MADIEBO PART 3: The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War
Anigbogu, Julian
>
Bolaji,
Chief Instructor, NMTC - Major C.K. Nzeogwu [East]
^^^^^
^^
Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu was from the MidWest like Col. Ejoor.
He was from Okpanam. Okpanam was never part of Eastern Nigeria. Before
the MidWestern region was created, Nzeogwu was from the Igbo-part of the
Western Region. Okpanam is a town on the Benin - Onitsha road is reached
just before Asaba. Asaba happens to be the last city before the East and
so the bridge across the Niger, joining it to Onitsha has always been
the traditional boundary with the East (whether between the West and the
East or later the MidWest and the East).
This excerpt made for interesting reading. What I'm wondering about is,
if there were senior officers left after the coup of Jan '66 and the
counter coup 6 months later, what was this quarel between Gowon and
Ojukwu, who were both Lt. Col. Although Ironsi, Ademulegun and Maimalari
all lost their lives, what happened to Col. Largema and Col. Yakubu Pam.
I left out Col. Ejoor and Brig. Ogundipe since the didn't come from the
"right" tribes. I guess that our problems really didn't start today.
The initial power struggle clearly seems to have been between the Igbo
(whether from the East or West) and the North (not Hausa since Gowon
and Pam were not Hausa) with everybody else on the sidelines.
We can only wish now that the Jan '66 was done right. Unfortunately it
wasn't and that lead to the counter coup of July '66, which we are still
suffering from. One thing that we still haven't learnt from is that we
need to stand up and be counted when the going is rough. One shouldn't
just come to share in the spoils. Kaduna Nzeogwu and his friends might
have had the best of intentions in trying to de-politicise the army but
some participants in the Jan '66 coup clearly goofed. We're paying the
price now. If what Madiebo wrote is true, then we clearly have a problem
which no one is talking about. How do we fix it if we don't acknowledge
it is there.
Regards,
Julian C. Anigbogu Schlumberger Austin
Product Center
Internet: anig...@slb.com 8311 North FM 620 Road
512-331-3420(voice) Austin, Texas 78726
512-331-3059(fax) U.S.A
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Mobolaji E. Aluko [SMTP:mal...@CLDC.HOWARD.EDU]
>Sent: Thursday, January 30, 1997 12:02 AM
>
>==================================================================
>
> The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War
>
> Major-General Alexander A. Madiebo, Rtd.
> Commander Biafran Army
>
>Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu (1980), 411 pages
>
>A TEN-PART SERIALIZATION - PART 3
>
>NOTE 1
>
>Chapters 1 & 2 of Madiebo's book are filled with information on the
>officers in charge of various, but not all, the military units. The
>following can be gleaned of various positions just before the January 1966
>coup:
.- soc.history.african.biafra is a moderated newsgroup. -.
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Mobolaji E. Aluko
Wemimo:
The ADDENDUM to Part 3 (Luckham's list), I believe, addresses some of your
concerns in respect to the inaccuracy that you noted below. In fact, if
the "81 officers" had additionally read "above a certain rank e.g. Major
or Lt. Colonel", it would have been closer to Luckham's numbers, give or
take differences in dates of promotion.
I just thought that I should remark that if you look at your list below, I
have starred (***) the names of those who appear in Luckham's list. The
others might have been officers who were commissioned after 1961 (the last
such date in Luckham), or who somehow were omitted by Luckham. Note that
there is a whole slew of officers, overwhelmingly Igbo, that were killed
in the July 1966 coup who do not feature at all in Luckham's list.
Take care, and enjoy your "vacation."
Bolaji
PS: In the ADDENDUM, the following officers killed in the July 1966
coup should have been starred, and were not starred inadvertently:
** Idika
** Egere
** Okoye
On Sun, 2 Feb 1997, W. Azeez wrote:
Previously, Bolaji Aluko wrote, in part, the following:
> NOTE 2
> >
> >Sources quote that there were about 81 officers in the Nigerian Army just
> >before the January 1966 coup. Of these, about 51 were from the East, 20
> >from the North and 10 from the West. From the West, in addition to 3
> >killed during the January 1966 coup (Ademulegun, Sodeinde and Major
> >Adegoke), the others included Brigadier Ogundipe, Col. Fajuyi, Col.
> >Adebayo, Major Ademoyega, Lt. Col Victor Banjo, Captain Adeleke and
> >Lieutenant Femi Oyewole.
Mobolaji E. Aluko
==================================================================
The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War
Major-General Alexander A. Madiebo, Rtd.
