Nzeogwu, May 1967 [Ejindu]
Nowamagbe Omoigui M.D.
I am posting to Igbo-net ('and other nets') as requested. I had sent
it to Hamza already, so I suspect it is already out on Naijanet.
NAO
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Date sent: Sun, 02 May 1999 23:36:24 -0400
From: Ebube Odunukwe <"Eb...@erols.com"@erols.com>
To: "Nowamagbe Omoigui M.D." <no...@RICHMED.MEDPARK.SC.EDU>
Copies to: enem...@shu.edu, eb...@erols.com
Subject: Re: A piece of history
Nowa, This is a very valuable piece of history indeed.
Thank you for sharing it.
Would you mind if I post it ? It may help to clear up some of the
minds half set that Nzeogwu set out to execute some sort of ethnic
cleansing. On the other hand, it will be nice if you post it to
Igbonet and other nets yourself. There is something noble about
exposing the truth, especially where there is no reward to be gained
by the bearer.
In Nigeria, if our people learn that protecting their ethnic groups is
not incompatible with lauding the positive things about other Nigerian
peoples, it will only be a matter of time before we discover that more
things unite us than divide us.
Either way, I think we ought to share this information.
Regards.
Ebube
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Nowamagbe Omoigui M.D. wrote:
Subject: Nzeogwu, May 1967 (Ejindu)
This is the famous interview with Major Patrick Chukwuma "Kaduna"
Nzeogwu in May 1967 by Dennis Ejindu in "Africa and the World".
Nzeogwu had just been released by Ojukwu after demonstrations by UNN
students. [He had been detained by Ironsi since January 1966]
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Ejindu: I am glad to meet you, Sir. How would you feel if you knew
that you are being regarded as a hero?
Nzeogwu: very pleased naturally. But the truth is that I am not a
hero. If there was any famous Major Nzeogwu, I have never heard of
him. . . .
E: It is rumoured that you have just finished writing a book, what is
it like?
N: Good gracious! Ninety-nine per cent of all the stories you hear
in this country are false. I have not written any book because there
was nothing to write about. You can only write about a finished job.
It would have been a useful means of warding off boredom though, but
one did not do it for the fear that the authorities might seize the
papers. However I had enough time to make detailed notes on what
happened, and one might use them if in future there was any need to
write something.
E: Before you went into prison, the cloud was so clear above this
country that one could see very far into the future. Now that you are
out, what do you see?
N: A job very badly done. If I may borrow your metaphor, the
atmosphere is admittedly somewhat cloudy. But I don't think there
will be rain. Indeed if you look steadily up you will find that the
sun is not yet set and might still peep through. The trouble is that
people generally can't tell which is a rain cloud and which is not,
and as a result they tend to be confused. As you know there is too
much bitterness at present in the country, and in the past people have
imagined that they could conveniently do without one another. But the
bitterness will clear in the end and they will find they are not as
self-reliant as they had thought. And they will long to be together.
. . The same applies to the Northerners. It may take ten or fifteen
years for them to come together again but there is no doubt, as far as
I can see, that they will. You see, in this world of imperfection, it
is sometimes very difficult to capture the ideal. But we can, at
least start with the second best.
E: What is the second best?
N: A Confederation.
E: Before I come back to that, may I take you back to January, 1966.
What exactly happened at Nassarawa Lodge (the premier's residence at
Kaduna) on the night of the 14th?
N: No, no, no; don't ask me anything about that, I don't want to
remember .
E: All right. A lot has been talked and written about the January
coup. But how tribalistic was it really in conception and execution?
N: In the North, no. In the South, yes. We were five in number, and
initially we knew quite clearly what we wanted to do. We had a short
list of people who were either undesirable for the future progress of
the country or who by their positions at the time had to be sacrificed
for peace and stability. Tribal considerations were completely out of
our minds at this stage. But we had a set-back in the execution. Both
of us in the North (himself and Major T.C. Onwuatuegwu) did our best.
But the other three who were stationed in the South failed because of
incompetence and misguided considerations in the eleventh hour. The
most senior among them (possibly Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna) was in
charge of a whole brigade and had all the excuse and opportunity in
the world to mobilize his troops anywhere, anyhow and any time. He
did it badly. In Lagos, even allowing for one or two genuine
mistakes, the job was badly done. The Mid-West was never a big
problem. But in the East, our major target, nothing practically was
done. He and the others let us down.
