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Incident of Buddhist flag - US involvement - Coup Generals (8)

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Kim Nguyen

May 13, 1996, 3:00:00 AM5/13/96

According to Commander Nguyen Van Y (Nguye^~n Va<n Y), former director of
Police and Security, informed that there is abnormal military mobilization he
tells it to Mr Nhu, but the latter answers, "That is our plan".

Later, people know that Mr Nhu deploys two plans called Bravo 1 and Bravo 2.
In Bravo 1, some loyal troups will organize a faked coup d'etat to trick
rebellious generals to appear; then Messrs. Diem-Nhu will go to Vung Tau to
hide away. Knowing who are betrayers, they will come back to re-establish
order. Mr Nhu assigns General Ton That Dinh to to be in charge, not knowing
that Dinh is also a betrayer. When Mr Nhu phones Dinh many times without an
answer, he knows that Dinh has taken the other side. At that moment, it is too

According to General Tran Van Don, Mr Nhu appoints Dinh to execute Bravo 1
against the coup d'etat with a force of 3,000 soldiers, 40 armored cars and six
special regiments with Dinh as head, Le Quang Tung and Nguyen Ngoc Khoi as
vice-heads. On 31/11/1963, General Dinh meets Tung and Khoi to discuss about
the job .

At mid-day of 1/11/1963, Tran Thien Khiem invites all high-ranked military
loyal and disloyal to the General Staff Headquarter for a lunch. When they
are all at place, General Duong Van Minh stands up and yells :"Coup d'etat".
Next, the military police with submachine guns enter and encircle them.

The officers loyal to Mr Diem's government like Air Force Commander,
Marines Commander were arrested by lower-ranked soldiers . Colonel Ho Tan
Quyen (Ho^` Ta^'n Quye^`n), Navy Commander, has been tricked by his
rebellious officers who invited him for a meal and killed him in a rubber
plantation. Colonel Le Quang Tung, head of the Special Force, and his
younger brother, lieutenant-colonel Khoi are forced before guns to let Mr
Diem know that all important areas are usurped so that Messrs. Diem-Nhu
should surrender. After that, they are led by escorts of General Duong
Van Minh to the backyard of the General Staff Headquarter, shot to death and
buried in two previously dug holes.

The coup instigators have two battalions of Marines with red scarves
transported by armored cars from Bien Hoa to cease Tan Son Nhat airport,
Navy Headquarter and its workshop, Defense ministry, General Office of
Police and Security, Post-office, but when coming to the Radio Station
they are stopped by strong resistance. Until 3h30, they cease the
station. The fight is fierce at the fort Cong Hoa (tha`nh Co^.ng Ho`a)
where there is a group to protect the presidential palace.

General Tran Van Don writes in his diary about Mr Do Mau, the man
self-claiming as decisive plotter as follows :

"After I let Do Mau know the time of the operation by saying :"The
decisive time is coming; you must stay next to me. Because you specialize
in politics, I want you to help two generals Le Van Kim and Nguyen Van Chieu
at the operating office." I suggest to bring Mau to Kim's office,
but Mau wants to use his jeep. When I arrive, Mau is not there. Captain
S. has to force Mau to come back when he see Mau use the back door of the
General Staff Headquarter; this gives me some suspicion. I will talk later
about this matter. I hand Mau to Kim and Chieu. From then onwards, Mau
never leaves us."

Is that Mr Do Mau wakes up and doesn't want to participate in the coup ?
Mr Do Mau never talks about this matter.

The coup generals call for Mr Diem to surrender, but he declines to do
so. At 4 pm, Mr Nguyen Tran hear Mr Duong Van Minh talk on the radio
:"Compatriots. Please listen to the president's words." But next is silence.
After the coup, I know that Mr Diem goes to the corridor of the presidential
palace to announce his resignation, but Mr Nhu stops him and says :"Your doing
that will kill my wife and me." Hearing that, Mr Diem steps back to his palace.

Mr Diem calls Mr Tran Thien Khiem by phone, but the answer :"President, it's
time for the army to meet the wish of the people."

Mr Diem taxes generals with not displaying their ideas clearly, but using
violence. He invites them to the palace to have a straight talk. Afraid
of a trick, Tran Van Don backs it down.

Duong Van Minh calls for Mr Diem's surrender for a second time; if Mr
Diem rejects, he will flatten the Gia-Long Palace. However, Mr Diem
hangs the phone. This makes Duong Van Minh shameful before other generals.

U.S. News and Reports writes that there are no generals and officers to
step forward to attack the palace; this shows that Mr Diem is "still a
man of prestige so great that no one would like to bear a disgrace to
assault directly Mr Diem." At last, the coup generals assigned Colonel
Nguyen Van Thieu, commander of the 5th Infantry, a Catholic and as seen
"loyal" to Mr Diem during the Buddhist crisis, as the first man to attack
Mr Diem. They want to watch a Catholic attack a Catholic president.

Last minutes between Mr Diem and Cabot Lodge

On 1/11/1963, Tran Van Don makes up another trick by insisting Pacific
Commander Admiral Harry D. Felt going with Lodge to visit Mr Diem so that
Don can hold Mr Diem back in Saigon instead of going to Dalat. Don also
persuades Lodge not to return to Washington on 31/10/1963 because he is
afraid that the Gia-Long Palace will have some suspicion.

Ton That Thien, press secretary of Mr Diem, cites that every time Admiral
Felt wants to stand up and leave, Lodge puts many questions so that Mr
Diem must talk to him. Until 12 pm, Felt leaves, but Lodge and his
assistant Flott stay with Mr Diem. The secret file from the White House
records Mr Diem's words clearly that :"Please tell President Kennedy that
I am a good and frank ally, that I would rather be frank and settle
questions now than talk about them later when we lose everything. Tell
President Kennedy that I take all the suggestions very seriously and wish
to carry them out, but it is a question of timing."

Recognizing that is a progress, Lodge telegraphs to Washington :"If U.S.
wants to resolve the matter thoroughly, we can do it now. Please see Diem's
announcement of releasing all Buddhists and students."

Two days before, 29/10/1963, Mr Diem recalled cultural advisor at the
Vietnamese embassy in Washington Tran Van Dinh (Tra^`n Va<n DDi~nh). He told
Dinh to go back to Washington to hold a press conference on 1/11/1963 with the
announcement : In few days, there will be an agreement between the Vietnamese
government and ambassador Cabot Lodge about a better method to
suppress the insurgency of communists. These measures will aim at using
more effectively the military and economic aid, creating an administrative
structure at the central and provincial level. In brief, it's a change in
policy and personnel."

After the suggested press conference, Dinh would go to New Delhi to meet
high-ranked officials from Hanoi. Written about this, doctor Hammer says
that it may be Hanoi wants to do trading with the South and stop intrusion
because Hanoi was caught in between in the dispute of China and USSR. It is
sure that Dinh wouldn't organize the press conference because of the difference
of 12-hour timing between Washington and Saigon.

Mr Diem's words to Lodge are very important and can change totally the
situation, including the ending of the war and release of Buddhist
demonstrators. Mr Diem's suggestion of a change in policy and personnel
is to meet totally demands of Kennedy and it's is an utmost yielding which
is rarely seen in a man like Mr Diem. However, Lodge's telegram is just
of second priority not an urgent one like the time when Lodge informs
about the coup d'etat to Washington. When the words from Mr Diem come to
Washington, the news about the coup d'etat has been known for many hours.
Kennedy and Lodge are at fault not to stop the coup d'etat and let the
political and military situation in Vietnam decline and that has been
warned by some advisors of Kennedy.

Mr Diem's words to Lodge is 1h30 before the coup d'etat occurs and the
plot can be stopped in time to wait for the order from Washington because
Lodge's duty is to organize the coup d'etat when Mr Diem doesn't accept
the demands of Washington.

