[Refugee] Report on corruption in screening in Malaysia

[BPSOS]

VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND HONG KONG
FAILURES OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION:
FLAWS AND CORRUPTION IN THE SCREENING PROCESS
IN MALAYSIA

BOAT PEOPLE S.O.S.
SEPTEMBER 1995

Boat People S.O.S. is a voluntary, non-profit, and tax-exempt organization
which operates solely on donations from the private sector. Its mandate is
to protect the welfare and dignity of Vietnamese boat people in Southeast
Asia and Hong Kong, and to defend their rights as asylum seekers. The
organization publishes a monthly newsletter with a circulation of 1,500,
serving as a forum for Vietnamese boat people in the camps who otherwise
would have no voice. The organization also helps fund pro bono lawyers to
work on refugee and immigration cases. Headquartered in Virginia, USA, the
organization has affiliates in Europe, Canada and Australia.

INTRODUCTION

In June 1989, Malaysia endorsed the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA)
adopted by some 70 countries at the Second International Conference on
Indochinese Refugees held in Geneva. In accordance with the CPA, in
September 1989 Malaysia established a screening process to select refugees
for resettlement and non-refugees for repatriation. The Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was to monitor this
screening process and to intervene whenever necessary.

While not a signatory of the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees, Malaysia agreed to abide by the international
standards and criteria in refugee protection:
"The criteria will be those recognized in the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, bearing in mind, to the
extent appropriate, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
other relevant international instruments concerning refugees, and will be
applied in a humanitarian spirit taking into account the special situation
of the asylum-seekers concerned and the need to respect the family unit."
(Text of the CPA)

In practice, refugee screening under the CPA has serious flaws and has
been strongly criticized by many human rights and refugee organizations
[1-3]. Several reports have documented rampant corruption in Indonesia and
the Philippines [4, 5]. Earlier this year, the UNHCR belatedly recognized
these problems, conducted an internal review of the screening processes in
Southeast Asia, and concluded that these problems did not adversely affect
genuine refugees.

Leaked documents from the UNHCR tell a different story. A document dated
December 3, 1991, reported instances of refugees screened out for failing
to pay screening officials [6]. The document revealed that "the damage
wrought to the credibility of the UNHCR and to the legitimacy of status
determination procedures is extreme." In July 1994, the successful escape
of 17 boat persons from Indonesia to Australia provided telling evidences
of the failures in screening. These escapees, denied refugee status under
the CPA, fled Indonesia to avoid deportation. Australia, bound by its own
laws, re-screened them despite the UNHCR's vehement objection. Of the 17,
four were found to be refugees, and two more found to be derivative
refugees. This approval rate of 35% is indicative of the error rate of
refugee screening under the CPA.

The conclusion of the UNHCR's internal review, although highly
questionable, is not surprising. Fear of public embarrassment and
potentially adverse effects on future funding would naturally and
inevitably result in biases in any such internal review. A fair assessment
necessitates an independent investigation by a governmental or
non-governmental body with no vested interest in the outcome.

This report is written with the intent of providing the overall background
and some pointers which could serve as a starting point for an independent
investigation. As such, it complements two previously published reports on
the corrupt screening processes in Indonesia [4] and the Philippines [5].
The factual accounts presented herein are based on interviews with former
UNHCR employees, asylum seekers--many of whom victims of corruption, and
their overseas relatives. Information has also been drawn from testimonies
at Congressional hearings, and sworn affidavits of former refugees and
former camp leaders. Names of victims and witnesses are withheld
throughout this report to protect those still in the camp from likely
reprisals by camp authorities.

THE SCREENING PROCEDURE

The screening procedure in Malaysia followed three stages.

1. The UNHCR Eligibility Unit provided group counseling to asylum seekers
prior to their actual screening interviews.

2. The actual screening was carried out by the Malaysian National Task
Force on Vietnamese Illegal Immigrants, in the presence of UNHCR monitors.
Through a process of "harmonization", the two bodies were to achieve an
informal consensus on the screening decisions.

3. If "screened out," the asylum seekers had 37 days to submit their
appeals to the Appeals Board, which was also under the jurisdiction of the
Task Force. In each case, the UNHCR also submitted to the Task Force its
independent assessment of the appeal.

