Renascent Igbo: Book I
Kalu N. Kalu
that I will, time permitting, endeavor to run the Qansy series to its
logical conclusion. But in so doing, I have decided to rephrase the subject
theme, and to accept by default, that the Qansy series may have run its
course in the concluding part III. Nonetheless, and beyond its wider symbolism,
I shall endeavor to proceed within the general theme dictated by that
single promise. Please read on.
If there is any single thing that we have learned in the tortured
political history of Nigeria, and in fact, in the political excesses of
many other countries around the world, it is that "opposition pays." In
the same way that opposition has its price, its rewards are also
inummerable. A simple cost-benefit analysis may suggest that the reward
oftentimes could be so profuse as to diminish within days, the sacrifices
that may have been made many years before. In the heydays of Nigerian
politics, and notwithstanding its crudeness, the Yorubas with specific
reference to the Action Group embraced the opposition front against the
dominant political orthodoxy. Their cumulative experience in both the
first and second Republics, and specifically the IBB and Abacha regimes,
have undoubtedly made the Yorubas (accepting a certain level of
generalization) the champions and masters of the "opposition doctrine" as
far as Nigerian politics is concerned. In this regard, they have played it
quite well and with great effect. But what makes it very unique, is that
they have done this without at the same time alienating themselves within
the status quo for which they have been fighting against. Either by
calculated action or by divine fate, they have done this either by
placing key members of their political elite within the nucleus of both
the "establishment" and "opposition" camps, in such a way that whichever
side wins, their loss would be minimal.
>From the annulment of June 12, the almost total demobilization of Yoruba
personnel from key elements of the armed forces, to the consequent death
of MKO, powerful Yoruba forums have continued to press on the issue of: a
national sovereign conference, restructuring of the military, political
autonomy, ethnic marginalization etc. These are crucial issues that the
Northern establishment does not want to hear, and to make them disappear
from the mainstream of national political discourse, the North decided
to compromise. It was a compromise framed and constantly wrapped around
the catch-word "concede." To "concede" means "to grudgingly and hesitantly
acknowledge a person to have someting, to allow, permit, or to grant a
certain right or permission." The connotation here is that somebody is
giving up something for the sake of peace and so the burden of guilt and
reciprocity must rest on the person to whom that concession is being given.
How can you concede when you never had a contest? The psychology behind
the consistent reference to the word "concede" was meant to sooth and
placate Southern emotions which was already boiling toward an inevitable
but decisive outcome. This seemingly innocuous word, became as disarming
as it was effective. How can you concede what you never had? Considered
alone on its singular merit, the only concession that was ever made in
Nigeria was made by the people of the Niger Delta, who were man-handled
into conceding the right to their oil. Nonetheless, I find it quite
beffuddling that the South has, perhaps with a certain stroke of political
credulity, allowed the North to extract so much political mileage out of
that single word "concede." In one brazen swipe, the troubled legacy of
almost 39 years of Northern misrule was forgoten, because the North has
finally "conceded." Again, the South has been taken.
The idea of "conceding" the Presidency to the South was a major test of
the political maturity of the North. It provide them so much bountiful
opportunity from which they could both maintain power as well as wreck
havock on the political disunity of the South. First, by enabling a
situation where the dominant Igbos of the East will compete with the
dominant Yorubas of the West, the Northerners ensured that even after the
election is over, recrimination and finger-pointing between the Igbos and
the Yorubas would continue. By throwing the presidential aspiration of
Southern minorities into the same political melee as a wild card, the
North also ensured that there would always be a perennial voice of
political discontent within the South. In the midst of all this, the
fundamental principles that were essentially agreed during the constitional
convention seem to have been negated. Nobody is talking about restructuring
the military nowadays, nor of reassessing the lop-sided federal and
ministerial appointments. The glaring inequity and crude partiality of
Nigerian redistributive politics has all but been forgotten. Are we now to
assume that all these issues will come to pass simply because a Southerner
has been made President, even when the real power behind the presidency is
as faceless as it is mysterious?