According to Lodge's report to Washington, at 4h30 pm (the coup d'etat is
at 1h30 pm) of 1/11/1963, after refusing twice to surrender, Mr Diem
phones Lodge to ask about Washington's attitude towards the coup d'etat in
response to what he has said to Lodge. Lodge says that he hears the
gunshots, but he doesn't know what happens.

"You should have a general idea about my responses. I am head of a
country. I did try to do my duty and I believe in that more than anybody

Lodge : "I am sure that president did your duty as I said this morning. I
admire your courage and what you have done to your country. Now, I just
concern about your life. I have been told that the plotters suggest to
let you and your brother leave the country safely if you resign. Do you
hear something like that ?"

Mr Diem : No...Do you have my phone number ?

Lodge : If thinking what I can do for you about your safety, phone me.

After that Lodge phones Father De Jaegher, Mr Diem's close friend, to
have him persuaded Mr Diem to resign but he refuses to do so.

Lodge also phones bishop Astar, papal nuncio of the Vatican to have him
advised Mr Diem to take refuge in the U.S. embassy, but there is no answer.

According to Michael Maclear in "The Ten Thousand Day War : 1945-1975",
Mr Diem phones General Tran Van Don. Don says : Mr President. I am
sorry for what has happened but what I ask you now is to be wise and
understand the situation and a special plane is ready if you surrender
without any conditions to carry you and your family out of Vietnam."

Tran Van Don puts many sins on Mr Diem before the coup d'etat to explain
for his betrayal. To make the image of Mr Diem worse, he says that Mr
Diem lost popular support, particularly among the peasantry which comprised
85% of the population, and Diem "began to be oppressive in his ambition. He
would like to be King of Vietnam. He believed too much that God had ordered
him to SVN with a mystic mission". These words are contrary to what Duong Van
Minh admits when Minh is exiled to Bangkok.

According to Do Tho, around mid-afternoon of 1/11/1963, Colonel Lam Son
brought officer cadres to protect the Gia-Long palace. The army of the
3rd Military Corps and Security at the camp Le Van Duyet arrive and
encircle the General Staff Headquarter. They request Mr Diem to attack and
this would make plot generals shake. But Mr Diem backs it down because
he doesn't want a bloodbath. Do Tho also says that Messrs. Diem-Nhu leave
the palace not "by a secret exit to escape from the palace" like written
in many books (including Halberstam's one), but walk to the street Le
Thanh Ton and use a car driven by Cao Xuan Vy, director of Thanh Nien Cong
Hoa (Republic Youth), to Ma Tuyen's house, Mr Diem's friend, in Cholon,
the Chinese quarter; Ma Tuyen is also a cadre of Thanh Nien Cong Hoa.
They are well welcomed here. Both discuss to move to the church "Father
Tam". There, they talk to Father Jean and attend the mass. Mr Nhu
wants each to go to different place. Mr Diem will go to the West to see
General Huynh Van Cao and Mr Nhu will go to the Central Highlands to be
with General Nguyen Khanh. If one is arrested, plotters won't dare
killing him because the other is still alive. Father Jean tells them to
stay but they think that Father Jean will be in trouble.


Kim Nguyen

May 13, 1996, 3:00:00 AM5/13/96

Mr Diem disagrees with Mr Nhu's suggestion by saying : you are hated by
them and they will kill you. Stay with me and I will protect you. We
have lived with each other for many years. It's the critical time; we
should not separate each other. Then, Mr Diem phones General Tran Thien
Khiem to tell him to get him home and phones all protecting force to stop
resistance. Next, he tells Do Tho to let Tran Van Don know his
whereabout. However, Duong Van Minh doesn't let Don and Khiem go to get
Mr Diem, but orders General Mai Huu Xuan (who still hates Mr Diem
because the latter has destroyed Binh Xuyen gang which Xuan had some
connection; Mr Diem did not only remember about that connection but uses
and promotes Xuan to the rank of general), Colonel Nguyen Van Quan,
Colonel Duong Ngoc Lam, lieutenant-colonel Duong Hieu Nghia and captain
Nguyen Van Nhung to organize a convoy to get Messrs. Diem-Nhu.

Do Tho is regretful that he didn't tell both to leave Saigon - Cho Lon
because he believes that Do Mau, Tran Van Don and Tran Thien Khiem will
protect the men. However, Mr Diem says to Do Tho that,"I don't know
whether or not I will die and I don't care. Please tell Nguyen Khanh that
I love him very much and request him to revenge for me".

Duong Ngoc Lam says that when the group go to the church "Father Tam"
around 7 pm, Messrs. Diem-Nhu were already there. Mai Huu Xuan approaches
them and say hello (some sources say that it's Nghia to do that while Xuan
stands behind); thinking that he will be sent abroad, Mr Diem asks Xuan
to drop by the palace to get clothing. Xuan answers that it is impossible
because he must bring Mr Diem to the General Staff Headquarter. Mr Nhu asks :
Get a president by this car (they are brought into an armored car) ? Xuan
says it's because of security. Mr Diem steps in the armored car without
saying a word. There is only one driver in the amored car. There are 4
cars before theirs. When the convoy runs for a while, young officers ask
to shot Mr Nhu, but Duong Ngoc Lam says :"Nobody shots anybody; we must
go to the General Staff Headquarter." The convoy stops at many places,
especially at the railway crossing on Hong Thap Tu street.

Arriving at the General Staff Headquarter, Duong Ngoc Lam comes to the armored
car M113 finding that the corpses of Messrs. Diem-Nhu lie on the ground : Their
hands are tied to their backs; Mr Diem has been shot from behind his head; Mr
Nhu has been stabbed many times on breast, back and shot on the head.

Later, Tran Van Don meets Duong Van Minh at the corridor of Tran Thien
Khiem's office and asks why the two must die. Minh answers disdainfully
:"Does that matter to me ? They were dead." Right at that moment, Mai Huu
Xuan comes to say to Minh that "Mission Accomplie". Don concludes that
Duong Van Minh ha ordered Mai Huu Xuan to kill them and that's only Minh to
decide it alone."

Nguyen Van Quang is later promoted to the rank of general and before his
death, says to Tran Van Don : "Diem-Nhu were killed at the railway gate on
Hong Thap Tu street (Co^?ng xe lu+?a ddu+o+`ng Ho^`ng Tha^.p Tu+.) by two
persons : Duong Hieu Nghia shot both men from the turret of the armored
car M113 with an automatic pistol (pistolet mitrailleur); Nhung, in the
car, used pistol and bayonet to finish the task..." (Mr Duong Hieu Nghia wrote
in an article recently (4/1996) that he didn't do it; it's Nhung to do it).

According to details Mai Huu Xuan lets Don know, Duong Van Minh orders
Xuan to welcome Messrs. Diem-Nhu. They are in the car with Duong Hieu
Nghia and Nhung. Xuan is in the car of Quan and Lam. The first and last
civilian strongman and his advisor die on the road to the General Staff

Tran Van Don says that Nguyen Van Nhung has been known a cruel man and
loved to kill. Ba Cut (Ba Cu.t) has been beheaded by Duong Van Minh, but
Minh still ordered to let Nhung dig his corps and cut it into many
pieces. Every time to kill somebody, Nhung makes a mark on his pistol.

In a readjustment coup (cuo^.c chi?nh ly') of Nguyen Khanh (Nguyen^~n
Kha'nh), General Duong Van Duc (Du+o+ng Va<n DDu+'c), in the night of
30/1/1964, arrests Nhung right before Duong Van Minh and Nguyen Ngoc Tho,
but Minh dares not to protect Nhung. Nhung is handed to the paratrooper
army of Nguyen Chanh Thi, tortured to death and declared he hangs himself.

