An invented Visigoth pedigree in medieval Muslim Iberia: Umar ibn Hafsun
t...@clearwire.net
(by analogy to historiography) .
I recently had brought to my attention an interesting article on the
genealogy of late-9th/early-10th century Iberian enigma Omar ben
Hafsun (Umar ibn Hafsun). This man belongs to a similar social class
in the Emirate of Cordoba as the earlier Musa ibn Musa ibn Qasi - a
leader who served as focus for discontent among the native families
that had converted to Islam, who during a period of Ummayad weakness
managed to establish what, at least for a brief time, was a pseudo-
principality free of central control. He went a step further, though,
in converting to Christianity. This has been characterized as more
opportunist than the result of suddenly finding Jesus, but his
overtures were rebuffed by Alfonso III, and he shortly reached out to
the North African Fatimids, which proved equally unproductive in
forestalling the Abd al Rahman III, who slowly chewed into his
territories. He was still holding out at Bobastro at the time of his
death, and was followed by his three sons in succession before
Bobastro was finally retaken and the ibn Hafsun's political entity
erased.
His pedigree has drawn a degree of interest. In the 11th century,
chronicler Ibn Hayan recorded that ibn Hafsun was great-grandson (via
Hafs, misrepresented as Hafsun, and Umar) of Jafar islami, the
convert, but then traces the pedigree through three additional names,
clearly unfamiliar to ibn Hayan, the first being unrecognizable, the
second apparently Damien, the third, a count, having alternative
readings (Frugello or Marcellus, which might appear similar in Arabic
script) to a certain Alfonso. This pedigree has been repeated by
various Al Andalus scholars, such as Ibn Khaldun, as well as modern
historians of Arab Iberia, including Duby and Levi Provencal.
In the new analysis* David Wasserstein takes a look at this pedigree
in the context of over a thousand preserved pedigrees of Iberian
Muslims of the period. In this analysis, he finds just 40 or so
pedigrees that contain names that may be Christian (although some of
these are names, such as Llub [Loup] or Garsiya [Garcia], that had
passed into Muslim usage, and others are just strings of characters
that simply do not represent an Arabic name and so may represent some
garbled attempt to render an unfamiliar Christian one). Even of these
40, only one other than Ibn Hafsun's has two consecutive Christian
names at the top. None of them contain any further details about the
pre-Muslim generation. Their patronymic naming would possibly have
preserved a Christian father's name, or the convert may not have
changed his own name (as appears to have been the case for the Banu
Qasi founder), but the Muslim compilers had no interest whatsoever in
the pre-Muslim history of these families, their conversion effectively
giving them a blank slate.
Then there is Ibn Hafsun's pedigree, which contains the convert's
Christian father, grandfather, great-grandfather (explicitly called a
count) and great-great-grandfather, Alfonso (and in some later
versions, the generation before that). Such a pedigree proves unique
among all Al Andalus pedigrees studied. Given that the one prominent
Muslim-to-Christian convert among his contemporaries is also the one
who has a pedigree with generations of reported Christian ancestry,
Wasserstein concludes that the pedigree is likely forged, and as there
is only one person who might have derived benefit from such a pedigree
being reported, and a particular window in his life when this would
have proved beneficial, he suggests that ibn Hafsun, at the time of
his conversion, invented for himself a pedigree that made him
descendant of the ancient Visigoth nobility.
The pedigree was, in short, a representation of political propaganda,
not of genealogical reality, and thus this study falls in line with
others suggesting the malleability of origin pedigrees.
taf
David J. Wasserstein (2002) "Inventing tradition and constructing
identity: The genealogy of Umar ibn Hafsün between Christianity and
Islam", Al Qantara, 23:269-297.
Nathaniel Taylor
<78b7c7fd-f3a6-4c24...@z6g2000pre.googlegroups.com>,
t...@clearwire.net wrote:
Todd, this is fascinating. The other side of the coin is that the other
960+ pedigrees which do not show Christian antecedents may also have
systematically misrepresented things, as it is likely that not a few of
the middling and upper-level Cordoban or Taifa famlies were descendants
of Christians within living memory.