Commander Biafran Army
Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu (1980), 411 pages
A TEN-PART SERIALIZATION - PART 3
==================================================================
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
MILITARY BACKGROUND
(page 8 ff)
When I joined what is now the Nigerian Army as an officer cadet in 1954,
it was merely a part of an all-embracing British Western African Army
called the ROyal West Africa Frontier Force (RWAFF). This force included
the armies of Nigeria, Gold Coast (now Ghana), Sierra Leone and Gambia.
THen there were eight indigenous Nigerian officers in the entire Army, the
rest being British officers. Even at that stage, it was already clear to
a few Nigerians and, of course, to the British authorities that the future
stability of a nation such as Nigeria depended to a large extent on the
existence of a reliable army. It was also obvious that only the group
that controlled the Army could aspire to run a stable Nigerian Government.
Unlike politics where the people thought they knew their rights and quite
often fought for them successfully, the average Souther Nigerian had
little interest in the Army. It was therefore easy for a few interested
persons to do whatever they wanted with the Army without being challenged,
and the British Government, being among the interested, took full
advantage of the situation. For a start, they saw to it that almost all
military installations were concentrated in one area of the country. To
illustrate this fact, below is a list of major military installations in
Nigeria and their locations, before the January 1966 coup:
Northern Nigeria
3rd Battalion Kaduna
5th Battalion Kano
1 Field Battery (Artillery) Kaduna
88 Transport Regiment Kaduna
Nigeria Military Academy Kaduna
Ordnance Depot Kaduna
44 Military Hospital Kaduna
Nigeria Military Training College Kaduna
Reconnaissance Squadron and Regimental
Headquarters Kaduna
6th Battalion (under formation) Kaduna
Ammunition Factory Kaduna
Recruit Training Depot Zaria
Nigeria Military School (NMS) Zaria
Western Nigeria
4th Battalion Ibadan
2 Field Battery (Artillery) Abeokuta
2 Reconnaissance Squadron Abeokuta
Eastern Nigeria
1st Battalion Enugu
There were no military units in Midwestern Nigeria and those in Lagos were
either administrative or ceremonial. Both the 2 Field Battery and the 2
Reconnaissance Squadron in Abeokuta in Western Nigeria were mover there
from Kaduna in 1965, after the political coming into being of the
Sardauna-Akintola alliance. [SEE NOTE 1]
To some senior military officers of Southern Nigeria origin this
concentration of military establishments in one part of Nigeria did not
appear as a mere coincidence, and so they sounded a note of warning to
some Southern Nigeria politicians and leaders who where invariably
uninterested. Thus, in 1964, the late Lt. Colonel Arthur Unegbe, then
the Quartermaster-General fought a one-man futile battle to prevent the
establishment of the 6th Battalion in Kaduna, and almost lost his job in
the process.
With all major military installations safely in Northern hands, the next
phase of the operation to gain control of the Army was to secure absolute
majority within the rank and file of the Army itself. Here the problems
were formidable for the British Government because with the unlimited
opportunities awaiting them in the fields of politics and administration,
the Northerners showed little or no interest in the Army. The ethnic
quote system of recruitment into the Army, which was introduced shortly
before Independence, provided the solution to the problem. Under this
system, whenever new recruits were needed for the Army, Northern Nigeria
would provide 60 percent, Eastern and Western Nigeria, 15 percent each,
and Midwestern Nigeria, 10 percent. The North could hardly fill their
quota and some Southerners took advantage of the situation by passing for
Northerners and thus getting recruited into the Army. In the name of
"ethnic balance" military hospitals were staffed with doctors trained in
Kano for about three years in preference to doctors of Southern Nigeria
origin with internationally recognised diplomas. [SEE NOTE 2]
The result of this system was that standards fell within the Army and
soldiers became politically conscious. In order to ensure the loyalty of
the military majority thus established, the criterion for promotion and
advancement in the Army was based more on political considerations than on
efficiency or competence. Thus, a course mate of mine, just for coming
from the privileged part of the country, was able to attain the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel and to attend all available courses in military
training colleges in Britain without even bothering to take the compulsory
local "Captain to Major" promotion examination in Nigeria. At the same
time his colleagues who trained with him in the Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst were still Captains.
This situation forced some Southern officer who were politically conscious
to identify themselves openly with political parties and politicians, in
order to gain military promotions and appointments without any hinderance.
