Orange Revolution In Ukraine - Why It Happened
Trident
Trident
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March 9, 2005
Dominique Arel
Chair of Ukrainian Studies
University of Ottawa
The Orange Revolution was the most momentous political event in
Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. But it rests on a
paradox. The Revolution was about the creation of a political nation,
about changing the nature of the political regime in Ukraine, and
redirecting the arrows of political development towards an "open
society" which, in the current political vocabulary, is synonymous
with one word: Europe. And yet, the Orange Revolution owes its
existence to a strong national movement in Ukraine. National as in
nationalism.
The "minority faith," to use the title of a well-known book by a
British professor, did not lead "nowhere," to use the title of a
rather infamous article by a former American diplomat. The national
faith actually became an electoral majority, although in unexpected
ways, and its success in achieving the hardest of feats, organized and
sustained collective action, cracked the old regime down the middle.
We have come a long way since Hans Kohn, for whom nationalism in the
East was all emotion and irrationality, and a threat to an open
society. The Orange Revolution took place in what for Kohn was the
deep East, since his East began at the French-German border. And yet,
if Ukraine is now on the road to an open society, it is largely thanks
to the strength of its nationalism.
The complicating factor is that Ukrainian society is suffering a
severe crisis of legitimacy. The non-Orange part of the electorate-44
percent, in the final round of elections on December 26-refuses to
accept that the popular uprising on Kyiv's Central Square (the Maidan)
was legitimate. The Orange electorate-just a touch over the majority
threshold, at 52%-refuses to accept non-Orange grievances as
legitimate. This could be dismissed as the normal dynamics of a
winner/loser electoral outcome, except for the fact that the Orange
and non-Orange constituencies are strikingly polarized geographically.
Ukraine had been geographically polarized once, during the
last round of presidential election that brought Leonid Kuchma to
power in 1994. The fact of the matter is, Ukraine is far more
polarized now than it was in 1994. At the same time, and this is not a
contradiction, as I will explain later, the huge level of rejection of
Viktor Yushchenko in Eastern Ukraine is virtually identical to that of
Leonid Kravchuk in 1994, at a time when there was no Orange
Revolution. I would venture to say that there is something deeper at
work, namely, the fear of exclusion. In this respect, the fact that
the new Cabinet of Ministers virtually excludes Eastern Ukraine, a
first since the creation of Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s, is quite
significant.
+++
The Orange Revolution began on 22 November 2004, when it became
clear that the old regime had stolen the election. Falsifying an
electoral outcome in a competitive context is an art, but there was
nothing artful in how Donetsk, the power base of then Prime Minister
Yanukovych, falsified the results. Donetsk reported an overwhelming
majority for Yanukovych (96 percent) which, as such, was not entirely
implausible, since similar near-unanimous support for Yushchenko could
be found in the Galician provinces of Western Ukraine. Where Donetsk
overreached was in reporting an enormous turnout of 97 percent, 10
percent higher than any other oblast outside of the Donbas, 16 percent
higher than the national average, and 19 percent higher than the
turnout obtained in the same Donetsk oblast just three weeks earlier.
What a statistician would cautiously call implausible, the
Maidan and, in quick succession, Western governments called
impossible. At least three-quarters of a million votes had been
fabricated in Donbas (Donetsk and neighboring Luhansk) and that alone
called into question the official small lead (2.9 percent) enjoyed by
Yanukovych in the national results. Sure enough, there were also
allegations of thousands of violations throughout eastern and southern
Ukraine. In a large country, the impact of these violations in local
precincts on the aggregate national result is difficult to assess.
Evidence based on taped phone conversations soon surfaced that the
Presidential Administration had intercepted results sent by
territorial electoral commissions and altered them before they were
eventually received by the Central Electoral Commission. Establishing
the authenticity of taped conversations, however, takes time.
What jolted Western governments and the OSCE in refusing to
recognize the result of this second round, and most likely served as
the initial impetus for people to fill the Maidan, was the obvious and
gross violation in Donetsk. One Russian in Donetsk, who was observing
the election in Yanukovych country for a European organization, was
shocked less by the violations per se, than the fact that they were
committed so openly and brazenly. This arrogance-let's call it the
hubris of incompetence-ultimately doomed the regime.
But for that to happen, you needed sustained social pressure. And
it is exactly at that point that absolutely everybody, beginning with
Yushchenko, was in the dark. And this is why all these stories about
the Orange Revolution being the result of Western intervention, while
containing a grain of truth, ultimately miss the point by a wide
margin. The backbone of Orange, the PORA student movement, was indeed
impressively organized, and no doubt greatly benefited from the
training it received from Serbian and Georgian colleagues, as well as
from American foundations. Sustaining a Tent City in downtown Kyiv
costs money, and a fair amount of it, but it is far more likely that
these resources came from a group of wealthy Yushchenko allies, who,
incidentally, now form the core of Tymoshenko's Cabinet, than from the
ubiquitous Uncle Sam. There was a lot of money circulating in Ukraine,
and not all in the camp of the Yanukovych-aligned oligarchs.
