Budianksy-Willey debate on Pearl Harbor
al kirke
----- Original Message -----
From: "Pearl Harbor" <pha...@hotmail.com>
> >POST to SOC.HISTORY.WAR.MISC
> <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
> >From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
>
> "For the year before the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. Navy's
> codebreakers were investigating only three Japanese naval codes.
> These were designated AN, AD, and MAT. The first was the
> operational, general purpose code of the Japanese Navy, which
> would later be designated JN-25; it was the code which
> was later successfully broken in winter/spring 1941-42 and the
> reading of which contributed to the decisive American victory
> at Midway. AD was an "Administrative" system used to a very
> limited extent, apparently by flag officers only. MAT was a
> "Material" system."
>
> "Contemporaneous, month-by-month reports on the progress
> of the Navy codebreakers, each date-stamped, cover the entire
> period 1940-41. They cover the work of the entire unit known
> as OP-20-GY, the Navy cryptanalytic office in Washington,
> and also report on the progress of the Navy decryption
> units in Hawaii and Cavite. They show unambiguously that when
> the AN codebook was changed on December 1940, and sub-
> sequently when the additive tables used with the code were changed
> on August 1, 1941, the U.S. Navy lost its ability to read this traffic
> altogether. By December 1, 1941, only 3,800 of the 30,000-plus
> code groups and 2,500 of the 50,000 additives in AN had
> been recovered. (Most of the recovered code groups were
> those for numerals, an even further limitation on reading.) No
> progress had been made at all in reading current AD or MAT
> systems from November 1, 1940 on (when code book and/or
> key changes went into effect in both systems). "
>
> END <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
> From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
>
> *************************************************
Analysis by Mark Willey author of Pearl Harbor Mother of All
Conspiracies -
1. In the first paragraph Budainsky says "the U.S. Navy's
codebreakers were investigating only three Japanese naval
codes." But that is a blatantly false statement. They investigated
five. He left out the "I or Intelligence code" and the second most
important one, the "S code," the Navy-merchant liaison code that
we stole from the Japanese Consulate in New York and therefore
read 99 percent. To miss almost half the total codes we investigated
is a damning indictment of his scholarlyness. No one can represent
themselves as an expert who mashes or deliberately distorts facts
that badly in his supposed field of expertise.
2. Budiansky says that no progress was made in reading the
AD or MAT systems but he is wrong on both counts. We read
both. Cmdr. Rochefort has stated in interviews (even available
on the net through the magazine Cryptolog) that Hawaii had made
good progress on the MAT code and Budiansky as an "expert"
should have known that. The AD code was read in Washington
and there are discussions about what good progress we made
on it in documents in the National Archives. Budiansky doesn't
even know what the code is.
3. In the second paragraph he talks about "month-by-month
reports" in Record Group 38 which he relies on. I have seen these.
They are unsigned and of unknown provenance and known to be
false. In 1945/1946 the Navy faked thousands of documents to
cover up the fact that they read Japanese navy codes prior to
December 7th, 1941. These documents Budiansky relies on were
some of the fakes. It is interesting that an "expert" like Budiansky
would fall for them. He also states these documents "also report
on the progress of the Navy decryption units in Hawaii and Cavite"
which is false. The reports only purport to cover OP-20-G
(in Washington).
4. To show how totally ignorant Budiansky is, he says that
JN-25B (AN-1) had "30,000-plus" code groups. But this code
has been in the public domain in the National Archives since
February 1996 and by 1999 he should have looked at it and
been familiar with it. It only has 14,500 code groups.
Some expert.
5. He says the U.S. Navy had only recovered 3,800 code
groups from the JN-25B dictionary by December 1941 but the
fact is that we know they had recovered over 4,000 on 5 March
1941. That tells us not only the documents he relies on are faked,
but it also tells us Budiansky doesn't know much about codes or
cryptoanalysis since 500 code groups is enough to read book
codes to about 90 percent of most messages. In fact, Rochefort
and Station Hypo knew many less than 500 code groups of JN-
25B immediately prior to the Battle of Midway.
Because there was a cover-up about Pearl Harbor - even to
the extent that generals and the head of Naval Intelligence were
strongly pressured to commit perjury before Congress about
Japanese navy codes - one must weigh the evidence about pre-
war cryptoanalysis very carefully. This Budainsky has horribly
failed to do. He is like an illiterate retard let loose in a library.
Sincerely,
Mark Willey
Geoffrey Sinclair
message,
From Kaga Estimated time of arrival 19th 2130.
Code groups,
21936 48222 01905 38832 87039 64527 11520 99708
meaning, one word per group
from NGUC Kaga stop ETA 19th 2130 stop.
NGUC = next group upper case
additive key
02923 41338 00989 15861 28959 90024 23693 18229
code plus additive
23859 89550 01884 43693 05988 54541 34113 07927
encrypted text as transmitted,
23859 89550 01884 26341 43693 05988 54541 34113 07927
1) All code groups divisible by three
2) Code groups exist for dates, times, common phrases etc.
3) Code groups exist for names of ships, places etc., there are
usually "upper case" meanings, other names would have to be
spelt out. (presumably one letter per code group)
4) Two different groups for "stop", there could be dozens of
groups for a common word.
5) The addition is digit by digit, non carrying.
6) The extra group in the final message is to tell the receiver
where to start in the additive table. There were keys and
conventions covering this.
Now given this "from NGUC Kaga stop ETA 19th 2130 stop."
imagine how easy it would be if only one "word" was missing,
then two words and so on. It is a code where the more you
know the more quickly you can resolve the unknowns.
Imagine you can strip the additives and already know the "from
NGUC Kaga" and can guess the stop, congratulations you have
decoded half the message. Useful isn't it? Now try and make
up a larger message and remove most of the words and try and
turn it into some sort of understandable message.
You see the US has never denied it was decrypting some IJN
JN-25B traffic, but only small numbers and usually fragments.
Figure out the settings for Purple and out dropped Japanese,
figure out the additive on JN-25 and you end up with a
vocabulary of over 30,000 "words". It was a major step
forward when it was realised the code groups were all
divisible by 3 as a garble check.
In addition there were separate tables
1) to give latitude and longitude,
2) geographic designators (AF = Midway)
3) date/time
these were effectively super enciphered giving an additional check
digit to minimise garbles.
al kirke wrote in message <6XeZb.348406$I06.3681650@attbi_s01>...
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Pearl Harbor" <pha...@hotmail.com>
Actually it is,
From: "al kirke" <alki...@comcast.net
Note by the way the above message is over 4 years old, apparently
only now is an attempt to reply being made.
> Analysis by Mark Willey author of Pearl Harbor Mother of All
>Conspiracies -
>
> 1. In the first paragraph Budainsky says "the U.S. Navy's
>codebreakers were investigating only three Japanese naval
>codes." But that is a blatantly false statement. They investigated
>five. He left out the "I or Intelligence code" and the second most
>important one, the "S code," the Navy-merchant liaison code that
>we stole from the Japanese Consulate in New York and therefore
>read 99 percent. To miss almost half the total codes we investigated
>is a damning indictment of his scholarlyness. No one can represent
>themselves as an expert who mashes or deliberately distorts facts
> that badly in his supposed field of expertise.
Ah this is fun, Willey, forgot to mention at least the following IJN codes,
the call sign code,
the "wewe" code, for call signs not in the call sign list
the IJNAF air/ground codes, which the Philippines were reading for
example.
The new jade code machine.
There are others.
So presumably Willey agrees his failure to mention all the codes
is also proof he is not an expert. It will be interesting to see what
the definition of intelligence code is and where it was supposed
to be used. It was rated as a low priority, even lower than the material
code, so the question is just how much work was done on it.
There were more than 5 codes investigated. Now note the merchant
marine code was readable at the time, no longer in need of investigation
by the codebreakers, just exploitation, and you can decide it is not an
IJN code if you want, since it was for merchant ships.
> 2. Budiansky says that no progress was made in reading the
>AD or MAT systems but he is wrong on both counts. We read
>both. Cmdr. Rochefort has stated in interviews (even available
>on the net through the magazine Cryptolog) that Hawaii had made
>good progress on the MAT code and Budiansky as an "expert"
>should have known that.
Edwin Layton notes the material code, which he calls HE required
6 months work in 1941 to crack for minor results. This means
Budiansky appears in error, assuming people are talking about the
same code.
>The AD code was read in Washington
> and there are discussions about what good progress we made
>on it in documents in the National Archives. Budiansky doesn't
>even know what the code is.
One of the favourite tactics over the IJN codes is to switch between
the IJN and USN designations of the codes, and the fact the USN
changed some of the designations it used during the war rather than
keeping the story straight.
The IJN code designated as AD was introduced on 1 November 1938,
and progress was made reading it to the point in November 1940 it
was beginning to be readable by the USN. It was then revised and
limited to flag officers, the USN called the new version NL and often
the Admiral's code and it is clear sometimes AD. As a result of the
smaller number of users there were few messages sent in the system
and no progress was made before investigation was abandoned in
mid December 1941.
Note JN-25A became JN-25B in November 1940, and the USN
was calling the system AN at the time. The Japanese made a
big mistake when changing JN-25 code books, they did not
change the additive book, the random numbers, at the same time
giving the allies a window of around 2 months into the new system.
It is a favourite trick of the conspiracy theories to ignore the code
changes in November 1940 as has happened above, no mention
that AD was partially readable in 1940 but not in 1941 thanks to
the changes.
> 3. In the second paragraph he talks about "month-by-month
>reports" in Record Group 38 which he relies on. I have seen these.
>They are unsigned and of unknown provenance and known to be
>false.
Ah how nice, to simply dismiss the evidence as false. How does
a signature change things?
If you would like to know the exact code groups recovered it was,
"OP-20-GY," CNSG 5750/198, RG38, is the month-by-month
progress report file. It reports the following code recovery numbers
for "AN-1 Code (Operations) (current)" (the then designation for
what later would be designated JN25B).
"Unfinished or Continuous" [i.e., a running tally]
April 1, 1941: "approximately 300 values recovered"
May 1, 1941: "approximately 400 values recovered"
June 1, 1941: "approximately 1100 values recovered"
July 1, 1941: "approximately 1100 values recovered"
August 1, 1941: "approximately 2000 values recovered"
Sept 1, 1941: "approximately 2000 values recovered"
Oct 1, 1941: "approximately 2400 values recovered"
"Completed during October 1941"
Nov 1, 1941: "600 values recovered" [i.e., a total of 3,000 values as of
this date]
"Completed during November 1941"
Dec 1, 1941: "800 values recovered" [i.e., a total of 3,800 values as of
this date]
"Unfinished or continuous"
Jan 1, 1942: "Approximately 6,180 values recovered"
Its not like its a secret anymore.
>In 1945/1946 the Navy faked thousands of documents to
>cover up the fact that they read Japanese navy codes prior to
>December 7th, 1941.
Just think folks, to generate thousands of false documents you
need hundreds of people involved, all of whom kept quiet about
it all their lives. Not only that only the true believers can see the
deception. As opposed to USN exercises like breaking out the
1940/41 IJN messages to see what they contained and what
they could have told. Presumably all the fakes were signed.
>These documents Budiansky relies on were
> some of the fakes. It is interesting that an "expert" like Budiansky
>would fall for them. He also states these documents "also report
>on the progress of the Navy decryption units in Hawaii and Cavite"
>which is false. The reports only purport to cover OP-20-G
>(in Washington).
Yes folks, apparently it was a competition, no USN group would
send its results to another. Let alone the British. Let alone the
idea Washington would rule on what was a valid meaning or not.
The allies worked to build a common book and Washington was
in charge of US efforts.
> 4. To show how totally ignorant Budiansky is, he says that
>JN-25B (AN-1) had "30,000-plus" code groups. But this code
>has been in the public domain in the National Archives since
>February 1996 and by 1999 he should have looked at it and
>been familiar with it. It only has 14,500 code groups.
> Some expert.
JN-25B had a possible 33,333 code groups, (99,999 divided by 3)
because it was "hatted" or "uppercase" each code group could
have two meanings, total 66,666 possible valid meanings.
It is known not all the code groups were used, but that is not
something the allies could assume.
> 5. He says the U.S. Navy had only recovered 3,800 code
>groups from the JN-25B dictionary by December 1941 but the
>fact is that we know they had recovered over 4,000 on 5 March
>1941. That tells us not only the documents he relies on are faked,
>but it also tells us Budiansky doesn't know much about codes or
>cryptoanalysis since 500 code groups is enough to read book
>codes to about 90 percent of most messages. In fact, Rochefort
>and Station Hypo knew many less than 500 code groups of JN-
>25B immediately prior to the Battle of Midway.
Note the unverified claim that 4,000 code groups were recovered
in March 1941.
Now look at the idea that Hypo knew less than 500 groups in
May 1942, in other words the USN did not supply many code
group recoveries to Pearl Harbor intelligence. Apparently the
conspiracy extended to trying to lose Midway as well.
By the way Edwin Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer,
reports receiving the current USN version JN-25B code book in
December 1941 and on 9 January 1942 reports the Philippines
circulated 1,700 new code additives, 950 new code group values
and 650 additional indicators. Presumably Layton managed to
keep half of the new code group values out of Rochefort's hands,
along with the code book.
Actually the less than 500 code groups claim is junk. It would be
easy to publish such a small list, a few hours typing would do it
and then we could all see what the magic words are that "many less
than 500" could break out 90% of the messages. Think about it, the
claim is say 400 out of 14,500 or less than 3% is enough to read
so much. In reality around 20% of the messages sent in mid 1942,
just before the code book change, were readable, others had parts
resolved. Remarkable that with 90% readable Washington and
Pearl Harbor could disagree so strongly as to the Japanese objective.
> Because there was a cover-up about Pearl Harbor - even to
>the extent that generals and the head of Naval Intelligence were
>strongly pressured to commit perjury before Congress about
>Japanese navy codes - one must weigh the evidence about pre-
>war cryptoanalysis very carefully. This Budainsky has horribly
>failed to do. He is like an illiterate retard let loose in a library.
Willey is a second generation pusher of the conspiracy theory.
People like Budiansky are a major threat to the fiction.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Mark Willey
From: "al kirke" <alki...@comcast.net
> Analysis by Mark Willey author of Pearl Harbor Mother of All
>Conspiracies -
> 1. In the first paragraph Budainsky says "the U.S. Navy's
>codebreakers were investigating only three Japanese naval
>codes." But that is a blatantly false statement. They investigated
>five.
>Ah this is fun, Willey, forgot to mention at least the following IJN
codes,
>the call sign code,
MW - "Call signs" are not codes. Don't be so uninformed. And there
obviously were more than 5 Japanese Naval codes, Stinnett says 29, but
OP-20-G only monitored 5 in 1941 according to the official History of
the unit. So your listing various codes is meaningless, a waste of
everyone's time and has nothing to do with this debate.
>the IJNAF air/ground codes, which the Philippines were reading for
example.
MW - Right, and Sinclair wants you to believe Japanese Air Force codes
are Japanese naval codes? This just shows the quality of his
expertise.
>So presumably Willey agrees his failure to mention all the codes
>is also proof he is not an expert.
No, I agree that you don't know anything about codes - in fact that
you and Budiansky are the same.
> Now note the merchant
>marine code was readable at the time, no longer in need of
investigation
>by the codebreakers, just exploitation, and you can decide it is not
an
>IJN code if you want, since it was for merchant ships.
In was called "NL" because it was the IJN-merchant ship liaison code
(NL= "Naval Liaison"). Every Japanese merchant ship was commandeered
into the Japanese Navy. So it is, in fact, a Japanese Navy code. I
guess Sinclair didn't know that Japanese merchant ships were part of
the Japanese Navy? Doesn't surprise me.
>Edwin Layton notes the material code, which he calls HE required
>6 months work in 1941 to crack for minor results. This means
> Budiansky appears in error,
MW - Budiansky IS in error, "not appears in error."
>>The AD code was read in Washington
>> and there are discussions about what good progress we made
>>on it in documents in the National Archives. Budiansky doesn't
>>even know what the code is.
>One of the favourite tactics over the IJN codes is to switch between
>the IJN and USN designations of the codes, and the fact the USN
>changed some of the designations it used during the war rather than
>keeping the story straight.
>The IJN code designated as AD was introduced on 1 November 1938,
Sinclair is clearly befuddled here. "AD" was the US designation, the
IJN designation was "Ango Sho C." Nowhere in my discussion did I
switch between the two and no one else has either. Sinclair is
hallucinating! Someone tranquilize him, quick!
>and progress was made reading it to the point in November 1940 it
>was beginning to be readable by the USN. It was then revised and
>limited to flag officers,
>the USN called the new version NL and often
This is all false. Those old lies expired a long time ago. It was
never referred to as "NL," that was speculation by author John
Costello, it was not a flag officers code but used only for personnel
matters like transfers and promotions. Come on! Catch up, Sinclair!
Don't bother to post unless you know at least the tiniest bit about
the subject, otherwise you are wasting peoples' time and electrons on
the net.
>It is a favourite trick of the conspiracy theories to ignore the code
>changes in November 1940 as has happened above, no mention
>that AD was partially readable in 1940 but not in 1941 thanks to
>the changes.
Sinclair, I will give a test to demonstrate that you don't have a
clue about what you are saying - tell everyone what changes you think
happened in the AD code in November 1940. And how possibly they could
have affected whether we read the code. Be specific. I know you will
have to run and ask some buddies but YOUR buddies probably won't know
either.
Good luck! By the way, I know exactly what changes were made and am
willing to submit them to an impartial observer in escrow so to speak.
> 3. In the second paragraph he talks about "month-by-month
>reports" in Record Group 38 which he relies on. I have seen these.
>They are unsigned and of unknown provenance and known to be
>false.
>Ah how nice, to simply dismiss the evidence as false. How does
>a signature change things?
A signature helps assign responsibility and accountability and also
allows follow-up inquiry. It is why we sign important documents like
wills and contracts.
>If you would like to know the exact code groups recovered it was,
>"OP-20-GY," CNSG 5750/198, RG38, is the month-by-month
>progress report file. It reports the following code recovery numbers
>for "AN-1 Code (Operations) (current)" (the then designation for
>what later would be designated JN25B).
>"Unfinished or Continuous" [i.e., a running tally]
>April 1, 1941: "approximately 300 values recovered"
>May 1, 1941: "approximately 400 values recovered"
>June 1, 1941: "approximately 1100 values recovered"
>July 1, 1941: "approximately 1100 values recovered"
>August 1, 1941: "approximately 2000 values recovered"
>Sept 1, 1941: "approximately 2000 values recovered"
>Oct 1, 1941: "approximately 2400 values recovered"
"Completed during October 1941"
Nov 1, 1941: "600 values recovered" [i.e., a total of 3,000 values as
of
this date]
Did Sinclair bother to add up the numbers? Let's see, 300 + 400 +
1100 + 1100 + 2000 + 2000 + 2400 does not equal 3,000. The first
reports are purportedly cumulative ("running tally") and therefore
they are false. The NSA has released the information in a press
release in 1991 that 2,000 codevalues of JN-25B were recovered by 4
January 1941 (See also NSA Senior Historian Donald Gish's 1993 article
in Intelligence and CounterIntelligence magazine . So it is impossible
that only 300 were known as of 1 April 1941. The reason I said these
faked reports are obviously false is that they have fictional numbers
that we know to be false.
>>In 1945/1946 the Navy faked thousands of documents to
>>cover up the fact that they read Japanese navy codes prior to
>>December 7th, 1941.
>Just think folks, to generate thousands of false documents you
>need hundreds of people involved, all of whom kept quiet about
>it all their lives.
There were only a handful. But one person can generate thousands of
fake documents by himself - that is common sense. Get real Sinclair!
Also there is a law - passed under FDR - that gives severe punishment
to anyone telling crypto secrets. That and the fact that these men and
their wives would lose their Navy pensions means it is not surprising
that in the hostile atmosphere to truth created by the Jools,
Budianskys and Sinclairs of the world that they preferred to keep
silent and now the grave holds most of them. Why would they come
forward with something they did that was so dishonorable and makes
them look like accessories to treason? Masochists perhaps? No, that is
silly. It is like Sinclair asking a rapist to proudly declare it to
the world. It is highly unlikely.
>> 4. To show how totally ignorant Budiansky is, he says that
>>JN-25B (AN-1) had "30,000-plus" code groups. But this code
>>has been in the public domain in the National Archives since
>>February 1996 and by 1999 he should have looked at it and
>>been familiar with it. It only has 14,500 code groups.
>> Some expert.
>JN-25B had a possible 33,333 code groups, (99,999 divided by 3)
>because it was "hatted" or "uppercase" each code group could
>have two meanings, total 66,666 possible valid meanings.
>It is known not all the code groups were used, but that is not
>something the allies could assume.
Hey Sinclair!!! Wake up! We are talking about now. We are talking
about post-1996 when have the codebook in our hands and can see that
Budiansky still thinks there are 33,000-plus codevalues because he
never bothered to look at the codebook for even one minute. Budiansky
believes that knowledge should be left to the revisionists and that
his audience has no use for facts.
>Now look at the idea that Hypo knew less than 500 groups in
>May 1942, in other words the USN did not supply many code
>group recoveries to Pearl Harbor intelligence. Apparently the
>conspiracy extended to trying to lose Midway as well.
Exactly! and Coral Sea as well. See Sinclair, you are smarter than you
thought you were.
>By the way Edwin Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer,
>reports receiving the current USN version JN-25B code book in
>December 1941 and on 9 January 1942 reports the Philippines
>circulated 1,700 new code additives, 950 new code group values
>and 650 additional indicators. Presumably Layton managed to
>keep half of the new code group values out of Rochefort's hands,
>along with the code book.
Yeah? Where does he report that? Because it is false.
>Actually the less than 500 code groups claim is junk. It would be
>easy to publish such a small list, a few hours typing would do it
>and then we could all see what the magic words are that "many less
>than 500" could break out 90% of the messages. Think about it, the
>claim is say 400 out of 14,500 or less than 3% is enough to read
>so much. In reality around 20% of the messages sent in mid 1942,
>just before the code book change, were readable, others had parts
>resolved. Remarkable that with 90% readable Washington and
>Pearl Harbor could disagree so strongly as to the Japanese objective.
You are rather loose with your condemnations. I am the only person
who has Rochefort /Station Hypo's JN-25B codebook so how would you
know it is junk? Are you a psychic? No, wait, you are an astrologer!
Why don't you make a FOIA request and get it from the NSA yourself?
Get the facts. It's hard. It takes a long time but that is the way I
did it.
Sinclair, let me educate you a little about book codes, and I
regret wasting my time on you. There are 10 words in the English
language which comprise more than 27 percent of writings. Book codes
are ersatz languages and follow the same tendencies. A few common
words go a long way. Rochefort says he read 90 percent of messages not
20. Stop making stuff up. Washington disagreed with Rochefort's
conclusions about Midway simply because they were trying to sabotage
the Pacific Fleet. It had nothing to do with the code. You should read
some of the translations made by Hypo in May 1942. You would learn a
lot. Some of them go to 8 pages and are very detailed. 90 percent is a
conservative estimate. By the way, the British were reading 100
percent of JN-25B in February and have released large numbers of those
translations to the PRO. Unlike the US, they don't bother to fake the
dates on the translations.
>Willey is a second generation pusher of the conspiracy theory.
>People like Budiansky are a major threat to the fiction.
People like Budianksy are the fiction.
Mark Willey
http://www.geocities.com/mark_willey/pearl.html
al kirke
>>Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
Mark has a copy of Rochefort's code book and he wants
to scan/OCR and post it on the web as a PERL exercise.
The Independent Institute has a bunch of Japanese code articles
http://www.independent.org/archive/pearlharbor.html#Documents
Best regards,
Al
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
news:c16uko$du8$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
Phil Jacobsen
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Pearl Harbor" <pha...@hotmail.com>
>
> > >POST to SOC.HISTORY.WAR.MISC
> <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
> > >From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
> >
> > From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
> >
> > *************************************************
>
> Analysis by Mark Willey author of Pearl Harbor Mother of All
> Conspiracies -
>
> 1. In the first paragraph Budainsky says "the U.S. Navy's
> codebreakers were investigating only three Japanese naval
> codes." But that is a blatantly false statement. They investigated
> five. He left out the "I or Intelligence code" and the second most
> important one, the "S code," the Navy-merchant liaison code that
> we stole from the Japanese Consulate in New York and therefore
> read 99 percent. To miss almost half the total codes we investigated
> is a damning indictment of his scholarlyness. No one can represent
> themselves as an expert who mashes or deliberately distorts facts
> that badly in his supposed field of expertise.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OP-20-G in Washington was only doing substantial work on three IJN
codes. No one was doing anything with the "I" or Intelligence Code. I
quote from SRH-355 "This system, being of least importance, has been
neglected in favor of others. Moreover, the information obtainable
from this code usually concerns activities other than Orange
[Japanese]. The fact that no code recovery efforts were logged in for
the months of 1941 shows little or nothing was done on this code. As
you will recall, when the Army's SIS requested help from OP-20-G on
Japanese diplomatic decrypts especially on Purple, this took a major
chunck of the cryptanalysts and especially translators away from JN
codes and ciphers.
The "S" code. Although I cannot presently provide a changeover date,
sometime in 1940 or 41, the merchant code was changed and the new one
was referred to as the "Maru" code. There are no intelligence reports
or records showing any decrypts of the Merchant Ship code discussed
above in the time frame of Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, the key parts of
that old code [such as the ship and place names] had not been
recovered which would make it rather difficult to provide those
important parts of the code. Only the "system" had been 99% recovered,
not the code and cipher values. See SRH-355 p. 396. The new "Maru"
code was not solved until early 1943. See Layton, "And I Was There" p.
471-2. So for all practical purposes, not much was done with any
merchant marine code at the time of Pearl Harbor which is what this
discussion is all about. This is some real nitpicking going on here.
Let's stay with something that has some real application to Pearl
Harbor.
> 2. Budiansky says that no progress was made in reading the
> AD or MAT systems but he is wrong on both counts. We read
> both. Cmdr. Rochefort has stated in interviews (even available
> on the net through the magazine Cryptolog) that Hawaii had made
> good progress on the MAT code and Budiansky as an "expert"
> should have known that. The AD code was read in Washington
> and there are discussions about what good progress we made
> on it in documents in the National Archives. Budiansky doesn't
> even know what the code is.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The "MAT" code. SRH-355 p. 396 states that "Current information is not
now being obtained from this system, but it is estimated that within
six months we (OP-20-G] will be able to read most of the traffic
shortly after receipt, except for the first few days of each new
cipher period. However, OP-20-G was not able to meet that prediction
due to the shift of personnel to assist the Army's SIS on diplomatic
messages. Dyer in Hawaii did continue that work, but the results was
rather minimal from reading all the Comint Summaries. Budiansky was
right. There just wasn't any real good intelligence information
obtained from this source.
The AD or Admiral's code was NOT being read in Washington at the time
of Pearl Harbor. What is your source for this allegation? Pearl Harbor
is the time frame we are all concerned about. I quote from Layton's
book, "And I Was There" p. 77. Dyer's team at Pearl Harbor had reached
the point in November 1940 that the "AD" system [first introduced on 1
November 1938] was beginning to produce intelligible text when Japan
made another major change [on 1 November 1940] in the underlying code.
Unlike the first version, the new edition of the code book appeared to
have a circulation limited to flag officers .... Only some two hundred
intercepts were ever made, a totally inadequate number for the
effective penetration of any cipher system."
Therefore, it is completely erroneous to say that the AD code was
being read in Washington after 1 November 1940. Even after that date,
it was not being read anywhere in the Navy. We are talking about Pearl
Harbor and WWII here. this is just like Stinnett and others that refer
to the breaking of JN-25A around November 1940 as the breaking of
JN-25B.
> 3. In the second paragraph he talks about "month-by-month
> reports" in Record Group 38 which he relies on. I have seen these.
> They are unsigned and of unknown provenance and known to be
> false. In 1945/1946 the Navy faked thousands of documents to
> cover up the fact that they read Japanese navy codes prior to
> December 7th, 1941. These documents Budiansky relies on were
> some of the fakes. It is interesting that an "expert" like Budiansky
> would fall for them. He also states these documents "also report
> on the progress of the Navy decryption units in Hawaii and Cavite"
> which is false. The reports only purport to cover OP-20-G
> (in Washington).>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I wonder why I am not suprised to see Wiley calling these official
OP-20-G reports "fakes." These documents included both the JN-25B book
values and cipher additive recoveries as reported by Corregidor as
well as those reported by the British at FECB Singapore. Were is your
evidence to the contrary?
>
> 4. To show how totally ignorant Budiansky is, he says that
> JN-25B (AN-1) had "30,000-plus" code groups. But this code
> has been in the public domain in the National Archives since
> February 1996 and by 1999 he should have looked at it and
> been familiar with it. It only has 14,500 code groups.
> Some expert.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I am glad to see that Wiley admits that JN-25B was also referred to as
AN-1. Now only if Stinnett would agree to that nomenclature. He still
shows JN-25B as AN. However, I assume Wiley misspoke and meant JN-25A
(AN) as being limited to 14,500 groups. JN-25B and successive editions
had a total of around 55,000 plus code groups when the various
auxilliary tables were added to the total maximum possible of 33,000
code values. This has been confirmed from NSA's Gish and others still
alive who worked on JN-25B. Please provide the citation for the JN-25B
code book reportedly in the National Archives.
> 5. He says the U.S. Navy had only recovered 3,800 code
> groups from the JN-25B dictionary by December 1941 but the
> fact is that we know they had recovered over 4,000 on 5 March
> 1941. That tells us not only the documents he relies on are faked,
> but it also tells us Budiansky doesn't know much about codes or
> cryptanalysis since 500 code groups is enough to read book
> codes to about 90 percent of most messages. In fact, Rochefort
> and Station Hypo knew many less than 500 code groups of JN-
> 25B immediately prior to the Battle of Midway.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Wilford ["Pearl Harbor Redefined"] claimed that Holtwick's reference
to 2,000 JN-25 code values recovered by 4 January 1941 referred to
JN-25B. However, GY records show that 1,400 JN-25A (AN) values were
recover by 1 January 1941. See my article, "Foreknowledge of Pearl
Harbor? No: The Story of the U.S. Navy's Efforts on JN-25B"
"Cryptologia" July 2003 p. 198-9. What is your source for 4,000 JN-25B
(AN-1) recoveries by 5 March 1941? It would be reasonable to assume
that 4,000 JN-25A (AN) values had been recovered by 5 March 1941. By
March, the British at FECB Singapore had only recovered some 500
JN-25B code values as I recall.
The statement that only 500 code values are needed to read a book code
of the size of JN-25B too ridiculous to respond to. Furthermore, there
were the small percentage of overlying cipher additives recovered to
contend with. Please provide the source of your allegation that
Rochefort only had 500 JN-25B code values to work with immediately
prior to the Battle of Midway.
>
> Because there was a cover-up about Pearl Harbor - even to
> the extent that generals and the head of Naval Intelligence were
> strongly pressured to commit perjury before Congress about
> Japanese navy codes - one must weigh the evidence about pre-
> war cryptoanalysis very carefully. This Budainsky has horribly
> failed to do. He is like an illiterate retard let loose in a library.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
First of all there was no perjury about Japanese navy codes. Very
little was asked or answered on that subject. Then Commander Fabian
testified that they had no success with Japanese naval codes on
Corregidor where current traffic was being worked on. Captain Whitlock
said the same in his Navy War College thesis. Generalized statements
by Wiley that are not grounded on any factual documentary basis do
nothing to prove anything. Revisionists have failed to prove there
were any decrypts of intelligence value of Japanese naval message that
were made prior to Pearl Harbor to sustain their charge that there was
advance knowledge of the planned attack and such advance knowledge was
withheld to get the U.S. into the war in Europe.
It is a shame that a more temperate discourse is not used in this
"discussion."
Just from the excerpts that I am aware of there, there are obviously a
panalopy of "errors" or incorrect allegations in Mr. Wiley's book. In
comparison, Mr. Budiansky's book, "Battle of Wits" is an outstanding,
well reseasched and documented record of Allied successes and failures
with codebreaking before and during WWII. Hopefully, it won't be
necessary to go through Mr. Wiley's book and denote all the errors to
see whose research is valid history and whose is more like fiction.
Philip H. Jacobsen
> Sincerely,
> Mark Willey
al kirke
"Phil Jacobsen" <k6...@cox.net> wrote in message
news:12002537.04022...@posting.google.com...
> "al kirke" <alki...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:<6XeZb.348406$I06.3681650@attbi_s01>...
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Pearl Harbor" <pha...@hotmail.com>
> >
> > > >POST to SOC.HISTORY.WAR.MISC
> > <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
> > > >From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
> > >
> > >> > END <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
> > > From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
> > >
> [omitted]
- BIG snip
I haven't taken the time to learn the mechanics of JN-25B, but
I've always been impresed with SRH-149, written by Captain
Lawrence Safford. who was awarded the Navy Legion of Merit
for his work in OP-20-G. Safford's essay is posted here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/SRH-149.html
In SRH-149 Safford writes:
"On 1 December 1941 the Japanese enciphered code
of 1939 suddenly became unreadable. CINCAF
promptly advised Washington to this effect. This could
have been a tip-off as to coming hostilities, but it also
could have been merely a routine change of system. After
all, the code had been in use for 2-1/2 years. Two weeks
later, Corregidor flashed the good news that the same
basic code was still being used, but that a new set of
additives was being used with it.* This was the third or
fourth set of additives used with this same code-book.
By February 1942 the new additives had been solved to
a readable extent."
Doesn't Safford tell us here that JN-25B was being read up until
1 December? I'm not sure why Safford uses the date 1 December,
because Appendix 6 of Rusbridger's book has a reproduction of
Japanese dispatch SRN-116741, which states that 4 December
is the date when additive system #8 will be used instead of additive
system #7. It also tells that #7 will be used concurrently with the
new #8, so the new #8 was compromised from the start.
Al
Geoffrey Sinclair
>- BIG snip
>
>I haven't taken the time to learn the mechanics of JN-25B, but
>I've always been impresed with SRH-149, written by Captain
>Lawrence Safford. who was awarded the Navy Legion of Merit
>for his work in OP-20-G. Safford's essay is posted here:
> http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/SRH-149.html
>
>In SRH-149 Safford writes:
> "On 1 December 1941 the Japanese enciphered code
> of 1939 suddenly became unreadable. CINCAF
> promptly advised Washington to this effect. This could
> have been a tip-off as to coming hostilities, but it also
> could have been merely a routine change of system. After
> all, the code had been in use for 2-1/2 years. Two weeks
> later, Corregidor flashed the good news that the same
> basic code was still being used, but that a new set of
> additives was being used with it.* This was the third or
> fourth set of additives used with this same code-book.
> By February 1942 the new additives had been solved to
> a readable extent."
>
>Doesn't Safford tell us here that JN-25B was being read up until
>1 December?
Safford is in trouble from the start when he says the code from 1939
was readable, when the code he was talking about came into
service from 1940. He is talking in very general terms, the 1940 B
version on JN-25 used the same 5 digits plus random numbers idea
as the 1939 A version, but with significant changes.
He is more correct to note the number of additive changes with the
new B code book.
Readable is being defined as stripping away the new random number
sequences to see the underlying code groups.
> I'm not sure why Safford uses the date 1 December,
>because Appendix 6 of Rusbridger's book has a reproduction of
>Japanese dispatch SRN-116741, which states that 4 December
>is the date when additive system #8 will be used instead of additive
>system #7. It also tells that #7 will be used concurrently with the
>new #8, so the new #8 was compromised from the start.
It is clear Safford is relying on memory so it is not surprising he has
a date slightly wrong. Layton says the additive change was 2 December,
the change over date would have been 3 December US time.
SRN-116741
2 Dec
From: NavMinister
To: All ND CINCS
All GD CINCS
All Fleet CINCS
"Starting 4 December 1941, system #8 of Naval Code will be used and system
#7 discontinued. (List 7 will still be used with some Japanese stations.)"
The only way #8 could be compromised is if the signal using #7 was repeated
in #8, and then only for that sequence. So #8 was not compromised at the start,
there was some potential but in reality the allies were back down to traffic analysis
as they recovered the new random number sequences. What a plan language
intercept told them was the code book was the same, it was only an additive
change.
Geoffrey Sinclair
news server.
Mark Willey wrote in message ...
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in 2,message news:<c16uko$du8$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au>...
deleted text,
"Note by the way the above message is over 4 years old, apparently
only now is an attempt to reply being made."
>From: "al kirke" <alki...@comcast.net
>> Analysis by Mark Willey author of Pearl Harbor Mother of All
>>Conspiracies -
>> 1. In the first paragraph Budainsky says "the U.S. Navy's
>>codebreakers were investigating only three Japanese naval
>>codes." But that is a blatantly false statement. They investigated
>>five.
>
>>Ah this is fun, Willey, forgot to mention at least the following IJN
>>codes, the call sign code,
"the "wewe" code, for call signs not in the call sign list"
>MW - "Call signs" are not codes. Don't be so uninformed.
The call signs were a code, while small it still had to be cracked.
>And there
>obviously were more than 5 Japanese Naval codes, Stinnett says 29, but
>OP-20-G only monitored 5 in 1941 according to the official History of
>the unit. So your listing various codes is meaningless, a waste of
>everyone's time and has nothing to do with this debate.
The standard Mark holds up for expertise is,
"To miss almost half the total codes we investigated
is a damning indictment of his scholarlyness. No one can represent
themselves as an expert who mashes or deliberately distorts facts
that badly in his supposed field of expertise."
Mark now says missing such codes does not matter when he does it.
Relying on Stinnett for code details is not a good idea, he misses the
changeover from JN-25A to JN-25B.
>>the IJNAF air/ground codes, which the Philippines were reading for
>example.
Deleted text,
"The new jade code machine.
There are others."
>MW - Right, and Sinclair wants you to believe Japanese Air Force codes
>are Japanese naval codes? This just shows the quality of his
>expertise.
Yes folks, apparently the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force was
not a part of the Imperial Japanese Navy, as opposed to the
Imperial Japanese Army Air Force. There was no Japanese
air force in WWII, there was an army and a navy air force, just
like the US.
I presume the 29 codes claimed mentioned by Stinnett are all
for surface forces, no to/from aircraft codes for example.
>>So presumably Willey agrees his failure to mention all the codes
>>is also proof he is not an expert.
Deleted text,
"It will be interesting to see what
the definition of intelligence code is and where it was supposed
to be used. It was rated as a low priority, even lower than the material
code, so the question is just how much work was done on it."
>No, I agree that you don't know anything about codes - in fact that
>you and Budiansky are the same.
Yes Mark intends to have two standards, one for himself and one
for anyone he disagrees with.
Deleted text,
"There were more than 5 codes investigated. "
>> Now note the merchant
>>marine code was readable at the time, no longer in need of
>>investigation
>>by the codebreakers, just exploitation, and you can decide it is not
>>an IJN code if you want, since it was for merchant ships.
>
> In was called "NL" because it was the IJN-merchant ship liaison code
>(NL= "Naval Liaison"). Every Japanese merchant ship was commandeered
>into the Japanese Navy. So it is, in fact, a Japanese Navy code. I
>guess Sinclair didn't know that Japanese merchant ships were part of
>the Japanese Navy? Doesn't surprise me.
So the change of subject from the fact the codebreakers were not
investigating the merchant code in 1941 since it was readable
according to Mark. In fact the 1941 code was not readable until 1943,
work was dropped in 1941 thanks to resource issues.
This is quite funny. The idea every Japanese merchant ship was
part of the navy pre war, not owned by the relevant shipping
company like in the US or UK and then possibly requisitioned
for military service. The IJN did not own the merchant ships nor
did it commandeer all the merchant ships, in order to start operations
by 1 December 1941 the Army had 2,163,000 tons of shipping, the
Navy 1,899,000 tons leaving 1,934,000 tons for civilian uses. As
of July 1 1941 the Army had 781,000 tons, the Navy 883,000 tons,
the civilian shipping had 4,486,000 tons.
