Battle of Bannockburn, 23-24 June 1314 --- Orders of Battle [OOB]
D. Spencer Hines
to generals and commanders-in-chief. Today, billions of dollars and
thousands of people around the world are occupied in smoking out the
Orders of Battle of their military, naval and aerial adversaries.
Currently, in the United States, for quite obvious reasons, the OOB of
Serbia, Iraq and North Korea are of very high interest. Russia and
China [PRC] have been of high interest for many years, and continue to
be so.
The OOB of King Edward II's Army and of King Robert The Bruce's Army
were also of high interest to the other side in 1314. Infantry and
Cavalry strength, organization, readiness, morale and equipage
constituted critical intelligence to the opposing Commanders-in-Chief,
who were in this case, the Field Commanders as well.
Major Archibald F. Becke, R.A., R.F.A. was an expert on OOB. He was
the official mappist and compiler of orders of battle for the
"Official History of the Great War" [World War I]. This meant that he
had to generate a complete OOB for all British units in World War I.
Therein lies an interesting story that leads us inexorably to the
bloody conflict at Bannockburn on 23-24 June 1314 --- and on to
Scottish Independence.
[To Be Continued]
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Britannicus Traductus
--
D. Spencer Hines --- "Scots! wha hae wi' Wallace bled, Scots! wham
Bruce has aften led, Welcome to your gory bed, Or to victory!... Lay
the proud usurpers low! Tyrants fall in every foe! Liberty's in every
blow! - Let us do or die! So may God ever defend the cause of truth
and liberty, as He did that day! Amen." "Scots Wha Hae" ["Bruce's
Address at Bannockburn"] (24 June 1314) [1794] Robert Burns
[1759-1796]
D. Spencer Hines
referred to as "stomach think" here, on this issue of the OOB of
Medieval Armies.
The "stomach think" has frequently left the impression that since
medieval writers often grossly exaggerated with respect to numbers of
infantry and cavalry, all numbers are hence terminally unreliable, and
we just don't know the OOB.
This may be a congenial argument to the Innumerate among us --- and
there are always many of those in any group today --- or to the
Historically lazy, who would prefer to be spoon-fed rather than do
some real Historical Analysis.
We can do better than that. We can act like Historians and use
Historical Methodologies, rather than like litterateurs or
sociologists, who are much more loosey-goosey.
[To Be Continued]
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Fortem Posce Animum
--
D. Spencer Hines --- "Scots! wha hae wi' Wallace bled, Scots! wham
Bruce has aften led, Welcome to your gory bed, Or to victory!... Lay
the proud usurpers low! Tyrants fall in every foe! Liberty's in every
blow! - Let us do or die! So may God ever defend the cause of truth
and liberty, as He did that day! Amen." "Scots Wha Hae" ["Bruce's
Address at Bannockburn"] (24 June 1314) [1794] Robert Burns
[1759-1796]
D. Spencer Hines wrote in message
<7bi3l0$a...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net>...
D. Spencer Hines
"Estimates of the size of the rival forces have varied widely, and
this is not surprising when none of the authorities were eyewitnesses.
Edward's biographer [N. B. The 'Monk of Malmesbury' in the 'Vita
Edwardi Secundi Monachi Cuiusdam Malmesberiensis'.] says his cavalry
'numbered over 2,000 without counting a numerous crowd of infantry'.
[N.B. 'without counting'.]
Barbour, with pardonable exaggeration in a Scot, says 40,000 horse of
whom 3,000 were 'barded'. In modern times, Oman estimated 'near 3,000
horse' with 15,000 to 18,000 infantry, while Morris [N.B. J.E. Morris
"Bannockburn"] prefers '2,000 to 2,500 mounted troops'. Two more
recent estimates in the one case give Edward 2,000 horse and 17,000
infantry, and in the other 2,500 horse and 15,000 infantry.
In contrast, Bruce's army was naturally poorly supplied with the heavy
'destriers' of medieval cavalry, and his knights fought on foot with
their retainers [N.B. Hutchison seems to know this without having
consulted either Delbruck or Verbruggen.] Oman estimated Bruce's
whole force at 10,000 at the most, while Barbour gave him 30,000
against the English 100,000. There was evidently a small body of
Scottish light cavalry numbering about 500. [N.B. Commanded by Sir
Robert Keith.] The latest estimate of Bruce's army is between 7,000
and 10,000, of whom only 6,000 were in the lines of battle.
The consensus of much learned argument is that some 6,000 Scots were
facing some 2,500 heavy English cavalry and about 15,000 English
infantry. Both sides had archers, but neither side had large numbers
of them --- the era of the long-bow was only just beginning." [pp.
77-79]
Pretty slim pickings. There is not a shred of really in-depth
Historical Order of Battle Analysis in Hutchison's account. But we
should not EXPECT it in a work of this sort, any more than we should
expect it in a literary analysis of Barbour's epic poem 'The Bruce' or
a Marxist-Leninist sociological analysis of the role of Infantry =
Good and Cavalry = Bad at Bannockburn.
This is a Biography of King Edward II, not a Military History of the
Battle of Bannockburn, suitable for War College study --- much less a
Historiography of the Battle of Bannockburn --- which is what we
really need.
But we are certainly doing better than the litterateurs and the
sociologists, who seem to have stalled out in this *terra incognita*.
Can we do better than Hutchison? Well, we should at least do our best
to find alternate sources of Historical and Order of Battle [OOB]
expertise, which is what Real Historians --- Good Historians --- do,
in a case of this sort, rather than just give up and flame out.
[To Be Continued]
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Britannicus Traductus
Copyright @ D. Spencer Hines 1999 --- All Rights Reserved
Paul J Gans
>There has been a good deal of what Ernest Hemingway [1899-1961] often
>referred to as "stomach think" here, on this issue of the OOB of
>Medieval Armies.
>The "stomach think" has frequently left the impression that since
>medieval writers often grossly exaggerated with respect to numbers of
>infantry and cavalry, all numbers are hence terminally unreliable, and
>we just don't know the OOB.
Nobody said all medieval numbers were terminally reliable.
That is far from true.
>This may be a congenial argument to the Innumerate among us --- and
>there are always many of those in any group today --- or to the
>Historically lazy, who would prefer to be spoon-fed rather than do
>some real Historical Analysis.
Are you arguing that medieval numbers such as 50,000 men
are, in fact, actual counts and NOT idiomatic expressions?
>We can do better than that. We can act like Historians and use
>Historical Methodologies, rather than like litterateurs or
>sociologists, who are much more loosey-goosey.
I wait anxiously for your demonstration. I assume that
you are going to pick an actual situation, give us the
medieval "numbers" and then show that the actual accurate
numbers are discernable?
Please do.
----- Paul J. Gans [ga...@panix.com]
Paul J Gans
>[To Be Continued]
Allow me to make a few minor points. You accept the
numbers given above without considering how those
writers arrived at them. A Real Medieval Historian
would be concerned about that. Each one of those
estimates is based on some conjecture regarding the
number of troops. And, of course, unless they give
other evidence, that makes *their* numbers worthless.
For example: Can we estimate how long it would 17,000
Englishmen to get through the "carse" at night? And
can we estimate how many would have fallen into the water
and drowned? There are two ways to deal with this. One
is to cut the size of the English army, the other is to
assume that they did not work their way through the bogs
and pottis at night.
So you see, the numerical estimates depend on one's view
of the battle and how it was fought. And one's view of
the battle depends on the numerical estimates. For
example, some authors, just as "real" as the ones cited
above, don't think that the English had much, if any
infantry at all.
Another key question is: "How many archers did the
English have?" They were crucial at Falkirk and they
are certainly mentioned as being at Bannockburn. Were
they so few as to be easily scattered by the few Scots
cavalry? You've given 500 as their number. Would 5,000
archers be scattered by 500 knights? Would 500 archers
be scattered? And where were the English knights during
this? Perhaps the Scots really had 5,000 knights and
far outnumbered the English, and perhaps *that* is what
won the battle.
This is not an attempt at obfuscation. What I'm trying
to convey is that one cannot simply estimate numbers out
of the blue. One must first have a theory as to what
actually happened. And of course, you can't know that
without knowing the numbers. So it is rather difficult
to try to separate out numbers from everything else.
D. Spencer Hines
>medieval writers often grossly exaggerated with respect to numbers of
>infantry and cavalry, all numbers are hence terminally unreliable,
"Nobody said all medieval numbers were terminally reliable. [sic]
That is far from true." [pjg]
He can't even quote properly.
Read closely, learn and inwardly digest --- before posting.
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Exitus Acta Probat
D. Spencer Hines
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
--
D. Spencer Hines --- "Scots! wha hae wi' Wallace bled, Scots! wham
Bruce has aften led, Welcome to your gory bed, Or to victory!... Lay
the proud usurpers low! Tyrants fall in every foe! Liberty's in every
blow! - Let us do or die! So may God ever defend the cause of truth
and liberty, as He did that day! Amen." "Scots Wha Hae" ["Bruce's
Address at Bannockburn"] (24 June 1314) [1794] Robert Burns
[1759-1796]
Paul J Gans wrote in message <7bnlic$alf$1...@news.panix.com>...
>D. Spencer Hines <shi...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
<snip>
>>Pretty slim pickings. There is not a shred of really in-depth
>>Historical Order of Battle Analysis in Hutchison's account. But we
>>should not EXPECT it in a work of this sort, any more than we should
>>expect it in a literary analysis of Barbour's epic poem 'The Bruce'
>>or a Marxist-Leninist sociological analysis of the role of Infantry
>>= Good and Cavalry = Bad at Bannockburn.
>
>>This is a Biography of King Edward II, not a Military History of the
>>Battle of Bannockburn, suitable for War College study --- much less
>>a Historiography of the Battle of Bannockburn --- which is what we
>>really need.
>
>>But we are certainly doing better than the litterateurs and the
>>sociologists, who seem to have stalled out in this *terra
>>incognita*.
>
>>Can we do better than Hutchison? Well, we should at least do our
>>best to find alternate sources of Historical and Order of Battle
>>[OOB] expertise, which is what Real Historians --- Good Historians
>>--- do, in a case of this sort, rather than just give up and flame
>>out.
>
>>[To Be Continued]
>
>
>Allow me to make a few minor points. You accept the
>numbers given above without considering how those
>writers arrived at them.
Not at all. Gans is reasoning from a FALSE PREMISE. I am simply
quoting Harold Hutchison, op. cit. I've not accepted his numbers, or
anyone else's. When and if I do, I shall say so. Gans should please
put on a better pair of glasses and read more carefully and closely.
He who reasons from a FALSE PREMISE and attributes false beliefs to
another writer --- writes only gibberish from that point forward.
Once again, as we have seen SO often before, Gans appears to have SHOT
FROM THE HIP --- as he frankly confesses is his propensity --- without
having studied the posts in this thread.
