The New American Cold War
ww
"..All of the dangerous fallacies underlying US policy are expressions
of unbridled triumphalism. The decision to treat post-Soviet Russia as
a vanquished nation, analogous to postwar Germany and Japan (but
without the funding), squandered a historic opportunity for a real
partnership and established the bipartisan premise that Moscow's
"direction" at home and abroad should be determined by the United
States. Applied to a country with Russia's size and long history as a
world power, and that had not been militarily defeated, the premise was
inherently self-defeating and certain to provoke a resentful backlash.
...In a democracy we might expect alternative policy proposals from
would-be leaders. But there are none in either party, only demands for
a more anti-Russian course, or silence. We should not be surprised.
Acquiescence in Bush's monstrous war in Iraq has amply demonstrated the
political elite's limited capacity for introspection, independent
thought and civic courage. (It prefers to falsely blame the American
people, as the managing editor of Foreign Affairs recently did, for
craving "ideological red meat.") It may also be intimidated by another
revived cold war practice--personal defamation. The Post and The New
Yorker have already labeled critics of their Russia policy "Putin
apologists" and charged them with "appeasement" and "again taking the
Russian side of the Cold War."
*******************
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060717/cohen_charlierose_video
posted July 10, 2006 (July 17, 2006 issue)
The New American Cold War
Stephen F. Cohen
Contrary to established opinion, the gravest threats to America's
national security are still in Russia. They derive from an
unprecedented development that most US policy-makers have recklessly
disregarded, as evidenced by the undeclared cold war Washington has
waged, under both parties, against post-Communist Russia during the
past fifteen years.
As a result of the Soviet breakup in 1991, Russia, a state bearing
every nuclear and other device of mass destruction, virtually
collapsed. During the 1990s its essential infrastructures--political,
economic and social--disintegrated. Moscow's hold on its vast
territories was weakened by separatism, official corruption and
Mafia-like crime. The worst peacetime depression in modern history
brought economic losses more than twice those suffered in World War II.
GDP plummeted by nearly half and capital investment by 80 percent. Most
Russians were thrown into poverty. Death rates soared and the
population shrank. And in August 1998, the financial system imploded.
No one in authority anywhere had ever foreseen that one of the
twentieth century's two superpowers would plunge, along with its
arsenals of destruction, into such catastrophic circumstances. Even
today, we cannot be sure what Russia's collapse might mean for the rest
of the world.
Outwardly, the nation may now seem to have recovered. Its economy has
grown on average by 6 to 7 percent annually since 1999, its
stock-market index increased last year by 83 percent and its gold and
foreign currency reserves are the world's fifth largest. Moscow is
booming with new construction, frenzied consumption of Western luxury
goods and fifty-six large casinos. Some of this wealth has trickled
down to the provinces and middle and lower classes, whose income has
been rising. But these advances, loudly touted by the Russian
government and Western investment-fund promoters, are due largely to
high world prices for the country's oil and gas and stand out only in
comparison with the wasteland of 1998.
More fundamental realities indicate that Russia remains in an
unprecedented state of peacetime demodernization and depopulation.
Investment in the economy and other basic infrastructures remains
barely a third of the 1990 level. Some two-thirds of Russians still
live below or very near the poverty line, including 80 percent of
families with two or more children, 60 percent of rural citizens and
large segments of the educated and professional classes, among them
teachers, doctors and military officers. The gap between the poor and
the rich, Russian experts tell us, is becoming "explosive."
Most tragic and telling, the nation continues to suffer wartime death
and birth rates, its population declining by 700,000 or more every
year. Male life expectancy is barely 59 years and, at the other end of
the life cycle, 2 to 3 million children are homeless. Old and new
diseases, from tuberculosis to HIV infections, have grown into
epidemics. Nationalists may exaggerate in charging that "the Motherland
is dying," but even the head of Moscow's most pro-Western university
warns that Russia remains in "extremely deep crisis."
The stability of the political regime atop this bleak post-Soviet
landscape rests heavily, if not entirely, on the personal popularity
and authority of one man, President Vladimir Putin, who admits the
state "is not yet completely stable." While Putin's ratings are an
extraordinary 70 to 75 percent positive, political institutions and
would-be leaders below him have almost no public support.
The top business and administrative elites, having rapaciously
"privatized" the Soviet state's richest assets in the 1990s, are
particularly despised. Indeed, their possession of that property,
because it lacks popular legitimacy, remains a time bomb embedded in
the political and economic system. The huge military is equally
unstable, its ranks torn by a lack of funds, abuses of authority and
discontent. No wonder serious analysts worry that one or more sudden
developments--a sharp fall in world oil prices, more major episodes of
ethnic violence or terrorism, or Putin's disappearance--might plunge
Russia into an even worse crisis. Pointing to the disorder spreading
from Chechnya through the country's southern rim, for example, the
eminent scholar Peter Reddaway even asks "whether Russia is stable
enough to hold together."
