The Uses of Air Power
Scott D. Orr
the usefulness of airpower, by Robert Pape
(http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/21/opinion/21PAPE.html).
The thrust of the argument is that the wars and interventions of the
1990's have proved that airpower alone can't accomplish much if
anything (and talks in particular about attacks aimed at leadership),
and can even backfire (e.g., the bombing aimed at Muammer Qaddafi,
which killed his daughter, probably provoked the Lockerbie airliner
bombing). Pape argues that for air power to be effective, it has to
be combined with ground forces, so that the enemy is forced to expose
itself to the air forces in order to fight against the ground units (a
"hammer and anvil" strategy).
Scott Orr
William Shapiro
has caught up with an idea that goes back as long as there have been
airpower advocates and infantrymen.
Bill
"Scott D. Orr" <sd...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:bi6n7vss9o0pvqa22...@4ax.com...
Scott D. Orr
<we...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>Nice to see that someone in the media (liberal, conservative, or otherwise)
>has caught up with an idea that goes back as long as there have been
>airpower advocates and infantrymen.
>
Well, yeah, obviously it's an idea that gets debated in military
circles--however, as long as it gets ignored in popular debate, the
Air Force can present itself as "the air power experts", and no one
will question its stupidity.
Scott Orr
William Shapiro
independent air force?
Bill
"Scott D. Orr" <sd...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:jcao7vg3lenut9hoo...@4ax.com...
Scott D. Orr
<we...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>Is there actually still a good reason (if there ever was one) for an
>independent air force?
>
The reason for it now is the reason it was originally created: it
keeps the Army from being a lot bigger than the Navy and able to throw
more lobbying weight around. The whole point of the Air Force was for
the civilian administration to be able to divide and conquer. This of
course is a problem when you get an administration like Clinton's that
defers to the military out of political fear rather than controlling
it like it's supposed to.
Scott Orr
Brad Meyer
<we...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>Is there actually still a good reason (if there ever was one) for an
>independent air force?
IMO, yes. What there ought to be, again, IMO, is an air force _and_ an
Army Air Corps. The Air Force should be responsible for control of the
airspace over the battlefield, including radar/SAM supression and/or
destruction. The Army Air Corps should operate in direct support of
the various Army Ground Forces. I caught a retired Air Force MGen on
one of the networks commenting on ground force support with words to
the effect that while he was gung ho Air Force, he had to admit that
the people who really had this sort of thing nailed were USMC air
units, and that their level of integration, wherein the Marine Pilots
do the tactical course a Quantico and have a detailed understnading of
ground operations, allows for the best possible application of their
assets. I would add to that that they also have a seperate "Air
Force", i.e. Naval Air, that is tasked with keeping the skys open over
the battle field. I think the relationship between Naval air and
Marine air provides a useful guideline for a relationship between Air
Force air and Army air. Naval Air nad Marine air have a degree of
commonality (Hornet) and a degree of divergence (Tomcat vs Harrier for
instance). Historically, each has had portions of its assets
transfered to control of the other as required by the battlefield
situation. If the Army were able to adopt a similar arrangement, there
might be an additional degree of commonality between Army air and
Marine air in terms of things like Harriers, A-10's, helos, etc.
IMO, a "force" command is primarily responsible for the development of
doctrine to accomplish a particular task or set of tasks. Command of
the airspace represets such a set of tasks and IMO their should be an
Air Force responsible for mastering that set of tasks. Support of the
Army ground forces represents a different set of tasks needing and
entirely different doctrine and therefore a seperate command (Army Air
Froce or whatever) responsible for developing and implimenting it.
D. Patterson
Such arrangements already exist. The Army has the Army Aviation combat
arms branch. The U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC), U.S. Army Air Forces
(USAAF) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) have always had tactical air
forces training and operating in direct assignment to and support of
designated Army commands and headquarters. The unique organization of
the U.S. Marine Corps and its Marine air squadrons is due to the unique
circumstances of its amphibious and assault missions. Although observers
can note instances where the U.S. Army can benefit from an entire air
force dedicated to the principal mission of close-air support for U.S.