"Government and Revolution in Vietnam" by Dennis J. Ducanson, Oxford
University Press, 1968, p. 340 :

Death of the president - If things had not turned out quite as General
Tran Tu Oai's tape recording had been repeating over the air the previous
afternoon, Ngo Dinh Diem did nevertheless surrender by telephone to Joint
General Staff Headquarter during the morning of 2/11/1963. He and his
brother were collected by the commandant of the Civil Guard -- oaths of
personal loyalty, even Can Lao ones, were forgotten in this moment -- and
he consigned them to a Captain Nguyen Van Nhung with an armoured car.
Later in the morning, the Captain delivered their corpses to the Generals,
battered and shot. General Oai announced that they had committed suicide
"inside the church"; the Captain was arrested shortly afterwards on a
charge of corruption, and soon General Oai's staff were putting it about
that he too had committed suicide, after confessing to the regicide.

"Assassin in our time " by Sandy Lesberg, Peebles International, London, 1976,
p. 142 :

The general in charge of bringing back the prisoners rode in one of the
carriers and the prisoners in the other. A major (Nhung) who had a grudge
against Nhu for having ordered the execution of one of his close friend
accompanied the prisoners. An eyewitness report described the assassination
which the generals at first called suicide then "accidental suicide".

Diem and Nhu sat with hands tied behind their backs. While Diem remained
silent, the major lunged at Nhu with his bayonet and stabbed him 15 or 20
times. Then he took out his revolver and shot Diem in the back of his
head; seeing Nhu's body still twitching on the floor, the major
administered the coup of grace by putting a bullet through Nhu's head

Washington's shaking

The assassination of Messrs. Diem-Nhu unmans shakes American Generals
favoring the coup and U.S. public.

Mr Do Mau, self-claiming as main plotter, writes that he cries when
seeing them killed. General Ton That Dinh also cries and punches onto his
desk in frustration. Not knowing how to explain, General Tran Tu Oai
(Tra^`n Tu+? Oai) of the General Information Office, announces :"The death
of Messrs. Diem-Nhu is an "accidental suicide". A stupid announcement
from a general makes people laugh at an excuse for an illegal act of coup

In the morning of 2/11/1963, when Conein goes to take a shower, he
receives a phone call from Cabot Lodge that Kennedy wants to know the
whereabout of Messrs. Diem-Nhu. Upon arriving at the General Staff
Headquarter he sees them dead.

In Washington, the National Security Council convenes for a discussion
about the situation after knowing there was a coup d'etat. An official
telegram is delivered and put on the table; all are silent. Reading it,
Kennedy with a faded face stands up, goes out for a while, comes back and
says :"Mr Diem has fought against communists for 9 years; he should have
something in return."

Michael Forrestal, one of the men favoring the coup d'etat and co-drafting
the official message 243 to Cabot Lodge on 24/8/1963 requests a resignation,
but Kennedy says that he should stay.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk who has been called "a man of no image" due
to always repeating after Kennedy sends a message to Cabot Lodge : "I want
to show my adoration to your managing the complicated event with perfection."
Then, another message is :"Reports about the death of
Diem-Nhu (shot with details of blood all over) on the first pages of
newspapers cause high emotion. We think that is unexpected from the coup

The truth is that it is an unavoidable consequence because in the secret
file of the White House, there is no item as the prime condition to keep
safe Messrs. Diem-Nhu when Kennedy directed Cabot Lodge to support coup

General Maxwell Taylor who opposes the coup d'etat and replaces Cabot
Lodge says :"Mr Diem's soul haunts each one of us who knew the coup. Due
to our complicity, the Americans must take responsibility upon the tragedy
that the South Vietnamese must bear and the consequent political chaos which
is the pretext of our withdrawal; by doing our role, we bring them into
suffered situations and this stops people to have any suggestions..."

Forrestal, talking about Kennedy, says :"The death in Saigon makes him
shocked morally and religiously, and this undermines his belief in any
suggestions related to Vietnam."

Doctor Hammer criticizes touchingly :"Now, a first Catholic head of state
is dead, assassinated due to the consequence of a policy of the first
Catholic American president who permits the plan."

To condone Kenedy, a friend says :"Anyhow, Diem and Nhu were tyrants."
Kennedy answers : "No, they were in difficult position. They did the best
they could for their country" ("A Death in November, p. 301).

This is too late for a historical contradicting statement, restoration of
honor for Messrs. Diem-Nhu, rejection of propagandas related to the coup
d'etat, a condemnation of coup generals who followed the inducements of the
Americans by betraying their president and treason. Doctor Hammer writes
:"Kennedy's statement is an offering before the graves of Messrs. Diem-Nhu."

Although Mr Nguyen Tran has opposed Messrs. Diem-Nhu's policies in 1958, he
acknowledges that Messrs. Diem-Nhu's statement written down by Lodge in a
message on 1/11/1963 is their effort of perfect compromise for the sake of the
self-governed interest of VN and that is praiseworthy. It is regretful that
their fate and SVN to confront a "colonialist and self-conceited"
behavior of a young Kennedy and a "governor-general" Cabot Lodge results in
their death.

When seeing General Tran Van Don on 2/1/1963 at the U.S. embassy, Cabot Lodge
says :"President Kennedy and American public are shocked. I say to them that I
can't believe there are such deaths and are very sad".

Sadness and regret may disturb the mind of Lodge, Kennedy and other
responsible people, but that is unavoidable as General Maxwell Taylor has
critized them that, "They unconsciously play with fire encouraging the
coup d'etat. In the first message to Lodge on 24/8/1963, a message
signaling a coup d'etat, it's Kennedy who did verify that "we must cope
with a such situation that Diem's life is not guaranteed."

Around 10 am of 2/11/1963, Flott, assistant of Cabot Lodge, visits Mr Nguyen
Tran and makes excuse about his dirty suit because he did come to the Gia-Long
palace to look for Messrs. Nhu and some documents. Flott boasts that he was
the last man to shake hand with Mr Diem yesterday. Through an introduction of
a friend, Nguyen Tran came to know Flott. Nguyen Tran did draft a letter and a
report and sent them to Kennedy dissuading him not to set up a coup d'etat and
should not send the U.S. army to Vietnam; that is Nguyen Tran's last advice to
him. Flot has come to see Nguyen Tran many times , but Nguyen Tran found way
to avoid seeing him because both hadn't the same political viewpoint.

As one still remembers on 14/5/1961, Vice-president Johnson on a public trip
to visit Vietnam said that "Mr Diem is a Churchill of Asia". However, on
return, Johnson wrote a report dated 23/5/1961 saying that, "Diem oppose US to
send combat troops to Vietnam. Diem wants just American advisors for training
Vietnamese military". It's no doubt that two deaths in November originate
mainly from Johnson's report.

According to "Vie^.t Nam 30 na<m ma'u lu+?a" (Vietnam's 30 years of bloody
war"), Volume I, Publisher Alpha, 1991, p. 610, informed that Messrs. Diem-Nhu
are arrested at the church "Father Tam" in Cholon, General Duong Van Minh
phones Henri Cabot Lodge. This ambassador answers in French that, "Nous ne
voulons pas les prisoniers, nous ne voulons que les cadares" ("Chu'ng to^i
kho^ng muo^'n tu` binh, chu'ng to^i chi? muo^'n xa'c che^'t"). One should not
generalize US friends like Cabot Lodge.

The death certificate for Mr Diem says that he is a small mandarin of
Binh Thuan, and for Mr Nhu, a librarian (qua?n thu? thu+ vie^.n). It's
ironic that Messrs. Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don,...have had titles
promoted by not a small mandarin in Binh Thuan, but by a president.