He doesn't seem to have read this paragraph of mine, supra, at all:
"Can we do better than Hutchison? Well, we should at least do our
best to find alternate sources of Historical and Order of Battle [OOB]
expertise, which is what Real Historians --- Good Historians --- do,
in a case of this sort, rather than just give up and flame out."
[DSH]
<additional gibberish, flowing from false premise, snipped>
>This is not an attempt at obfuscation. [pjg]
Of course it is.
>What I'm trying to convey is that one cannot simply
>estimate numbers out of the blue. [pjg]
Who is suggesting anything of the sort? This is a Gansian "Lesson to
Grandmother On How To Bake A Cake."
<additional gibberish, flowing from false premise, snipped>
So far, I've simply quoted some figures from Harold Hutchison. This
is Military History we are doing, not sociology.
Gans, unfortunately, is champing at the bit, like one of those poor
allegedly 'choked' Roman horses he told us about.
[To Be Continued --- Stay Tuned]
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Fortem Posce Animum
Caledonicus Traductus
wil...@hotmail.com
snip some stuff
>
>>This may be a congenial argument to the Innumerate among us --- and
>>there are always many of those in any group today --- or to the
>>Historically lazy, who would prefer to be spoon-fed rather than do
>>some real Historical Analysis.
>
>Are you arguing that medieval numbers such as 50,000 men
>are, in fact, actual counts and NOT idiomatic expressions?
>
>
>>We can do better than that. We can act like Historians and use
>>Historical Methodologies, rather than like litterateurs or
>>sociologists, who are much more loosey-goosey.
>
>I wait anxiously for your demonstration. I assume that
>you are going to pick an actual situation, give us the
>medieval "numbers" and then show that the actual accurate
>numbers are discernable?
>
>Please do.
>
> ----- Paul J. Gans [ga...@panix.com]
Mr Hines,
I would like to see this in relation to the Battles
of Montgisard in 1177, Marj Ayyun in 1182 &
Hattin in 1187 --- all of them in what was known
as Outremer.(Just the Franks OOB & numbers)
The sources have a variety of numbers for each
battle & each historian I have looked at has
a different conclusion as to total numbers, numbers
of each troop type & the formations therof.
I dont have the books here, but the historians
were Smail, Runciman, Delpech, Verbruggen &
Oldenburg.
Maybe you could send them copies when you're
done(albiet posthumou(r)sly)
Illegitimis Non Carborundum
(probably inapropriate) :-)
Bill.
David Read
<shi...@worldnet.att.net> writes
<snip>
>
>Can we do better than Hutchison? Well, we should at least do our best
>to find alternate sources of Historical and Order of Battle [OOB]
>expertise, which is what Real Historians --- Good Historians --- do,
>in a case of this sort, rather than just give up and flame out.
This is how Oman arrives at his estimate for the English OOB for
Bannockburn, (paragraphing and footnote numbering rejigged for ease of
reading):-
********************************************************
On the afternoon of Sunday, June 23, the vanguard of the English came
in sight on the low line of hills which formed the southern horizon.
Edward II had brought with him what seemed a very formidable host to
a fourteenth-century chronicler. The feudal levy had been
called out, and though the self-seeking Thomas of Lancaster
and many of his friends had found excuses for not appearing
themselves,[1] they had sent their normal contingents to join
those of the more loyal baronage.
Adding the usual stipendiary squadrons of paid horse, and the king's
_familia_, with some Gascon knights and even a few Germans known to have
been present, there were probably near three thousand horse in the
field, but possibly a few hundred Iess.[2] This was a special
effort, and it is not unlikely that the numbers of Falkirk were
a little exceeded. The Earl of Gloucester alone had raised a
squadron of five hundred horsemen. But no absolutely safe
computation can be made. For infantry we have certain
official figures to serve as a base for calculation.
Writs had been issued to the sheriffs of twelve English counties, to the
Lords Marchers, and the justices of North and South Wales
The total of foot-soldiers requisitioned was twenty-one thousand
five hundred and forty.[3] No man was summoned from any
region south of Warwickshire and Staffordshire, and the
Midland contingents were light, save those of Lincolnshire and
of Shropshire, a district always relied upon for good service,
because of the old experience of its men in Welsh wars. Cheshire
and Lancashire, shires in which Edward I had been wont to
place much confidence, appear very poorly represented by
five hundred men each. And Cumberland and Westmoreland
show no figures at all - perhaps their levies were told off for
frontier guard on the West March.
In addition, writs were sent off to Ireland, at an earlier date than the
issue of the English and Welsh summonses, asking twenty-five chiefs or
kinglets to supply four thousand men ; they were brought over
by Richard de Burgh, Earl of Ulster.[4] With a few Gascon
crossbowmen and other foreign driblets, as also small con-
tingents brought by certain desperate adherents among the
Scots, there might have been twenty-six thousand or twenty-
eight thousand infantry in all, if every shire had done its duty.
But even in the best days of Edward I the English infantry
levies had been hard to assemble in full force, and even harder
to keep together when once gathered. There had been occasions
when not more than 50 per cent of the designated contingents
had appeared at the front.[5]
In 1314 there was widespread discontent in the realm, and Edward of
Carnarvon was not a popular king, so that it is quite possible that no
more than fifteen thousand or eighteen thousand foot were really
collected. On the other hand, the occasion was a pressing one, and the
national honour was at stake for the relief of Stirling,[6] so that
there is some danger that the numbers present may be under-
estimated. As to whether the Irish contingent had joined, we
have no good authority discoverable. Shipping had been
provided for them, and Barbour says that there was in the
English host "a great meinie from Ireland," [7] but there is no
mention of them in the fight. Their presence might raise
King Edward's infantry to twenty thousand men, but it cannot
be regarded as certain.
The horse was told off into ten " battles," probably (like the
French at Courtrai) in three lines of three battles each, with the
tenth forming an advanced guard.[8] We have no proper details
of the marshalling, knowing only that the Earls of Gloucester
and Hereford led the "vaward," and that the king with the
Earl of Pembroke headed the rear-battle. But details as to the
array are of little importance, because (as all accounts agree) the
host was so cramped and crushed together on the battlefield
that to the enemy it appeared all one vast " schiltron," speckled
from front to rear with the flags of barons and bannerets. Only
the "vaward" was distinguishable, the rest was one large
weltering mass.[9]
[1] Lancaster made the very poor excuse that the king, according to the
Ordinances of 1311, ought to have consulted Parliament before levying
his host.
[2] The author of the _Vita Edwardi_ gives only two thousand knights,
but has obvious reasons for stating the numbers of the army as low as
possible. A contemporary Scottish writer, Bernard abbot of Arbroath,
gives three thousand one hundred, probably very close to the real
figure. See Mackenzie's _Bannockburn_ pp23, 24.
[3] Rymer's _Foedera_, May 27, 1314;. The figures are perhaps worth
giving. They
run as follows :
Men.
Yorkshire . . . . . . . 4000
Northumberland . . . . . . . . . 2500
Bishopric of Durham . . . . . . . 1500
Lancashire . . . . . . . . . . 500
Lincolnshire. . . . . . 3000
Salop and Stafford . . . 500
Leicestershire and Warwickshire . . . 500
Justices of South Wales, i.e.
counties of Cardigan and Carmarthen . . . . 1000
Certain Marcher Lords. . . . 2040
Justices of North Wales, i.e.
counties of Anglesea, Carnarvon,
and Merioneth . . . . 2000
[4] Rymer'a Foedera, iii. 432, 1314.
[5] See in Morris's _Welsh Wars_, p. 301, the very bad case of the army
raised in 1300, where of sixteen thousand men ordered up only seven
thousand six hundred and nineteen ever reached the front. But this was
an exceptionally bad record.
[6] In the writ of May 27, the language used is very strong.
[7] xi. 100.
[8] Barbour speaks of ten "battles" in one place (xi. 155), and of nine
in another (xii. 537). The tenth battle may have been the " vaward." The
poet in the first is dealing with arrangements before the battle, and in
the second with the actual engagement.
[9] Barbour, xii. 429-35.
Oman II pp 88-90
*********************************************************
cheers,
--
David Read
David Read
<shi...@worldnet.att.net> writes
>Can we do better than Hutchison? Well, we should at least do our best
>to find alternate sources of Historical and Order of Battle [OOB]
>expertise, which is what Real Historians --- Good Historians --- do,
>in a case of this sort, rather than just give up and flame out.
This is how Oman arrives at his estimate for the Scottish OOB for
Bannockburn (footnote numbering rejigged):-
**************************************************
King Robert told off the Scottish host into four " battles "
and a small cavalry reserve. Only five hundred picked men-
at-arms were kept on horseback, under Sir Robert Keith, the
Marshal of Scotland ; the rest of the knights and squires
descended to fight on foot among their retainers-obviously
to stiffen the general levy, as the Yorkshire knights had done
at the Battle of the Standard. Bruce explained that whether
for fighting among trees, or for fighting at a marsh-passage,
the foot-soldier has an advantage over the horseman. The
" vaward " was given in charge to Thomas Randolph, Earl of
Moray, the centre to the King's brother, Sir Edward Bruce,
the " rearward " to Walter, the young Lord Steward, and Sir
James Douglas.[1]
The king himself had a fourth brigade to form the reserve, composed of
his own retainers from his earldom of Carrick, and of the men of Argyle,
Cantyre, and the Western Isles, with some Lowland troops in addition.
Normally, as we have often seen in other battles, a " vaward "
took the right wing of an army in position, and a " rearward " the left.
But the exigencies of manoeuvre would seem to have produced at
Bannockburn a divergence from custom. Randolph, though he had the
"vaward," actually got engaged on the extreme left of the line. The
whole force may have amounted to ten thousand men at the most, perhaps
to a few thousands less, though the best Scottish historian gives the
figure of thirty thousand or a little
over.[2]
The marshalling having been arranged, the army retired
into camp in the New Park, out of sight of the approaching
enemy, behind the wooded eminence now known as " Gillies'
Hill," after sending forth some horsemen as outriders to watch
for the approach of the enemy.
[1] We are not told what regions furnished the men for each of the three
front-line divisions, the only local specification being that the king
had the levy of Carrick, with those of Argyle, Cantyre, and the Western
Isles (Barbour, xi. 330-4)
[2] Barbour is, like Hemingburgh, a good narrator, but with no accurate
sense of figures or their meaning. His thirty thousand (xi. 428) Scots
are probably as wild an estimate as his hundred thousand English.
Oman II pp87-88
********************************************
cheers,
--
David Read
Steve Whittet
>
>>...'Monk of Malmesbury'...Edward's ...cavalry ...over 2,000
>>...without counting a numerous crowd of infantry'.
>>...[N.B. 'without counting'.]
>
>>...Barbour ...40,000 horse... ofwhom 3,000 were 'barded'.
>>...Oman ...'near 3,000 horse'
>>...15,000 to 18,000 infantry,
>>...J.E. Morris...'2,000 to 2,500 mounted troops'.