Army commands, the budgetary realities incresingly preclude it as the
budgets and personnel are increasingly diminished by the U.S. Congress
for all of the armed forces. Because combat aircraft and pilot training
are prohibitvely expensive in declining budgets and post Cold War force
levels, each aircraft and pilot must be multi-role in their mission
capabilities. The days when aircraft cost less than a $100,000 each and
pilots were easily trained as cannon fodder are long gone. Consequently,
even the air squadrons of the USMC are being drawn farther and farther
away from their own past dedicated roles. Until the U.S. Congress sees a
need to fund a comparably expensive and dedicated fixed wing air force
like that of the USMC and USN (U.S. Navy) as a part of the USAF or the
USA (U.S. Army), the USAF has no choice but to use its tactical air
forces to accomplish all of its assigned air missions and not just the
close-support air mission.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
David Thornley
Scott D. Orr <sd...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>bombing). Pape argues that for air power to be effective, it has to
>be combined with ground forces, so that the enemy is forced to expose
>itself to the air forces in order to fight against the ground units (a
>"hammer and anvil" strategy).
>
To be picky, it's a little more useful than that. In WWII, it was found
that air attack on enemy positions well away from friendly soldiers
could demoralize them so that friendly soldiers coming up a few
hours later could benefit (see Gooderson, "Air Power on the Battlefield").
This is a different effect, of course, not that tactical air power
is really useful without ground forces.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Akorps666
pulling their punches, not hitting the Iraqi ground
forces very hard, in hopes they will surrender. But
that seems to be having the wrong effect in some
cases, leading the Iraqi ground forces to fight back.
I think what coalition forces should do, is start
vaporizing Iraqi ground forces using the MOABs
where that is feasible (also vaporizing terrorist
groups where that is feasible).
The Iraqis are very tough, handling them with kid
gloves is not the way to earn their respect. Using
the MOABs on them would not only eliminate
pockets of resistance, but cause Iraqi troops in
earshot to become demoralized and surrender.
One of their weaknesses is sensitivity to loud
explosions, for some reason or another (witness
how shaken the Iraqi generals were when loud
explosions went off while they were giving a
briefing for the TV cameras in Baghdad).
If there is a way to use MOABs as close as
possible to Baghdad, that also would help bring
the war to an end more quickly. The Iraqis don't
respect weakness, only strength and power.
Anthony Ventimiglia
> The Iraqis are very tough, handling them with kid
> gloves is not the way to earn their respect. Using
> the MOABs on them would not only eliminate
> pockets of resistance, but cause Iraqi troops in
> earshot to become demoralized and surrender.
> One of their weaknesses is sensitivity to loud
> explosions, for some reason or another (witness
> how shaken the Iraqi generals were when loud
> explosions went off while they were giving a
> briefing for the TV cameras in Baghdad).
>
> If there is a way to use MOABs as close as
> possible to Baghdad, that also would help bring
> the war to an end more quickly. The Iraqis don't
> respect weakness, only strength and power.
>
Do you have any concept of reality ? More bombs and missles have been
used in these few days than any other Military campaign in the
world. You say our punches, so would you have me believe that most of
these bombs and missles are being fired in the middle of the desert
for hope that they'll scare the opposition ?
--
-- Orwell was off by nineteen years
Scott D. Orr
The air campaign has been pretty light, from what I've seen. The
problem though with hitting the Iraqi units is that most of the big
ones are in cities.
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
wrote:
>Because combat aircraft and pilot training
>are prohibitvely expensive in declining budgets and post Cold War force
>levels, each aircraft and pilot must be multi-role in their mission
>capabilities. The days when aircraft cost less than a $100,000 each and
>pilots were easily trained as cannon fodder are long gone. Consequently,
>even the air squadrons of the USMC are being drawn farther and farther
>away from their own past dedicated roles. Until the U.S. Congress sees a
>need to fund a comparably expensive and dedicated fixed wing air force
>like that of the USMC and USN (U.S. Navy) as a part of the USAF or the
>USA (U.S. Army), the USAF has no choice but to use its tactical air
>forces to accomplish all of its assigned air missions and not just the
>close-support air mission.
