Media Warfare #16
Vitaca Milut
From Media Warfare (the collection of texts made by Zivota Ivanovic):
[...]
Slovenia and Croatia when it went to the summit of the EC Foreign
Ministers held on December 16 in Brussels.
Kohl was aware that in case of a vote, he would be probably backed by
Italy, Denmark and Belgium, while Great Britain, Spain, Holland and Greece
would be againkst it, and the others, especially France, would hesitate
between saving the appearance of European unity and not killing Maastricht
in the cradle, and preventing Germany from taking the lead in Europe.
Outside the EC, Croatia and Slovenia had already been recognized by the
Baltic republics (in August) and the Ukraine (December 12). A similar
decision by Iceland followed on December 19, whilst only Austria, Sweden
and the Holy See seemed prepared to join the German initiative.
In a dramatic letter addressed to Genscher just before the EC summit, UN
ecretary General Javier P=E9rez de Cu=E9llar opposed the "premature,
selective and discordant recognition", which might lead to an expansion of
conflicts in Bosnia and Macedonia. Well aware of this danger, the Great
Powers, headed by the United States, tried until the very last moment to
block Germany. President Bush appealed to Kohl, and Genscher - fearing
total isolation - made a number of desperate telephone calls and conducted
marathon talks even with the Premier of Zaire Nguza-Carl-i-Bond. The
merican press quoted the concern of the Europeans, which (according to
The New York Times) suspected that the Germans' final objective was to
renew its sphere of influence extending from Tallin in Estonia to Zagreb
in Croatia.
At the heated session of the EC Foreign Ministers held on December 16 in
Brussels, Genscher was finally given the green light by his colleagues.
Germany realized the bluff used by its partners: no one wanted to engage
in a direct confrontation only five days after the agreement on European
Union had been reached in Maastricht. The German diplomats even had aces
up their sleeves: they were in a position to remind the French that they
had backed them againKst the Americans on issues concerning European
defense, and the English of the major concessions they had been given in
Maastricht. Germany was in a position to choose. The Community recognized
the two republics on January 15, after a Committee of jurists - chaired by
Robert Badinter established whether the Yugoslav republics complied with
the minority protection criteria that the EC requires in order to grant
recognition (for Croatia the Committee was "reserved" due to insufficient
guarantees offered to the Krajina Serbs). But Germany did not wait. The
Chancellor kept his promise: Slovenia and Croatia were recognized before
Christmas.
Hand in the Cookie Jar
Right after the impetuous recognitions granted on December 23, 1991,
Germany disappeared from the Balkan scene for almost two years. As
everyone had foreseen, she recognition of Slovenia and Croatia did not put
out the fire in former Yugoslavia. {t would have been justified only in
two cases: if it were part of a global agreement among former Yugoslav
republics, or if the West used military intervention to support the
secessionists against the Serbs. The unilateral move made by Germany
obviously canceled the first option, which was hard to implement in
itself. The absolute reluctance of the West - and especially Germany - to
become trapped in a Balkan war with unforeseeable consequences, excluded
the other theoretical possibility.
In fact, the expansion of the conflict to Bosnia is ascribed (at least
partially) to the premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, even by
those who agreed to it to prevent a schism within the EC and among Westem
countries in general. The post festum lamentations by reputable American,
French and Italian officials, intended to transfer the responsibility for
the error committed to Gemmany and the Holy See, seemed hypocritical,
since they came from countries that did nothing to stop the Gemman "drive"
at the end of 1991, unless one doubts the truthfulness of the statement
recently made by Lammers that Gemmany alone is weaker then all the other
powers put together.
The reactions of the Gemman political and intellectual elite were also
similar to those of a child caught with his hand in the cookie jar. An
nteresting fact is that the Gemman Foreign Office made a detailed
memorandum "for intemal use only" containing justifications of the Bonn
policy regarding Yugoslavia. Isn't it a coincidence that only a few months
later, Genscher abandoned the political scene and his successor, Klaus
Kinkel, found it necessary to immediately clarify that there were no
solutions for the war in Yugoslavia, and that Germany would pursue
"unilateral actions" no more. As I mentioned before, the Germans' reserved
attitude lasted until last winter.
Dynamics of Duration
We have tried to interpret the parabola traced by Kohl's policy regarding
Yugoslavia in view of Germany 's changing geopolitical position after
unification, and consequently in accordance with the need to overcome the
puberty phase of the Bundesrepublik. Until last year, the temm "national
interest" was taboo, or more precisely, Bonn affirmed that it had no
national interests, since its point of view coincided with that of the
West. Amongst other things, this granted them the ideal conditions for
conducting an independent Eastem policy.