The reality was the US had to prioritise in 1941, which meant Purple
and JN-25, to the point of dropping work on other systems.
>>Edwin Layton notes the material code, which he calls HE required
>>6 months work in 1941 to crack for minor results. This means
>> Budiansky appears in error,
Deleted text,
"assuming people are talking about the same code."
>MW - Budiansky IS in error, "not appears in error."
As I said appears in error.
>>>The AD code was read in Washington
>>> and there are discussions about what good progress we made
>>>on it in documents in the National Archives. Budiansky doesn't
>>>even know what the code is.
>
>>One of the favourite tactics over the IJN codes is to switch between
>>the IJN and USN designations of the codes, and the fact the USN
>>changed some of the designations it used during the war rather than
>>keeping the story straight.
>
>>The IJN code designated as AD was introduced on 1 November 1938,
>
> Sinclair is clearly befuddled here. "AD" was the US designation, the
>IJN designation was "Ango Sho C." Nowhere in my discussion did I
>switch between the two and no one else has either. Sinclair is
>hallucinating! Someone tranquilize him, quick!
It would appear Mark can only have a debate if the other side is asleep.
Mark might want to check out Stinnet's use of the various designations,
IJN, USN contemporary and the final USN designations, as a way of
ignoring problems with what the code breakers did.
My paragraph was a basic statement, not a Mark did, but it appears
Mark hallucinated about what it said.
By the way I said designated AD, which is what Mark called it. This
was the USN designation.
>>and progress was made reading it to the point in November 1940 it
>>was beginning to be readable by the USN. It was then revised and
>>limited to flag officers, the USN called the new version NL and often
Deleted text,
"the Admiral's code and it is clear sometimes AD. As a result of the
smaller number of users there were few messages sent in the system
and no progress was made before investigation was abandoned in
mid December 1941.
Note JN-25A became JN-25B in November 1940, and the USN
was calling the system AN at the time. The Japanese made a
big mistake when changing JN-25 code books, they did not
change the additive book, the random numbers, at the same time
giving the allies a window of around 2 months into the new system."
>This is all false. Those old lies expired a long time ago.
Ah yes, the standard attempt to simply sweep away unpleasant facts.
>It was never referred to as "NL," that was speculation by author John
>Costello,
Edwin Layton makes the claim for NL equals Admirals Code in his
book, and notes the sources are interview with Dyer, Rochefort papers,
the "Top Secret Ultra" memo of 15 August 1944 and SRH-335 pages
339-99.
>it was not a flag officers code but used only for personnel
>matters like transfers and promotions. Come on! Catch up, Sinclair!
>Don't bother to post unless you know at least the tiniest bit about
>the subject, otherwise you are wasting peoples' time and electrons on
>the net.
As I said one of the confusions in the debate comes from the fact
there are often 3 designations floating around for the different
codes in use in 1941. So you have to be careful, Hawaii was
working on what is commonly called the Admiral's code by the USN
and was unable to crack it.
>>It is a favourite trick of the conspiracy theories to ignore the code
>>changes in November 1940 as has happened above, no mention
>>that AD was partially readable in 1940 but not in 1941 thanks to
>>the changes.
Note the change of subject, no denial the changes stopped the
USN reading it, only a "I know more than you do" reply. Most
people ignore the Admiral's code for the very good reason
it was not cracked by the USN post 1040.
> Sinclair, I will give a test to demonstrate that you don't have a
>clue about what you are saying - tell everyone what changes you think
>happened in the AD code in November 1940. And how possibly they could
>have affected whether we read the code. Be specific. I know you will
>have to run and ask some buddies but YOUR buddies probably won't know
>either.
This is quite funny, apparently the claim is the IJN revised the code
so poorly they in effect did not revise it at all. Unlike the changes
from JN-25A to JN-25B. Furthermore Mark knows without ever
asking my knowledge of the Admiral's code.
>Good luck! By the way, I know exactly what changes were made and am
>willing to submit them to an impartial observer in escrow so to speak.
This is good, apparently Mark has an impartial observer, given he
has made it clear he does not trust the US government it will be
interesting to see who it is. Furthermore I do not have to do a thing
here, not even look up notes, since the wonder AD code challenge
is voided by me posting any details.
What is amusing is Mark trying to claim expertise by stating he knows
all about a minor code. Also in this public forum he only wants private
tests of expertise.
>> 3. In the second paragraph he talks about "month-by-month
>>reports" in Record Group 38 which he relies on. I have seen these.
>>They are unsigned and of unknown provenance and known to be
>>false.
>
>>Ah how nice, to simply dismiss the evidence as false. How does
>>a signature change things?
>
>A signature helps assign responsibility and accountability and also
>allows follow-up inquiry. It is why we sign important documents like
>wills and contracts.
So the standard of proof is no document can be authentic unless
someone has signed it? And the proof applied in terms of the
analysis of the signatures is what?
>>If you would like to know the exact code groups recovered it was,
>
>>"OP-20-GY," CNSG 5750/198, RG38, is the month-by-month
>>progress report file. It reports the following code recovery numbers
>>for "AN-1 Code (Operations) (current)" (the then designation for
>>what later would be designated JN25B).
>
>>"Unfinished or Continuous" [i.e., a running tally]
>>April 1, 1941: "approximately 300 values recovered"
>>May 1, 1941: "approximately 400 values recovered"
>>June 1, 1941: "approximately 1100 values recovered"
>>July 1, 1941: "approximately 1100 values recovered"
>>August 1, 1941: "approximately 2000 values recovered"
>>Sept 1, 1941: "approximately 2000 values recovered"
>>Oct 1, 1941: "approximately 2400 values recovered"
>
>"Completed during October 1941" Nov 1, 1941: "600 values
>recovered" [i.e., a total of 3,000 values as of this date]
>
> Did Sinclair bother to add up the numbers? Let's see, 300 + 400 +
>1100 + 1100 + 2000 + 2000 + 2400 does not equal 3,000.
Yes folks, apparently Mark is determined to ignore the fact the
reports are the cumulative totals to the given date.
>The first
>reports are purportedly cumulative ("running tally") and therefore
>they are false.
Now we come to the reality recovered has to be defined, where
it is a "definite", "probable" or "possible" definition and what
has been recovered, the number or the meaning associated with
the number.
>The NSA has released the information in a press
>release in 1991 that 2,000 codevalues of JN-25B were recovered by 4
>January 1941 (See also NSA Senior Historian Donald Gish's 1993 article
>in Intelligence and CounterIntelligence magazine.
Code values appear to be defined here as the 5 digit number
divisible by 3, what you end up with when you remove the random
numbers. Then comes the trouble of turning the digits into words.
It is well known the failure of the IJN to change the random number
additive book enabled an initial burst of recovery of the numbers,
that is not the same as the words. The words recovered are what
I reported, there were more numbers recovered than words at the
start of the cracking. Confusing the two totals is a way of advancing
the conspiracy theory.
There were three tasks, recovering the code values, the actual
numbers so you knew you had stripped the random numbers,
then came the next problem assigning a meaning to the group.
The third task, recovering the system that told what group of random
numbers were in use, the indicators.
The reports on the change over from the A to B versions of JN-25
have always made it clear the two months the IJN kept using the
old additive (random number) book meant the allies could recover
a large amount of the 5 digit numbers in use. This then helped when
it came time to strip off the new additive sequences. It is not the
same as assigning a word to a given 5 digit group.
>So it is impossible
>that only 300 were known as of 1 April 1941. The reason I said these
>faked reports are obviously false is that they have fictional numbers
>that we know to be false.
Simply Mark has decided to switch definitions, from the 5 digit,
number which the USN needed to know it had removed the
random numbers, and the meaning assigned to the number. One
report is about the numbers, the other about the words, Mark
manages to push the line both documents are talking about the
same thing.
>>>In 1945/1946 the Navy faked thousands of documents to
>>>cover up the fact that they read Japanese navy codes prior to
>>>December 7th, 1941.
>
>>Just think folks, to generate thousands of false documents you
>>need hundreds of people involved, all of whom kept quiet about
>>it all their lives.
"Not only that only the true believers can see the
deception. As opposed to USN exercises like breaking out the
1940/41 IJN messages to see what they contained and what
they could have told. Presumably all the fakes were signed."
> There were only a handful. But one person can generate thousands of
>fake documents by himself - that is common sense. Get real Sinclair!
Yes folks, apparently a handful of men had all the time to create
thousands of documents, after creating the legend to fit them
into then insert them into the archives, presumably after making
sure the real documents were removed. All this in a short space
of time. Furthermore none of the non conspiracy involved people
have noticed the changes as the documents are released.
Presumably all the conspirators were really good typists or could
mimic different hand writing styles. It takes time and effort to
put together thousands of documents then add the effort to keep
the story straight. Willey claims it was done in a short period of
time just post war.
Deleted text,
"Yes folks, apparently it was a competition, no USN group would
send its results to another. Let alone the British. Let alone the
idea Washington would rule on what was a valid meaning or not.
The allies worked to build a common book and Washington was
in charge of US efforts."
>Also there is a law - passed under FDR - that gives severe punishment
>to anyone telling crypto secrets.
Because of the publication of such details and the resulting problems
in the early 1930s. Yardley's "The American Black Chamber", this
was the first such event and the result was the creation of a criminal
offence.
>That and the fact that these men and
>their wives would lose their Navy pensions means it is not surprising
>that in the hostile atmosphere to truth created by the Jools,
>Budianskys and Sinclairs of the world that they preferred to keep
>silent and now the grave holds most of them.
Yes folks, apparently the conspiracy covers everybody and no
one left post death confessions. None of the Commonwealth
personnel noted. Furthermore there is no protection for anyone
saying there was a conspiracy, presumably Mark is posting from
prison for example, or capacity for the people involved to leak
documents or all the many other ways we know people in a system
can let others know of problems.
What is really fun is the idea me posting to the internet frightens people
who went through WWII.
>Why would they come
>forward with something they did that was so dishonorable and makes
>them look like accessories to treason? Masochists perhaps? No, that is
>silly. It is like Sinclair asking a rapist to proudly declare it to
>the world. It is highly unlikely.
The fun thing is the conspiracy has to include Commonwealth
personnel as well as US and that apparently all of them have
also been silenced. Presumably there are never any confessions
in the justice systems, people doing deals over charges and so on.
Instead it is all absolute, all the people involved at the time have been
completely silenced for their entire lives.
>>> 4. To show how totally ignorant Budiansky is, he says that
>>>JN-25B (AN-1) had "30,000-plus" code groups. But this code
>>>has been in the public domain in the National Archives since
>>>February 1996 and by 1999 he should have looked at it and
>>>been familiar with it. It only has 14,500 code groups.
>>> Some expert.
>
>>JN-25B had a possible 33,333 code groups, (99,999 divided by 3)
>>because it was "hatted" or "uppercase" each code group could
>>have two meanings, total 66,666 possible valid meanings.
>>It is known not all the code groups were used, but that is not
>>something the allies could assume.
>
> Hey Sinclair!!! Wake up! We are talking about now. We are talking
>about post-1996 when have the codebook in our hands and can see that
>Budiansky still thinks there are 33,000-plus codevalues because he
>never bothered to look at the codebook for even one minute. Budiansky
>believes that knowledge should be left to the revisionists and that
>his audience has no use for facts.
Note by the way Mark somehow knows Budiansky has never looked
at a JN-25B code book, or rather one of the USN reconstructions of it.
Where is the authentic IJN book of JN-25B? The US stopped working
on the code book in mid 1942 when the B version gave way to the C.
Budiansky is correct when he says there were 30,000 plus code groups,
this is not the same as saying there were 30,000 plus code groups with
meanings the code, there was a lesser number with meanings, but there
were more meanings than code groups in use since the groups could
have two meanings. Also note common words were deliberately given
multiple code groups.
Deleted text,
"Note the unverified claim that 4,000 code groups were recovered
in March 1941."
>>Now look at the idea that Hypo knew less than 500 groups in
>>May 1942, in other words the USN did not supply many code
>>group recoveries to Pearl Harbor intelligence. Apparently the
>>conspiracy extended to trying to lose Midway as well.
>
>Exactly! and Coral Sea as well. See Sinclair, you are smarter than you
>thought you were.
Ah this is good, the conspiracy needs to go well into 1942, involving
an ever expanding number of US and Commonwealth people,
remember the UK station in Colombo and the US/Australian
station in Melbourne? Presumably the conspiracy went on to try and
lose Guadalcanal, Marianas, Philippines, etc.
>>By the way Edwin Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer,
>>reports receiving the current USN version JN-25B code book in
>>December 1941 and on 9 January 1942 reports the Philippines
>>circulated 1,700 new code additives, 950 new code group values
>>and 650 additional indicators. Presumably Layton managed to
>>keep half of the new code group values out of Rochefort's hands,
>>along with the code book.
>
> Yeah? Where does he report that? Because it is false.
Layton reports it in his book, noting the information came through
via the secure Copek channel. One error on my part it was 17
January 1942, not 9 January.
>>Actually the less than 500 code groups claim is junk. It would be
>>easy to publish such a small list, a few hours typing would do it
>>and then we could all see what the magic words are that "many less
>>than 500" could break out 90% of the messages. Think about it, the
>>claim is say 400 out of 14,500 or less than 3% is enough to read
>>so much. In reality around 20% of the messages sent in mid 1942,
>>just before the code book change, were readable, others had parts
>>resolved. Remarkable that with 90% readable Washington and
>>Pearl Harbor could disagree so strongly as to the Japanese objective.
>
> You are rather loose with your condemnations. I am the only person
>who has Rochefort /Station Hypo's JN-25B codebook so how would you
>know it is junk? Are you a psychic? No, wait, you are an astrologer!
Note the change in subject, the claim there were only 500 code
groups known to Rochefort is the junk, but it is turned into the
code book is junk. By the way how could Mark be sure only he
has the relevant document, consulted his psychic or astrologer?
It is interesting to see Mark decide someone is free with their
condemnations as he tries insults and character assassination.
Also if it was so simple for a few people to generate thousands
of conspiracy documents it should be trivial to post a list of less
than 500 5 digit numbers and what those numbers meant. Mark
has claimed he as had the book for years, still no list.
>Why don't you make a FOIA request and get it from the NSA yourself?
>Get the facts. It's hard. It takes a long time but that is the way I did it.
So Mark has a copy of some of Rochefort's papers and is trying
to tell us the USN censored the JN-25 code book sent to Pearl
Harbor and kept from it almost all the additional code recoveries
in the first 5 months of 1942 but apparently no one noticed at
the time, not at Pearl, not at the Commonwealth stations. Despite
the way stations were reporting to each other.
> Sinclair, let me educate you a little about book codes, and I
>regret wasting my time on you.
This presumably means Mark will not be back. The exit strategy
in case I know more than Mark can handle or the real experts
appear.
>There are 10 words in the English
>language which comprise more than 27 percent of writings. Book codes
>are ersatz languages and follow the same tendencies. A few common
>words go a long way. Rochefort says he read 90 percent of messages not
>20. Stop making stuff up.
You see folks, one of the reasons I include an example of a JN-25
message is to note the way it is quite clear that you can read parts
of messages. By May 1942 around 20% of the messages could
be read at close to completeness and 90% could have some
text resolved. In intelligence speak it is possible to then say 90%
of messages were readable, as long as you understand the implied
partial before readable. Mark prefers not to make the point clear.
One for the other points is the way the code made an allowance for
the common word problem, by giving such words multiple code
groups.
As for all those common words,
http://www.infoplease.com/askeds/12-31-98askeds.html
"This question is not as simple as it sounds. Even professional linguists
disagree about what such a list would be, and whether it is even
possible to make a valid one.
The main problem is that it is impossible to study all uses of the English
language, so any answer provided will depend on the sample of language
studied. People speak different words than they write, and vocabulary
varies with the region or country of the speaker, the speaker's age and
education level and other factors.
Some people have taken a stab at it nonetheless. For example, according
to the Brown Corpus, [W. Nelson Francis and H. Kucera, Frequency
Analysis of English Usage: Lexicon and Grammar (Houghton Mifflin, 1982):
p. 465.], these are the top ten most frequently used words in English, with
their part of speech:
the (article)
be (verb)
of (preposition)
and (coordinating conjunction)
a (article)
in (preposition)
he (personal pronoun)
to (infinitive mark)
have (verb)
to (preposition)"
People are welcome to go through my post leaving only these words
in and see how much sense it makes.
11111 22222 33333 to 44444 55555 66666 77777 88888 99999
12345 23456 in and 34567 45678 56789 67890 09876 98765.
Is what the above sentence reduces to, which is 15% readable.
>Washington disagreed with Rochefort's
>conclusions about Midway simply because they were trying to sabotage
>the Pacific Fleet. It had nothing to do with the code.
Yes folks, the US was trying to lose its remaining fleet in the
Pacific, making it a much more costly war. Silly isn't it?
>You should read
>some of the translations made by Hypo in May 1942. You would learn a
>lot. Some of them go to 8 pages and are very detailed. 90 percent is a
>conservative estimate.
As noted above some messages were broken out entirely, some not
at all and most partially, as 1942 went on the "readable" numbers went up.
The allies were throwing more resources at the code, they had more to
work with and the reality is cracking this sort of code is forward feedback,
the more you know the easier it is to fill in the smaller gaps.
>By the way, the British were reading 100
>percent of JN-25B in February and have released large numbers of those
>translations to the PRO. Unlike the US, they don't bother to fake the
>dates on the translations.
So the new claim is the UK had 100% recovery of all the code groups
in February 1942? As opposed to being able to break out some
messages completely? Like the US? But Pearl Harbor was kept in
the dark?
And as usual the flat statement the US faked translation dates. Since
the USN decoded a large number of the 1941 signals post war as an
exercise to see what could have been learnt the conspiracy would really
like to claim they were done in 1941.
>>Willey is a second generation pusher of the conspiracy theory.
>>People like Budiansky are a major threat to the fiction.
>
>People like Budianksy are the fiction.
No, the conspiracy is the fiction.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
JN-25B
al kirke
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
news:c1ek02$8g9$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
Safford writes that we were "reading" the Japanese naval codes until
additive list #8 was implemented, and two weeks after that Corregidor
reported that the additives had changed but not the code book values.
Do we agree that Safford got a Navy Legion of Merit medal for his
work on codes? So he may not really be in trouble. Would it be
reasonable for us to take Safford's words as written, and listen more
closely to you after you get your medal?
> > I'm not sure why Safford uses the date 1 December,
> >because Appendix 6 of Rusbridger's book has a reproduction of
> >Japanese dispatch SRN-116741, which states that 4 December
> >is the date when additive system #8 will be used instead of additive
> >system #7. It also tells that #7 will be used concurrently with the
> >new #8, so the new #8 was compromised from the start.
>
> It is clear Safford is relying on memory so it is not surprising he has
> a date slightly wrong. Layton says the additive change was 2 December,
> the change over date would have been 3 December US time.
Safford wrote SRH-149 very carefully, both in what he says and
what he doesn't say. He writes that
The decryption of Japanese Diplomatic messages in
Washington throughout 1941 is now a matter of public
knowledge and some 40 volumes comprise the official
record.
Safford doesn't tell us that the corresponding 40 volumes of
Japanese naval dispatches are somehow not present..
Safford does tell us that:
We may summarize by stating that the COMINT organizations
of the Army and the Navy worked in perfect coordination during
this period and provided the White House, State Department,
Army General Staff and Naval Operations with authentic, timely
and complete information concerning the Diplomatic Crisis and
the mobilization and movements of Japanese amphibious forces
for the conquest of Southeast Asia. The White House and State
Department used this information with consummate skill. The
failure of the General Staff and Naval Operations to profit from
the same information is beyond the scope of the present text.
Safford tells us a lot here. Note the words "timely", "complete".
"mobilization", "movements", "Japanese amphibious forces". He
doesn't tell us specifically what is beyond the scope of the present
text, but we can guess.
He also tells that the man-power loading due to Japanese navy
traffic in early December was: 85% of his decryption and 50%
of his translation capabilities, so wouldn't you say we were
reading Japanese naval dispatch traffic? How else would you
account for those manpower loading numbers?
So I don't think Safford was careless when he wrote December 1.
I think he was setting up for somebody to say out loud that a
December 2 message couldn't be read, based on his essay, and
then get mouse-trapped by the fact that the additive list really
changed on Dec.4.
Cheers,
Al
Mark Willey
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Pearl Harbor" <pha...@hotmail.com>
>
> > >POST to SOC.HISTORY.WAR.MISC <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
> > >From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
> >> > END <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
> > From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
> *************************************************
Is this the Phillip "know-nothing" Jacobsen that once posted that
JN-25B cipher 8 was introduced 1 December 1941? Yes, I believe it is.
Jacobson, every school boy knows it was introduced 4 December 1941.
Shame on you! I'll show below how ill-informed you are about other
aspects of JN-25B.
About a year ago "Know-nothing" Jacobsen argued that the USA knew
where the Japanese carrier fleet was and at the same time did not know
where they were. I told him, he should post this argument to the
newsgroups because it would show everyone the "quality" of his mind.
Before I get to specifics from the last post, let's lay out the
debate on the most important question, "did the U.S. Navy read JN-25B
prior to the Pearl Harbor attack?" That is critical because every
detail of the attack was radioed by the Japanese in this code. So if
we read the code, we knew everything.
I would summarize the apologists position as being "no" and their data
consists of (and here "Know-Nothing" Jacobsen, you may bring forth
other "evidence" if you are aware of any) -
1. The testimony of Lt. Fabian reported in the 1946 Congressional
Report that Com 16 the Philippines did not read anything at all in
JN-25B. He is the only person to make that claim under oath.
2. An article or articles by Duane Whitlock to the same effect.
3. OP-20-G "month-by-month reports" in Record Group 38 referred to by
Budiansky and posted to the newsgroups.
Now before I go on to list the evidence in the affirmative, let us
note briefly that each of these 3 "facts" relied on by the apologists
have been thoroughly discredited. Fabian and Whiltlock were directly
contradicted by NSA Senior Historian Donald Gish in an article in the
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Fall 1993, and
contemporaneously contradicted by a 16 November 1941 letter by Lt.
Leitwiler and a December 1941 official report from Com16. The faked
month-by-month reports were also contradicted by the 1991 NSA press
release as well as the Gish article referred to above.
The evidence that the U.S. Navy read JN-25B prior to Pearl Harbor is –
1. Exhibit 151 Congressional Report. It is posted on the WWW.
2. NSA has stated over and over that we read JN-25B prior to Pearl
Harbor (Parker 1994 among many including the Gish article cited
above).
3. Official Navy History of its crypto unit. SRH-355 page 464 e.g.
4. Official Reports and unofficial statements (but NSA vetted) by the
Commander of the Navy Crypto unit Captain L. Safford. SRH – 149 for
example. His "Rhapsody in Purple" article for Cryptologia 1982 for
another in which he is completely dismissive of the claim the U.S. did
not read JN-25B. In no uncertain terms he impugned the integrity and
intelligence of people who claimed that we didn't read the code
(including Wohlstetter).
5. Winston Churchill in his Nobel Prize winning books. GRAND ALLIANCE
page 598.
6. The letter from the co-commander of the Philippine crypto unit COM
16 referenced above saying they were "current" in JN-25B and decoding
so many JN-25B messages in November 1941 that it kept two
Japanese-to-English translators very busy. Stinnett has kindly put a
scan of it on the web.
7. The Official History of the British codebreaking unit FECB. "It may
be explained here that but for this mistake (using old cipher tables
when JN-25B was first implemented) on the part of the Japanese, the
form of the new (code) book from which , as is known, intelligence
from a wide field was produced in November 1941 and from March 1942
until its supersession in June 1942." Quoted in Rusbridger for one.
"Intelligence from a wide field," I would enjoy someone explaining
that away.
8. The videotaped statements of Sir Eric Nave, Australia's top
codebreaker.
9. Statements JN-25B was read throughout 1941 by British codebreakers
at FECB (Cmdr. Malcolm Burnett and his wife Mary, e.g.) and Dutch
codebreakers at Kamer 14 that were working the code in 1941 (See
Costello for the former and my book for the latter).
10. Article by Albert Pelletier who was one of the 4 Japanese language
translators hired by the Navy to translate decoded Japanese naval
messages full time throughout 1941 (by comparison only 2 Navy
translators worked diplomatic traffic). Pelletier says he translated
decoded JN-25B messages throughout 1941 in "My Life with JN-25," NCVA
Cryptolog, Summer 1992.
11. Etc. I could go on for example about RIP 79 or the crypto machine
JEEP IV that read JN-25B mechanically in October 1941 or the use of
difference tables by U.S. Navy codebreakers in the fall of 1941 to
read encoded JN-25B messages directly into English, but Congress, the
Navy, and the NSA should be sufficient authority to establish that the
revisionists have the official position and the apologists are blowing
smoke on JN-25B. The official position is that the U.S. Navy crypto
units OP-20-G and Com 16 read JN-25B prior to December 7, 1941. The
political-hack apologists for FDR defend the wacko negative position
on this issue.
So that is the debate – consider yourself a jury and weigh the facts
on both sides and see which is more convincing. And then ask yourself
if you think the apologists are honest and honorable people for siding
with the facts they do? Are they insane? Terminally stupid? Or
habitually lying sleazebags? I have my opinion which.
I am surprised that Jacobsen wants to argue the point about three (3)
or five (5) codes because, as we say, you can look it up. But I
wonder about his honesty because he quotes out of context just to make
the opposite point than the original document did. So to parse the
above quotation, because it actually gives away the truth anyway,
"This system, being of least importance" is actually from a larger
selection referring to the five codes we monitored. It was the least
important of the five we monitored, true. It certainly was not the
least important of the 29 or so naval codes the Japanese used. Our
Navy deemed it of fifth most importance overall, that is why they
monitored it and did not monitor others. The phrase "has been
neglected" did not mean that we didn't monitor it or didn't read it
but that since it was of least importance it was neglected relative to
the other four codes monitored, that is to say, less time and effort
was spent on it. The rest of "No-Nothing Phil's" paragraph is all
nonsense. But let us even stipulate that little was done on the I code
in 1941, it was an old transposition code broken years before. But
Jacobsen should not rely on faked documents to prove his point (nor
out of context quotes).
>The "S" code. Although I cannot presently provide a changeover date,
>sometime in 1940 or 41,
That is because you know nothing, Jacobsen! You clown! You are so out
of date! I published this in my book.
>Furthermore, the key parts of
>that old code [such as the ship and place names] had not been
>recovered which would make it rather difficult to provide those
>important parts of the code.
>Only the "system" had been 99% recovered,
>not the code and cipher values.
Don't you ever know what you are talking about, Bozo Jacobsen? The S
code was completely 100% recovered because it was stolen - that means
we had all the codevalues and all the "key parts". The reason S code
messages were only >>READ<< "99 percent" is because they were sent by
radio and there are always garbles because of human error or
atmospheric conditions. Look at his logic – he changes the official
statement the messages were 99 percent read to the "system" was only
99 percent "recovered." He makes it up. Jacobsen, what does "system"
mean to you? In your befuddled head, what does that word mean?
Everyone would like to know how you can recover a system (according to
you "99%") and miss "the key parts of the code." Explain that so we
can laugh at you.
>So for all practical purposes, not much was done with any
>merchant marine code at the time of Pearl Harbor which is what this
>discussion is all about. This is some real nitpicking going on here.
Nitpicking? You admit Budiansky is caught with his pants down, is
totally wrong, is off his nut, and you call it nitpicking? Budianksy
says three codes and it is in reality five codes (40 percent error
rate by an "expert") and you think pointing such a huge error is
nitpicking. Hmmm! But then how come you always pick nits? You
endlessly discuss nits. Here we are talking big – whether whole codes
were read – and you think it is one of your normal discussions, a nit.
How come the big nitpicker screams "nitpicking" when his team loses
and shows its stupidity and ignorance? What about fair play? Why don't
you just admit the obvious, Budiansky is a fool, instead of claiming I
am nitpicking? Your bias is showing. You want to give him a pass for
such a huge and fundamental error? You should be on the side of truth,
not defending a buffoon like Budiansky when you see him deep in error.
Why is Budiansky even publishing when he is so ignorant?
>Let's stay with something that has some real application to Pearl
>Harbor.
>> 2. Budiansky says that no progress was made in reading the
>> AD or MAT systems but he is wrong on both counts. We read
>> both. Cmdr. Rochefort has stated in interviews (even available
>> on the net through the magazine Cryptolog) that Hawaii had made
>> good progress on the MAT code and Budiansky as an "expert"
>> should have known that. The AD code was read in Washington
>> and there are discussions about what good progress we made
>> on it in documents in the National Archives. Budiansky doesn't
>> even know what the code is.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>The "MAT" code. SRH-355 p. 396 states that "Current information is
not
>now being obtained from this system, but it is estimated that within
>six months we (OP-20-G] will be able to read most of the traffic
>shortly after receipt, except for the first few days of each new
>cipher period. However, OP-20-G was not able to meet that prediction
>due to the shift of personnel to assist the Army's SIS on diplomatic
>messages. Dyer in Hawaii did continue that work, but the results was
>rather minimal from reading all the Comint Summaries. Budiansky was
>right. There just wasn't any real good intelligence information
>obtained from this source.
More nitpicking, I suppose. The first part of the quote above was for
years prior to 1941 but Jacobsen wants you to believe it was 1941. We
didn't "obtain real good intelligence information" from MAT according
to "Know-nothing Jacobsen" but it wasn't because we didn't read it, we
did read the code real good but there wasn't anything much of use sent
in the code. Again he tries to befuddle people by changing terms in
mid-argument. Either his mind wanders or he is a dishonest debater.
>The AD or Admiral's code was NOT being read in Washington at the time
>of Pearl Harbor. What is your source for this allegation?
Jacobsen, below you mention it was read in November 1941, so you are
trying to prove the negative. You have to give the source. And you
don't even know what change was made to the code so how could you say
anything about whether it was read in 1941? You don't know. You don't
know anything. And I hope you are not going to reference the faked
documents again. So sad.
>Pearl Harbor
>is the time frame we are all concerned about. I quote from Layton's
>book, "And I Was There" p. 77. Dyer's team at Pearl Harbor had
reached
>the point in November 1940 that the "AD" system [first introduced on
1
>November 1938] was beginning to produce intelligible text when Japan
>made another major change [on 1 November 1940] in the underlying
code.
>Unlike the first version, the new edition of the code book appeared
to
>have a circulation limited to flag officers .... Only some two
hundred
>intercepts were ever made, a totally inadequate number for the
>effective penetration of any cipher system."
>Therefore, it is completely erroneous to say that the AD code was
>being read in Washington after 1 November 1940.
OK, I see the quote refers to Dyer's team at Hawaii Station Hypo
(Pearl Harbor) and then I see No-nothing Phil makes a claim about
Washington based on that. He says ">Therefore, it is completely
erroneous to say that the AD code was
>being read in Washington after 1 November 1940" !!!
Logic is well above you, Pill. Please! "Pearl Harbor" means
"Washington" to Jacobson? Why am I slumming in this newsgroup with
fools who know nothing, and can not reason their way out of paper bag?
Why do I waste my time? Geez!!!
>> 3. In the second paragraph he talks about "month-by-month
>> reports" in Record Group 38 which he relies on. I have seen these.
>> They are unsigned and of unknown provenance and known to be
>> false. In 1945/1946 the Navy faked thousands of documents to
>> cover up the fact that they read Japanese navy codes prior to
>> December 7th, 1941. These documents Budiansky relies on were
>> some of the fakes. It is interesting that an "expert" like
Budiansky
>> would fall for them. He also states these documents "also report
>> on the progress of the Navy decryption units in Hawaii and Cavite"
>> which is false. The reports only purport to cover OP-20-G
>> (in Washington).>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>I wonder why I am not suprised to see Wiley calling these official
>OP-20-G reports "fakes." These documents included both the JN-25B
book
>values and cipher additive recoveries as reported by Corregidor as
>well as those reported by the British at FECB Singapore. Were is your
>evidence to the contrary?
**First, they do not say anything about FECB or Corregidor – you
obviously have never seen them. Budiansky said Hawaii and Philippines
– you changed the story again, Pill, what is your problem? You never
argue straight. You never get the facts. Your brain cannot even focus
for a whole paragraph. (So what do you think? Budiansky screwing up
again? Or is it you?)** but that is a nit…
Hey, stupid! I pointed out already that a cumulative running total in
April of 300 codevalues is obviously a faked document since the NSA
and Navy have both published authoratively and also on the word of
Lawrence Safford that we had recovered 2000 by 4 Jan 1941 and also on
the official contemporaneous report of Admiral Hart that the British
gave us 500 on 5 March 1941. So if the British gave us 500 and we had
at least 2000 (really 3800) a month prior to your "evidence" even you,
no-nothing Phil Jacobsen, should be able to do the math. You can't
even detect the simplest fraud documents when they hit you in the face
and people should listen to you? Get out, loser!
>> 4. To show how totally ignorant Budiansky is, he says that
>> JN-25B (AN-1) had "30,000-plus" code groups. But this code
>> has been in the public domain in the National Archives since
>> February 1996 and by 1999 he should have looked at it and
>> been familiar with it. It only has 14,500 code groups.
>> Some expert.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>I am glad to see that Wiley admits that JN-25B was also referred to
as
>AN-1.
???? What?
>However, I assume Wiley misspoke and meant JN-25A
>(AN) as being limited to 14,500 groups. JN-25B and successive
editions
>had a total of around 55,000 plus code groups when the various
>auxilliary tables were added to the total maximum possible of 33,000
>code values. This has been confirmed from NSA's Gish and others still
>alive who worked on JN-25B. Please provide the citation for the
JN-25B
>code book reportedly in the National Archives.
My jaw dropped when I read this load of crap. Jacobsen, seriously, you
must be embarrassed about your total lack of knowledge about what you
are talking about. Don't you even look at these code books? How can
you post, when you don't have a clue? You are wasting electrons,
sucker. You are wasting everyone's time. You don't know how many
codevalues are in JN-25A (even though I posted that to web years ago)
and the codebook has been public since 1996 and you have no clue at
all about JN-25B. I am shocked. Just get out!
> 5. He says the U.S. Navy had only recovered 3,800 code
> groups from the JN-25B dictionary by December 1941 but the
> fact is that we know they had recovered over 4,000 on 5 March
> 1941. That tells us not only the documents he relies on are faked,
> but it also tells us Budiansky doesn't know much about codes or
> cryptanalysis since 500 code groups is enough to read book
> codes to about 90 percent of most messages. In fact, Rochefort
> and Station Hypo knew many less than 500 code groups of JN-
> 25B immediately prior to the Battle of Midway.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Wilford ["Pearl Harbor Redefined"] claimed that Holtwick's reference
to 2,000 JN-25 code values recovered by 4 January 1941 referred to
JN-25B. However, GY records show that 1,400 JN-25A (AN) values were
recover by 1 January 1941.
(Sigh!) Just for your information, that is a wrong number. But notice
that if 1,400 JN-25A codevalues were recovered, the 2,000 number must
necessarily then refer to JN-25B, the only other version at the time.
>By
>March, the British at FECB Singapore had only recovered some 500
>JN-25B code values as I recall.
Yeah, then how come the running cumulative total is listed as only 300
in April 1941 according to documents you incessantly refer to? See a
problem there? No? Can you compare two numbers and identify which is
larger? Didn't think so. Second grade arithmetic is above Jacobsen.
Remedial math, Jacobsen, it is the key to your future. Please take it!
Come back in ten years when you get out of sixth grade.
>The statement that only 500 code values are needed to read a book
code
>of the size of JN-25B too ridiculous to respond to.
You mean you don't know enough to respond. That is because you don't
know anything at all about codes. So what are you doing here wasting
everyone's time?
> Furthermore, there
>were the small percentage of overlying cipher additives recovered to
>contend with. Please provide the source of your allegation that
>Rochefort only had 500 JN-25B code values to work with immediately
>prior to the Battle of Midway.
I have his codebook. I got it thru FIOAing the NSA.
>> Because there was a cover-up about Pearl Harbor - even to
>> the extent that generals and the head of Naval Intelligence were
>> strongly pressured to commit perjury before Congress about
>> Japanese navy codes - one must weigh the evidence about pre-
>> war cryptoanalysis very carefully. This Budainsky has horribly
>> failed to do. He is like an illiterate retard let loose in a
>>library.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>First of all there was no perjury about Japanese navy codes.
You pointed it out yourself – Fabian's testimony under oath. Lies
under oath are perjury.
>Very
>little was asked or answered on that subject. Then Commander Fabian
>testified that they had no success with Japanese naval codes on
>Corregidor where current traffic was being worked on.
First of all, you see, you found the perjury yourself unaided. Wow.
Guess you forgot? Were you dropped on your head when you were a baby?
>Captain Whitlock
>said the same in his Navy War College thesis.
Ooooh! The man who sent messages to Hawaii to mislead them into
thinking the Japanese carriers were west of the Philippines in the
South China Sea in late November/early December 1941, the man who has
the most to cover up, in un-crossexamined statements not under oath is
the gospel to you? I am so impressed. The man who caused the disaster
at Pearl Harbor is now allowed to cover up and dissemble. The man who
has the most to hide is your source, Jacobsen? So nice. This Whitlock
is the man most responsible for the deaths at Pearl Harbor at the
operational level. Even he admits it.
>Generalized statements
>by Wiley that are not grounded on any factual documentary basis do
>nothing to prove anything. Revisionists have failed to prove there
>were any decrypts of intelligence value of Japanese naval message
that
>were made prior to Pearl Harbor to sustain their charge that there
was
>advance knowledge of the planned attack and such advance knowledge
was
>withheld to get the U.S. into the war in Europe.
Sounds like you are making generalized statements not grounded on any
factual documentary basis in this paragraph, Jacobsen. Are you joking?
>It is a shame that a more temperate discourse is not used in this
>"discussion."
It is a shame that people who know absolutely nothing and cannot think
– Budainsky, Jacobsen, etc inject themselves in this "discussion."
There is enough misinformation about Pearl Harbor in official sources
that we don't need Jacobsen's and Budainsky's dreck.
>Just from the excerpts that I am aware of there, there are obviously
a
>panalopy of "errors" or incorrect allegations in Mr. Wiley's book.
How would you know, moron?
Mark Willey
>Phil "know nothing" Jacobsen
Tracy White
ones making stuff up or hiding something.
I'd be more willing to listen to your points if you didn't stoop to
infantile name calling. As it is now all I see is another lame troll
hiding behind the perceived annonymity of the internet and making
himself feel better by beating up on others with insults.
Phil Jacobsen
> al kirke" <alki...@comcast.net> wrote in message news:<6XeZb.348406$I06.3681650@attbi_s01>...
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Pearl Harbor" <pha...@hotmail.com>
> >
> > > >POST to SOC.HISTORY.WAR.MISC <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
> > > >From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
> > >> > END <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
> > > From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
> > Below One arrow = Phil "know-nothing" Jacobsen
> > *************************************************
>
> Is this the Phillip "know-nothing" Jacobsen that once posted that
> JN-25B cipher 8 was introduced 1 December 1941? Yes, I believe it is.
> Jacobson, every school boy knows it was introduced 4 December 1941.
> Shame on you! I'll show below how ill-informed you are about other
> aspects of JN-25B.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Since Mr. Wiley cannot conduct a gentlemanly discussion and must
resort to vile name calling, this will be my last post on this thread.
Isn't there a moderator here to put a stop to such abusive name
calling?
I am sure that Mr. Wiley is referring to someone else as giving the
date of 1 December 1941 (vice 4 December 1941) for the change to
Cipher 8 of JN-25B. In fact, Captain Safford was quoted here of
erroneously saying that the cipher changed on 1 December 1941.
Apparently, it is quite alright when Safford makes that simple
nitpicking error. However, I deny Mr. Wiley's allegation.
I must vigorously disagree that I ever said that there was any
foreknowledge of the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor with a
carrier strike force. Let's discuss the present posts and not refer to
past posts unless you can provide a citation where such allegations
can be checked by all.