How does Wasserstein describe this corpus of genealogies
generally--where are they found etc.?
> *David J. Wasserstein (2002) "Inventing tradition and constructing
> identity: The genealogy of Umar ibn Hafsün between Christianity and
> Islam", Al Qantara, 23:269-297.
Nat Taylor
a genealogist's sketchbook:
http://www.nltaylor.net/sketchbook/
t...@clearwire.net
> The other side of the coin is that the other
> 960+ pedigrees which do not show Christian antecedents may also have
> systematically misrepresented things, as it is likely that not a few of
> the middling and upper-level Cordoban or Taifa famlies were descendants
> of Christians within living memory.
This was likely the case. I am not sure, however, that
'misrepresented' is quite right. Rather, the information was simply
irrelevant to them. They are not hiding that the families converted,
just not reporting the pre-conversion details.
There is something more hidden in the details - the name Karloman,
which is more Frankish than Visigoth or Ibero-Roman, is significantly
overrepresented among the Christian names found atop the pedigrees.
What could this indicate?
> How does Wasserstein describe this corpus of genealogies
> generally--where are they found etc.?
"I checked for this purpose the four large biographical dictionaries
which we have for al-Andalus up to the fifth/eleventh or sixth/twelfth
century: the Akhbar al-Fuqaha of al-Khushani, recently published by
Maria Luisa Avila and Luis Molina, and those of Ibn al-Faradi, of Ibn
Bashkuwal and of al-Dabbi.(22)"
(22) Muhammad b. Harit al-Jusani, _Ajbar al-Fuqaha wa-l-Muhadditin_,
ed Avila, M.L. and Molina, L., Madrid (Fuentes Arabico-Hispanas, 3),
1992; Ibn al-Faradi, _Ta'rikh 'Ulama' al-Andalus_, ed. Codera, F., 2
vols., Madrid, 1890; Ibn Bashkuwal, _Kitab al-Sila_, ed. Codera, F., 2
vols., Madrid, 1882-83; al-Dabbi, _Kitab Bughyat al-Multamis_, Codera,
F., and Ribera, J., Madrid, 1885.
I note that absent from his accounting is the pedigree of the Banu
Qasi themselves. They likewise have two Christian names at the top of
the pedigree - Fortun and Cassius, but Cassius is the convert
(presumably after Fortun had been born and named), matching the
general pattern.
I find this period interesting. A nativist-Muslim response to the Arab-
Muslim domination gave the first indication that central authority
could not hold together the centrifugal forces at work in the emirate
without extraordinary leadership. Umar ibn Hafsun, the Galician Abd al
Rahman ibn Marwan, the Banu Qasi and Muhammad al Tawil all established
dynasties that seemed well on the way to full autonomy, if not full
independence. It was not to be, however, Cordoba finding not one but
two extraordinary leaders in Abd al Rahman III, who snuffed out these
rebel dynasties one by one, followed by Al Mansur, whose death set the
final disillusion of the emirate/caliphate into the Taifas in motion.
I can't help but wonder what might have happened if Abd al Rahman III
turned out to be a weaker man. Would this have seen a Balkanization of
the peninsula at a period before the ambivalent Chrisitan kingdoms had
consolidated the power that enabled them to dominate the Taifas? Might
it have led to the slow reunion of the peninsula by political means as
happened with most of the Christian territories (the Banu Qasi had
already intermarried with the Pamplona royals and counts of Pallars,
while al Tawil's family had married with Aragon, and as I posted a few
months back, Leon, as well as the Banu Qasi), rather than long,
bitter, military conquest, or even left behind a collection of smaller
states like pre-Garibaldi Italy? How might this have affected the
peoples of these territories: Mozarabs, Moors, Arabs and Jews, that
faced the brunt of the Inquisition? Or on the other hand, would this
earlier fragmentation have led to an earlier North African re-
invasion, by the Fatimids, at a time when the Christian kingdoms were
mired in similar fragmentation and infighting?
taf
Nathaniel Taylor
<dcf9a077-dc9a-4328...@1g2000pre.googlegroups.com>,
t...@clearwire.net wrote:
> On Sep 7, 6:06 am, Nathaniel Taylor <nltay...@nltaylor.net> wrote:
>
> > The other side of the coin is that the other
> > 960+ pedigrees which do not show Christian antecedents may also have
> > systematically misrepresented things, as it is likely that not a few of
> > the middling and upper-level Cordoban or Taifa famlies were descendants
> > of Christians within living memory.