As long as catastrophic possibilities exist in that nation, so do the
unprecedented threats to US and international security. Experts differ
as to which danger is the gravest--proliferation of Russia's enormous
stockpile of nuclear, chemical and biological materials; ill-maintained
nuclear reactors on land and on decommissioned submarines; an impaired
early-warning system controlling missiles on hair-trigger alert; or the
first-ever civil war in a shattered superpower, the terror-ridden
Chechen conflict. But no one should doubt that together they constitute
a much greater constant threat than any the United States faced during
the Soviet era.
Nor is a catastrophe involving weapons of mass destruction the only
danger in what remains the world's largest territorial country. Nearly
a quarter of the planet's people live on Russia's borders, among them
conflicting ethnic and religious groups. Any instability in Russia
could easily spread to a crucial and exceedingly volatile part of the
world.
There is another, perhaps more likely, possibility. Petrodollars may
bring Russia long-term stability, but on the basis of growing
authoritarianism and xenophobic nationalism. Those ominous factors
derive primarily not from Russia's lost superpower status (or Putin's
KGB background), as the US press regularly misinforms readers, but from
so many lost and damaged lives at home since 1991. Often called the
"Weimar scenario," this outcome probably would not be truly fascist,
but it would be a Russia possessing weapons of mass destruction and
large proportions of the world's oil and natural gas, even more hostile
to the West than was its Soviet predecessor.
How has the US government responded to these unprecedented perils? It
doesn't require a degree in international relations or media punditry
to understand that the first principle of policy toward post-Communist
Russia must follow the Hippocratic injunction: Do no harm! Do nothing
to undermine its fragile stability, nothing to dissuade the Kremlin
from giving first priority to repairing the nation's crumbling
infrastructures, nothing to cause it to rely more heavily on its
stockpiles of superpower weapons instead of reducing them, nothing to
make Moscow uncooperative with the West in those joint pursuits.
Everything else in that savaged country is of far less consequence.
Since the early 1990s Washington has simultaneously conducted, under
Democrats and Republicans, two fundamentally different policies toward
post-Soviet Russia--one decorative and outwardly reassuring, the other
real and exceedingly reckless. The decorative policy, which has been
taken at face value in the United States, at least until recently,
professes to have replaced America's previous cold war intentions with
a generous relationship of "strategic partnership and friendship." The
public image of this approach has featured happy-talk meetings between
American and Russian presidents, first "Bill and Boris" (Clinton and
Yeltsin), then "George and Vladimir."
The real US policy has been very different--a relentless,
winner-take-all exploitation of Russia's post-1991 weakness.
Accompanied by broken American promises, condescending lectures and
demands for unilateral concessions, it has been even more aggressive
and uncompromising than was Washington's approach to Soviet Communist
Russia. Consider its defining elements as they have unfolded--with
fulsome support in both American political parties, influential
newspapers and policy think tanks--since the early 1990s:
A growing military encirclement of Russia, on and near its borders, by
US and NATO bases, which are already ensconced or being planned in at
least half the fourteen other former Soviet republics, from the Baltics
and Ukraine to Georgia, Azerbaijan and the new states of Central Asia.
The result is a US-built reverse iron curtain and the remilitarization
of American-Russian relations.
A tacit (and closely related) US denial that Russia has any legitimate
national interests outside its own territory, even in ethnically akin
or contiguous former republics such as Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia.
How else to explain, to take a bellwether example, the thinking of
Richard Holbrooke, Democratic would-be Secretary of State? While
roundly condemning the Kremlin for promoting a pro-Moscow government in
neighboring Ukraine, where Russia has centuries of shared linguistic,
marital, religious, economic and security ties, Holbrooke declares that
far-away Slav nation part of "our core zone of security."
video | posted July 10, 2006 (July 17, 2006 issue)
The New American Cold War
Stephen F. Cohen
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Stephen F. Cohen explores the new American cold war in this excerpt
from a recent interview on The Charlie Rose Show.
The real US policy has been very different--a relentless,
winner-take-all exploitation of Russia's post-1991 weakness.