Yet what everybody expected was for a relatively small following to
disrupt business as usual in the center, much like the small
demonstrations of Ukraine Without Kuchma four years earlier, during
the Gongadze crisis, with pressure placed on Western powers not to
recognize the election. What happened instead was a mass outpouring on
the streets and swelling numbers, instead of diminishing ones. One can
dispute how many exactly there were in the streets, but one had only
to look at the Maidan to think Berlin, Prague and Bucharest 1989. Or
Belgrade 2000, and Tbilisi 2002. As the saying goes in my native
language, a picture is worth a thousand words.
In the perspective of rational choice analysts, the "tipping
point" had been reached, the point after which the benefits of
engaging in collective action surpass the costs. That, no one could
foresee. It wasn't supposed to happen in Ukraine. All the seminars in
Ukrainian studies I had attended in the past few years, including one
I hosted a month before the second round, had concurred on one thing:
civil society in Ukraine is too weak to stand up to the rise of a
post-Soviet authoritarian regime. Prague 1989 in Kyiv? Not in your
wildest dreams. And yet it happened. The Revolution was first and
foremost a revelation: that Ukrainian society had in fact profoundly
changed since independence.
With a mass, but peaceful uprising in downtown Kyiv, the nerve
center of the government, the old regime elites, rather than Western
governments, were the ones who came under massive pressure. With so
many people in the streets, and the obvious falsification in Donetsk,
the decision by the West not to recognize results was far easier to
make, even though France and Germany, ever mindful of their oil
interests in Orange-challenged Russia, could have lived without the
problem. From that point on, with the tipping point passed in terms of
street demonstrations, and with Ukraine shunned by the West, the fate
of the Orange Revolution rested on the cohesion of the old regime
elite. As the Yale political scientist Keith Darden argues in The
Blackmail State, the old regime (which I am using here as a shorthand,
but which in fact was not that old, but rather the the peculiar
creation of a post-Soviet environment) was all about the subversion of
state institutions (security, fiscal, regional, educational) to the
benefit of one particular leader and his coterie.
In one sense, the rise of Our Ukraine, Yushchenko's political
vehicle, is the story of individual officials who served the Kuchma
regime and were either forced out, or became disillusioned, and then
banded together to challenge the regime, beginning with Yushchenko
himself, followed by Yulia Tymoshenko, current Vice-Premier Anatolii
Kinakh, and the list is relatively long. The Orange Revolution, on the
other hand, is the story of high-powered elites who defected from the
Kuchma regime while still in control of their institutions. Prior to
the first round, only Volodymyr Lytvyn, a former Kuchma Chief of Staff
who was supposed to have become his henchman as parliamentary Speaker,
was on the verge of defecting, a predilection that was sealed on
November 27, when parliament voted not to recognize the second round.
Under street pressure, the defections snowballed. University rectors
challenged the regime and allowed their students to demonstrate.
Regional councils proclaimed they would not acknowledge the results.
Diplomats posted abroad denounced the falsification. Media magnates,
the so-called "oligarchs," began to loosen the administration's
control of their news broadcasts. Crucially, the security forces
refused to follow orders to use force. The Western media reported that
such an order had been given, when the Revolution was a week-old, and
that the SBU made it clear that it would confront Army or Interior
Ministry troops if it had to. Whether an order was actually given
remains to be investigated, yet, by all indications, the regime knew,
by the second week, that it could no longer count on the support of
its security service. The last straw was the decision of the Supreme
Court invalidating the second round and ordering a third one, in
defiance of the expressed preference of President Kuchma.
Before Orange, Ukraine watchers knew that whether Ukraine would
turn the corner would be contingent on whether a critical mass of
elites would defect from the old regime. What would trigger this
spiral of defections was impossible to predict. Which is another way
of saying that Orange was impossible to predict. What is Orange? The
Orange Revolution is not about policy issues that are normally front
and center in electoral contests, but about a process. It is neither
about a joyful acceptance of the neo-liberal economic model, nor about
American geostrategic interests, but rather about the systemic abuse
of executive power in Ukraine, and the disingenuousness of proclaiming
a strategic course of European integration, while regressing on all
political, economic, and legal indicators of Europeanness. The Orange
Revolution is about the creation of a civil society in real time,
before our eyes, in the sense that, for the first time in Ukrainian
history, an organized society acted as a counter-weight to the state.
Twelve days of massive demonstrations, between November 22 and
December 3 (the day the Court ruled), cannot be fabricated.