>
> This was likely the case. I am not sure, however, that
> 'misrepresented' is quite right. Rather, the information was simply
> irrelevant to them. They are not hiding that the families converted,
> just not reporting the pre-conversion details.
Ah, you're right: this is more a passive transformation (conveniently
forgetting Christian antecedents) than what was done for ibn Hafsun
(inventing them).
> There is something more hidden in the details - the name Karloman,
> which is more Frankish than Visigoth or Ibero-Roman, is significantly
> overrepresented among the Christian names found atop the pedigrees.
> What could this indicate?
If as you reported there are many nonsense strings which may indicate
some copyist throwing up his hands at a Christian name, the frequency of
'Caroloman' might indicate that the copyist said "Aha!, here's an
infidel name I recognize" which preserved it from the gibberish fate so
many other names met, leaving it overrepresented in this corpus. I
don't have any data on frequency of this name in Visigothic or even
Frankish populations.
> > How does Wasserstein describe this corpus of genealogies
> > generally--where are they found etc.?
>
> "I checked for this purpose the four large biographical dictionaries
> which we have for al-Andalus up to the fifth/eleventh or sixth/twelfth
> century: the Akhbar al-Fuqaha of al-Khushani, recently published by
> Maria Luisa Avila and Luis Molina, and those of Ibn al-Faradi, of Ibn
> Bashkuwal and of al-Dabbi.(22)"
>
> (22) Muhammad b. Harit al-Jusani, Ajbar al-Fuqaha wa-l-Muhadditin ,
> ed Avila, M.L. and Molina, L., Madrid (Fuentes Arabico-Hispanas, 3),
> 1992; Ibn al-Faradi, Ta'rikh 'Ulama' al-Andalus , ed. Codera, F., 2
> vols., Madrid, 1890; Ibn Bashkuwal, Kitab al-Sila , ed. Codera, F., 2
> vols., Madrid, 1882-83; al-Dabbi, Kitab Bughyat al-Multamis , Codera,
> F., and Ribera, J., Madrid, 1885.
>
> I note that absent from his accounting is the pedigree of the Banu
> Qasi themselves. They likewise have two Christian names at the top of
> the pedigree - Fortun and Cassius, but Cassius is the convert
> (presumably after Fortun had been born and named), matching the
> general pattern.
>
> I find this period interesting. A nativist-Muslim response to the Arab-
> Muslim domination gave the first indication that central authority
> could not hold together the centrifugal forces at work in the emirate
> without extraordinary leadership. Umar ibn Hafsun, the Galician Abd al
> Rahman ibn Marwan, the Banu Qasi and Muhammad al Tawil all established
> dynasties that seemed well on the way to full autonomy, if not full
> independence. It was not to be, however, Cordoba finding not one but
> two extraordinary leaders in Abd al Rahman III, who snuffed out these
> rebel dynasties one by one, followed by Al Mansur, whose death set the
> final disillusion of the emirate/caliphate into the Taifas in motion.
> I can't help but wonder what might have happened if Abd al Rahman III
> turned out to be a weaker man. Would this have seen a Balkanization of
> the peninsula at a period before the ambivalent Chrisitan kingdoms had
> consolidated the power that enabled them to dominate the Taifas?
But conventional wisdom holds that the Christian kingdoms grew in power
precisely because of the weakness of Cordoba after Al Mansur. If
Abd-al-Rahman III or Al Mansur were weaker, the Christian growth might
have happened earlier. Or it might not. Economic historians also point
to a rise in agrarian productivity and associated midlevel trade in the
10th-11th centuries leading to social complexification everywere, not
just on the Iberian 'frontier'. So if there had been a weakness in
Cordoba in the early 10th c. it may not have been subjectible to
exploitation by Christian states; Taifas may have become more powerful
and more used to balance-of-power politics, thus better able to resist
Christian growth after 1000.