>
The problem is that, when it picks out equipment, the USAF doesn't
give the ground support mission priority; it doesn't receive priority
in training, either.
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
wrote:
The Navy air units are also tasked with ground support, at least in
part, and from what I know they do a much better job of it than the
Air Force--but then, remember that the Marines are part of the Navy.
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
>In article <bi6n7vss9o0pvqa22...@4ax.com>,
>Scott D. Orr <sd...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>>bombing). Pape argues that for air power to be effective, it has to
>>be combined with ground forces, so that the enemy is forced to expose
>>itself to the air forces in order to fight against the ground units (a
>>"hammer and anvil" strategy).
>>
>To be picky, it's a little more useful than that. In WWII, it was found
>that air attack on enemy positions well away from friendly soldiers
>could demoralize them so that friendly soldiers coming up a few
>hours later could benefit (see Gooderson, "Air Power on the Battlefield").
>This is a different effect, of course, not that tactical air power
>is really useful without ground forces.
If you read Pape's piece, I think that sort of use would fall under
what he's talking about. For example, he argues that what made the
difference in Kosovo was the _threat_ of ground forces which would
have been supported by air power.
Scott Orr
D. Patterson
Your opinion is worthless. We've proven before that you are clueless in
your claims about close support.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
D. Patterson
That is a bald faced lie. Every tactical combat pilot is trained in
close air support. The close air support receives at least as much or
more of its share of the resources in comparison to the other missions
which must be supported.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
William Shapiro
Bill
"D. Patterson" <n...@fidalgo.net> wrote in message
news:3E7E5DD8...@fidalgo.net...
D. Patterson
2001-2002. I provided a number of links to actual U.S. Air Force, U.S.
Marine Corps, and other sources discussing this issue. Check the
archives to see our discussions.
Brad Meyer
wrote:
>That is a bald faced lie. Every tactical combat pilot is trained in
>close air support. The close air support receives at least as much or
>more of its share of the resources in comparison to the other missions
>which must be supported.
If so, it is a refreshing change. It was only a dozen years or so ago
they were talking about grounding the A-10 because the AF didn't want
to fly it and the AF/Army deal was that Army could not fly fixed wing.
Be that as it may, the real issue is organic support. No matter how
well the AF trains, they will still be Air Force pilots, not Army
pilots. Not forces organic to the field force.
Louis Capdeboscq
base such a study.
It's true that the air force remains generally unenthusiastic about air
support, as opposed to winning the war on its own, but then I guess
that's both the advantage and the price to pay for creating an
independent air force: you get theories about how to achieve air
superiority as opposed to expensive flying artillery, but the flip side
is that you also get theories about strategic bombing winning the war on
its own.
William Shapiro a écrit:
D. Patterson
>
> On Sun, 23 Mar 2003 17:25:15 -0800, "D. Patterson" <n...@fidalgo.net>
> wrote:
>
> >That is a bald faced lie. Every tactical combat pilot is trained in
> >close air support. The close air support receives at least as much or
> >more of its share of the resources in comparison to the other missions
> >which must be supported.
>
> If so, it is a refreshing change. It was only a dozen years or so ago
> they were talking about grounding the A-10 because the AF didn't want
> to fly it and the AF/Army deal was that Army could not fly fixed wing.
>
No change was necessary, because the Air Force never wanted to abandon
the close air support (CAS) mission role in the first place. On the
contrary, the Air Force was trying to expand its CAS capabilities in
tandem with its battlefield air interdiction (BAI) capabilities.
Retiring the Fairchild A-10 Thunderbolt II was never intended to end or
diminish the close air support (CAS) mission by the USAF. On the
contrary, the Air Force wanted to retire the twenty year old and
airframe weary A-10, so the budget and pilots would be available to
deploy large numbers of A-16 Block 60 aircraft in the close air support
(CAS) and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) missions. Unfortunately,
the Army tried to gain control of the Fairchild A-10 Thunderbolt II and
the OV-10 Bronco with the help of political influence in the U.S.