I would challenge Mr. Wiley to provide chapter and verse to support
his statement that "[E]very detail of the attack [on Pearl Harbor] was
radioed in this [JN-25B] code." OP-20-G documentation clearly shows
that the Japanese Navy did not send Operational Orders by radio. All
we have are some 20 1945-47 decrypts that were culled out of thousands
of messages that give hints as to an operation against capital ships,
a reference to a position in the North Pacific Ocean by a tanker that
was not part of the Strike Force and some other inferences. Even then,
these translators had the knowledge of the attack to guess at several
key meanings such as torpedoes with attachments etc. Furthermore,
these cryptanalysts had the experience of WWII to work with plus
captured code books and other aides to work with that the few
cryptanalysts on Corregidor did not possess. It is ridiculous to
equate the 3,800 book recoveries and the relatively small number of
cipher additive recoveries as of November/early December 1941 with the
post war decryption effort that is provided in SRH-406. There is
nothing in the Corregidor intelligence summaries which can be tied
directly to any substantial JN-25B decrypts.
I have never seen Donald Gish's article, but Mr. Wiley does not accept
his statement that there were about 55,000 basic code groups in
JN-25B. Using Wiley's logic, what Gish said in 1993 should be
discredited. However, I would prefer to see just exactly what Mr. Gish
said in 1993. For some reason, Mr. Wiley didn't bother to provide a
quote.
Lieutenant Lietwiler's letter of 16 November 1941 dealt primarily with
cipher additive recoveries. Lietwiler spoke of "code recovery efforts"
not producing decrypts of intelligence value. Again, read my article,
"Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No: The Story of the U.S. Navy's
Efforts on JN-25B" in the July issue of "Cryptologia" where I show
that there were no such decrypts from Corregidor before Pearl Harbor.
Again, Mr. Wiley makes overall allegations as to evidence but provides
no details as to what is in Exhibit 151 of the Congressional Hearings.
As to Frederick Parker, he said, "The actual reading of current
Japanese messages before Pearl Harbor, however, was not to be. U.S.
cryptanalysis of the ciphers had outstripped the U.S. capability for
code recoveries. That is, OP-20-G and Corregidor (as well as London
and Singapore) had not recovered enough of the basic code, and JN-25
decrypts could not be produced in time to play a part in U.S. and
policy or military decisions during this critical period. Thousands of
intercepted Japanese Navy messages in JN-25 were not exploited
because, as a result of manpower shortages and higher prioritie, the
underlying code values remaind unrecovered. See "Pearl Harbor
Revisited" p. 29-30.
Parker also said, "Little if any of the COMINT provided by Station C
came from cryptanalysis. Washington could not supply current code
group meanings, Station C was not able to read messages in the Fleet
General-Purpose System JN-25, or in several of the minor naval codes.
"Pearl Harbor Revisited" p. 48.
This should end all discussion the status of JN-25B and all
revisionist allegations that JN-25B decrypts provided foreknowledge of
the Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor. Mr. Wiley should be careful
whom he quotes.
Mr. Wiley refers to Captain Safford's SRH-149. However, this overall
history of U.S. naval Comint suffers quite a bit from Safford's faulty
memory as well as his bias in trying to justify his terrible decision
to keep Rochefort and Dyer, the best cryptanalytic team we had on the
old practically discarded AD or "Admiral's Code" instead of allowing
them to jump onto JN-25B (AN-1). As a result, Safford made many
mistakes in his accounting in SRH-149. He never differentiated between
JN-25A (AN) and JN-25B (AN-1) which replaced the former on 1 November
1940. He also misstated the date for the change to Cipher #8 as 1
December 1941 when we all know that it was changed on 4 December 1941.
See p. 13. Also, right after that Safford speaking about 1 December
1941 erroneously stated that "[t]he code had been in use for 2 1/2
years. In fact, JN-25B (AN-1) had only been in use one year, one month
and three days. Safford makes another mistake on page 13, when he
states that JN-25B (AN-1) "was finally superceded on 31 May/1 June
1941 [sic] by another similar basic code. In fact, JN-25B (AN-1) was
superceded on 27 May 1942. The reference to the enciphered code of
1939 becoming unreadable, only refers to the cipher recovery and book
building effort not decrypts of intelligence value. There were none
and SRH-149 does not provides any evidence of such decrypts of
intelligence value.
Again, Lieutenant Lietwiler's letter of 16 November 1941 only stated
that they were working on the current cipher additive book not that
they were "current in JN-25B" Lietwiler did not say they were
"decoding" JN-25B messages as Mr. Wiley recklesslessly charges. He
only said, we are keeping two translators busy "with their code
recovery effforts etc. ..." There is a big difference between
providing decrypts of intelligence value and making recoveries of
basic code values. By 1 December 1941 only 3,800 out of some 50,000
plus plus JN-25B basic code values had been recovered.
As to James Rusbridger, Eric Nave in an interview with a Japanese TV
station disavowed most everything that Rusbridger said. BTW, I have
the tape so I suggest that Mr. Wiley would be well off to drop that
reference.
Commander Burnett was the liaison officer to CincPac during the later
part of the war and was as surprised with the attack on Pearl Harbor
as everyone else. This counters some later statements made by Mrs.
Burnett. Also, the duty officer at the Japanese desk at Bletchley Park
was astounded when he received the news of the Pearl Harbor attack. BP
had not advance information on said attack.
Mr. Wiley errs horribly again when he states that Albert Peletier "who
was one of the 4 Japanese language translators hired by the Navy to
translate decode Japanese naval messages full time throughout 1941."
and that Peletier "says he translated decode JN-25B messages
throughout 1941 in "My life with JN-25," NCVA Cryptolog, Summer 1942.
Yeoman 1/c Pelletier was a career naval petty officer at the time who
was a cryptanalyst and was not a Japanese linguist capable of making
translations. Mr. Wiley should really be a bit more careful about what
he writes. Captain Pelletier wrote about his pre-war work on JN-25B in
the NCVA History Book. He said, "We had been making fairly good
progress in recovering code groups .... Before the war we in GZ were
not current with the Japanese messages. Our traffic came by slow boat
from Cavite {sic), Guam and Hawaii, and by the time the additives were
stripped, and the messages logged and printed, we were at least two
months behind. I was also informed that my job was to recover code
groups and not to worry about Intelligence per se .... Our work began
to show results in early April 1942." Again, I would suggest that Mr.
Wiley drop his references and erroneous attributions to Pelletier.
The JEEP IV was only used to strip off cipher additives not to "read
JN-25B messages" as Mr. Wiley erroneously stated. In fact, the JEEP IV
was abandoned by Corregidor around October/November 1941 as they found
they could do a better job manually. See Lietwiler's November letter.
The difference table was another device to strip off cipher additives
and had nothing to do with providing decrypts as Mr. Wiley alleged. In
fact, both OP-20-G and Corregidor worked out the difference table in
November 1941 and it was not in time to provide any direct value in
producing pre-war decrypts.
There is no NSA official position that either OP-20-G or Corregidor
was producing JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value. Citations
please!!!
Finally, Mr. Wiley does stipulate that little was done on the "I" code
after he made so much fuss about Stephen Budiansky's treatment of that
code.
I note that Mr. Wiley does not provide the date the "S" code was
superceded by the "Maru" code. Obviously, it was well before Pearl
Harbor, so all this gnashing of teeth over the old "S" in the context
of Pearl Harbor is much ado about nothing. The key parts of the old
"S" code were a direct quotation. I see that Mr. Wiley provides no
citation for his contrary allegation. Agin, the code was superceded so
the discussion is really moot.
I admit nothing as to Steve Budiansky being in error. He provides
proper citations to justify his statements in a classic book on Allied
code and cipher breaking. I wish Mr. Wiley would do the same.
I never said the AD code was read in November 1941 as Mr. Wiley
charges. I clearly stated that it was read up to 1 November 1940 when
it was changed. I quoted Layton's, "And I Was There." Please don't
misquote me.
It was Mr. Wiley that stated the AD code was being read in Washington.
It was not being read in Hawaii after 1 November 1940 either. Where is
Mr. Wiley's evidence that the AD ("Admiral's code) was being read
anywhere after 1 November 1940. More red herrings.
As to the GY records, there is documentation in other narratives that
state those figures included the recoveries from Corregidor when they
were apprised of them. Corrigidor also passed on the FECB recoveries
to OP-20-G in Washington.
I have never seen any statement by Captain Safford that we had
recovered 2,000 JN-25B code groups by 4 January 1941. I have seen
Captain Holtwick's report in SRH-355 where he states that 2,000 JN-25
(note no suffix was mentioned) code groups were recovered by 4 January
1941 and I mentioned that report. It is clear that Holtwick was
referring to 2,000 JN-25A code groups recovered by 4 January 1941.
Since the GY report shows 1,400 JN-25A (AN) code groups recovered by 1
January 1941, it is clear that Holtwick was referring to JN-25A not
JN-25B. There are other reasons to verify this attribution. Both
Safford and Holtwick reported many things based on memory. The written
documents issued by the section that worked on those codes are far
more accurate that the five year old memories of either Safford or
Holtwick. I note that no citation for 4,000 JN-25B code groups being
recovered early in 1941 was provided by Mr. Wiley as requested.
Now Mr. Wiley is referring to a non-available document as his
authority for only 14,500 code groups in JN-25B. Why not accept Donald
Gish's 55,000 value or the remaining linguist that is still alive that
the total code groups of JN-25B were in that range? Why isn't it o.k.
to refer to some things Gish says but not others. It seems it depends
on whose ox is being gored.
As to the 1,400 code groups for JN-25A (AN) in the GY reports, OP-20-G
was at least two months behind in working JN-25A. They had no JN-25B
messages to work on until around 1 February 1941. So it is obvious
that they continued to work on old JN-25A traffic. It is a good thing
they did as they were able to take advantage of the continued use of
the cipher additive table even though the underlying code values had
changed. It was necessary in working on the same cipher additive book
to continue working on JN-25A until the cipher additive book also
changed. It is apparent that Mr. Wiley doesn't have a good grasp of
how the efforts on JN-25A and JN-25B and the overlying cipher additive
books was being carried out by Corregidor and OP-20-G
Again, since OP-20-G was working at least two months behind Corregidor
(and FECB) their recoveries that started in March 1941 apparently
didn't get to OP-20-G until around May 1941.
I wish Mr. Wiley would leave out his personal attacks. But then again
those who read this board can see for themselves what type of person
he is.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to engage in a responsible debate
with Mr. Wiley so I will sign off and leave this board to others. Good
bye.
Philip H. Jacobsen
> The evidence that the U.S. Navy read JN-25B prior to Pearl Harbor is ?
> 1. Exhibit 151 Congressional Report. It is posted on the WWW.
> 2. NSA has stated over and over that we read JN-25B prior to Pearl
> Harbor (Parker 1994 among many including the Gish article cited
> above).
> 3. Official Navy History of its crypto unit. SRH-355 page 464 e.g.
> 4. Official Reports and unofficial statements (but NSA vetted) by the
> Commander of the Navy Crypto unit Captain L. Safford. SRH ? 149 for
> So that is the debate ? consider yourself a jury and weigh the facts
> atmospheric conditions. Look at his logic ? he changes the official
> statement the messages were 99 percent read to the "system" was only
> 99 percent "recovered." He makes it up. Jacobsen, what does "system"
> mean to you? In your befuddled head, what does that word mean?
> Everyone would like to know how you can recover a system (according to
> you "99%") and miss "the key parts of the code." Explain that so we
> can laugh at you.
>
> >So for all practical purposes, not much was done with any
> >merchant marine code at the time of Pearl Harbor which is what this
> >discussion is all about. This is some real nitpicking going on here.
>
> Nitpicking? You admit Budiansky is caught with his pants down, is
> totally wrong, is off his nut, and you call it nitpicking? Budianksy
> says three codes and it is in reality five codes (40 percent error
> rate by an "expert") and you think pointing such a huge error is
> nitpicking. Hmmm! But then how come you always pick nits? You
> endlessly discuss nits. Here we are talking big ? whether whole codes
> were read ? and you think it is one of your normal discussions, a nit.
> **First, they do not say anything about FECB or Corregidor ? you
> obviously have never seen them. Budiansky said Hawaii and Philippines
> ? you changed the story again, Pill, what is your problem? You never
> argue straight. You never get the facts. Your brain cannot even focus
> for a whole paragraph. (So what do you think? Budiansky screwing up
> again? Or is it you?)** but that is a nit?
> You pointed it out yourself ? Fabian's testimony under oath. Lies
> ? Budainsky, Jacobsen, etc inject themselves in this "discussion."
David Thornley
al kirke <alki...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>news:c1ek02$8g9$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
>>
>> new B code book.
>>
>> Readable is being defined as stripping away the new random number
>> sequences to see the underlying code groups.
>
>Safford writes that we were "reading" the Japanese naval codes until
>additive list #8 was implemented, and two weeks after that Corregidor
>reported that the additives had changed but not the code book values.
>
the messages could not be read.
>Do we agree that Safford got a Navy Legion of Merit medal for his
>work on codes? So he may not really be in trouble. Would it be
>reasonable for us to take Safford's words as written, and listen more
>closely to you after you get your medal?
>
Actually, it's not necessarily reasonable to take anybody's words
as written, in the sense that we should necessarily rely on them.
Everybody makes mistakes.
>> It is clear Safford is relying on memory so it is not surprising he has
>> a date slightly wrong. Layton says the additive change was 2 December,
>> the change over date would have been 3 December US time.
>
>Safford wrote SRH-149 very carefully, both in what he says and
>what he doesn't say. He writes that
>
> The decryption of Japanese Diplomatic messages in
> Washington throughout 1941 is now a matter of public
> knowledge and some 40 volumes comprise the official
> record.
>
This has absolutely nothing to do with the Pearl Harbor strike.
That was not in Japanese diplomatic messages.
Moreover, the Japanese diplomatic cipher and naval codes were
two very different things, from a cryptanalytic point of view.
>Safford doesn't tell us that the corresponding 40 volumes of
>Japanese naval dispatches are somehow not present..
>
If we're taking Safford as read, then putting words into his
mouth accomplishes nothing.
>Safford does tell us that:
>
> We may summarize by stating that the COMINT organizations
> of the Army and the Navy worked in perfect coordination during
> this period and provided the White House, State Department,
> Army General Staff and Naval Operations with authentic, timely
> and complete information concerning the Diplomatic Crisis and
Irrelevant to Pearl Harbor.
> the mobilization and movements of Japanese amphibious forces
> for the conquest of Southeast Asia.
Irrelevant to Pearl Harbor.
Pearl Harbor is not part of Southeast Asia, and involved precisely
no Japanese amphibious forces.
>Safford tells us a lot here. Note the words "timely", "complete".
>"mobilization", "movements", "Japanese amphibious forces". He
>doesn't tell us specifically what is beyond the scope of the present
>text, but we can guess.
>
So, Safford is to be taken as completely reliable, both according
to his own words and to the words you want to put in his mouth?
His words say and imply absolutely nothing about a Pearl Harbor
attack.
>He also tells that the man-power loading due to Japanese navy
>traffic in early December was: 85% of his decryption and 50%
>of his translation capabilities, so wouldn't you say we were
>reading Japanese naval dispatch traffic? How else would you
>account for those manpower loading numbers?
>
Presumably he was reading some of it (the decryption effort gives
no information on what he was reading, but the translation does).
The Japanese had more than one code.
Moreover, this doesn't tell us which messages were being read.
The Pearl Harbor attack was not reliant on messages that had
to be transmitted, and so it doesn't seem reasonable to
casually conclude that Safford et al. were reading Japanese
messages sent by cable or courier.
>So I don't think Safford was careless when he wrote December 1.
>I think he was setting up for somebody to say out loud that a
>December 2 message couldn't be read, based on his essay, and
>then get mouse-trapped by the fact that the additive list really
>changed on Dec.4.
>
OK, so Safford is right in what you think he should have said?
Instead of a casual mistake, he is now plotting some sort of
trap?
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Geoffrey Sinclair
al kirke wrote in message ...
>
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>news:c1ek02$8g9$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
>> al kirke wrote in message ...
>>
>> >- BIG snip
>> >
>> >I haven't taken the time to learn the mechanics of JN-25B, but
>> >I've always been impresed with SRH-149, written by Captain
>> >Lawrence Safford. who was awarded the Navy Legion of Merit
>> >for his work in OP-20-G. Safford's essay is posted here:
>> > http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/SRH-149.html
>> >
>> >In SRH-149 Safford writes:
>> > "On 1 December 1941 the Japanese enciphered code
>> > of 1939 suddenly became unreadable. CINCAF
>> > promptly advised Washington to this effect. This could
>> > have been a tip-off as to coming hostilities, but it also
>> > could have been merely a routine change of system. After
>> > all, the code had been in use for 2-1/2 years. Two weeks
>> > later, Corregidor flashed the good news that the same
>> > basic code was still being used, but that a new set of
>> > additives was being used with it.* This was the third or
>> > fourth set of additives used with this same code-book.
>> > By February 1942 the new additives had been solved to
>> > a readable extent."
>> >
>> >Doesn't Safford tell us here that JN-25B was being read up until
>> >1 December?
>>
>> Safford is in trouble from the start when he says the code from 1939
>> was readable, when the code he was talking about came into
>> service from 1940. He is talking in very general terms, the 1940 B
>> version on JN-25 used the same 5 digits plus random numbers idea
>> as the 1939 A version, but with significant changes.
>>
>> He is more correct to note the number of additive changes with the
>> new B code book.
>>
>> Readable is being defined as stripping away the new random number
>> sequences to see the underlying code groups.
>
>Safford writes that we were "reading" the Japanese naval codes until
>additive list #8 was implemented, and two weeks after that Corregidor
>reported that the additives had changed but not the code book values.
Quite correct Al, have you noted the number of code groups the US
felt it had correct I have posted? Which was around 5% of the potential
code groups available?
The additives were a book of 100,000 random numbers, the way to
make the messages random. To remove such random numbers
requires a large set of messages to catch when the non random
humans repeat themselves enough to make the numbers non random.
Change the random numbers and you stop people seeing the code
groups for at least a while, if you have changed the code groups at
the same time then you really set back the attempts to crack the code.
For about 2 weeks the allies were unsure as to how extensive the
changes were, then they found out it was the random numbers only,
thanks to a Japanese slip up. The combination of such slips, more
resources and more traffic meant recovery successes went up.
Codes have their theoretical security then their real life one.
To quote Phil Jacobsen,
"Actually, when a book and overlying cipher system is "solved" only means
that you know how it is composed and can begin to make solid book and cipher
value recoveries. First, you have to solve the "system" used to make up the
code and cipher. Then you can go about book building and cipher additive
recoveries. "Reading" is the intermediate step of book building and cipher
additive recovery and provides fragmentary parts of messages. "Decrypting"
is producing decrypts of intelligence value partial or full. "
Captain Safford,
"Com 16's estimates were more reliable than Com 14's not only
because of better radio interception, but because Com 16 was
currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet's Cryptographic
System ("5 number code" or "JN-25") and was exchanging technical
information and translations with the British CI Unit at Singapore...
The major project of the 14th naval district CI unit in November
1941 was to attack the Japanese flag officers cryptographic
system (transposition cypher) superposed (sic) on a 4 character
code - I think we called it "AD" - in which they were being backed
up by a similar attack in the Navy department. The system (its
earlier editions) had been our main source of information on the
Japanese navy from 1926-27 up until November 1940. It was
the most difficult, as well as the most important, system the
Japanese navy was using and our most skilled and most
experienced officers and men were attempting its solution.
If we could have solved the flag-officers' system, Admiral Kimmel
would probably have known of the Japanese plans and the Pacific
Fleet would not have been surprised on 7 December 1941.
Unfortunately neither the US navy nor the British cryptanalysts
ever succeeded in cracking this system. The "5 numeral" system
yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion of
the Pearl Harbor raid, either before or afterward. The Japanese
abandoned the AD system in 1942 or 1943, apparently because of
extensive delays, and unreadable messages. As regards JN-25 or
"5 numeral" system, the current code (JN-25B) had been in effect
since 1 December 1940, remaining in effect until 27-31 May 1942,
and was partly readable in November 1941. A new system of keys
was introduced on 4 December 1941 and reported by Com 16
041502, but the carry-over of the old code made their solution quite
simple and we were reading messages again by Christmas,
Corregidor getting the actual break on 8 December 1941. The
Hawaiian CI unit did not commence work on the Japanese navy's
"5-digit" system until 10 December 1941, at which date they
discontinued their attack on the "flag officers" system." "
Note the difference between the definition of reading being used above
and what Al is trying to believe.
End quote
>Do we agree that Safford got a Navy Legion of Merit medal for his
>work on codes? So he may not really be in trouble. Would it be
>reasonable for us to take Safford's words as written, and listen more
>closely to you after you get your medal?
Al, if you are going to mention Safford's medal note he was a Captain
in 1941 and still a Captain in 1945, he was caught in the post attack
blame game and removed from his post in early 1942
Al, you are the one saying readable equals reading all parts of all
messages, and trying to claim Safford is saying the same thing.
It is quite simple Al, if readable means reading all then JN-25B was
not readable in May 1942, since not all messages were broken out.
Everyone agrees on that.
The USN missed the fact the IJN battlefleet was at sea for example.
How about that, an operation involving almost all of the IJN and with
all the extra code recoveries and the extra need for radio communications
on the scattered fleet the allies managed to miss one task force, the one
with all the battleships, the one that had largely stayed in home waters.
Yet it is considered so odd that in December 1941 the allies missed
one task force out of almost the entire IJN.
>> > I'm not sure why Safford uses the date 1 December,
>> >because Appendix 6 of Rusbridger's book has a reproduction of
>> >Japanese dispatch SRN-116741, which states that 4 December
>> >is the date when additive system #8 will be used instead of additive
>> >system #7. It also tells that #7 will be used concurrently with the
>> >new #8, so the new #8 was compromised from the start.
>>
>> It is clear Safford is relying on memory so it is not surprising he has
>> a date slightly wrong. Layton says the additive change was 2 December,
>> the change over date would have been 3 December US time.
>
>Safford wrote SRH-149 very carefully, both in what he says and
>what he doesn't say. He writes that
>
> The decryption of Japanese Diplomatic messages in
> Washington throughout 1941 is now a matter of public
> knowledge and some 40 volumes comprise the official
> record.
>
>Safford doesn't tell us that the corresponding 40 volumes of
>Japanese naval dispatches are somehow not present..
This is good, unless Safford rules out everything Al will put words
into his mouth and claim it is Safford speaking, so 40 volumes of
diplomatic traffic automatically equals 40 volumes of naval traffic.
If it did then presumably the 20% of interception efforts and 3% of
decryption efforts against the German and Italian navies would
yield something like 26 volumes of intercepts and 2 to 3 of
cracked messages. Furthermore when Safford notes the allocation
of resources for November and early December 1941 Al is deciding
this is the allocation of resources for the whole year. Since it took all
of 1941 to accumulate the around 40 volumes worth of diplomatic
messages.
"The 11111 sat on the 22222" takes longer to translate into
Japanese than "The cat sat on the mat", since solve the purple
keys and out came Japanese, remove the random numbers from
JN-25 and you still had to figure out the code groups.
>Safford does tell us that:
>
> We may summarize by stating that the COMINT organizations
> of the Army and the Navy worked in perfect coordination during
> this period and provided the White House, State Department,
> Army General Staff and Naval Operations with authentic, timely
> and complete information concerning the Diplomatic Crisis and
> the mobilization and movements of Japanese amphibious forces
> for the conquest of Southeast Asia. The White House and State
> Department used this information with consummate skill. The
> failure of the General Staff and Naval Operations to profit from
> the same information is beyond the scope of the present text.
>
>Safford tells us a lot here. Note the words "timely", "complete".
>"mobilization", "movements", "Japanese amphibious forces". He
>doesn't tell us specifically what is beyond the scope of the present
>text, but we can guess.
Yes folks, Safford's report that his section did all it was supposed to
do and the intelligence system he was a key part of worked perfectly,
is to be taken as gospel. Furthermore when Safford specifically
mentions what worked perfectly, the attacks by amphibious forces
in South East Asia, Al adds this must mean Safford really means the
attack on Pearl Harbor. In other words unless Safford keeps putting
in "not Pearl" in every sentence Al will tell us all Safford implies
it because he has failed to rule it out, every time.
>He also tells that the man-power loading due to Japanese navy
>traffic in early December was: 85% of his decryption and 50%
>of his translation capabilities, so wouldn't you say we were
>reading Japanese naval dispatch traffic? How else would you
>account for those manpower loading numbers?
For a start the Army was doing decryption work on the diplomatic
codes, so there were more resources on that traffic. Secondly
Al keeps telling us reading means reading all, and ignores things
like the other IJN codes Willey is so hot on reminding people the
USN was working on, instead Al tells us it was all JN-25.
As an explanation try the fact the USN was pushing hard to increase
the amount of JN-25 it was reading, an effort that did not instantly
translate into results. All of a sudden what the IJN was doing became
much more important.
>So I don't think Safford was careless when he wrote December 1.
>I think he was setting up for somebody to say out loud that a
>December 2 message couldn't be read, based on his essay, and
>then get mouse-trapped by the fact that the additive list really
>changed on Dec.4.
As opposed to someone relying on memory around 11 years after
the event making a simple date change confusion, based on things
like the call sign change date and the reality 3 December in Japan
is 2 December in the US, thanks to the international date line.
Instead we have Al telling us Safford was laying all these incredibly
subtle "traps" in his evidence. As opposed to the fact Safford wrote
the document 11 years after the events and as such is vulnerable to
simple mistakes of memory.
SRN-116741
2 Dec
From: NavMinister
To: All ND CINCS
All GD CINCS
All Fleet CINCS
"Starting 4 December 1941, system #8 of Naval Code will be used and system
#7 discontinued. (List 7 will still be used with some Japanese stations.)"
Note the problems with dates in the Pacific, 4 December 1941 Japanese
time is 3 December US time.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Mark Willey wrote in message ...
>al kirke" <alki...@comcast.net> wrote in message news:<6XeZb.348406$I06.3681650@attbi_s01>...
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Pearl Harbor" <pha...@hotmail.com>
>>
>> > >POST to SOC.HISTORY.WAR.MISC <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
>> > >From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
>> >> > END <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
>> > From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
>> Below One arrow = Phil "know-nothing" Jacobsen
Mark goes to considerable trouble to alter headings and signatures,
to add insults, which is a good clue as to his preferences. Mark is
also worried about the hostile atmosphere he operates in, despite
pushing his fiction as fact and insulting people.
> Is this the Phillip "know-nothing" Jacobsen that once posted that
>JN-25B cipher 8 was introduced 1 December 1941? Yes, I believe it is.
>Jacobson, every school boy knows it was introduced 4 December 1941.
>Shame on you! I'll show below how ill-informed you are about other
>aspects of JN-25B.
SRN-116741
2 Dec
From: NavMinister
To: All ND CINCS
All GD CINCS
All Fleet CINCS
"Starting 4 December 1941, system #8 of Naval Code will be used and system
#7 discontinued. (List 7 will still be used with some Japanese stations.)"
Note the problems with dates in the Pacific, 4 December 1941 Japanese
time is 3 December US time. So is it 3, 4 or 5 December, depending on
whose times are being used in this translation of the message? Mark does
not specify US or Japanese time, so I guess he is, by his own definition,
a "know nothing".
> About a year ago "Know-nothing" Jacobsen argued that the USA knew
>where the Japanese carrier fleet was and at the same time did not know
>where they were. I told him, he should post this argument to the
>newsgroups because it would show everyone the "quality" of his mind.
Phil Jacobsen is a real problem for Mark, Phil was there, serving in the
intelligence system in WWII in places like Guadalcanal.
So Mark has to try and denigrate Phil, this is before the fact Mark has
to avoid replying because his fiction cannot stand up to the scrutiny.
So Mark invents his accusations rather than reply properly.
> Before I get to specifics from the last post, let's lay out the
>debate on the most important question, "did the U.S. Navy read JN-25B
>prior to the Pearl Harbor attack?" That is critical because every
>detail of the attack was radioed by the Japanese in this code. So if
>we read the code, we knew everything.
This is quite fun, firstly it assumes the allies intercepted every IJN
message, and did so perfectly. No concept of receiving part of a
message or having garbles, let alone missing one, apparently the
USN had a comparable number of radio operators monitoring the
IJN as the IJN had radio operators sending traffic for example. After
all the divisible by 3 character of JN-25 was there as a garble check,
and there are plenty of examples of asking for repeats, by all navies
and the IJN had plenty of transmitters out there.
In fact the reality is key messages were not radioed. There were
telegraph links laid to the island the Nagumo Force started from,
lines laid in the 19th century, the navy took care to take over the
post offices on the island. Airfields were being built and by the
end of the war the island had more than 1 airfield, and in any case
the IJN had the big seaplanes or despatch boats if a courier service
was required.
Finally Mark is trying to use the intelligence definition of read, which
is we can recover code groups, to mean we can read the plain text.
>I would summarize the apologists position as being "no"
Mark forgets the list of code group recoveries listed by people like
Budiansky. The reality is the code was becoming readable as most
people define it, but not enough to tell the allies all they wanted to
know.
>and their data
>consists of (and here "Know-Nothing" Jacobsen, you may bring forth
>other "evidence" if you are aware of any) -
Just think of the extra effort to type the insult before the name, almost
all the time, gives an idea of Mark's priorities.
>1. The testimony of Lt. Fabian reported in the 1946 Congressional
>Report that Com 16 the Philippines did not read anything at all in
>JN-25B. He is the only person to make that claim under oath.
This again comes down to the definition of reading, recovering
code groups is not the same as reading the plain text.
>2. An article or articles by Duane Whitlock to the same effect.
My such specific references keep popping up.
>3. OP-20-G "month-by-month reports" in Record Group 38 referred to by
>Budiansky and posted to the newsgroups.
Note by the way people like Edwin Layton, Rochefort and so on
are excluded from the non conspiracy evidence. Mark needs to
pretend where the balance of evidence is. He has to rule out all
the books on the intelligence war during WWII that conclude there
was no conspiracy, or all the books on the opening of the Pacific
war that disagree with him, Prange, Costello, Prados and so on.
Also the logic of how such a wonder conspiracy happened, the
way it was somehow arranged and enforced across half the world,
from Washington to Singapore, and points in between, the way
the British were involved in the system, the way apparently the
wonder secret has been kept for years by the people who actually
were there and so on. All this is ignored.
>Now before I go on to list the evidence in the affirmative, let us
>note briefly that each of these 3 "facts" relied on by the apologists
>have been thoroughly discredited. Fabian and Whiltlock were directly
>contradicted by NSA Senior Historian Donald Gish in an article in the
>Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Fall 1993, and
>contemporaneously contradicted by a 16 November 1941 letter by Lt.
>Leitwiler and a December 1941 official report from Com16. The faked
>month-by-month reports were also contradicted by the 1991 NSA press
>release as well as the Gish article referred to above.
Fundamentally Mark is deciding to simply change definitions, from
recovery of the 5 digit numbers, so the allies knew what was a
valid code group number, to recovery of the meaning of that code
group. In the December 1940 and January 1941 period the IJN
decision not to change the random number book meant the allies
could recover a large number of code group numbers. Then came
the problem of assigning meaning. Mark tries to tell us knowing the
code group number equals knowing the code group meaning.
Then add trying to pass off results in JN-25A as results in the B version.
By the way Gish states the JN-25B code had around 55,000 values,
which contradicts Mark's claim of around 1/4 that.
>The evidence that the U.S. Navy read JN-25B prior to Pearl Harbor is –
>1. Exhibit 151 Congressional Report. It is posted on the WWW.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/x18-151.html
Note Safford says partially readable. Mark is trying to expand the
size of partial.
>2. NSA has stated over and over that we read JN-25B prior to Pearl
>Harbor (Parker 1994 among many including the Gish article cited
>above).
The fun thing is the difference between reading parts of it and all of it.
The intelligence definition of read versus the one Mark tries to claim.
>3. Official Navy History of its crypto unit. SRH-355 page 464 e.g.
Again the usual stuff, the changing of definitions.
>4. Official Reports and unofficial statements (but NSA vetted) by the
>Commander of the Navy Crypto unit Captain L. Safford. SRH – 149 for
>example. His "Rhapsody in Purple" article for Cryptologia 1982 for
>another in which he is completely dismissive of the claim the U.S. did
>not read JN-25B. In no uncertain terms he impugned the integrity and
>intelligence of people who claimed that we didn't read the code
>(including Wohlstetter).
There is reading parts of the code and reading all or enough,
www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/SRH-149.html
>5. Winston Churchill in his Nobel Prize winning books. GRAND ALLIANCE
>page 598.
By the way in the same chapter Churchill says all the messages the
allies read were put on the public record in 1946. Mark prefers the
one statement but not the two. Churchill confessing to a conspiracy
is against Mark's claims no one would do such a thing.
>6. The letter from the co-commander of the Philippine crypto unit COM
>16 referenced above saying they were "current" in JN-25B and decoding
>so many JN-25B messages in November 1941 that it kept two
>Japanese-to-English translators very busy. Stinnett has kindly put a
>scan of it on the web.
Yes folks, as the IJN geared up, as lots of signals were intercepted, the
other point is the station was also working on other traffic, not just JN-25
or for that matter IJN.
"On 24 October, 1941, LT. L. W. Parke, USN, at OP-20-G, forwarded a letter to
LT John M. Lietwiler on Corregidor. The letter discussed in general terms
some items regarding cryptanalysis of Japanese traffic as well as delays
which were being experienced in receiving hard copy traffic from Corregidor
and Guam. According to the letter, no traffic had been received from Guam
since 30 June and none from Corregidor for the period 10 July through 14
August. It was considered that the delays were far too great and plans were
being studied to either forward the traffic on onion-skin paper via air
freight at $2.50 a pound or on microfilm via air mail. The air freight idea
was preferred by LT Parke since it would not require the installation of
photographic equipment at each site as well as OP-20-G in Washington, D.C.
LT Lietwiler responded on 16 November and endorsed the air freight shipment
of traffic on onion-skin paper since he stated it would be practically
impossible for Corregidor to handle the volume of traffic being forwarded if
they were to use microfilm. LT Lietwiler also stated that all of
Corregidor's resources were being devoted to trying to keep up with current
cryptographic traffic, and no work was being performed on old material.
According to the letter, enough current traffic was read to keep two
translators very busy."
The actual quote,
"We have stopped work on the period 1 February to 31 July as we have
all we can do to keep up with the current period. We are reading enough
current traffic to keep two translators very busy, i.e. with their code recovery
efforts etc. included"
Note what gets dropped from the conspiracy version, the fact the
translators were not translating documents full time. They had a range
of duties one of which was translating documents, another was assigning
meaning to code groups. Also note the current period is being implied
as 1 August 1941 onwards, after the additive change.
Given the code book had not changed going through the previous
additive book period was still a way to find new code groups.
>7. The Official History of the British codebreaking unit FECB. "It may
>be explained here that but for this mistake (using old cipher tables
>when JN-25B was first implemented) on the part of the Japanese, the
>form of the new (code) book from which , as is known, intelligence
>from a wide field was produced in November 1941 and from March 1942
>until its supersession in June 1942." Quoted in Rusbridger for one.
>"Intelligence from a wide field," I would enjoy someone explaining
>that away.
It would be interesting to see what the official history of the Far
East Combined Bureau is called.
Mark has decided that the ability of the British to be able to find
out lots about what was coming towards them automatically
equals knowing about Pearl Harbor. Also that it automatically
meant they knew Malaya was going to be hit as opposed to
Thailand first, Malaya later.
By the way Rushbridger concludes Churchill knew but FDR did not,
Mark ignores that bit of the book.
Rusbridger, James, and Eric Nave. Betrayal at Pearl Harbor:
How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II. New York:
Summit, 1991. London: O'Mara, 1991. [pb] Old Tappan, NJ:
Simon & Schuster, 1992.
Eric Nave did not do any cryptanalysis in the
lead up to Pearl Harbor, he was teaching other Australians
the techniques to put together a much bigger Australian unit.
Reviews of the book follow,
For Tordella and Fishel, IJI&C 6.3, "this book does so much
wanton damage to historical fact that it should not be allowed
to into the record without a thorough inquest." It "violates
common sense" and is a "complete fabrication.... [I]n 1941
JN-25 was for all practical purposes unreadable, unproductive
of intelligence." Nave's "knowledge of the history of JN-25 must
have been so defective as to render his recollections worthless."
Betrayal at Pearl Harbor is a "conglomeration of confusion and
error.... This could be a book-length hoax."
Gish, IJI&C 6.3, opines that the book "makes a feeble case
for a conspiracy based on hearsay and misconstrued bits and
pieces of information misleadingly presented as evidence....
The book is filled not only with large and basic errors of a
cryptologic nature ... but with errors of fact.... [T]he arguments
and evidence presented ... reveal[] no basis for the fanciful
conspiracy theory developed in the book."
Aldrich, I&NS 7.3, argues that "[n]owhere do the authors
provide convincing evidence" of deliberate duplicity on
Churchill's part. Instead, what is offered is "only the thinnest
of circumstantial evidence from which a number of
questionable deductions are drawn." Sissons, I&NS 9.2,
agrees with this judgment, noting that the evidence produced
by the authors for "a signal sent to the [Japanese] carrier
force on 25 November ... that revealed its position and
likely destination ... is unconvincing."
(edits done by the reviewing site)
>8. The videotaped statements of Sir Eric Nave, Australia's top
>codebreaker.
Like on Japanese television where he denied the conspiracy claims.
Nave was not working on codes in 1941, he was largely teaching people.
See also his memoirs, at the Australian War Memorial, no conspiracy
stuff, that call came with Rushbridger.
When did Eric receive his knighthood?
>9. Statements JN-25B was read throughout 1941 by British codebreakers
>at FECB (Cmdr. Malcolm Burnett and his wife Mary, e.g.) and Dutch
>codebreakers at Kamer 14 that were working the code in 1941 (See
>Costello for the former and my book for the latter).
So far we have the usual situation, throughout 1941 the allies were
gradually cracking the code, figuring out the code groups and Mark
has decided they were reading all, or at least much more than they
say they were.
>10. Article by Albert Pelletier who was one of the 4 Japanese language
>translators hired by the Navy to translate decoded Japanese naval
>messages full time throughout 1941 (by comparison only 2 Navy
>translators worked diplomatic traffic). Pelletier says he translated
>decoded JN-25B messages throughout 1941 in "My Life with JN-25," NCVA
>Cryptolog, Summer 1992.
This is interesting and contradicts Safford who says half the USN
translators were working on diplomatic traffic.
The trouble with this claim is that Pelletier was not a language
translator in 1941, he was doing the crypto work. He also notes
that since messages arrived from the Pacific via surface mail
they were months behind when it came to tackling messages.
Also note 4 people working on the signals sent by hundreds of
ships and bases is not a good ratio.
Finally the key role of the translators was trying to assign meaning
to code groups, a much more difficult task than translating straight
Japanese.
>11. Etc. I could go on for example about RIP 79
RIP 79 equals USN book of AN-1 or JN-25B values.
>or the crypto machine
>JEEP IV that read JN-25B mechanically in October 1941
The Lietwiler letter shows Jeep IV was not in great use in November
1941, the Philippines had largely abandoned use of it.
>or the use of
>difference tables by U.S. Navy codebreakers in the fall of 1941 to
>read encoded JN-25B messages directly into English,
Difference tables, to strip out the random numbers. Japanese is
a very context sensitive language. Go try a computer translation
of it using today's computing power.
>but Congress, the
>Navy, and the NSA should be sufficient authority to establish that the
>revisionists have the official position and the apologists are blowing
>smoke on JN-25B.
Ah yes, the way Mark claims his position is the official one, all he
has to do is actually provide some evidence. Note the gap between
what Mark implies people said or did and reality.
The usual stuff, Mark simply gives the allies greater ability than they
had at the time.
>The official position is that the U.S. Navy crypto
>units OP-20-G and Com 16 read JN-25B prior to December 7, 1941. The
>political-hack apologists for FDR defend the wacko negative position
>on this issue.
