Fw: AN ACCOUNT OF BIAFRA/NIGERIA WAR; READ FOR INSIGHT!!

[ALEXANDER E. J. UKOH, M.D.,F.A.C.S.]

August 9, 1967

At 3 a.m. on August 9, 1967 (31 years ago), a column of Biafran troops
under the command of Col. Victor Banjo crossed the Niger Bridge at
Onitsha into Asaba, and launched the Biafran Invasion of the MidWest....
...Upon arrival in Asaba, they split up into three spearheads - one made
a dash for Benin-City, [the capital] the other headed for Warri, [in the
oil-rich delta], while the third swung northwards toward Agenebode
(across the Niger from Idah, in Benue State).

There had been no northern troops in the MidWest. The Nigerian Army
Area Command at that time was manned by Midwesterners, under the command
of Col. Conrad Nwawo [the same officer to whom Major Patrick C.K.
Nzeogwu (also MidWest Igbo) had surrendered in Jan 1966]. All but two
officers (Lt. Col. David Ejoor & Major Sam Ogbemudia) of the rank of
Major and above were Midwestern Ibos.

Lt. Col David Ejoor (Military Governor, MidWest), was caught between his
numerous Midwestern Ibo officers (whom he could not trust) and the
federal government (whom they did not trust). He tried to play a
balancing act by declaring that the MidWestern region 'would not become
a battlefield'.

But Gowon (alerted by military intelligence) was a bit suspicious of the
situation. Recognizing that (by prior agreement) there were no northern
(and other) troops in the MidWest, Gowon took the precaution of quietly
creating a new brigade at Okene (in modern day Kogi State). These
soldiers were under the command of 28 year old Lt. Col . Murtala
Mohammed, who had lost out to Gowon in the internal power struggle after
the July 29, 1966 coup. They were being massed in preparation for a
possible dash to Agbor through Auchi, in the MidWestern region, to cut
off any attempt by the Biafran Army to match on Benin-City and on to
Lagos.

However, Ojukwu struck first, fast and with near-total surprise.

By pre-arrangement, the MidWestern Area Command put up no resistance,
essentially folding into the Biafran rearguard. Very strangely, the
keys to the Nigerian Army Armory in Benin fell into their hands. The
two Officers who were most deeply involved in all of this were Lt. Col.
Mike Okwechime and Col. Conrad Nwawo. [Nigerian Army Headquarters took
the view that these officers were involved in a coup d'etat against the
MidWestern region of Nigeria - an attitude that affected the way they
were treated after the war ended in Jan 1970.]

The Military Governor, Col. David Ejoor, escaped to Lagos on a bicycle,
which he says he rode for 200 miles. [Later, as a Major-General, he
eventually became the Chief of Staff, Army and retired in July 1975].

Major Albert Nwazu Okonkwo was proclaimed Military Administrator of the
MidWest region by Col. Emeka Ojukwu. Later this was changed to
'Governor' of the "Republic of Benin" on Sept 19, 1967. This proved to
be the shortest lived republic in history because at 6 p.m. on Sept 20,
1967 Benin-City was recaptured.......by troops of the second division,
Nigerian Army led by Major Sam Ogbemudia under the overall command of
Col. Murtala Mohammed.

[The Benin operation was conducted in a giant pincer movement with
motorized infantry (and infantry on foot). They were supported by 81mm
Mortar Fire and Ferret & Saladin Scout Cars. One group came down from
the north through Auchi via Ikpoba Hill wedging the retreating Biafrans,
eager to avoid being trapped against an onslaught from the other group
coming from the West through Ore.]

WHY DID OJUKWU STRIKE?

There are some historians who draw a parallel between Ojukwu's invasion
of the MidWest and Hitler's assault on Austria (the Anchsluss). I think
we can find more mundane reasons, relevant to the Nigerian situation.