Junior officers hoined in the bitter struggle for military success through
politics - a massive exercise which reduced the Army and its promotions to
a ridiculous farce. It could best be described as a football pool in
which rich dividends were paid out to successful stakers.
For soldiers of Northern Nigeria origin, the question of political
alignment posed no problems for they were by birth aligned to the
privileged political establishment. Indeed, it was risky for a Southern
Nigeria commanding officer to punish a Northern soldier for fear of being
accused of victimisation. For instance in 1964, I sentenced a Northern
soldier to 14 days imprisonment for being drunk on duty. This soldier
wrote a petition to the Minister of State for Army - a Northern Nigerian -
accusing me of victimisation. It took me well over six weeks to clear
myself by justifying the punishment. Ironically, three years later, in
1967, during the Biafra-Nigeria war, I was astonished to meet this same
soldier in Biafra. He confessed he had been a fake Northern Nigerian all
the time he was in the Nigerian Army.
The height of political manoeuvering among the military came when the
commander of the First Brigade, Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun, a Yoruba,
closely identified himself with the Northern Peoples Congress, in 1964,
hoping by this move to achieve his ambition of becoming the first
indigenous General Officer to command the Nigeria Army on the departure of
the last British General. In his eagerness to demonstrate his loyalty to
the party, he consented to the request of the Northern Nigeria Premier,
the Sardauna of Sokoto, for troops to be sent to the Tiv Division to quell
the political riots without clearance from the Army Headquarters in Lagos.
The Commanding Officer of the 5th Battalion, Lt. Colonel Unegbe, whose
troops were to be sent, opposed the move, insisting on the need for proper
procedure. He not only failed to stop the move, but was immediately
relieved of his command and posted to Lagos on the orders of the Sardauna.
Major Michael Okwechime and I also made our views on the matter known
publicly, and this made life uncomfortable in the Army for both of us
until the death of Brigadier Ademulegun during the coup of January, 1966.
As the division within the Army widened, intensified by the unofficial
move of troops to the Tiv Division, Major Nzeogwu once met Colonel Unegbe
and myself in the former's office in Kaduna, and while speaking on the
subject advised that we "go easy with the Brigadier, for when the strong
wind blows, all the grass bends low to allow it to pass." This proverb
was not sufficiently clear enough to enable us to have an idea of what the
Major was referring to. How closely Brigadier Ademulegun and the Sardauna
were working at this time can be illustrated by this story told by Lt.
Colonel David Ejoor shortly before the January 1966 coup.
Colonel Ejoor, a Midwestern Nigerian, who was the senior General Staff
Officer (GSO) at Army Headquarters, while on official tour of the First
Brigade, paid a courtesy call on Brigadier Ademulegun one Sunday morning.
The Brigadier was upstairs when he arrived but a big, and rather richly
dressed Northerner was sitting on the carpet in the living room. Colonel
Ejoor completely ignored this man and sat on a chair cross-legged reading
a magazine while he waited for the Brigadier to come downstairs. When the
Brigadier came down, he introduced the man on the carpet to Ejoor as Sir
Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and Premier of Northern Nigeria.
The Colonel was frightened out of his wits, and after a trembling
handshake, he staggered out of the back door and disappeared in utter
confusion.
Ademulegun's close political association with the Sardauna made him rather
too confident about his chances of superceding Brigadier Ironsi as the
next General Officer Commanding (GOC) and, in a army where competence and
seniority were of no real value, his confidence seemed quite reasonable.
However, he probably talked and boasted too much to the embarrassment of
his political supporters and benefactors. When the time for the
appointment eventually came, Ademulegun did quite a lot of open
campaigning to strengthen his position. Thus, Ademulegun, with the help
of the Sardauna, fought and succeeded in having Ironsi, who had just
returned from the Congo as a General, revert to the rank of Brigadier.
Then using the Northern Government press and radio, he widely publicised
his curriculum vitaie and that of Ironsi, making sure that his was the
more impressive. The bulk of the Southern Army split into two opposing
sides to campaign for Ademulegun and Ironsi, the latter of whom showed
little interest in the exercise.
Ironsi was eventually appointed the GOC on the advice of Brigadier
Maimalari but the struggle had created a permanent division in the Army.
