Hamid Karzai is Afghanistan's Ngo Dinh Diem - Gangster, Thug, Drug Dealer
Julie (English only!)
by Michael Wallach
Asia Times Online
Oct 30, 2009
The mountains of Afghanistan are quickly growing verdant in their
similarity to the jungles of Vietnam. The revelation this week in the
New York Times that Afghan President Hamid Karzai's brother, Ahmed
Karzai, is a ''thug'', ''suspected player in the country's booming
illegal opium trade'', and ''on the CIA payroll'', is striking not for
its news quotient, but for the fact that it was made by what appear to
be White House officials. We are in 1963 all over again.
It was that year that American president John F Kennedy, fresh off his
victory in the Cuban missile crisis, began asserting himself more
deeply in the Vietnam conflict, which had, until then, been
run almost entirely by the US Central Intelligence Agency. The
president was intervening because Ngo Dinh Diem, the CIA's man in
Saigon, a city he ruled in a country he only tried to rule, had gained
a reputation as a gangster, thug, and narcotics dealer both on the
ground in Vietnam and in the international press.
Diem had carefully built a network of power from his base of Catholic
supporters, French post-colonial arms and narcotics dealers, local
criminals, control of the prostitution and bar industry, and through
work with a longtime Saigon criminal syndicate known as the Bin Xuyen,
originally river pirates, now traders in narcotics, and more
importantly, information. His spy network was thorough and terrifying
to the local populace. Through this network, Diem, a man who kept a
working casino on the top floor of his presidential palace, had gained
a firm grip on the security of Saigon.
However, the North Vietnamese had built a successful public relations
campaign against Diem for these very reasons. Kennedy felt he had to
win over the population of Vietnam, and could never do so with such a
known thug in office. This was in direct contradiction to the CIA's
perspective. Their chief man in Asia, Edward Lansdale, had personally
nurtured Diem's rise to power. He felt that Diem, while dirty, had
taken great strides in gaining control of a country that the colonial
French had so recently fled.
The dispute became personal: Kennedy asked Lansdale to the White
House, and Lansdale fought tooth and nail in a September 1963 National
Security meeting for the president to back Diem and to give him moral
and political, as well as financial and military, support. Lansdale
berated the administration for not having already done so - even going
so far as to accuse State Department officials of having tried to kill
Diem in 1960.
Ultimately, Kennedy came round to the belief that the United States
could better win over Vietnam by replacing Diem. He ordered the
American ambassador at the time, Henry Cabot Lodge, not to meet with
Diem, and soon American military commanders gave the go-ahead to a
coup by Diem's own military leaders.
The new leaders let the network of thugs, criminals, gangsters, and ex-
colonialists fall apart, and with it, Saigon's security. The coup led
to a never-ending power struggle among South Vietnamese military
leaders for control of the various power centers of the old network.
Amidst the chaos, the North Vietnamese leadership was able to quickly
infiltrate the city.
In the words of the North Vietnamese politburo: "Diem was one of the
strongest individuals resisting the people and communism. Everything
that could be done in an attempt to crush the revolution was carried
out by Diem. Diem was one of the most competent lackeys of the US
imperialists ... Among the anti-communists in South Vietnam or exiled
in other countries, no one has sufficient political assets and
abilities to cause others to obey."
Ho Chi Minh thought Diem was such a powerful figure that he ''could
scarcely believe the American's could be so stupid'' as to have
replaced him.
Indeed, Ho Chi Minh's prediction proved true. Under new rule, Saigon
fell from bad to worse, forcing the CIA to later re-institute a
''strong-man'' policy in the city, only to see support for its rule
and efficacy undermined by the Tet offensive. In Vietnam, neither the
idealist route of dumping thugs nor the cynical route of reinstating
them worked. Ultimately, there was no compelling reason to the
Vietnamese why the United States should be in Vietnam.
And so it is little surprise, but a well-timed reminder, that also
this week, a leading American figure in Afghanistan offered his
resignation, stating, ''I have lost understanding of and confidence in
the strategic purposes of the United States' presence in
Afghanistan.'' Mathew Hoh, the Senior Civilian Representative for the
US Government in Zabul province, wrote on September 10 in a four-page
resignation letter that ''I have doubts and reservations about our
current strategy and planned future strategy, but my resignation is
based not upon how we are pursuing this war, but why and to what
end.''