This is quite funny really, Mark decides to fudge the evidence.
>So that is the debate – consider yourself a jury and weigh the facts
>on both sides and see which is more convincing.
Mark decides the best thing is not to show the evidence against him.
>And then ask yourself
>if you think the apologists are honest and honorable people for siding
>with the facts they do? Are they insane? Terminally stupid? Or
>habitually lying sleazebags? I have my opinion which.
Mark has a real problem when anyone who has access to the evidence
turns up, he needs to smear them.
>I am surprised that Jacobsen wants to argue the point about three (3)
>or five (5) codes because, as we say, you can look it up.
People can remember Mark trying to claim expert status by the
battle of who listed what code being worked on. Now comes the
attempt to change the subject.
>But I
>wonder about his honesty because he quotes out of context just to make
>the opposite point than the original document did.
Mark needs to pretend others are doing what he is.
>So to parse the
>above quotation, because it actually gives away the truth anyway,
>"This system, being of least importance" is actually from a larger
>selection referring to the five codes we monitored. It was the least
>important of the five we monitored, true. It certainly was not the
>least important of the 29 or so naval codes the Japanese used.
This is fun, it will be interesting to see what sort of ranking system
was used.
>Our
>Navy deemed it of fifth most importance overall, that is why they
>monitored it and did not monitor others. The phrase "has been
>neglected" did not mean that we didn't monitor it or didn't read it
>but that since it was of least importance it was neglected relative to
>the other four codes monitored, that is to say, less time and effort
>was spent on it. The rest of "No-Nothing Phil's" paragraph is all
>nonsense.
Mark's definition of nonsense,
"Moreover, the information obtainable
from this code usually concerns activities other than Orange
[Japanese]. The fact that no code recovery efforts were logged in for
the months of 1941 shows little or nothing was done on this code. As
you will recall, when the Army's SIS requested help from OP-20-G on
Japanese diplomatic decrypts especially on Purple, this took a major
chunck of the cryptanalysts and especially translators away from JN
codes and ciphers."
>But let us even stipulate that little was done on the I code
>in 1941, it was an old transposition code broken years before. But
>Jacobsen should not rely on faked documents to prove his point (nor
>out of context quotes).
Mark wants the faked documents and out of context quotes field
for himself.
>>The "S" code. Although I cannot presently provide a changeover date,
>>sometime in 1940 or 41,
>
>That is because you know nothing, Jacobsen! You clown! You are so out
>of date! I published this in my book.
Ah yes, Mark is not here to actually inform anyone, he is here to
insult and try and sell his book.
>>Furthermore, the key parts of
>>that old code [such as the ship and place names] had not been
>>recovered which would make it rather difficult to provide those
>>important parts of the code.
>>Only the "system" had been 99% recovered,
>>not the code and cipher values.
>
>Don't you ever know what you are talking about, Bozo Jacobsen? The S
>code was completely 100% recovered because it was stolen - that means
>we had all the codevalues and all the "key parts".
Think of it this way, the allies had plenty of enigma machines, that
did not translate into cracking the messages. What was needed
were the "keys", which were changed at regular intervals.
>The reason S code
>messages were only >>READ<< "99 percent" is because they were sent by
>radio and there are always garbles because of human error or
>atmospheric conditions. Look at his logic – he changes the official
>statement the messages were 99 percent read to the "system" was only
>99 percent "recovered." He makes it up. Jacobsen, what does "system"
>mean to you? In your befuddled head, what does that word mean?
>Everyone would like to know how you can recover a system (according to
>you "99%") and miss "the key parts of the code." Explain that so we
>can laugh at you.
It is quite simple, having the code book is one thing, having the current
keys is another.
The allies did not start reading the merchant ship code until late 1942,
that is actually decoding enough of the messages and in a timely manner.
The trouble becomes which version of the merchant marine code Mark
is talking about, the one the US stole in an operation that the Japanese
were aware might have happened, or the code that replaced the stolen
one, cracked in late 1942 and early 1943.
>>So for all practical purposes, not much was done with any
>>merchant marine code at the time of Pearl Harbor which is what this
>>discussion is all about. This is some real nitpicking going on here.
>
>Nitpicking? You admit Budiansky is caught with his pants down, is
>totally wrong, is off his nut, and you call it nitpicking? Budianksy
>says three codes and it is in reality five codes (40 percent error
>rate by an "expert") and you think pointing such a huge error is
>nitpicking. Hmmm! But then how come you always pick nits? You
>endlessly discuss nits. Here we are talking big – whether whole codes
>were read – and you think it is one of your normal discussions, a nit.
>How come the big nitpicker screams "nitpicking" when his team loses
>and shows its stupidity and ignorance? What about fair play? Why don't
>you just admit the obvious, Budiansky is a fool, instead of claiming I
>am nitpicking? Your bias is showing. You want to give him a pass for
>such a huge and fundamental error? You should be on the side of truth,
>not defending a buffoon like Budiansky when you see him deep in error.
>Why is Budiansky even publishing when he is so ignorant?
Mark really hates people like Budiansky and Jacobsen, they have the
truth and this stops Mark's fiction. Note Mark is now back to his basic
standard, when he misses mentioning a code it is no problem, but
anyone else it is proof of their lack of expertise.
>>Let's stay with something that has some real application to Pearl
>>Harbor.
>
>>> 2. Budiansky says that no progress was made in reading the
>>> AD or MAT systems but he is wrong on both counts. We read
>>> both. Cmdr. Rochefort has stated in interviews (even available
>>> on the net through the magazine Cryptolog) that Hawaii had made
>>> good progress on the MAT code and Budiansky as an "expert"
>>> should have known that. The AD code was read in Washington
>>> and there are discussions about what good progress we made
>>> on it in documents in the National Archives. Budiansky doesn't
>>> even know what the code is.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>
>>The "MAT" code. SRH-355 p. 396 states that "Current information is not
>>now being obtained from this system, but it is estimated that within
>>six months we (OP-20-G] will be able to read most of the traffic
>>shortly after receipt, except for the first few days of each new
>>cipher period. However, OP-20-G was not able to meet that prediction
>>due to the shift of personnel to assist the Army's SIS on diplomatic
>>messages. Dyer in Hawaii did continue that work, but the results was
>>rather minimal from reading all the Comint Summaries. Budiansky was
>>right. There just wasn't any real good intelligence information
>>obtained from this source.
>
>More nitpicking, I suppose. The first part of the quote above was for
>years prior to 1941 but Jacobsen wants you to believe it was 1941. We
>didn't "obtain real good intelligence information" from MAT according
>to "Know-nothing Jacobsen" but it wasn't because we didn't read it, we
>did read the code real good but there wasn't anything much of use sent
>in the code. Again he tries to befuddle people by changing terms in
>mid-argument. Either his mind wanders or he is a dishonest debater.
Basic rule the more insults the more Mark is worried.
>>The AD or Admiral's code was NOT being read in Washington at the time
>>of Pearl Harbor. What is your source for this allegation?
>
>Jacobsen, below you mention it was read in November 1941, so you are
>trying to prove the negative. You have to give the source. And you
>don't even know what change was made to the code so how could you say
>anything about whether it was read in 1941? You don't know. You don't
>know anything. And I hope you are not going to reference the faked
>documents again. So sad.
Yes folks, Mark cannot reveal the intercepts he says were in the AD
code in 1941 and decrypted during 1941. Phil notes the change in
the code in November 1940, Mark claims Phil wrote 1941.
The absence of any decrypts is the negative proof by the way, Mark
needs some positive proof.
Captain Safford,
"The major project of the 14th naval district CI unit in November
1941 was to attack the Japanese flag officers cryptographic
system (transposition cypher) superposed (sic) on a 4 character
code - I think we called it "AD" - in which they were being backed
up by a similar attack in the Navy department. The system (its
earlier editions) had been our main source of information on the
Japanese navy from 1926-27 up until November 1940. It was
the most difficult, as well as the most important, system the
Japanese navy was using and our most skilled and most
experienced officers and men were attempting its solution.
If we could have solved the flag-officers' system, Admiral Kimmel
would probably have known of the Japanese plans and the Pacific
Fleet would not have been surprised on 7 December 1941.
Unfortunately neither the US navy nor the British cryptanalysts
ever succeeded in cracking this system. "
Mark prefers only parts of Captain Safford's writings.
>>Pearl Harbor
>>is the time frame we are all concerned about. I quote from Layton's
>>book, "And I Was There" p. 77. Dyer's team at Pearl Harbor had
>reached
>>the point in November 1940 that the "AD" system [first introduced on
>1
>>November 1938] was beginning to produce intelligible text when Japan
>>made another major change [on 1 November 1940] in the underlying
>code.
>>Unlike the first version, the new edition of the code book appeared
>to
>>have a circulation limited to flag officers .... Only some two
>hundred
>>intercepts were ever made, a totally inadequate number for the
>>effective penetration of any cipher system."
>>Therefore, it is completely erroneous to say that the AD code was
>>being read in Washington after 1 November 1940.
>
>OK, I see the quote refers to Dyer's team at Hawaii Station Hypo
>(Pearl Harbor) and then I see No-nothing Phil makes a claim about
>Washington based on that. He says
"Therefore, it is completely erroneous to say that the AD code was
being read in Washington after 1 November 1940" !!!"
>Logic is well above you, Pill. Please! "Pearl Harbor" means
>"Washington" to Jacobson? Why am I slumming in this newsgroup with
>fools who know nothing, and can not reason their way out of paper bag?
>Why do I waste my time? Geez!!!
Mark is arranging to disappear when it is obvious his fiction is
not working.
Presumably the people in Pearl Harbor kept the decrypts, never
giving any to Washington, nor any code recoveries. Nor will
the evidence of the people there, like Rochefort be allowed to
intrude, they say they did not crack the code.
>>> 3. In the second paragraph he talks about "month-by-month
>>> reports" in Record Group 38 which he relies on. I have seen these.
>>> They are unsigned and of unknown provenance and known to be
>>> false. In 1945/1946 the Navy faked thousands of documents to
>>> cover up the fact that they read Japanese navy codes prior to
>>> December 7th, 1941. These documents Budiansky relies on were
>>> some of the fakes. It is interesting that an "expert" like Budiansky
>>> would fall for them. He also states these documents "also report
>>> on the progress of the Navy decryption units in Hawaii and Cavite"
>>> which is false. The reports only purport to cover OP-20-G
>>> (in Washington).>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>
>>I wonder why I am not suprised to see Wiley calling these official
>>OP-20-G reports "fakes." These documents included both the JN-25B book
>>values and cipher additive recoveries as reported by Corregidor as
>>well as those reported by the British at FECB Singapore. Were is your
>>evidence to the contrary?
>
>**First, they do not say anything about FECB or Corregidor – you
>obviously have never seen them.
Yes folks, no one was sharing their code book recoveries, it was
a competition, not a shared effort. The idea Washington would
be the master list.
>Budiansky said Hawaii and Philippines
>– you changed the story again, Pill, what is your problem? You never
>argue straight. You never get the facts. Your brain cannot even focus
>for a whole paragraph. (So what do you think? Budiansky screwing up
>again? Or is it you?)** but that is a nit…
Budiansky's words,
"They cover the work of the entire unit known
as OP-20-GY, the Navy cryptanalytic office in Washington,
and also report on the progress of the Navy decryption
units in Hawaii and Cavite. "
Note how Mark changes the definition, dropping out Washington.
>Hey, stupid! I pointed out already that a cumulative running total in
>April of 300 codevalues is obviously a faked document since the NSA
>and Navy have both published authoratively and also on the word of
>Lawrence Safford that we had recovered 2000 by 4 Jan 1941 and also on
>the official contemporaneous report of Admiral Hart that the British
>gave us 500 on 5 March 1941.
Mark simply switches definitions here between the 5 digit groups
and the meaning given to those groups and/or between the A and
B versions of the code. He further assumes the USN immediately
accepted all the British recoveries as "proven" as opposed to
being given a list, with overlaps, of a mixture of "proven", "probable"
and "possible" code group meanings.
>So if the British gave us 500 and we had
>at least 2000 (really 3800) a month prior to your "evidence" even you,
>no-nothing Phil Jacobsen, should be able to do the math. You can't
>even detect the simplest fraud documents when they hit you in the face
>and people should listen to you? Get out, loser!
Phil is quite good at detecting frauds, that is why Mark needs to
try and insult rather than reply.
>>> 4. To show how totally ignorant Budiansky is, he says that
>>> JN-25B (AN-1) had "30,000-plus" code groups. But this code
>>> has been in the public domain in the National Archives since
>>> February 1996 and by 1999 he should have looked at it and
>>> been familiar with it. It only has 14,500 code groups.
>>> Some expert.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>
>>I am glad to see that Wiley admits that JN-25B was also referred to
>>as AN-1.
>
>???? What?
It would seem Mark has a habit of confusing codes.
>>However, I assume Wiley misspoke and meant JN-25A
>>(AN) as being limited to 14,500 groups. JN-25B and successive
>>editions
>>had a total of around 55,000 plus code groups when the various
>>auxilliary tables were added to the total maximum possible of 33,000
>>code values. This has been confirmed from NSA's Gish and others still
>>alive who worked on JN-25B. Please provide the citation for the
>>JN-25B code book reportedly in the National Archives.
>
>My jaw dropped when I read this load of crap. Jacobsen, seriously, you
>must be embarrassed about your total lack of knowledge about what you
>are talking about. Don't you even look at these code books? How can
>you post, when you don't have a clue? You are wasting electrons,
>sucker. You are wasting everyone's time. You don't know how many
>codevalues are in JN-25A (even though I posted that to web years ago)
>and the codebook has been public since 1996 and you have no clue at
>all about JN-25B. I am shocked. Just get out!
Note folks, the above is no reply, just Mark is right, no facts will be
provided. Mark needs to tell us all where the authentic IJN JN-25A
and JN-25B code books are, not the reconstructions the US started
but never finished.
>> 5. He says the U.S. Navy had only recovered 3,800 code
>> groups from the JN-25B dictionary by December 1941 but the
>> fact is that we know they had recovered over 4,000 on 5 March
>> 1941. That tells us not only the documents he relies on are faked,
>> but it also tells us Budiansky doesn't know much about codes or
>> cryptanalysis since 500 code groups is enough to read book
>> codes to about 90 percent of most messages. In fact, Rochefort
>> and Station Hypo knew many less than 500 code groups of JN-
>> 25B immediately prior to the Battle of Midway.
>
>Wilford ["Pearl Harbor Redefined"] claimed that Holtwick's reference
>to 2,000 JN-25 code values recovered by 4 January 1941 referred to
>JN-25B. However, GY records show that 1,400 JN-25A (AN) values were
>recover by 1 January 1941.
>
>(Sigh!) Just for your information, that is a wrong number. But notice
>that if 1,400 JN-25A codevalues were recovered, the 2,000 number must
>necessarily then refer to JN-25B, the only other version at the time.
Note the wonderful attempts at logic here, instead of Holtwick being
wrong the number is retained with one of those no evidence must be
claims. Simply again Mark is confusing the A and B versions and the
totals of 5 digit numbers recovered versus meanings assigned to the
groups.
>>By
>>March, the British at FECB Singapore had only recovered some 500
>>JN-25B code values as I recall.
>
>Yeah, then how come the running cumulative total is listed as only 300
>in April 1941 according to documents you incessantly refer to? See a
>problem there? No? Can you compare two numbers and identify which is
>larger? Didn't think so. Second grade arithmetic is above Jacobsen.
>Remedial math, Jacobsen, it is the key to your future. Please take it!
>Come back in ten years when you get out of sixth grade.
Translation Mark cannot handle the fact the code group recoveries
went through a protracted process, particularly early, from possible
to probable to definite. That, unsurprisingly, there was overlap
between the US and UK efforts and that it took time to send the
material to Washington and further time for Washington to rule on
the validity.
The fewer the words recovered the more uncertain the assignments.
>>The statement that only 500 code values are needed to read a book
>>code of the size of JN-25B too ridiculous to respond to.
>
>You mean you don't know enough to respond. That is because you don't
>know anything at all about codes. So what are you doing here wasting
>everyone's time?
Wasting everyone's time and bandwidth is Mark's job after all. He
has spent much more time insulting that providing evidence.
>> Furthermore, there
>>were the small percentage of overlying cipher additives recovered to
>>contend with. Please provide the source of your allegation that
>>Rochefort only had 500 JN-25B code values to work with immediately
>>prior to the Battle of Midway.
>
>I have his codebook. I got it thru FIOAing the NSA.
Mark apparently has decided whatever document he has received
from the archives represents all the code groups available to Pearl
Harbor in May 1942. Despite evidence Pearl was shipped a USN
version of the JN-25B code book in December 1941 and kept up
to date with all the code recoveries.
All the people involved are quite clear the number of recoveries was
much greater than 500 and Pearl was informed.
>>> Because there was a cover-up about Pearl Harbor - even to
>>> the extent that generals and the head of Naval Intelligence were
>>> strongly pressured to commit perjury before Congress about
>>> Japanese navy codes - one must weigh the evidence about pre-
>>> war cryptoanalysis very carefully. This Budainsky has horribly
>>> failed to do. He is like an illiterate retard let loose in a
>>>library.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>
>>First of all there was no perjury about Japanese navy codes.
>
>You pointed it out yourself – Fabian's testimony under oath. Lies
>under oath are perjury.
Mark, as appears normal, simply twists people's words.
>>Very
>>little was asked or answered on that subject. Then Commander Fabian
>>testified that they had no success with Japanese naval codes on
>>Corregidor where current traffic was being worked on.
>
>First of all, you see, you found the perjury yourself unaided. Wow.
>Guess you forgot? Were you dropped on your head when you were a baby?
No it simply is a case that Fabian notes that they could not the
information they wanted out of the code in time.
If Mark cut out the insults he would probably more than halve the length of
his non reply.
>>Captain Whitlock said the same in his Navy War College thesis.
>
>Ooooh! The man who sent messages to Hawaii to mislead them into
>thinking the Japanese carriers were west of the Philippines in the
>South China Sea in late November/early December 1941, the man who has
>the most to cover up, in un-crossexamined statements not under oath is
>the gospel to you? I am so impressed. The man who caused the disaster
>at Pearl Harbor is now allowed to cover up and dissemble. The man who
>has the most to hide is your source, Jacobsen? So nice. This Whitlock
>is the man most responsible for the deaths at Pearl Harbor at the
>operational level. Even he admits it.
Yes folks, when someone makes a statement Mark does not like out
comes the not under oath bit, favourable statements can be made
without any oaths needed.
By the way if Whitlock caused the disaster why blame FDR? And
the usual bit, somehow Whitlock knew where the IJN carriers were
and acted, from the other side of the Pacific as part of the wonder
conspiracy.
There were plenty of assessments as to the location of the IJN
carriers, none of them had eastern Pacific, most had most to all
in home waters.
>>Generalized statements
>>by Wiley that are not grounded on any factual documentary basis do
>>nothing to prove anything. Revisionists have failed to prove there
>>were any decrypts of intelligence value of Japanese naval message that
>>were made prior to Pearl Harbor to sustain their charge that there was
>>advance knowledge of the planned attack and such advance knowledge was
>>withheld to get the U.S. into the war in Europe.
>
>Sounds like you are making generalized statements not grounded on any
>factual documentary basis in this paragraph, Jacobsen. Are you joking?
Mark has trouble with the truth.
>>It is a shame that a more temperate discourse is not used in this
>>"discussion."
>
>It is a shame that people who know absolutely nothing and cannot think
>– Budainsky, Jacobsen, etc inject themselves in this "discussion."
>There is enough misinformation about Pearl Harbor in official sources
>that we don't need Jacobsen's and Budainsky's dreck.
Mark needs to push his fiction, it requires no other sources around.
>>Just from the excerpts that I am aware of there, there are obviously a
>>panalopy of "errors" or incorrect allegations in Mr. Wiley's book.
>
>How would you know, moron?
The reality is Willey's book is largely fiction, a fact he confirms by
preferring insults and "I know the truth" with no evidence in public forums.
It is hard to push a 60 year old conspiracy when there are ones 1 or 2
years old to take its place. Being a pioneer in the "its all a conspiracy"
club does not pay today's bills when there are newer events to go write
fiction about.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
kirke) wrote:
> Safford doesn't tell us that the corresponding 40 volumes of
> Japanese naval dispatches are somehow not present..
What corresponding volumes? purple was a cypher broken before you
entered the war. The Japanese navy used codes. Whether or not the
Naval codes were broken you still have to get round the precautions
the Japanese took before an during Pearl Harbor. The orders were never
transmitted by radio but by land line and precautions were taken
against accidental transmission by the attack fleet going as far as
removing transmitting keys from the fleet radios.
Even assuming the Japanese transmitted everything in clear, you still
have to prove the Pearl Harbor plan was ever transmitted. The Japanese
may not have understood code breaking but they certainly understood
signal analyses.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
Mark Willey
> > > >From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
> > >> > END <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
*************************************************
First let me note that Jacobsen could not find any more evidence on
behalf of the proposition that JN-25B was not read before Pearl Harbor
(leaving that proposition rather bare indeed) and he had no answer for
the History of FECB claim that intelligence from a wide field was
gained from JN-25B in November 1941.
>> Is this the Phillip "know-nothing" Jacobsen that once posted
that
>> JN-25B cipher 8 was introduced 1 December 1941? Yes, I believe it
is.
>> Jacobson, every school boy knows it was introduced 4 December 1941.
>> Shame on you! I'll show below how ill-informed you are about other
>> aspects of JN-25B.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>Since Mr. Wiley cannot conduct a gentlemanly discussion and must
>resort to vile name calling, this will be my last post on this
thread.
Ooooh! Jacobsen is a crybaby! Get out, loser.
>I am sure that Mr. Wiley is referring to someone else as giving the
>date of 1 December 1941 (vice 4 December 1941) for the change to
>Cipher 8 of JN-25B... However, I deny Mr. Wiley's allegation.
In an article entitled "Naval Intelligence as of Pearl Harbor" by a
Philip H. Jacobsen at www.microworks.net/pacific/intelligence/
pearl_harbor.htm
you wrote "A JN-25B key change on 1 December was a setback to this
cryptanalytic effort." Now, Jacobsen, you knew you were going to be
caught lying and you lied anyway. That means that you are
pathological. You are sick!
Before I go on to refute his post in detail, I want to review what the
original argument was about. Budiansky wrote that the U.S. Navy
"investigated" (an amateurish and imprecise term) only three Japanese
Naval codes prior to Pearl Harbor. I simply corrected him that it was
five (5) codes, then Sinclair listed a few random codes from the
Japanese airforce and diplomatic codes and then Jacobsen jumped in and
wrote that the mere existence of other Japanese codes proved I was
wrong about how many the U.S. Navy investigated – to wit, five was
wrong and Budiansky was right it was three.
This is Jacobsen's logic. To answer how many Japanese Naval codes
the U.S. Navy monitored (investigated), Jacobsen has staked his
reputation on the idea that the mere existence of other codes is
dispositive or even relevant. Most Alzheimer's patients high on crack
think better than Jacobsen.
>I would challenge Mr. Wiley to provide chapter and verse to support
>his statement that "[E]very detail of the attack [on Pearl Harbor]
was
>radioed in this [JN-25B] code."
"We know now that they contained important details concerning the
existence, organization, objective, and even the whereabouts of the
Pearl Harbor Strike Force." (NSA Historian Francis Parker in Pearl
Harbor Revisited, 1994, p 21 and yes it is on the net and yes it is an
official NSA publication.)
>OP-20-G documentation clearly shows
>that the Japanese Navy did not send Operational Orders by radio.
You demand chapter and verse from me but what do you offer? Vague,
useless and false references. The Japanese always sent operation
orders through radio. The radioed operational order for Pearl Harbor
is in the Congressional Report, volume 1 p. 180, transcript pp 437-8.
>I have never seen Donald Gish's article, but Mr. Wiley does not
accept
>his statement that there were about 55,000 basic code groups in
>JN-25B. Using Wiley's logic, what Gish said in 1993 should be
>discredited. However, I would prefer to see just exactly what Mr.
Gish
>said in 1993. For some reason, Mr. Wiley didn't bother to provide a
>quote.
First of all, Gish is referring to mathematical possibilities and
although this is advanced third grade arithmetic so Pill Jacobsen
cannot follow, it is theoretically possible that the Japanese could
have used 55,000 numbers in their code because the math allows it.
They just didn't. And I do quote Gish in my book but the reason I
don't in this newsgroup is because Pill will use my information to
pose as an expert to other people. He's a poser. I have no reason to
educate this buffoon.
>Lieutenant Lietwiler's letter of 16 November 1941 dealt primarily
with
>cipher additive recoveries.
He has a paragraph on cipher additives and one on codevalues.
> Lietwiler spoke of "code recovery efforts"
>not producing decrypts of intelligence value.
He never says anything like that. Jacobsen are you lying again when
the letter is on the web. Just stop it. You are so sick!!
>Again, read my article,
>"Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No: The Story of the U.S. Navy's
>Efforts on JN-25B" in the July issue of "Cryptologia" where I show
>that there were no such decrypts from Corregidor before Pearl Harbor.
You know, Jacobsen, if you were smarter you would have realized the
NSA has already admitted that Corregidor decrypted JN-25B before Pearl
Harbor and the NSA has the decrypts just as Gish wrote back in 1993.
You should have saved yourself a lot of embarrassment and not written
a totally wacko fictional article, known ahead of time to be false.
>Again, Mr. Wiley makes overall allegations as to evidence but
provides
>no details as to what is in Exhibit 151 of the Congressional
Hearings.
It is online. You can read it. It says that we read JN-25B "currently"
and exchanged "translations" with the British before Pearl Harbor. You
are so lazy it is disgusting. Read it yourself. Don't force me to do
all the work for you. You should be on Jerry Springer.
>As to Frederick Parker, he said, "The actual reading of current
>This should end all discussion the status of JN-25B and all
>revisionist allegations that JN-25B decrypts provided foreknowledge
of
>the Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor. Mr. Wiley should be
careful
>whom he quotes.
I am careful. Parker was very dishonest. But then, that particular
cycle of NSA lies ended in 1996 when the Navy dumped the Crane,
Indiana, COMSEC files into the National Archives. You don't see the
NSA lying so much about JN-25B any more. They still lie about JNA-20
etc. and are sitting on one-fourth of the raw Japanese JN-25B encoded
messages sent in the fall of 1941 but most of Parker's lies have
expired. Do you know why, Jacobsen? Of course not. Parker's lies
expired because the underlying references he relied on to stay
classified have now been declassified and released to me. I caught the
NSA flagrantly lying. Parker's references pointed to classified
documents that said the exact opposite of what he said they said. So
when I quote Parker, I know what parts are true and which are not.
> Captain Safford's SRH-149. However, this overall
>history of U.S. naval Comint suffers quite a bit from Safford's
faulty
>memory
As if you would know!
>as well as his bias in trying to justify his terrible decision
>to keep Rochefort and Dyer, the best cryptanalytic team we had on the
>old practically discarded AD or "Admiral's Code" instead of allowing
them to jump onto JN-25B (AN-1).
Safford did not make the decisions about what Pearl Harbor worked on
after April 1941. It was taken out of his hands and the decisions came
down from upstairs. You really know nothing, Pill.
> As a result, Safford made many
>mistakes in his accounting in SRH-149.
I not only have the old redacted version of this document, I have the
nearly totally unredacted version which no one else who has not bought
my book has. You can't name one significant mistake.
> He never differentiated between
>JN-25A (AN) and JN-25B (AN-1) which replaced the former on 1 November
>1940.
Hey, Bozo, the date was "1 December 1940" when JN-25B went into
effect. But facts are nitpicks for you because you never have any. The
reason that Safford doesn't distinguish between JN-25A and JN-25B is
that JN-25A was never read currently and is not relevant to Pearl
Harbor. We know JN-25A was retired before Yamamoto even thought of the
Pearl Harbor plan. Safford ignores JN-25A and rightly so. When Safford
says "JN-25" he generally means "JN-25B" because that is the only one
of any significance. The error is that you cannot grasp simple
realities.
>He also misstated the date for the change to Cipher #8 as 1
>December 1941 when we all know that it was changed on 4 December
1941.
I thought you said that was nitpicking? And you made the same mistake.
>Also, right after that Safford speaking about 1 December
>1941 erroneously stated that "[t]he code had been in use for 2 1/2
>years. In fact, JN-25B (AN-1) had only been in use one year, one
month
>and three days.
JN-25 went into effect June 1939 which is 2 and a half years from
December 7, 1941. Safford was right, you are wrong. Safford referred
to the system generally here. JN-25A and JN-25B are virtually
identical. They are the same crap. It is not a mistake to refer to two
forms of the same thing as one. Like we do not say an IRS form 1040 in
1983 is something totally different from an IRS form 1040 in 2004.
They have the same function and are very similar. So we use the term
1040 for both. It was the same JN-25 system (and I am talking about
"system" in the cryptoanalytic sense, something you wouldn't
understand).
> Safford makes another mistake on page 13, when he
>states that JN-25B (AN-1) "was finally superceded on 31 May/1 June
>1941 [sic] by another similar basic code. In fact, JN-25B (AN-1) was
>superceded on 27 May 1942.
Well this is a common slip 1941/1942 but he is more right than you.
The changeover was sloppy and it did take several days but JN-25C9
went officially into effect only on 1 June 1942 (Japanese time, = May
31 U.S.). The incompetence of the Japanese in sending messages in both
JN-25B7 and B8 while also sending in the new code JN-25C9 for three
days in late May was so typical. They were always incompetent at
communications security.
>The reference to the enciphered code of
>1939 becoming unreadable, only refers to the cipher recovery and book
>building effort not decrypts of intelligence value. There were none
>and SRH-149 does not provides any evidence of such decrypts of
>intelligence value.
This is puzzling. How would you know? You are trying to prove a
negative and that is impossible. So here you are, demonstrating again
and again that you know nothing about codes in general and JN-25B in
particular and people are supposed to take your word? Why? Reasonable
people should listen to you and believe the opposite on the principle
that you are always wrong. SRH-149 says the U.S. Navy "did a thorough
job" on the Japanese navy codes in 1941 and Safford at the end says
that the chain of command "failed to profit" from the intelligence
supplied to them by cryptoanalysis. Reasonable people confronted with
the statement that someone "failed to profit" from intelligence would
conclude that there must have been some intelligence that could have
been profited from. But logic is not your strong point.
>Again, Lieutenant Lietwiler's letter of 16 November 1941 only stated
>that they were working on the current cipher additive book not that
>they were "current in JN-25B" Lietwiler did not say they were
>"decoding" JN-25B messages as Mr. Wiley recklesslessly charges. He
>only said, we are keeping two translators busy "with their code
>recovery effforts etc. ..." There is a big difference between
>providing decrypts of intelligence value and making recoveries of
>basic code values. By 1 December 1941 only 3,800 out of some 50,000
>plus plus JN-25B basic code values had been recovered.
Jacobsen, I know you are very dumb and you don't know anything but
here you are just dishonest. You have deliberately misquoted the
letter. The letter says "We are reading enough current traffic to keep
two translators very busy, i.e. with their code recovery efforts etc.
included." This is from a paragraph about Cipher 7 of JN-25B and
informing Parke that they have stopped work on Cipher 6. You didn't
quote the entire sentence because you are dishonest. The letter says
in plain English that they are reading current traffic, specifically
JN-25B7 because he draws a distinction with cipher 6. And the meaning
of the whole sentence, as anyone can see, is that reading current is a
big workload especially when considering these same translators are
also recovering additional JN-25B codevalues when they get spare time.
Jacobsen, you are dishonest. You are a sleazebag!! Get out, loser!
>As to James Rusbridger, Eric Nave in an interview with a Japanese TV
>station disavowed most everything that Rusbridger said. BTW, I have
>the tape so I suggest that Mr. Wiley would be well off to drop that
>reference.
Nave disavowed "the Churchill only knew thesis" as anyone would. But
his autobiography is in the Australian archives so I advise you not
lie about what Nave said.
>Commander Burnett was the liaison officer to CincPac during the later
>part of the war and was as surprised with the attack on Pearl Harbor
>as everyone else. This counters some later statements made by Mrs.
>Burnett.
Ya, he was surprised they weren't ready for the attack. Burnett told
Costello that the British read JN-25B throughout 1941. Days of Infamy
1994.
>Mr. Wiley errs horribly again when he states that Albert Peletier
"who
>was one of the 4 Japanese language translators hired by the Navy to
>translate decode Japanese naval messages full time throughout 1941."
>and that Peletier "says he translated decode JN-25B messages
>throughout 1941 in "My life with JN-25," NCVA Cryptolog, Summer 1942.
>Yeoman 1/c Pelletier was a career naval petty officer at the time who
>was a cryptanalyst and was not a Japanese linguist capable of making
>translations.
Oh, you are calling Pelletier a liar? Right. For your information, he
claimed he was a linguist and Japanese naval messages are very simple.
He even states that Phil Cate was a better linguist than he, Pelletier
was, and that he consulted with Cate frequently.
>Mr. Wiley should really be a bit more careful about what
>he writes.
And
>to show results in early April 1942." Again, I would suggest that Mr.
>Wiley drop his references and erroneous attributions to Pelletier.
You are a bloody fool! You call Pelletier a liar and then say I should
be careful about what I write? You are a totally dishonest fool.
>The JEEP IV was only used to strip off cipher additives not to "read
>JN-25B messages" as Mr. Wiley erroneously stated.
Jacobsen, you don't know what the machine did. You have no clue. Why
are you even talking about it? You are such a loser.
>The difference table was another device to strip off cipher additives
>and had nothing to do with providing decrypts as Mr. Wiley alleged.
Here again you know nothing about JN-25B and nothing about how the
difference tables worked or what they were used for. Aren't you
embarrassed? Don't you care what you write? Have you no shame?
>In
>fact, both OP-20-G and Corregidor worked out the difference table in
>November 1941 and it was not in time to provide any direct value in
>producing pre-war decrypts.
It was in September and October, Moron. Do you ever get your facts
right? And they were extremely useful and saved a lot of time on the
IBM punch card sorting machines that otherwise would have had to
decode all JN-25B messages. It took a huge load off the machines and
the Japanese language translators as well.
>There is no NSA official position that either OP-20-G or Corregidor
>was producing JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value. Citations
>please!!!
Well depending on what you mean by "intelligence value," and we can
assume that you have no clue, NSA's Gish did write that important
intelligence was gained in the Philippines, e.g. Cite previously
provided.
>Finally, Mr. Wiley does stipulate that little was done on the "I"
code
>after he made so much fuss about Stephen Budiansky's treatment of
that
>code.
That is because Budiansky was completely wrong. We monitored the code,
we solved it, and therefore, even using Budianksy's unprofessional
amateur and imprecise term "investigated," it is true that we
investigated the "I" code. I don't think Budiansky missing the second
most important Naval code entirely (the S code) or factually missing
40 percent of the codes we did monitor is a small matter when this
bozo is posing as an expert in something he knows nothing about.
Budiansky is very stupid. But he is also very ignorant and that is the
point I was making. Frauds like you and Budiansky should be exposed.
It is a duty.
>I note that Mr. Wiley does not provide the date the "S" code was
>superceded by the "Maru" code.
You don't even know what you are talking about. Get out.
>Obviously, it was well before Pearl
>Harbor, so all this gnashing of teeth over the old "S" in the context
>of Pearl Harbor is much ado about nothing.
Obviously? Jacobsen you don't even know what the S code or Maru code
are or whether or which replaced the other. I have never encountered
such a know nothing fool as you are. If I didn't know better I would
think you were a fifth grader in slow class.
> The key parts of the old
>"S" code were a direct quotation. I see that Mr. Wiley provides no
>citation for his contrary allegation. Agin, the code was superceded
so
>the discussion is really moot.
"Agin?" NL which is the American designation for what the Japanese
call the "S code" was superceded on 31 August 1942. Long after Pearl
Harbor, you clown. But you wouldn't know that, would you, Pill? You
know nothing. You disgust me! You are so worthless!
>I admit nothing as to Steve Budiansky being in error.
That shows how dumb you are and how little you know.
>I clearly stated that it (AD code) was read up to 1 November 1940
when
>it was changed. I quoted Layton's, "And I Was There."
"It was changed." You moron, you don't know what you are talking
about? What was the change, stupid? If you even had a clue about what
you were talking about then you would know we continued to read it
because of the nature of the specific change that was made. Get out!
You loser!
>As to the GY records, there is documentation in other narratives that
>state those figures included the recoveries from Corregidor when they
>were apprised of them. Corrigidor also passed on the FECB recoveries
>to OP-20-G in Washington.
Oohh! You are changing your story again. Before it was in the records
Budiansky referenced and now it is not them at all but some vague
"other narratives" that obviously you haven't seen! That looks like
you are saying Budiansky was in error. An admission! Funny after you
said you wouldn't make any.
>I have never seen any statement by Captain Safford that we had
>recovered 2,000 JN-25B code groups by 4 January 1941.
That just proves you are not an expert.
> I have seen
>Captain Holtwick's report in SRH-355 where he states that 2,000 JN-25
>(note no suffix was mentioned) code groups were recovered by 4
January
>1941 and I mentioned that report. It is clear that Holtwick was
>referring to 2,000 JN-25A code groups recovered by 4 January 1941.
>Since the GY report shows 1,400 JN-25A (AN) code groups recovered by
1
>January 1941, it is clear that Holtwick was referring to JN-25A not
>JN-25B.
Here we are back with Jacobsen's innumeracy. He sees that JN-25A has
1,400 and then "it is clear" to his muddy brain that is identical to
2000. You are just so bad, you are making me puke.
>Now Mr. Wiley is referring to a non-available document as his
>authority for only 14,500 code groups in JN-25B. Why not accept
Donald
>Gish's 55,000 value or the remaining linguist that is still alive
that
>the total code groups of JN-25B were in that range?
This seems to be difficult for apologists but we revisionists actually
look at the codebook. I counted the code groups. The JN-25B codebook
is in the National Archives and anyone can get a copy and count
entries themselves. It is not "non-available." It is very available
but apologists are too stupid and too arrogant to use facts so they
write fiction. The facts are against them.
>As to the 1,400 code groups for JN-25A (AN) in the GY reports,
OP-20-G
>was at least two months behind in working JN-25A. They had no JN-25B
>messages to work on until around 1 February 1941.
Are you serious? You just make stuff up. The History of GYP1 says they
worked on lots of JN-25B messages in both December 1940 and January
1941. You are living in alternative universe. A universe of retarded
people.
>So it is obvious
>that they continued to work on old JN-25A traffic.
And here is this "obvious." Meaning Jacobsen is swimming well beyond
his depth.
>It is apparent that Mr. Wiley doesn't have a good grasp of
>how the efforts on JN-25A and JN-25B and the overlying cipher
additive
>books was being carried out by Corregidor and OP-20-G
Actually I have a perfect grasp of it but you have just shown "agin"
that you know nothing.
>Again, since OP-20-G was working at least two months behind
Corregidor
>(and FECB) their recoveries that started in March 1941 apparently
>didn't get to OP-20-G until around May 1941.
Oh stop! Stop speculating about stuff that is hundreds of miles over
your head. You are a total blithering idiot! "Two months behind" is
crap and "apparently"? Anything you think is "apparent" is just wrong.
>Philip H. Jacobsen
I know that there are a lot of idiots on the newsgroups but Jacobsen
just takes the cake. He can't get anything right, he knows nothing,
his mind wanders, his logic is crack logic, and he is completely
dishonest. He is a total loser. He shouldn't post again. He is such a
total waste of time.
Mark Willey
http://www.geocities.com/mark_willey/pearl.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>below from last post
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
pha...@hotmail.com (Mark Willey) wrote:
> That is critical because every
> detail of the attack was radioed by the Japanese in this code.
Have you any evidence for that?
al kirke
> This will probably appear in the wrong place, thanks to a buggy news
server.
>
> al kirke wrote in message ...
> >
> >"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
> >news:c1ek02$8g9$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
> >> al kirke wrote in message ...