Accompanied by broken American promises, condescending lectures and
demands for unilateral concessions, it has been even more aggressive
and uncompromising than was Washington's approach to Soviet Communist
Russia. Consider its defining elements as they have unfolded--with
fulsome support in both American political parties, influential
newspapers and policy think tanks--since the early 1990s:
§ A growing military encirclement of Russia, on and near its
borders, by US and NATO bases, which are already ensconced or being
planned in at least half the fourteen other former Soviet republics,
from the Baltics and Ukraine to Georgia, Azerbaijan and the new states
of Central Asia. The result is a US-built reverse iron curtain and the
remilitarization of American-Russian relations.
§ A tacit (and closely related) US denial that Russia has any
legitimate national interests outside its own territory, even in
ethnically akin or contiguous former republics such as Ukraine, Belarus
and Georgia. How else to explain, to take a bellwether example, the
thinking of Richard Holbrooke, Democratic would-be Secretary of State?
While roundly condemning the Kremlin for promoting a pro-Moscow
government in neighboring Ukraine, where Russia has centuries of shared
linguistic, marital, religious, economic and security ties, Holbrooke
declares that far-away Slav nation part of "our core zone of security."
§ Even more, a presumption that Russia does not have full
sovereignty within its own borders, as expressed by constant US
interventions in Moscow's internal affairs since 1992. They have
included an on-site crusade by swarms of American "advisers,"
particularly during the 1990s, to direct Russia's "transition" from
Communism; endless missionary sermons from afar, often couched in
threats, on how that nation should and should not organize its
political and economic systems; and active support for Russian
anti-Kremlin groups, some associated with hated Yeltsin-era oligarchs.
That interventionary impulse has now grown even into suggestions that
Putin be overthrown by the kind of US-backed "color revolutions"
carried out since 2003 in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and
attempted this year in Belarus. Thus, while mainstream editorial pages
increasingly call the Russian president "thug," "fascist" and "Saddam
Hussein," one of the Carnegie Endowment's several Washington crusaders
assures us of "Putin's weakness" and vulnerability to "regime change."
(Do proponents of "democratic regime change" in Russia care that it
might mean destabilizing a nuclear state?)
Underpinning these components of the real US policy are familiar cold
war double standards condemning Moscow for doing what Washington
does--such as seeking allies and military bases in former Soviet
republics, using its assets (oil and gas in Russia's case) as aid to
friendly governments and regulating foreign money in its political
life.
More broadly, when NATO expands to Russia's front and back doorsteps,
gobbling up former Soviet-bloc members and republics, it is "fighting
terrorism" and "protecting new states"; when Moscow protests, it is
engaging in "cold war thinking." When Washington meddles in the
politics of Georgia and Ukraine, it is "promoting democracy"; when the
Kremlin does so, it is "neoimperialism." And not to forget the
historical background: When in the 1990s the US-supported Yeltsin
overthrew Russia's elected Parliament and Constitutional Court by
force, gave its national wealth and television networks to Kremlin
insiders, imposed a constitution without real constraints on executive
power and rigged elections, it was "democratic reform"; when Putin
continues that process, it is "authoritarianism."
Finally, the United States is attempting, by exploiting Russia's
weakness, to acquire the nuclear superiority it could not achieve
during the Soviet era. That is the essential meaning of two major steps
taken by the Bush Administration in 2002, both against Moscow's strong
wishes. One was the Administration's unilateral withdrawal from the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, freeing it to try to create a
system capable of destroying incoming missiles and thereby the capacity
to launch a nuclear first strike without fear of retaliation. The other
was pressuring the Kremlin to sign an ultimately empty nuclear weapons
reduction agreement requiring no actual destruction of weapons and
indeed allowing development of new ones; providing for no verification;
and permitting unilateral withdrawal before the specified reductions
are required.
The extraordinarily anti-Russian nature of these policies casts serious
doubt on two American official and media axioms: that the recent
"chill" in US-Russian relations has been caused by Putin's behavior at
home and abroad, and that the cold war ended fifteen years ago. The
first axiom is false, the second only half true: The cold war ended in
Moscow, but not in Washington, as is clear from a brief look back.
The last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, came to power in 1985 with
heretical "New Thinking" that proposed not merely to ease but to
actually abolish the decades-long cold war. His proposals triggered a
fateful struggle in Washington (and Moscow) between policy-makers who
wanted to seize the historic opportunity and those who did not.
President Ronald Reagan decided to meet Gorbachev at least part of the
way, as did his successor, the first President George Bush. As a
result, in December 1989, at a historic summit meeting at Malta,
Gorbachev and Bush declared the cold war over. (That extraordinary
agreement evidently has been forgotten; thus we have the New York Times
recently asserting that the US-Russian relationship today "is far
better than it was 15 years ago.")