>>...recent estimates...2,000 horse..17,000 infantry,
>>...2,500 horse...5,000 infantry.
If this were a bid all these estimates would be in the hunt.
Consider that the high estimates may include support troops,
grooms, yeomen, swany's, pitalls, servants, lackies, and teamsters.
A supply line 20 miles long loaded with the lords food, clothing, tents,
tables and chairs, wine, candles, arrows, changes of armour, extra weapons,
would include a lot of draft animals.
A first step in making an estimate would be to address how many
support troops each side needed.Knights going into combat would
require certain services they wouldn't have time to see to
themselves.
Taking care of their horses, tents, weapons and logistics,
might easily require a squad of men in support for every
knight who fought. Barbour would then be correct, but so
would Oman and Morris who would not count support troops.
>
>>...In contrast, Bruce's army
>>...poorly supplied with the heavy 'destriers' of medieval cavalry,
>>...his knights fought on foot with their retainers
The issue is really do the retainers count as infantry.
Under what circumstances can they be expected to enter
the battle? Would they be armed for their own protection
least they be killed in the case of a rout?
Bruces third force is apparently of this nature. Was
it unusual for support troops to join into a victory?
When winning appeared iminent there would be little
danger and opportunity loot the bodies of routed
and much hated enemies.
>>...Hutchison...without...Delbruck...Verbruggen
>>...Oman estimated Bruce's whole force at 10,000 at the most,
>>...Barbour gave him 30,000 against the English 100,000.
If the support force is 2/3 the total number this sounds
like both would be correct.
>>...Scottish light cavalry numbering about 500.
>>...[N.B. Commanded by Sir Robert Keith.]
>>...latest estimate of Bruce's army
>>...between 7,000 and 10,000,
>>...6,000 were in the lines of battle.
There are four commanders engaged. One of the commanders
holds his forces in reserve. Take the archers and light
cavalry off the top as 1/5 the total force. Lets say each
infantry commander has 2000 men...10,000 total
6,000 were in the lines of battle.
Each commander has an additional 500 shock troops or skirmishers
either light cavalry or archers or both. Keith is assigned to
Randolph who holds the left flank.
>
>>...The consensus
>>...6,000 Scots
>>...facing...2,500 heavy English cavalry
>>...about 15,000 English infantry.
>>...Both sides had archers
>>...neither side had large numbers of them
>>...not a shred of really in-depth
>>...Historical Order of Battle Analysis
>>...Can we do better ...?
I would like to thank Mr Hines for his careful study of the
available data. It makes it somewhat easier to answer questions
when they are well asked. Mr Gans also has some good thoughts.
First lets look at the constraints. There are several criteria
we could apply.
How many men and horses in support will physically fit
on 20 miles of Roman road?
Taking one square mile of land as a knights fee, how many
knights fees does each king control?
How many men at what spacing will physically fit on the
battlefield with what sort of front, what rank and file,
and in what sort of organization by rank of command.
Were there corporals and sergents or their equivalent?
How many men would each command?
We are given the third force elected one or more captains.
How many men would a captain control?
How many men did a knighted gentleman control?
Would some young knights be lieutenants or the equivalent
and others captains?
What about Earls and other lords? Bruce as Earl of Carrick
supposedly had 500 mounted knights under his command.
How many Earls did Edward have? The Earls of Glouchester
and Hereford are mentioned in the battle and others are
mentioned as killed, captured or discomfitted in the rout.
With 2,500 - 3,000 cavalry we are talking about 5-6 Earls
for Edward while Bruce appears to have at least 3-4.
Can we arbitrarily assign 500 cavalry to each and then compare
that to the number given?
>...the numbers given above
>...considering how ...writers arrived at them.
>...estimates..based on ..conjecture regarding the number of troops.
>...Can we estimate
>...how long it would 17,000 Englishmen to get through the "carse" at night?
>...how many would have fallen into the water and drowned?
>...cut the size of the English army,
>...assume that they did not work their way through the bogs and pottis at
night.
With large numbers of support troops, Whiler the knights and their
squires stopped at Bannockburn for supper it is likely their yeomen
and lackies could build corduroy roads through the bogs and supply
torches to light the way; campfires at the destination, even perhaps
circle the wagons into a sort of fort and provide pickets and guards
to search out and defend against bogs and pottis as well as the enemy.
>
>...the numerical estimates depend on one's view
>...of the battle and how it was fought.
>...one's view of the battle depends on the numerical estimates.
>...some authors,...don't think
>...that the English had much, if any, infantry at all.
>
>..."How many archers did the English have?"
>...They were crucial at Falkirk
>...they are certainly mentioned as being at Bannockburn.
>...Were they so few as to be easily scattered by the few Scots cavalry?
>...Would 5,000 archers be scattered by 500 knights?
>...Would 500 archers be scattered?
>...where were the English knights during this?
>...Perhaps the Scots really had 5,000 knights
>...and far outnumbered the English
>
>...one cannot simply estimate numbers out of the blue.
>...One must first have a theory as to what actually happened.
>...you can't know that without knowing the numbers.
Estimating is a part of my profession. I have done it on both
a large and small scale. Estimating the numbers of men involved
in a battle is really no different than estimating how large an
army of men it takes to build something.
The first step is to break down big catagories into smaller
ones. One way to do that is by assigning commanders a given
number of troops and by assigning combat troops support troops
according to a formula which appears consistant with the data.
>
> ----- Paul J. Gans
steve
D. Spencer Hines
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
--
D. Spencer Hines --- "Scots! wha hae wi' Wallace bled, Scots! wham
Bruce has aften led, Welcome to your gory bed, Or to victory!... Lay
the proud usurpers low! Tyrants fall in every foe! Liberty's in every
blow! - Let us do or die! So may God ever defend the cause of truth
and liberty, as He did that day! Amen." "Scots Wha Hae" ["Bruce's
Address at Bannockburn"] (24 June 1314) [1794] Robert Burns
[1759-1796]
Steve Whittet wrote in message ...
>In article <7bnlic$alf$1...@news.panix.com>, ga...@panix.com says...
>>
>>D. Spencer Hines <shi...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>>>Hutchison, in his biography of Edward II, op. cit., gives it a try.
>>
>>>..."Estimates of the size of the rival forces ...
>>>...'Monk of Malmesbury'...Edward's ...cavalry ...over 2,000
>>>...without counting a numerous crowd of infantry'.
>>>...[N.B. 'without counting'.]
>>
>>>...Barbour ...40,000 horse... ofwhom 3,000 were 'barded'.
>>>...Oman ...'near 3,000 horse'
>>>...15,000 to 18,000 infantry,
>>>...J.E. Morris...'2,000 to 2,500 mounted troops'.
>>>...recent estimates...2,000 horse..17,000 infantry,
>>>...2,500 horse...5,000 infantry.
>
>If this were a bid all these estimates would be in the hunt.
>
>Consider that the high estimates may include support troops,
>grooms, yeomen, swany's, pitalls, servants, lackies, and teamsters.
>A supply line 20 miles long loaded with the lords food, clothing,
tents,
>tables and chairs, wine, candles, arrows, changes of armour, extra
weapons,
>would include a lot of draft animals.
An excellent point. This is certainly an important consideration.
King Robert's 'Third Force' were certainly 'yeomen, swany's and
pitalls' --- plus. Barbour tells us so.
Yes, "Servants, lackies, and teamsters" are there too.
The Teeth To Tail ratio is always important in any Army.
>
>A first step in making an estimate would be to address how many
>support troops each side needed. Knights going into combat would
>require certain services they wouldn't have time to see to
>themselves.
Quite.
>
>Taking care of their horses, tents, weapons and logistics,
>might easily require a squad of men in support for every
>knight who fought. Barbour would then be correct, but so
>would Oman and Morris who would not count support troops.
>>
>>>...In contrast, Bruce's army
>>>...poorly supplied with the heavy 'destriers' of medieval cavalry,
>>>...his knights fought on foot with their retainers
>
>The issue is really do the retainers count as infantry.
>Under what circumstances can they be expected to enter
>the battle? Would they be armed for their own protection
>least they be killed in the case of a rout?
How many folks here would put themselves on a battlefield --- but
carry no weapon, of any kind --- in 1314?
>
>Bruces third force is apparently of this nature. Was
>it unusual for support troops to join into a victory?
>
>When winning appeared iminent there would be little
>danger and opportunity loot the bodies of routed
>and much hated enemies.
That is precisely what the Third Force did. We see 'Ancient Pistol'
and 'Nym' do it in Shakespeare's Henry V, at Agincourt --- in the KB
film.
Excellent! We are beginning to Pierce The Veil.
You are certainly asking the right questions. This man is no Isolated
Innumerate.
Let's start with King Edward II's Cavalry --- that may be an easier
way to Pierce the Veil.
[To Be Continued]
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Britannicus Traductus Sum
D. Spencer Hines
"About Pentecost (26 May 1314) King Edward approached the March of
Scotland. With the King were the Earl of Gloucester and Hertford
[N.B. Edward II's nephew --- DSH], the Earl of Hereford and Essex
(Constable of England) [N.B. Edward II's brother-in-law --- DSH] the
Earl of Pembroke [N.B. Edward II's 1st cousin --- DSH.]
[This is excellent evidence for the importance of the critical nexus
between Genealogy and History, which so many careless 'medievalists'
ignore, at their own peril. DSH]
[Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke [Edward's 1st cousin] was
particularly useful to King Edward. He was a seasoned commander in
the field and had met Bruce in combat twice, at Methven in 1306, where
he defeated him, and at Loudon Hill in 1307, where he lost to him.
Pembroke knew the difficulties of the Scottish terrain. DSH]
[Edward II, himself, had the experience of four previous full-throated
Scottish campaigns behind him, but he'd not yet met Bruce on the field
of honour. DSH]
Major Becke continues:
"and Sir Robert de Umfreville, the Earl of Angus [S.] (Joint Guardian
between Berwick and the Forth and Joint King's Lieutenant and Keeper
of Scotland), Sir Robert de Clifford, Lord Clifford (Warden of the
Scottish Marches), Sir Henry de Beaumont, Lord Beaumont, Sir John
Comyn [N.B. Son of Sir John 'The Red' Comyn, who was reportedly
killed by Bruce [finished off by another] on 10 February 1306 in
Greyfriars Church, before the altar. --- DSH], Sir John de Segrave,
Sir Payn Tibetot [N.B. Sir Payn Tibetot is the 11th Great-Grandfather
of General George Washington [1732-1799] First President of the United
States. --- DSH], Sir Ingram de Umfreville, and Sir Edward de Mauley
(Steward of the Royal Household).
On the next day (27 May) the final writs, to summon the forces
required for the impending campaign in Scotland, were issued from New
Minster."
------------------------------------------------------
We note that the King's close relatives, the Earls of Gloucester,
Hereford and Pembroke are in company with him and presumably have
brought their forces.