First there was a perception that the Midwest and West would unite with
the East to fight the feudal north. Awolowo had sent public signals
that "If East goes, then West must go". Senior Yoruba officers had
supported Awo's demand that northern troops leave their region, and that
westerners be recruited immediately to make the West less vulnerable to
the North. [Gowon actually ordered northern troops in Ibadan to
withdraw to Ilorin, but rescinded this order on May 27 when he declared
a State of Emergency.]

Second, within the first months of the war (which began at 5 am on July
6th, 1967 after secession had been declared on May 30), Nsukka, Ogoja
and Bonny were seized by federal troops. The seaborne assault on Bonny
(by Col. Benjamin Adekunle), gave the 3rd Marine Commando Division
control of the river channel leading to Port Harcourt and undermined
Biafran control of the oilfields, making negotiations with oil companies
very difficult. [Nsukka and Ogoja were taken by troops under the
command of Lt. Col. Sule Apollo and Major Martin Adamu respectively,
under the overall supervision of Col. Mohammed Shuwa.]

Thirdly, Ojukwu wanted to render Gowon's irritating May 27 creation of
Rivers and South-Eastern (Cross-River) states moot by seizing Lagos and
sacking the federal government.

Lastly, Ojukwu felt he could take the MidWest at minimum cost, because
of sympathetic officers who dominated the Benin Area Command.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

There was disagreement among key Biafran Commanders about the rate and
pace of the invasion. Col. Victor Banjo for example, apparently
disobeyed orders to proceed further West (to Ibadan and Lagos) from Ore.
It is said (but not proven) that he was in touch with Yoruba leaders
who expressed serious concern about his entry into Ibadan (through Ife
road) with a horde of Biafran (Igbo) troops under his command. They may
have exploited his "yoruba conscience" (Ojukwu saw it this way). He may
also have been concerned about an ambush, given the hostility of the
local population. So he hesitated at Ore, which later became the scene
of a bloody battle. Federal troops (using old colonial survey maps of
the bushpaths and hills, which were not available to the Biafrans)
pummeled the Biafran spearhead between Ohosu (Ofusu) and Ore.

Secondly, there were serious logistic errors. The invasion of the
MidWest represented the first appearance in the War of Biafran-made
Armored Cars converted from caterpillars. When Banjo ordered these
heavy armored units up to the front to provide armor support, they
proved too wide and heavy for the narrow bridge over the Ikpoba river in
Benin-City. An attempt was then made to bring up the armor through
Siluko road, up from Urhonigbe. All of this caused an inordinate waste
of crucial time. [For many years after the war, a relic of a Biafran
Armored Car could still be seen near the old Ikpoba bridge]

Thirdly, the Biafran force got distracted going after locals whose
support they needed. For example, three prominent MidWesterners,
including Mr. Sam Umweni (of Radio Nigeria, Benin) and Mr. Imoukhuede
(of the civil service), were kidnapped by Biafran forces and taken back
to Biafra were they remained in prison (without trial) until the end of
the war. Such actions did not endear them to the people they came to
liberate from the 'feudal' north.

WHAT WERE THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE MIDWEST INVASION?

First, it antagonized non-Igbo ethnic groups in the MidWest who became
extremely hostile to MidWest Igbos (as well as some non-Igbo NCNC
supporters who may have been privy to the Invasion). They were regarded
[at that time] as fifth columnists. This hostility lasted for many
years, possibly well beyond the end of the civil war. Thus, previously
lukewarm non-Igbo groups were galvanized against the entire concept of
Biafra, fearing Igbo domination, and rushed to get conscripted on the
federal side, offering help and assistance. [Unconfirmed folklore
states that even native doctors joined the fray, using spells and juju
to cause unusual ailments among Biafran troops such as massive testicles
!]