Declarations alone, however, could not terminate decades of warfare
attitudes. Even when Bush was agreeing to end the cold war in 1989-91,
many of his top advisers, like many members of the US political elite
and media, strongly resisted. (I witnessed that rift on the eve of
Malta, when I was asked to debate the issue in front of Bush and his
divided foreign policy team.) Proof came with the Soviet breakup in
December 1991: US officials and the media immediately presented the
purported "end of the cold war" not as a mutual Soviet-American
decision, which it certainly was, but as a great American victory and
Russian defeat.
That (now standard) triumphalist narrative is the primary reason the
cold war was quickly revived--not in Moscow a decade later by Putin but
in Washington in the early 1990s, when the Clinton Administration made
two epically unwise decisions. One was to treat post-Communist Russia
as a defeated nation that was expected to replicate America's domestic
practices and bow to its foreign policies. It required, behind the
facade of the Clinton-Yeltsin "partnership and friendship" (as
Clinton's top "Russia hand," Strobe Talbott, later confirmed), telling
Yeltsin "here's some more shit for your face" and Moscow's
"submissiveness." From that triumphalism grew the still-ongoing
interventions in Moscow's internal affairs and the abiding notion that
Russia has no autonomous rights at home or abroad.
Clinton's other unwise decision was to break the Bush Administration's
promise to Soviet Russia in 1990-91 not to expand NATO "one inch to the
east" and instead begin its expansion to Russia's borders. From that
profound act of bad faith, followed by others, came the dangerously
provocative military encirclement of Russia and growing Russian
suspicions of US intentions. Thus, while American journalists and even
scholars insist that "the cold war has indeed vanished" and that
concerns about a new one are "silly," Russians across the political
spectrum now believe that in Washington "the cold war did not end" and,
still more, that "the US is imposing a new cold war on Russia."
That ominous view is being greatly exacerbated by Washington's
ever-growing "anti-Russian fatwa," as a former Reagan appointee terms
it. This year it includes a torrent of official and media statements
denouncing Russia's domestic and foreign policies, vowing to bring more
of its neighbors into NATO and urging Bush to boycott the G-8 summit to
be chaired by Putin in St. Petersburg in July; a call by would-be
Republican presidential nominee Senator John McCain for "very harsh"
measures against Moscow; Congress's pointed refusal to repeal a
Soviet-era restriction on trade with Russia; the Pentagon's revival of
old rumors that Russian intelligence gave Saddam Hussein information
endangering US troops; and comments by Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, echoing the regime-changers, urging Russians, "if necessary, to
change their government."
For its part, the White House deleted from its 2006 National Security
Strategy the long-professed US-Russian partnership, backtracked on
agreements to help Moscow join the World Trade Organization and adopted
sanctions against Belarus, the Slav former republic most culturally
akin to Russia and with whom the Kremlin is negotiating a new union
state. Most significant, in May it dispatched Vice President Cheney to
an anti-Russian conference in former Soviet Lithuania, now a NATO
member, to denounce the Kremlin and make clear it is not "a strategic
partner and a trusted friend," thereby ending fifteen years of official
pretense.
More astonishing is a Council on Foreign Relations "task force report"
on Russia, co-chaired by Democratic presidential aspirant John Edwards,
issued in March. The "nonpartisan" council's reputed moderation and
balance are nowhere in evidence. An unrelenting exercise in double
standards, the report blames all the "disappointments" in US-Russian
relations solely on "Russia's wrong direction" under Putin--from
meddling in the former Soviet republics and backing Iran to conflicts
over NATO, energy politics and the "rollback of Russian democracy."
Strongly implying that Bush has been too soft on Putin, the council
report flatly rejects partnership with Moscow as "not a realistic
prospect." It calls instead for "selective cooperation" and "selective
opposition," depending on which suits US interests, and, in effect,
Soviet-era containment. Urging more Western intervention in Moscow's
political affairs, the report even reserves for Washington the right to
reject Russia's future elections and leaders as "illegitimate." An
article in the council's influential journal Foreign Affairs menacingly
adds that the United States is quickly "attaining nuclear primacy" and
the ability "to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or
China with a first strike."
Every consequence of this bipartisan American cold war against
post-Communist Russia has exacerbated the dangers inherent in the
Soviet breakup mentioned above. The crusade to transform Russia during
the 1990s, with its disastrous "shock therapy" economic measures and
resulting antidemocratic acts, further destabilized the country,
fostering an oligarchical system that plundered the state's wealth,
deprived essential infrastructures of investment, impoverished the
people and nurtured dangerous corruption. In the process, it
discredited Western-style reform, generated mass anti-Americanism where
there had been almost none--only 5 percent of Russians surveyed in May
thought the United States was a "friend"--and eviscerated the
once-influential pro-American faction in Kremlin and electoral
politics.