On 3/11/1963, Nguyen Tran arrives at Tran Trung Dung's house on Doan Thi Diem
street for infos. Dung confirms that Messrs. Diem-Nhu have been killed. Dung
and a priest do shrouding their corpses according to Catholic ceremony. Their
corpses are then buried in the backyard of the General Staff Headquarter.
However, through many coups d'etat after, generals still feel unsafe and rebury
them at the cemetery Mac Dinh Chi. Nguyen Tran drops by to visit them seeing
that their graves have no tombstones.

Tran Trung Dung's wife is Hoang Anh, niece of Messrs. Diem-Nhu. Sobing,
she asks the Council of Generals to verify that the two were killed not by
suicide because suicide is a disgrace to the family. Dung laments to me
:"She is too naive."

As Marguerite Higgins writes, when exiled in Bangkok, Duong Van Minh
admits to an American that he orders to kill Messrs. Nhu because "I
couldn't do differently". He couldn't let Mr Diem alive because "he got
sympathy from simple and rustic people in the rural areas, especially
Catholics and refugees." About Mr Nhu, Minh says, "Nhu was afraid of by
many people and did set up many organizations."

Mr Tran Van Huong, prime minister from 10/1964 to 1/1965, speaks to a
British diplomat : "They, generals, decided to kill Messrs. Diem-Nhu
because they were too afraid of them. They knew that they had no talent
(ba^'t ta`i), morality (dda.o ddu+'c va` lua^n ly'), and no support from
the vast majority of the Viets. They could not stop Messrs. Diem-Nhu
taking back the power if these men were alive."

Informed that Messrs. Diem-Nhu were assassinated, Mrs. Nhu who is staying
at the hotel Beverly Whilshire utters efficacious words :"This blood will
flow to Washington." It's true that 20 days after the death of Messrs.
Diem-Nhu, Kennedy is assassinated by Oswald in Dallas, Texas. Then,
Robert Kennedy, his younger brother, who once said to Kennedy that "why
don't we eradicate that painful prickle ?" had the same fate not long

Mrs. Nhu and her 3 kids are transported by an American airplane to
anywhere she wants.

Rewards ?

In an official message dated 30/10/1963 of the State Department to Cabot
Lodge, George Bundy notes that coup generals may need a hefty sum of money
at the last minutes (Conein later says that that money would be used for coup
generals to escape in case the coup failed and that is not a bribery); he also
says that generals can keep that money if the coup d'etat is well-organized and
successful; the use of money should be done secretly. This order is executed by
Lucien Conein. However, Conein does it openly by bringing that money to the
Joint General Staff Headquarter on 1/11/1963. Lucien gives 3 million dong (not
in dollars as Tran Van Don said) to Tran Van Don and Ton That Dinh. The
sharing of money creates a bad reputation; due to this, in 1971, general Tran
Van Don orders major Dang Van Hoa (DDa<.ng Va<n Hoa) to conduct a search for
receipts. Major Hoa makes a report dated 14/8/1971 with details as follow :

- Tran Thien Khiem : VN $500,000

- Ton That Dinh : $600,000

- Le Nguyen Khang : $100,000

- Nguyen Van Thieu : $50,000

- Tran Ngoc Huye^n (Tra^`n Ngo.c Huye^'n) : $100,000

- Phan Hoa Hiep (Phan Ho`a Hie^.p) : $100,000

- Dao Ngoc Diep (DDa`o Ngo.c Die^.p) : $100,000

Total : $1,550,000

Another $1,450,000 has been delivered to Duong Van Minh, Le Van Kim
(Le^ Va<n Kim), Ton That Dinh, Nguyen Huu Co (Nguye^~n Hu+~u Co'), Tran
Ngoc Tam (Tra^`n Ngo.c Ta'm), Nguyen Khanh (Nguye^~n Kha'nh) and Do Cao
Tri (DDo^~ Cao Tri'). Furthermore, Mr Duong Van Minh gets another 6,000
dollars found in a suitcase of Mr Diem.


Kim Nguyen

May 13, 1996, 3:00:00 AM5/13/96

Theo Tho+`i Ba'o 11/4/96

Saigon -- Ho^.i Khoa Ho.c Su+? VC ta.i Saigon vu+`a co^ng bo^' chu+o+ng
tri`nh nghie^n cu+'u "Saigon Xu+a" dde^? chua^?n bi. cho ca'c le^~ ky? nie^.m
300 na<m tha`nh la^.p Saigon (1698-1998). Ho^.i na`y dda~ pha^n chia 5 giai
ddoa.n dde^? nghie^n cu+'u ve^` Saigon, tu+` 2000 na<m tru+o+'c Thie^n Chu'a
Gia'ng Sinh cho de^'n nhu+~ng na<m cuo^'i cu?a the^' ky? 20.

Ngoa`i ra Ho^.i Khoa Ho.c Su+? VC cu~ng se~ ta^.p trung va`o mo^.t so^'
va^'n dde^` chi'nh dde^? nghie^n cu+'u va` bie^n soa.n. Cha<?ng ha.n nhu+ :
Bie^n soa.n cuo^'n thu+ mu.c nghie^n cu+'u ve^` Saigon, su+u ta^.p va` he^.
tho^'ng mo^.t bo^. ca'c ba?n ddo^` cu?a tha`nh pho^' tu+` khi tha`nh la^.p
dde^'n nay. su+? te^n ddu+o+`ng cu?a Saigon, su+. hi`nh tha`nh va` pha't
trie^?n co^.ng ddo^`ng ca'c da^n to^.c o+? Saigon qua ca'c tho+`i ky`, mo^.t
so^' va^'n dde^` kinh te^', va<n ho'a va` con ngu+o+`i Saigon, di~ nhie^n la`
du+o+'i nha~n quan cu?a CS.

DDu+o+.c bie^'t, chu+o+ng tri`nh nghie^n cu+'u qui mo^ na`y ve^` Saigon se~
ddu+o+.c thu+.c hie^.n trong 3 na<m (1996-1998).

DDe^'n na<m 1998, ddu'ng di.p ky? nie^.m 300 na<m tha`nh la^.p Saigon, ta^'t
ca? ca'c co^ng tri`nh nghie^n cu+'u cu?a CS ne^u tre^n se~ ddu+o+.c to^?ng
ke^'t va` pho^? bie^'n ro^.ng ra~i cho da^n chu'ng.

Na<m 1698 dda~ ddu+o+.c cho.n la` na<m tha`nh hi`nh cu?a Saigon (du` ra<`ng
lu'c ddo' chu+a mang te^n Saigon !), chi'nh la` na<m Chu'a Nguye^~n Phu'c Chu
(co`n go.i la` Minh Vu+o+ng) dda~ cho Nguye^~n Hu+~u Ca?nh va`o Nam dda<.t ra
phu? Gia DDi.nh, go^`m vu`ng dda^'t DDo^`ng Nai va` Ta^n Bi`nh (bao go^`m
Saigon va` Long An nga`y nay) la`m co^'t lo~i.

Vu`ng Gia DDi.nh lu'c ddo' co`n hoang vu, nhu+ng Chu'a Nguye^~n muo^'n kha^?n
hoang, khai tha'c, dda<.t quan cai tri., dda<.t bo^. ddinh, bo^. ddie^`n,
cha^'n chi?nh ho^. kha^?u...nhu+ dda~ la`m o+? Kha'nh Ho`a, Bi`nh Thua^.n
tru+o+'c ddo'.