Second, Awolowo and other Yoruba leaders (e.g. Colonel Robert Adeyinka
Adebayo) became intensely suspicious of Ojukwu's agenda. Some of these
leaders had actually visited the East as part of peace delegations on
Mar 27 and May 5. [He (Ojukwu) had not coordinated this MidWest move
with them. Obviously this was probably what prompted Ojukwu to make Col
. Banjo the Commander, but it did not work out as planned, which is why
Ojukwu had Banjo shot later on]. Up until that time, although Awo had
been released by Gowon (from his 1962 treasonable felony conviction),
and was the deputy head of the Federal Executive Council (effective June
12, 1967), the West was sitting on the fence. They had lost politicians
and officers in BOTH the Jan 1966 and July 1966 coups (Samuel Akintola,
Brigadier Ademulegun, Col Shodeinde, Col Fajuyi etc). In terms of
factions, the Lagos group (Ogunsanya and others) were opposed to the
"Oduduwa Republic" secessionist leanings of radical intellectual inland
Yorubas; bad blood between pro-Akintola and pro-Awo groups remained; and
the civilian and military wings of Yoruba leadership were not
particularly well coordinated. However, on August 12, 1967, (three days
after the Asaba crossing), Awo publicly appealed to Yorubas to support
the federal government against the Igbos.

As previously noted, advance elements of the Biafran invasion force
actually reached Ore (in present day Ondo state). It is no coincidence
that Obafemi Awolowo (Finance) and Anthony Enahoro [Information], along
with the super-permanent secretaries, most of whom were southern
minorities, became the main civilian bulwarks of the War Cabinet - the
back office.

Thirdly, Gowon announced the end of "Police Action" and declared 'Total
War' against Biafra. The second division of the Nigerian Army (later
headquartered in Benin, then moved to Ibadan in the early seventies) was
formally created (with the symbol of a 'Snarling Tiger') under Col.
Murtala Mohammed and charged to:

1. Check the secessionist advance at Ore
2. Drive them out the MidWest, and
3. Follow them in hot pursuit.

WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THE RE-CAPTURE OF BENIN-CITY?

FEDERAL SIDE:

Murtala Mohammed became known as "Monty of the MidWest". Time magazine
even hailed him as the Commander of the 'brutally efficient' second
division of the Nigerian Army.

Lt. Col. S. O. Ogbemudia was appointed acting administrator of the
MidWestern State by Col. Murtala Mohammed. This was later ratified by
Gowon. [Brigadier Ogbemudia was retired as Military Governor in July
1975, served as civilian Governor of Bendel from Oct-Dec1983 and Federal
Minister for Labor & Productivity under Abacha in the nineties]

Elements of the Third Marine Division assisted the Second Division in
clearing the Delta region from Forcados to Warri. One prominent
officer in the re-capture of Warri was Capt (later 'Major') Shehu Musa
YarAdua, who eventually became Chief of Staff, SHQ in February 1976.
[He died in jail last December as a retired Major General]

The main spearhead of the Second division moved on to Asaba, where two
momentous events occurred.

a. The Asaba Massacre: This has never been properly acknowledged by
federal authorities. Able-bodied men who could be located (all Igbos)
were lined up and summarily executed, Nazi style, for "collaborating
with the enemy".
b. Three disastrous attempts to cross the Niger Bridge into the Igbo
heartland. Against instructions from SHQ, Murtala Mohammed (taking a
cue from General George Patton's behavior during the invasion of Italy,
and encouraged by his initial success in evicting the Biafran force
from the MidWest) tried repeatedly to take Onitsha from Asaba all by
himself, losing thousands of men and millions of dollars of material in
the process. The bridge was disabled and badly planned beach landings
repulsed with Biafran made "Shore-Batteries" and "Ogbunigwe". In one
such assault, Major Ejiga (who later retired as a Major General) lost
his entire battalion and swam back (alone) to the Asaba side on a raft.
[A young and promising officer, Major Igbinosa lost his life during
another assault.]