Noticeably absent are four very powerful Earls of the Realm ---
Lancaster, Warwick, Arundel and Surrey. Lancaster, Warwick, and
Arundel, in concert with Hereford, had seen to the execution of Piers
Gaveston in June 1312.
Hutchison, op.cit., tells us [p. 77] that the "earls of Gloucester,
Hereford and Pembroke were prompt to answer the summonses in person,
but the earls of Lancaster, Warwick, Arundel and Surrey refused to
attend, and sent only the minimum quotas of their feudal obligations."
They took the position that "according to the Ordinances, the king
should have consulted his barons before taking up arms --- it was an
excuse quite insufficient to erase the stain upon their honour."
We can see them as the "Disloyal Opposition" to King Edward II ---
perhaps an important factor in the defeat of the English Army at
Bannockburn.
Uninformed folks sometimes naively see Medieval Monarchs as Absolute
Monarchs or as Fools [N.B. Both views are generally erroneous and
reductionist. But, to 'milk-dud warriors' they are psychologically
reassuring --- soothing to the *amour propre* --- the self-esteem.
Edward II, as a severely weakened monarch, did not always have his way
nor, *au contraire*, should we think of him as "stupid" --- as some of
us did with respect to Henry V in his Campaign of 1415.] --- 'Reality'
in combat for a Commanding General, who is also Commander-in-Chief and
Head of State, indeed Sovereign, is quite different.
There are all sorts of constraints, inhibitions and limitations on
Edward II to consider and analyze.
We shall, hopefully, begin to see all this, as we study the OOB and
conduct a detailed analysis of how it was summoned, furnished,
concentrated and employed --- to the extent permitted by the extant
evidence and expertise in OOB.
[To Be Continued]
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Britannicus Traductus Sum
Copyright @ D. Spencer Hines 1999 --- All Rights Reserved
D. Spencer Hines
has developed trouble keeping track of the running posts in this
thread, which I've originated. He says he is afraid that he'll lose
the thread of the argument and has requested that I number my posts.
I'm happy to comply. There have been seven posts on the OOB matter
before this one. So, I'm numbering this one as #8. --- DSH]
Major Archibald F. Becke [AFB] R.A., R.F.A., op. cit., has some
interesting things to say about the OOB of King Edward II's Cavalry.
Now at least one errant rascal here would like us to put Major Becke
up on a hypothetically postulated pedestal, as some sort of "sainted"
figure.
I'm not willing to do that --- no matter who insists that I should, or
indeed stentoriously misrepresents that I already have.
Although some milk-dud warriors and even an occasional social studies
teacher may attempt to do that, as we have seen with DeVries [That
repetitive mantra, "According to DeVries..." has worn a bit thin.]
No, Eric, I'm not talking about you.
Will someone please throw a shoe at John Dewey, or whoever invented
'social studies', to wake him up? But, I'll not throw the first rock,
not I. Never fear, Eric.
No doubt, the milk-dud warriors may wish to sucker us into a similar
wrong-headed position, the better to cut Becke off at the knees as one
of those 'Colonel Blimp-like' 'retired military gentlemen' figures of
ridicule that we see so often in leftist cartoons, including academic
fantasies encapsulated in books and articles of a certain identically
cartoon-like genre.
Real Historians don't do that sort of thing. Real Historians study
the work of someone carefully, listening to what she or he has to say,
making sure that they understand it and only THEN begin the vetting
and critiquing process.
Shoot-From-The-Hip Artists have neither the discipline, the prudence
nor the patience for such a measured Historical exercise. They want
the verdict and sentence first, to be followed in due and deliberate
course by the trial [maybe, when we have time] a la the Red Queen [how
delightfully apposite] in "Alice In Wonderland."
AFB tells us that ONE of his sources [tertiary or quaternary, no
doubt] is a manuscript "kindly presented to the late Editor" [N.B.
That would appear to be the principal Editor of the Second Edition of
"The Complete Peerage" --- Vicary Gibbs.] by Brigadier General E.B.
Burton.
This manuscript by General Burton is entitled notes on "Strengths of
Armies At Bannockburn, 1314."
If someone in the U. K. can find a published version of it, or the
manuscript itself in Major Becke's papers, please bring it on. It
may, however, only exist in the form of Major Becke's interpretation
and exegesis.
Yes, I fully realize that both Becke and Burton have been deceased for
quite some time, but that seems insufficient reason to cast them into
outer darkness without a good read. Shakespeare is dead too, but he
seems to have quite a following --- even extending to popular films
such as "Shakespeare In Love."
While I'm certainly not suggesting that "Becke in Love" is about to
become a Hollywood blockbuster, if I were making a sequel to
'Braveheart', perhaps christened 'Bannockburn', I should certainly
recommend Major Becke's account to the Screenwriters, the
Cinematographer [DP] and the Director. I'm hoping Mel Gibson will
agree to do it. <g>
What do General Burton and Major Becke have to say about Edward II's
Cavalry at Bannockburn?
Gentle Readers will recall that we have previously been told by
various and sundry experts that Edward II had something on the order
of 2,000 to 3,000 horse. Oman estimated 'near 3,000 horse' --- as I
previously reported. Barbour says 3,000 of Edward's 40,000 horse were
'barded' --- as I also previously reported.
----------------------------------------------------------
"The cavalry force which King Edward took with him into Scotland was
composed of the Feudal Levy, Paid Men At Arms and the King's Household
and Personal Retainers [N.B. *Vita Edwardi Secundi* (*Chronicles of
Edward I and Edward II*, Rolls Ser. vol. ii, p. 201 --- AFB] [N.B.
The man has a ruddy good sense of the Requirements for Capitalisation,
Don't You Think? --- DSH]
On the day when the writs for service were dispatched from New Minster
(27 May), King Edward, in his previously quoted letter to the Sheriff
of York said that he did not want cavalry because the ground was
unsuitable for its employment**; for this reason on 22 March the King
summoned only 96 military tenants. But he had not obtained the assent
of Parliament, and the Clergy refused their aid; in addition all the
Earls declined to attend, except the King's relatives the Earls of
Hereford, Gloucester and Pembroke.
[N.B. *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, *Chronicles of Edward I and Edward II,
Rolls Ser., vol ii, pp 200-01; *Chron. de Melia* Rolls Ser., vol ii,
p. 330; *cf. ante*, vol x, p.219, note "m," sub OXFORD." --- AFB]
[**N.B. "This is confirmed by a letter sent by King Edward to the
Sheriff of York on 27 May, in which the King states that the Scots
were assembling in considerable numbers "in strong and marshy places
(where access for horses will be difficult) between us and our Castle
of Stirling." --- AFB]
[N.B. AFB really sounds like a 'dumb British Army man' doesn't he?
<groak> "Major Blimp." One who simply doesn't have the brains to
understand the complex political, social and economic factors
involved, as a necessary prelude to the Battle of Bannockburn."
<groak> --- DSH]
[N.B. Odds are he's probably a Dead White [English] Anglo-Saxon
Protestant Male [DWEM WASP] pronounced "Dweem Wasp" --- as well. "To
The Dust Heap --- Along With Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels."
<groak> --- DSH]
The average number of lances furnished per tenant is considered by
some authorities to have varied from 1 to 3; and taking the most
generous estimate, we might place the English Feudal Levy in 1314 at a
maximum strength of 500." [AFB]
----------------------------------------------------
What is really important in this entire OOB exercise is not the exact
precision of the numbers, but the validity or invalidity of the
techniques and methodologies involved in estimating.
Some naive and simple-minded folks think that if we can't get an exact
answer then there is no sense in estimating and we might as well just
give up.
Real Historians, Managers, Financiers, Generals, Admirals, Planners,
Realtors, Congessmen and Women, Senators, Insurance Executives,
Architects, Bankers, Businessmen and Women know better.
You, know Real World People --- as contrasted with Academics.
Perhaps Steve Whittet and others will have something to tell us about
all that.
One might call it 'The Art and Science of Estimating'.
[To Be Continued]
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Britannicus Traductus Sum
Fortem Posce Animum
Copyright @ D. Spencer Hines 1999 --- All Rights Reserved
D. Spencer Hines
analysis of King Edward II's Cavalry.
This analysis is based on Brigadier General E. B. Burton's notes on
"Strengths of Armies At Bannockburn" --- among many other sources
available to Major Becke:
----------------------------------------------------
"Edward II engaged no paid men-at-arms, as he did not require any
additional cavalry, nor had he any funds wherewith to pay them. As
well as the cavalry of the Feudal Levy [N.B. Becke estimated these at
a maximum strength of 500. Vide, my post #8. --- DSH] there were
the King's Household and Personal Retainers (including any foreigners
who might happen to be present), and adding these to the Feudal Levy
the maximum strength of Edward II's cavalry force in 1314 would not
have been more than 700 strong.
To obtain the battle-strength of the English cavalry on 24 June,
deductions must be made to cover the march-casualties of men and
horses in moving to the Tweed and in the advance from the Tweed to the
Bannock.
There are also the battle-casualties of 23 June inflicted on
Clifford's force and those incurred by the cavalry of the Van on the
same afternoon, and it is necessary to deduct those of Clifford's
force who retired to Stirling Castle after the defeat which Moray
inflicted on Clifford on the 23rd, for they certainly did not take any
active part in the battle of the 24th; and an allowance must be made
for mounted constables of infantry at 1 per 100 foot.
If these deductions are made, it seems unlikely that the mounted force
which left Falkirk on the morning of the 23rd could have exceeded 550
strong, and in the battle on the 24th King Edward presumably could not
dispose of more than 450-500 heavy cavalry on armoured horses.
[N.B. It had not been the practice to protect the horse by any sort
of armour before the 2nd-half of the XIIIth Century, and just at first
the *couverture* was partly of a quilted nature and partly of
chain-mail, worn to protect the chest and flanks of the charger. ---
AFB]
The English Army was quite rightly composed mainly of infantry,
because of the nature of the ground on which the principal fighting
was likely to take place. To the southward of Stirling Castle the
terrain was largely tree-clad; whereas to the south-eastward, although
quite open, it was in many places boggy and broken." [AFB]
----------------------------------------------------
What is really important in this entire Bannockburn OOB exercise is
not the exact precision of the numbers, but the validity or invalidity
of the techniques and methodologies involved in estimating.
We need to beat Major Becke's and General Burton's data and analyses
against all other available data. Theirs is no final word nor panacea
on these matters.
Still, an estimate of 450-500 heavy cavalry on armoured horses for
King Edward II's battle-strength on the morning of 24 June 1314 is a
marked difference from our previous estimate of at least 2,000 and
perhaps as many as 3,000. Hutchison settles on 2,500.
Some naive and simple-minded folks think that if we can't get an EXACT
answer, then there is no sense in estimating --- and we might just as
well give up.
Real Historians, Managers, Financiers, Generals, Admirals, Planners,
Realtors, Congressmen and Congresswomen, Senators, Insurance
Executives, Architects, Bankers, Businessmen and Businesswomen know
better.