> >>
> >> >- BIG snip
> >
> > We may summarize by stating that the COMINT organizations
> > of the Army and the Navy worked in perfect coordination during
> > this period and provided the White House, State Department,
> > Army General Staff and Naval Operations with authentic, timely
> > and complete information concerning the Diplomatic Crisis and
> > the mobilization and movements of Japanese amphibious forces
> > for the conquest of Southeast Asia. The White House and State
> > Department used this information with consummate skill. The
> > failure of the General Staff and Naval Operations to profit from
> > the same information is beyond the scope of the present text.
> >
> >Safford tells us a lot here. Note the words "timely", "complete".
> >"mobilization", "movements", "Japanese amphibious forces". He
> >doesn't tell us specifically what is beyond the scope of the present
> >text, but we can guess.
>
> Yes folks, Safford's report that his section did all it was supposed to
> do and the intelligence system he was a key part of worked perfectly,
> is to be taken as gospel. Furthermore when Safford specifically
> mentions what worked perfectly, the attacks by amphibious forces
> in South East Asia, Al adds this must mean Safford really means the
> attack on Pearl Harbor. In other words unless Safford keeps putting
> in "not Pearl" in every sentence Al will tell us all Safford implies
> it because he has failed to rule it out, every time.
Here's a pointer to the Lietwiler Memorandum,
http://www.independent.org/tii/news/021201Stinnett.html
Note that part of the Memorandum where Lietwiler states that:
"We have stopped work on the period 1 February to 31
July as we have all we can do to keep up with the current
period. We are reading enough current traffic to keep two
translators very busy, i.e., with their code recovery effort,
etc. included In in this connection, I certainly wish you could
see your way clear to drop the ancient history side of this
cipher and work with us on the current system as it comes
up. With Singapore, we have adopted a system of exchanging
block numbers to prevent duplication. We have more or less
given them a free hand in selecting the cipher blocks they
tackle on account of their more limited traffic."
Captain Safford and Lt. Leitwiler, who use the words "currently
reading.", had personal knowledge. Who presumes to dispute them?
-snip-
Begin disputing here:
Scott @ Sandy
embarrass himself again. Much of what you wrote as already been countered by
Sinclair. Also Wiley could you please start quote your sources better.
Example.....
> "We know now that they contained important details concerning the
> existence, organization, objective, and even the whereabouts of the
> Pearl Harbor Strike Force." (NSA Historian Francis Parker in Pearl
> Harbor Revisited, 1994, p 21 and yes it is on the net and yes it is an
> official NSA publication.)
Funny how it comes from Parker edited and doesn't support his point. Lets
read the whole page.
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ComInt-2.html
>>>>>>>>>>
That is, OP-20-G and Corregidor (as well and London and Singapore) had not
recovered enough of the basic code, and JN-25 decrypts could not be produced
in time to play a part in U.S. and policy or military decisions during this
crucial period. Thousands of intercepted Japanese Navy messages in JN-25
were not exploited because, as a result of manpower shortages and higher
priorities, the underlying code values remained unrecovered.57
These proved to be costly factors indeed, because analysts at Hawaii,
Corregidor, and Washington never discovered the vital information contained
in the untranslated messages. We now know that they contained important
details concerning the existence, organization, objective, and even the
whereabouts of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force, the Japanese Navy's First Air
Fleet. Hidden in these messages was the full magnitude of the enterprise
planned by the Japanese to begin on 7-8 December 1941. Had these messages
been read on a current basis, it is possible -- even probably, given the
analytic skills so evident in these centers -- that the early course of the
war would have been significantly altered. Unfortunately, most of the U.S.
Navy's cryptanalytic effort was devoted to another Japanese cryptographic
problem: recovering the daily cipher, translating the texts, and reading the
Japanese diplomatic messages.
end page................
You seem to seize on words of larger statements that don't support what you
make them out to say.
Willeys site
"knew the full and immediate purpose of their enemy."
Now the full quote:
"...To them, as to me, it seemed that for Japan to attack and make war upon
the United States would be an act of suicide. Moreover, they knew, earlier
than we in Britain could know, the full and immediate purpose of their
enemy. ..."
(Churchill's "Grand Alliance" p 603)
Another
Willeys site:
"From the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital
Japanese ciphers, and were decoding large numbers of their military and
diplomatic telegrams." (Churchill, "The Grand Alliance," p. 598)
Full quote:
"From the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital
Japanese ciphers, and were decoding large numbers of their military and
diplomatic telegrams." In the secret American circles these were referred to
as 'Magics'. The 'Magics' were repeated to us, but there
was an inevitable delay - sometimes of two or three
days - before we got them. We did not know therefore
at any given moment all that the President or Mr. Hull
knew. I make no complaint of this."
>>>>>>>
Does anyone else find this interesting?
>> I have seen
>> Captain Holtwick's report in SRH-355 where he states that 2,000 JN-25
>> (note no suffix was mentioned) code groups were recovered by 4
> January
>> 1941 and I mentioned that report. It is clear that Holtwick was
>> referring to 2,000 JN-25A code groups recovered by 4 January 1941.
>> Since the GY report shows 1,400 JN-25A (AN) code groups recovered by
> 1
>> January 1941, it is clear that Holtwick was referring to JN-25A not
>> JN-25B.
>
> Here we are back with Jacobsen's innumeracy. He sees that JN-25A has
> 1,400 and then "it is clear" to his muddy brain that is identical to
> 2000. You are just so bad, you are making me puke.
I guess Ralph Erskine also falls into that innumeracy.
http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-diplo&month=0102&wee
k=b&msg=dnMmFXjLuf8SQP9ej67c6w&user=&pw=
Timothy Wilford has suggested (26 January) that these statistics "are
improbable", relying on SRH 355, p 398, which states that "On 4 January
1941 it was reported that about 2000 values had been recovered ... in the
"5-numeral" code (JN-25)". His post of 6 February clarifies his position:
he merely claims that this "_only makes sense if_ it concerns ... JN-25B"
(my emphasis).
This quotation from p 398 is completely ambiguous, since it could
theoretically refer to JN 25A or 25B. The fact that, as Wilford observes,
its author "distinguished between the two systems, JN-25A and JN-25B, in a
footnote on the same page" is neither here nor there. The footnote does
not relate to "2000", or code values recovered. It deals with JN 25 in
general, and is no help here. Moreover, this part of p 398 is not a
primary document. It may well be an indirect quotation from one, but no
real source is given - only "it was reported."
However, everything fits neatly into place (both p 398 and the primary
documents we rely on) if, as Philip Jacobsen and I contend, "2,000" refers
to JN 25A.
>> Now Mr. Wiley is referring to a non-available document as his
>> authority for only 14,500 code groups in JN-25B. Why not accept
> Donald
>> Gish's 55,000 value or the remaining linguist that is still alive
> that
>> the total code groups of JN-25B were in that range?
>
> This seems to be difficult for apologists but we revisionists actually
> look at the codebook. I counted the code groups. The JN-25B codebook
> is in the National Archives and anyone can get a copy and count
> entries themselves. It is not "non-available." It is very available
> but apologists are too stupid and too arrogant to use facts so they
> write fiction. The facts are against them.
Could you tell me who else states that there are only around 14,500 code
groups? Does Brian Villa or Timothy Wilford
Scott
Tracy White
> Captain Safford and Lt. Leitwiler, who use the words "currently
> reading.", had personal knowledge. Who presumes to dispute them?
> Begin disputing here:
You don't actually comprehend what he's saying in that memo do you?
He's talking about the ADDITIVES.
Scott @ Sandy
Addition:
Pelletier stated only 10 percent of JN-25 was readable. Letter Al Pelletier
Cryptolog (Summer 1992)p5. Also see testimoney of Rochfort who stated the
same PHA (note 4) part 10, p4674
British progress was also around the same at 10 percent
both Smith, Emperor's Codes: p 96 Aldrish Intellegence and the War Again
Japan: 68-91
Small edit "embarrass yourself" on first response
in article BC641D83.2A828%snss...@pacbell.net, Scott @ Sandy at
snss...@pacbell.net wrote on 2/27/04 9:59 PM:
al kirke
"Tracy White" <whi...@blarg.net> wrote in message
news:f13d5e6.04022...@posting.google.com...
Why would Captain Safford and Lieutenant Leitwiler need translators
if their Japanese naval dispatch intercepts had not been both stripped
of additives and converted to Japanese language code book values?
Best regards,
Al
Scott @ Sandy
non-replys? Are you going to misquote Pelletier like Stinnett did on pg 73?
Or are you going to keep avoiding the bulk of our statements and "prove"
documents to be fake with your more of your creatively bad math skills?
in article BC6423F4.2A82A%snss...@pacbell.net, Scott @ Sandy at
snss...@pacbell.net wrote on 2/27/04 10:26 PM:
David Thornley
more codes than JN-25, and one would think translators would be
valuable in breaking the additive table.
After all, if you've got three additives in a row, you want a
translator to look at what you've recovered and suggest extensions
to those three words (or groups, or whatever). Not to mention
that, if you've got a set of additives figured out, you can
pull significant chunks of text that must be translated from
a significant number of messages, without being able to read
all of any messages or some of every message.
Geoffrey Sinclair
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>news:c1mgdl$pt4$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
>> This will probably appear in the wrong place, thanks to a buggy news
>server.
>>
>> al kirke wrote in message ...
>> >
>> >"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>> >news:c1ek02$8g9$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
>> >> al kirke wrote in message ...
>> >>
>> >> >- BIG snip
>---BIG SNIP--
Al does not like the following text, to the next >
To quote Phil Jacobsen,
Captain Safford,
End quote
Note the difference between the definition of reading being used above
and what Al is trying to believe.
Al, if you are going to mention Safford's medal note he was a Captain
in 1941 and still a Captain in 1945, he was caught in the post attack
blame game and removed from his post in early 1942
Al, you are the one saying readable equals reading all parts of all
messages, and trying to claim Safford is saying the same thing.
It is quite simple Al, if readable means reading all then JN-25B was
not readable in May 1942, since not all messages were broken out.
Everyone agrees on that.
The USN missed the fact the IJN battlefleet was at sea for example.
How about that, an operation involving almost all of the IJN and with
all the extra code recoveries and the extra need for radio communications
on the scattered fleet the allies managed to miss one task force, the one
with all the battleships, the one that had largely stayed in home waters.
Yet it is considered so odd that in December 1941 the allies missed
one task force out of almost the entire IJN.
This is good, unless Safford rules out everything Al will put words
into his mouth and claim it is Safford speaking, so 40 volumes of
diplomatic traffic automatically equals 40 volumes of naval traffic.
If it did then presumably the 20% of interception efforts and 3% of
decryption efforts against the German and Italian navies would
yield something like 26 volumes of intercepts and 2 to 3 of
cracked messages. Furthermore when Safford notes the allocation
of resources for November and early December 1941 Al is deciding
this is the allocation of resources for the whole year. Since it took all
of 1941 to accumulate the around 40 volumes worth of diplomatic
messages.
"The 11111 sat on the 22222" takes longer to translate into
Japanese than "The cat sat on the mat", since solve the purple
keys and out came Japanese, remove the random numbers from
JN-25 and you still had to figure out the code groups.
>> > We may summarize by stating that the COMINT organizations
Al go look at your quote, "reading enough current traffic", is what
Leitwiler writes. People can note all the snipped text where
Captain Safford's words are deleted, they say no conspiracy,
but here Al tries to run the line Safford is gospel.
Safford,
"The "5 numeral" system
yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion of
the Pearl Harbor raid, either before or afterward."
Al presumes to dispute these words, though deleting appears to
be the first option.
The USN definition of reading, seeing the basic code groups,
then came decrypting, seeing the basic plain text.
Yes folks, Al puts words into people's mouths then tries to use their
name to avoid having to actually explain the contradictions.
Note the definition of the periods, the previous period was 1 February
to 31 July, the current period started 1 August.
JN25 was a series of 5 digit numbers divisible by 3. To disguise the
groups random numbers were added to them. So the recovery process
was possible, probable definite group, followed by possible, probable,
definite meaning.
The way to remove the random numbers was to compare messages
and the longer the additive (random number) book was in use the more
code groups could be recovered. The library of intercepted signals
would be searched from day 1 of the new additive book for matches.
Think of it this way, if you scored a match and removed the random
numbers then you ended up with at least part of the code groups of
that signal, but running the same sequence over previous signals
could provide more code groups. JN25 was that sort of code, the
more success you had the easier the rest became.
Al is trying to run the line reading means reading the plain text, when
the USN defined it as reading the code groups. He is trying to define
current as signals in November but the letter starts the current period
in August.
After finding the 5 digit numbers came the task to assign meanings,
""The 11111 sat on the 22222" takes longer to translate into
Japanese than "The cat sat on the mat", since solve the purple
keys and out came Japanese, remove the random numbers from
JN-25 and you still had to figure out the code groups.
The letter makes it clear the duties of the translators include code
recovery. It was two full time people by the way, go look at the
output of the average Japanese English translator, but Al is busy
telling us there was enough code recovered for the plain text to
be resolved, when the people involved have made it clear that
was not the case. They and the records agree at around 10
to 15% of the code groups.
"People are welcome to go through my post leaving only these words
in and see how much sense it makes.
11111 22222 33333 to 44444 55555 66666 77777 88888 99999
12345 23456 in and 34567 45678 56789 67890 09876 98765.
Is what the above sentence reduces to, which is 15% readable."
>-snip-
Test of most of the bits snipped.
Geoffrey Sinclair
the wrong place.
Mark Willey wrote in message ...
>k6...@cox.net (Phil Jacobsen) wrote in message news:<12002537.04022...@posting.google.com>...
>pha...@hotmail.com (Mark Willey) wrote in message news:<a0911e65.04022...@posting.google.com>...
>> > > >POST to SOC.HISTORY.WAR.MISC <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
>> > > >From: Stephen Budiansky <ste...@budiansky.com>
>> > >> > END <<Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:52:49 -0400
>> Below One arrow = Phil "know-nothing" Jacobsen
> No arrows = Mark Willey
Mark spends a lot of time insulting Phil, rather than replying.
>First let me note that Jacobsen could not find any more evidence on
>behalf of the proposition that JN-25B was not read before Pearl Harbor
>(leaving that proposition rather bare indeed) and he had no answer for
>the History of FECB claim that intelligence from a wide field was
>gained from JN-25B in November 1941.
First let me note Phil provided his evidence, and it is a good rule the
more Mark insults Phil the more Phil is accurate.
Mark thinks he operates in a hostile environment, that apparently
has nothing to do with the abuse he throws at people and pushing
fiction as fact.
>>> Is this the Phillip "know-nothing" Jacobsen that once posted that
>>> JN-25B cipher 8 was introduced 1 December 1941? Yes, I believe it
>is.
>>> Jacobson, every school boy knows it was introduced 4 December 1941.
>>> Shame on you! I'll show below how ill-informed you are about other
>>> aspects of JN-25B.
>
>>Since Mr. Wiley cannot conduct a gentlemanly discussion and must
>>resort to vile name calling, this will be my last post on this thread.
>
>Ooooh! Jacobsen is a crybaby! Get out, loser.
No, Phil has decided that someone who simply wastes everyone's
time throwing insults can be left to safely self destruct, or for the
recreational posters
>>I am sure that Mr. Wiley is referring to someone else as giving the
>>date of 1 December 1941 (vice 4 December 1941) for the change to
>>Cipher 8 of JN-25B...
The bit chopped,
"In fact, Captain Safford was quoted here of
erroneously saying that the cipher changed on 1 December 1941.
Apparently, it is quite alright when Safford makes that simple
nitpicking error."
>However, I deny Mr. Wiley's allegation.
>
>In an article entitled "Naval Intelligence as of Pearl Harbor" by a
>Philip H. Jacobsen at www.microworks.net/pacific/intelligence/
>pearl_harbor.htm
>you wrote "A JN-25B key change on 1 December was a setback to this
>cryptanalytic effort." Now, Jacobsen, you knew you were going to be
>caught lying and you lied anyway. That means that you are
>pathological. You are sick!
Yes folks, apparently making a mistake of 3 days in one post is
enough to totally invalidate you, despite Captain Safford making
the same error.
Furthermore Mark feels the need to spend almost as much time
with insults.
Mark seems to need to go through the writings looking for typos
as a way of proving he is right, but only about the typos.
>Before I go on to refute his post in detail, I want to review what the
>original argument was about. Budiansky wrote that the U.S. Navy
>"investigated" (an amateurish and imprecise term) only three Japanese
>Naval codes prior to Pearl Harbor.
Mark needs to keep insulting everybody, it covers for the lack
of evidence. Apparently investigating is a bad word when
used by someone other than Mark, to describe the efforts of
the allies.
>I simply corrected him that it was
>five (5) codes, then Sinclair listed a few random codes from the
>Japanese airforce and diplomatic codes and then Jacobsen jumped in and
>wrote that the mere existence of other Japanese codes proved I was
>wrong about how many the U.S. Navy investigated – to wit, five was
>wrong and Budiansky was right it was three.
This is becoming very funny really, the posts are all present and
people can go and check. Mark set up knowing how many codes
were being cracked as a test of expertise, claiming Budiansky was
wrong since he said 3. Mark then added a lot of insults, rather
than a simple correction.
The trouble is the number investigated, was more than 3, more
than 5, because there were other systems involved, I listed a
selection if IJN and IJNAF codes, which Mark now decides
were diplomatic.
"Ah this is fun, Willey, forgot to mention at least the following IJN codes,
the call sign code,
the "wewe" code, for call signs not in the call sign list
the IJNAF air/ground codes, which the Philippines were reading for
example.
The new jade code machine.
There are others.
So presumably Willey agrees his failure to mention all the codes
is also proof he is not an expert. It will be interesting to see what
the definition of intelligence code is and where it was supposed
to be used. It was rated as a low priority, even lower than the material
code, so the question is just how much work was done on it."
Apparently some of the above are now diplomatic codes.
Note in exhibit 151 Safford says about Pearl Harbor, it could read
"Weather Ciphers and other minor systems of the Japanese Navy "
Mark failed to mention the weather cyphers for example, the standardised
allied JN designation system has entries like JN-152 for navigation warnings,
there were a lot of codes in use.
For example when the station in Melbourne Australia was set up in
early 1942 it was investigating, JN-11, JN-25 and others like JN 33,
40, 41, 42, 108, 155, 166, 180, 182, 183, and 199, unless the IJN
had a major surge in new codes in December 1941 most of these
were around pre war and various code breakers had looked at them.
> This is Jacobsen's logic. To answer how many Japanese Naval codes
>the U.S. Navy monitored (investigated), Jacobsen has staked his
>reputation on the idea that the mere existence of other codes is
>dispositive or even relevant. Most Alzheimer's patients high on crack
>think better than Jacobsen.
This summarises Mark quite well, a non reply full of insults.
The allies spent most of their effort on 3 main codes, others were
investigated, some even solved since things like aircraft codes
have to be simple to use.
>>I would challenge Mr. Wiley to provide chapter and verse to support
>>his statement that "[E]very detail of the attack [on Pearl Harbor]
>>was radioed in this [JN-25B] code."
>
>"We know now that they contained important details concerning the
>existence, organization, objective, and even the whereabouts of the
>Pearl Harbor Strike Force." (NSA Historian Francis Parker in Pearl
>Harbor Revisited, 1994, p 21 and yes it is on the net and yes it is an
>official NSA publication.)
By the way the above is no reply to the claim every detail was radioed.
People might want to note where the quote Mark so selectively uses
comes from,
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ComInt-2.html#ComInt-9
"With the progress made on recovery of the new code values, U.S. officials
believed that the combined efforts of all units would again bring the system
close to the point of reading current traffic by early summer 1941. Code
recovery continued to progress well. Throughout the summer and fall of
1941, new discoveries about the nature of the code were routinely committed
to a Registered Intelligence publication (RIP) and given wide if slow-moving
distribution to the field units.
The actual reading of current Japanese messages before Pearl Harbor,
however, was not to be. U.S. cryptanalysis of the ciphers had outstripped
the U.S. capability for code
-20---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
page 21
recoveries. That is, OP-20-G and Corregidor (as well and London and
Singapore) had not recovered enough of the basic code, and JN-25
decrypts could not be produced in time to play a part in U.S. and policy or
military decisions during this crucial period. Thousands of intercepted
Japanese Navy messages in JN-25 were not exploited because, as a
result of manpower shortages and higher priorities, the underlying code
values remained unrecovered.57
These proved to be costly factors indeed, because analysts at Hawaii,
Corregidor, and Washington never discovered the vital information
contained in the untranslated messages. We now know that they contained
important details concerning the existence, organization, objective, and
even the whereabouts of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force, the Japanese
Navy's First Air Fleet. Hidden in these messages was the full magnitude
of the enterprise planned by the Japanese to begin on 7-8 December
1941. Had these messages been read on a current basis, it is possible --
even probably, given the analytic skills so evident in these centers -- that
the early course of the war would have been significantly altered. Unfortunately,
most of the U.S. Navy's cryptanalytic effort was devoted to another Japanese
cryptographic problem: recovering the daily cipher, translating the texts, and
reading the Japanese diplomatic messages."
This is a person's opinion that had the US been able to decrypt all it
intercepted in late 1941 it could have figured out the Pearl Harbor
strike. An intelligence officer saying if only we had more resources
we would have picked the attack. The trouble becomes how much
is the result of hindsight, knowing what happened when it comes to
finding the "right" answer.
The other thing to note is he is saying the US needed to build a picture
from many intercepts, not intercept a smoking gun message.
>>OP-20-G documentation clearly shows
>>that the Japanese Navy did not send Operational Orders by radio.
>
>You demand chapter and verse from me but what do you offer? Vague,
>useless and false references. The Japanese always sent operation
>orders through radio. The radioed operational order for Pearl Harbor
>is in the Congressional Report, volume 1 p. 180, transcript pp 437-8.
The following URL's are big files.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_4.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/app-d.html
Which is where pages 180 and 437 are of the congressional report,
they do not have the operational order.
By the way please note the IJN did understand the concept of couriers
and radio silence.
>>I have never seen Donald Gish's article, but Mr. Wiley does not accept
>>his statement that there were about 55,000 basic code groups in
>>JN-25B. Using Wiley's logic, what Gish said in 1993 should be
>>discredited. However, I would prefer to see just exactly what Mr.
>>Gish said in 1993. For some reason, Mr. Wiley didn't bother to
>provide a quote.
>
>First of all, Gish is referring to mathematical possibilities and
>although this is advanced third grade arithmetic so Pill Jacobsen
>cannot follow, it is theoretically possible that the Japanese could
>have used 55,000 numbers in their code because the math allows it.
Actually the maths allows 66,666 given upper and lowercase
definitions, the numbers 00001 to 99999 divisible by three times
two.
>They just didn't. And I do quote Gish in my book but the reason I
>don't in this newsgroup is because Pill will use my information to
>pose as an expert to other people. He's a poser. I have no reason to
>educate this buffoon.
This is the usual non reply, Mark has the answer but cannot share it
with anyone. Presumably Mark will exclude the information from
his book as well, in case the wrong people find it.
Ralph Erskine notes the 55,000 figure since some 27,500 of the
available code groups were given two meanings.
>>Lieutenant Lietwiler's letter of 16 November 1941 dealt primarily
>>with cipher additive recoveries.
>
>He has a paragraph on cipher additives and one on codevalues.
There are 5 paragraphs,
paragraph 1 about recovering the 5 digit code groups
paragraph 2 is a please explain about a phrase
paragraph 3 is about the translators and their work.
paragraph 4 is a complaint about meanings sent to the unit
paragraph 5 is about the method of sending intercepts to the unit.
The hand written "reply" indicates the problems of figuring out the
meaning of code groups, the way some were assigned then later
declared wrong. Also it confirms Phil's point the Navy Department
started on JN-25B after the Philippines.
>> Lietwiler spoke of "code recovery efforts"
>>not producing decrypts of intelligence value.
>
>He never says anything like that. Jacobsen are you lying again when
>the letter is on the web. Just stop it. You are so sick!!
Phil has confused the letter, which talks about code recovery efforts
and the later evidence of the unit about the value of the information
they obtained.
>>Again, read my article,
>>"Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No: The Story of the U.S. Navy's
>>Efforts on JN-25B" in the July issue of "Cryptologia" where I show
>>that there were no such decrypts from Corregidor before Pearl Harbor.
>
>You know, Jacobsen, if you were smarter you would have realized the
>NSA has already admitted that Corregidor decrypted JN-25B before Pearl
>Harbor and the NSA has the decrypts just as Gish wrote back in 1993.
>You should have saved yourself a lot of embarrassment and not written
>a totally wacko fictional article, known ahead of time to be false.
Yes folks, Mark cannot refute the article, instead has to layer on
the insults. Mark simply tries to pretend recovering the 5 digit
code groups equals recovering the meaning of the group.
Mark tries to make out having a few words is cracking a message.
>>Again, Mr. Wiley makes overall allegations as to evidence but
>>provides no details as to what is in Exhibit 151 of the Congressional
>>Hearings.
>
>It is online. You can read it. It says that we read JN-25B "currently"
>and exchanged "translations" with the British before Pearl Harbor. You
>are so lazy it is disgusting. Read it yourself. Don't force me to do
>all the work for you. You should be on Jerry Springer.
Mark does not want to actually help anyone, just abuse them
either verbally or by selling them his book,
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/x18-151.html
Note Safford says partially readable. Mark is trying to expand the
size of partial. It also has the quote,
"The "5 numeral" system
yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion of
the Pearl Harbor raid, either before or afterward."
Mark uses a different definition of readable to Phil, who uses
the one he was taught in the USN, that is able to read the
code groups, decrypting gave the plain text.
It is one of the problems with Safford's writing, translations were
code groups and attempts to understand messages, reading
was removing the additives,
"Reference (a) advised that Com 16 intercepts were considered
most reliable and requested Com 16 to evaluate reports on
Japanese naval movements and send despatch to Opnav, info
Cincpac. Com 16's estimates were more reliable than Com 14's,
not only because of better radio interception, but because Com
16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet
Cryptographic System ("5-number code" or "JN25") and was
exchanging technical information and translations with the British
C. I. Unit at Singapore. "
>>As to Frederick Parker, he said, "The actual reading of current
>>This should end all discussion the status of JN-25B and all
>>revisionist allegations that JN-25B decrypts provided foreknowledge
>>of the Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor. Mr. Wiley should be
>>careful whom he quotes.
>
>I am careful. Parker was very dishonest.
This is good, simply dismiss those who fail to agree as dishonest,
except on the bits Mark likes.
>But then, that particular
>cycle of NSA lies ended in 1996 when the Navy dumped the Crane,
>Indiana, COMSEC files into the National Archives. You don't see the
>NSA lying so much about JN-25B any more.
Mark yet again fails to mention the difference between obtaining
the 5 digit code groups and the underlying text.
Nor does mark give any evidence to contradict the statement.
>They still lie about JNA-20
>etc. and are sitting on one-fourth of the raw Japanese JN-25B encoded
>messages sent in the fall of 1941 but most of Parker's lies have
>expired. Do you know why, Jacobsen? Of course not. Parker's lies
>expired because the underlying references he relied on to stay
>classified have now been declassified and released to me. I caught the
>NSA flagrantly lying. Parker's references pointed to classified
>documents that said the exact opposite of what he said they said. So
>when I quote Parker, I know what parts are true and which are not.
This is good, only Mark knows it seems, only he can declare
truth and lies.
>> Captain Safford's SRH-149. However, this overall
>>history of U.S. naval Comint suffers quite a bit from Safford's
>>faulty memory
>
>As if you would know!
You mean the fact it was written years after the event.
That it contains errors as a result.
>>as well as his bias in trying to justify his terrible decision
>>to keep Rochefort and Dyer, the best cryptanalytic team we had on the
>>old practically discarded AD or "Admiral's Code" instead of allowing
>them to jump onto JN-25B (AN-1).
>
>Safford did not make the decisions about what Pearl Harbor worked on
>after April 1941. It was taken out of his hands and the decisions came
>down from upstairs. You really know nothing, Pill.
All Mark has to do now is note the new AD code started in December
1940, well within Safford's claimed period of responsibility.
>> As a result, Safford made many
>>mistakes in his accounting in SRH-149.
>
>I not only have the old redacted version of this document, I have the
>nearly totally unredacted version which no one else who has not bought
>my book has. You can't name one significant mistake.
It seems the advertisement for the book continues.
>> He never differentiated between
>>JN-25A (AN) and JN-25B (AN-1) which replaced the former on 1 November
>>1940.
>
>Hey, Bozo, the date was "1 December 1940" when JN-25B went into
>effect. But facts are nitpicks for you because you never have any. The
>reason that Safford doesn't distinguish between JN-25A and JN-25B is
>that JN-25A was never read currently and is not relevant to Pearl
>Harbor. We know JN-25A was retired before Yamamoto even thought of the
>Pearl Harbor plan. Safford ignores JN-25A and rightly so. When Safford
>says "JN-25" he generally means "JN-25B" because that is the only one
>of any significance. The error is that you cannot grasp simple
>realities.
Interestingly people like John Prados note the allies had cracked
parts of JN-25A before its retirement, and were in fact "reading"
it concurrently using the USN definitions and obtaining the plain
text of some messages, "reading" it according to Mark.
You see Mark has a problem, apparently after 18 months of JN-25A,
a simpler system than the B version, the allies had not been able to
read it, according to Mark, but 2 months later there they are with
2,000 or so JN-25B code groups recovered and well on the way
to reading it, in fact Mark claims only 500 groups were needed.
Note the USN apparently recovered 1,000 code groups from JN-25A,
the groups for the numbers 0 to 999.
The allies did succeed in cracking some of JN-25A, the Japanese
were able to replace it in a timely manner so it did not hurt them too
much, but the IJN failed to do a complete revision, code book,
additives and indicators all at the same time. That gave the
allies a chance to confirm the value of the "B" 5 digit code groups,
which in turn helped when the additives were changed. It is fun
to see the claim the allies failed to crack JN-25A in 18 months
followed by they cracked the harder version in 2 or fewer months.
>>He also misstated the date for the change to Cipher #8 as 1
>>December 1941 when we all know that it was changed on 4 December
>>1941.
>
>I thought you said that was nitpicking? And you made the same mistake.
Mark decides it is fine for Safford to make the mistake but not Phil.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/SRH-149.html
for people who want to read it themselves.
>>Also, right after that Safford speaking about 1 December
>>1941 erroneously stated that "[t]he code had been in use for 2 1/2
>>years. In fact, JN-25B (AN-1) had only been in use one year, one
>>month and three days.
>
>JN-25 went into effect June 1939 which is 2 and a half years from
>December 7, 1941. Safford was right, you are wrong. Safford referred
>to the system generally here. JN-25A and JN-25B are virtually
>identical. They are the same crap.
This is good, both had the same idea, 5 digits and random numbers
but the B version was more complicated, the twin meanings, the
extra tables.
In SRH-149 Safford writes:
"On 1 December 1941 the Japanese enciphered code
of 1939 suddenly became unreadable. CINCAF
promptly advised Washington to this effect. This could
have been a tip-off as to coming hostilities, but it also
could have been merely a routine change of system. After
all, the code had been in use for 2-1/2 years."
Under Saffords reasoning the code had become unreadable
8 times in the past 2 and a half years, 7 additive books and
the A to B changeover.
The reality is the code had not been in service for that period
of time. The basic 5 digit groups with random numbers idea
had been, but the code book and additive books had been
changed. Safford appears to be writing from memory, and so
the details are unclear to wrong.
>It is not a mistake to refer to two
>forms of the same thing as one. Like we do not say an IRS form 1040 in
>1983 is something totally different from an IRS form 1040 in 2004.
>They have the same function and are very similar. So we use the term
>1040 for both. It was the same JN-25 system (and I am talking about
>"system" in the cryptoanalytic sense, something you wouldn't
>understand).
Mark clearly needs this Safford document, so Safford is excused,
others are insulted. If Safford had meant code system in the
crytoanalytic sense he really should have said so, as it reads he
is wrong, the code in use in December 1941 was not the same as
the June 1939 code.
>> Safford makes another mistake on page 13, when he
>>states that JN-25B (AN-1) "was finally superceded on 31 May/1 June
>>1941 [sic] by another similar basic code. In fact, JN-25B (AN-1) was
>>superceded on 27 May 1942.
>
>Well this is a common slip 1941/1942 but he is more right than you.
>The changeover was sloppy and it did take several days but JN-25C9
>went officially into effect only on 1 June 1942 (Japanese time, = May
>31 U.S.). The incompetence of the Japanese in sending messages in both
>JN-25B7 and B8 while also sending in the new code JN-25C9 for three
>days in late May was so typical. They were always incompetent at
>communications security.
Translation Phil is right the code changeover was 27 May but Safford
is too important for Mark so the fact some IJN stations used the old
code for a few days is trotted out as an excuse.
By the way most large organisations are poor at communications
security, the problems in telling people why they need to use the
code materials properly, and simple human error.
>>The reference to the enciphered code of
>>1939 becoming unreadable, only refers to the cipher recovery and book
>>building effort not decrypts of intelligence value. There were none
>>and SRH-149 does not provides any evidence of such decrypts of
>>intelligence value.
>
>This is puzzling. How would you know? You are trying to prove a
>negative and that is impossible.
This is good, apparently the lack of decrypts the reports of the people
present and so on is not evidence of a lack of decrypts of messages.
People report fragments.
>So here you are, demonstrating again
>and again that you know nothing about codes in general and JN-25B in
>particular and people are supposed to take your word? Why? Reasonable
>people should listen to you and believe the opposite on the principle
>that you are always wrong. SRH-149 says the U.S. Navy "did a thorough
>job" on the Japanese navy codes in 1941 and Safford at the end says
>that the chain of command "failed to profit" from the intelligence
>supplied to them by cryptoanalysis.
Mark is having to alter the meaning of his quotes again,
"There were no problems of collaboration between the Army and Navy
for strictly military COMINT matters, as each service was working alone
in its proper sphere of activity. The Navy COMINT team did a thorough
job with respect to the Japanese Navy with no help from the Army. "
Note COMINT, the people doing things like code breaking, traffic
analysis, direction finding, Mark simply changes this to code breakers.
The only occurrence of the words "failed to profit" in SRN-149,
"Later, beginning in 1936, Navy intercept stations in the Far East
copied considerable Japanese Army messages which were likewise
turned over to the War Department. However, for some unknown
reason the U.S. Army posts at Tientsin and Manila **failed to profit**
from this wealth of Japanese Army messages."
Note the change of meaning, Safford says Army codes, Mark tries
to pretend Safford says Navy codes.
>Reasonable people confronted with
>the statement that someone "failed to profit" from intelligence would
>conclude that there must have been some intelligence that could have
>been profited from. But logic is not your strong point.
Logic is a strong point for Phil, hence Mark's needs to manufacture
evidence.
Translation Safford puts forward the thesis his area did good work,
the failures were somewhere else. Safford also says in the report
they did not receive any hints of the Pearl Harbor attack, but that is
to be ignored.
For an example of failure to use the material try the Philippines and
the loss of the air force day one.
>>Again, Lieutenant Lietwiler's letter of 16 November 1941 only stated
>>that they were working on the current cipher additive book not that
>>they were "current in JN-25B" Lietwiler did not say they were
>>"decoding" JN-25B messages as Mr. Wiley recklesslessly charges. He
>>only said, we are keeping two translators busy "with their code
>>recovery effforts etc. ..." There is a big difference between
>>providing decrypts of intelligence value and making recoveries of
>>basic code values. By 1 December 1941 only 3,800 out of some 50,000
>>plus plus JN-25B basic code values had been recovered.
>
>Jacobsen, I know you are very dumb and you don't know anything but
>here you are just dishonest. You have deliberately misquoted the
>letter. The letter says "We are reading enough current traffic to keep
>two translators very busy, i.e. with their code recovery efforts etc.
>included." This is from a paragraph about Cipher 7 of JN-25B and
>informing Parke that they have stopped work on Cipher 6. You didn't
>quote the entire sentence because you are dishonest. The letter says
>in plain English that they are reading current traffic, specifically
>JN-25B7 because he draws a distinction with cipher 6. And the meaning
>of the whole sentence, as anyone can see, is that reading current is a
>big workload especially when considering these same translators are
>also recovering additional JN-25B codevalues when they get spare time.
>Jacobsen, you are dishonest. You are a sleazebag!! Get out, loser!
Yes folks, Mark decides the translators were working on translations
mostly and code groups as a side issue. The people present at the
time note the lack of decrypts, the turning of messages into text.
Reading in USN terms is the 5 digit groups, the current period is
defined as having started on 1 August, as the group builds up its
intercepts and the resulting greater success in stripping away the
new random number sequences. As more numbers are recovered
the previous signals can be tested for more code groups. It is why
working on the pre 1 August signals was still worthwhile, since the
code groups had not changed. Keep running the machines if you
have the manpower to resolve the code groups.
>>As to James Rusbridger, Eric Nave in an interview with a Japanese TV
>>station disavowed most everything that Rusbridger said. BTW, I have
>>the tape so I suggest that Mr. Wiley would be well off to drop that
>>reference.
>
>Nave disavowed "the Churchill only knew thesis" as anyone would. But
>his autobiography is in the Australian archives so I advise you not
>lie about what Nave said.
It is quite simple Nave's autobiography has none of the conspiracy
stuff in it, there is no comfort in it for Mark. The Rushbridger book
has been debunked.
>>Commander Burnett was the liaison officer to CincPac during the later
>>part of the war and was as surprised with the attack on Pearl Harbor
>>as everyone else. This counters some later statements made by Mrs.
>>Burnett.
>
>Ya, he was surprised they weren't ready for the attack. Burnett told
>Costello that the British read JN-25B throughout 1941. Days of Infamy
>1994.
Ah yes, Mark yet again simply mistakes the definition of reading and
tries to overclaim what someone said.
For example the British reported in April 1941 they had recovered 30%
of the additive book then in use. In May 1941 came full liaison with the
US, the US had given the UK a JN-25B code book with around 500
recovered values in February 1941. The 4,000 additive and 290 indicator
groups given at the same time were all from the A version.
By November 1941 the British were reporting the recovery of 3,000
code groups. By the change of additives on 4 December 1941 the
number was around 4,000 recovered code groups.
It is clear many of the early recoveries were the usual sort of cribs,
the standard reports sent, same format and around the same time,
the "nothing to report" sort of signals.
>>Mr. Wiley errs horribly again when he states that Albert Peletier "who
>>was one of the 4 Japanese language translators hired by the Navy to
>>translate decode Japanese naval messages full time throughout 1941."
>>and that Peletier "says he translated decode JN-25B messages
>>throughout 1941 in "My life with JN-25," NCVA Cryptolog, Summer 1942.
>>Yeoman 1/c Pelletier was a career naval petty officer at the time who
>>was a cryptanalyst and was not a Japanese linguist capable of making
>>translations.
>
>Oh, you are calling Pelletier a liar? Right. For your information, he
>claimed he was a linguist and Japanese naval messages are very simple.
>He even states that Phil Cate was a better linguist than he, Pelletier
>was, and that he consulted with Cate frequently.
In other words Phil is basically correct, Pelletier had some understanding
of Japanese but not enough in 1941 to be a linguist, he was assigned
the job of figuring out code groups. Pelletier also reports the 10% readable
figure, along with just about everyone else at the time.
>>Mr. Wiley should really be a bit more careful about what he writes. And
>>to show results in early April 1942." Again, I would suggest that Mr.
>>Wiley drop his references and erroneous attributions to Pelletier.
>
>You are a bloody fool! You call Pelletier a liar and then say I should
>be careful about what I write? You are a totally dishonest fool.
Note by the way Mark has decided not to actually contradict the
fact Pelletier reported results in April 1942, not 1941, but 1942.
>>The JEEP IV was only used to strip off cipher additives not to "read
>>JN-25B messages" as Mr. Wiley erroneously stated.
>
>Jacobsen, you don't know what the machine did. You have no clue. Why
>are you even talking about it? You are such a loser.