Some officers, however, preferred to be neutral for, apparently, they
considered a "coup d'etat" the only way of restoring the country's
political and military situation to normalcy. These neutral officers,
acting as umpries, saw no possibility of a return to normalcy through the
democratic means unless there was a change of the Federal Government. In
Nigeria, like most parts of Africa, where the policy is "once in power,
always in power", only force could remove the government. It was not
enough for the North to gain full control of the Army, it also went a step
further to use that Army with abandon for the benefit of the Region
exclusively. For instance, the Reconnaissance Squadron under Major Robert
Scoot, between 1958 and 1960 when I served in the unit, did nothing but
carry out the wishes of the Northern Government. Major Scott who, as
Lieutenant Colonel, served in the British Embassy in Lagos as the Military
Attache during the Civil War, was at that time a personal friend of the
Sardauna, and therefore very influential among the Northern civil servants
and politicians. In 1958, a part of this unit, under my command,
conducted an operation throughout the Northern Region designed to
exterminate the Quitia birds that destroyed grain. In 1959, I agin took a
part of this unit to the Northern Camerouns (now Sardauna Province) to
destroy lions alleged to be killing cattle in the Mambila Plateau. Apart
from those specific tasks, the Army carried out "flag matches" all the
year round in the Northern Region to reassure their leaders - privileges
which were not extended to the South.
The involvement of the army in politics took a turn for the worse during
the Western Nigeria Parliamentary elections in October, 1965. The
Commanding Officer of the 4th Battalion at Ibadan was alleged to have
arranged for a training cadre on how to use military automatic weapons for
Chief Samuel Akintola, the Premier of Western NIgeria, and his Ministers.
The Premier was later killed in the January 1966 coup. THe malpractices
that were alleged during the Western Regional elections were possible only
because the Army was said to have encouraged the dumping of ballot papers
into the boxes in the polling booths by supportes of Akintola while they
intimidated supporters of the opposing AG. I paid a one-day visit to
Abeokuta during the elections and discovered that the Army was far from
being impartial in its role of ensuring fair play. It had become clear
that Nigeria was overdue for a change.
By October 1965, rumours of an impending coup were already circulating
within the country. A circular letter was passed around all army units to
alert commanders to the possibility of a coup. Major C.K. Nzeogwu, the
Chief Instructor at the Nigeria Military Training College (NMTC) had been
preparing for a demonstration exercise since October 1965. For this
exercise, he sought and had the authority of First Brigade Headquarters to
have elements of all army units in Kaduna represented in the demonstration
team. For this reason, Nzeogwu had for this exercise, in addition to
troops of the NMTC, a Company of 3rd Battalion, a troop of guns, one
engineer troop, one reconnaissance troop and representatives of other
support arms and services.
=========================================================================
MOBOLAJI ALUKO NOTES ON PART 3
==========================================================================
NOTE 1
Chapters 1 & 2 of Madiebo's book are filled with information on the
officers in charge of various, but not all, the military units. The
following can be gleaned of various positions just before the January 1966
coup:
**General Officer Commanding (GOC) - Brigadier Aguiyi-Ironsi [East]
*Commander, 1st Brigade - Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun [West]
*Commander, 2nd Brigade - Brigadier Zakari Maimalari [North]
Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion - Lt. Col. George Kurubo [East]
*Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion - Col. Largema [North]
Commanding Officer, 5th Battalion - Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu [East]
**Second-In-Command, 3rd Battalion - Major Israel Okoro [East]
*Quartermaster-General - Lt. Col. Arthur Unegbe [East]
*Adjutant-General, Army Headquarters - Colonel Yakubu Pam [North]
General Staff Officer (GSO), Army HQ - Col. David Ejoor [MidWest]
Staff Officer, Army HQ - Major Christian Anuforo [East]
*Commandant, Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) - Col. Ralph
Sodeinde [West]
Chief Instructor, NMTC - Major C.K. Nzeogwu [East]
Inspector, Reconnaissance Regiment - Major Hassan Katsin [North]
Military Attache, Nigerian High Commission, London - Col. Conrad
Nwawo [East]
* Killed in January 1966 Coup
** Killed in July 1966 Coup
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE 2
Sources quote that there were about 81 officers in the Nigerian Army just
before the January 1966 coup. Of these, about 51 were from the East, 20
from the North and 10 from the West. From the West, in addition to 3
killed during the January 1966 coup (Ademulegun, Sodeinde and Major
Adegoke), the others included Brigadier Ogundipe, Col. Fajuyi, Col.
Adebayo, Major Ademoyega, Lt. Col Victor Banjo, Captain Adeleke and
Lieutenant Femi Oyewole.