Military encirclement, the Bush Administration's striving for nuclear
supremacy and today's renewed US intrusions into Russian politics are
having even worse consequences. They have provoked the Kremlin into
undertaking its own conventional and nuclear buildup, relying more
rather than less on compromised mechanisms of control and maintenance,
while continuing to invest miserly sums in the country's decaying
economic base and human resources. The same American policies have also
caused Moscow to cooperate less rather than more in existing US-funded
programs to reduce the multiple risks represented by Russia's materials
of mass destruction and to prevent accidental nuclear war. More
generally, they have inspired a new Kremlin ideology of "emphasizing
our sovereignty" that is increasingly nationalistic, intolerant of
foreign-funded NGOs as "fifth columns" and reliant on anti-Western
views of the "patriotic" Russian intelligentsia and the Orthodox
Church.
Moscow's responses abroad have also been the opposite of what
Washington policy-makers should want. Interpreting US-backed "color
revolutions" as a quest for military outposts on Russia's borders, the
Kremlin now opposes pro-democracy movements in former Soviet republics
more than ever, while supporting the most authoritarian regimes in the
region, from Belarus to Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Moscow is forming a
political, economic and military "strategic partnership" with China,
lending support to Iran and other anti-American governments in the
Middle East and already putting surface-to-air missiles back in
Belarus, in effect Russia's western border with NATO.
If American policy and Russia's predictable countermeasures continue to
develop into a full-scale cold war, several new factors could make it
even more dangerous than was its predecessor. Above all, the growing
presence of Western bases and US-backed governments in the former
Soviet republics has moved the "front lines" of the conflict, in the
alarmed words of a Moscow newspaper, from Germany to Russia's "near
abroad." As a "hostile ring tightens around the Motherland," in the
view of former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, many different Russians
see a mortal threat. Putin's chief political deputy, Vladislav Surkov,
for example, sees the "enemy...at the gates," and the novelist and
Soviet-era dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn sees the "complete
encirclement of Russia and then the loss of its sovereignty." The risks
of direct military conflict could therefore be greater than ever.
Protesting overflights by NATO aircraft, a Russian general has already
warned, "If they violate our borders, they should be shot down."
Worsening the geopolitical factor are radically different American and
Russian self-perceptions. By the mid-1960s the US-Soviet cold war
relationship had acquired a significant degree of stability because the
two superpowers, perceiving a stalemate, began to settle for political
and military "parity." Today, however, the United States, the
self-proclaimed "only superpower," has a far more expansive view of its
international entitlements and possibilities. Moscow, on the other
hand, feels weaker and more vulnerable than it did before 1991. And in
that asymmetry lies the potential for a less predictable cold war
relationship between the two still fully armed nuclear states.
There is also a new psychological factor. Because the unfolding cold
war is undeclared, it is already laden with feelings of betrayal and
mistrust on both sides. Having welcomed Putin as Yeltsin's chosen
successor and offered him its conception of "partnership and
friendship," Washington now feels deceived by Putin's policies.
According to two characteristic commentaries in the Washington Post,
Bush had a "well-intentioned Russian policy," but "a Russian
autocrat...betrayed the American's faith." Putin's Kremlin, however,
has been reacting largely to a decade of broken US promises and
Yeltsin's boozy compliance. Thus Putin's declaration four years ago,
paraphrased on Russian radio: "The era of Russian geopolitical
concessions [is] coming to an end." (Looking back, he remarked bitterly
that Russia has been "constantly deceived.")
Still worse, the emerging cold war lacks the substantive negotiations
and cooperation, known as détente, that constrained the previous one.
Behind the lingering facade, a well-informed Russian tells us,
"dialogue is almost nonexistent." It is especially true in regard to
nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration's abandonment of the ABM
treaty and real reductions, its decision to build an antimissile
shield, and talk of pre-emptive war and nuclear strikes have all but
abolished long-established US-Soviet agreements that have kept the
nuclear peace for nearly fifty years. Indeed, according to a report,
Bush's National Security Council is contemptuous of arms control as
"baggage from the cold war." In short, as dangers posed by nuclear
weapons have grown and a new arms race unfolds, efforts to curtail or
even discuss them have ended.