Unlike in Hong Kong, there was no formal procedure for asylum seekers in
Malaysia to petition for mandate reviews by the UNHCR.

Ideally, this procedure should help minimize mistakes and abuses in
screening. However, in reality the UNHCR had little control over the
implementation of the CPA. Immediately after it signed the CPA and agreed
to the principle of first asylum, Malaysia pushed off thousands of boat
people back to the sea. Then in 1992, Malaysia unilaterally stopped
screening new arrivals. These late-comers were locked up in prisons until
their eventual deportation to Vietnam. The UNHCR could do little about
Malaysia's blatant violations of key CPA provisions.

Gerassimos Fourlanos, the head of the UNHCR Eligibility Unit during that
period fittingly described the system as "probably the best that could be
achieved under the circumstances prevailing in South East Asia" [7].
Screening under the CPA was primarily controlled by first asylum
governments which, at best, gave short shrift to human rights or refugee
protection. The primary motives of these governments were to end the
outflow of boat people and to clear the camps as soon as possible.

In that regional setting, screening in Malaysia contained many of the same
procedural flaws, although to a lesser extent, found elsewhere in the
region. Corruption, under control for the first two years, rapidly became
pervasive afterwards. Many asylum seekers with compelling claims were
suspiciously denied refugee status when they or their overseas relatives
refused to pay bribes demanded by screening officials.

CORRUPTION

Initially, when Pulau Bidong Camp was still open, screening was conducted
at Marang, two hours by boat from Pulau Bidong. Interaction between asylum
seekers and screening officials was minimal. This arrangement made
corruption less likely to occur.

In November 1991, Pulau Bidong was closed and the boat people were
transferred to Sungei Besi Camp, located near Kuala Lumpur. Screening was
also moved from Marang to Sungei Besi. With the increased contacts between
screening officials, UNHCR employees, and the asylum seekers, corruption
started to spread.

By early 1993, corruption had become rampant and institutionalized. As in
Indonesia and the Philippines, screening officials used "agents" to scout
for prospective "clients". These agents were Task Force security guards
posted in the camp, asylum seekers employed by the Task Force, and some
UNHCR personnel. These agents formed an elaborate and expansive network
preying on the boat people in the camp and outreaching to their relatives
overseas. The administrator of this network was Major Mohammed Bin Wang,
also known as A Wang. He was reportedly only the front man for
higher-ranking officials in the Task Force who had actual control of the
corruption network1 . Major Mohammed was also the Administrator of the
Appeals Board.Task Force security guards, while playing no role in
screening, represented the direct link to those who did. They projected an
image of authority--necessary to close the deals--but at the same time
protect the anonymity of higher-ups in the racket. Some of these security
guards, identified by their victims, included Captain Rosli Bin Mohammed
Nizam, Deputy Camp Commandant; Abdul Ghani Amir, security officer; and
Shariffudin, security officer.

To facilitate their contacts with Vietnamese asylum seekers these guards
employed a number of camp detainees as scouts and messengers. These
Vietnamese agents were assigned to doing odd jobs for the Task Force in
the camp in order to justify their frequent contacts with the security
guards. These Vietnamese agents were adept at initiating and obtaining
deals. Many of these agents soon became familiar fixtures in the camp.
They made good money and enjoyed privileges unavailable to the common
asylum seekers. The most precious reward of all was guaranteed refugee
status.

The Malaysian security guards placed their Vietnamese agents under close
scrutiny to guard against foul play. In 1993, Nguyen Duc Tho, one of the
most productive Vietnamese agents, double-crossed the Task Force and kept
for himself US $4,000, paid by an asylum seeker who has since resettled in
Norway. Tipped off by other agents, the guards searched Tho's hut, took
the money, and dismissed him from the network. Tho, already screened in as
a refugee, was soon resettled in Australia.

Le Duc Phuc, MC 554.010, was another exposed agent. In early 1993, several
asylum seekers denounced him to the camp authorities. The Task Force sent
Phuc to the "Monkey House," a prison-like confinement built within Sungei
Besi Camp, not as punishment but for protection. After being screened in,
Phuc left for Canada, directly from the "Monkey House."