By conceding the Presidency to the South, the North not only saved Nigeria
to live another day, but postponed its eventual day of reckoning. They
also institutionalized their role as the unwritten king-makers of national
politics. This also brings out a very destructive flaw in the temperament
of Northern politics, and that is, self-interest comes first before partisan
loyalty and ideological conformity. Accepting the fact that the past election
was a referendum on preserving either the "status quo" or "progressive
change," but when Northern members of the Ekwueme wing of the PDP absconded
and voted for the opposite camp, what would that mean for ideological
conformity? While it is said that each man acts only for his own
self-interest, but how can one justify this act except by inventing base
intentions and dishonorable motives to account for them.
So many things seem to happen in Nigerian politics that for those who have
any interest in studying that part of the world, they may never run out
of bizzare issues for new political inquiries. Here, a president-elect who
has not yet been sworn-in nor does he have any constitutional mandate, has
taken it up on himself to negotiate on behalf of a country that he is yet
to be legitimately sworn-in to govern. Another rare case in which two
de-facto governments seem to be running parallel to each other at the same
time. An electoral process in which the Vice-President "elect" is chosen
after the election, but not before the election. Even the current military
dictator has decided to appoint his "own" Nigerian ambassadors to other
countries barely three months to the entry of the next "civilian"
administration. Should this not be at the discretion of the new President?
And here again, Ogbonnaya Onu, having failed to win the Governorship of
his own state, suddenly found himself as the presidential candidate of the
APP. And yet with the speed and urgency in which all this happened, he did
not pause to ask himself some serious questions. He continued to wallow in
his own world until it suddenly collapsed around him. Onu's case as trivial
as it may look, bears a great lesson for the Igbos. It is quite unfair but
unfortunate, that some individuals, in the pursuit of their own grandiose
fortunes and vain privileges, would wilfully or otherwise drag the political
fortunes of the Igbo nation along with them into the abysmal pit which they
have sunk. I have read about an "Igbo Leaders of Thought-Anambra State," and
I wondered what all this meant. I never knew that we have now degenerated
to the level of establishing "Igbo Leaders of Thought" state-by-state. How
would you like "Igbo Leaders of Thought-Imo?" Or of Ebonyi? Or of Delta? When
this "Igbo Leaders of Thought-Anambra" congratulate Obasanjo and promise
him the allegiance of "all" Igbos, how does that fit with the earlier
emotional call by the Ohaneze that all Igbos should vote for the AD-APP
alliance? This sort of mixed messages and intemperate signals is a recipe
for complete disaster. By creating more divisions among themselves, Igbos
play quite well into the hands of their detractors who would use all means
to fan and sustain such divisions. These divisions may seem quite
insignificant in the beginning, but sooner or latter, they do add up, and
eventually take on a life of their own. Why can't Igbos just have one
"Igbo-Leaders-of-Thought" and speak with one voice? Nigeria left the Igbos
in 1966. In 1999, the Igbos are still getting set to catch up with it. But
since I have said this much already, I believe I am equally entitled to
some kind of digression. I am constantly reminded of the almost infectious
humility exhibited by Ikechukwu Oguocha of "Let peace reign in Nigeria"
fame. While he entitles himself as "Ide Ju Ogwugwu I," perhaps with some
genuine expression of regal disposition, he always tempers it with ["Of
My Own Village Only"]. How gracious could he be to have been more reserving?
How benevolent could he be to have been more sparing? With prejudice to
none, please let us call it "Leaders of Thought-Anambra State Only," and
reserve the "Igbo" for all of us.
The tragedy of the Obasanjo presidency is that, beyond the effusive
euphoria, it masks a more destructive crisis beneath, the crisis of
"democratic consolidation." My good friend and colleague Omo N'Oba
Professor Julius Ihonvbere has written so much about this that I will not
belabor you here. So for now, let us leave its finer details for the
conference table. Suffice it to say that the election of an individual
alone, either by popular election or otherwise, is not a sufficient
condition for the establishment of democratic governance. The bedrock of
any democratic revival has to be anchored on the freedom and autonomy of
the judicial system, a free press, an impersonal bureaucracy, a competitive
electoral system, uncircumscribed political liberties, constitutional and
representative accountability, transparency in governance, a liberal civil
society, and most importantly, a standing constitutional document which
invariably, must establish in advance the scope and extent of expressed
and implied authorities, and the political, representative, and judicial
obligations of the various institutions of the national government.