Now President Barack Obama is choosing between strategies in
Afghanistan, with the New York Times reporting that his administration
has ''deep divisions''. Yet they seem to be split only between the
strategies of cynicism and of false idealism. The White House has
already made clear that its decision will involve a troop increase,
the question being only how large and deployed in what way.
Throughout the general mass media bonanza that has been covering the
decision over Afghanistan, from the fawning entire Nightline episode
dedicated to a ''day in the life'' of Stanley McChrystal, to the most
recent New York Times piece about Karzai's allegedly drug-dealing
brother, few have explored why the US remains in Afghanistan at all.
The New York Times article, based on statements of "American
officials" indicates only one thing: that the White House has clearly
decided to confront the CIA, and Karzai, over Afghan policy,
undermining both in one quick news attack. What it has clearly not
decided to do is pull out of Afghanistan.
There is an old British diplomatic saying, ''The United States will
always do the right thing, after it's tried all its other options.''
Lets hope that 45 years after 1963 we have outgrown this. But it
doesn't appear to be the case.
-------------------
Michael Wallach is the former senior analyst for Middle East Public
Opinion at the US State Department. He resigned, with little fanfare,
due to the US's overall Middle East policy.
Um Bala
cu~ng vie^'t ve^` ra su*. da'nh gia'cu?a phia' CS ve^` NDD.
"In the words of the North Vietnamese politburo: "Diem was one of the
strongest individuals resisting the people and communism. Everything
that could be done in an attempt to crush the revolution was carried
out by Diem. Diem was one of the most competent lackeys of the US
imperialists ... Among the anti-communists in South Vietnam or exiled
in other countries, no one has sufficient political assets and
abilities to cause others to obey."
Ho Chi Minh thought Diem was such a powerful figure that he ''could
scarcely believe the American's could be so stupid'' as to have
replaced him.
Indeed, Ho Chi Minh's prediction proved true. Under new rule, Saigon
fell from bad to worse, forcing the CIA to later re-institute a
''strong-man'' policy in the city, only to see support for its rule
and efficacy undermined by the Tet offensive. In Vietnam, neither the
idealist route of dumping thugs nor the cynical route of reinstating
them worked. Ultimately, there was no compelling reason to the
Vietnamese why the United States should be in Vietnam.
Um Bala
Quote:
"In the words of the North Vietnamese politburo: "Diem was one of the
strongest individuals resisting the people and communism. Everything
that could be done in an attempt to crush the revolution was carried
out by Diem. Diem was one of the most competent lackeys of the US
imperialists ... Among the anti-communists in South Vietnam or exiled
in other countries, no one has sufficient political assets and
abilities to cause others to obey."
Ho Chi Minh thought Diem was such a powerful figure that he ''could
scarcely believe the American's could be so stupid'' as to have
replaced him.
Indeed, Ho Chi Minh's prediction proved true. Under new rule, Saigon
fell from bad to worse, forcing the CIA to later re-institute a
''strong-man'' policy in the city, only to see support for its rule
and efficacy undermined by the Tet offensive. In Vietnam, neither the
idealist route of dumping thugs nor the cynical route of reinstating
them worked. Ultimately, there was no compelling reason to the
Vietnamese why the United States should be in Vietnam. "
On Nov 9, 12:45 pm, "Julie (English only!)" <jjs...@gmail.com> wrote:
Um Bala
la`m TC va` Nga Xo^ tu*'c gia^.n. Na(m 1964 trong lu'c qua^n VNCH co`n
du`ng su'ng carbine, TC trang bi. cho CSVN su'ng AK va` B40. Tra^.n
Bi`nh Gia?, VNCH tung va`o ma(.t tra^.n 2 tie^?u ddoa`n TQLC va` BDQ
kho^ng ngo*` bi. CS trang bi. AK 47 dda'nh thie^.t ha.i na(.ng. Ma~i
dde^;n 1968 My~ mo*'i trang bi. M16 cho qua^n VNCH. Trong nhu*~ng na(m
1964-1966, co^.ng qua^n chie^'m do'ng ca'c tho^n a^'p va` qua^.n ly.
he?o la'nh, ca('t ddu*o*`ng sa' bao va^y Saigon, nga(n ca?n kho^ng
cho cho*? ga.o va`o tha`nh pho^' Tu*` mo^.t nu*o*'c sa?n xua^'t ga.o.
da^n tha`nh pho^' VN pha?i mua ga.o My~.