> Might
> it have led to the slow reunion of the peninsula by political means as
> happened with most of the Christian territories (the Banu Qasi had
> already intermarried with the Pamplona royals and counts of Pallars,
> while al Tawil's family had married with Aragon, and as I posted a few
> months back, Leon, as well as the Banu Qasi), rather than long,
> bitter, military conquest, or even left behind a collection of smaller
> states like pre-Garibaldi Italy?
I wouldn't describe Christian expansion as a 'long bitter military
conquest'. To *most* people living then, I expect it would have been
seen as a more static, back-and-forth scenario of politicking & skirmish
which would not have been seen as Christian v. Muslim. A climate of
sustained conquest would only have been recognizable perhaps in the
reigns of Alfonso VI, San Fernando, and possibly Jaume of Aragon.
> How might this have affected the
> peoples of these territories: Mozarabs, Moors, Arabs and Jews, that
> faced the brunt of the Inquisition? Or on the other hand, would this
> earlier fragmentation have led to an earlier North African re-
> invasion, by the Fatimids, at a time when the Christian kingdoms were
> mired in similar fragmentation and infighting?
Here again relative strengths of various neighbors, and independent
means of wealth, are important. It's hard to say what confluence of
economic ability, inviting weakness of one's neighbors, and a
wag-the-dog desire to wage war abroad to bolster one's place at home,
would have been possible for the Fatimids or the Idrissids, as it was
for Yusuf (Almoravids) or the Almohad geenerals.
t...@clearwire.net
> > Might
> > it have led to the slow reunion of the peninsula by political means as
> > happened with most of the Christian territories (the Banu Qasi had
> > already intermarried with the Pamplona royals and counts of Pallars,
> > while al Tawil's family had married with Aragon, and as I posted a few
> > months back, Leon, as well as the Banu Qasi), rather than long,
> > bitter, military conquest, or even left behind a collection of smaller
> > states like pre-Garibaldi Italy?
>
> I wouldn't describe Christian expansion as a 'long bitter military
> conquest'. To *most* people living then, I expect it would have been
> seen as a more static, back-and-forth scenario of politicking & skirmish
> which would not have been seen as Christian v. Muslim. A climate of
> sustained conquest would only have been recognizable perhaps in the
> reigns of Alfonso VI, San Fernando, and possibly Jaume of Aragon.
I was more characterizing it as viewed in retrospect. It took long
enough and involved enough atrocities, if only in legend, that when it
was finally over one could look back and convince oneself that God had
led you through, over that long road, and thereby you were justified
in completing the work by expelling the others completely. Had Leon/
Castile acquired, say, Toledo, through personal union via the
intermarriage of their royalty with the ibn al-Tawil, by that time
cousins many times over, would the Muslims still have been as likely
to flee to the south, with the concomitant confiscation and regrants?
Would kings coming from such a mixed background be as likely to expel
any subjects with Muslim ancestry? That is more what I was referring
to. And deprive the Spanish of this 'divine entitlement' view of
their past, how would that have affected their approach to the New
World?
> > How might this have affected the
> > peoples of these territories: Mozarabs, Moors, Arabs and Jews, that
> > faced the brunt of the Inquisition? Or on the other hand, would this
> > earlier fragmentation have led to an earlier North African re-
> > invasion, by the Fatimids, at a time when the Christian kingdoms were
> > mired in similar fragmentation and infighting?
>
> Here again relative strengths of various neighbors, and independent
> means of wealth, are important. It's hard to say what confluence of
> economic ability, inviting weakness of one's neighbors, and a
> wag-the-dog desire to wage war abroad to bolster one's place at home,
> would have been possible for the Fatimids or the Idrissids, as it was
> for Yusuf (Almoravids) or the Almohad geenerals.