You, know Real World People --- as contrasted with some Cloistered
Ivory Tower Academics.
Perhaps Steve Whittet and others will have something to tell us about
all that.
One might call it 'The Art and Science of Estimating'.
[To Be Continued]
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Britannicus Traductus Sum
Fortem Posce Animum
David Read
<shi...@worldnet.att.net> writes
<snip>
>If these deductions are made, it seems unlikely that the mounted force
>which left Falkirk on the morning of the 23rd could have exceeded 550
>strong, and in the battle on the 24th King Edward presumably could not
>dispose of more than 450-500 heavy cavalry on armoured horses.
>
>[N.B. It had not been the practice to protect the horse by any sort
>of armour before the 2nd-half of the XIIIth Century, and just at first
>the *couverture* was partly of a quilted nature and partly of
>chain-mail, worn to protect the chest and flanks of the charger. ---
>AFB]
>
>The English Army was quite rightly composed mainly of infantry,
>because of the nature of the ground on which the principal fighting
>was likely to take place. To the southward of Stirling Castle the
>terrain was largely tree-clad; whereas to the south-eastward, although
>quite open, it was in many places boggy and broken." [AFB]
>
>----------------------------------------------------
>
>What is really important in this entire Bannockburn OOB exercise is
>not the exact precision of the numbers, but the validity or invalidity
>of the techniques and methodologies involved in estimating.
>
>We need to beat Major Becke's and General Burton's data and analyses
>against all other available data. Theirs is no final word nor panacea
>on these matters.
>
>Still, an estimate of 450-500 heavy cavalry on armoured horses for
>King Edward II's battle-strength on the morning of 24 June 1314 is a
>marked difference from our previous estimate of at least 2,000 and
>perhaps as many as 3,000. Hutchison settles on 2,500.
On this matter, the questions I would ask of Becke would be these:-
1) Is he saying that *all* of Edward II's cavalry at Bannockburn were
"heavy cavalry on armoured horses" and that there were no mounted lesser
nobility, sergeants, etc., present on unbarded horses ? Oman does not
say whether his 3,000 English horse, ("possibly a few hundred less")
were barded or not. Barbour apparently says that "3,000 of Edward's
40,000 horse were 'barded'", which is perhaps an indication of what one
might expect to be the *ratio* between armoured and unarmoured horses
for the English army at Bannockburn.
Ian Heath writes of the armoured horse in the mid-14th century:-
"Despite its rarity in contemporary illustrations (where only about 1
horse in 33 is armoured), it is apparent from contemporary chronicles
and poems that horse armour was to be found in use during most of this
period. Chandos Herald records 400 men-at-arms on barded horses at
Poitiers, while Geoffrey le Baker says there wee 500 'clad in mail to
protect them from arrows'. Froissart even claims that 20,000 Castilian
horses wore armour at Aljubarotta, Chandos Herald similarly claiming
that the Franco-Castilians at Najera included 4,500 barded horses.
Regardless of these latter fantastic figures, however, it remains
evident that horse-armour was relatively uncommon, if far from rare,
during the 14th century." _Armies of the Middle Ages, vol 1_, p154
2) Oman refers to the _Vita Edwardi_ as "giving only two thousand
knights but has obvious reasons for stating the numbers of the army as
low as possible", and that the abbot of Arbroath records "three thousand
one hundred, probably very close to the real figure". (Anyone familiar
with Oman's _A History of the Peninsular War_ will be aware of just how
diligently *he* assesses OOB's - which does not mean to say that his is
always the final word either.) Oman appears to be in conflict with Becke
in the interpretation of the figures from the _Vita Edwardi_, and one
wonders what Becke thought of the abbot of Arbroath's estimate.
cheers,
--
David Read
D. Spencer Hines
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
--
D. Spencer Hines --- "Scots! wha hae wi' Wallace bled, Scots! wham
Bruce has aften led, Welcome to your gory bed, Or to victory!... Lay
the proud usurpers low! Tyrants fall in every foe! Liberty's in every
blow! - Let us do or die! So may God ever defend the cause of truth
and liberty, as He did that day! Amen." "Scots Wha Hae" ["Bruce's
Address at Bannockburn"] (24 June 1314) [1794] Robert Burns
[1759-1796]
David Read wrote in message ...
>In article <7bt457$9...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net>, D. Spencer Hines
><shi...@worldnet.att.net> writes
>
><snip>
>
>>If these deductions are made, it seems unlikely that the mounted
force
>>which left Falkirk on the morning of the 23rd could have exceeded
550
>>strong, and in the battle on the 24th King Edward presumably could
not
>>dispose of more than 450-500 heavy cavalry on armoured horses.
Just to ensure that no one gets a wrong impression, Major Archibald F.
Becke, R.A., R.F.A., wrote the paragraph, supra.
>>
>>[N.B. It had not been the practice to protect the horse by any sort
>>of armour before the 2nd-half of the XIIIth Century, and just at
first
>>the *couverture* was partly of a quilted nature and partly of
>>chain-mail, worn to protect the chest and flanks of the charger. ---
>>AFB]
>>
>>The English Army was quite rightly composed mainly of infantry,
>>because of the nature of the ground on which the principal fighting
>>was likely to take place. To the southward of Stirling Castle the
>>terrain was largely tree-clad; whereas to the south-eastward,
although
>>quite open, it was in many places boggy and broken." [AFB]
>>
>>----------------------------------------------------
>>
>>What is really important in this entire Bannockburn OOB exercise is
>>not the exact precision of the numbers, but the validity or
invalidity
>>of the techniques and methodologies involved in estimating.
>>
>>We need to beat Major Becke's and General Burton's data and analyses
>>against all other available data. Theirs is no final word nor
panacea
>>on these matters.
>>
>>Still, an estimate of 450-500 heavy cavalry on armoured horses for
>>King Edward II's battle-strength on the morning of 24 June 1314 is a
>>marked difference from our previous estimate of at least 2,000 and
>>perhaps as many as 3,000. Hutchison settles on 2,500.
>
>On this matter, the questions I would ask of Becke would be these:-
>
>1) Is he saying that *all* of Edward II's cavalry at Bannockburn were
>"heavy cavalry on armoured horses" and that there were no mounted
lesser
>nobility, sergeants, etc., present on unbarded horses ? Oman does not
>say whether his 3,000 English horse, ("possibly a few hundred less")
>were barded or not. Barbour apparently says that "3,000 of Edward's
>40,000 horse were 'barded'", which is perhaps an indication of what
one
>might expect to be the *ratio* between armoured and unarmoured horses
>for the English army at Bannockburn.
This is a valid question. I suspect that Mackenzie might well have
something to tell us on this.
Dr. W. MacKay Mackenzie, 'The Battle of Bannockburn' and 'The
Bannockburn Myth.' Dr. Mackenzie also edited Barbour's 'The Bruce'.
There is yet another source that I think might well prove useful.
It is 'Bannockburn. The Story of the Battle' by General Sir Philip
Christison, Baronet, G.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., D.L., B.A., F.S.A.
Scot and I. Cameron Taylor (Scottish National Trust, 1962).
I have no idea as to its quality, but I have a hunch it may be sold at
the Bannockburn [alleged] battlefield site.
Has anyone read it? If so, please tell us about it.
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Fortem Posce Animum
<snip>
D. Spencer Hines
My last message, in answer to David Read, would be #10, not #9. My
error.
Thank you.
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
--
D. Spencer Hines --- "Scots! wha hae wi' Wallace bled, Scots! wham
Bruce has aften led, Welcome to your gory bed, Or to victory!... Lay
the proud usurpers low! Tyrants fall in every foe! Liberty's in every
blow! - Let us do or die! So may God ever defend the cause of truth
and liberty, as He did that day! Amen." "Scots Wha Hae" ["Bruce's
Address at Bannockburn"] (24 June 1314) [1794] Robert Burns
[1759-1796]
D. Spencer Hines wrote in message
<7btndm$d...@bgtnsc03.worldnet.att.net>...
>Vide infra.
>
>D. Spencer Hines
>
>Lux et Veritas
>--
>
>D. Spencer Hines --- "Scots! wha hae wi' Wallace bled, Scots! wham
>Bruce has aften led, Welcome to your gory bed, Or to victory!... Lay
>the proud usurpers low! Tyrants fall in every foe! Liberty's in every
>blow! - Let us do or die! So may God ever defend the cause of truth
>and liberty, as He did that day! Amen." "Scots Wha Hae" ["Bruce's
>Address at Bannockburn"] (24 June 1314) [1794] Robert Burns
>[1759-1796]
>
>>>quite open, it was in many places boggy and broken." [AFB]
>>>
>>>----------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>>What is really important in this entire Bannockburn OOB exercise is
>>>not the exact precision of the numbers, but the validity or
>invalidity
>>>of the techniques and methodologies involved in estimating.
>>>
>D. Spencer Hines
>
>Lux et Veritas
>Fortem Posce Animum
>
><snip>
Steve Whittet
says...
>
>Major Archibald F. Becke [AFB] R.A., R.F.A., op. cit., tells us:
...
This is my idea of what a quality posting to this group
might aspire to. It is both interesting and informative.
In particular, the listing of Earls, both those present
and those who abstain tells us something about the size
of the forces involved.
I anticipate with some pleasure that it is...
>[To Be Continued]
>
>D. Spencer Hines
steve
Eric P. Fein
"D. Spencer Hines" wrote:
<snip: RANT>
> Although some milk-dud warriors and even an occasional social studies
> teacher may attempt to do that, as we have seen with DeVries [That
> repetitive mantra, "According to DeVries..." has worn a bit thin.]
> No, Eric, I'm not talking about you.
>
> Will someone please throw a shoe at John Dewey, or whoever invented
> 'social studies', to wake him up? But, I'll not throw the first rock,
> not I. Never fear, Eric.
Don't patronize me.
And exactly what is it that you have against the idea of "social
studies"?
For one who appears to have so many questions, comments, and problems
with the American educational system, you appear to have very few -- if
any -- answers.
eric
--
+ Eric P. Fein +
+ waka-...@worldnet.att.net +
+ http://home.att.net/~waka-jawaka +
Steve Whittet
says...
>
>
>
>"D. Spencer Hines" wrote:
><snip: RANT>
>> teacher may attempt to do that, as we have seen with DeVries [That
>> repetitive mantra, "According to DeVries..." has worn a bit thin.]
>> No, Eric, I'm not talking about you.
>>
>> Will someone please throw a shoe at John Dewey, or whoever invented
>> 'social studies', to wake him up? But, I'll not throw the first rock,
>> not I. Never fear, Eric.
>
>
>And exactly what is it that you have against the idea of "social
>studies"?
>
>For one who appears to have so many questions, comments, and problems
>with the American educational system, you appear to have very few -- if
>any -- answers.
Mr Hines is right to question the American educational system.