The Task Force also employed criminal elements, or "Botak", as a threat to
both their Vietnamese agents and the asylum seekers. On many occasions,
camp representatives had publicly protested corruption and other
injustices in screening, through petitions, demonstrations, and hunger
strikes, or at meetings with the Task Force and the UNHCR. On each such
occasion, the Botak were used to silence the camp leaders through
harassment, threats and physical assaults. These Botak were also rewarded
with refugee status.
The most notorious Botak at Sungei Besi Camp was Nguyen Van Oanh, MC 517,
a criminal escaping from prison in Vietnam where he served time for
manslaughter. At Sungei Besi, he became a gang leader and was used by the
Task Force as its hatchet man. As a reward for his service, the Task Force
granted him refugee status, despite his lack of refugee claims and despite
his criminal record. However, arrangements to resettle him in Canada and
Australia were blocked by Vietnamese organizations in both countries
(Appendix A). Oanh recently left for resettlement in Japan.

Ngo Van Doi, MC 472, is another telling example. Before his escape to
Malaysia, he had served in the Communist public security police, under the
pseudonym Hoang Em. He had gained notoriety for his cruel treatment of
prisoners. In Malaysia, Doi joined Nguyen Van Oanh's gang. At Pulau
Bidong, an asylum seeker identified Doi as his persecutor. Nevertheless,
the Task Force screened Doi in. The UNHCR then referred him for
resettlement in the US. The US Consulate learned of the allegations after
having made a favorable review of Doi's application. Putting the case on
hold, the US Consulate asked its contacts in Vietnam to verify Doi's
background. After a lengthy investigation, in May 1992, the US denied him
resettlement. Two years after this set-back, Doi was admitted into
Australia. Meanwhile, the former victim who had identified Doi was denied
refugee status, and now faces deportation to Vietnam.

Several UNHCR certified interpreters also participated in the corruption
racket. They were particularly effective and valuable to the network. As
UNHCR interpreters, they could help or harm a case because the credibility
of each claim depends largely on the quality of its translation. As
Vietnamese expatriates, these interpreters had the know-how and means to
contact overseas relatives of their victims.
Steven Dung Nguyen, originally from Texas, was one of the most aggressive
UNHCR agents. Using

UNHCR biographical records of asylum seekers, he traced down their
overseas relatives and spared no threats for those turning down his
advances. In early 1993, an American citizen had to seek protection for
his relatives from Representative Dan Burton and the US consulate after
receiving Nguyen's threats (Appendix B). Nguyen later married a Malaysian
woman and opened a trading company in Kuala Lumpur.

Another UNHCR interpreter, Nguyen Van Trung, was more cautious, operating
through a Vietnamese asylum seeker, Vinh Viet Phuoc, MC 466. Phuoc,
employed by the Task Force as a medical aid at the Sick Bay, took
advantage of this position to scout for clients and arrange all the
transactions for Trung. In early 1993, Phuoc was screened in and resettled
in Australia. At about the same time, complaints against Trung surfaced.
The UNHCR reportedly conducted an internal review of the allegations but
did not announce its outcome.

The price for refugee status varied from US $3,000 to $8,000, depending on
the number of agents involved. Those having to go through the Vietnamese
agents often ended up paying more. These Vietnamese agents claimed their
own portion of the commission, and so did the security guards, before the
money was passed to the collectors at the Task Force. Others who were able
to deal directly with the Task Force at its headquarters, usually through
Major Mohammed, could get a significant discount.

Major Mohammed, however, avoided direct contact with the asylum seekers.
He either worked through agents or dealt directly with overseas relatives
of the asylum seekers. The effective intervention of Major Mohammed lured
a constant stream of Vietnamese visitors to Kuala Lumpur from America and
Australia. There were also visitors who came to Malaysia only to see their
relatives at Sungei Besi. Camp security guards often brazenly proposed
deals to these unsuspecting visitors. Others visitors, stopping by to pick
up camp entry permits, were accosted by members of the Task Force at its
headquarters. Many such visitors have identified Ghani Bin Harun, a senior
staff at the Task Force headquarters, as a key agent.
Those who agreed to discuss the deals would be introduced to Major
Mohammed. Major Mohammed usually came to meet the overseas visitors at
their hotels, bringing with him screening records as proofs of his
position and authority. If the negotiation was inconclusive, he could be
contacted directly at home (# 603-412-6952) or via a car phone (#
603-223-7525) installed in his expensive BMW.