Translation, as the Leitwiler letter Mark uses shows Jeep IV was a
machine to automate the stripping of the random numbers.
>>The difference table was another device to strip off cipher additives
>>and had nothing to do with providing decrypts as Mr. Wiley alleged.
>
>Here again you know nothing about JN-25B and nothing about how the
>difference tables worked or what they were used for. Aren't you
>embarrassed? Don't you care what you write? Have you no shame?
Basically when only insults come back people can assume Mark
knows the other person is right and has to duck.
>>In
>>fact, both OP-20-G and Corregidor worked out the difference table in
>>November 1941 and it was not in time to provide any direct value in
>>producing pre-war decrypts.
>
>It was in September and October, Moron. Do you ever get your facts
>right?
The Lietwiler letter calls the difference table the new method in mid
November 1941, which the hand written notes say the Navy department
was using as well.
>And they were extremely useful and saved a lot of time on the
>IBM punch card sorting machines that otherwise would have had to
>decode all JN-25B messages. It took a huge load off the machines and
>the Japanese language translators as well.
The difference method resolved the 5 digit groups, the message still
had to be translated, code groups assigned meanings.
>>There is no NSA official position that either OP-20-G or Corregidor
>>was producing JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value. Citations
>>please!!!
>
>Well depending on what you mean by "intelligence value," and we can
>assume that you have no clue, NSA's Gish did write that important
>intelligence was gained in the Philippines, e.g. Cite previously
>provided.
In other words Mark is going to have definition wars and simply
ignore the other methods of intelligence, over and above cracking
JN-25 messages.
>>Finally, Mr. Wiley does stipulate that little was done on the "I" code
>>after he made so much fuss about Stephen Budiansky's treatment of
>>that code.
>
>That is because Budiansky was completely wrong. We monitored the code,
>we solved it, and therefore, even using Budianksy's unprofessional
>amateur and imprecise term "investigated," it is true that we
>investigated the "I" code. I don't think Budiansky missing the second
>most important Naval code entirely (the S code) or factually missing
>40 percent of the codes we did monitor is a small matter when this
>bozo is posing as an expert in something he knows nothing about.
>Budiansky is very stupid. But he is also very ignorant and that is the
>point I was making. Frauds like you and Budiansky should be exposed.
>It is a duty.
Mark considers it a duty to expose himself as well, when you use the
same tests Mark uses against Mark he is very much in the non
expert category, then add most of what he calls other people.
Mark claims the USN did not work on the merchant code, they stole it,
but complains Budiansky does not mention it when listing the US codes
being investigated by the code breakers. Why investigate what you
already have?
>>I note that Mr. Wiley does not provide the date the "S" code was
>>superceded by the "Maru" code.
>
>You don't even know what you are talking about. Get out.
Translation Mark is not going to actually provide any information.
>>Obviously, it was well before Pearl
>>Harbor, so all this gnashing of teeth over the old "S" in the context
>>of Pearl Harbor is much ado about nothing.
>
>Obviously? Jacobsen you don't even know what the S code or Maru code
>are or whether or which replaced the other. I have never encountered
>such a know nothing fool as you are. If I didn't know better I would
>think you were a fifth grader in slow class.
Translation Mark is not going to actually provide any information.
>> The key parts of the old
>>"S" code were a direct quotation. I see that Mr. Wiley provides no
>>citation for his contrary allegation. Agin, the code was superceded
>>so the discussion is really moot.
>
>"Agin?" NL which is the American designation for what the Japanese
>call the "S code" was superceded on 31 August 1942. Long after Pearl
>Harbor, you clown. But you wouldn't know that, would you, Pill? You
>know nothing. You disgust me! You are so worthless!
Mark obviously things picking up spelling errors on the internet is a
way of showing his big picture expertise. Presumably his failure
to spell Phil's name correctly is a sign of Mark's lack of knowledge
and his self disgust and value.
Note Layton makes the association, AD became NL at the end of
1940 and Safford notes it was discontinued in 1942 or 1943. This
is one of the traps, knowing the various designations.
>>I admit nothing as to Steve Budiansky being in error.
>
>That shows how dumb you are and how little you know.
Translation Mark is trying to avoid dealing with the evidence.
>>I clearly stated that it (AD code) was read up to 1 November 1940
>>when it was changed. I quoted Layton's, "And I Was There."
>
>"It was changed." You moron, you don't know what you are talking
>about? What was the change, stupid? If you even had a clue about what
>you were talking about then you would know we continued to read it
>because of the nature of the specific change that was made. Get out!
>You loser!
The fun thing is Mark claims the changes were so minor the US
cracked it quite quickly. This is despite all the people involved,
Safford, Layton, Rochefort and so on all saying the 1941 version
of the code was not cracked, mainly due to the fact it was not
used very much, only a few hundred intercepts in the code.
Mark will not tell anyone the changes.
>>As to the GY records, there is documentation in other narratives that
>>state those figures included the recoveries from Corregidor when they
>>were apprised of them. Corrigidor also passed on the FECB recoveries
>>to OP-20-G in Washington.
>
>Oohh! You are changing your story again. Before it was in the records
>Budiansky referenced and now it is not them at all but some vague
>"other narratives" that obviously you haven't seen! That looks like
>you are saying Budiansky was in error. An admission! Funny after you
>said you wouldn't make any.
Translation Mark changes the definitions again and hides.
>>I have never seen any statement by Captain Safford that we had
>>recovered 2,000 JN-25B code groups by 4 January 1941.
>
>That just proves you are not an expert.
Mark must not be an expert either since he does not show
the quote either.
>> I have seen
>>Captain Holtwick's report in SRH-355 where he states that 2,000 JN-25
>>(note no suffix was mentioned) code groups were recovered by 4 January
>>1941 and I mentioned that report. It is clear that Holtwick was
>>referring to 2,000 JN-25A code groups recovered by 4 January 1941.
>>Since the GY report shows 1,400 JN-25A (AN) code groups recovered by
>>1 January 1941, it is clear that Holtwick was referring to JN-25A not
>>JN-25B.
>
>Here we are back with Jacobsen's innumeracy. He sees that JN-25A has
>1,400 and then "it is clear" to his muddy brain that is identical to
>2000. You are just so bad, you are making me puke.
As opposed to Holtwick making an error or adding the possibly
recovered values to the definites or confusing code groups
with additive groups or the A with the B versions, for example.
>>Now Mr. Wiley is referring to a non-available document as his
>>authority for only 14,500 code groups in JN-25B. Why not accept
>>Donald Gish's 55,000 value or the remaining linguist that is still alive
>>that the total code groups of JN-25B were in that range?
>
>This seems to be difficult for apologists but we revisionists actually
>look at the codebook. I counted the code groups. The JN-25B codebook
>is in the National Archives and anyone can get a copy and count
>entries themselves. It is not "non-available." It is very available
>but apologists are too stupid and too arrogant to use facts so they
>write fiction. The facts are against them.
Yes folks, Mark will not answer the point, is the JN-25B code
book in the archives a USN reconstruction, that stopped in
June 1942 which would tell us the number of code groups the
USN recovered, 14 to 16,000 makes sense starting from around
4,000 6 months earlier, or an IJN original which would tell us the
numbers of code groups in use, which is much closer to the
33,333 groups and 66,666 meanings possible.
Note the URL
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ComInt-2.html#ComInt-9
Indicates the A version had around 30,000 5 digit groups in use. It
then notes,
"The new code was named JN-25 "Baker." It proved to have several
unfamiliar features in key generation as well as new and larger code
and additive books. "
>>As to the 1,400 code groups for JN-25A (AN) in the GY reports, OP-20-G
>>was at least two months behind in working JN-25A. They had no JN-25B
>>messages to work on until around 1 February 1941.
>
>Are you serious? You just make stuff up. The History of GYP1 says they
>worked on lots of JN-25B messages in both December 1940 and January
>1941. You are living in alternative universe. A universe of retarded
>people.
Mark feels it unnecessary to actually provide the document or quote.
>>So it is obvious
>>that they continued to work on old JN-25A traffic.
>
>And here is this "obvious." Meaning Jacobsen is swimming well beyond
>his depth.
Usual rule more insults, more truth to be avoided.
>>It is apparent that Mr. Wiley doesn't have a good grasp of
>>how the efforts on JN-25A and JN-25B and the overlying cipher
>>additive books was being carried out by Corregidor and OP-20-G
>
>Actually I have a perfect grasp of it but you have just shown "agin"
>that you know nothing.
The balance of evidence shows Mark writing the most fiction, his abuse
confirms it.
>>Again, since OP-20-G was working at least two months behind
>>Corregidor (and FECB) their recoveries that started in March 1941
>>apparently didn't get to OP-20-G until around May 1941.
>
>Oh stop! Stop speculating about stuff that is hundreds of miles over
>your head. You are a total blithering idiot! "Two months behind" is
>crap and "apparently"? Anything you think is "apparent" is just wrong.
As usual, when Mark simply resorts to insults it is a good indication
he is trying to duck the truth.
See for example the Lietwiler letter, the hand notes which shows that
the Philippines unit were working on the B version for some time before
Washington started.
One of the more interesting things is the way the US used the
mail system to ship copies of intercepts back to the US, it saved
money and avoided the chance of the Japanese cracking the
code the copies of the signals were sent in.
This is the reality of the 1940's, transport and communication costs
were much higher.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Magic/COMINT-CoralSea/PartOne.html
"For some time, OP-20-G had used air mail for the transport of vital
cryptographic material. In early January 1942, OP-20-G initiated a
desperate attempt to speed up delivery of current cryptographic
recoveries to each center. Washington authorized each center to
send code and additive recoveries in radio messages on a special
"COPEK" channel that linked CAST to HYPO and Washington, and
that, by the end of March, included Melbourne. The organization
continued to use surface mail for the basic traffic."
>I know that there are a lot of idiots on the newsgroups but Jacobsen
>just takes the cake. He can't get anything right, he knows nothing,
>his mind wanders, his logic is crack logic, and he is completely
>dishonest. He is a total loser. He shouldn't post again. He is such a
>total waste of time.
Mark needs to spend a paragraph telling us all he needs a clear
run to push his fiction, that abuse is his preferred reply.
Mark Willey
I really didn't think we could find anyone more ignorant than Phil
Jacobsen or Budianksy on the issue of pre-war cryptoanalysis but now
Sinclair steps forward to entertain us!! I skip most of his post
because it is just a waste of time and not worth reading. Sinclair has
nothing to offer but ignorance and diarrhea of the keyboard.
"You either read a code or you don't." Cmdr. Joseph Rochefort
Congressional Exhibit 151 -
"Com 16's estimates were more reliable than Com 14's,
not only because of better radio interception, but because Com
16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet
Cryptographic System ("5-number code" or "JN25") and was
exchanging technical information and translations with the British
C. I. Unit at Singapore. "
"currently reading messages in …JN-25" – what is so hard to
understand about that?
"exchanging … translations with the British" – what is so hard
about that? Translations mean only one thing = Japanese language
to English.
A. ******************************
>You see Mark has a problem, apparently after 18 months of JN-25A,
>a simpler system than the B version, the allies had not been able to
>read it, according to Mark, but 2 months later there they are with
>2,000 or so JN-25B code groups recovered and well on the way
>to reading it, in fact Mark claims only 500 groups were needed.**
I don't have a problem, I said we "never read JN-25A currently" – I
did not say we didn't read it. We did read it, just not currently.
"Currently" is the operative word. The word "currently" is a term of
art, so naturally Sinclair can't understand it. But thanks for
misquoting me. It leaves you without a point, though.
JN-25A is not a simpler system than JN-25B. It is the same system
and is, in fact, more difficult to break. The Auxillary table (which
Sinclair calls ‘second meanings') was a huge blunder in JN-25B that
just demolishes the code. Horrible cryptography!! The number table in
JN-25B has not one but three flaws in it. JN-25B was truly pathetic, a
misbegotten trivial joke of a code. A baby code. An abortion. A
horror. A flat out hash of mistakes! A giveaway code. Weak beyond
belief! Julius Caesar had much better codes. The Japanese were just
terrible at codes and JN-25B was one of their worst and weakest
efforts. A worthless code! A laugher. This tiny code was so easy to
break that everyone felt sorry for the Japanese. As Captain Safford
wrote, the Japanese language provided more security than the JN-25B
crypto system and the language provided none at all.
The history of JN-25 is simply a universally well-known fact but
the reason that we read 2000 codevalues of JN-25B in its first month
is because the Japanese blundered the code away. Without the blunder,
solving the dictionary would have been dramatically slower.
** By the way, the NSA admits we read JN-25B "currently" as of 4
January 1941, eleven (11) months before Pearl Harbor. And "read,"
Sinclair, means intercepted JN-25B cryptograms were decoded into
plaintext Japanese and translated into English.
It is curious that three codebreakers in Hawaii could solve JN-25B
in four months from a cold start in 10 December 1941 and predict the
Battle of Midway but we have all these bozos in the newsgroups
claiming 55 JN-25B codebreakers could not solve the identical code in
over a year from 1 December 1940 to 7 December 1941 and missed all
intelligence Pearl Harbor. There is something very wrong with that
picture. That was why the NSA told so many lies about JN-25B, circa
1994, to explain that extremely embarrassing problem away. Now the NSA
is caught with their pants down. They are exposed as the Orwellian
Ministry of Truth. They did not expect the codebooks to get out for 25
more years but the U.S. Navy tripped them up. But as long as there are
useful idiots like Jacobsen, Budiansky, and Sinclair around, the NSA
has some cover. Those fools repeat ancient NSA lies because they are
enemies of the truth.
B. ****************************
>>Again, Lieutenant Lietwiler's letter of 16 November 1941 only stated
>>that they were working on the current cipher additive book not that
>>they were "current in JN-25B" Lietwiler did not say they were
>>"decoding" JN-25B messages as Mr. Wiley recklesslessly charges. He
>>only said, we are keeping two translators busy "with their code
>>recovery effforts etc. ..." There is a big difference between
>>providing decrypts of intelligence value and making recoveries of
>>basic code values. By 1 December 1941 only 3,800 out of some 50,000
>>plus plus JN-25B basic code values had been recovered.
>
>Jacobsen, I know you are very dumb and you don't know anything but
>here you are just dishonest. You have deliberately misquoted the
>letter. The letter says "We are reading enough current traffic to
keep
>two translators very busy, i.e. with their code recovery efforts etc.
>included."
Everyone should reread Jacobsen's paragraph (above with >>) carefully.
He cuts out and quotes a fragment out of a sentence in order to lie
about what it says. It shows a depth of dishonesty that is scary.
C. ***********************************
>>> Lietwiler spoke of "code recovery efforts"
>>>not producing decrypts of intelligence value.
>
>>He never says anything like that. Jacobsen are you lying again when
>>the letter is on the web. Just stop it. You are so sick!!
>Phil has confused the letter, which talks about code recovery efforts
>and the later evidence of the unit about the value of the information
>they obtained.
Pill is always wrong! Sinclair you know it and defend him
anyway! I guess that makes you his whore.
>Geoffrey Sinclair
Sinclair, you have bad sources and a weaker mind. Senility? Let Al
Kirke beat you upside the head for awhile, it may improve you.
Can't hurt.
Geoffrey Sinclair
>
>I really didn't think we could find anyone more ignorant than Phil
>Jacobsen or Budianksy on the issue of pre-war cryptoanalysis but now
>Sinclair steps forward to entertain us!! I skip most of his post
>because it is just a waste of time and not worth reading. Sinclair has
>nothing to offer but ignorance and diarrhea of the keyboard.
This is amusing since I have just finished reading an article on
work place bullying, noting the people spouting the insults are
the ones with real problems.
Mark has decided to duck most of my points, try to editorialise
them away. The only way to reply is to delete the evidence it
seems, then use insults.
Primary documents appear to be quite effective in reducing Mark's
efforts to push fiction.
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ComInt-2.html#ComInt-9
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/x18-151.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/SRH-149.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Magic/COMINT-CoralSea/PartOne.html
The following URL's are big files.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_4.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/app-d.html
Which is where pages 180 and 437 are of the congressional report,
they do not have the operational order Mark says is present.
>"You either read a code or you don't." Cmdr. Joseph Rochefort
This is a nice profound statement, and rather ignores the reality
about how different types of secret writing, codes and cyphers,
work. No context to it, just a flat statement.
>Congressional Exhibit 151 -
>"Com 16's estimates were more reliable than Com 14's,
>not only because of better radio interception, but because Com
>16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet
>Cryptographic System ("5-number code" or "JN25") and was
>exchanging technical information and translations with the British
>C. I. Unit at Singapore. "
>
>"currently reading messages in …JN-25" – what is so hard to
>understand about that?
It is quite simple, reading is being defined as being able to see
the underlying code groups, not breaking out the messages into
plain text.
>"exchanging … translations with the British" – what is so hard
>about that? Translations mean only one thing = Japanese language
>to English.
Congratulations on discovering with some 3,000 to 4,000 code
groups recovered the allies could put words to some code groups
and were exchanging such information. Just try and cope with the
fact translation is hard enough but even harder when words
are missing, especially in a context sensitive language like
Japanese. That a major part of the translator's day was trying
to figure out the meanings of code groups
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/x18-151.html
Note Safford says partially readable. Mark is trying to expand the
size of partial. It also has the quote,
"The "5 numeral" system
yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion of
the Pearl Harbor raid, either before or afterward."
>A. ******************************
>>You see Mark has a problem, apparently after 18 months of JN-25A,
>>a simpler system than the B version, the allies had not been able to
>>read it, according to Mark, but 2 months later there they are with
>>2,000 or so JN-25B code groups recovered and well on the way
>>to reading it, in fact Mark claims only 500 groups were needed.**
>
> I don't have a problem, I said we "never read JN-25A currently" – I
>did not say we didn't read it. We did read it, just not currently.
>"Currently" is the operative word. The word "currently" is a term of
>art, so naturally Sinclair can't understand it. But thanks for
>misquoting me. It leaves you without a point, though.
Now the world will wait with baited breath for the definition of
"currently" as applied by Mark. Mark now wants to say the
allies did not read JN-25A currently after 18 months, but did have
this higher level of penetration of the B version after 2 months.
Similar sort of claim, the B version was apparently much much
easier to crack.
> JN-25A is not a simpler system than JN-25B. It is the same system
>and is, in fact, more difficult to break. The Auxillary table (which
>Sinclair calls ‘second meanings') was a huge blunder in JN-25B that
>just demolishes the code. Horrible cryptography!! The number table in
>JN-25B has not one but three flaws in it. JN-25B was truly pathetic, a
>misbegotten trivial joke of a code. A baby code. An abortion. A
>horror. A flat out hash of mistakes! A giveaway code. Weak beyond
>belief! Julius Caesar had much better codes. The Japanese were just
>terrible at codes and JN-25B was one of their worst and weakest
>efforts. A worthless code! A laugher. This tiny code was so easy to
>break that everyone felt sorry for the Japanese. As Captain Safford
>wrote, the Japanese language provided more security than the JN-25B
>crypto system and the language provided none at all.
Note by the way the above paragraph is basically one long series of insults,
this time against the Japanese, with no evidence presented.
Yes folks, Mark needs to pretend the IJN went backwards cryptographically
in order to peddle his fiction. The idea the Japanese actually had people
who understood codes has to be ignored, things like knowing to revise the
code book every 18 months for example, since no code can be 100%
secure. The fact the references all agree the B version was harder to crack.
The twin meanings per group, the additional tables for position, date and times,
the larger code book.
> The history of JN-25 is simply a universally well-known fact but
>the reason that we read 2000 codevalues of JN-25B in its first month
>is because the Japanese blundered the code away. Without the blunder,
>solving the dictionary would have been dramatically slower.
The well known fact is quite simple, the Japanese changed the
code book, the number of code groups and their meanings, but not
the random numbers used to disguise the code groups. Hence the
allies, who had recovered a significant number of the random numbers
had 2 months to recover the new 5 digit numbers, very useful when the
random numbers were finally changed. That still left the problem of
turning the numbers into text.
> ** By the way, the NSA admits we read JN-25B "currently" as of 4
>January 1941, eleven (11) months before Pearl Harbor. And "read,"
>Sinclair, means intercepted JN-25B cryptograms were decoded into
>plaintext Japanese and translated into English.
As usual Mark is busy simply changing definitions, from the success
against the A version to the B version, and the success in recovering
the 5 digit code groups to recovering their meanings.
Mark has decided not to back up his claims with references, people
can go back over my previous post and note the problems he has when
the full document is shown.
> It is curious that three codebreakers in Hawaii could solve JN-25B
>in four months from a cold start in 10 December 1941 and predict the
>Battle of Midway but we have all these bozos in the newsgroups
>claiming 55 JN-25B codebreakers could not solve the identical code in
>over a year from 1 December 1940 to 7 December 1941 and missed all
>intelligence Pearl Harbor. There is something very wrong with that
>picture.
This is the usual junk, Edwin Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer,
reports the arrival of a copy of the JN-25B code book in early December
and that Pearl was kept fully involved and informed about the other
station's code breaking success, the British, Australian and American
efforts from Colombo to Washington.
The very wrong part is Mark trying to pretend Pearl Harbor was kept
in ignorance about other people's efforts. Mark still has not put up
his wonder 500 group code book he says was all Pearl had.
>That was why the NSA told so many lies about JN-25B, circa
>1994, to explain that extremely embarrassing problem away. Now the NSA
>is caught with their pants down. They are exposed as the Orwellian
>Ministry of Truth. They did not expect the codebooks to get out for 25
>more years but the U.S. Navy tripped them up. But as long as there are
>useful idiots like Jacobsen, Budiansky, and Sinclair around, the NSA
>has some cover. Those fools repeat ancient NSA lies because they are
>enemies of the truth.
Simply the above paragraph is fiction. Some wonder conspiracy
that failed to make sure the archives were properly rigged and
the code books lost or destroyed for example.
Mark still has not bothered to inform us whether the code books he
claims to have seen is an allied reconstruction, which stopped in
June 1942, or an IJN original when it comes to his claims about
how big the code book was.
>B. ****************************
>
>>>Again, Lieutenant Lietwiler's letter of 16 November 1941 only stated
>>>that they were working on the current cipher additive book not that
>>>they were "current in JN-25B" Lietwiler did not say they were
>>>"decoding" JN-25B messages as Mr. Wiley recklesslessly charges. He
>>>only said, we are keeping two translators busy "with their code
>>>recovery effforts etc. ..." There is a big difference between
>>>providing decrypts of intelligence value and making recoveries of
>>>basic code values. By 1 December 1941 only 3,800 out of some 50,000
>>>plus plus JN-25B basic code values had been recovered.
>>
>>Jacobsen, I know you are very dumb and you don't know anything but
>>here you are just dishonest. You have deliberately misquoted the
>>letter. The letter says "We are reading enough current traffic to keep
>>two translators very busy, i.e. with their code recovery efforts etc.
>>included."
>
>Everyone should reread Jacobsen's paragraph (above with >>) carefully.
>He cuts out and quotes a fragment out of a sentence in order to lie
>about what it says. It shows a depth of dishonesty that is scary.
People can see above the use of exhibit 151 by Mark, but not to
worry, double standards apply.
>C. ***********************************
>
>>>> Lietwiler spoke of "code recovery efforts"
>>>>not producing decrypts of intelligence value.
>>
>>>He never says anything like that. Jacobsen are you lying again when
>>>the letter is on the web. Just stop it. You are so sick!!
>
>>Phil has confused the letter, which talks about code recovery efforts
>>and the later evidence of the unit about the value of the information
>>they obtained.
>
>Pill is always wrong! Sinclair you know it and defend him
>anyway! I guess that makes you his whore.
Yes folks, when in doubt go for the insult. Deliberately mis spell the
name, but rave about typos in other people's work, and ignore the
fact peer reviews journals do not publish "always wrong" material.
Phil has published information that debunk's Mark's claims, hence
the need to insult.
http://www.usni.org/NavalHistory/Articles03/NHjacobsen12.htm
>Sinclair, you have bad sources and a weaker mind. Senility? Let Al
>Kirke beat you upside the head for awhile, it may improve you.
>Can't hurt.
Sort of summarises Mark quite well, prefers others to do his work. It
must be comforting for Al to learn he is considered 2nd or 3rd string.
There are lots of text in my previous post Mark cannot reply to, here is a
good example, Mark's claim and reality,
>SRH-149 says the U.S. Navy "did a thorough
>job" on the Japanese navy codes in 1941 and Safford at the end says
>that the chain of command "failed to profit" from the intelligence
>supplied to them by cryptoanalysis. Reasonable people confronted with
>the statement that someone "failed to profit" from intelligence would
>conclude that there must have been some intelligence that could have
>been profited from.
Mark is having to alter the meaning of his quotes again,
"There were no problems of collaboration between the Army and Navy
for strictly military COMINT matters, as each service was working alone
in its proper sphere of activity. The Navy COMINT team did a thorough
job with respect to the Japanese Navy with no help from the Army. "
Note COMINT, the people doing things like code breaking, traffic
analysis, direction finding, Mark simply changes this to code breakers,
and the output from the IJN to just IJN codes.
The only occurrence of the words "failed to profit" in SRN-149,
"Later, beginning in 1936, Navy intercept stations in the Far East
copied considerable Japanese Army messages which were likewise
turned over to the War Department. However, for some unknown
reason the U.S. Army posts at Tientsin and Manila **failed to profit**
from this wealth of Japanese Army messages."
Note the change of meaning, Safford says Army codes, Mark tries
to pretend Safford says Navy codes.
For those who want to see the actual code, as opposed to an editorial
about how easy it was,
JN-25B
message,
Code groups,
additive key
code plus additive
encrypted text as transmitted,
Geoffrey Sinclair
Mark Willey
Sincliar looks for the "Message to sail" in volume 40 in spite of my
giving the correct volume number (1). Sincliar can't get anything
right even when lead to water. Sincliar, you cannot just open any of
the 40 volumes of the Congressional Report and look for page 181 in
that volume. You have to look in the volume cited, you cretin.
>>Congressional Exhibit 151 -
>>"Com 16's estimates were more reliable than Com 14's,
>>not only because of better radio interception, but because Com
>>16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet
>>Cryptographic System ("5-number code" or "JN25") and was
>>exchanging technical information and translations with the British
>>C. I. Unit at Singapore. "
>
>>"currently reading messages in JN-25" what is so hard to
>>understand about that?
>It is quite simple, reading is being defined as being able to see
>the underlying code groups, not breaking out the messages into
>plain text.
What is your source for this bizarre and counterintuitive fantasy
definition of "reading?" "Is being defined"? Only by you because you
have no idea what you are talking about. You are hallucinating,
Sincliar. You make stuff up. Get out of here, loser!
>"exchanging translations with the British" what is so hard
>about that? Translations mean only one thing = Japanese language
>to English.
>Congratulations on discovering with some 3,000 to 4,000 code
>groups recovered the allies could put words to some code groups
>and were exchanging such information.
And here Sincliar relies on documents just proved to be fakes for his
3,000 to 4000 number!!! We can not expect better from him. He is
hopeless.
*********************
>The fact the references all agree the B version was harder to crack.
>The twin meanings per group, the additional tables for position, date
>and times,
>the larger code book.
What are your sources, Sincliar? Safford never claims B version was
harder to crack. And he is the expert. No one competent has ever
claimed version B is harder to crack. That is ridiculous! B version is
much easier to crack and anyone competent looking at the codebooks
would understand that immediately. But do apologists look at the
codebooks? No, it just would interfere with their story. Sincliar, you
are just a uninformed moron.
***************************
>The very wrong part is Mark trying to pretend Pearl Harbor was kept
>in ignorance about other people's efforts.
Station Hypo was never given RIP 79 - the JN-25B codebook so "kept in
ignorance" is a typically mild characterization by me. Layton and
others say Washington sabotaged their efforts against JN-25B.
*****************************
>There are lots of text in my previous post Mark cannot reply to, here
is a
>good example, Mark's claim and reality, The only occurrence of the
>words "failed to profit" in SRN-149,
>"Later, beginning in 1936, Navy intercept stations in the Far East
>copied considerable Japanese Army messages which were likewise
>turned over to the War Department. However, for some unknown
>reason the U.S. Army posts at Tientsin and Manila **failed to
profit**
>from this wealth of Japanese Army messages."
>Note the change of meaning, Safford says Army codes, Mark tries
>to pretend Safford says Navy codes.
Page 16 says about the period prior to Pearl Harbor and I quote: "We
may summarize by stating that the COMINT organization of the Army and
the Navy worked in perfect coordination during this period and
provided the White House, State Department, Army General Staff and
Naval Operations with authentic, timely, and complete information ...
The failure of the General Staff and Naval Operations to profit from
the same information is beyond the scope of this 'History.' "
"Complete information" - very interesting! My guess is that Sincliar
will tell you this means "incomplete information." I can see it now -
Sincliar - "complete information is being defined as incomplete
information."
**********************
>You see the US has never denied it was decrypting some IJN
>JN-25B traffic, but only small numbers and usually fragments.
Interesting because Budiansky and Jacobsen have
always denied we read anything at all. Period. Two of their three
sources Fabian and Whitlock said we read nothing at all. Period.
Sincliar, you are as sloppy with your allies as you are with the
sources. Get out, loser!
Sinc-liar, what an appropriate name.
Mark Willey
Geoffrey Sinclair
>
>Sincliar looks for the "Message to sail" in volume 40 in spite of my
>giving the correct volume number (1). Sincliar can't get anything
>right even when lead to water. Sincliar, you cannot just open any of
>the 40 volumes of the Congressional Report and look for page 181 in
>that volume. You have to look in the volume cited, you cretin.
It really shows Mark's preferences that he can ensure the mis spelling
of people's names but not provide the evidence. You see Mark has
a problem with the report, since it says
"On November 25 the commander in chief, combined fleet, issued
the following order to the striking force, which had, since November
22, been assembled at Hitokappu bay"
Mark is trying to tell us the order was radioed, the congressional
report does not say that.
The sort of reply Mark makes is amusing since I have just finished
reading an article on work place bullying, noting the people spouting
the insults are the ones with real problems.
Mark has decided to duck most of my points, try to editorialise
them away. The only way to reply is to delete the evidence it
seems, then use insults.
Primary documents appear to be quite effective in reducing Mark's
efforts to push fiction.
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ComInt-2.html#ComInt-9
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/x18-151.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/SRH-149.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Magic/COMINT-CoralSea/PartOne.html
>>>Congressional Exhibit 151 -
>>>"Com 16's estimates were more reliable than Com 14's,
>>>not only because of better radio interception, but because Com
>>>16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet
>>>Cryptographic System ("5-number code" or "JN25") and was
>>>exchanging technical information and translations with the British
>>>C. I. Unit at Singapore. "
>>
>>>"currently reading messages in JN-25" what is so hard to
>>>understand about that?
>
>>It is quite simple, reading is being defined as being able to see
>>the underlying code groups, not breaking out the messages into
>>plain text.
>
>What is your source for this bizarre and counterintuitive fantasy
>definition of "reading?" "Is being defined"? Only by you because you
>have no idea what you are talking about. You are hallucinating,
>Sincliar. You make stuff up. Get out of here, loser!
Mark has a real problem, the only way he can push his ideas is if no
one else is around.
Real simple, the USN defined reading as being able to see the code
system stripped of the encypherments, in JN-25's case the random
numbers, then came decrypting, obtaining the raw text.
>>"exchanging translations with the British" what is so hard
>>about that? Translations mean only one thing = Japanese language
>>to English.
>
>>Congratulations on discovering with some 3,000 to 4,000 code
>>groups recovered the allies could put words to some code groups
>>and were exchanging such information.
The bit deleted,
"Just try and cope with the
fact translation is hard enough but even harder when words
are missing, especially in a context sensitive language like
Japanese. That a major part of the translator's day was trying
to figure out the meanings of code groups
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/x18-151.html
Note Safford says partially readable. Mark is trying to expand the
size of partial. It also has the quote,
"The "5 numeral" system
yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion of
the Pearl Harbor raid, either before or afterward.""
>And here Sincliar relies on documents just proved to be fakes for his
>3,000 to 4000 number!!! We can not expect better from him. He is
>hopeless.
Yes folks, Mark like to declare the documents he does not like as
fakes, he also says you only needed 500 groups anyway to read
the code but cannot accept 4,000. Above all Mark needs to keep
deleting the bits of the document he does not like.
More deleted words, to the next >>
Now the world will wait with baited breath for the definition of
"currently" as applied by Mark. Mark now wants to say the
allies did not read JN-25A currently after 18 months, but did have
this higher level of penetration of the B version after 2 months.
Similar sort of claim, the B version was apparently much much
easier to crack.
Yes folks, Mark needs to pretend the IJN went backwards cryptographically
in order to peddle his fiction. The idea the Japanese actually had people
who understood codes has to be ignored, things like knowing to revise the
code book every 18 months for example, since no code can be 100%
secure.
>>The fact the references all agree the B version was harder to crack.
>>The twin meanings per group, the additional tables for position, date
>>and times, the larger code book.
>
>What are your sources, Sincliar? Safford never claims B version was
>harder to crack. And he is the expert. No one competent has ever
>claimed version B is harder to crack. That is ridiculous! B version is
>much easier to crack and anyone competent looking at the codebooks
>would understand that immediately. But do apologists look at the
>codebooks? No, it just would interfere with their story. Sincliar, you
>are just a uninformed moron.
Translation Mark has declared the B version to be weaker, this is
despite it being a bigger code book, introduced upper case, two
meanings per code group and hatting, a greater randomness
when assigning words to code groups. It also introduced three
extra tables for superencypherment of position, geographic locations
and date/time. The additive book also grew in size.
As for sources about the B code try Smith, The Emperor's Codes,
Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded and in fact just about any book
on the IJN codes, apart from Mark's. It will be interesting to see
the quote where Safford says JN-25A was as easy as B or easier.
More deleted text, to the next >
"The well known fact is quite simple, the Japanese changed the
code book, the number of code groups and their meanings, but not
the random numbers used to disguise the code groups. Hence the
allies, who had recovered a significant number of the random numbers
had 2 months to recover the new 5 digit numbers, very useful when the
random numbers were finally changed. That still left the problem of
turning the numbers into text.
As usual Mark is busy simply changing definitions, from the success
against the A version to the B version, and the success in recovering
the 5 digit code groups to recovering their meanings.
Mark has decided not to back up his claims with references, people
can go back over my previous post and note the problems he has when
the full document is shown.
This is the usual junk, Edwin Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer,
reports the arrival of a copy of the JN-25B code book in early December
and that Pearl was kept fully involved and informed about the other
station's code breaking success, the British, Australian and American
efforts from Colombo to Washington."
>***************************
>>The very wrong part is Mark trying to pretend Pearl Harbor was kept
>>in ignorance about other people's efforts.
More deleted text,
"Mark still has not put up
his wonder 500 group code book he says was all Pearl had."
>Station Hypo was never given RIP 79 - the JN-25B codebook so "kept in
>ignorance" is a typically mild characterization by me. Layton and
>others say Washington sabotaged their efforts against JN-25B.
Mark has Layton as a source, Mark ignores Layton stating that
Pearl received a JN-25 code book in December 1941, and was
kept fully informed about other people's code recoveries.
Layton says Washington disagreed with Pearl over the Midway
operation and took its revenge for being wrong against Rochefort.
If you look at the number of insults Mark has chosen to use in his
no replies, and replaced them 1 for 1 with a code value from his
500 long book then he would be well on the way to publishing the
complete work by now.
More deleted text,
"Mark still has not bothered to inform us whether the code books he
claims to have seen is an allied reconstruction, which stopped in
June 1942, or an IJN original when it comes to his claims about
how big the code book was."
>*****************************
>>There are lots of text in my previous post Mark cannot reply to, here
>>is a good example, Mark's claim and reality, The only occurrence of the
>>words "failed to profit" in SRN-149,
Here is a good example of Mark's need to distort, the above paragraph
has been created by editing out the following text, which goes in between
"reality," and "the only occurrence" above, the full text, to the sssss marker.
Mark's claim and reality,
>SRH-149 says the U.S. Navy "did a thorough
>job" on the Japanese navy codes in 1941 and Safford at the end says
>that the chain of command "failed to profit" from the intelligence
>supplied to them by cryptoanalysis. Reasonable people confronted with
>the statement that someone "failed to profit" from intelligence would
>conclude that there must have been some intelligence that could have
>been profited from.
Mark is having to alter the meaning of his quotes again,
"There were no problems of collaboration between the Army and Navy
for strictly military COMINT matters, as each service was working alone
in its proper sphere of activity. The Navy COMINT team did a thorough
job with respect to the Japanese Navy with no help from the Army. "
Note COMINT, the people doing things like code breaking, traffic
analysis, direction finding, Mark simply changes this to code breakers,
and the output from the IJN to just IJN codes.
The only occurrence of the words "failed to profit" in SRN-149,
>sssss The only occurrence of the words "failed to profit" in SRN-149,
>
>>"Later, beginning in 1936, Navy intercept stations in the Far East
>>copied considerable Japanese Army messages which were likewise
>>turned over to the War Department. However, for some unknown
>>reason the U.S. Army posts at Tientsin and Manila **failed to
>>profit** from this wealth of Japanese Army messages."
>
>>Note the change of meaning, Safford says Army codes, Mark tries
>>to pretend Safford says Navy codes.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/SRH-149.html
Now we have the next attempt to hack a document to make it say
something completely different,
>Page 16 says about the period prior to Pearl Harbor and I quote:
It is actually page 14, and it goes like this the first sentence is,
"The decryption of Japanese Diplomatic messages in Washington
throughout 1941 is now a matter of public knowledge and some 40
volumes comprise the official record."
>"We
>may summarize by stating that the COMINT organization of the Army and
>the Navy worked in perfect coordination during this period and
>provided the White House, State Department, Army General Staff and
>Naval Operations with authentic, timely, and complete information ...
Note the edit by Mark, the three dots, here is what goes into it,
"concerning the Diplomatic Crisis and the mobilization and movements
of Japanese amphibious forces for the conquest of Southeast Asia. The
White House and State Department used this information with consummate
skill."
>The failure of the General Staff and Naval Operations to profit from
>the same information is beyond the scope of this 'History.' "
>
>"Complete information" - very interesting! My guess is that Sincliar
>will tell you this means "incomplete information." I can see it now -
>Sincliar - "complete information is being defined as incomplete
>information."
Actually Mark's guess was clearly in hope that, despite me providing
the URL to the document, I would not be able to pick where he had
deleted the necessary words. Turning diplomatic traffic to military,
moves in south east Asia to Hawaii. Standard stuff really.
>**********************
>>You see the US has never denied it was decrypting some IJN
>>JN-25B traffic, but only small numbers and usually fragments.
>
>Interesting because Budiansky and Jacobsen have
>always denied we read anything at all. Period. Two of their three
>sources Fabian and Whitlock said we read nothing at all. Period.
>Sincliar, you are as sloppy with your allies as you are with the
>sources. Get out, loser!
Translation, Mark simply decides to misrepresent people's words,
from when they were talking about complete signals versus words
or phrases found while cracking the meanings of groups.
>Sinc-liar, what an appropriate name.
Mark needs to insult, rather than answer for his fiction.
Must be hard Mark, being stuck with the legacy of carrying on your
fathers' hates. Trying to sell junk conspiracy claims to a generation
that thinks Gulf War I is ancient history, Vietnam over what the
politicians did when young, the target audience being more and more
made up of people who know you are pushing fiction, the devoted few
becoming fewer and realising how little value for money the conspiracy
is. Leaving only the "all Americans are the source of all evil" crowd to
sell to, instead of the preferred "some Americans are the source of all
evil" straw man your father bought into. The propagandists aiming at
the current generation are busy inventing their own conspiracy theories
for current day events, not those from 60 years ago, they sell better.
JN-25B
message,
Code groups,
additive key
code plus additive
encrypted text as transmitted,
You see the US has never denied it was decrypting some IJN
JN-25B traffic, but only small numbers and usually fragments.
Figure out the settings for Purple and out dropped Japanese,
al kirke
> Mark Willey wrote in message ...