Yes, quite. I guess it is sort of like wondering how England would
have turned out differently had Harold not challenged William's claim
to the crown. He still gets the prize, but without the social
disruption, and what would that have done? There is no answer, or
rather, there are a range of answers, all of which probably say more
about the person answering than the alternative realities.
taf
Jean Coeur de Lapin
> On Sep 7, 2:04 pm, Nathaniel Taylor <nltay...@nltaylor.net> wrote:
>
> > > Might
> > > it have led to the slow reunion of the peninsula by political means as
> > > happened with most of the Christian territories (the Banu Qasi had
> > > already intermarried with the Pamplona royals and counts of Pallars,
> > > while al Tawil's family had married with Aragon, and as I posted a few
> > > months back, Leon, as well as the Banu Qasi), rather than long,
> > > bitter, military conquest, or even left behind a collection of smaller
> > > states like pre-Garibaldi Italy?
I object to the comparison with Italy, which remained a congeries of
small states largely because (a) the Papacy kept its hold on central
Italy, preventing unification of north and south, and (b) constant
invasions and partial occupations of the north (also the south) by
Spain, France, the German imperial coronation invasions, etc., (c)
Venice's unconquerable hold on the northeast. Had it been left to
itself, as Spain was, Italy would probably have been unified centuries
earlier, as Spain was (and England, and France, and Poland, and
Russia). Though of course Italy's geography prevents real unity.
> > I wouldn't describe Christian expansion as a 'long bitter military
> > conquest'. To *most* people living then, I expect it would have been
> > seen as a more static, back-and-forth scenario of politicking & skirmish
> > which would not have been seen as Christian v. Muslim.
There were LONG periods of desultory peace, especially as Aragon's
attention was fixed on the Med and Castille was torn by civil wars and
noble feuds. But the Christian banner was there to be claimed, and it
was claimed, by all the more vigorous prosecutors of the Reconquista,
including Alfonso VI, Alfonso VII, San Fernando, Fernando "of
Antquera", up to and including Fernando and Isabel.
> I was more characterizing it as viewed in retrospect. It took long
> enough and involved enough atrocities, if only in legend, that when it
> was finally over one could look back and convince oneself that God had
> led you through, over that long road, and thereby you were justified
> in completing the work by expelling the others completely. Had Leon/
> Castile acquired, say, Toledo, through personal union via the
> intermarriage of their royalty with the ibn al-Tawil, by that time
> cousins many times over, would the Muslims still have been as likely
> to flee to the south, with the concomitant confiscation and regrants?
But the legends of Pelayo et al were there, and Muslims were expelled
from the north as it was taken, step by step. Those conquered were
usually promised retention of property and right to worship, and the
promises were always betrayed as soon as it was safe to do so. F&I
promised these things to the Muslims who stayed. And many did -- as
late as Philip III. But changing their mind was nothing new. There was
no divine word on a place for the unconverted in Christian orthodoxy -
in marked contrast to Muslim orthodoxy, which does ordain such a place
(and until the 20th century, and the infection of European
nationalism, was pretty reasonable about it).
> Would kings coming from such a mixed background be as likely to expel
> any subjects with Muslim ancestry?
Even more so -- to prove they were not "tainted."
Thus Philip II, when Cardinal Mendoza pointed out he had Jewish blood
(as did the Cardinal), became the more determined to rid the land of
anyone with Jewish (or Muslim) blood, just to make it clear he was
utterly Catholic.
>That is more what I was referring
> to. And deprive the Spanish of this 'divine entitlement' view of
> their past, how would that have affected their approach to the New
> World?
I don't think it would have made a bit of difference.
The momentum was all the other way.
A closed mind is easier to fight with than an open mind, willing to
understand.
> > > How might this have affected the
> > > peoples of these territories: Mozarabs, Moors, Arabs and Jews, that
> > > faced the brunt of the Inquisition? Or on the other hand, would this
> > > earlier fragmentation have led to an earlier North African re-
> > > invasion, by the Fatimids,
(Presume you mean the Almohads and Almoravids - the Fatimids went east
not north)
>at a time when the Christian kingdoms were
> > > mired in similar fragmentation and infighting?
A weaker Umayyad response would only have led to an earlier
reconquest.