Education, particularly education in the social sciences,
is a brain disease. It diseminates answers where it should
be asking questions. If a student has a lot of questions
comments, and problems with the system he is liable to be
diagnosed as having a learning disabilty, weeded out as a
child and medicated into compliance with the attitudes and
values, norms and mores favored by the consensus.
After some military service I went to college toward the
end of the Johnson administration and just before graduating
took some seminars with Dr Robert Wood who was Johnsons
Director of HUD.
I thought it was interesting that his salary as president
of a university was less than that of the iron workers who
shared the bar we had our informal meetings in.
I fondly remember the ease with which we used to talk our
sociology professors into leading their class cadres to
one of the daily demonstrations on nearby Boston Common,
whereopon we would take over the class and use it for
asking questions.
>
>eric
steve
Grub Daddy
>
> In article <36E2AD3E...@worldnet.att.net>, waka-...@worldnet.att.net
> says...
> >
> >
> >
> >"D. Spencer Hines" wrote:
> ><snip: RANT>
> >> teacher may attempt to do that, as we have seen with DeVries [That
> >> repetitive mantra, "According to DeVries..." has worn a bit thin.]
> >> No, Eric, I'm not talking about you.
> >>
> >> Will someone please throw a shoe at John Dewey, or whoever invented
> >> 'social studies', to wake him up? But, I'll not throw the first rock,
> >> not I. Never fear, Eric.
> >
> >
> >And exactly what is it that you have against the idea of "social
> >studies"?
> >
> >For one who appears to have so many questions, comments, and problems
> >with the American educational system, you appear to have very few -- if
> >any -- answers.
>
> Mr Hines is right to question the American educational system.
>
> Education, particularly education in the social sciences,
> is a brain disease. It diseminates answers where it should
> be asking questions. If a student has a lot of questions
> comments, and problems with the system he is liable to be
> diagnosed as having a learning disabilty, weeded out as a
> child and medicated into compliance with the attitudes and
> values, norms and mores favored by the consensus.
rite on brudda. day say da grub daddy be chewin a "learning disabilty"
caus i be askin da questions n gettin no word. day say da grub daddy
be chillin wit "auditory and visual processing problems". but nuna dat
meen a thang to da gub daddy. i'z got da talk caus my homeez, we be
kickin it wit da hoz on 42nd. it da way we rap.
grub daddy aka chunk daddy
D. Spencer Hines
On 6 Mar 1999, I indicated that Aymer de Valence, [c.1270-1324] 10th
Earl of Pembroke was the 1st cousin of King Edward II.
That is what Major Becke had and I should have double-checked it.
William was actually the 1st cousin, once removed, of Edward II ---
and a half-cousin.
The common ancestor is Isabella d'Angouleme [1188-1246] Comtesse
d'Angouleme. She is the Grandmother of Aymer de Valence and the
Great-Grandmother of Edward II. Edward II descends from her first
husband, King John [1167-1216] and William descends from her second
husband, Hugh X de Lusignan, Comte de la Marche.
I should have been more careful.
Aymer de Valence, 10th Earl of Pembroke, as gentle readers may recall,
is the man who defeated Robert The Bruce at Methven in 1306 and lost
to him at Loudon Hill in 1307. Hutchison considers Pembroke to be
'perhaps the most experienced soldier on either side'.
Aymer de Valence is also a descendant of William The Marshal
[c.1147-1219] 4th Earl of Pembroke, on his Mother's side. William the
Marshal is his Great-Grandfather.
Loudon Hill, a quite important battle, is discussed in DeVries little
book and we could probably profitably discuss it some day, to general
advantage. John Barbour's 'The Bruce' is also an excellent secondary
source on the Battle of Loudon Hill, just as it is for Bannockburn.
It was Aymer de Valence who escaped from the Bannockburn battlefield
bare-foot and who, in company with his Welsh troops [who no doubt
helped to show him the way] escaped to Carlisle over the bleak Lowland
moors.
Barbour says that the fleeing English 'had not leisure even to make
water'. [Bruce, 241-3].
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Caledonicus Traductus Sum
Paul J Gans
[...]
>2) Oman refers to the _Vita Edwardi_ as "giving only two thousand
>knights but has obvious reasons for stating the numbers of the army as
>low as possible", and that the abbot of Arbroath records "three thousand
>one hundred, probably very close to the real figure". (Anyone familiar
>with Oman's _A History of the Peninsular War_ will be aware of just how
>diligently *he* assesses OOB's - which does not mean to say that his is
>always the final word either.) Oman appears to be in conflict with Becke
>in the interpretation of the figures from the _Vita Edwardi_, and one
>wonders what Becke thought of the abbot of Arbroath's estimate.
You would do us all a great favor if you could expand on
the statement "but has obvious reasons for stating the
numbers of the army as low as possible."
I agree with this, but...
This discussion has in some ways degenerated into the
usual two-stools bit. On the one hand some folks are
arguing that the sources had a vested interest in making
the English numbers as small as possible (i.e. Alex; I've
argued that Delbruck had a vested interest in making the
numbers as small as possible too, but that's another thing.)
And on the other, we have arguments that the sources are
stating numbers to be 'way too large.
If one argues on the one hand, folks on the other hand
come at one. And vice versa.
Thus my request above. Why do you feel that the Oman
thinks the author of the _Vita Edwardi II_ wanted
the numbers as low as possible?
This is not a trick question. I'm genuinely interested.
------ Paul J. Gans [ga...@panix.com]
Paul J Gans
Actually Steve, as you realize, all of Becke's information
comes from the same primary sources we've been talking
about all along. Becke's work, on the face, is no more
convincing than is Oman or DeVries, and probably less so
due to his lack of experience in the field of medieval
military history, medieval sources, and all of the
ancilliary "wisdom" one gains from having studied both
the political situation *and* the battles that preceded
and followed Bannockburn.
All of which explains why no modern medieval military
historian cites or quotes Becke.
D. Spencer Hines
R.A., R.F.A., has made, using the notes from Brigadier General E. B.
Burton, to analyze Edward II's complement of cavalry.
Now, it's time to look at the figures for foot. This is a great deal
more complex and the narrative is longer. It will take a while to do
it right. First, Becke lays the groundwork:
"Practically a whole year had been given to the English King to raise
the relieving army; but 1313 had passed away without any active
measures being taken for this purpose. On the other side of the
Border King Robert realized that King Edward might advance directly
the 1314 season opened, and by this date the Scots would have to be
ready and in force covering Stirling Castle. It is most likely that
the Scots learned of the first distribution of the English writs for
service (issued in March 1314), since one was sent to Ireland.
[N.B. Robert The Bruce had married Elizabeth de Burgh in 1302. She
was the daughter of Richard 'The Red Earl' de Burgh [1259-1326], 2nd
Earl of Ulster. The supposition here is that the Earl of Ulster would
have passed intelligence concerning the writ on to his son-in-law,
through the appropriate agents. Once again, Genealogy and History are
Handmaidens. --- DSH]
On the other hand, Bruce could not be certain whether the English Army
would enter Scotland in April, or whether the invasion would be
deferred to May, or even to June. It was necessary, therefore, in
April, for Bruce to begin the assembly of his army in front of
Stirling, and by May the Scottish concentration was certainly far
advanced. This is confirmed by a letter sent by King Edward to the
Sheriff of York on 27 May, in which the King states that the Scots
were assembling in considerable numbers "in strong and marshy places
(where access for horses will be difficult) between us and our Castle
of Stirling."
It is now necessary to make a reasonable estimate of the English and
Scottish armies which were collected to decide the fate of Stirling
Castle. John Barbour, in his great XIV Century poem, *The Bruce* gave
the following numbers:
ENGLISH "Ane hundredth thousand men and ma." [N.B. 40,000 horse and
60,000 foot --- DSH]
SCOTS "Thretty thousand and sum deill mare"
These numbers merely emphasize the poet's desire to stress not only
the importance of the Battle of Bannock Burn but also the greatness of
his hero --- Robert de Bruce."
No particular surprises here. Major Becke will have more to say about
John Barbour's poem, which he has no intent of disregarding, as well
as the numbers of opposing armies in medieval chronicles --- in the
next installment.
Let me emphasize, once again, that I'm simply giving everyone here the
benefit of this narrative by Becke on OOB. I take no position on the
accuracy of his numbers, I've made that quite clear. The man should
be allowed to make his case. He has already made it on the English
horse. Some quite valid questions were raised by David Read. But,
I'm surprised that some folks are bad-mouthing Becke on grounds of
inexperience, without knowing his credentials in detail, and before
they've even seen what he has to say. That is hardly a judicial
historical temperament.
[To Be Continued]
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Caledonicus Traductus
David Read
writes
>
>You would do us all a great favor if you could expand on
>the statement "but has obvious reasons for stating the
>numbers of the army as low as possible."
>
>I agree with this, but...
>
>This discussion has in some ways degenerated into the
>usual two-stools bit. On the one hand some folks are
>arguing that the sources had a vested interest in making
>the English numbers as small as possible (i.e. Alex; I've
>argued that Delbruck had a vested interest in making the
>numbers as small as possible too, but that's another thing.)
>
>And on the other, we have arguments that the sources are
>stating numbers to be 'way too large.
>
>If one argues on the one hand, folks on the other hand
>come at one. And vice versa.
>
>Thus my request above. Why do you feel that the Oman
>thinks the author of the _Vita Edwardi II_ wanted
>the numbers as low as possible?
>
>This is not a trick question. I'm genuinely interested.
>
OK. Remember that it is Oman's statement, "but has obvious reasons for
stating the numbers of the army as low as possible", not mine. What I
believe Oman to mean, (and I would have thought that this is quite
obvious), is that the author of the _Vita Edwardi_ is sympathetic to the
English cause and has therefore understated English numbers.
In calculating the question of numbers on each side, there are two main
criteria to bear in mind; they are firstly the *total* number available
to either side, and secondly the ratio or difference in numbers between
English and Scots. (One might also add, in the light of what Becke has
written, that the ratio between infantry and cavalry and/or barded and
unbarded horse in the English army could also be re-examined).
cheers,
--
David Read
Paul J Gans
Thanks.
D. Spencer Hines
some of the results.
As a Historian, it's always useful to look at a battle from both ends.
Major Becke previously mentioned that since the ground before
Stirling Castle was unsuitable for cavalry, Edward II summoned only 96
military tenants.
We know that the Earls of Lancaster, Warwick, Arundel and Surrey told
Edward II, by their actions, "include me out" --- in the immortal
manner of Samuel Goldwyn.
Now we all know that calculating casualties in any battle,
particularly a medieval one is a very difficult proposition. Here too
we must weigh all the sources, apply our own intelligence and
experience to the analysis and not leap to unwarranted assumptions or
unjustified conclusions. Shooting from the Hip and Good History just
don't go together.