Once both parties reached agreement on a deal, the victim had to pay a
down payment of several thousand dollars. Upon being shown the screening
decision prior to its official release, the victim must have the rest of
the money paid in full. The payments, both the down payment and the
balance, could be made directly to Major Mohammed or through his agents.
Money could be wired directly to Major Mohammed's bank account (#
006015208 at EON Bank Limited, Jalan Tun Perak, Kuala Lumpur) or through
the bank accounts of agents. For instance, Steven Dung Nguyen, the UNHCR
interpreter, used a bank account listed under the name of Ng Hun Mun
(account # 114079269170 at Kwong Yik Bank, Kuala Lumpur). In yet other
cases, money orders were sent to asylum seekers at Sungei Besi Camp, who
in turn paid the security guards or the Vietnamese agents.

It was not always easy to negotiate with Major Mohammed. In early 1994, he
demanded $8,000 from an American citizen for the refugee status of his
relative. The victim handed $2,000 in cash--all he had--to Major Mohammed
as down payment, intending to negotiate about the rest after his return to
the United States. Major Mohammed adamantly demanded the full amount. The
victim, unable to raise the large sum of money, requested the intervention
of Representative Dana Rohrabacher, but to no avail. His relative was
screened out and he lost his down payment [7].

PROCEDURAL FLAWS

Beside corruption, refugee screening in Malaysia suffered from many
procedural flaws, which resulted in mistakes and abuses of their own or
exacerbated those caused by rampant corruption. These procedural flaws
existed even during 1991-1992, when the leadership at the UNHCR Branch
Office in Malaysia was doing its best to make screening work. This report
only presents a sketch of some procedural flaws that have severely
affected the integrity of the screening process; an in-depth analysis
would require a separate report.

1. LACK OF PRE-SCREENING COUNSELING

From September 1989 to January 1991, there was completely no pre-screening
counseling by the UNHCR. In May 1990, the first screening decisions were
released; their arbitrariness shocked the entire camp. The Vietnamese Camp
Committee repeatedly wrote to the UNHCR to request legal assistance. Every
time, the UNHCR replied that it had no lawyers to spare.

In December 1990, a mass demonstration broke out. The demonstrators
demanded that (a) the UNHCR provide professional pre-screening counseling
and legal assistance at the appeal stage, (b) asylum seekers be given
sufficient time to present their claims during screening, and (c) the Task
Force provide reasons for its denials of refugee status.

By early January 1991, the situation in Pulau Bidong became explosive.
Several asylum seekers had attempted suicide. One young man had plunged to
his death from a cliff after being screened out. At a meeting with
representatives of the boat people, Dr. Shamsul Bari, the UNHCR
Representative, finally agreed to provide pre-screening counseling.

The counseling sessions turned out to be of little help. They were
administered to groups of 70-100 asylum seekers at a time, and each
session lasted for only about one hour. At these sessions, UNHCR legal
consultants only provided general advice which shed no light on the
screening process or on the refugee criteria.

"The UNHCR only gave general advices such as to tell the truth, not to
hide rape incidents at sea, to be prepared for the screening interview, to
think carefully before making a statement... There was absolutely no
mention of refugee criteria." (Affidavit of Colonel Nguyen Thieu, former
Head of Vietnamese Camp Committee in Pulau Bidong, done in Pennsylvania,
Jan. 27, 1993).
Sixteen months into the screening program, pre-screening counseling came
too late and too little: too late for about one third of the boat people
who had already been screened, and too little for the two thirds awaiting
screening.

2. LACK OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE ON APPEALS

At the same meeting with representatives of the boat people, Dr. Bari
ruled out direct legal assistance to asylum seekers. Instead, he agreed to
support a self-help group, which he later named Review Advice Group (RAG).
In terms of support, the UNHCR agreed to provide RAG with typewriters,
stationery and other office supplies. Dr. Bari also promised to send a
legal consultant to Pulau Bidong once a week to train the group on refugee
laws.

This self-help group had been formed in September 1990 by the Vietnamese
Camp Committee. It consisted of ten counselors, ten translators and three
typists. Only six of the ten counselors had some legal training in
Vietnam. Many of them did not speak English. Translators were therefore
needed to translate the appeals prepared by the counselors into English.
The typists then typed up these translated appeals for submission to the
Task Force. Errors could creep into the appeals throughout this
multi-stage process. These errors ranged from the benign such as
typographical errors to the critical such as incorrect translation or
skipped paragraphs.