Finally, anti-cold war forces that once played an important role in the
United States no longer exist. Cold war lobbies, old and new ones,
therefore operate virtually unopposed, some of them funded by
anti-Kremlin Russian oligarchs in exile. At high political levels, the
new American cold war has been, and remains, fully bipartisan, from
Clinton to Bush, Madeleine Albright to Rice, Edwards to McCain. At
lower levels, once robust pro-détente public groups, particularly
anti-arms-race movements, have been largely demobilized by official,
media and academic myths that "the cold war is over" and we have been
"liberated" from nuclear and other dangers in Russia.
Also absent (or silent) are the kinds of American scholars who
protested cold war excesses in the past. Meanwhile, a legion of new
intellectual cold warriors has emerged, particularly in Washington,
media favorites whose crusading anti-Putin zeal goes largely
unchallenged. (Typically, one inveterate missionary constantly charges
Moscow with "not delivering" on US interests, while another now calls
for a surreal crusade, "backed by international donors," to correct
young Russians' thinking about Stalin.) There are a few notable
exceptions--also bipartisan, from former Reaganites to Nation
contributors--but "anathematizing Russia," as Gorbachev recently put
it, is so consensual that even an outspoken critic of US policy
inexplicably ends an article, "Of course, Russia has been largely to
blame."
Making these political factors worse has been the "pluralist" US
mainstream media. In the past, opinion page editors and television
producers regularly solicited voices to challenge cold war zealots, but
today such dissenters, and thus the vigorous public debate of the past,
are almost entirely missing. Instead, influential editorial pages are
dominated by resurgent cold war orthodoxies, led by the Post, whose
incessant demonization of Putin's "autocracy" and "crude
neoimperialism" reads like a bygone Pravda on the Potomac. On the
conservative New York Sun's front page, US-Russian relations today are
presented as "a duel to the death--perhaps literally."
The Kremlin's strong preference "not to return to the cold war era," as
Putin stated May 13 in response to Cheney's inflammatory charges, has
been mainly responsible for preventing such fantasies from becoming
reality. "Someone is still fighting the cold war," a British academic
recently wrote, "but it isn't Russia." A fateful struggle over this
issue, however, is now under way in Moscow, with the "pro-Western"
Putin resisting demands for a "more hard line" course and, closely
related, favoring larger FDR-style investments in the people (and the
country's stability). Unless US policy, which is abetting the
hard-liners in that struggle, changes fundamentally, the symbiotic axis
between American and Russian cold warriors that drove the last conflict
will re-emerge. If so, the Kremlin, whether under Putin or a successor,
will fight the new one--with all the unprecedented dangers that would
entail.
Given different principles and determined leadership, it is still not
too late for a new US policy toward post-Soviet Russia. Its components
would include full cooperation in securing Moscow's materials of mass
destruction; radically reducing nuclear weapons on both sides while
banning the development of new ones and taking all warheads off
hair-trigger alert; dissuading other states from acquiring those
weapons; countering terrorist activities and drug-trafficking near
Russia; and augmenting energy supplies to the West.
None of those programs are possible without abandoning the warped
priorities and fallacies that have shaped US policy since 1991.
National security requires identifying and pursuing essential
priorities, but US policy-makers have done neither consistently. The
only truly vital American interest in Russia today is preventing its
stockpiles of mass destruction from endangering the world, whether
through Russia's destabilization or hostility to the West.
All of the dangerous fallacies underlying US policy are expressions of
unbridled triumphalism. The decision to treat post-Soviet Russia as a
vanquished nation, analogous to postwar Germany and Japan (but without
the funding), squandered a historic opportunity for a real partnership
and established the bipartisan premise that Moscow's "direction" at
home and abroad should be determined by the United States. Applied to a
country with Russia's size and long history as a world power, and that
had not been militarily defeated, the premise was inherently
self-defeating and certain to provoke a resentful backlash.
That folly produced two others. One was the assumption that the United
States had the right, wisdom and power to remake post-Communist Russia
into a political and economic replica of America. A conceit as vast as
its ignorance of Russia's historical traditions and contemporary
realities, it led to the counterproductive crusade of the 1990s, which
continues in various ways today. The other was the presumption that
Russia should be America's junior partner in foreign policy with no
interests except those of the United States. By disregarding Russia's
history, different geopolitical realities and vital interests, this
presumption has also been senseless.
As a Eurasian state with 20-25 million Muslim citizens of its own and
with Iran one of its few neighbors not being recruited by NATO, for
example, Russia can ill afford to be drawn into Washington's expanding
conflict with the Islamic world, whether in Iran or Iraq. Similarly, by
demanding that Moscow vacate its traditional political and military
positions in former Soviet republics so the United States and NATO can
occupy them--and even subsidize Ukraine's defection with cheap
gas--Washington is saying that Russia not only has no Monroe
Doctrine-like rights in its own neighborhood but no legitimate security
rights at all. Not surprisingly, such flagrant double standards have
convinced the Kremlin that Washington has become more belligerent since
Yeltsin's departure simply "because Russian policy has become more
pro-Russian."