Khi TT Johnson tung qua^n My~ dde^? cu*'u Nam VN thi` CS la.i du`ng
chie^u ba`i cho^'ng ngoa.i xa^m dde^? quye^'n ru~ da^n mie^`n Nam,
tha`nh ra VNCH ma^'t cha'nh nghi~a nhu* NDD dda~ tha^'y tru*o*'c.
Pha?i dde^'n 1968, My~ chi.u kho^ng no^?i to^?n tha^'t pha?i ru't kho?
i Khe Sanh ho. mo*'i bie^'t ho. la^`m, ca`ng ddem qua^n va`o can
thie^.p thi` qua^n CSVN ca`ng ma.nh. Va` TU Dda?ng CS va` Ho^ Chi'
Minh dda~ nha^.n xe't ddu'ng.
Tu*o*ng tu*. nhu* VN, qua^n Northern Alliances cu?a Afghanistan ban
dda^`u cu~ng dda'nh tan qua^n Taliban chie^'m la.i thu? ddo^ chi?
trong va`i tha'ng vo*'i su*. giu'p ddo*~ cu?a va`i tra(m li'nh BK My~.
Nhu*ng khi qua^n My~ ddo^? va`o a`o a.t thi` Taliban du`ng co*'
cho^'ng ngoa.i xa^m la`m cha'nh phu? Karzai ma^'t cha'nh nghi~a, y
he^.t nhu* ti`nh tra.ng VNCH sau 1964. Va` Taliban ddang lo*'n ma.nh
dde doa. cha'nh phu? Afghanistan chi? vi` My~ ddem qua^n va`o.
Quote:
"In the words of the North Vietnamese politburo: "Diem was one of the
strongest individuals resisting the people and communism. Everything
that could be done in an attempt to crush the revolution was carried
out by Diem. Diem was one of the most competent lackeys of the US
imperialists ... Among the anti-communists in South Vietnam or exiled
in other countries, no one has sufficient political assets and
abilities to cause others to obey."
Ho Chi Minh thought Diem was such a powerful figure that he ''could
scarcely believe the American's could be so stupid'' as to have
replaced him.
Indeed, Ho Chi Minh's prediction proved true. Under new rule, Saigon
fell from bad to worse, forcing the CIA to later re-institute a
''strong-man'' policy in the city, only to see support for its rule
and efficacy undermined by the Tet offensive. In Vietnam, neither the
idealist route of dumping thugs nor the cynical route of reinstating
them worked. Ultimately, there was no compelling reason to the
Vietnamese why the United States should be in Vietnam. "
President Triết
Ku da`i va(`ng va(.c bie^'t nga`y na`o ra
:))
La~o No^ng (Phu) ddi co^ng ta'c ba?n Mu*o*`ng
Bu' ddi't xong mo^.t ca'i le^n ddu*o*`ng ve^` que^.
:-)))
:))
Co' chi. ba'n tru*'ng vi.t......[ga`].... ra^'t to !
;-))))
President Triết
nhìn vào hồ sơ thì thấy ghi "Bốn đời chồng nhưng vẫn còn gin" thì đặt
câu hỏi:
“Tại sao cô 4 đời chồng rồi mà vẫn còn gin?”
Cô gái trả lời :
-“Lấy anh chàng đầu là một anh chàng công tác tại phòng điều tra xét
hỏi nên cứ GIỮ NGUYÊN VẸN",
do vậy không làm ăn chi hết
==> ly dị! Người chồng thứ hai là một nhà hùng biện nên NÓI THÌ HAY
CHỨ KHÔNG BIẾT LÀM
==> ly dị! Người chồng thứ ba công tác tại viện bảo tàng nên KHÔNG RỜ
VÀO HIỆN VẬT
==> ly dị! Người chồng thứ tư công tác tại phòng kế hoạch nên chỉ VẠCH
RA RỒI ĐỂ ĐÓ CHỨ KHÔNG LÀM TIẾP
==> ly dị luôn!”
Ban giám khảo hỏi tiếp:
-“Nếu đoạt được vương miệng cô sẽ lấy chồng làm nghề nào?”
-“Em sẽ lấy anh đạp xích lô”
-“Tại sao lại là đạp xích lô”
-“Tại đạp xích lô rất thực tế LEO LÊN LÀ ĐẠP LIỀN....!!!”