Where does this path lead to? For the time being, we can make only three
provisional assumptions, which make it easier to conceive future
developments:
1. Unlike the oversimplified interpretations given by Germanophobes, the
Bonn policy regarding Yugoslavia was never the consequence of a revised
and amended "general plan for the East". On the contrary, the deviations
made in the second half of 1991, which helped isolate the Bonn policy in
the Balkans from that of its allies, derive directly from the fact that
there was no geopolitical plan. German unilateral actions were not at all
planned, and they widened a gap that still exists in the Gemman political
elite between awareness of the new responsibilities that united Germany
has, and the inability to create a suitable strategy. The case of Croatia
corroborates this because it was first recognized and then treated with
serious dissociation, as soon as Bonn became aware that Tudjman was not
capable of integrating his country into Central Europe.
2. The void created by the lack of a geopolitical plan in Germany in the
second half of 1991, was filled by an extraordinary manipulation of
concepts. It could be taken as a textbook example. In fact, Bonn reached
the decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia due to the almost unanimous
demand of public opinion which was mobilized by two notions and one hidden
intention.
A. The first concept, which is of a moralistic type, interpreted the fall
of the Berlin wall as a new springtime for "the people". The Germans could
not deny the right to self-determination to other peoples who were
subjugated by communism. The problem is that this right, strictly
speaking, means nothing, because it can mean anything. What is a people?
Who can speak on their behalf? How can this principle be harmonized with
respect to borders, glorified in Helsinki and then regularly breached
after 1990? Since there is no universal answer to these questions, the
so-called right to self-determination is exposed to manipulation. "It's a
phrase full of dynamite," said Robert Lansing, Secretary of State in the
Administration of Woodrow Wilson, the man who, along with Lenin, invented
this universal expedient against the status quo. Using it in the case of
Yugoslavia meant lighting the fuse on a powder keg.
B. The second notion, of a geopolitical type, is the concept of
Mitteleuropa. It encompasses a historical-cultural communion between the
Germanic countries and the countries ruled by the Hapsburgs - including
Slovenia and Croatia. In the political sense, Germany had to come to the
aid of related nations.
C. The hidden intention of this vision was to use the magnetic attraction
of the German mark and German culture, to peacefully create - around
Germany - a constellation of small and medium-sized states including two
former Yugoslav republies (more precisely, Hapsburg lands).
The diffusion of the aforementioned notions initially created a schism on
the German political scene. Those of a leftist orientation became
partisans of the "just" fight of the Slovenes and Croats for independence
- either for their moral convictions, to create problems for the
Government or due to the mood of public opinion.
Among the r.ght-wingers, in CSU and part of CDU (Schauble, Ruhe, Hornhiss,
etc.) the idea was supported by those who wanted to use the spirit of
"another '48" to push Germany outside the enclosure of a republic having
its center in Bonn. It was a test or an adventure, depending on the point
of view, intended primarily to verify the validity of military instruments
as a means in Germany's foreign policy (the Bundeswehr's involvement in
"hot-spots" is a top national interest) and to gradually bring ermany back
among the victorious powers. For Germany, Croatia should have been vhai
Kuwait was for the Americans: an expedient to enhance power and prestige.
In the center of it stood Kohl and Genscher, trying to save the appearance
of consent within the Community, both because of their faith in Europe and
in an attempt to remove the latent distrust among the Allies towards a
united Germany. It was an unsustainable position in view of the
opportunism and moralism coming from the Left and the geopolitical use of
the prevailing notions by the Right.
3. Those who urged independent German action wanted (and still do) to tum
Germany into a "normal" European nation-state, like France or England,
freeing it of its "metaphysical guilt". But political leaders such as
Schauble, or right-wing nationalist theoreticians such as Karl-Heinz
Weissmann, were not able to transform this aspiration - undoubtedly
peaceful and democratic - into a concrete geopolitical plan. It is one
thing to be a "normal" power in Western Europe or surrounded by the
Atlantic, and another to protect a border with post-communist instability.
The new German democratic Right (still but for how long?) without a party
of its own, risks to become a prisoner of historical memory (or amnesia).
Should Germany allow itself to be hypnotized by the media moralism, or to
be drawn into the maelstrom of geopolitical concepts from the past, i.e.
if it succumbs to the dynamics of duration, the fall of the Berlin Wall
might mark the third German (and European) failure in this century.
Getting involved in the Balkans and inciting phobias among Westem
partners, does not seem to be the best way to German reaffirmation. It
would be a paradox if a nation which thinks of itself as Western - today
81% of the Germans believe that friendship with the US is "important"
(this being a percentage never achieved in past decades) - were once again
to try to discover itself through an autistic contemplation of its
possible fate.
Rome, March 1994
Prenela
Vitaca Milut (Pronounced: Vitacha Miloot)
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Kad je Djordje Srbijom zavlad'o
I Srbiju krstom prekrstio "Drino, vodo, plemenita medjo,
I svojijem krilom zakrilio, Izmedj' Bosne i izmedj' Srbije,
Od Vidina, pak do reke Drine, Naskoro ce i to vreme doci,
Od Kosova te do Biograda, Kada cu ja i tebeka preci
'Vako Djordje Drini govorio: I cestitu Bosnu polaziti!"
(Iz narodne pesme "Pocetak bune protiv dahija")
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