We do however have one sober English account [*Annales Londienses de
tempore Edwardi Secundi*, in *Chronicles of Edward I and Edward II*,
Rolls Ser., vol. i, p. 231] that records the names of 37 English lords
and knights who made the supreme sacrifice and lost their lives on 23
and 24 June 1314, at Bannockburn.
We are wise, when we discuss Medieval Warfare to get to this level of
detail, if we can. We often see very loosey-goosey discussions of
medieval battles here on soc.genealogy.medieval that do not get beyond
the warblings and peregrinations of the milk-dud warrior approach to
Medieval Warfare.
Many tyro historians today eschew any account of battles, because they
don't know what they are talking about --- and you won't see this
approach in a 'social studies' course.
The English lords and knights fallen at Bannockburn, according to
*Annales Londienses* are:
Sir Gilbert de Clare, Earl of Gloucester and Hereford [N.B. He who led
the disastrous charge at the Scottish schiltroms, on the 24th, taking
many with him to their deaths. He had urged delay on King Edward II,
because of the unfavorable battle conditions. King Edward II accused
him of cowardice. The understandable supposition is that that was a
direct influence on his actions. He was 25 years old and Edward II's
nephew. King Robert The Bruce was his second cousin, through the
descent from William The Marshal. I'll have more to say about that
later.]
Sir Robert de Clifford, Lord Clifford, Sir William Lord Marshal
(Hereditary Marshal of Ireland), Sir Payn Tibetot [N.B. He was one of
the knights who followed closely on the heels of Gilbert de Clare and
was killed early in the battle. He is the 11th Great-Grandfather of
General George Washington [1732-1799] First President of the United
States.], Sir Anselm the Marshal, Sir John de Mountfort, Sir Henry de
Bohun, Sir John de Rivers, Sir Edmund de Mauley (Steward of the King's
Household).
Sir John Comyn, Sir Robert de Hastele, Sir Edmund Comyn, Sir William
Deyncourt, Sir Giles de Argentine, Sir John Lovell le Riche, Sir
Edmund de Hastings, Sir Robert Botevilyn, Sir Oliver de Picton, Sir
Gerard del Idle, Sir John de Gosorald, Sir Hugo de Scales.
Sir John de Elsefeld, Sir John de Henebregge, Sir Robert de Pulford,
Sir Thomas de Bosford, Sir Reynold Deyncourt, Sir Robert de
Applyndene, Sir Thomas de Conradi, Sir Thomas de St. Leger, Sir
Reynold de Lem, Sir Robert Bertram, knight of Beauchamp, Sir John
Cabery, Sir Thomas de Ercedekene, Sir Nicholas de Vespont, Sir Miles
de Stapleton, Sir Miles de Poynings, and Sir William de Gosyngton.
Major Becke thinks this may constitute as many as 25 to 30% of the
English knights who took part in the battle of Bannockburn --- a
decidedly high percentage.
Requiem in Pace.
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Fortem Posce Animum
Britannicus Traductus sum
David Read
<shi...@worldnet.att.net> writes
<snip>
>Major Becke thinks this may constitute as many as 25 to 30% of the
>English knights who took part in the battle of Bannockburn --- a
>decidedly high percentage.
What reasons, if any, does Becke give for thinking that the casualties
in knights represents 25 to 30% of the total who took part in the
battle, and on what basis do either you or he consider this to have been
a "decidedly high percentage" ?
The particular reason that I ask the second part of the above question
is this; in more recent battles than those of the medieval era, where we
have both field returns from before a battle as well as post-battle
casualty lists available, 25 to 30% losses would not be considered
exceptional for units which had borne the brunt of the fighting. Indeed,
one would also expect to see that the front-line leadership of such
heavily engaged units suffered proportionately even greater casualties
than those of the men they had led into action.
cheers,
--
David Read
D. Spencer Hines
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Exitus Acta Probat
--
D. Spencer Hines --- "Scots! wha hae wi' Wallace bled, Scots! wham
Bruce has aften led, Welcome to your gory bed, Or to victory!... Lay
the proud usurpers low! Tyrants fall in every foe! Liberty's in every
blow! - Let us do or die! So may God ever defend the cause of truth
and liberty, as He did that day! Amen." "Scots Wha Hae" ["Bruce's
Address at Bannockburn"] (24 June 1314) [1794] Robert Burns
[1759-1796]
David Read wrote in message ...
>In article <7c1c5c$l...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net>, D. Spencer Hines
><shi...@worldnet.att.net> writes
>
><snip>
>
>>Major Becke thinks this may constitute as many as 25 to 30% of the
>>English knights who took part in the battle of Bannockburn --- a
>>decidedly high percentage.
>
>What reasons, if any, does Becke give for thinking that the
>casualties in knights represents 25 to 30% of the total who
>took part in the battle, and on what basis do either you or
>he consider this to have been a "decidedly high percentage" ?
You know just as much as I do. I've quoted him accurately. The
language "a high percentage" is his. If there were more to quote,
rest assured I'd quote it. We shall have to keep our pencils sharp
and look to OTHER good sources for confirmation or rebuttal of that
statement.
Thanks for raising it.
>
>The particular reason that I ask the second part of the above
question
>is this; in more recent battles than those of the medieval era, where
we
>have both field returns from before a battle as well as post-battle
>casualty lists available, 25 to 30% losses would not be considered
>exceptional for units which had borne the brunt of the fighting.
You'll get some arguments on this. These are certainly not the sort
of casualty levels which a contemporary American general could
maintain and keep his job.
Are you talking about Verdun, the Somme, Ypres, Tarawa, Guadalcanal or
something similar?
>Indeed,
>one would also expect to see that the front-line leadership of such
>heavily engaged units suffered proportionately even greater
casualties
>than those of the men they had led into action.
Please give some concrete examples, rather than just these vague and
general statements. Which medieval battles are you talking about?
Thank you.
>
>cheers,
>--
>David Read
Cheers,
Paul Murphy
>
> The English lords and knights fallen at Bannockburn, according to
> *Annales Londienses* are:
>
[snipped the list]
> Major Becke thinks this may constitute as many as 25 to 30% of the
> English knights who took part in the battle of Bannockburn --- a
> decidedly high percentage.
You quoted 37 (by my count) named amongst the dead, so when Becke
suggests this as 25-30% of the total number of English knights, I'm very
surprised by this figure, since the number of dead amongst the English
nobility was exceeded by the number who were captured and ransomed
(details of which are recorded in the histories as well). There were
almost a hundred of the upper ranks captured and ransomed, which would
suggest that even at 25%, only 11 knights made it off the field. At
30%, it would appear that the number surviving was somewhere in the
region of -15. Yes, that's a negative number....
Quoting Barbour (which I'm loathe to do), he reckons:
465 It wes forsuth a gret ferly
To se samyn sa fele dede ly.
Twa hundyr payr off spuris reid
War tane of knychtis that war deid,
The erle of Glosyster ded wes thar
i.e. there were two hundred dead knights, plus the following list of
major players. As potentially unreliable as Barbour can be, this does
at least seem more reasonable than Becke's figures.
In the C14th, I'd be very surprised to see casualty figures of more than
about 10% amongst the nobility unless in exceptional circumstances, such
as the dreaded A*******t, whereas amongst the infantry, figures of
20-25% are believable as a worst case. This is due to the vast
superiority of equipment for the nobility, which made them almost
invulnerable to archery except at very close range or if they were
exceptionally unlucky.
Morale also has to be taken into account - once a battle swings
decisively in favour of one side, none of the infantry are likely to
stick around to see the end. This was clear in several cases,
Bannockburn and Falkirk being relevant examples on each side. In this
sort of scenario, it could easily be argued that after perhaps only 5%
casualties on one side, morale will slip close to breaking point. At
10%, rout is almost inevitable in irregular soldiers, and it is during
the rout that the percentage can increase dramatically if the terrain
prevents rapid flight, and if the victor can follow up his advantage
effectively. Therefore, anyone quoting 30% casualty figures amongst the
nobility is extremely suspect - perhaps he was guilty of imposing his
own experiences on Bannockburn, since his most recent exposure was
during WW1.
Paul.
--
+---------------------------------------------------------+
|Paul J Murphy, Head of I.T., Gemini Research Ltd |
|162 Science Park, Cambridge CB4 4GH - Tel. 01223 435305 |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
D. Spencer Hines
The statement by Major Becke must be closely parsed. Here it is
verbatim:
"This is probably a fair statement of the killed; it may represent as
much as 25-30% of the knights who took part in the battle --- a high
percentage." Please note that he says *knights.* So, presumably,
lances and squires, who were not knights would not make this count.
I wish we had a copy of General Sir Philip Christison's book, for
comparison purposes.
Major Becke has more to say on casualties that may be of interest to
gentle readers:
-----------------------------------------------------
"There is great doubt about the numbers that took the field on both
sides in this Bannock Burn Campaign, but there is an even greater
uncertainty about the losses incurred by both armies in the two days'
fighting. The one outstanding feature in the contemporary accounts,
common to the statements of the strengths of both sides at Bannock
Burn and to the English losses in the battle, is gross exaggeration.
Barbour writes: 'In the great battle thus decided there were thirty
thousand slain or drowned, while some were taken prisoners and others
fled.' Barbour is also responsible for asserting that two hundred
pairs of red (i.e., gilt or gold) spurs were taken from dead English
knights. Other accounts are equally unreliable, and one places at 700
the number of English knights and squires who fell in this battle."
------------------------------------------------------
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Requiem in Pace
David Read
<shi...@worldnet.att.net> writes
>You know just as much as I do. I've quoted him accurately. The
>language "a high percentage" is his.
OK.
>If there were more to quote,
>rest assured I'd quote it. We shall have to keep our pencils sharp
>and look to OTHER good sources for confirmation or rebuttal of that
>statement.
Indeed. I'm sure you would quote more if there were more to quote. I can
either refrain from commenting and asking questions until you have
completed your series of posts quoting Becke, or I can ask as you go
along. Which would you prefer ?
>
>Thanks for raising it.
OK.
>
>You'll get some arguments on this. These are certainly not the sort
>of casualty levels which a contemporary American general could
>maintain and keep his job.
That does not surprise me in the least. But the question of whether a
general, American or otherwise, could keep his job after suffering such
high casualties in certain units under his command is not really the
point.
>
>Are you talking about Verdun, the Somme, Ypres, Tarawa, Guadalcanal or
>something similar?
They may be good examples, but I'm thinking more along the lines of
battles with which Becke himself would have been familiar at the time
that he wrote about Bannockburn. Thus I would point particularly to
Waterloo 1815 and Mars-la-Tour 1870, although there are many others that
might be equally mentioned.
>
>Please give some concrete examples, rather than just these vague and
>general statements. Which medieval battles are you talking about?
I wasn't talking about medieval battles; if we have such accurate
statistics from medieval battles I would be as interested as you to hear
them. As I said, where we do have reasonably accurate statistics, they
are from "more recent battles than those of the medieval era."