E: You must have anticipated that Gen. Ironsi would let you down in
the end. Why did you surrender to him the way you did?
N: I was being sensible. The last thing we desired was unnecessary
waste of life. If I had stuck to my guns there would have been a civil
war, and as the official head of the Army, he would have split the
loyalty of my men. Again, you must remember that the British and
other foreigners were standing by to help him. Our purpose was to
change our country and make it a place we could be proud to call our
home, not to wage war.
E: It has been said that Gen. Ironsi set out to complete your job for
you. Was there anything you did not like in his administration?
N: Yes, everything. First he chose the wrong advisers for the work
he half-heartedly set out to do. Most of them were either mediocre or
absolutely unintelligent. Secondly, he was tribalistic in the
appointment of his governors. Thirdly the Decree 34 (which nullified
the federal constitution and established a unitary government) was
unnecessary, even silly. In fact. . .
E: But you wanted a unitary government?
N: No. Not a unitary government as such. We wanted to see a
strong centre. We wanted to cut the country to small pieces, making
the centre inevitably strong. We did not want to toy with power,
which was what he did.
E: Tell me, what do you think of him as a soldier?
N: I am afraid I cannot tell you that. But I will say that as a
person he was very well liked and as the Supreme Commander, his orders
were promptly carried out.
E: If he joined the Army as a gunner, he must have progressed as a
military strategist?
N: Yes, if he had, he could have done so. But he actually joined the
Army as a tally-clerk and was a clerk most of the time.
E: From the present chaos, what type of Nigeria do you envisage?
N: In the first place, secession will be ill-advised, indeed
impossible. Even if the East fights a war of secession and wins, it
still cannot secede. Personally, I don't like secession and if this
country disintegrates, I shall pack up my things and go. In the
present circumstances, confederation is the best answer as a temporary
measure. In time, we shall have complete unity.
Give this country a confederation and, believe me, in ten or fifteen
years the young men will find it untolerable, and will get together to
change it. And it is obvious we shall get a confederation or
something near it. Nothing will stop that.
E: Do you think there will be any war?
N: No. Nobody wants to fight. The East which is best equipped and
best prepared for war, does not want to attack anybody. The North
cannot fight. And Lagos cannot fight now. If they had attacked the
East in August or September, they would have had a walk-over. Today,
I think they will be ill advised to try.
E: An Englishman said to me the other day that the best thing Ojukwu
can do is take over Lagos. Do you think he can do it even if he
wanted to?
N: Yes, I think the East is strong enough to do if they want to. But
it will serve no useful purpose. It can only serve to destroy life
and property. You see, the effective power does not lie in Lagos but
in Kaduna, and if you remove Gowon somebody else will take his place.
If you capture the South against the North, all you can achieve is
civil war, disintegration and border clashes.
E: Finally, let me come to the controversy over your release. Much
as it has been a popular action you have been released by the East
government against the wish of the Federal government. What do you
say to that?
N: All I can say is that I am happy and grateful to be out. We feel
grateful to the Nsukka students for their persistent demand, and to
the boys in the barracks for their pressure on the authorities in the
East. And to the Nigerian public in general for their concern over
our welfare.
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POST-SCRIPT: Biafra was declared a few weeks after this interview on
May 30, 1967. The civil war began on July 6, 1967. Denied any
Biafran command appointment, Nzeogwu started engaging in voluntary
ad-hoc reconnaisance operations with small groups of soldiers. He died in
a bridge ambush on July 29, 1967 near Nsukka and was buried with full
military honors at the Military Cemetry, Kaduna. Ojukwu invaded the
Midwest on August 9, 1967 on his way to the West and Lagos. Ifeajuna
was executed on September 25, 1967 by Ojukwu for his role in Operation
'Kinshasha special'. The civil war ended ("officially") on Jan 15, 1970.
Tim Onwuategwu was murdered shortly after the war ended. The only
surviving member of the original "five majors" is Adewale Ademoyega.
[Donatus Okafor was killed during the July 29, 1966 mayhem]
Gowon was overthrown on July 29, 1975. Today, courtesy, not only of
Obasanjo, his friend, but also other military rulers, Nigeria is a country
with a strong center and many small and weak states (as Nzeogwu had
wanted). It remains to be seen whether this controversial set-up will endure.
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