Picture on Page 30 of Madiebo's book shows:
"General Ironsi watching a mortar concentration at Kachia near Kaduan in
1966, shortly before his overthrow. Some of the officers shown are
(from left to right): Lt. Col. Imo, Major Obioha, Lt. Col. Okoro (with
umbrella), Lt. Col. A. Madiebo, Major Ogbemudia (with map), Col.
Bassey, Major General A. Ironsi, Lt. Col. O. Kalu, Lt. Col. M. Shuwa,
Lt. Col. J. Akagha, etc."
Other officers of Eastern origin of note not mentioned so far include
Major E. Aghanya, Major. H. Chukwuka, Major E. Ifeajuna, Major D. Okafor,
Major T.C. Onwuatuegwu, Maj. J. Obienu, Major Chudi Sokei, Major T. E.
Nzegwu, Major I. Ekanem, Major P.C. Obi, and several others.
Almost half of the Eastern officer corps was killed in the July 1966 coup.
==============================================================================
Johnson Agbinya
Disclaimer:
NO information in this table belongs to me. All that
I have done is reproduce the table as it is - bearing
only difficulties in typing some characters over the
keyboard
(Johnson I Agbinya).
Who Was Who of Nigerian Army as of 1966.
Part III
Origins, training and promotions up to 1966 of officers in 1944 to 1961
cohorts (From: "The Nigerian Military', by Robin Luckham, Cambridge
University Press, pp. 343-346).
length of time of promotion from
date of commision to the rank
stated (months)
/----------------------------\
CohortName Trg ST Region YC Lt Cpt MJ ltC Col. Brig. MG
1959 Muritala S'hs N 1961 7 28 - -
Mohammed
1959 Haruna S'hs N 1961 7 26 - -
1959 Kalu NCO psc Ibo(E) 1961 0 25 47 -
1959 Ogbemudia NCO MW 1961 0 36 - -
1959 Ayo-Ariyo NCO Yor. 1961 0 27 50 -
1959 Daramola NCO Yor. 1961 0 36 - -
1959 Imadomiwiyi NCO Yor. 1961 0 24 - -
1959 Ochefu NCO N 1961 0 36 - -
1959 B. Usuman NCO N 1961 0 36 - -
1959 Afiegbe NCO MW 1961 0 ? - -
1959 Iwe NCO Ibo 1961 0 30 - -
1959 Nnamani NCO Ibo 1961 0 27 - -
1959 Ademoyega Grad. Yor. 1962 ? 19 - -
1960 Aniebo S.S. Ibo(MW) 1960 18 48 60 -
1960 Kyari S.S. N 1960 18 48 - -
1960 Ohanehi S.S. Ibo(E) 1960 11 42 - -
1960 Agbazue S.S. Ibo 1960 14 - - -
1960 Omananyi S.S. N 1960 18 42 - -
1960 Jalo S.S. N 1960 17 46 - -
1960 Orogbu S.S. E? 1960 17 46 - -
1960 Odiwo S.S. MW? 1960 16 41 to Air Force 1965
1960 Obienu S.S. Ibo(MW) 1961 8 27 39 -
1960 M. Usman S'hs N 1961 8 27 to Air Force 1965
1960 Emelifonwu S'hs Ibo(E) 1961 8 ? - -
1960 Johnson S'hs Yor. 1961 2 23 - -
1960 Aisida S'hs Yor. 1962 1 25 - -
1960 Alao S'hs Yor.(N) 1962 1 ? to Air Force 1965
1960 Ally S'hs E 1962 1 22 - -
1960 Isong S'hs E 1962 1 24 - -
1960 Obada S'hs MW 1962 1 25 - -
1960 Onifade NCO Yor. 1962 1 25 - -
1960 Ogunro NCO Yor. 1962 1 39 to Air Force 1965
1961 Oluleye S.S. Yor. 1961 16 45 - -
1961 Okon S.S. E 1961 10 42 - -
1961 Obioha S.S. Ibo 1961 16 45 - -
1961 Apolo S.S. N 1961 18 48 - -
1961 Bamigboye S.S. Yor.(N) 1961 18 48 - -
1961 Alabi S.S. Yor.(N) 1961 18 50 - -
1961 Adamu S.S. N 1961 18 48 - -
1961 Abisoye S.S. Yor.(N) 1961 18 48 - -
1961 Obeya S.S. N 1961 18 48 - -
1961 Danjuma S.S. N 1961 18 48 - -
1961 Shande S.S. N 1961 17 - - -
1961 Okoye S.S. Ibo(E) 1961 27 - - -
1961 Armah S.S. Ibo? 1961 27 - - -
MW?