> >"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
news:<c212jo$ul7$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au>...
> >
> >Sincliar looks for the "Message to sail" in volume 40 in spite of my
> >giving the correct volume number (1). Sincliar can't get anything
> >right even when lead to water. Sincliar, you cannot just open any of
> >the 40 volumes of the Congressional Report and look for page 181 in
> >that volume. You have to look in the volume cited, you cretin.
>
> It really shows Mark's preferences that he can ensure the mis spelling
> of people's names but not provide the evidence. You see Mark has
> a problem with the report, since it says
>
> "On November 25 the commander in chief, combined fleet, issued
> the following order to the striking force, which had, since November
> 22, been assembled at Hitokappu bay"
>
> Mark is trying to tell us the order was radioed, the congressional
> report does not say that.
>
> The sort of reply Mark makes is amusing since I have just finished
> reading an article on work place bullying, noting the people spouting
> the insults are the ones with real problems.
>
> Mark has decided to duck most of my points, try to editorialise
> them away. The only way to reply is to delete the evidence it
> seems, then use insults.
>
> Primary documents appear to be quite effective in reducing
> Mark's efforts to push fiction.
Mr. Sinclair
Robert Stinnett, in his book Day of Deceit, writes on page 45 that
the radio logs of Station H, on Hawaii, show that on November 25,
1941, Yamamoto sent two dispatches to the First Air Fleet, anchored
at Hitokappu Bay. The messages are what we have come to know as
the Order to Sail and sink the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Sincliar, you are correct when you write that the congressional
report does not say the order to sail was radioed. Stinnet agrees
because he writes on page 45 that:
"- all were excluded from the many investigations that took place
from 1941 to 1946 and the congressional probe of 1995 -"
Stinnet gives us his Primary Document cites on the Order to
Sail on page 322 of his book, to wit:
"For Yamamoto's first dispatch see two sources:
(1) Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p.87 (2) Captain E. M. Trapnell, USN,
Captain J. S. Russell, USN, and Lieutenant Commander
J. A. Field, Jr., USNR, eds., The Campaigns of the Pacific
War (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Naval Analyis
Division, USGPO Washington, 1946) p.50
For Yamamoto's second dispatch, see Wallin, Pearl Harbor
p. 86, Campaigns, supra. The Wallin version is reproduced
in Appendix D of this book.
Could you please verify for us Stinnett's Primary Document
cites in Wallin?
Al
- Big snip. -
David Thornley
That book is thoroughly untrustworthy. If you compare the
footnotes with what is actually said, you will find that Stinnett
says a great many things without support.
writes on page 45 that
>the radio logs of Station H, on Hawaii, show that on November 25,
>1941, Yamamoto sent two dispatches to the First Air Fleet, anchored
>at Hitokappu Bay. The messages are what we have come to know as
>the Order to Sail and sink the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.
>
That's what he writes. It doesn't mean that his sources support
that. He provides no quotes from his source that indicate that
the message was transmitted by radio.
>Mr. Sincliar, you are correct when you write that the congressional
>report does not say the order to sail was radioed. Stinnet agrees
>because he writes on page 45 that:
> "- all were excluded from the many investigations that took place
> from 1941 to 1946 and the congressional probe of 1995 -"
>
Stinnett provides no evidence of this.
>Stinnet gives us his Primary Document cites on the Order to
>Sail on page 322 of his book, to wit:
>
>"For Yamamoto's first dispatch see two sources:
>(1) Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p.87 (2) Captain E. M. Trapnell, USN,
>Captain J. S. Russell, USN, and Lieutenant Commander
>J. A. Field, Jr., USNR, eds., The Campaigns of the Pacific
>War (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Naval Analyis
>Division, USGPO Washington, 1946) p.50
>
>For Yamamoto's second dispatch, see Wallin, Pearl Harbor
>p. 86, Campaigns, supra. The Wallin version is reproduced
>in Appendix D of this book.
>
The reproduction is of the text. Stinnett quotes absolutely
*nothing* that would indicate that the message was radioed.
It would be in keeping with Stinnett's practice to quote a source
that gives the text of the document, and then make up a reference
to its interception.
>Could you please verify for us Stinnett's Primary Document
>cites in Wallin?
>
Wallin's book was written in 1968, and is not in any sense a primary
source document. Wallin appears to have been involved with the
battleship California during the attack.
Since it was published by the Navy, I looked at Navy sources, and
found nothing similar on the list of radio intercepts at
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/ComInt-A.html
The Navy website notes that these messages were read after the war.
I don't have a copy of Wallin's book, and don't really see why I
should hunt it down. Stinnett gives me no reason to believe that
Wallin confirms that the message was sent by radio, and there are
good reasons to think it would not have been. The Japanese were
aware of radio security, and there was a telegraph line going to
that bay.
Geoffrey Sinclair
al kirke wrote in message ...
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>news:c23kkh$18p$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
(snip)
>Mr. Sinclair
>Robert Stinnett, in his book Day of Deceit, writes on page 45 that
>the radio logs of Station H, on Hawaii, show that on November 25,
>1941, Yamamoto sent two dispatches to the First Air Fleet, anchored
>at Hitokappu Bay. The messages are what we have come to know as
>the Order to Sail and sink the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.
>
>Mr. Sincliar,
Watch the spelling Al, otherwise it shows you need to insult, rather
than present evidence.
>you are correct when you write that the congressional
>report does not say the order to sail was radioed. Stinnet agrees
>because he writes on page 45 that:
> "- all were excluded from the many investigations that took place
> from 1941 to 1946 and the congressional probe of 1995 -"
Al, how can Mark quote the page in the Congressional investigation
where the order to sail is reproduced and then Stinnett tell us all the
message was excluded from the Congressional investigation?
Oh yes, the USSBS was published, available for people to read.
By the way if you really want to have us believe Stinnett is the
authority check out his page 324 of his hardcover edition
where he states "There is no reliable evidence, found by the
author, that establishes how much of the 5 - Num [JN25]
could be deciphered, translated and read by naval cryptographers
in 1941". Now go back and read the book where it assumes,
his opinion, his assumption, the USN could read the signals
Stinnett wants them to have read, including the ones he tries
to pretend were sent by radio instead of hand delivered.
Stinnett has no idea what the USN could read, he simply gives
his opinion.
>Stinnet gives us his Primary Document cites on the Order to
>Sail on page 322 of his book, to wit:
>
>"For Yamamoto's first dispatch see two sources:
>(1) Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p.87 (2) Captain E. M. Trapnell, USN,
>Captain J. S. Russell, USN, and Lieutenant Commander
>J. A. Field, Jr., USNR, eds., The Campaigns of the Pacific
>War (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Naval Analyis
>Division, USGPO Washington, 1946) p.50
>
>For Yamamoto's second dispatch, see Wallin, Pearl Harbor
>p. 86, Campaigns, supra. The Wallin version is reproduced
>in Appendix D of this book.
>
>Could you please verify for us Stinnett's Primary Document
>cites in Wallin?
Al, last time I checked I was not a reference for those who do not
bother to follow up on information given to them two years ago.
This is from December 2001, in reply to Al back then, the key
section is reproduced, then the full review.
"It gets worse for Stinnett's argument. On pp. 45-47, Stinnett
supposedly uncovers four radio dispatches---two by Nagano and two
by Yamamoto---that were "intercepted" and decoded, and thus
warned FDR (but not Kimmel) that the Japanese fleet was on the
move. Virtually all of Stinnett's thesis hangs on these four intercepts
indicating that the Japanese did not keep radio silence. It is the
lynchpin of his "new" information, and the core of his book. No
originals exist, but rather, Stinnett's source for this "new" information
is "two US naval histories: Pearl Harbor by Vice Admiral Homer N.
Wallin and The Campaigns of the Pacific War prepared by the . . .
Strategic Bombing Survey." Wallin's source was the 1979 Pearl
Harbor hearings, which referenced the Navy's History Section.
Both of these came from a November 29, 1945 document produced
by the History Section, based on October 1945 interviews with
principal Japanese actors!
Let's reconstruct this: Stinnett cites Wallin, who cites the Hearings,
which cite the History Section's "reconstructions" with Japanese
four years after the incident. Even then, the Strategic Bombing survey,
cited in the classic book by Gordon Prange, et. al., At Dawn We Slept,
quotes the Strategic Bombing survey as saying that none of the four
were transmitted by radio and that all four messages were
hand-delivered. This is confirmed by virtually all of the Japanese
participants, including Genda, in repeated interviews. Stinnett's key
evidence then---which is hardly new, and has been in the open for
years---is that there is no "new" evidence, and that the Hitokappu
Bay message was hand delivered. Had Stinnett traced the citations
back, to use his waffle terms, it's hard to believe that he would have
relied on this as evidence of anything."
Now the full review.
Robert B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl
Harbor. New York. Free Press, 2000. 388 pp, xiv. ISBN
0-684-85339-6. $26.00 hardcover.
Reviewed by Larry Schweikart, University of Dayton
This is a difficult review to write for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is that I detest what Franklin D. Roosevelt did to the
United States by introducing the welfare state mentality. Only in the
1990s---60 years after the New Deal---did the nation start to undo
some of the damage inflicted on the economic and social institutions
by FDR's ultra-liberal policies. Nevertheless, while FDR is guilty of
many sins, "setting up" the 7th U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941
to as to slip the United States into war through the "back door" is
not one of them.
Robert Stinnett could have had an important book, a respected
book, and an influential book. To do that, he would have had to
stuck to the facts as he had them, and possibly even re- title the
book something like, How Intelligence Operations Might Have
Averted Disaster at Pearl. Nevertheless, Stinnett, who is not a
trained historian, did an admirable job of collecting and analyzing
---to a point---new data, and organizing it to tell a story. Unfortunately,
it appears he had the story he wanted to tell mapped out in advance,
and whittled, pushed, and squeezed every piece of information into
its pre-determined hole so as to complete his mosaic.
The story? Obviously, from the title, that Franklin Roosevelt, acting
on the memo of a Navy captain, diabolically plotted an intricate plan
to maneuver the Empire of Japan into war in 1941. The Japanese
dutifully obliged, coincidentally responding to every Roosevelt initiative
like puppets on a string. Further, Stinnett argues, Roosevelt, having
goaded Japan to fire the first shot, sat on critical intelligence that
normally would have gone to the commanders in Hawaii, Gen. Walter
Short and Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, thereby deliberately and devilishly
hanging U.S. soldiers and sailors out as fodder to pump up the
emotional turbines of the American electorate for a war the people
really did not want.
If this sounds familiar, it should. It was the basis for the Millis/Tansill
"Back Door to War" theories several decades ago, which were
revived by "pop" historian John Toland in the 1980s with his book
Infamy. After an initial burst of publicity, Infamy was subsequently
torpedoed (pardon the pun) by the work of the late Gordon Prange
and his students, Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon. Toland's
chief witness for the prosecution, it seems, "Seaman Z," was
tracked down by Goldstein and Dillon and repudiated most of
what Toland ascribed to him.
But just as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has provided
a literal gold mine for John Kennedy assassination researchers, so
too has it opened the door for further Pearl Harbor revisionism. It is
to the author of FOIA, appropriately, that Stinnett dedicates his book.
There is no question that Stinnett has unearthed a boxcar load of
documents previously unseen by most Americans. His familiarity
with the markings of radio transmissions and his analysis of who
could have known what is impressive and may have been valuable
in another context. Lacking a historian's perspective, however,
Stinnett fails to perform one of the most basic elements of historical
research, namely to follow the footnotes. It leads him to a disastrous
trap, which I will develop in detail.
Stinnett's lack of historical training also produces a tunnel vision
that sees one potential path of actions (among many thousands) as
the only possible route that could have unfolded. The result is that at
every critical point where Stinnett prepares the reader for a "gotcha"
of FDR, he aborts his mission, employing a host of "mush" terms that
reveal that in fact has does not have the incriminating evidence that
his title purports to contain. I have counted at least 23 such term uses,
but I am sure there are many more that I missed. Among them:
*(introduction, xiv) "The commanders in Hawaii . . . were deprived of
intelligence that might have made them more alert to risks entailed
in Roosevelt's policy . . . ." Would it made them more "alert" or not? How so?
*(5) Journalist Edward Murrow, commenting on what "he and Murrow
were told by FDR" "hinted" at a "tantalizing" conclusion: "The
President's surprise [at the attack] was not as great as that of other
men around him. Nor was the attack unwelcome." Then Stinnett
admits, "Any conclusion about the Murrow meeting must remain
speculative." Oh? So why report it?
*(9) "The paper trail of the McCollum memo ends with the Knox
endorsement. Although the proposal was addressed to Anderson, no
specific record has been found by the author indicating whether he or
Roosevelt actually saw it." Yet Stinnett builds much of his early case
on the McCollum memo, which we will have more to say about later.
Why bother, when there is no proof FDR "actually saw it?"
*(9) "Throughout 1941, it seems, providing Japan into an overt act
of war was the principal policy that guided FDR's actions toward
Japan." Was this the policy, or not? Can you prove it?
*(9) "Roosevelt's 素ingerprints' can be found on each of McCollum's
proposals." Yet Stinnett has no proof FDR "actually saw it." So
Roosevelt must have handled it without seeing it.
*(10) "Action D [of the McCollum memo] was very risky and could
have resulted in a loss of American lives approaching that of Pearl
Harbor. In the end, however, no shots were fired . . . ." So there are
alternatives to a single-path of history after all!
*(12) "There is no evidence that Admiral Kimmel knew of the action
plans advanced by McCollum, because Admiral Richardson never
told him of them." This raises an incredible possibility that Stinnett
appears not to have considered: if Kimmel had known of the "action
plans" (if, indeed, such things did exist, and which FDR saw---which
Stinnett says he cannot prove), would Kimmel have enthusiastically
gone along with them? In retrospect, Kimmel supporters portray him
as "set up." In reality, did he feel "left out?"
*(14) "A link to some of McCollum's provocations surfaced earlier
in 1940 but did not produce a written directive." Or, in plainspeak,
either no one saw McCollum's memo, or the people who did see
it did not act on it.
*(17) Referring to FDR's statement to members of his staff that
"If somebody attacks us, then it isn't a foreign war, is it?" Stinnett
writes, "McCollum's eight-action memo would soon make the
President's words a reality." This is where the revisionists fail to
realize what they are really saying: The "eight-action memo did
not make the President's words a reality," the Japanese Imperial
Fleet did! The most astounding side-effect of the revisionists'
arguments is to completely excuse the Japanese for any role in
Pearl Harbor. (Toland ends his book by blaming FDR for the
presence of nuclear weapons and for the Cold War that resulted
from, as he saw it, the use of the atomic bombs on Japan . . . by Truman.)
*(35) Director Walter S. Anderson, the head of the Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI) "obviously believed in the McCollum
strategy and went to Hawaii knowing of the risks inherent in
increasing American pressure on a militant Japan." First, Stinnett
oes not know what Anderson "believed," and second, his
comments virtually apologize for "increasing pressure" on "poow
wittle Japan," whom he admits was "militant." But the kicker
comes in the next sentence. Again, on p. 35, Stinnett writes, "Yet
in an oral-history interview conducted by Columbia University in
March 1962, he [Anderson] claimed to know nothing of the
Richardson-Roosevelt discussion concerning keeping the fleet
in Hawaiian waters." It appears as an interpreter of thoughts,
Stinnett knows what Anderson "obviously believed," despite
what the man himself "claimed."
*(37) "Had he been briefed, Kimmel could have requested that
Purple decryptions be sent to him from either Washington or
Corregidor." Or, he could not have. The man who did not put up
long range reconnaissance, who did not coordinate well with
General Short, who did not have the fleet on full alert despite
numerous and abundantly clear warnings, who did not have
torpedo nets up---that admiral would "have requested"
decryptions if only he had been briefed.
*(44) Dutch naval attache Johan Ranneft, monitoring Japanese
fleet movements for the Dutch, reported in a diary that he had
plotted carrier groups, but had one unnamed port location.
"Ranneft's unnamed port could only be Hitokappu Bay . . . ."
Stinnett goes on to say "There was no way Ranneft could mistake
the southern Japanese carrier movement for an eastern foray."
*(48) "Dropping 践itokappu Bay' from the typewritten summary
may have been done deliberately to conceal American success
in decoding Japanese naval communications." Or, it may not
have been done deliberately. I will say more on this key message later.
*(96) "It is quite possible that Director [J. Edgar] Hoover learned
he was excluded from the Tsu intercepts and, in a state of pique,
planted the espionage questions directed at FDR with favored
White House reporters." It is also possible, if one believes
Anthony Summers, that Hoover was involved in trying on new
dresses. Either is as equally likely . . . or unlikely.
*(96) "The prickly FBI director was offended when he was refused
access to secret naval communications documents. FBI censorship
still veils the full details, but apparently Navy codebreakers refused
to share Japanese intercepts, including the Tsu reports, with
Hoover." We don't know, do we, because "FBI censorship still veils
the full details" . . . or not.
*(97) "Though there is no proof that he saw the Tsu reports,
[Hoover] continued to forward evidence of the Japanese espionage
at Honolulu to "Berle." There is "no proof" that Hoover saw the Tsu
reports, and there is no proof that FDR saw the McCollum memo.
What else can the author share that he has no proof of? I have no
proof that UFOs exist, or that unicorns live in Dayton, Ohio. Is that
grounds for a book---"The Unicorn Deception?"
*(134) "How much was disclosed to Admiral Kimmel and the
White House [by the codebreakers] is obscured by continued US
censorship." This tack gets old. The author is plenty eager to pat
himself on the back for using FOIA to obtain some documents, but
retreats to the "censorship" canard when the documents he does
get don't make his case.
*(136) "Admiral Kimmel's war plans staff should have been
alarmed by the arrival of a Japanese invasion force south of Wake
Island." Certainly, the staffers would have been less alarmed than
the Wake Islanders. But I could just as easily argue that the staff
"should have been relieved" that the fleet wasn't south of Oahu.
*(136) Commander Vincent R. Murphy was "the man who was
responsible for evaluating Japanese intentions" as the assistant
war plans officer for Kimmel. "Murphy attended major meetings
with America's top naval brass [who? how 奏op'?] while in
Washington in late 1940, which suggests that he learned of FDR's
policy of 鼠et Japan commit the first act of war.'" While working with
the U.S. Air Force, I hung out with some of the "top brass" (generals,
colonels, and Senior Executive Service-types) related to aerospace
transport programs. How much do you think I learned from them
about strategic bomber programs? Or about policies related to
"no-fly" zones in Iraq?
*(136) Stinnett follows these two "shoulda/wouldas" with a third on
the same page: "It is unreasonable to believe [Adm.] Richardson
[Kimmel's superior] did not convey Roosevelt's policy to his top
aide---Murphy." Now Stinnett has two degrees of separation from
reality: he has no proof that Murphy knew and he has not proof that
Richardson told him, and he cites both as evidence to the contrary!
*(145) "Neither Kimmel nor his family ever mentioned the mysterious
sortie and the sudden recall from the North Pacific waters." But
Stinnett thinks this sortie important enough to dwell on at length.
*(168) After stating that "the Kimmel-Bloch-Rochefort alert of
November 25 is the only intelligence report generated by Station
HYPO that can be linked to President Roosevelt," on the following
page he backtracks, saying "Tracing the Navy's copy of the HYPO
message to the White House during this time frame is difficult." He
then spends the remainder of the paragraph explaining that he
cannot prove that this alert "can be linked to President Roosevelt."
*(207) Edwin Layton, responding to a comment by Kimmel, "may
not have been completely frank. . . . He then expanded the falsification."
So is it a lack of frankness, or an outright falsification? The answer
comes soon enough when we learn that Joseph Rochefort is in on
the plot: "Rochefort . . . backed up Layton . . . ."
There are other similar "mush phrases" I could cite, but the reader,
no doubt, gets the point. Other, arguably more serious, problems
abound. Stinnett has more than a few substantial contradictions in
his Stinnett thesis. He admits that "American agencies from whom
the oil is bought [by Japan] go ahead and make suitable
arrangements with government authorities in Washington," (19), and
calls the oil-licensing system a "sham." The embargo, he points out,
did not work between July 1940 and April 1941, but, of course,
"McCollum's proposals had not yet been adopted." (19) So that
explains it! The proposals by a mid-level navy officer, that Stinnett
has no proof were ever seen by FDR, had "not yet been adopted."
Yet a few pages later, Stinnett tells us that "Japan's initial planning
for the attack began in the fall of 1940, about a month after McCollum's
action recommendations were sent to the White House." (30) So the
oil embargo had nothing to do with Japan's decision to prepare the
Pearl Harbor attack, and the McCollum memo had nothing to do
with it, since it had only been a month and nothing in the McCollum
memo---[which Stinnett cannot prove FDR even saw----possibly
could have been approved, let alone acted on, by the President!
This alone is a fatal blow to Stinnett's argument (but, believe it or
not, hardly the worst error). The onus for war was clearly on Japan.
Planning already started no matter what FDR did, or whose advice
he took. But this is, in essence, working backward. Stinnett's thesis
falls apart right from the start, when he rolls the dice, as it were, on
a memo by Lt. Commander Arthur H. McCollum, the head of the
Far East desk of ONI.
McCollum's five-page memo of October 1940 (which Stinnett calls
the "eight-action memo") was a blueprint for starting a war with
Japan, and, more important, inciting Japan to "fire the first shot."
Stinnett places incredible stock in the notion that a mid-level
commander in an intelligence agency---and only one of several---
somehow had the ear of the President of the United States. Intel
groups generate these memos by the hundreds and few, if any,
ever directly end up in the hands of the President. Indeed, in the 20th
century, one would be hard pressed to name any large-scale public
initiative---let alone manipulating a foreign power into a war---that
was the work of a mid-level military officer. Possibly the closest
anyone could come would be the Iran-Contra Affair, which is a pretty
far cry from provoking an enemy into bombing American soil. It has
already been established that Stinnett cannot prove Roosevelt, or
Kimmel, or even Murphy, ever saw the memo, and we know that
although Anderson denied hearing anything about the "eight-action"
plan in a January 1941 meeting between Richardson and Roosevelt,
which, to Stinnett, is proof that he in fact did know about it! (35)
One of the most egregious errors, though, is that Stinnett fails to
mention that it was prohibited by the Navy's regulations for an
officer to sent any memo forward without sending it first to his
superiors, including copies to his superiors, including Adm. Kimmel.
One of the central lynchpins of Stinnett's argument---that FDR was
engaged in manipulation behind Kimmel's back- --thus collapses.
Where Stinnett could have made a valuable contribution---in the
unearthing of various intercepts of radio broadcasts on November
25, and, at the latest, on November 26, while the Japanese fleet
was still in Japan---he fritters away through a failure to appreciate
the big picture within which not only the intelligence groups, but all
the Pacific armed forces, were operating. The crux of the issue
was this: while many of the intercepts show movement, and
although the Japanese carriers were known to be at sea,
Stinnett's own evidence time and again suggests that they were
thought to be heading south. When viewed in the understanding of
Japanese naval capabilities of the day, it is easy to see why no
one took seriously an attack on Pearl Harbor at that time: Japan
did the impossible, conducting three major simultaneous
amphibious or attack operations in Singapore, the Philippines,
and Pearl Harbor. Most military authorities would admit that the
United States, today, with all its vast capabilities could not pull
off such a feat. When combined with the chronic underestimation
of Japanese prowess, there is little doubt that any messages of
ships at sea were taken as feints and decoys for the "main attack"
at Singapore.
Rochefort's dispatch of November 26 makes this clear: while the
Japanese fleet was on the move, intelligence "INDICAT[s] STRONG
FORCE COMPONENT MAY BE PREPARING TO OPERATE IN
SOUTH EASTERN ASIA WHILE PARTS MAY OPERATE FROM . . .
MARSHALLS" (166). This is anything but confirmation that the fleet
was headed to Pearl! Captain Duane Whitlock, as Stinnett confirms
denies that any message spelling out Hitokappu Bay was ever sent.
But even if it was, this was only the staging area, and as such did
not lock the Japanese into moving in any predetermined direction.
It gets worse for Stinnett's argument. On pp. 45-47, Stinnett
supposedly uncovers four radio dispatches---two by Nagano and two
by Yamamoto---that were "intercepted" and decoded, and thus
warned FDR (but not Kimmel) that the Japanese fleet was on the
move. Virtually all of Stinnett's thesis hangs on these four intercepts
indicating that the Japanese did not keep radio silence. It is the
lynchpin of his "new" information, and the core of his book. No
originals exist, but rather, Stinnett's source for this "new" information
is "two US naval histories: Pearl Harborby Vice Admiral Homer N.
Wallin and The Campaigns of the Pacific War prepared by the . . .
Strategic Bombing Survey." Wallin's source was the 1979 Pearl
Harbor hearings, which referenced the Navy's History Section.
Both of these came from a November 29, 1945 document produced
by the History Section, based on October 1945 interviews with
principal Japanese actors!
Let's reconstruct this: Stinnett cites Wallin, who cites the Hearings,
which cite the History Section's "reconstructions" with Japanese
four years after the incident. Even then, the Strategic Bombing survey,
cited in the classic book by Gordon Prange, et. al., At Dawn We Slept,
quotes the Strategic Bombing survey as saying that none of the four
were transmitted by radio and that all four messages were
hand-delivered. This is confirmed by virtually all of the Japanese
participants, including Genda, in repeated interviews. Stinnett's key
evidence then---which is hardly new, and has been in the open for
years---is that there is no "new" evidence, and that the Hitokappu
Bay message was hand delivered. Had Stinnett traced the citations
back, to use his waffle terms, it's hard to believe that he would have
relied on this as evidence of anything.
What about the decrpytions of 120+ other "radio transmissions" that
Stinnett claims to have found from various fuel tankers and other ships?
These messages may well have been intercepted, but most were not
translated until after the war (and certainly not in December 1941).
Keeping in mind that the intelligence sources were looking for a task
force heading toward Singapore, any information not fitting into that
template was delayed in translation, then analysis. Here, I again will
defer to Stinnett's waffle language, and say, it is not clear if any of the
radio decryptions were actually translated, and if they were, if they
were then sent to Washington or to Kimmel. Of course, Stinnett
cannot prove that they were---only that they were intercepted.
Historians of Pearl Harbor are well familiar with the evidence that
surfaced in the mid-1980s about the information Duskow Popov gave
the FBI on a microdot, which the FBI then for the most part ignored.
This is the same scenario.
Moreover, the notion that Kimmel, if only properly warned, would
have taken action is, to use Stinnett's phraseology, difficult to believe.
Rochefort told Kimmel on October 22 that Japan was in the midst of
a large-scale "screening maneuver," and while Hitokappu Bay
references were deleted from the messages passed to Kimmel to
conceal American decoding successes, Stinnett again takes this as
denying the Admiral critical information. But Stinnett misses the key
phrases---it wasn't the starting point that was important, it was the
"screening" mission that convinced Kimmel and everyone else that
this fleet was not a threat to Pearl. Stinnett misses the significance
of the December 2 decrypt. While making the case we had in fact
cracked the code, he ignores the fleet moves "thus implying a move
from Japan proper to the south." On my Rand- McNally, Hawaii is
due east of Japan. Singapore is south.
There is other evidence that even had Kimmel had more information,
he wouldn't have known what to do with it. RCA messages were
delivered to Kimmel by David Sarnoff: "Though made personally
aware of the RCA messages by Sarnoff's visit, neither Kimmel nor
Short ever took an interest in them" (108). Stinnett notes that Gen.
Short waited two days for a photo plane to have machine guns
installed before sending it out on patrol. But what about all the PBYs
and other long-range aircraft that could have made visual reconnaissance?
Characterizing Kimmel and Short as "watch[ing] helplessly" while the
[Japanese] ships steamed into position," neither dispatched any subs,
long-range ground-based air, or even a destroyer or two to patrol the
region they (according to Stinnett) were so concerned about.
This takes us to the last significant point, namely the recall of the
U.S. carriers that Kimmel had sent to the "intended Japanese launch
site" (145) Washington "issued directives that caused Kimmel to
quickly order the Pacific Fleet out of the North Pacific and back to
its anchorages in Pearl Harbor." (145) Although Stinnett includes
a monstrous endnote section, little is said about exactly what was
in these "directives." But let's use his tactic and imagine we know.
Likely it was something along the lines of: "Get those carriers, which
have no battleship or submarine support, and which are our only
naval air assets in the Pacific, back where they can be protected
from submarine attacks." On page 148, Stinnett explains that the
U.S. was outnumbered four to one in carriers alone. If viewed in this
light, Stinnett's amazement that "neither Admiral Kimmel nor his
family ever mentioned the mysterious sortie and the sudden
recall . . . ." I should hope not! It indicates that Kimmel realized he
may have exposed the carrier fleet to an ambush at sea.
On November 28, Adm. Betty Stark told Kimmel in no uncertain
terms to take all due precautions: "THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT
REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A
COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR
DEFENSE . . . YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO UNDERTAKE
SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES YOU
DEEM NECESSARY . . . ." (172) Stark's only caveat was not to
"alarm" the civilian population. Based on these instructions,
Stinnett concluded Kimmel was "handcuffed." (173).
Other contradictions and flat-out errors abound. A central point in
the Stinnett thesis is that Adm. Anderson was promoted shortly
before December 1941 to act as FDR's "enforcement" mechanism.
But Anderson's own oral history, and national biographical sources
confirm, that he was promoted in July 1936, and he attributed his
position as a demotion based on a falling out with Frank Knox.
If Anderson was friendly with FDR, it doesn't come through in his oral history.
There are still more inconsistencies and errors. On page 146,
Stinnett calls it a "bizarre series of coincidences" that Yamamoto
and Kimmel both selected the identical launch area as the most
desirable from which to attack Pearl Harbor, then on 147 he tells
us that "naval war planning had always contemplated a Japanese
carrier raid aimed at Hawaii from the North Pacific." After 100+
pages explaining how Kimmel was denied information, Stinnett
eproduces a message from Admiral Royal Ingersoll indicating an
attack was possible "in any direction" INCLUDING ATTACK ON
PHILIPPINES OR GUAM. . . ." Again, Rochefort's November 26
intercept warned of a Japanese fleet "PREPARING TO OPERATE
IN SOUTH EASTERN ASIA." To repeat: in the context of what
intelligence sources knew about Japanese capabilities, any attack
on the Philippines or South Eastern Asia would exclude a strike
anywhere else. He describes the vessels at Pearl as "27-year-old
relics of World War I," yet every one of the ships sunk (except the
Arizona) returned to action in World War II.
Stinnett's single most important contribution is the revelation that the
Japanese transmitted in the open late on November 25 or early on
November 26. If this is "breaking radio silence," it is pretty flimsy stuff.
The overarching issue remains clear, though. Data must be analyzed in
a variety of contexts. Intelligence efforts at codebreaking were superb
prior to Pearl Harbor, but the context in which they were placed was
obsolete---a Japanese Empire capable of only one large-scale
operation. Perhaps if other areas of intelligence about Japan's
capabilities, and intentions, were better, a surprise attack would have
been averted.
But the key fact remains: Japan intended to attack Pearl Harbor,
surprise or not, and as John Toland showed, fully expected to find
the ships under way, all guns blazing. Japanese documents reveal
that planners there anticipated losing 30% of the entire Pearl Harbor
task force! This makes clear that nothing Kimmel, or FDR, could
have done would have forestalled the December 7 strike. Even if
Kimmel and Short had been better prepared and fully informed, it
only would have changed the finally tally, not the outcome.
End of quote
al kirke
> This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news
server.
>
> al kirke wrote in message ...
> >"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
> >news:c23kkh$18p$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
>
> (snip)
>
> >Mr. Sinclair
> >Robert Stinnett, in his book Day of Deceit, writes on page 45 that
> >the radio logs of Station H, on Hawaii, show that on November 25,
> >1941, Yamamoto sent two dispatches to the First Air Fleet, anchored
> >at Hitokappu Bay. The messages are what we have come to know as
> >the Order to Sail and sink the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.
> >
> >Mr. Sincliar,
>
> Watch the spelling Al, otherwise it shows you need to insult, rather
> than present evidence.
Suppose I told you that there could well have been a telegraph
cable from Kokkaido to Etrov Island, which contains Hitokappu
Bay, but that it was a comercial link, and not a secure military
resource. Would you ask us to believe that Yamamoto would
send his dispatches over an insecure civilian undersea cable rather
than use his encripted military radio?
> >you are correct when you write that the congressional
> >report does not say the order to sail was radioed. Stinnet agrees
> >because he writes on page 45 that:
> > "- all were excluded from the many investigations that took place
> > from 1941 to 1946 and the congressional probe of 1995 -"
>
> Al, how can Mark quote the page in the Congressional investigation
> where the order to sail is reproduced and then Stinnett tell us all the
> message was excluded from the Congressional investigation?
How about Stinnett's being in error, and Mark is correct? Would
you argue that?
> Oh yes, the USSBS was published, available for people to read.
>
> By the way if you really want to have us believe Stinnett is the
> authority check out his page 324 of his hardcover edition
> where he states "There is no reliable evidence, found by the
> author, that establishes how much of the 5 - Num [JN25]
> could be deciphered, translated and read by naval cryptographers
> in 1941". Now go back and read the book where it assumes,
> his opinion, his assumption, the USN could read the signals
> Stinnett wants them to have read, including the ones he tries
> to pretend were sent by radio instead of hand delivered.
> Stinnett has no idea what the USN could read, he simply gives
> his opinion.
You're playing sophistry with us. The question is not how much
could be read, 0% to 100%, but whether or not enough could
be read to be militarily useful, and as a percentage of the code
book that might not be very much. The issue then is how much
of the code needed to be read in order to extract the meaning
of the dispatch, right?
Willey tells us that he has the codebook Rocheford used to plan
Nimit's Midway campaign, and it has 413 code book values. So
that small number of book values was sufficient for that purpose.
You are invited to dispute the code book issue with him.
> >Stinnet gives us his Primary Document cites on the Order to
> >Sail on page 322 of his book, to wit:
> >
> >"For Yamamoto's first dispatch see two sources:
> >(1) Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p.87 (2) Captain E. M. Trapnell, USN,
> >Captain J. S. Russell, USN, and Lieutenant Commander
> >J. A. Field, Jr., USNR, eds., The Campaigns of the Pacific
> >War (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Naval Analyis
> >Division, USGPO Washington, 1946) p.50
> >
> >For Yamamoto's second dispatch, see Wallin, Pearl Harbor
> >p. 86, Campaigns, supra. The Wallin version is reproduced
> >in Appendix D of this book.
> >
> >Could you please verify for us Stinnett's Primary Document
> >cites in Wallin?
-Snip some olde stuff-
Schweikart is the author of the review of Stinnet's book
that follows. What he does in the review is complain
about errors and inadequacies in the book. So what?
The book is a massive effort and contains a huge amount
of information. Rather than complain about shortcomings,
we can learn from elements in the book that must be sound.
Some of these are important and easily found, such as:
The radio log of the S.S. Lurline is mentioned on p.279 of
Toland's book, Infamy, where he writes that on the nights
of Dec. 1, 2, and 3, the radio operators of the liner copied
Japanese military traffic on the "lower marine bands" for
many hours. And when the ship docked in Honolulu, they
turned their radio log over to USN Capt. Mayfield.
The next time I read of the S.S. Lurline's radio log was on
p.198 of Stinnett, where he writes that sometime in the 1970's
somebody removed the log from the National Archives, and
that the withdrawal slip isn't signed or dated. Just imagine
what the late fee must be.
A big item in Stinnett is on p. 211, where he tells us of Station
VICTOR, a Navy D/F station at Pago Pago in Ameriican
Samoa, and that 300 pages of RDF fixes from VICTOR
originated between July and December 1941 are in Archives
II in Maryland. When the DF reports from VICTOR and the
other RFD stations are made public they will show the
triangulated day by day positions of the Japanese ships
during that time perion, and the question of japanese naval
dispatch code decription becomes irrelevant.
Schweikart writes:
> Nevertheless, while FDR is
guilty of
> many sins, "setting up" the 7th U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941
> to as to slip the United States into war through the "back door" is
> not one of them.
So how can Schweikart know this until the RDF fix reports from
the Navy D/F stations are made public?
The title, Historian, gives me small confidence. I'd read a ton of
them who insisted that the Brits declared war on Germany in 1914
because the Germans violated Belgian neutrality. Then I find that
in 1912 the Brits had promised to have 100,000 troops on the
French left wing when the fighting started..
Not nice at all.
Al
success:
the French have Alsace/Lorraine,
the Polish have Danzig,
the Germans are now no threat to the Royal Navy.
> *(9) "Roosevelt's 'fingerprints' can be found on each of McCollum's
> *(48) "Dropping 'Hitokappu Bay' from the typewritten summary
> with America's top naval brass [who? how 'top'?] while in
> Washington in late 1940, which suggests that he learned of FDR's
> policy of 'let Japan commit the first act of war.'" While working with
David Thornley
al kirke <alki...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>news:c2hod3$2e5$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
>
>cable from Kokkaido to Etrov Island, which contains Hitokappu
>Bay, but that it was a comercial link, and not a secure military
>resource. Would you ask us to believe that Yamamoto would
>send his dispatches over an insecure civilian undersea cable rather
>than use his encripted military radio?
>
much more secure than sending it by radio. Obviously, you encrypt
it no matter what route it's taking. There is also the option of
using a courier, which is even more secure.
>> By the way if you really want to have us believe Stinnett is the
>> authority check out his page 324 of his hardcover edition
>> where he states "There is no reliable evidence, found by the
>> author, that establishes how much of the 5 - Num [JN25]
>> could be deciphered, translated and read by naval cryptographers
>> in 1941". Now go back and read the book where it assumes,
>> his opinion, his assumption, the USN could read the signals
>> Stinnett wants them to have read, including the ones he tries
>> to pretend were sent by radio instead of hand delivered.
>> Stinnett has no idea what the USN could read, he simply gives
>> his opinion.
>
>You're playing sophistry with us. The question is not how much
>could be read, 0% to 100%, but whether or not enough could
>be read to be militarily useful, and as a percentage of the code
>book that might not be very much. The issue then is how much
>of the code needed to be read in order to extract the meaning
>of the dispatch, right?
>
You say "the dispatch" here. This means that the question has to
be asked for each and every dispatch, unless the code is cracked
enough so that all dispatches are basically readable.
>Willey tells us that he has the codebook Rocheford used to plan
>Nimit's Midway campaign, and it has 413 code book values. So
>that small number of book values was sufficient for that purpose.
>You are invited to dispute the code book issue with him.
>
You aren't making enough sense here to intelligently disagree with.
Rochefort did not plan any campaign. Presumably you mean that he
used a document with 413 entries to decrypt the Japanese order, but
even then you don't tell us whether this was the base code or a
chunk of the additive table.
Nor is there any necessary reason why any other transmission could
be read with that code book. If Rochefort had 413 additive values,
for instance, he could read anything encoded with that particular
section of the additive table, and nothing else.
>> >Could you please verify for us Stinnett's Primary Document
>> >cites in Wallin?
>
>-Snip some olde stuff-
>
Um, you didn't answer the question.
>Schweikart is the author of the review of Stinnet's book
>that follows. What he does in the review is complain
>about errors and inadequacies in the book. So what?
So what? If a book has enough errors and inadequacies, it
is unreliable. If Stinnett can be shown to be basing some of
his conclusions on screwy reasoning from inaccurate premises,
then it follows that his other conclusions are suspect.
>The book is a massive effort and contains a huge amount
>of information.
This is why it is painful to go through and list each shortcoming
as found. It would be extremely tedious to show each and every
instance where Stinnett is making things up, or jumping to conclusions
in a preordained way, or selectively using sources.
Rather than complain about shortcomings,
>we can learn from elements in the book that must be sound.
>Some of these are important and easily found, such as:
>
Elements that must be sound? *Every* chapter I read is full of
outright misstatements that are not supported by his sources,
even taking the footnotes at face value. I don't think anything
in his book *must* be sound, except for direct quotes from other
sources.