Eventually, Mohammed acceded to orders to swing northwards, make an
unopposed crossing at Idah, and take Onitsha via a north-south coastal
advance. Even then, he suffered one more humiliating loss at Abagana,
when fleet-footed Biafran troops ambushed a long column of vehicles,
troops and material, practically destroying the logistic backbone of the
entire division. The Onitsha operation was clearly a nightmare. Gowon
replaced Mohammed with Colonel Ibrahim Haruna who was himself later
replaced on May 12, 1969 by Col. Gibson Jallo when all divisional
commanders were recalled. [These officers eventually retired as Major-
General Haruna and Lt. General Jallo in the late seventies and early
eighties, respectively]. Brigadier (later General) Murtala Mohammed
became Head of State in July 1975 when Gowon was overthrown by a cabal
of civil war officers. After 200 days of impulsive rule he was killed
in February 1976 when his car was riddled with bullets in front of the
federal secretariat in Ikoyi. [The International Airport in Lagos is
named in his memory - the same airport he had commandeered in August
1966 with a threat to fly northern families back to the north in a move
to secede from the south - as he had originally planned - "Operation
Araba"].

BIAFRAN SIDE:

In the wake of the disastrous MidWest expedition, a furious Ojukwu
ordered the court-martial and subsequent execution of Col. Banjo, Major
Emmanuel Ifeajuna, 'Major' Sam Agbamuche (Agbam) and 'Major' Phillip
Alale. They were found guilty of "treason". One source claims that
Ifeajuna's wife and pet cat were also killed. However, I have not been
able to corroborate this.

POST-SCRIPT:

In Jan 1970, seated among the delegation that accompanied 'Major
General' Effiong to Dodan Barracks for the Biafran surrender, was
'Brigadier' Conrad Nwawo, the last Area Commander of Benin on August 9,
1967. After the surrender ceremony, Gowon ordered a Board of Inquiry to
evaluate the role of specific officers in the coup of Jan 15 1966 and
the MidWest invasion of 1967. Most of these officers were detained
until October 1st 1974, when they were released in an Independence day
amnesty. They included:

a. Colonel Conrad D. Nwawo
b. Lt. Col. A. B. Nwajei
c. Major Albert Okonkwo (the Governor of the Republic of Benin)
d. Major A. Asoya
e. Major Adewale Ademoyega (Jan 15 coup)
f. Captain Ben Gbulie (Jan 15 coup)
g. Captain E. M. Udeaja
h. Captian G.N. Okonkwo
i. Captain J. N. Isichie
j. Lt. F.M. Okocha
k. Lt. F.O. Amuchienwa
l. Lt. B. A. O Oyewole
m. Lt. N.S. Nwokocha
n. Lt. G.B. Ikejiofor
o. Lt. G.G. Onyefuru
p. Lt. A.R.O Egbikor
q. Lt. A.N. Azubuogu
r. 2/Lt. C.G. Ngwuluka
s. Lt. J.C. Ojukwu
t. Lt. J.O. Ijeweze

All were dismissed except Ojukwu and Ijeweze who were retired. Many of
these individuals are still alive.

CAN ALL THIS HAPPEN AGAIN?

History tends to repeat itself. But Time will tell whether we learnt
any lessons.

APPENDIX: LONG TERM EFFECTS OF THE INVASION

Effect On Army Recruitment Policy

The experience of the MidWest Invasion affected Army recruitment.
Before the war, the army was viewed as an unattractive career meant for
drop-outs. During the War a huge number of non-Igbo MidWesterners
joined the Army, a phenomenon which led to a disproportionate
representation of Bendel State in the Army during the seventies and
early eighties. [One middle-belt Army Officer told me in 1983 that the
barracks were 'crawling' with Bendelites]. After the war, the
experience also led to a new policy to admit an equal number (to the
extent possible) of officers from each state of the federation, as well
as each local government of each state - particular for those states
(like Bendel) with multiple ethnic groups. When in 1979, recruitment of
other ranks and men began in earnest again, a similar policy was applied
at that level, with a stipulation for minimum education. That intake
group was called 79NA.