The first two training sessions, about one hour each, were conducted by a
UNHCR field officer, who was not a lawyer. Only much later did the group
get to meet with UNHCR legal officers. In the words of Colonel Nguyen
Thieu, RAG's founder and first chairman, these meetings were not very
informative and did not help that much:

"In all those meetings, UNHCR lawyers often eluded detailed and specific
questions, answering only in general and vague terms. A frequent response
was: 'Just do as you like; just write whatever you want. We will review
it.' We were not provided any guidelines on screening or refugee
criteria." (Affidavit of Colonel Nguyen Thieu, former Head of Vietnamese
Camp Committee and RAG, done in Pennsylvania, Jan. 27, 1993).

After Pulau Bidong Camp closed and all the boat people were transferred to
Sungei Besi Camp in November 1991, meetings with UNHCR legal officers
became less and less frequent. From October 1992 to August 1993, there
were only three brief meetings of less than one hour each.
All in all, RAG counselors, ill-equipped and ill-trained, could not make
up for the lack of legal assistance.

In 1993, realizing their own shortcomings and the UNHCR's unwillingness to
provide legal assistance, RAG appealed to Legal Assistance for Vietnamese
Asylum Seekers (LAVAS) for help. LAVAS, already providing pro bono legal
assistance to asylum seekers in the Philippines and Hong Kong, wrote to
the UNHCR to seek access to Sungei Besi Camp. Werner Blatter, UNHCR
Director of the Regional Bureau for Asia and Oceania, rejected the request
on the pretext that asylum seekers in Malaysia already had RAG's quality
services:

"Assistance with preparation of appeals is, in the first instance,
provided by the Review Advice Group (RAG), which offers services in terms
of translation, typing up of submissions and advice on how to present the
same. RAG members are qualified and experienced camp residents and they
meet regularly with UNHCR legal consultants in an interactive process
which helps to clarify any doubts asylum seekers may have particularly
about the form and direction of appeal submissions. This process has gone
very smoothly so far." (Letter to LAVAS dated November 4, 1993)

Such a high praise is contradicted by the self-evaluation of many RAG
counselors:

"Members in the group were all volunteers who were barely more qualified
than those whom they were supposed to help. Indeed, most members of RAG
had only fragmented knowledge of English and knew nothing about refugee
laws. Our group received no formal training from the UNHCR. As an
indication of our level of competence, I did not realize the pejorative
meaning of the acronym RAG that UNHCR assigned to our group until I came
to the United States." (Affidavit of Le Tran Cat, former RAG chairman at
Sungei Besi, done in Houston, Texas, Oct. 16, 1993).

"The appeals were often filled with translation errors and with
misrepresentation due to awkward or incorrect use of terms. Many of the
appeals written by one RAG member were incomprehensible to even another
RAG member. At times I found that my own writings did not make any sense
when I read them again a few days later, after the appeals had been
submitted. We were constantly rushed by the 37-day deadline for appeal
submission. Often I had to help 40-50 cases a month and there was not much
I could do to maintain the quality, if any, of my work." (Affidavit of
Pham Minh Duc, former RAG counselor, done in Pasadena, Texas, Dec. 1,
1993)

Gerassimos Fourlanos, head of the UNHCR Eligibility Unit in Malaysia from
July 1991 to August 1992, testified at a US Congressional hearing that the
lack of legal assistance denied many asylum seekers a fair chance to
appropriately present their refugee claims [7]:

"One of the basic flaws of the screening process, which constitutes a
violation of a basic principle of law or a general principle of law, is
the lack of legal representation. We all know how important that is... The
people did not know how to present the cases. In some cases, they did
entrust private lawyers from Australia and other countries. Those lawyers
did not know the CPA. Their submissions did not help us at all.

"Also, we did not know what to do with them. Some people said, 'do not pay
attention to such submissions.' Others said, 'read at least the content.'
There are no clear lines. There is no clear policy, and it is very
different from country to country.

"Those still in the camps, perhaps they should get the chance of some
legal-like body seeing through their cases so that no genuine refugee is
lost."

Contrary to assertions by Mr. Blatter, screening did not go smoothly. It
was marked by a string of demonstrations, hunger strikes, sit-ins, and a
dozen suicide attempts resulting in two tragic deaths and several serious
injuries.