Kim Nguyen

May 13, 1996, 3:00:00 AM5/13/96

SGN 26/4/96

Theo Reader's Digest, 4/1996

Ca'c ba?n du+. a'n va` thie^'t ke^' ddang trong giai ddoa.n duye^.t xe't
cuo^'i cu`ng dde^? tha`nh la^.p dda`i tu+o+?ng nie^.m ddu+o+.c mong cho+` tu+`
la^u ta.i Washington D.C.. Vie^.n Ba?o Ta`ng va` DDa`i Tu+o+?ng Nie^.m Ca'c
Na.n Nha^n CS se~ tru+ng ba`i vo^ so^' nhu+~ng to^.i a'c ta`y tro+`i tro+`i
kho^ng dung dda^'t kho^ng tha ga^y ra bo+?i nhu+~ng te^n ddo^` dde^. cuo^`ng
ti'n cu?a Marx va` Le^nin. Kha'ch dde^'n tha<m se~ ta^.n ma<'t nhi`n tha^'y
mo^.t so^' ba<`ng chu+'ng su+? tu+` nhu+~ng tha'ng nga`y dden to^'i
du+o+'i a'ch cai tri. ba<`ng khu?ng bo^' cu?a CS. Mo^.t ma?nh cu?a bu+'c
tu+o+`ng o^ nhu.c Ba' Linh, mo^.t mo^ pho?ng xa` lim nho^'t phi co^ng Hoa Ky`
ta.i Hanoi Hilton, mo^.t trung ta^m du+~ kie^.n ddie^.n toa'n chu+'a
danh sa'ch ca'c na.n nha^n cu?a cuo^.c ta`n sa't dda^~m ma'u nha^'t trong
su+? loa`i ngu+o+`i.

I't nha^'t nhu+~ng na.n nha^n na`y co`n ddu+o+.c the^' gio+'i bie^'t dde^'n,
bo+?i vi` chu'ng ta se~ kho^ng bao gio+` bie^'t he^'t CS dda~ thu? tie^u va`
ha.i che^'t bao nhie^u ngu+o+`i. Ha`ng tra<m nga`n ngu+o+`i Cossack dda~ bi.
Ho^`ng qua^n Nga ta`n sa't da~ man trong cuo^.c no^.i chie^'n sau cuo^.c ca'ch tha'ng 10 ta.i Nga. Ha`ng chu.c nga`n da^n da ddo? Miskito dda~ bi. bo.n
CS Sandinistas gie^'t che^'t ta.i Nicaragua, ho+n 2 trie^.u ngu+o+`i Trung
Quo^'c bi. thu? tie^u khi te^n ddo^` te^? Mao DDo^ng thu+.c hie^.n
cuo^.c ca?i ca'ch ruo^.ng dda^'t ho^`i dda^`u tha^.p nie^n 1950. The^' ma`
te^n dda^`u so? Ho^` Chi' Minh la.i cho ngu+o+`i ddi ho.c dde^? ve^` a'p
cho VN.

DDo^'i vo+'i ba?n cha^'t kha't ma'u hung ha<ng va` gie^'t ngu+o+`i vo^ nha^n
dda.o thi` ngay ca? quy? su+' du+o+'i a^m ty cu~ng kho^ng so sa'nh no^?i vo+'i
bo.n CS. DDu+'c Quo^'c Xa~ pha?i chi.u tra'ch nhie^.m vo+'i nha^n loa.i ve^`
ca'i che^'t ho+n 11 trie^.u ngu+o+`i vo^ to^.i, nhu+ng lu~ quy? ddo? CS co`n
ghe^ go+'m ho+n nhie^`u vi` dda~ ha.i che^'t ho+n 100 trie^.u ngu+o+`i ca?
tha^?y tre^n toa`n the^' gio+'i. Co+n a'c mo^.ng khu?ng khie^'p ma` CS ga^y ra
dda~ bao tru`m le^n kha<'p qua? ddi.a ca^`u tu+` tha'ng 10/1917 va` co`n tie^'p
tu.c cho dde^'n ho^m nay. Su+. hung ba.o da~ man ma^'t ti'nh ngu+o+`i la` ba?n
quye^`n ma` CS luo^n luo^n su+? Na<m 1901, Le^nin dda~ da.y dda`n em
ra<`ng, "Ba.o lu+.c la` ddo^.ng lu+.c chi'nh cu?a ca'ch". Ho+n nu+?a
the^' ky? sau, Nikita Khrushchev he^'t lo+`i ca ngo+.i dda`n anh Le^nin va`
go.i ba.o lu+.c la` phu+o+ng thu+'c hie^.u qua? nhanh cho'ng nha^'t dde^? tie^u
die^.t ke? thu` cu?a chu? nghi~a Bolshevism. No^'i go't dda`n anh, Khrushchev
dda~ cho 3000 xe ta<ng ca`y na't cuo^.c no^?i da^.y ddo`i tu+. do ta.i Hungary.
CS la` ddo^`ng nghi~a vo+'i che^'t cho'c, ba^'t cu+' no+i na`o cu~ng va^.y va`
se~ kho^ng bao gio+` thay ddo^?i. Ta.i Ukraine va` nhu+~ng vu`ng la^n ca^.n,
ho+n 7 trie^.u no^ng da^n bi. bo? cho che^'t ddo'i theo le^.nh cu?a DDie^.n
Kremlin. Nhu+~ng no^ng da^n ddo'i kho^? ha'i rau qua? tu+` ma?nh ruo^.ng cu?a
ho. dde^? a<n dde^`u bi. xu+? ba<'n ta.i cho^~. Xa'c ngu+o+`i na<`m dda^`y
ra^~y tre^n kha<'p ca'c con ddu+o+`ng cu?a tha`nh pho^' Kharkiv. Mo^.t
ngu+o+`i so^'ng so't ke^? la.i ra<`ng bo.n CS Nga gie^'t ngu+o+`i nhu+ ra.,
ca?nh che^'t cho'c ru`ng ro+.n nhu+ co' mo^.t be^.nh tra`n qua tha`nh
pho^' va^.y.

CS ddo^`ng nghi~a vo+'i ta`n sa't da~ man ta.i Ethiopia, no+i ma` te^n
Mengistu Haile Mariam tro+? tha`nh la~nh tu. CS ddo^.c ta`i na<m 1977 va` sau
ddo' gie^'t che^'t ma^'y chu.c nga`n ngu+o+`i, bao go^`m ca? ho.c sinh trung
ho.c ta.i Addis Ababa. CS ddo^`ng nghi~a vo+'i che^'t cho'c ta.i VN khi CS
cu+o+'p chi'nh quye^`n na<m 1945, te^n ma gia'o Ho^` Chi' Minh, tay sai CS
quo^'c te^', dda~ gio+? thu? ddoa.n he`n ha. thu? tie^u ca'c chi'nh kha'ch
thuo^.c Vie^.t Nam Quo^'c Da^n DDa?ng va` ca'c dda?ng pha'i chi'nh tri. ddo^'i
la^.p kha'c. Cuo^.c ca?i ca'ch ruo^ng dda^'t ba<'t chu+o+'c theo ca'c dda`n
anh CS thu+.c te^' chi? la` mo^.t hi`nh thu+'c a<n cu+o+'p cu?a da^n ro^`i
gie^'t ngu+o+`i bi.t mie^.ng. Sau khi du`ng ba.o lu+.c xa^m chie^'m VNCH, bo.n
CS Ha` No^.i dda~ dde^ he`n thu? tie^u nhu+~ng ngu+o+`i cho^'ng ddo^'i va`
ha`nh ha. cho che^'t da^`n che^'t mo`n ca'c si~ quan vie^n chu+'c chi'nh
quye^`n Saigon ta.i nhu+~ng tra.i tu` ta^.p trung.