Congress. By the time the dust had settled from the resulting political
feuds, the Air Force was ordered to keep only two wings of the Fairchild
A-10 Thunderbolt II, whereas the Air Fore had wanted to deploy up to 400
A-16 or F/A-16 aircraft in the CAS and BAI mission roles. The political
interference actually caused a much lower number of attack aircraft to
be available for CAS than the Air Force had tried to procure.
Even though the Air Force was unable to procure purpose built A-16
fighters for the CAS and BAI mission roles, the Air Froce tried to
workaround the limitation of only two wings of A-10 CAS aircraft by
converting existing F-16 fighters into F/A 16 fighters. Unfortunately,
the exisitng F-16 fighters proved during the Gulf War to be unsuitable
for such ad hoc conversions by the addition of weapons pods. But the Air
Force tried to make more CAS fighters aircraft available despite the
fiscal and procurement limitations they were required to honor.
Presently, the Air Force is continuing its support for CAS and will be
deploying the Joint Strike Force (JSF) fighter aircraft as a replacement
for the A-10 and F/A-16, as will the Marine Corps and the Navy.
> Be that as it may, the real issue is organic support. No matter how
> well the AF trains, they will still be Air Force pilots, not Army
> pilots. Not forces organic to the field force.
Such an argument is contrary to the battlefield trends. The A-10 was
first designed and built in 1970. Their airframes are overdue for
retirement, without virtual reconstructions like the B-52
Stratofortress. Unlike the B-52 Stratofortress, however, the A-10 is
facing a greatly worsened threat environment which makes it far more
vulnerable every year. The threat environment is only going to get much
worse in the next ten to twenty years as air defense radars and air
defense surface-to-air missiles improve even more than they were in 1990
or 2003. Consequently, the future of CAS will require VTOL aircraft with
increased speed and real stealth capabilities lacking in the A-10
Thunderbolt II and the AV-8 Harrier. Such an aircraft must be used in
the CAS and BAI mission roles, and the BAI mission role is not and never
has been a responsibility of the Army. The Army is only concerned with
the FEBA and CAS. Extending the Army into an overlapping area of
responsibility with a BAI mission role beyond the FEBA creates all kinds
of problems from competing budgets to divided command problems to
increased friendly fire incidents. The best organic air support the Army
could possibly have is represented by the attack helicopters, the future
UAV Predator type drones, and the organic artillery.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
TMOliver
>
> Your opinion is worthless. We've proven before that you are
> clueless in your claims about close support.
>
dallas, I think you've intentionally or unintentionally (for I'm
often also in gross disagreement with the poster) fallen for
what has been perceived as conventional wisdom.
Some years of experience close to matter have left me with
relatively strong views....
(1) With exception of the dump truck drivers (A10 pilots) whose
training and operational missions emphasize the CAS role, USAF
training and employment for fixed wing fighter/strike a/c and
crews only minimally emphasizes CAS.
(2) Obviously, by the very nature of their overall
indoctrination and training ("Every Marine a rifleman!"), the
USMC's "Naval" aviators (Yes, USMC pilots all go the USN flight
training and always have, a side bit here for some who might
never have understood this quirk...), are in my view
immeasurably better prepared for and comfortable in the CAS
role. Even their a/c, especially the AV8, are optimized for
CAS. Additionally, a substantial number of USMC officers, both
aviators and non-aviators, undergo training in the arcane art of
communications with and control of a/c engaged in CAS.
Certainly every Marine battalion and many company sized
formations would have "organic" air control capacity in one or
more specially trained personnel, just as for many years a
spectrum of USMC and USN officers and senior enlisted personnel
were specially trained to control Naval Gunfire Support.