Nor was American triumphalism a fleeting reaction to 1991. A decade
later, the tragedy of September 11 gave Washington a second chance for
a real partnership with Russia. At a meeting on June 16, 2001,
President Bush sensed in Putin's "soul" a partner for America. And so
it seemed after September 11, when Putin's Kremlin did more than any
NATO government to assist the US war effort in Afghanistan, giving it
valuable intelligence, a Moscow-trained Afghan combat force and easy
access to crucial air bases in former Soviet Central Asia.
The Kremlin understandably believed that in return Washington would
give it an equitable relationship. Instead, it got US withdrawal from
the ABM treaty, Washington's claim to permanent bases in Central Asia
(as well as Georgia) and independent access to Caspian oil and gas, a
second round of NATO expansion taking in several former Soviet
republics and bloc members, and a still-growing indictment of its
domestic and foreign conduct. Astonishingly, not even September 11 was
enough to end Washington's winner-take-all principles.
Why have Democratic and Republican administrations believed they could
act in such relentlessly anti-Russian ways without endangering US
national security? The answer is another fallacy--the belief that
Russia, diminished and weakened by its loss of the Soviet Union, had no
choice but to bend to America's will. Even apart from the continued
presence of Soviet-era weapons in Russia, it was a grave misconception.
Because of its extraordinary material and human attributes, Russia, as
its intellectuals say, has always been "destined to be a great power."
This was still true after 1991.
Even before world energy prices refilled its coffers, the Kremlin had
ready alternatives to the humiliating role scripted by Washington.
Above all, Russia could forge strategic alliances with eager anti-US
and non-NATO governments in the East and elsewhere, becoming an arsenal
of conventional weapons and nuclear knowledge for states from China and
India to Iran and Venezuela. Moscow has already begun that turning away
from the West, and it could move much further in that direction.
Still more, even today's diminished Russia can fight, perhaps win, a
cold war on its new front lines across the vast former Soviet
territories. It has the advantages of geographic proximity, essential
markets, energy pipelines and corporate ownership, along with kinship
and language and common experiences. They give Moscow an array of soft
and hard power to use, if it chooses, against neighboring governments
considering a new patron in faraway Washington.
Economically, the Kremlin could cripple nearly destitute Georgia and
Moldova by banning their products and otherwise unemployed migrant
workers from Russia and by charging Georgia and Ukraine full
"free-market" prices for essential energy. Politically, Moscow could
truncate tiny Georgia and Moldova, and big Ukraine, by welcoming their
large, pro-Russian territories into the Russian Federation or
supporting their demands for independent statehood (as the West has
been doing for Kosovo and Montenegro in Serbia). Militarily, Moscow
could take further steps toward turning the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization--now composed of Russia, China and four Central Asian
states, with Iran and India possible members--into an anti-NATO
defensive alliance, an "OPEC with nuclear weapons," a Western analyst
warned.
That is not all. In the US-Russian struggle in Central Asia over
Caspian oil and gas, Washington, as even the triumphalist Thomas
Friedman admits, "is at a severe disadvantage." The United States has
already lost its military base in Uzbekistan and may soon lose the only
remaining one in the region, in Kyrgyzstan; the new pipeline it backed
to bypass Russia runs through Georgia, whose stability depends
considerably on Moscow; Washington's new friend in oil-rich Azerbaijan
is an anachronistic dynastic ruler; and Kazakhstan, whose enormous
energy reserves make it a particular US target, has its own large
Russian population and is moving back toward Moscow.
Nor is the Kremlin powerless in direct dealings with the West. It can
mount more than enough warheads to defeat any missile shield and
illusion of "nuclear primacy." It can shut US businesses out of
multibillion-dollar deals in Russia and, as it recently reminded the
European Union, which gets 25 percent of its gas from Russia, "redirect
supplies" to hungry markets in the East. And Moscow could deploy its
resources, connections and UN Security Council veto against US
interests involving, for instance, nuclear proliferation, Iran,
Afghanistan and possibly even Iraq.
Contrary to exaggerated US accusations, the Kremlin has not yet
resorted to such retaliatory measures in any significant way. But
unless Washington stops abasing and encroaching on Russia, there is no
"sovereign" reason why it should not do so. Certainly, nothing Moscow
has gotten from Washington since 1992, a Western security specialist
emphasizes, "compensates for the geopolitical harm the United States is
doing to Russia."