>The next time I read of the S.S. Lurline's radio log was on
>p.198 of Stinnett, where he writes that sometime in the 1970's
>somebody removed the log from the National Archives, and
>that the withdrawal slip isn't signed or dated. Just imagine
>what the late fee must be.
>
I'm not paying the late fee, so I don't really care. What Stinnett
tells us is that the log isn't where it should have been, and there
is no documentation of why not. It is a bit of a jump to reason from
this fact (assuming it is correct) to the idea that it was necessarily
removed secretly because it was too revealing.
>A big item in Stinnett is on p. 211, where he tells us of Station
>VICTOR, a Navy D/F station at Pago Pago in Ameriican
>Samoa, and that 300 pages of RDF fixes from VICTOR
>originated between July and December 1941 are in Archives
>II in Maryland. When the DF reports from VICTOR and the
>other RFD stations are made public they will show the
>triangulated day by day positions of the Japanese ships
>during that time perion, and the question of japanese naval
>dispatch code decription becomes irrelevant.
>
However, Stinnett does include what he claims to be a photographic
copy of a report from Corregidor on December 3. If you look at the
intercepts listed, you will find that absolutely none of them come
from any area of sea that the Striking Force could be in.
It appears that some of these reports are available, and Stinnett
does not bother to explain why some are and some aren't. He simply
quotes one with a caption saying that it lists the normal call
sign of the carrier force, not noting that the direction given
intersects Yokohama.
>Schweikart writes:
>> Nevertheless, while FDR is
>guilty of
>> many sins, "setting up" the 7th U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941
>> to as to slip the United States into war through the "back door" is
>> not one of them.
>
>So how can Schweikart know this until the RDF fix reports from
>the Navy D/F stations are made public?
>
Similarly, how can you know the opposite until the RDF fix reports
are made public? If these are such critical evidence, then you're
completely off base making accusations against Roosevelt without
them. If not, then we can look at the rest of the evidence.
>The title, Historian, gives me small confidence. I'd read a ton of
>them who insisted that the Brits declared war on Germany in 1914
>because the Germans violated Belgian neutrality.
That was part of it.
Then I find that
>in 1912 the Brits had promised to have 100,000 troops on the
>French left wing when the fighting started..
>
Which Brits? There were joint talks in 1912, but His Majesty's
Government was not committed to any action based on them. The
talks undoubtedly did play a part in the decision to go to war
when Britain did. It is entirely possible for a government
official to go beyond his authority and promise something that
he is not in a position to do so, and it is also entirely possible
to misinterpret a statement or contingency as a promise.
Now, let's look at the differences. In one case, the question is
what people knew. In another case, the question is what people
thought, and what their motives were. The second is almost always
going to be fuzzier and will cause more disagreement.
David Thornley
David Thornley <thor...@visi.com> wrote:
>In article <eDd3c.526981$na.1264952@attbi_s04>,
>al kirke <alki...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>
Then we can decide whether debating the minutae is important.
Stinnett's story, as far as I can tell:
Roosevelt wanted to get the US into the war against Germany.
He decided to do this by getting Japan to attack the US, in the
hope that Germany would then declare war on the US, allegedly
in compliance with the Tripartite Pact.
He encouraged the Japanese to do so, and wanted them to make a
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
He therefore suppressed warnings to Pearl Harbor, so that the
Japanese surprise attack would succeed.
Let's look at this carefully.
Yes, Roosevelt wanted us in the war against Germany. I think this
is borne out well by the evidence.
In order to be in the war, a state of war with Germany needed to
exist, and the US public had to be in a mood to allow him to proceed
with making Germany the prime target. This means, very specifically,
that the US public cannot be so angry at the Japanese as to insist
on taking out the Japanese and ignoring Germany. This is something
Roosevelt did worry about, as can be seen from the evidence.
It is also worth noting that Roosevelt's main advisers were telling
him to be harder on the Japanese than he was. He was normally being
urged to impose more effective embargoes.
Therefore, it appears that Roosevelt should have been leery of war
with Japan, and indeed was so.
Stinnett's claim is that the Japanese attack on the US would invoke
the Tripartite Pact, so Germany would declare war on the US. In
fact, the Tripartite Pact would only apply if the US attacked
Japan, something that Roosevelt presumably knew, and Roosevelt
also presumably had some idea of Hitler's compliance with treaties
he had signed (like, not at all unless convenient). Therefore,
there was no good reason to think that getting the Japanese to
attack the US was going to get the US into a war with Germany.
However, it gets stranger.
Roosevelt apparently thought that a successful surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor was necessary. Not an unsuccessful surprise attack.
Apparently, for his plans, it was bad for the US to be seen as
fighting back successfully. This is something I've never seen a
Pearl Harbor conspiracy buff even try to explain coherently.
Having done so, Roosevelt went around making sure that the top
men at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel and General Short, were
deprived of information that would enable them to predict the attack.
Except that he did an absolutely miserable job. Marshall had
informed Short that Short should consider aerial attack as the
most important threat. Ten days before the attack, both Short
and Kimmel received warnings of imminent war from Washington.
In other words, this was the sort of plan that could be fatally
derailed by an accidental discharge of somebody's duty. If Short,
a successful career officer, had actually *paid attention* to his
orders, or made some sort of connection between the probable outbreak
of war and a possible military action, he would have destroyed
the whole plan. He could have done something revolutionary like
have his air officer prepare a plan to meet possible air attack,
and order him to implement it. Heck, Kimmel could conceivably
have performed the long-range aerial reconnaisance he was ordered
to do. He probably wouldn't have spotted the Japanese, but
he might have.
So, this is an absolutely ridiculous conspiracy. It can only
succeed by having a very deep faith in the total incapacity of
two experienced officers of high rank to follow orders. If
this was so, one wonders why any effort was necessary to keep
any information from the blockheads.
If we believe Stinnett's story, then, we have Roosevelt engineering
a tremendously complicated and ricketty conspiracy. Perhaps the
Japanese will not attack Pearl Harbor - remember that Yamamoto
had to threaten resignation to get permission to do it. Perhaps
Hitler will not declare war after the attack. Perhaps the US
public will be too incensed to allow Roosevelt to implement his
Europe-first strategy. Most of all, perhaps somebody at Pearl
Harbor will be cleaning his duty and it will go off.
This conspiracy is also rather large, as Stinnett assures us that
the Japanese carrier fleet was known to be coming, due to radio
transmissions. This means that numerous people had to know it
was coming. Numerous officers in Washington, DC, had to be in
on the conspiracy, lest they accidentally send useful information
to Hawaii.
Of all these conspirators, Stinnett could only find two enlisted
men who would come forward. The documentary evidence has been made
completely unavailable. Nearly without exception, everybody involved
in a ramshackle and stupid conspiracy that resulted in the death of
thousands of men and the destruction of the United States' main
combat force kept silent until the end of their lives. No
Japanese, as far as I know, has come forward to say that the carrier
force did not observe radio silence.
There is no good evidence for this conspiracy. There is no clear
smoking gun that shows that anybody in the US knew of the Pearl
Harbor attack before it happened. The Japanese maintained the
tightest security they could on the plan, and there is no good
evidence that they transmitted any message explaining what was
going to happen in any form it could be intercepted. All this
talk of JN-25 is irrelevant unless there is reason to believe
that any information about the Pearl Harbor attack was possibly
intercepted in JN-25 form.
Stinnett's claims of radio intercepts from the Pearl Harbor Striking
Force do not match any other evidence we have. The Japanese deny
making lots of transmissions. The radio intercept report he
reproduces in his book does not show any signs of the Japanese
carriers.
In short, before we continue the discussion of details, would it
be too much to ask for either a coherent explanation of what was
going on, or solid evidence that there was such a conspiracy?
al kirke
"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
news:404e020c$0$166$a186...@newsreader.visi.com...
> In article <eDd3c.526981$na.1264952@attbi_s04>,
> al kirke <alki...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >
> >"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
> >news:c2hod3$2e5$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
> >
> >Suppose I told you that there could well have been a telegraph
> >cable from Kokkaido to Etrov Island, which contains Hitokappu
> >Bay, but that it was a comercial link, and not a secure military
> >resource. Would you ask us to believe that Yamamoto would
> >send his dispatches over an insecure civilian undersea cable rather
> >than use his encripted military radio?
> >
> This makes no sense. Sending a message on an insecure cable is
> much more secure than sending it by radio. Obviously, you encrypt
> it no matter what route it's taking. There is also the option of
> using a courier, which is even more secure.
Doesn't it make sense that Yamamoto believed his radio comm
was secure? Isn't it your considered opinion that encrypted radio
comm is believed to be secure, even when it's not? (Carefull ....)
- big snip-
> >The title, Historian, gives me small confidence. I'd read a
> >ton of them who insisted that the Brits declared war on
> >Germany in 1914 because the Germans violated Belgian
> >neutrality.
>
> That was part of it.
>
> > Then I find that in 1912 the Brits had promised to have
> > 100,000 troops on the French left wing when the fighting
> > started..
> >
> Which Brits? There were joint talks in 1912, but His Majesty's
> Government was not committed to any action based on them.
> The talks undoubtedly did play a part in the decision to go to
> war when Britain did. It is entirely possible for a government
> official to go beyond his authority and promise something that
> he is not in a position to do so, and it is also entirely possible
> to misinterpret a statement or contingency as a promise.
Actually the relevant documents were made public by dirty
rotten Lenin, in his spitefull attempts to make capitalistic
governments look bad, in that they had just killed millions of
their young men in attempts to gain territory and trade advantage.
Stieve, Isvolsky and the World War;
Preface
The great majority of these documents were taken from the
collection published by the Soviet Government in 1922,
under the title of Material for the history of Franco-Russian
relations, 1910-1014. Collection of secret diplomatic
documents of the Imperial Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.'
ibid p.86
" ...August, 1912 ... But from a fairly comprehensive report
of Sazonov's prepared at their conclusion for the Tsar, we
learn a great deal.
....
First comes the Franco-Russian naval convention:
...
The second point in Sazonov's report [401] is headed
Strategic lines of communication.
...
Very significant is Sazonov's third point; it contains the
following details regarding British-French relations [401]
British relations were the subject of a particularly candid
exchange of views between M.Poincare and myself.
The French Premier mentioned that latterly, under the influence
of Germany's aggressive policy towards France, these relations
had assumed the character of quite special intimacy, and he
confided to me that while no written agreement between France
and Great Britian was in existence, the General and Navel Staffs
of the two States were nevertheless in close touch with one
another, and were uninteruptedly and with mutual openness
consulting one another on matters of mutual interest. This
continual exchange of ideas had led to a verbal agreement
between the Governments of France and Great Britian, in which
Great Britian had declared her readiness to come to the aid of
France with her land and naval forces should France be attacked
by Germany. Great Britian had promised to support France on
land by a detachment 100,000 strong sent to the Belgian frontier,
in order to ward off an invasion of the German army through
Belgium, which was expected by the French General Staff.
....
ibid p.89
"That these agreements already covered British assistance
on land in the sense now revealed by Poincare is perfectly
clear from the minutes of the meeting of the Chiefs of the
French and Russian General Staffs on August 31, 1911.
According to this document, General Dubail declared 'that
the French army is concentrated just as quickly as the
German, and is in a position to take the offensive against
Germany -with the aid of the British Army on its left wing-
on the 12th day (after mobilization)' "
Marvelous, isn't it?
Al
Churchill's Grand Alliance, John Charmley, p.359
"It was all very odd. The British had fought two world
wars to prevent Germany from dominating Europe, and
they had still ended up in a German-dominated. Europe."
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
(al kirke) wrote:
> Then I find that
> in 1912 the Brits had promised to have 100,000 troops on the
> French left wing when the fighting started..
That would have been a good trick. I would be interested to know
where, whoever was concerned thought Britain could get hold of 100,000
troops in 1912. The total available force was the BEF which I believe
comes up short.
British war plans did envisage sending troops to operate on the
French left, if Britain got involved in a continental war. However
there was no commitment to do so and because of this the French army
plans made no mention of any use of British forces.
Geoffrey Sinclair
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>news:c2hod3$2e5$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
>> This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news
>server.
>>
>> al kirke wrote in message ...
>> >"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>> >news:c23kkh$18p$1...@au-nws-0001.flow.com.au...
>>
>> (snip)
>>
>> >Mr. Sinclair
>> >Robert Stinnett, in his book Day of Deceit, writes on page 45 that
>> >the radio logs of Station H, on Hawaii, show that on November 25,
>> >1941, Yamamoto sent two dispatches to the First Air Fleet, anchored
>> >at Hitokappu Bay. The messages are what we have come to know as
>> >the Order to Sail and sink the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.
>> >
>> >Mr. Sincliar,
>>
>> Watch the spelling Al, otherwise it shows you need to insult, rather
>> than present evidence.
>
>Suppose I told you that there could well have been a telegraph
>cable from Kokkaido to Etrov Island, which contains Hitokappu
>Bay, but that it was a comercial link, and not a secure military
>resource. Would you ask us to believe that Yamamoto would
>send his dispatches over an insecure civilian undersea cable rather
>than use his encripted military radio?
Let us start with the spellings, Hokkaido Island to Etorofu Island.
Since Etorofu was the second island in line, the cables went via
Kunashiri.
Now an exercise in logic. Take message, encode, now decide the
most secure transmission method, via a radio link known to be
monitored or via a commercial cable that means no radio with
the only way the enemy can intercept is to have a spy in the postal
system or via courier which is the safest.
Al, why do you assume the Japanese post office would refuse to
send an encoded IJN message? Why do you assume the IJN
had to worry about allied spies in the postal system? Why do you
think the IJN took over the relevant post offices on Etorofu?
"There was a
marine cable between Nemuro, Hokkaido and Shana, Etorofu in 1941
which was then tied to the telegraph office at Hitokappu Bay. Source.
Recollection of Mr. Hirokazu Kawguchi of Hachioji City in Tokyo who
was born at Shana in 1923 and worked at the Shana cable office.
Next, there was a daily air courier service between Ominato and
Hitokappu Bay to transfer documents received from Tokyo by air
and to send documents to Tokyo by air while the 1st Air Fleet was
at Hitokappu Bay. Source. “History on Communications” by Admiral
Susumiiro Ishiguru (of Strike Force experience) (Tokyo: Tokyo Reserve
Police Association 1953)."
see RG457 HCC SRN-115481 Archives II, College Park MD:
“GZ Comment: Note that Striking Force OpOrders (MEIREI SAKU) are
all written operation orders and are not [underlined] sent by dispatch,
hence we have no way of knowing the contents."
>> >you are correct when you write that the congressional
>> >report does not say the order to sail was radioed. Stinnet agrees
>> >because he writes on page 45 that:
>> > "- all were excluded from the many investigations that took place
>> > from 1941 to 1946 and the congressional probe of 1995 -"
>>
>> Al, how can Mark quote the page in the Congressional investigation
>> where the order to sail is reproduced and then Stinnett tell us all the
>> message was excluded from the Congressional investigation?
>
>How about Stinnett's being in error, and Mark is correct? Would
>you argue that?
Al, look at Stinnett's claim, "all excluded", it shows he has failed to do
the most basic of checks.
>> Oh yes, the USSBS was published, available for people to read.
>>
>> By the way if you really want to have us believe Stinnett is the
>> authority check out his page 324 of his hardcover edition
>> where he states "There is no reliable evidence, found by the
>> author, that establishes how much of the 5 - Num [JN25]
>> could be deciphered, translated and read by naval cryptographers
>> in 1941". Now go back and read the book where it assumes,
>> his opinion, his assumption, the USN could read the signals
>> Stinnett wants them to have read, including the ones he tries
>> to pretend were sent by radio instead of hand delivered.
>> Stinnett has no idea what the USN could read, he simply gives
>> his opinion.
>
>You're playing sophistry with us. The question is not how much
>could be read, 0% to 100%, but whether or not enough could
>be read to be militarily useful, and as a percentage of the code
>book that might not be very much. The issue then is how much
>of the code needed to be read in order to extract the meaning
>of the dispatch, right?
No Al, the question is the fact Stinnett's whole code breaking section
is based on assumed abilities by the USN, it is really a what if. To
write such a book as a history is a joke. Stinnett relies on the allies
being able to crack the messages Stinnett needs them to crack, when
he needs them to crack the messages, but at the end states he has no
idea what was crackable but goes ahead and assumes what he needs
to make his story.
Also before any claims about cracking a specific message have to
be addressed you need to show it was transmitted by radio and also
intercepted, reasonably cleanly. Stinnett simply ignores the fact his
sources contradict him.
>Willey tells us that he has the codebook Rocheford used to plan
>Nimit's Midway campaign, and it has 413 code book values. So
>that small number of book values was sufficient for that purpose.
>You are invited to dispute the code book issue with him.
Al the claim by Mark is junk, something noted over two years ago. I note
that at 1 code word a day it would have been possible to have put those
famous 413 code values on the web around a year ago. A competent
typist should be able to knock over the list in a day. Still we have no
list. I note when I pointed out the problems with the claim to Mark in
this thread he chose not to reply. Apart from the idea a dictionary of
55,000 words is effectively reduced to 413 words we have the problem
it means Pearl Harbor was never given any JN-25B information from
anyone else, despite the people there making it clear they were given
an up to date version of the recoveries in December and shared results
with the other groups from then on.
Go volunteer to put the code book online Al, you have the access, go
take up the issue with Mark, the fact it has yet to appear despite claims
about wanting to, along with the relevant details of where people can
find the original in the archives. Then we can compare the book Mark
says he has to the signals known to be decoded in May 1942. Some
8 pages long according to Mark and 90% of messages readable is
supposed to be a conservative estimate, all with 413 out of 55,000
meanings.
>> >Stinnet gives us his Primary Document cites on the Order to
>> >Sail on page 322 of his book, to wit:
>> >
>> >"For Yamamoto's first dispatch see two sources:
>> >(1) Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p.87 (2) Captain E. M. Trapnell, USN,
>> >Captain J. S. Russell, USN, and Lieutenant Commander
>> >J. A. Field, Jr., USNR, eds., The Campaigns of the Pacific
>> >War (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Naval Analyis
>> >Division, USGPO Washington, 1946) p.50
>> >
>> >For Yamamoto's second dispatch, see Wallin, Pearl Harbor
>> >p. 86, Campaigns, supra. The Wallin version is reproduced
>> >in Appendix D of this book.
>> >
>> >Could you please verify for us Stinnett's Primary Document
>> >cites in Wallin?
>
>-Snip some olde stuff-
Yes folks, Al was given the same information in December 2001,
now in March 2004 he does not thank people for presenting it, nor
even comment on it. Instead it has to be deleted, we have to go to
an editorial running down the source of the information and trying
to find something else in Stinnett's book to talk about. Just do not
answer the main problem.
Al is running the line Stinnett has proof the message in question was
radioed, two sources, except one source is actually quoting the other
source. So one source, which is the post war interviews with IJN
officers, no proof of radio there, in fact there are plenty of remarks
about key messages being sent by courier for example.
So Al, tell us all, after asking for the information, why delete it?
Here it is again.
"Al, last time I checked I was not a reference for those who do not
bother to follow up on information given to them two years ago.
This is from December 2001, in reply to Al back then, the key
section is reproduced, then the full review.
"It gets worse for Stinnett's argument. On pp. 45-47, Stinnett
supposedly uncovers four radio dispatches---two by Nagano and two
by Yamamoto---that were "intercepted" and decoded, and thus
warned FDR (but not Kimmel) that the Japanese fleet was on the
move. Virtually all of Stinnett's thesis hangs on these four intercepts
indicating that the Japanese did not keep radio silence. It is the
lynchpin of his "new" information, and the core of his book. No
originals exist, but rather, Stinnett's source for this "new" information
is "two US naval histories: Pearl Harbor by Vice Admiral Homer N.
Wallin and The Campaigns of the Pacific War prepared by the . . .
Strategic Bombing Survey." Wallin's source was the 1979 Pearl
Harbor hearings, which referenced the Navy's History Section.
Both of these came from a November 29, 1945 document produced
by the History Section, based on October 1945 interviews with
principal Japanese actors!
Let's reconstruct this: Stinnett cites Wallin, who cites the Hearings,
which cite the History Section's "reconstructions" with Japanese
four years after the incident. Even then, the Strategic Bombing survey,
cited in the classic book by Gordon Prange, et. al., At Dawn We Slept,
quotes the Strategic Bombing survey as saying that none of the four
were transmitted by radio and that all four messages were
hand-delivered. This is confirmed by virtually all of the Japanese
participants, including Genda, in repeated interviews. Stinnett's key
evidence then---which is hardly new, and has been in the open for
years---is that there is no "new" evidence, and that the Hitokappu
Bay message was hand delivered. Had Stinnett traced the citations
back, to use his waffle terms, it's hard to believe that he would have
relied on this as evidence of anything."
>Schweikart is the author of the review of Stinnet's book
>that follows. What he does in the review is complain
>about errors and inadequacies in the book. So what?
Ah this is funny, Al simply ignores the fact the book is so
riddled with problems it is really fiction, but fiction Al likes
so much he has at least two copies. So for Al the more
errors the more we must simply focus on the odd paragraph.
>The book is a massive effort and contains a huge amount
>of information. Rather than complain about shortcomings,
>we can learn from elements in the book that must be sound.
Al, so far people going into the book, that is checking the
references, indicate the amount of accurate information is
very low. You can spot more mistakes than sound elements.
>Some of these are important and easily found, such as:
>
>The radio log of the S.S. Lurline is mentioned on p.279 of
>Toland's book, Infamy, where he writes that on the nights
>of Dec. 1, 2, and 3, the radio operators of the liner copied
>Japanese military traffic on the "lower marine bands" for
>many hours. And when the ship docked in Honolulu, they
>turned their radio log over to USN Capt. Mayfield.
>
>The next time I read of the S.S. Lurline's radio log was on
>p.198 of Stinnett, where he writes that sometime in the 1970's
>somebody removed the log from the National Archives, and
>that the withdrawal slip isn't signed or dated. Just imagine
>what the late fee must be.
In other words it looks as though someone helped themselves
to a momento or it has been misplaced. Ever here of stories
of misplaced books, ever heard of stories of people taking
documents for themselves?
As for the claims themselves they run into the IJN officers
making it clear they were not transmitting, the poor direction
finding equipment on the liner, the Soviet traffic, the way the
people on the liner were not trained Japanese radio interceptors,
you do know the IJN used a modified system of Morse code,
don't you Al? It meant special training was required by the allied
intercept operators.
Even assuming the traffic was IJN we still have the traffic sent
when setting up the Japanese picket boat system. Those small
ships the Doolittle raid ran into. Then add the fact Toland's claims
are unverifiable without the logs. Even the sources pushing the
conspiracy side of things note the traffic was not on normal IJN
frequencies, which leads to the obvious question, why must we
then assume it was the carrier force, using unusual frequencies
for around 3 days?
>A big item in Stinnett is on p. 211, where he tells us of Station
>VICTOR, a Navy D/F station at Pago Pago in Ameriican
>Samoa, and that 300 pages of RDF fixes from VICTOR
>originated between July and December 1941 are in Archives
>II in Maryland. When the DF reports from VICTOR and the
>other RFD stations are made public they will show the
>triangulated day by day positions of the Japanese ships
>during that time perion, and the question of Japanese naval
>dispatch code decription becomes irrelevant.
Al will continue to push this idea, that the missing intercepts
are out there somewhere. The IJN officers who state the
force did not transmit, the 1942 IJN after action report stating
the same thing are going to be ignored.
American Samoa is around 15 degrees south of the equator
and 170 to 175 degrees west. In other words more south than
New Guinea and level with Northern Australia. It is better off than
Hawaii at 155 west, for North South bearings in the western
Pacific, but much worse off for picking transmissions up
from the Northern Hemisphere, Hawaii is around 20 degrees
north. The listening station there is well placed to pick up
Japanese transmissions in the mandated islands.
>Schweikart writes:
>> Nevertheless, while FDR is
>guilty of
>> many sins, "setting up" the 7th U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941
>> to as to slip the United States into war through the "back door" is
>> not one of them.
>
>So how can Schweikart know this until the RDF fix reports from
>the Navy D/F stations are made public?
Al, it is quite simple, the First Air Fleet, Kido Butai, Nagumo force
or Pearl Harbor strike force came in from the North. The original
course was North Japan to San Francisco, ending up roughly
North of Hawaii 4 days before the attack, then turning south.
As for the above junk radio intercept idea, plot the course
of the IJN raiding force as it crossed the Pacific, note how
quickly bearings of it from Pearl Harbor cease being anywhere
near Japan. Note how within a few days it would be obvious
an IJN task force was in the North Pacific well away from Japan.
Pearl Harbor would not have needed any cross bearings to
figure out the IJN was moving east. Changes in bearings
from Pearl Harbor would tell that. Note that the force was
closer to the Aleutians than Midway, steaming nearly due
west from the Kuriles (it crossed the international date line
at over 40 degrees north) until past 170 degrees west, roughly
due south of Dutch Harbor, then turning south east before
turning south due north of Hawaii for the final run in. Bearings
from Pearl Harbor for more than the last third of the voyage
would have put the IJN force as coming from about Dutch
Harbor or Anchorage.
Of course the task force did not transmit, the Nagumo the
homesick teenager concept is junk, it needs Pearl Harbor
to miss all the messages for a start. Can you imagine the
messages flying, "This is Pearl IJN task force plotted South
of Aleutians please confirm", and apparently receiving
several replies "sorry hamburger caught in radio" or
something similar from the Philippines and, of course, the
stations in Alaska/Dutch Harbor. So now we have the
claim the Philippines, the Alaskan and Pearl Harbor commands
were all in on the conspiracy. Yes folks the only person that
did not know about Pearl Harbor was General Tojo, the
Japanese Prime minister.
Can you really imagine the Alaskan authorities picking up IJN
radio transmissions due south of them and doing nothing?
What if the IJN was coming for them?
>The title, Historian, gives me small confidence.
Now comes the attempt to discredit the man, not the information
being presented, we jump to Al's conspiracy theory of WWI. Al
has Stinnett's book and could check the references and dispute
the various points being made in the review, instead he tries to
discredit the man, or more particularly historians in general.
> I'd read a ton of
>them who insisted that the Brits declared war on Germany in 1914
>because the Germans violated Belgian neutrality. Then I find that
>in 1912 the Brits had promised to have 100,000 troops on the
>French left wing when the fighting started..
>
>Not nice at all.
Note Al does not bother to give a source of this fact, nor bother to
understand the relationship between Britain and France was not
a full alliance. The British had options. Belgium in hostile hands,
French (pre 20th century) or German, (20th century) was not
acceptable to the British.
>Al success:
> the French have Alsace/Lorraine,
> the Polish have Danzig,
> the Germans are now no threat to the Royal Navy.
Al has the idea the British went to war in WWI to make Danzig
Polish it seems. Just ignore the cost of the war, the way it broke
up the old political systems, causing the usual stability problems,
both not good for business.
The rest of the message is simply a repeat of the review, if people
want to compare Al's editorial about it and the review itself.
David Thornley
al kirke <alki...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
>news:404e020c$0$166$a186...@newsreader.visi.com...
>> >
>> much more secure than sending it by radio. Obviously, you encrypt
>> it no matter what route it's taking. There is also the option of
>> using a courier, which is even more secure.
>
>Doesn't it make sense that Yamamoto believed his radio comm
>was secure? Isn't it your considered opinion that encrypted radio
>comm is believed to be secure, even when it's not? (Carefull ....)
>
secure (not entirely correctly). This does not mean that every
possible message would go by radio. If there is a telegraph line
to some place, there is no reason why it cannot be used. It
reduces the radio traffic, after all. Nor is there any reason
why a critical order would not be sent by courier, if one
wanted to emphasize the importance and remove the possibility
of decoding error.
In other words, there is no particular reason why those orders would
have been sent by radio. There are equally good reasons to send them
by telegraph, and even reasons to use a courier. We have been
informed by people who have looked into it that the messages were
not radioed, and unless I get some conflicting evidence, not
unsupported statements, it seems most likely to me that the Japanese
did not use radio.
Of course, if the Japanese didn't radio these messages, then the
question of whether they were intercepted and if they could be
decrypted is completely irrelevant.
>> >The title, Historian, gives me small confidence. I'd read a
>> >ton of them who insisted that the Brits declared war on
>> >Germany in 1914 because the Germans violated Belgian
>> >neutrality.
>>
>> That was part of it.
>>
>> > Then I find that in 1912 the Brits had promised to have
>> > 100,000 troops on the French left wing when the fighting
>> > started..
>> >
>> Which Brits? There were joint talks in 1912, but His Majesty's
>> Government was not committed to any action based on them.
>> The talks undoubtedly did play a part in the decision to go to
>> war when Britain did. It is entirely possible for a government
>> official to go beyond his authority and promise something that
>> he is not in a position to do so, and it is also entirely possible
>> to misinterpret a statement or contingency as a promise.
>
>Actually the relevant documents were made public by dirty
>rotten Lenin, in his spitefull attempts to make capitalistic
>governments look bad, in that they had just killed millions of
>their young men in attempts to gain territory and trade advantage.
>
So? That doesn't mean that the British felt compelled to go to war.
Looking at what was going on during the crisis, it seems to me that
the British Cabinet was acting as if they had a choice in the matter.
>ibid p.86
>" ...August, 1912 ... But from a fairly comprehensive report
>of Sazonov's prepared at their conclusion for the Tsar, we
>learn a great deal.
> ....
>First comes the Franco-Russian naval convention:
> ...
Hint: France and Russia were formal allies, and had been since
1892. There is no reason why a Franco-Russian naval convention
would be in the least controversial.
>The second point in Sazonov's report [401] is headed
>Strategic lines of communication.
> ...
Obviously suspicious. Yeah.
>Very significant is Sazonov's third point; it contains the
>following details regarding British-French relations [401]
>
> British relations were the subject of a particularly candid
> exchange of views between M.Poincare and myself.
>
> The French Premier mentioned that latterly, under the influence
> of Germany's aggressive policy towards France, these relations
> had assumed the character of quite special intimacy, and he
> confided to me that while no written agreement between France
> and Great Britian was in existence, the General and Navel Staffs
> of the two States were nevertheless in close touch with one
> another, and were uninteruptedly and with mutual openness
> consulting one another on matters of mutual interest. This
> continual exchange of ideas had led to a verbal agreement
> between the Governments of France and Great Britian, in which
> Great Britian had declared her readiness to come to the aid of
> France with her land and naval forces should France be attacked
> by Germany. Great Britian had promised to support France on
> land by a detachment 100,000 strong sent to the Belgian frontier,
> in order to ward off an invasion of the German army through
> Belgium, which was expected by the French General Staff.
>....
>
The British and French had been doing a lot of detailed discussions
about how they should cooperate in the event they were both at war
with Germany.
However, I make the BEF out as more like 80,000 men than 100,000.
This means that Poincare was inaccurate in his belief of what
the British would do. Either he misunderstood what the British
said, or he misunderstood how binding the British considered
these agreements.
Not to mention again that the Cabinet was engaged in deliberations
that show that the Cabinet members did not consider Britain to be
committed. If they didn't think Britain committed, well, Britain
wasn't committed.
>ibid p.89
> "That these agreements already covered British assistance
> on land in the sense now revealed by Poincare is perfectly
> clear from the minutes of the meeting of the Chiefs of the
> French and Russian General Staffs on August 31, 1911.
Right. The French were of the opinion that the British were going
to come in on their side with 100,000 men. This does not mean
that the British were going to do so. Now, not going to war alongside
France would mean a complete break from centuries of British policy,
in that it would allow a burgeoning naval power to dominate the
Continent, but Britain did not commit itself beforehand.
I do not know whether Poincare and others misunderstood the British,
or if British military authorities promised what they could not
necessarily deliver (and, in the event, did not deliver).
al kirke
Tell us how it is that what you 'make out' overrides what Poincare writes.
> Either he misunderstood what the British
> said, or he misunderstood how binding the British considered
> these agreements.
In going to war the Brits behaved like they were committed as Poincare
writes. Do you disagree?
> Not to mention again that the Cabinet was engaged in deliberations
> that show that the Cabinet members did not consider Britain to be
> committed. If they didn't think Britain committed, well, Britain
> wasn't committed.
In the event the Brits went to war, like they were committed.
Do you disagree?
> >ibid p.89
> > "That these agreements already covered British assistance
> > on land in the sense now revealed by Poincare is perfectly
> > clear from the minutes of the meeting of the Chiefs of the
> > French and Russian General Staffs on August 31, 1911.
>
> Right. The French were of the opinion that the British were going
> to come in on their side with 100,000 men. This does not mean
> that the British were going to do so. Now, not going to war alongside
> France would mean a complete break from centuries of British policy,
> in that it would allow a burgeoning naval power to dominate the
> Continent, but Britain did not commit itself beforehand.
In the event, August 1914, Poincare was correct. Do you disagree?
Al
David Thornley
al kirke <alki...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
>news:404f4cf0$0$157$a186...@newsreader.visi.com...
>> In article <r6x3c.222838$jk2.862649@attbi_s53>,
>> al kirke <alki...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >
>> >following details regarding British-French relations [401]
>> >
>> > British relations were the subject of a particularly candid
>> > exchange of views between M.Poincare and myself.
>> >
>> > The French Premier mentioned that latterly, under the influence
>> > of Germany's aggressive policy towards France, these relations
>> > had assumed the character of quite special intimacy, and he
>> > confided to me that while no written agreement between France
>> > and Great Britian was in existence, the General and Navel Staffs
>> > of the two States were nevertheless in close touch with one
>> > another, and were uninteruptedly and with mutual openness
>> > consulting one another on matters of mutual interest. This
>> > continual exchange of ideas had led to a verbal agreement
>> > between the Governments of France and Great Britian, in which
>> > Great Britian had declared her readiness to come to the aid of
>> > France with her land and naval forces should France be attacked
>> > by Germany. Great Britian had promised to support France on
>> > land by a detachment 100,000 strong sent to the Belgian frontier,
>> > in order to ward off an invasion of the German army through
>> > Belgium, which was expected by the French General Staff.
>> >
>> about how they should cooperate in the event they were both at war
>> with Germany.
>>
>> However, I make the BEF out as more like 80,000 men than 100,000.
>> This means that Poincare was inaccurate in his belief of what
>> the British would do.
>
>Tell us how it is that what you 'make out' overrides what Poincare writes.
>
Your quote discusses what Poincare thought ahead of time.
My estimate is of what actually happened, some time later.
There is no conflict at all.
What it does mean is that Poincare's understanding did not quite match
what the British actually did do. Either his understanding of what
he had been told was off, or the British did not do as they told
the French.
>> Either he misunderstood what the British
>> said, or he misunderstood how binding the British considered
>> these agreements.
>
>In going to war the Brits behaved like they were committed as Poincare
>writes. Do you disagree?
>
Yes, I disagree. The British did much like Poincare writes, but that
does not mean they felt committed to it.
>> Not to mention again that the Cabinet was engaged in deliberations
>> that show that the Cabinet members did not consider Britain to be
>> committed. If they didn't think Britain committed, well, Britain
>> wasn't committed.
>
>In the event the Brits went to war, like they were committed.
>Do you disagree?
>
I not only fail to disagree, I completely fail to comprehend the
relevance. The fact that somebody made a prediction, and that
prediction came mostly (but not entirely) true, does not mean
that that person was infallible, or that things would necessarily
have happened that way.
In order for the British to come in, the British Cabinet had to
agree to do so. Since there was no signed treaty, it had to be
by a Cabinet decision. Now, there were people in the Cabinet
who opposed going to war (Morley, for example, as you have pointed
out before), and the Cabinet deliberations that I've seen do not
seem to be merely on the basis that Britain had an obligation
or promise that must be fulfilled.
>> Right. The French were of the opinion that the British were going
>> to come in on their side with 100,000 men. This does not mean
>> that the British were going to do so. Now, not going to war alongside
>> France would mean a complete break from centuries of British policy,
>> in that it would allow a burgeoning naval power to dominate the
>> Continent, but Britain did not commit itself beforehand.
>
>In the event, August 1914, Poincare was correct. Do you disagree?
>
Yes, actually, I do. I can, in fact, do arithmetic. The British
sent four infantry and one cavalry division, and that ain't 100,000
men.
Now, if Poincare was incorrect in one matter, does that mean he was
necessarily infallible on others?
al kirke
<ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote in message
news:c2m7go$k40$1...@thorium.cix.co.uk...
> In article <eDd3c.526981$na.1264952@attbi_s04>, alki...@comcast.net
> (al kirke) wrote:
>
> > Then I find that
> > in 1912 the Brits had promised to have 100,000 troops on the
> > French left wing when the fighting started..
>
> That would have been a good trick. I would be interested to know
> where, whoever was concerned thought Britain could get hold of 100,000
> troops in 1912. The total available force was the BEF which I believe
> comes up short.
>
> British war plans did envisage sending troops to operate on the
> French left, if Britain got involved in a continental war. However
> there was no commitment to do so and because of this the French army
> plans made no mention of any use of British forces.
Actually the relevant documents were made public by Dirty Rotten
Lenin, in his spitefull attempts to make capitalistic governments look
bad, in that they had just killed millions of their young men in attempts
to gain territory and trade advantage.
In the files of Czar's foreign ministry, Dirty Rotten Lenin also found the
details on how the Allies were gonna carve up the world after their
victory. The Secret Treaties and Understandings, were telegraphed
from Moscow to some British newspapers that printed them. They
were arranged by Seymour Cocks and published by The Union of
Democratic Control. They are free on The Memory Hole
http://www.blancmange.net/tmh/books/tstu/secrettreaties.html
And they were what the American Doughboys died for. That and the
Treaty of Versailles.
Stieve's book, Isvolsky and the World War, is easy to get.
abebooks.com has it starting at $7 What's not so easy is to
learn that the book exists. Here are some snips:
Stieve, Isvolsky and the World War;
Preface
The great majority of these documents were taken from the
collection published by the Soviet Government in 1922,
under the title of Material for the history of Franco-Russian
relations, 1910-1014. Collection of secret diplomatic
documents of the Imperial Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.'
ibid p.86
" ...August, 1912 ... But from a fairly comprehensive report
of Sazonov's prepared at their conclusion for the Tsar, we
learn a great deal.
....
First comes the Franco-Russian naval convention:
...
The second point in Sazonov's report [401] is headed
Strategic lines of communication.
...
Very significant is Sazonov's third point; it contains the
following details regarding British-French relations [401]
British relations were the subject of a particularly candid
exchange of views between M.Poincare and myself.
The French Premier mentioned that latterly, under the influence
of Germany's aggressive policy towards France, these relations
had assumed the character of quite special intimacy, and he
confided to me that while no written agreement between France
and Great Britian was in existence, the General and Navel Staffs
of the two States were nevertheless in close touch with one
another, and were uninteruptedly and with mutual openness
consulting one another on matters of mutual interest. This
continual exchange of ideas had led to a verbal agreement
between the Governments of France and Great Britian, in which
Great Britian had declared her readiness to come to the aid of
France with her land and naval forces should France be attacked
by Germany. Great Britian had promised to support France on
land by a detachment 100,000 strong sent to the Belgian frontier,
in order to ward off an invasion of the German army through
Belgium, which was expected by the French General Staff.
....
ibid p.89
"That these agreements already covered British assistance
on land in the sense now revealed by Poincare is perfectly
clear from the minutes of the meeting of the Chiefs of the
French and Russian General Staffs on August 31, 1911.
According to this document, General Dubail declared 'that
the French army is concentrated just as quickly as the
German, and is in a position to take the offensive against
Germany -with the aid of the British Army on its left wing-
on the 12th day (after mobilization)' "
Marvelous, isn't it?
Al
Churchill's Grand Alliance, John Charmley, p.359
"It was all very odd. The British had fought two world
wars to prevent Germany from dominating Europe, and
they had still ended up in a German-dominated. Europe."
> Ken Young
> ken...@cix.co.uk
> Maternity is a matter of fact
> Paternity is a matter of opinion
Marvelous, isn't it?
Al
Victory!
France has Alsace-Lorraine.
Poland has Danzig.
The Germans are now no threat to the Royal Navy.