The training sysllabus used in the USN's "RAG" (Replacement Air
Group) squadrons for all versions of the F/A-18 Hornet and Super
Hornet (the principal strike a/c of the USN) provides major
emphasis for the delivery of ordnance in the CAS role, a
traditionalist approach based on experience gained during WWII
and Korea in cooperating with land forces. Obviously, most
naval aviators woiuld maintain that cooperation with USMC units
provides a better developed capacity for CAS, just as carrier-
based avaiators would be likely to claim that the air intercept
role is optimized when the air controllers are familiar "voices"
with whom the aviators have trained and who may better
appreciate the performance parameters of the a/c and standing
squadron doctrine.
None of the above in any way negates the competence or skill of
the USAF's aviators, especially A10 drivers whose entire
training focuses on CAS, but simply emphasizes that the USN and
USMC training focuses upon CAS, especially the communication and
coordination with ground forces to a greater extent than does
the USAF. Coordination and communications with ground forces by
the USAF centers upon the existence of specially trained USAF
ground personnel, small units or single controller/coordinators,
a luxury not available to or deployed in company with every
force in combat.
Certainly, most of the "doctrinal" background for the CAS role
was developed by USN/USMC aviators operating with USMC ground
forces in the Pacific Theater.
Even Hollywood has always recognized it.....
TMO
David Thornley
Scott D. Orr <sd...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>On 23 Mar 2003 01:28:56 GMT, thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) wrote:
>
>>To be picky, it's a little more useful than that. In WWII, it was found
>
>what he's talking about. For example, he argues that what made the
>difference in Kosovo was the _threat_ of ground forces which would
>have been supported by air power.
>
agreement here.
D. Patterson
>
[...]
>
> None of the above in any way negates the competence or skill of
> the USAF's aviators, especially A10 drivers whose entire
> training focuses on CAS, but simply emphasizes that the USN and
> USMC training focuses upon CAS, especially the communication and
> coordination with ground forces to a greater extent than does
> the USAF. Coordination and communications with ground forces by
> the USAF centers upon the existence of specially trained USAF
> ground personnel, small units or single controller/coordinators,
> a luxury not available to or deployed in company with every
> force in combat.
>
> Certainly, most of the "doctrinal" background for the CAS role
> was developed by USN/USMC aviators operating with USMC ground
> forces in the Pacific Theater.
>
> Even Hollywood has always recognized it.....
>
> TMO
I can understand why you would have acquired the idea that the USAF did
not have such a capability comparable to the USN/USMC doctrines. After
the ETO campaigns, the growing Army and Air Force CAS capabilities
suffered a series of setbacks and renewals during the Korean Conflict
and afterwards in the Sixties to early Seventies. What you may not be
aware of, however, is the big changes and improvements which occurred in
concurrence with the late days of the Vietnam War and the deployments of
the A-10 and other TAS elements. Each Army combat maneuver unit was
assigned an attached USAF detachment responsible for training and
operating with their host Army units. This integration was comprehensive
enough to entail the adoption of Army uniforms, weapons, and training
for the assigened USAF personnel. You should discuss this issue with the
experienced USAF personnel and related TAC/ACC pilots.
Dallas Patterson
n...@fidalgo.net
TMOliver
I will agree with you in spirit and even in fact as it involves
the utilization of the A-10 (and of course the recent afaptation
of precision gided weapons to CAS, but humorously would note
that yesterday, when CENTCOM announced the shift of emphasis to
"Urban CAS", and spoke of the time spent developing the "Plan"
by tis "bright kid" on staff (who turns out to be a USMC MAJOR,
a qualified naval aviator).
One of the problems facing the new (an adaption of the old, from
the ETO during late WWII) "cabrank" marshall of attack a/c over
Baghdad will be the inflexibility of many of the GPS-guided
weapons, the "set and forget" sort for which the target had to
be selected prior to launch. Laser guidance requires either the
strike a/c or another (or a ground based laser in the hands of a
controller) to contantly illuminate a target, not always easy
among multi-story structures and narrow thoroughfares.
I hope we've all gotten better at the task, becasue (as w/arty),
it only takes one short round to spoil the day).
TMO
D. Patterson
Let's hope that is just reflects the budget saving opportunities in
"Jointness" <chuckle>.
Dallas