage. What is
> > the actual difference in speeds between the 34/85 and the Panther?
>
> About 5 km/h on road. Cross-country speed depends on so many factors that it
> is harder to evaluate. Both tanks had roughly identical power-to-weight
> ratios.
Like I said, not particularly significant mobility issue.
Jeff
Patrick C Miller
: The Shermans 75mm was hot stuff in 1942, but I am curious as to why it
: hadn't been upgunned completely by 1944.
According to Steven Zaloga's book on the Sherman, the American decision
to stick with the 75mm gun was based on experience with German tanks
encountered in North Africa. There were Tiger Is in North Africa, but
they were too few in number to be considered a serious threat.
Zologa says the greatest shock to the Americans after the invasion of
Normandy was encountering large numbers of Panthers. Only then did the
need to up-gun the Sherman begin to sink in.
As a side point, does anyone know how much information the Soviets
shared with the Americans and British about the types of German tanks they
were encountering and their capabilities? I think we tend to assume that
that the Americans and British knew everything the Soviets knew about
German armor, but I wonder if that was really the case.
*****************************
Patrick C. Miller
pami...@plains.NoDak.edu
*****************************
DBSDESIGN
Well sir, since you're the one who seems so fond of
footnotes and references, perhaps you could provide
some yourself...
> the Allies had several groups of experts to conduct
> such studies. They were usually highly qualified
Really? How do you know that most of them were
qualified? Where did you this information from?
Is there some kind of personnel roster available?
What evidence do you have that most of these vehicle
inspectors were experts? With full knowledge of the
destructive effects on tanks, as caused by all types
of Allied guns, bombs, rockets, etc.
> and spent a reasonable amount of time in analysis
> before producing a report.
How would you know? What evidence do you have that
proves they actually spent a reasonable amount of time
in analysis. Other than writing things in their reports?
They can write anything down that they please.
Finally, maybe you could explain why you think these
Army inspectors were any more or less objective,
honest, and unbiased than the Allied fighter pilots
who claim to have destroyed thousands of AFVs?
Oh... BTW, should I have included a *reference* for
that last line about Allied pilots, even though it is
common knowledge?
Tero P. Mustalahti
thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote:
>
> In article <6ohfum$hg6$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>, <term...@utu.fi> wrote:
>
> >He wrote *obsolescent*, not obsolete! I have to agree with him -- all other
> >medium tanks were obsolescent compared to the Panther from a purely technical
> >point of view.
> >
> All other "medium tanks"? The Panther was clearly in the heavy tank
> weight range, being almost exactly the weight of a KV or JS. By
> increasing the weight of the tank by 50% over the Sherman, it was
> possible to provide a superb gun, superb front armor, and good speed.
> Should this come as a surprise?
The Panther was a successor of the PzKpfw IV, which was a medium tank. The
Germans called the Panther medium (mittlere). The Panther was heavier than
other medium tanks of the war because it was the latest design. If you
compare it to the M26 Pershing or the Centurion, which were same generation
tanks as the Panther, you will notice that the Panther was not much heavier.
The Pershing was reclassified as medium soon after the war, although it was a
heavy tank during the war.
There were *never* universally agreed weight limits for light/medium/heavy
tanks. In the beginning of the war medium tanks weighed typically around 20
to 25 tons. In 1945 most medium tanks weighed more than 30 tons. The Italian
medium tanks weighed only 10 - 15 tons. The French Char B1bis weighed only
31.5 tons, but in 1940 it was considered to be a heavy tank.
> The Sherman was (with the 76mm gun, HVSS suspension, and wet storage)
> pretty much the equal of anything in its weight class. It demonstrated
> in Korea that it could match the T-34/85; are there any Comet fans out
> there?
I agree with you on this one. The Comet was the best British tank that saw
service during the war, but the soon the Centurion, which by far was the best
tank _designed_ during the war, eclipsed it completely.
Andy O'Neill
<< T34/85 >>
>> Could torch a Tiger over the frontal arc. Could probably pop the turret of
>> a Panther, frontally, at a decent range also.
>
>Yeah, right. I don't think so, not from the front. The 85mm had about
>equivalentpenetrationto the American 76mm, and it couldn't penetrate a Tiger or
>Panther
To throw a bit more into the discussion...
The Russians based the design of their arrowhead tungsten ammo on German
stuff.
They weren't terribly good at the technology though, and the early ammo
was reputedly prone to breaking up on impact.
( Sometimes exploding in the breach as well ).
Not sure that they ever quite got around to fixing the ammo quality
completely.
Russian HE rounds contained significantly less explosive filler than the
equivalent calibre of other countries due to their difficulties in
manufacturing the rounds.
Andy O'Neill