American crusaders insist it is worth the risk in order to democratize
Russia and other former Soviet republics. In reality, their campaigns
since 1992 have only discredited that cause in Russia. Praising the
despised Yeltsin and endorsing other unpopular figures as Russia's
"democrats," while denouncing the popular Putin, has associated
democracy with the social pain, chaos and humiliation of the 1990s.
Ostracizing Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko while embracing
tyrants in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan has related it to the thirst for
oil. Linking "democratic revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia to NATO
membership has equated them with US expansionism. Focusing on the
victimization of billionaire Mikhail Khodorkhovsky and not on Russian
poverty or ongoing mass protests against social injustices has
suggested democracy is only for oligarchs. And by insisting on their
indispensable role, US crusaders have all but said (wrongly) that
Russians are incapable of democracy or resisting abuses of power on
their own.
The result is dark Russian suspicions of American intentions ignored by
US policy-makers and media alike. They include the belief that
Washington's real purpose is to take control of the country's energy
resources and nuclear weapons and use encircling NATO satellite states
to "de-sovereignize" Russia, turning it into a "vassal of the West."
More generally, US policy has fostered the belief that the American
cold war was never really aimed at Soviet Communism but always at
Russia, a suspicion given credence by Post and Times columnists who
characterize Russia even after Communism as an inherently "autocratic
state" with "brutish instincts."
To overcome those towering obstacles to a new relationship, Washington
has to abandon the triumphalist conceits primarily responsible for the
revived cold war and its growing dangers. It means respecting Russia's
sovereign right to determine its course at home (including disposal of
its energy resources). As the record plainly shows, interfering in
Moscow's internal affairs, whether on-site or from afar, only harms the
chances for political liberties and economic prosperity that still
exist in that tormented nation.
It also means acknowledging Russia's legitimate security interests,
especially in its own "near abroad." In particular, the planned third
expansion of NATO, intended to include Ukraine, must not take place.
Extending NATO to Russia's doorsteps has already brought relations near
the breaking point (without actually benefiting any nation's security);
absorbing Ukraine, which Moscow regards as essential to its Slavic
identity and its military defense, may be the point of no return, as
even pro-US Russians anxiously warn. Nor would it be democratic, since
nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians are opposed. The explosive
possibilities were adumbrated in late May and early June when local
citizens in ethnic Russian Crimea blockaded a port and roads where a US
naval ship and contingent of Marines suddenly appeared, provoking
resolutions declaring the region "anti-NATO territory" and threats of
"a new Vietnam."
Time for a new US policy is running out, but there is no hint of one in
official or unofficial circles. Denouncing the Kremlin in May, Cheney
spoke "like a triumphant cold warrior," a Times correspondent reported.
A top State Department official has already announced the "next great
mission" in and around Russia. In the same unreconstructed spirit, Rice
has demanded Russians "recognize that we have legitimate interests...in
their neighborhood," without a word about Moscow's interests; and a
former Clinton official has held the Kremlin "accountable for the
ominous security threats...developing between NATO's eastern border and
Russia." Meanwhile, the Bush Administration is playing Russian roulette
with Moscow's control of its nuclear weapons. Its missile shield
project having already provoked a destabilizing Russian buildup, the
Administration now proposes to further confuse Moscow's early-warning
system, risking an accidental launch, by putting conventional warheads
on long-range missiles for the first time.
In a democracy we might expect alternative policy proposals from
would-be leaders. But there are none in either party, only demands for
a more anti-Russian course, or silence. We should not be surprised.
Acquiescence in Bush's monstrous war in Iraq has amply demonstrated the
political elite's limited capacity for introspection, independent
thought and civic courage. (It prefers to falsely blame the American
people, as the managing editor of Foreign Affairs recently did, for
craving "ideological red meat.") It may also be intimidated by another
revived cold war practice--personal defamation. The Post and The New
Yorker have already labeled critics of their Russia policy "Putin
apologists" and charged them with "appeasement" and "again taking the
Russian side of the Cold War."
The vision and courage of heresy will therefore be needed to escape
today's new cold war orthodoxies and dangers, but it is hard to imagine
a US politician answering the call. There is, however, a
not-too-distant precedent. Twenty years ago, when the world faced
exceedingly grave cold war perils, Gorbachev unexpectedly emerged from
the orthodox and repressive Soviet political class to offer a heretical
way out. Is there an American leader today ready to retrieve that
missed opportunity?
ELCHINO
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Ko' fa?i the^' kho^ng MO.i ???