So, with reference to Waterloo, Becke would have undoubtedly been
familiar with the heavy casualties suffered by the Union Brigade, within
which we might focus upon the Scots Greys. This regiment suffered around
50% casualties at Waterloo. And from Mars-la-Tour, Becke should have
been keenly aware of the horrific casualties sustained by the German
cavalry, and in particular we might point to the _Todtenritt_ of von
Bredow's cavalry brigade which lost over 50% casualties.
Despite losses in cavalry of such magnitudes, and especially those of
the Franco-German War of 1870-71, the use of cavalry as an _arme
blanche_ still had powerful advocates in the run-up to the Great War of
1914-18. Again, it is reasonable to suppose that Becke would have been
entirely familiar with this debate, and that he would have read the
highly influential _Cavalry in Future Wars_ by the German General von
Bernhardi. Becke would have almost certainly been aware how much General
Sir John French, soon to be commanding the British Expeditionary Force
of 1914, admired von Bernhardi's work.
When Becke comments on the 37 English lords and knights who made the
supreme sacrifice at Bannockburn, and then comments that they may have
constituted 25 - 30% of the total of such knights, one is left wondering
whether or not he has made what seems to be a spectacular leap in logic.
How does he know that those fatalities did not constitute 10 - 20%, or
indeed 60 - 70 % of the original total. Did he have access to medieval
data that compared the numbers of fatalities with the numbers of wounded
and missing or captured ? On the evidence so far presented to
soc.history.medieval we have little reason to suppose that Becke was
particularly knowledgeable about the medieval period in general, but we
do know that he wrote about the Battle of Waterloo and World War One.
Using _Armies at Waterloo_ by Scott Bowden as the most comprehensive
modern (1983) analysis of OOB's and casualties at Waterloo, we see that
the Scots Greys went into action with 31 officers and 423 men. They lost
7 officers killed and 9 wounded, and 96 other ranks killed and 89
wounded. Becke would have been familiar with Captain William Siborne's
analysis, which is generally similar. In terms of numbers killed for
both officers and men, (and these are indeed exceptionally high losses
for a cavalry regiment on the winning side), the percentage is close to
what Becke claims for the percentage of fatalities among the English
knights at Bannockburn.
The question is, has Becke arrived at the percentages he calculates for
casualties at Bannockburn *not* from comparable medieval data, but from
the more accurate data of the 19th century with which he was undoubtedly
familiar.
cheers,
--
David Read
D. Spencer Hines
As to your question, no I see no evidence for that. Please do comment
whenever you like and tell us about other data on Bannockburn, as you
find it. I think we'd be wise to keep the focus on Bannockburn and
similar medieval battles. Flodden will no doubt be mentioned by a
savvy reader.
I suggest we continue to look at other accounts and do a comparative
analysis between what Becke says and all the others.
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
--
D. Spencer Hines --- "Scots! wha hae wi' Wallace bled, Scots! wham
Bruce has aften led, Welcome to your gory bed, Or to victory!... Lay
the proud usurpers low! Tyrants fall in every foe! Liberty's in every
blow! - Let us do or die! So may God ever defend the cause of truth
and liberty, as He did that day! Amen." "Scots Wha Hae" ["Bruce's
Address at Bannockburn"] (24 June 1314) [1794] Robert Burns
[1759-1796]
David Read wrote in message <3+DwZEAn...@dreadful.demon.co.uk>...
D. Spencer Hines
points concerning Major Becke's account. This is just the sort of
historical dialogue that we need. I'm hoping that other folks, who
have some skill in estimating will jump in too. I'm certainly not
smart enough to answer all the questions that may be asked about OOB
at Bannockburn. In fact I'm studying it for the first time myself and
there seem to be no certified experts on the issue.
We've heard rumours that Bernie Bachrach is perhaps doing something
similar with respect to the size and composition of Charlemagne's
Armies. OOB for Charlemagne? Intriguing, and one might even see some
eventual crosstalk between the issues.
Laura Blanchard ought to be a pro at estimating after she examines
some of those brick walls in Philadelphia --- and I wish her good
hunting. If we run into a brick wall, she's the first one we should
consult.
There are several books, which I've tried to secure at my present
location, without success. These appear to be good solid secondary
and tertiary sources, perhaps available in Britain. Here they are:
Agnes Mure MacKenzie, "Robert Bruce, King of Scots"
James A. MacKay, "Robert Bruce, King of Scots"
[N.B. Popular title. Ronald McNair Scott was more creative. His book
is "Robert The Bruce, King of Scots. <g>]
W. MacKay MacKenzie, "The Battle of Bannockburn"
and "The Bannockburn Myth" and "The Bruce" by John Barbour, edited by
W. MacKay MacKenzie
[N.B. I've also seen 'Mackenzie' rather than MacKenzie' and 'Mackay'
rather than 'MacKay' --- for these folks.]
General Sir Philip Christison, Baronet, G.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,
D.L., B.A., F.S.A. Scot and I. Cameron Taylor; 'Bannockburn: The Story
of the Battle' (Scottish National Trust, 1962).
I have no idea as to the quality of these books, having never seen
them. But, I have a hunch that they might reveal some tantalizing
cribs and clues to the skillful Historian As Detective, as Robin Winks
has rightly put it.
I've had some fragmentary reports that General Sir Philip's and I.
Cameron Taylor's book [pamphlet?] may be sold at Bannockburn.
Would anyone in Scotland or England be interested in checking these
books to see if they reveal any cribs and clues as to the OOB and
narrative of the battle? A major university library in the United
States may well have them too.
Yes, I realize that these accounts will use the same "original
sources" for the Battle of Bannockburn, as Kelly DeVries calls them.
But even though the secondary and tertiary accounts will be based on
the same "original sources" --- each writer has her or his own
emphases and, of course, may read the "original sources"
differently --- so we are not dealing with a uniform plain-vanilla
product here.
Sincerely,
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Caledonicus Traductus Sum
Paul J Gans
>Sincerely,
>D. Spencer Hines
Spencer, one of the things we try hard to teach
students is that you cannot create information
out of nothing. Sampling 10 uninformed opinions
gives no more information than sampling one.
All we have are the original sources on Bannockburn.
If you are interested in making your own estimates,
you *have* to go back to those sources and to the
allied records such as what contemporary correspondence may
exist.
There is utterly no point in dealing with folks who
have written secondary sources in a case like this.
Each will have his own interpretation, his own biases,
his own prejudices. And since in most cases these were
written by non-experts, each may lack a detailed under-
standing of what was really going on.
Now, experts have done just this--looked at the sources
and the other material. Prestwich studied the life
of Edward II as well as the Bannockburn material and
came to the conclusion that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to say too much that is definite.
You may think that you can do better. More power
to you. But of course, in the end you will be asked
how you came to your figures. A list of secondary
sources won't be convincing.
For example, your Major Becke, feels that there were
under 100 knights at Bannockburn. No source puts the
number that low. Further, as the distinction between
armed cavalry of the noble class and armed cavalry
of the non-noble class had long since disappeared in
medieval armies, it is hard to know what his numbers
mean even if they are right. The army, we are told
by the sources was both large and generous in the
numbers of its cavalry. Thus 100 just won't wash.
Indeed, I'd be surprised if the King himself did not
have almost that number in his household.
So, if you were presenting your work in a seminar,
one of the first questions to you would be: Why do
you trust Becke? David Read has essentially asked
you that question. Your answer was that you are
only reporting what Becke says. That's insufficient.
Why should we care what Becke says? You have got
to make a case for Becke *first*, before you quote
him.
In fact, as far as I can determine, Becke's work on
Bannockburn sank without a trace. Nobody since has
bothered with it. That means either that it has
physically escaped notice (not likely) or that
nobody thinks very highly of it. You do, preferring
it to Oman or DeVries. Thus the onus is on you
to tell us why.
D. Spencer Hines
reference to any hard historical data. He really has nothing to say.
Again, he's a drowning man clinging to a piece of flotsam. He's
beginning to experience fear. He's run into that brick wall, a real
one, more than one brick thick.
2. Major Becke is one source among many. Brigadier Burton may have
had some useful insights into OOB at Bannockburn. Exploring his
notes, as presented in Becke's paper is a useful aid to estimating.
It helps one avoid dumb errors, such as postulating a one-brick-thick
brick wall. Real Historians try to avoid pratfall blunders of that
sort.
3. General Sir Philip Christison may turn out, or may not turn out,
to have some insights not discovered by Oman, Delbruck and/or
Verbruggen. One certainly cannot determine that without reading
Christison. DeVries doesn't even belong in the same company with
Oman, Delbruck and Verbruggen and it is absurd to see his name
constantly thrown up alongside theirs. DeVries has simply served up
warmed-over Verbruggen. Were the personal contact not there, we'd not
be hearing about him.
4. Real Historians do not come to conclusions first and then twist
the evidence to fit their pre-conceptions. But cheap popularizers who
have been smoked out as liars, cheats, frauds and charlatans on
numerous occasions, often do. I've never said that I prefer any of
these secondary or tertiary sources to any other. That would be
totally ahistorical. Anyone who misrepresents that position, which
I've stated with clarity and dispatch on many occasions, is a liar ---
pure and simple.
5. A close reading of all the relevant tertiary sources, of high
quality, that we have on the Battle of Bannockburn can lead one to new
insights into the "original" or secondary sources. This is
particularly important when there are no extant, strictly construed,
primary sources on the Battle of Bannockburn.
6. Trial, Verdict, Sentence. Not, Verdict, Sentence, Fugedaboudit.
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
Fortem Posce Animum
Mary Gentle
whi...@shore.net (Steve Whittet) wrote:
> In article <7bs4tu$q...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net>,
>shi...@worldnet.att.net says...
> >
> >Major Archibald F. Becke [AFB] R.A., R.F.A., op. cit.,
>tells us:
> ...
>
> This is my idea of what a quality posting to this group
> might aspire to. It is both interesting and informative.
>
> In particular, the listing of Earls, both those present
> and those who abstain tells us something about the size
> of the forces involved.
>
> I anticipate with some pleasure that it is...
>
> >[To Be Continued]
> >
> >D. Spencer Hines
>
> steve
>
I don't suppose there is an American equivalent of 'Private
Eye', to whom I could forward this candidate for the Order of
the Brown Nose?
Thought not. :)
David Brewer
mary_...@cix.compulink.co.uk "Mary Gentle" writes:
> In article <qAvE2.465$I51....@news.shore.net>,
> whi...@shore.net (Steve Whittet) wrote:
>
> > In article <7bs4tu$q...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net>,
> >shi...@worldnet.att.net says...
[...]
>
> I don't suppose there is an American equivalent of 'Private
> Eye', to whom I could forward this candidate for the Order of
> the Brown Nose?
>
> Thought not. :)
Crazy names, crazy guys.
--
David Brewer
"It is foolishness and endless trouble to cast a stone at every
dog that barks at you." - George Silver, gentleman, c.1600