3. INCOMPETENT INTERPRETERS

Prior to 1991, interpreters used in screening were recruited from within
the camp population. Their English was sub-standard, especially in
understanding specialized legal terms. Responding to repeated requests
from and protests by the asylum seekers, starting in 1991 the UNHCR hired
several overseas interpreters. Many of these interpreters, being
themselves refugees not too long ago, were hardly more competent than camp
recruits. Others who grew up in resettlement countries experienced the
opposite problem: their knowledge of Vietnamese was superficial and
inadequate. Military terminology, ideological parlance, North Vietnamese
dialects, or post-75 jargons were beyond the reach of these young and
inexperienced interpreters2 .Asylum seekers in Malaysia referred
sarcastically to some of these interpreters as "catastrophes", because an
incompetent interpreter could wreak havoc to the claims of the unfortunate
asylum seekers he or she helped. Official UNHCR announcements, translated
into Vietnamese by these certified interpreters, prompted many jokes among
the boat people and also caused many to fear for their future. These
announcements, rife with mistakes, indicated only a fifth to sixth grade
proficiency in Vietnamese.

In response to criticisms by non-governmental organizations, the US State
Department in 1992 allocated money for the hiring of some 100 certified
interpreters for the entire region. As far as Malaysia was concerned, this
remedy came too late because screening was at the time almost over.
Poor translation was an even greater problem at the appeal stage. Most RAG
translators-- volunteers recruited from the camp population--had only an
elementary knowledge of English. In many cases, facts were distorted by
poor translation; inconsistencies were introduced by the use of wrong
military or technical terminology. Some of the appeals became, after
translation, simply incomprehensible.

4. NO REASONS FOR DENIALS

Despite repeated requests by the Vietnamese Camp Committee, the Task Force
refused to provide reasons for their screening decisions, thus denying
asylum seekers the opportunity to meaningfully appeal unfair denials of
refugee status. Asylum seekers and their RAG counselors had to resort to
guesswork in writing the appeals.

"It was very hard to help the boat people with their appeals because
reasons were not given for the screening decisions. We made several
requests to UNHCR to disclose the reasons for each decision, as was done
in a number of asylum countries, so that we could at least know where to
start with the appeal. UNHCR replied that Malaysia did not want to give
out the reasons for their decisions. We therefore had to make wild guesses
as to what to put down in the appeals. Add that to our deficient knowledge
of refugee law, you have the formula for a catastrophe." (Affidavit of
Pham Minh Duc, former RAG counselor, done in Pasadena, Texas, Dec. 1,
1993)

5. OTHER ADVERSE FACTORS

Responding to the asylum seekers' repeated complaints and appeals, Dr.
Bari introduced some remedial half-measures in early 1991. These remedies
were, however, short-lived. As soon as the Pulau Bidong camp population
was transferred to Sungei Besi in late 1991, UNHCR's official support for
RAG ended. Meetings between UNHCR legal consultants and RAG counselors
became infrequent and were eventually discontinued.

Then in early 1993, an internal conflict erupted between two rival camps
within the UNHCR Branch Office in Kuala Lumpur, pitching the Acting
Representative against the new head of the Eligibility Unit. Consumed by
this internal conflict, the UNHCR became even less interested in and less
capable of controlling the quality of screening.

At about the same time, the UNHCR's regional emphasis shifted from
protection to repatriation. In a move towards promoting repatriation, in
June 1993 the Task Force released 2,500 screening decisions all at once
and ordered that all appeals must be submitted within three months. RAG
was overwhelmed and its members overworked. It was able to help only 20%
of the cases needing assistance. The only consolation for those not
receiving assistance was to learn later that RAG's help made little
difference. Adding to the asylum seekers' misfortune, UNHCR decided to
reduce its supply of stationery to RAG. Within two weeks of the deadline,
700 people were still scrambling for paper to write their appeals.

These problems, although themselves accidental, exacerbated the inherent
flaws of the screening procedure in Malaysia. The affidavits of two former
RAG members enclosed in Appendix C describe some of these problems in
detail.

Boat People S.O.S. is a non-profit organization operating entirely on
private contributions.
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 2652, Merrifield, VA 22116.
Tel: 703-205-3916; Fax: 703-204-2662