Nigeria's brand of democracy, to be authentic must be measured against
commonly accepted universal standards, but not by its own primitive
inventions.
The idea of having a democratic government without a ready constitution is
a "faux pas," a non-starter, and a devious attempt to scuttle what has
been presented as a most crucial case for deciding the survival of the
nation. Much of these fundamental issues were the cornerstone of the Ekwueme
candidacy, but with him out of the way, these same issues seem to have fizzled
as well. Even if he so desires to revisit them, and in light of the political
tight-rope into which he has painted himself, Obasanjo would be the most
unlikely candidate to effect any of the changes in ways that would make
them meaningful. The issue of political and economic marginalization was a
credible issue which the Igbos championed long before the emergence of the
current political discourse. The case for the marginalization of the Igbos
was effective when it was articulated in unison and with a single political
thrust. The case for "marginalization" as the rallying cry for a renewed
"opposition" was ironically dealt a heavy blow when it became savaged and
trivialized from all corners of Nigeria's political spectrum. Accepting
the fact that the issue of sectoral marginalization had existed in other
parts of Nigeria ante-bellum, it remains undisputed that the Igbos gave it
its contemporary political appeal. As soon as the southern minorities
developed their own version of marginalization, the Yorubas their own, the
Middle-Belters their own, the Northern "establishment" quickly discovered
that amidst all these agitations, there were too many different shades of
"marginalization" that was being peddled by the various groups. All that
was needed was to add one more to make it total and complete, and to argue
that "everybody has always been marginalized." And so here was the "coup
de grace" against "marginalization" as a political trump card. The
Hausa-Fulani simply came out and decried that it too has been "marginalized"
for years. Even the natives upon whose land the federal capital of Abuja
was built came out from behind the rock to cry marginalization. As shocking
and trivializing this may be, one did not know whether to fade away in
thin air, or simply swallow the seeming insult from the Northern peddlers
of "marginalization." But it worked. Southerners suddenly lost the
stomach for championing the cause of "marginalization." The Igbos lost as
well as the Southern minorities partly because the minorities having
single-handedly charted the course for their own salvation, were ready to
go it alone. Both the Igbos and the minorities had divergent views on the
issue of marginalization, which not only opened it up for political
caricature, but also may have laid it to rest for good.
I shalI take a few moments to address two specific words that has been
used on behalf of the Igbos, in the hope that it would form a more
convinient background within which to frame the rest of this discourse.
The two words are "South-East" and "Igbo-Speaking." I have also noticed
that my Igbo brethrens have oftentimes and unbeknowest to them, been very
quick to accept alien coinages that have been "assigned" to them without
raising any eyebrow. There was a time when Cross-River and Akwa-Ibom were
known as the South-Eastern state, but now the name has reverted to the
five mainland Igbo states. Understandably so, the geopolitical influence
of the Igbos was much greater when we had the "East," and the same apllies
to the North and the West. But for the North, even though it has been
divided into many smaller states, the ideal and strength behind the word
"North" still maintains its political value and is always a potent
rallying cry. And to an extent, the same goes for the West, who having
emerged so far as they did, have now understood that they can get
anything they want from Nigeria without firing a single shot, even in the
midst of delayed providence. They have understood that passive politics is
akin to the politics of death, and so they have avoided it with great
care. The word "South-East" with its connotation of a limited geopolitical
space is an arbitrary boundary drawn under a punitive post-war mind-set of
ethnic isolation.
On the other hand, the idea of "Igbo-speaking" is a misnomer and must be
viewed in the same way as a post-war phenomena with a corrosive and
hideous under-belly. You are either Igbo or you are not Igbo.