CS ddo^`ng nghi~a vo+'i che^'t cho'c ta.i Ta^y, no+i ma` te^n Mao
DDo^ng thu+.c hie^.n dda~ ta^m tie^u die^.t Pha^.t Gia'o Ta^y cu?a ha<'n.
Ho^`ng qua^n Trung Co^.ng tra`n va`o ta`n sa't ha`ng nga`n da^n Ta^y va`
chie^'m ddo'ng xu+' so+? cu?a Pha^.t Gia'o na`y cho to+'i nga`y ho^m nay. CS
ddo^`ng nghi~a vo+'i che^'t cho'c ta.i Cambodia, no+i ma` bo.n CS Khmer DDo?
kha't ma'u ngu+o+`i dda~ gie^'t ha.i ga^`n 2 trie^.u da^n chu'ng vo^ to^.i
ba<`ng nhu+~ng hi`nh thu+'c da~ man mo.i ro+. la`m cho ca? the^' gio+'i pha?i
kinh to+?m. CS ddo^`ng nghi~a vo+'i a'm sa't thu? tie^u ta.i Cuba, ta.i DDo^ng
DDu+'c, ta.i Afghanistan. Tu+` tha`nh pho^' Szczecin o+? vu`ng Baltic cho
to+'i Trieste ven vi.nh Adriatic. Thi` CS ddo^`ng nghi~a vo+'i gie^'t ngu+o+`i
! Tu+` nhu+~ng ca<n la`ng gulag be^n Nga cho to+'i Thie^n An Mo^n o+? Trung
Co^.ng cu~ng la` nhu+~ng ca?nh gie^'t ngu+o+`i !

Cuo^.c chie^'n tranh Cao Ly, cuo^.c chie^'n tranh VN, trong khu ru+`ng ra^.m
Katyn va` trong nhu+~ng ca<n ha^`m o+? Lubyanka, gie^'t ngu+o+`i ! Ho+n 100
trie^.u na.n nha^n cu?a bo.n quy? ddo? CS. Va` ddo' chi? la` nhu+~ng ngu+o+`i
bi. gie^'t ha.i. Con so^' 100 trie^.u chu+a bao go^`m nhu+~ng ngu+o+`i bi.
ta`n phe^' va` tro+? ne^n ddie^n da.i vi` to^.i a'ch cu?a CS. Bie^'t bao gia
ddi`nh dda~ la^m vao` ca?nh nu+o+'c ma<'t lu+ng tro`ng vi` co' ngu+o+`i tha^n
bi. CS gie^'t ha.i. Bie^'t bao nhie^u con ngu+o+`i dda~ pha?i so^'ng kho^'n
kho^? thie^'u a<n thie^'u ma<.c, bi. bu+ng bi't tin tu+'c vo+'i the^' gio+'i
be^n ngoa`i trong nhu+~ng "thie^n ddu+o+`ng" CS. Con so^' 100 trie^.u na.n
nha^n cu~ng co`n chu+a bao go^`m ca'c tu` nha^n chi'nh tri. bi. dda`y ddi lao
ddo^.ng kho^? sai ha`ng ma^'y chu.c na<m ta.i vu`ng ba<ng gia' Siberia, chu+a
bao go^`m ca? trie^.u ngu+o+`i VN ma<.c cho so'ng gio' ba dda`o cu`ng bao
nhie^u nguy hie^?m kha'c dda~ lao mi`nh ra Bie^?n DDo^ng tro^'n cha.y CS. Co`n
bie^'t bao nha` va<n tho+ bi. CS du`ng mo.i ca'ch dde^? bi.t mie^.ng, bao
nhie^u nha` tu ha`nh (Pha^.t gia'o, Co^ng gia'o, Tin La`nh, Cao DDa`i, Ho`a
Ha?o,...) bi. thu? tie^u, ca^`m tu`, a'p bu+'c kho^'ng che^, va` co`n nu+~a
bie^'t bao nhie^u gia ddi`nh tan ta'c, chia ly khi bi. CS tru` da^.p hoa<.c khi
pha?i bo? xu+' ra ddi vi` quye^'t kho^ng ddo^.i tro+`i chung vo+'i CS.

Co' ma^'y ai co`n nghi~ to+'i thu+o+ng xo't ho. hay kho^ng ? Hay nhu+~ng ca'i
che^'t na`y dda~ chi`m va`o di~ va~ng, la^'y co+' la` ha~y nhi`n ve^` "tu+o+ng
lai" ? Chu'ng ta dda~ que^n ddi ba?n cha^'t man ro+. cu?a loa`i quy~ ddo? chi?
vi` be^n ngoa`i ho. co' lo+'p da ddo^`ng chu?ng to^.c ? Chu'ng ta dda~ que^n
ddi chi'nh ca'c quo^'c gia ye^u chuo^.ng tu+. do nga`y na`o co`n mo+? ro^.ng
vo`ng tay ddo'n chu'ng ta va`o hu+o+?ng tu+. do, ha.nh phu'c cu`ng ho. ?
Chu'ng ta dda~ que^n ddi chi'nh nhu+~ng quo^'c gia na`y co' la^`n cu~ng chi?
vi` su+. tu+. do cu?a chu'ng ta ma` ho. dda~ ddo^? bie^'t bao xu+o+ng ma'u
dde^? giu+~ cho chu'ng ta mo^t giai ddoa.n tuy nga<'n ngu?i dda^`y pha^'n
dda^'u ddau thu+o+ng cu~ng chi? vi` muo^'n giu'p chu'ng ta ddu+o+.c tu+. do
trong cuo^.c chie^'n tranh ddo^'i dda^`u loa`i quy? ddo? ga^y cuo^.c chie^'n
tu+o+ng ta`n du+o+'i danh nghi~a "gia?i pho'ng" ? Chi'nh vi` ca^`n thu+'c
ti?nh su+. tho+` o+ que^n la~ng na`y ma` Vie^.n Ba?o Ta`ng va` DDa`i Tu+o+?ng
Nie^.m Na.n Nha^n CS se~ ddu+o+.c xa^y trong tho+`i gian sa<'p to+'i.
Ai trong chu'ng ta co`n giu+~ ddu+o+.c nhu+~ng di va^.t cu?a ngu+o+`i tha^n
hoa<.c cu?a chi'nh mi`nh chu+'ng minh to^.i a'c cu?a CS ne^n ddem dde^'n dde^?
ta<.ng Vie^.n Ba?o Ta`ng na`y ha^`u giu'p pha^`n na`o cho the^' he^. mai sau
dde^? co' mo^.t y' nie^.m ma` pho`ng tha^n.

Kim Nguyen

May 13, 1996, 3:00:00 AM5/13/96

* ngu+o+`i thu+' nha^'t :

Bu`i DDi`nh Thi ke'o to^i va`o la.i buo^`ng cu~, no+i ma` chu'ng to^i vu+`a
dda`o tu+o+`ng vu+o+.t ngu.c dde^m qua. Cha<'c cha<'n mo^.t ddie^`u la` Bu`i
DDi`nh Thi tu+o+?ng to^i dda~ che^'t ro^`i ne^n mo+'i lo^i dda^`u to^i va`o
pho`ng tru+o+'c, dda<.t to^i na<`m quay ma<.t nhi`n ra sa^n, nho+` the^' to^i
mo+'i co' co+ ho^.i nhi`n tha^'y to^.i a'c ta`y tro+`i cu?a anh ta. Ne^'u
bie^'t to^i co`n so^'ng, co' le~ Bu`i DDi`nh Thi dda~ ban cho mo^.t va`i "cu'
a^n hue^." ro^`i.