This is the reason why the number and distribution of states in the
country is a sensitive political issue not only as it affects revenue
allocation, but also the military balance. All went well with an equal
number of southern and northern states (under Gowon) until Obasanjo/
Mohammed regime approved an imbalance with more states in the north than
the south - an imbalance which IBB and Abacha sustained. As regards the
Igbos, the mechanism through which they perceive that they have been
"contained" in Army recruitments since the civil war has to do with the
relatively small number of states allocated to that ethnic group
(considering its population) as compared with, for example, the Yorubas.
Hence the support for a return to a regional system.

Subsequent Distribution of Military (and related) Facilities

Benin-City (capital of MidWestern Region, MidWestern State, Bendel State
and now Edo State) became the headquarters of the Second Division (which
was created specifically to liberate the MidWest) until it was
transferred to Ibadan in the early seventies. The real reason the HQ
was transferred was that the West put pressure on the federal government
that it wanted a Divisional HQ. The ostensible reason it was
transferred (and cover story) was a probe into the activities of the
Ogboni Secret Society in Benin-City and Bendel in general. Army Brass
claimed the army was being corrupted! A Brigade HQ was, however, left
in Benin until the late eighties/ early nineties when it was suddenly
moved to Akure, as part of another "reorganization". The huge Brigade
HQ compound in GRA (which used to be the Divisional HQ) was turned over
to the state government. There remains an infantry battalion at
Ekenhuan on Gele-Gele road. The large Ikpoba Army barracks (at the
junction of the Benin-Asaba and Benin-Auchi roads) no longer exists.

Secondly, the civil war airforce forward operational base (FOB) in Benin
was transformed into the headquarters of the Tactical Air Command,
Nigerian AirForce during the reorganization after 1975. It remained so
until Air Vice Marshall Ibrahim Alfa became Chief of Air Staff in 1984
and (without any credible reason) moved it to Makurdi. What remains now
are a few Dornier-type courier transport aircraft sitting in the rain
near the old terminal.

The reason why there is a large Military Hospital in Benin (on Airport
road) was because Benin became an important rear location for strategic
medical evacuation during the War. That hospital (so far) remains there
today (as does the HQ (and School) of the Army's Corp of Supply and
Transport).

Agenebode and Auchi, (the springboards for Mohammed's northern flank
assault on Benin) had a huge barrack facility (cantonment) built in the
late seventies, that was later turned over to the Police, Prisons and
Immigration in the late eighties/ early nineties. The HQ of the Nigerian
Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Corps (NAEME) may still be in
Auchi, however. As for Warri, it continues to have a battalion which is
now administratively under the Brigade HQ in Port Harcourt. Warri also
has an oil refinery and is the location of the Delta Steel Plant, Aladja
. It has a modern Port. A dual carriage trans-delta expressway now
links it to Port Harcourt. Asaba is now the capital of Delta State (an
arrangement that was put in place by Maryam Babangida, expoiting her
husband's anger at the Delta for the Orkar coup in 1990). The Niger
bridge was repaired after the War, as was the famous Onitsha market
which was gutted with fire. A river-port is now located at Onitsha
(built by Shehu Shagari). Little (if any) evidence remains of the blood
that was shed there. Shagari also built a Port in Sapele, which is now
a Nigerian Naval Base (Central Command).

Roads & Monuments:

>>Certain roads in major MidWestern cities were named after key Civil War
>>Commanders (Mohammed, Gowon, Ogbemudia and others). I believe these
>>roads reverted to their old names when the Murtala/ Obasanjo regime came
>>to power, but many were again renamed sometime later in honor of those
>>who fought for the liberation.
>>
>>A statue named "Soldier of Peace" lies adjacent to the Museum at Ring
>>Road Park in Benin-City. It is dedicated to those who lost their lives
>>liberating the MidWest.

.- soc.history.african.biafra is a moderated newsgroup. -.
| The opinions of the moderators may differ from the poster's |
`- Contact moderators via biafr...@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu. -'