"Igbo-speaking" is not a mediating factor, and must be seen only as a
cultural derivative of being Igbo. The idea of Igbos unsuspectingly
accepting the new-age coinage of "Igbo-speaking" is simply very
disheartening. It is an unfortunate ploy that has allowed some sectors of
the borderline Igbo communities to attempt for a new identity, contrasting
assimilative coincidences in "language" with more genuine and indisputable
issues of genealogy. The Igbos in general, despite whatever odds they face
either within or without, must eventually decide what they want to be, the
"South-East" or "Igbo nation." The idea of "Igbo Nation" is not new and
has always been there. What I am saying is that this idea is under a
virulent attack of being subsummed within the more adverse and destructive
framework of "South-East" or "Igbo-speaking" characterizations. These two
terms must be rejected in all their shades, and effectively replaced with
a renewed affirmation of the "Igbo Nation" - a more authentic reflection
that embraces all elements of the Igbo stock in the mainland five states,
the Delta state, the Rivers State, and the Cross River State. It is only
on the platform of an "Igbo Nation" or "Igboland" that our political fate
can have its renaissance as a people, a culture, and as a movement.
The Yorubas have a very funny way of dealing with the mind-set of their
adversaries. Even though to the faint of heart they may seem a house
divided, but inside, they remain bound by the sacred oath of their rich
heritage, custom and language. Despite Falae's legal antagonisms, the
Yorubas will eventually (as they have already begun to) rally around their
kinsman Olu Obasanjo. At the end of the day, when all the equations are
calculated and balanced, they will have very little to lose. For they have
mastered how to drive the "opposition" without cutting the important "bridges"
to the emergent political authority. It is, and awkwardly so, very good
politics. And quite effective. But they should not have it both ways. As
I have indicated earlier, "opposition" has its price as well as its rewards.
In the void that has been created, and in recognition of a new reality, it
presents an opportunity for the Igbos to take up the mantle of the
"opposition." The case for either confederacy or self-determination must
be pursued as the central theme. So should other fundamental issues
concerning discriminatory redistribution, cultural preservation, and a
myriad of post-war compensatory claims engendered by the most atrocious
and vindictive forms of political brinksmanship directed against the Igbo
nation. All these should rightfully be embraced under a liberal doctrine
of justifed resistance, resistance here not meant to be misconstrued as
resistance by force, but resistance through a consistent and civilized
political advocacy. It is rather unfortunate and quite misleading when some
people equate the idea of self-determination with an unreserved quest for
absolute political independence or sovereignty. This is far from the
truth, and to the extent that common references to self-determination
could be misconstrued as a negative agitation, I shall blame it on the
cavalier and generalized way in which it has oftentimes been used in
circumstances that are esentially unalike.
The point is that "self-determination" need not necessarily mean full
sovereignty, and as such, to recognize a right to self-determination does
not in itself commit us to affirming that every group to which the
principle applies must of necessity uphold the view of secession as an
endgame doctrine. My hypothesis has been that the moral appeal of the
principle of self-determination depends precisely on its vagueness. It
is a kind of placeholder for a range of possible accommodations which
could specify various forms of authorities and relationships, and other
more basic constitutional and corporate values that might be served in a
particular geopolitical context. Once these basic values are identified,
it should thus be possible to dispense largely a common framework that
would guarantee all the contending parties a mutually-rewarding political
space for all their expressions within a common political community,
thereby making the clamor for full sovereignty either unecessary or
inarguable. We can attest to much of this by taking a closer look at the
continued quest of the Ijaws of the Niger Delta for self-determination
and their Kiama Declaration.
And so to the extent that critical issues concerning the structure and
governance of the state remain unresolved, so should their advocacy. Even
if the opportunity for their attainment remain ever remote, that in itself
should not provide enough grounds for negating them. The mere fact that
they are presented as an issue has its own political benefit. To the extent
that it forces a compromise among the contending powers and leads to a
progressive change and equitable re-distribution of political and economic
authority, then its purpose has been served. History has taught us that
where sane minds operate, there is always an angel listening. As long as
one can adequately preserve life as well as safeguard what has already
been achieved, and to the extent that it is avoidable without worsening
the current condition, fundamental change need not be made by a premptive
recourse to force, but by a consistent and unwavering advocacy devoid of
fear and personal self-interest.