Vu+`a qua<~ng to^i vo^ buo^`ng, Bu`i DDi`nh Thi vo^.i quay tro+? ra cu+?a khu
kie^n giam dda^?y ma.nh anh Tie^'p va`o. Tu+` lu'c tha^'y anh Tie^'p bi.
dda'nh o+? bo+` so^ng cho dde^'n lu'c ddo' la` bao la^u, to^i cu~ng kho^ng
the^? ddoa'n ddu+o+.c vi` tri' nho+' to^i lu'c ddo' ro^'i loa.n. Anh bi. ddo`n
nhie^`u i't the^' na`o to^i cu~ng cha<?ng hay. To^i chi? bie^'t la` lu'c ddo'
to^i tro^ng anh co`n co' ve? kha' ho+n to^i, tuy da'ng anh tro^ng ta? to+i,
nhu+ng anh co`n ddi ddu+'ng ddu+o+.c. Chung quanh anh lo^' nho^' bo.n ca'n
bo^.. To^i nghe co' ca? tie^'ng phu. nu+~ cha<'c la` vo+. con ca'n bo^. nghe
tin cu~ng dda~ cha.y le^n xem ca?nh ha`nh ha. tu` vu+o+.t ngu.c. To^i kho^ng
bie^'t ai dda~ qua^.t anh Tie^'p nga~ xuo^'ng, nhu+ng to^i tha^'y ro~ Bu`i
DDi`nh Thi, va` chi? co' mo^.t mi`nh Bu`i DDi`nh Thi ma` tho^i, nha?y cho^`m
to+'i ca^`m tay anh Tie^'p ke'o le^n, ro^`i du`ng ngo'n cha^n da^.m le^n mo^.t
ca'ch ddie^n cuo^`ng le^n ngu+.c, le^n anh giu+~a tie^'ng chu+?i bo+'i
va` co^? vo~ cu?a mo^.t lu~ ca'n bo^..

Na<`m nhi`n ra ca?nh a^'y, to^i bie^'t la` anh Tie^'p kho^ng the^? chi.u no^~i
cu' ddo`n hie^?m ddo^.c na`y cu?a Bu`i DDi`nh Thi. Kho^ng ro~ Bu`i DDi`nh Thi
ha`nh ha. anh Tie^'p trong bao la^u cho to+'i khi to^i nghe anh ke^u le^n
tha^.t to :"Cha<'c con che^'t ma^'t Me. o+i !". To^i kho^ng ngo+` ddo' la`
ca^u no'i cuo^'i cu`ng cu?a ddo+`i anh. DDa<.ng Va<n Tie^'p dda~ che^'t.
Kho^ng ai ngo+` ddu+o+.c mo^.t cuo^.c ddo+`i dda~ tu+`ng ngang do.c oai hu`ng
cu?a anh dda~ bi. cha^'m du+'t mo^.t ca'ch tu+'c tu+o+?i nhu+ the^' na`y va`o
mo^.t buo^?i sa'ng a^m u nga`y 2/5/79 trong nha` tu` Thanh Ca^?m, lu'c anh
vu+`a 46 tuo^?i. Bu`i DDi`nh Thi dda~ gie^'t che^'t anh mo^.t ca'ch da~ man.
Ne^'u to^i kho^ng so^'ng so't thi` ai bie^'t ddu+o+.c ghi the^m mo^.t tha?m trong nha` tu` CS ?

Ho^m nay ngo^`i vie^'t la.i ca?nh na`y lo`ng to^i ddau nho'i. To^i
co' ca?m tu+o+?ng nhu+ ddang xem mo^.t ddoa.n phim chie^'u nhu+~ng hi`nh a?nh
me'o mo', be^.nh hoa.n. Ruo^.t to^i co tha<'t la.i va` to^i ca?m tha^'y buo^`n
no^n ! Trong ca? cuo^.c do+`i cu?a to^i, kho^ng ca?nh na`o la`m to^i ddau xo't
ba<`ng ca?nh mo^.t DDa.i u'y QLVNCH ddang tro+.n tru+`ng ca<.p ma<'t ddo?
nga^`u nhu+ ma'u, ddie^n cuo^`ng dda'nh dda^.p, cha` dda.p mo^.t Thie^'u ta'
QLVNCH ddang na<`m va^.t xuo^'ng dda^'t, do+? so^'ng do+? che^'t, mi`nh dda^`y
ma'u me, tru+o+'c su+. chu+'ng kie^'n cu?a mo^.t lu~ ca'n bo^. VC ddu+'ng va^y
quanh vu+`a chu+?i bo+'i vu+`a ho` he't co^? vo~. Ca?nh na`y kho^ng
kha'c gi` ca?nh trong mo^.t ddoa.n phim cu?a cuo^'n phim "quo Vadis"
ma` to^i dda~ xem, ddo' la` ca?nh mo^.t dda'm kha'n gia? kha't ma'u ta^.p trung
trong mo^.t hi' tru+o+`ng tho+`i co^? dda.i La Ma~ ddang la` he't ddie^n
cuo^`ng co^? vo~ nhu+~ng con a'c thu' ca<'n xe' ca'c na.n nha^n bi. ke^'t a'n
tu+? hi`nh ddu+o+.c va^'t cho chu'ng. DDie^`u dda'ng tie^'c la` "Cha<'c con
che^'t ma^'t Me. o+i !" la.i kho^ng pha?i la` mo^.t con thu', anh ta la` mo^.t
con ngu+o+`i. Ho+n the6' nu+~a, anh dda~ tu+`ng la` chie^'n hu+~u cu?a anh
Tie^'p va` 2 ngu+o+`i chu+a he^` co' thu` oa'n gi` vo+'i nhau, anh du+o+.c
chu'ng to^i coi la` mo^.t ngu+o+`i anh em, mo^.t ngu+o+`i ba.n tu` ddo^`ng
chung ca?nh ngo^.. Vie^'t to+'i dda^y, ca?m gia'c kinh hoa`ng cu?a 17 na<m
ve^` tru+o+'c bu+`ng so^'ng da^.y la`m tim to^i se tha<'t la.i, nu+o+'c ma<'t
to^i bo^~ng du+ng tuo^n tra`o xuo^'ng, nhu+~ng ngo'n tay to^i kho^ng co`n giu+~
no^~i ca^y vie^'t. To^i pha?i ngu+`ng la.i dde^? no'i chuye^.n vo+'i anh

"Anh Tie^'p o+i ! Gio+` na`y oan ho^`n anh o+? dda^u ? Anh co' bie^'t
ngu+o+`i em na`y ddau xo't nhu+ the^' na`o khi ngo^`i ghi la.i nhu+~ng do`ng
na`y kho^ng ? Nu+o+'c ma<'t cu?a ngu+o+`i em na`y cu+' tu^n tra`o ra, cha?y
xuo^'ng u+o+'t ca? a'o... Mo^~i na<m, va`o nga`y gio^~ cu?a anh, khi tha<'p
ne'n hu+o+ng ddu+'ng ca^`u nguye^.n tru+o+'c ba`n tho+` anh, lo`ng em ddau xo't
vo^ cu`ng, nhu+ng chu+a bao gio+` em kho^'n kho^? nhu+ lu'c em ddang vie^'t
la.i tu+`ng chi tie^'t ve^` ca'i che^'t cu?a anh. Tha'ng 8/1995 vu+`a ro^`i,
khi qua My~, em dda~ thay anh to+'i nghi~a trang Arlington vie^'ng mo^. cu?a
Me. anh va`o mo^.t buo^?i sa'ng tinh su+o+ng, khi kho^ng khi' co`n trong la`nh.
Em ddi vo+'i Thu.. Khi nhi`n la`n kho'i hu+o+ng bay to?a le^n cao, tu+.
nhie^n em nho+' la.i ca^u no'i cu?a anh tru+o+'c khi Bu`i DDi`nh Thi ddu+a anh
ve^` be^n kia the^' gio+'i :"Cha<'c con che^'t ma^'t Me. o+i !". Ngu+o+`i em
na`y bo^`i ho^`i xu'c ddo^.ng, quay ddi dde^? ga.t nu+o+'c ma<'t, trong khi
Thu. ddang lu'i hu'i lau chu`i mo^. bia cu?a Me..."