But where did this civil society come from? We still know
little about the social foundations of Orange, and no doubt
sociological and anthropological studies will do much to inform our
understanding in the years ahead. But two factors appear to have
played a critical role: the generational and the national. Orange
began with PORA, a group of students who were children or teenagers at
the time of independence, and ended with the nomination of what
appears to be the youngest Cabinet since the Bolshevik Revolution,
with an average age of 44. To be sure, people of all ages were on
Maidan, and the grandmothers, the babulias, were out there in full
force. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that the driving force, both
at ground level and at central command, was a generation that had not
been in a position of authority during the Soviet era. That
generation, we can surmise, is anything but a homo sovieticus in how
it views the state. This is most disturbing to neighboring autocrats,
beginning with Russia, in their assessment of the export potential of
the Orange Revolution. Given a similar opportunity, why would the
young, post-Soviet, generation in Russia behave any differently?
The mitigating factor, however, is nationalism. Nationalism is
a term of opprobrium to many, and is very often used selectively. Yet
it has value as a concept of comparative political analysis. Let me be
very clear as to what I mean here. Nationalism is a claim of political
sovereignty based on a claim of cultural distinctiveness. The French
model of the nation is generally presented as contradicting this
assertion but, in the last analysis, the French defined the French as
whoever spoke French and nothing else. They were, and remain, quite
intolerant on the issue of linguistic diversity. In Ukraine,
nationalism is a factor because one constituency is far more cohesive
than another in its vision of the nature of Ukrainian cultural
distinctiveness. That constituency is strongest in Western Ukraine,
territories that were not part of a Russian Imperial or Soviet state
until the Second World War (with one regional semi-exception). Western
Ukrainians did not fill the square on their own, but there is little
doubt that they, Galicians in particular, were overrepresented, in the
backbone of Maidan. Remove them from the equation and you have a
serious organizational problem.
But leave them alone on the square and you have an even bigger
problem. The Orange Revolution is not a Galician coup. It is rather
about Western Ukrainians and Central Ukrainians coming together for
the first time for real, rather than symbolically, as happened in
1919. In electoral arithmetic, there is no question, as I will show in
a moment, that Yushchenko's breakthrough was specifically in Central
Ukraine. On Maidan, although we don't yet have access to systematic
data, one has to assume that the bulk of non-Western Ukrainian
demonstrators were from areas of Central Ukraine. At the elite level,
again the composition of the new Ukrainian Cabinet is instructive. Of
the 23 ministers, only four are from the East, but only four are from
the West. Nearly two-thirds are from Central Ukraine. The Donbas media
has frequently raised the specter of Galicia taking over Ukraine, but
a single minister is actually from Galicia. It is Central Ukraine that
now dominates Ukrainian politics.
Why is this important? The civil society revealed by the Orange
Revolution has taken root precisely in the areas where Ukrainian
national consciousness is more cohesive. Historically, of course,
nationalism can graft itself on any political ideology. In interwar
Western Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism had appropriated for itself an
authoritarian model of society that was rampant in Central Europe. In
the early years of independence, mainstream nationalists appeared to
be more interested in the trappings of statehood, than about
substantive reforms. But the Kuchmagate scandal, four years ago,
revealed that the only constituency capable of presenting an organized
resistance to the subversion of democracy, even if unsuccessful at the
time, were the nationalists. The fringe elements notwithstanding, the
nationalists, in that defining moment, revealed themselves to be
democrats, in fact, the only democrats.
The question we have to ask ourselves is why is it that people
mobilized, then and now, in some regions (West and Center), and not
others (East and South)? My answer has to do with how people relate to
their national identity. Ukrainians in Central and Western Ukraine
have a more cohesive view of their identity, and this greater sense of
solidarity is a facilitating factor in their ability to undertake
collective action. Nationalism acts a vehicle for the realization of a
project, and that project has become that of an open society, as we
know it in Europe. It is high time for us to leave the experience of
"integral" nationalism in the closet, in the historical closet-once
again, fringe outbursts notwithstanding. Nationalism produced the
Orange Revolution which, as I said at the outset, took the form of a
popular uprising for an open society.
But Orange conquered only half of the country, and this half is
highly concentrated geographically. What are the facts about this
polarization? Ukraine is divided into twenty-seven territories:
twenty-four provinces or oblasts, one autonomous republic (Crimea),
and two cities with a special territorial status (Kyiv, the capital,
and the naval port of Sevastopol, whose facilities are leased to the
Russian Fleet). In the final round of December 26, Yanukovych won in
ten territories, comprising just under half of the national electorate
(48 percent). Yushchenko won in seventeen territories, comprising just
over the other half (52 percent). In the territories that he carried,
Yanukovych received 75 percent of the vote. In the territories carried
by Yushchenko, his score was 80 percent. In only one of all
twenty-seven territories was the vote relatively close: the Southern
oblast of Kherson, where Yanukovych beat Yushchenko 51 percent to 43
percent. In all other twenty-six territories, the margin of victory by
one or the other candidate was enormous. After Kherson, the closest
race in the whole country was in Kirovohrad, a Central Ukrainian
oblast which straddles the Center and the South (partly located in an
area that was historically known as Novorossia), where Yushchenko
defeated Yanukovych by 31 percentage points, 63 percent to 32 percent,
which in any country would be considered a landslide.