Only two lasting dynasties of Muslim rulers were founded in Spain: the
Umayyads of Cordoba and the Nasrids of Granada. (Perhaps you could
include the Banu Qasi). Otherwise, they were all short-lived and
easily overthrown. Dynastically, Islam is not the stable, renewable
force that Christianity is in conjunction with secular dynasties. I'm
not sure why that is.
> Yes, quite. I guess it is sort of like wondering how England would
> have turned out differently had Harold not challenged William's claim
> to the crown. He still gets the prize, but without the social
> disruption, and what would that have done?
The first sign of a revolt against his Norman ways -- and there would
have been, sooner than later -- and William would have been down on
the Saxons like a ton of bricks -- as he was on Edwin and Morcar in
Northumbria. The Anglo-Saxon ways were too disorderly to fight back
against Norman organization -- indeed, Harold had to attack William
when he did because his army was about to disintegrate to go home for
the harvest -- he had no right to hold them after a certain space of
time. William had an army as long as he wanted it -- and that sort of
government was bound to beat Harold's in time. (If Harold had been
able to hold his army together, and had fought a scorched-earth
guerilla war against William, he'd have won the war.)
Jean Coeur de Lapin
t...@clearwire.net
wrote:
> On Sep 8, 1:27 am, t...@clearwire.net wrote:
>
> > On Sep 7, 2:04 pm, Nathaniel Taylor <nltay...@nltaylor.net> wrote:
>
> > > > Might
> > > > it have led to the slow reunion of the peninsula by political means as
> > > > happened with most of the Christian territories (the Banu Qasi had
> > > > already intermarried with the Pamplona royals and counts of Pallars,
> > > > while al Tawil's family had married with Aragon, and as I posted a few
> > > > months back, Leon, as well as the Banu Qasi), rather than long,
> > > > bitter, military conquest, or even left behind a collection of smaller
> > > > states like pre-Garibaldi Italy?
>
> I object to the comparison with Italy, which remained a congeries of
> small states largely because (a) the Papacy kept its hold on central
> Italy, preventing unification of north and south, and (b) constant
> invasions and partial occupations of the north (also the south) by
> Spain, France, the German imperial coronation invasions, etc., (c)
> Venice's unconquerable hold on the northeast. Had it been left to
> itself, as Spain was, Italy would probably have been unified centuries
> earlier, as Spain was (and England, and France, and Poland, and
> Russia). Though of course Italy's geography prevents real unity.
Poland left to itself? hardly. Yes, Spain ended up being free from
numerous invasions, but was that some inherent character of Iberia, or
might it have been different if it didn't have a strong Cordoba
through the 11th century? Certainly a strong Cordoba forced
Charlemagne to pull back to the Pyrenees from Zaragoza, and the
Cordoban influence in the region, and particularly on Pamplona in
these earliest years (when Cordoba was Russia to Pamplona's Georgia),
played some role in the family politics that ended up kicking the
Franks out of Aragon. With a continued foothold there as well as
Catalonia, I am not convinced the Franks would not have tried to move
farther into Iberia. Later the Cordoba power apparently dissuaded ibn
Hafsun's attempt to get the Fatimids to come north, so you could have
had Franks and Fatimids mucking around among a whole set of warring
statelets. Sure, every place has unique factors, but that doesn't mean
there is only one possible result. Basically, I am suggesting that if
you change one critical factor, might this have brought about a
different outcome - contingency vs predestination.
> > Would kings coming from such a mixed background be as likely to expel
> > any subjects with Muslim ancestry?
>
> Even more so -- to prove they were not "tainted."
> Thus Philip II, when Cardinal Mendoza pointed out he had Jewish blood
> (as did the Cardinal), became the more determined to rid the land of
> anyone with Jewish (or Muslim) blood, just to make it clear he was
> utterly Catholic.
Except there is no evidence whatsoever that Philip II had Jewish
blood. Further, Phillip's reaction after the die was already cast is
hardly indicative of what may have happened under completely different
circumstances.