The Igbos should, without equivocation, reject the idea of "zoning" the
Senate President to the South-East. It establishes a very destructive
precedent in the natural evolution of Nigerian democracy, and to the
extent that it prempts legitimate constutional authority, it is illegal.
In a normal democratic process, the legislative session after having been
inaugurated, would decide who would be the Senate President in a popular
vote essentially weighed in favor of the majority party. The idea of
pacifying the Ekwueme wing of the PDP by conceeding the position to them,
borders on the most egregious form of political brokerage. As expected,
this very act, even as the new government is yet to be inaugurated, has
already started to tear apart at the fabric of the member states of the
South-East. Abia and Imo want the position to be given to them. Enugu
wants it and so does Ebonyi. But Anambra must have it, especially since
Ekwueme is from that state. What is the difference, either way? Unfortunately,
it is this sort of "politics-against-thy-brother" that the Igbos seem to have
mastered quite well. Just throw the "Senate President" to them, relax and
watch them tear at each others throat.
And that brings me to the next issue. What is there in the position of
"Senate President?" Not much. Must an Igbo be the Senate President and
would they be better off? Certainly not. The Igbos do not need to have the
"Senate President," and, in fact, are better off without it. Many have
stated that the "Senate President" ranks third in the hierachy of
political power. May be so, but what does that mean for the Igbos? The
seemingly innocuous appeal of the "Senate President" masks a more
hideous omen for the Igbos. Beyond the tokenism, the more disarming
effect and danger is that it creates a false pretense that Igbos have
now been accommodated within the ruling government, and as such may be
less disposed to pursue a more focused and aggresive reconstruction of
their battered political fate. Even without challenging the dictates of
nature and the certainty of human mortality, there is without doubt,very
little likelihood that the Senate President would have the ocassion to
become the President of Nigeria. To that effect, being third in the line
of succession to the Presidency, is as inconsequential as it is
irrelevant. If I can see some evidence in its favor which I cannot
oppose,I also see objections against it which I cannot resolve. There may
be so many solid arguments for and against it that, not knowing what to
decide, one may run the risk of unnecessary procastination. I strongly
believe that far from removing the obstacles to Igbo salvation, it would
multiply them and make them more insurmountable. To the extent that
"brokerage politics" seem to have overtaken the natural course of Nigerian
democracy, I remain in respectful doubt concerning the utility of the
"Senate President," particularly to the Igbos.
Suffice it to say that the "Senate President" has neither administrative
nor executive authority. He may be a powerful figure in passing crucial
legislation, but then he has only one vote. What then is all this
"euphoria" about the "Senate President" going to the South-East?" Is there
more to the symbolism or to the substance? I am happy that Ekwueme
rejected the offer of the position. As much as he had tried, if he was
unable as Vice President to get Shagari to build an inland seaport
at Onitsha, how much successful can he be in convincing the
Northern-dominated legislature to vote for an international airport in
Igboland? Please ask ex-Senator (Dr) Joseph Wayas about all the glorious
things he was able to do for his own Cross River state as Senate
President. Yet if that opportunity were to be offered to him again,I
have no doubt that he would accept, not necessarily for what it can offer
(since there is none), but unfortunately for the kinds of hollow symbolisms
and imaginative fancies, all ladden with vain ceremonies but bereft of
authenticity.
And so I have simply stated my creed to you as nature reads it in my
heart. Consult your own while I speak, that is all I ask for. I do not
presume to think myself infallible. The issues raised here informs
specific arguments which may speak to your own reasoning, and I would not
regret finding a more valid refutation to them. The more I reflect on the
political and civil situation of the Igbos, the less I am able to imagine
that the nature of human motives and hypocrisy would allow a better one.
For those who tell us that we must eschew argument, because it enlightens
neither oneself nor others; I shall refute this assertion by stating that
just as argument might lead to more conflict and confusion, it can in the
same way lead to greater understanding and permanent accommodation. If the
fundamental issues have to be argued, let them be argued and let the
pieces fall where they may.
Farewell.
Kalu N. Kalu.
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