1961 A.Abubakar S.S. N 1961 13 38 - -
1961 G.A.Yakubu S.S. N 1961 27 - - -
1961 Bajowa S.S. Yor. 1961 27 - - -
1961 Oji S.S. Ibo 1961 27 - - -
1961 Iweanya S.S. Ibo 1961 27 - - -
1961 Idika S.S. Ibo 1961 27 - - -
1961 Ihidigbo S'hs Ibo 1962 3 27 - -
1961 Uwakwe S'hs Ibo 1962 3 27 - -
1961 Gbulie S'hs Ibo(E) 1962 3 27 - -
1961 Akinrade S'hs Yor. 1962 3 27 - -
1961 Eremebo S'hs MW 1962 3 27 - -
1961 Anekwe S'hs Ibo 1963 2 - - -
1961 Nwobosi S'hs Ibo(E) 1963 2 - - -
1961 Egere S'hs Ibo 1963 2 - - -
1961 Remawa S'hs N 1963 2 - - -
1961 Olehi NCO Yor.? 1963 7 - - -
1961 Tiku NCO N 1962 ? 28 - -
******************** end of Part III ************************
Comment: It is more than likely the last but one officer "Olehi" is an
Idoma chap - a northerner (Johnson I Agbinya).
********* end of Part III ***************
Acronyms
********
S'hs for Sanhurst
Tfg training
ST staff training
YC Year Commissioned
RT Region/tribe
Lt leutenant
Cpt Captain
M Major
ltC Lt. Col.
Col. Colonel
Brg Brigadier
MG Major General
Grad. Graduate
N North
E East
Yor. Yoruba
Ibo Igbo
MW Mid-West
psc(p) Pakistan Staff College, Quetta
jssc Joint Services Staff College
idc Imperial Defence College
ss direct entry Short service training
W. Azeez
Previously, Bolaji Aluko wrote, in part, the following:
>NOTE 2
>
>Sources quote that there were about 81 officers in the Nigerian Army just
>before the January 1966 coup. Of these, about 51 were from the East, 20
>from the North and 10 from the West. From the West, in addition to 3
>killed during the January 1966 coup (Ademulegun, Sodeinde and Major
>Adegoke), the others included Brigadier Ogundipe, Col. Fajuyi, Col.
>Adebayo, Major Ademoyega, Lt. Col Victor Banjo, Captain Adeleke and
>Lieutenant Femi Oyewole.
The above information is grossly inaccurate. Flipping through a list
of books this morning, I was able to compile about 41 Yoruba officers
who were already in the Nigerian Army by January 1966. The names are
are given below.
Senior officers (Major and above) at the end of 1966. Note as many
as 10 of these 24 officers were probably Captains in Jan 1966.
1. E. O. Abisoye
2. Robert Adebayo
3. Simeon Adegoke (killed Jan 1966 at Ibadan)
4. Henry Adefowope
5. Benjamin Adekunle
6. Adewale Ademoyega (Participated in the Jan Coup)
7. Samuel Ademulegun
8. A. Adeniran (not certain that he was a Major at the end of 1966)
9. J.A. Akinrinade
10. Ayo Ariyo
11. Victor Banjo
12. S.F. Daramola
13. Francis Fajuyi
14. Mobolaji Johnson
15. Olusegun Obasanjo
16. Major Ogunro (NMTC Kaduna; killed in July 1966)
17. Babatunde Ogundipe
18. James Oluleye
19. Olufemi Olutoye
20. Austin Peters
21. Oluwole Rotimi
22. Rapheal Sodeinde
23. Sho-Sliva
24. R.F. Sotomi
Ranks below Major at the end of 1966
25. Ganiyu Adeleke (participated in January coup)
26. S.B. Akinola
27. Yemi Alabi
28. E. Akinfenwa
29. Olu Bajowa
30. Ferreira
31. Iluyomade (not certain that he was commissioned b/4 Jan 1966)
32. David Jemibewon
33. Makanjuola
34. F. Onifade (killed at Bonny Dec. 1967; also may have been a major
b/4 the end of 1966)
35. T.B. Ogundeko
36. F.O. Olafimihan (participated in the January coup)
37. Omojokun
38. Ola Oni
39. Olufola Oyewole (participated in the January coup)
40. Ibrahim Taiwo (killed during Dimka's coup)
41. Tomoye (not certain that he was commissioned b/4 Jan 1966)
Note: this list is not exhaustive.
Wemimo Azeez.