> > > > How might this have affected the
> > > > peoples of these territories: Mozarabs, Moors, Arabs and Jews, that
> > > > faced the brunt of the Inquisition? Or on the other hand, would this
> > > > earlier fragmentation have led to an earlier North African re-
> > > > invasion, by the Fatimids,
>
> (Presume you mean the Almohads and Almoravids - the Fatimids went east
> not north)
No I meant an earlier Muslim re-invasion from North Africa, but by the
Fatimids - that is the thing about contra-historical speculations. It
involves some critical change perhaps causing things to turn out
differently than they did historically. If Cordoba hadn't been able to
put down the rebellions and ended up crumbling in the early 10th
century, might Iberia have looked more tempting to neighbors both
north and south?
> >at a time when the Christian kingdoms were
> > > > mired in similar fragmentation and infighting?
>
> A weaker Umayyad response would only have led to an earlier
> reconquest.
Or no reconquest at all. I am just not convinced that at a time when
Asturias split into three kingdoms then calved off an all-but-
independent Castile, and Pamplona was ripped by a coup sponsored by a
coalition of Muslim and Christian neighbors, had the south crumbled as
well you necessarily would have still developed the culture of
Reconquest, as opposed to one of changing alliances among perpetually
warring and intermarrying glorified city-states, as seemed already
underway among Ribagorza/Pallars, Pamplona, Aragon, the Banu Qasi and
the Banu Tawil. When you view the interactions between Pamplona and
the Banu Qasi, you do not see this "must overrun and expel the Muslim
lands' mindset, but rather close cooperation and intermarriage, with
Cordoba as the enemy. It was only as Cordoba kept forcing the Banu
Qasi back under their thumb that the region became polarized along
strict religious lines. I would even suggest that the Banu Qasi state,
to their misfortune, absorbed the wrath of Cordoba and gave Pamplona
several windows in which they could make important strides toward
nationhood, and that with a weak Cordoba, the whole mix in the region
would have been different, including, perhaps, a joint Pamplona/Banu
Qasi/Banu Tawil entity that would have had a completely different
mindset.
> Only two lasting dynasties of Muslim rulers were founded in Spain: the
> Umayyads of Cordoba and the Nasrids of Granada. (Perhaps you could
> include the Banu Qasi). Otherwise, they were all short-lived and
> easily overthrown. Dynastically, Islam is not the stable, renewable
> force that Christianity is in conjunction with secular dynasties. I'm
> not sure why that is.
I'm not sure _that_ it is. I don't think there is anything different
about Islam that makes for unstable secular dynasties. Rather, I
think a combination of chronology, geography relative to the other
Iberian entities, and luck, bad or otherwise, had more to do with it.
> > Yes, quite. I guess it is sort of like wondering how England would
> > have turned out differently had Harold not challenged William's claim
> > to the crown. He still gets the prize, but without the social
> > disruption, and what would that have done?
>
> The first sign of a revolt against his Norman ways -- and there would
> have been, sooner than later -- and William would have been down on
> the Saxons like a ton of bricks -- as he was on Edwin and Morcar in
> Northumbria. The Anglo-Saxon ways were too disorderly to fight back
> against Norman organization
Again, you are arguing that what happened was bound to happen, based
on how things ended up playing out, but it is not at all clear to me
that if faced with a circumstance essentially the same as Edward faced
against Godwin that it would have resulted in the annihilation of the
English nobility and wholesale replacement by Normans, as ended up
happening with the Conquest. First of all, there would have been no
occupying army, and William would have had to mobilize English troops
against the rebels. It may well have ended exactly as it did under
Edward, with a compromise. William was more than just a brute, and I
suspect he would have taken a route more like Canutes, where a small
number of targeted assassinations, salting of the leadership with
people loyal to him - not just Danes but native English willing to
work with him in exchange for advancement, and reaching a modus
vivendi with families too important to be taken out and too proud to
be taken in, he was able to pacify the nation and even institute
reforms, and this was after conquest, while I was positing a peaceful
inheritance by William. What William did after the Conquest, which
forced him into a role of occupier and forced him to eliminate the
English nobility in order to pay off the promises he had been forced
to make in order to launch the invasion, is hardly a fair
representation of his likely actions in the completely different
circumstances I had posited, that of peaceful inheritance.
taf