Gie^'t che^'t anh Tie^'p xong Bu`i DDi`nh Thi lo^i xa'c anh va`o buo^`ng va^'t
cho^`ng le^n ngu+o+`i to^i ddang na<`m nhu+ mo^.t tha^y ma ba^'t do^.ng du+o+'i
lo^'i ddi, no+i ma` ma^'y tha'ng tru+o+'c dda^y te^n DDa.i ta' Co^ng an VC
Hoa`ng Thanh dda~ ddi qua dde^? nhi`n ma<.t chu'ng to^i. Lu'c na`y to^i na<`m
ngu+?a co`n xa'c anh Tie^'p me^`m nhu~n na<`m sa^'p a'p le^n ngu+o+`i to^i.
Trong tu+ the^' ddo', to^i la` ngu+o+`i tha^n cuo^'i cu`ng co' ma<.t dde^?
tie^~n ddu+a anh ve^` the^' gio+'i be^n kia. Xa'c anh Tie^'p tha^.t dde`
le^n ngu+o+`i la`m to^i nga.t tho+?, to^i co^' vu`ng va^~y la^.t xa'c anh qua
mo^.t be^n dde^? co' the^? hi't tho+?, nhu+ng tay to^i kho^ng co`n cu+? ddo^.ng
ddu+o+.c, cu~ng may lu'c ddo' co' mo^.t te^n ca'n bo^. bu+o+'c va`o va` to^i
nghe tie^'ng cu?a Bu`i DDi`nh Thi ba'o ca'o :"Tha<`ng Tie^'p no' che^'t ro^`i".
Te^n ca'n bo^. ra li.nh cho Bu`i DDi`nh Thi ke'o xa'c anh Tie^'p le^n be^. xi
m,ng, cho^~ ma` mo.i nga`y anh va^~n na<`m, nho+` ddo' to^i kho^ng bi. che^'t

Na<`m du+o+'i sa`n nhi`n le^n, to^i co`n tha^'y ddo^i go't cha^n dda^`y bu`n
cu?a anh Tie^'p va` ddo' la` hi`nh a?nh cuo^'i cu`ng to^i nho+' ve^` mo^.t
ngu+o+`i anh ke^'t nghi~a ma` to^i he^'t lo`ng ye^u qui' va` ki'nh phu.c. Ma~i
to+'i 13 na<m sau, tu+'c la` na<m 1992, khi qua Pha'p to^i mo+'i ddu+o+.c nhi`n
tha^'y hi`nh a?nh kha'c thuo^.c ve^` anh khi chi. Huye^`n Thanh trao cho to^i
ma^'y ta^'m a?nh chu.p ngo^i mo^. cu?a anh Tie6'p na` chi. mo+'i ve^` VN xa^y
cho anh ta.i Nam DDi.nh la` co^' hu+o+ng cu?a anh. To^.i nghie^.p cho chi.
Thanh, ngu+o+`i vo+. sa<'p cu+o+'i cu?a anh. Tie^'p, tu+` ho^m nghe tin anh qua
ddo+`i dde^'n nay, chi. kho^ng co`n nghi~ to+'i mo^.t hi`nh a?nh nao` kha'c.
Chi. dda~ bi. xu'c ddo^.ng du+~ do^.i khi nghe to^i ke^? la.i chi tie^'t ve^`
ca'i che^'t cu?a Tie^'p. Trong tha'ng 5/1995, khi du+o+.c to^i ba'o tin Bu`i
DDi`nh Thi dda~ dde^'n Hoa Ky` va` hie^.n ddang o+? Qua^.n Cam, su+. xu'c
ddo^.ng cu?a chi. ga^`n nhu+ ta<ng dde^'n cu+.c ddo^.. Tro+? la.i tha?m
tre^n, khi bie^'t Tie^'p dda~ che^'t tha^.t ro^`i, lo`ng to^i ddau xo't vo^
cu`ng. 2 anh em dda~ na^ng ddo+~ nhau trongnhu+~ng ngay` hoa.n na.n, gio+`
dda^y kho^ng co`n nu+~a. Trong cuo^.c ddo+`i co`n la.i cu?a to^i, ga^`n nhu+
kho^ng lu'c na`o que^n ddu+o+.c hi`nh a?nh cu?a anh.

Lu'c ba^'y gio+` to^i nho+' al.i, tru+o+'c khi vu+o+.t ngu.c, to^i co' da6'u
chie^'c va`ng 2 chi? va`o ca'i cu'c qua^`n cu?a anh Tie^'p. DDa^y la` chie^'c
nha^~n ma` anh Thu., ngu+o+`i em ke^' cu?a anh dda~ khe'o da^'u trong mo^.t
ho^.p su+~a 2 dda'y go+?i ra cho anh cu`ng vo+'i ta^'m ba?n ddo^` va` ca'i
ddi.a ba`n. To^i chi? nho+' ddu+o+.c tu+`ng ddo'. DDa^y la` ha`nh trang qui;
nha^'t ma` anh ca^`n co' khi quye^'t ddi.nh vu+o+.t ngu.c. Kho^ng ngo+` anh
kho^ng co`n su+? ddu+o+.c chu'ng nu+~a.

Mo^t lu'c sau, to^i la.i ddi va`o co+n ho^n me^ nhu+ mo^.t gia^'c chie^m bao
ke'o da`i. To^i tha^'y mi`nh ddang cho+'i vo+'i bu+o+'c ddi tre^n mo^.t vu`ng
dda^`y ma^y tra<'ng ddo'ng tha`nh tu+`ng ma?ng cu+'ng nhu+ nu+o+'c dda' trong
mo^.t khoa?ng kho^ng gian hoa`n toa`n ye^n la<.ng. To^i dda.p tre^n ca'c va^`ng
ma^y tie^'n le^n ma` cha<?ng bie^'t la` ddi ve^` dda^u, thi?nh thoa?ng kho^ng
gian hoa`n toa`n ye^n la<.ng. To^i dda.p le^n cA'c va^`ng ma^y tie^'n le^n ma`
cha<?ng bie^'t ddi ve^` dda^u, thi?nh thoa?ng mo^.t ta?ng ba<ng vo+~ ra, to^i
bi. hu.t ha^~ng va` ba'm va`o tha`nh ca'c ta?ng may kha'c de^? leo le^n va`
co^' ga<'ng vu+o+n to+'i trong khoa?ng cha^n kho^ng mo^ng lung huye^`n a?o...

(co`n tie^'p)

Kim Nguyen

May 13, 1996, 3:00:00 AM5/13/96

> Rewards ?

>In an official message dated 30/10/1963 of the State Department to Cabot
>Lodge, George Bundy notes that coup generals may need a hefty sum of money
>at the last minutes (Conein later says that that money would be used for
>coup generals to escape in case the coup failed and that is not a >bribery);
he also says that generals can keep that money if the coup >d'etat is
well-organized and successful; the use of money should be done >secretly. This
order is executed by Lucien Conein. However, Conein does >it openly by
bringing that money to the Joint General Staff Headquarter on >1/11/1963.

Lucien gives 3 million dong (not in dollars as Tran Van Don >said) ...

should be :

Rewards ?

In an official message dated 30/10/1963 of the State Department to Cabot
Lodge, George Bundy notes that coup generals may need a hefty sum of money
at the last minutes (Conein later says that that money would be used for coup
generals to escape in case the coup failed and that is not a bribery); he also
says that generals can keep that money if the coup d'etat is well-organized and
successful; the use of money should be done secretly. This order is executed by
Lucien Conein. However, Conein does it openly by bringing that money to the
Joint General Staff Headquarter on 1/11/1963. Lucien gives 3 million dong

(Tran Van Don said that money is in Vietnamese dong, not in US dollars)...


May 13, 1996, 3:00:00 AM5/13/96

Great news. Thanks.
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