Another way to look at it is to divide Ukraine into regions. There
is an interesting debate in the literature as to how best to delineate
Ukraine's regions, but for the sake of continuity here, let me resort
to a dividing principle that I have been using for a decade, focused
on five regions, with Kyiv in brackets. In this grouping, the
Yanukovych zone is divided into an industrial East and a
semi-industrial, semi-agricultural South, while the predominantly
agricultural Yushchenko zone is divided into three regions according
to their distinct periods of incorporations into a Moscow-dominated
state: the Left Bank (1640s), the Right Bank (1790s), and the West
(1940s). The Kyiv metropolis, as an industrial magnet, is a huge
exception in this agricultural landscape. On December 26, Yanukovych
carried 79 percent of the East and 70 percent of the South, while
Yushchenko carried 72 percent of the Left Bank, 78 percent of Kyiv, 78
percent of the Right Bank, and 89 percent of the West.
The geographical polarization is stark, and it is starker than it was
ten years ago. In the presidential election of July 1994, former Prime
Minister Leonid Kuchma unexpectedly edged incumbent Leonid Kravchuk by
six percentage points, 51 percent to 45 percent. The election was not
about democracy, as it took place in a relatively fair and free
fashion, and the legitimacy of Kuchma's victory was not contested. A
comparison of the regional breakdown of the vote with the 2004
election is instructive. The support for Kuchma and Kravchuk, compared
to Yanukovych and Yushchenko, was virtually the same in 1994 and 2004
for the East, South, and West: 75 percent for the winner in the East
and South, 90 percent for the winner in the West. Nearly all the
changes took place at the Center-Left and Right Bank, and in the
capital. The Left Bank declared itself two to one in favor of Kuchma
(66 percent to 31 percent), and that was the biggest puzzle at the
time. It now voted for Yushchenko three to one (72 percent to 24
percent). The Right Bank evolved from a relatively close contest (54
percent to 42 percent in favor of Kravchuk) into a sweep, four to one
(78 percent to 19 percent) for Yushchenko. Critics of the polarization
model argued back then that the Right Bank acted as a buffer between
the polarized East and West. But there is no such buffer anymore,
except for tiny Kherson.
Between 1994 and 2004, one social stratum significantly
altered its electoral orientation: the peasantry. Until recently, the
peasantry was nationally-oriented only in Western Ukraine, that is, in
areas that did no experience the social cataclysms of collectivization
and famine in the 1930s. In the agricultural heartland of Central
Ukraine, the peasantry tended to vote Socialist or Communist. It was
1917-1918 all over again, although for different reasons: the national
movement conquered the West, the capital and some urban areas of the
Center, but could not penetrate the countryside. Yushchenko's greatest
achievement was his capacity to rally rural Ukraine under his banner.
It began with the parliamentary elections of 2002 and became hegemonic
with the final round of the 2004 presidential saga.
What we don't know yet is how exactly the peasantry became Orange.
Once again, serious field research is required. There are two possible
story lines. The first is the activation of a social class that had
essentially been broken in the 1930s. In the past decade, the
peasantry may have developed a political consciousness which makes it
critical of the authorities and receptive to the Orange message. The
peasantry may not have been stomping the ground on Maidan in
November-December, but it is its determination to vote for change that
sealed the fate of the Old Regime. For the first time in Ukrainian
history, the peasantry may have become a politically active component
of the emerging political nation.
The second possible explanation focuses on elites. Perhaps the
peasantry, as a legacy of the 1930s, and as a reflection of its
economic dependence, is still, on the whole, largely obedient to local
authorities, but what changed in the past decade is how local
authorities orient themselves. With all the talk about how
"administrative resources," that is, the improper use of local
administrative offices to promote the candidate of the regime,
distorted the results of the first round of election in October 2004-a
round that already produced a geographically polarized result, with
the polarization increasing in each round-no one could satisfactorily
explain to me why adminresursy would allegedly work in Eastern and
Southern Ukraine, but not elsewhere. Particularly under conditions
where all local administrations were under massive pressure from the
center to produce results favoring Yanukovych, and where Yushchenko
was shut out from the main TV channels that are broadcast nationally,
i.e. in all regions. Why couldn't the blackmail state blackmail
everybody, especially in remote rural areas?
In a seminal article, the American political scientist Lucan Way
argued that the project of autocratic restoration, seemingly
successful in Russia, faced a structural problem in Ukraine, namely
the division of its elites along the national question. In spite of
the blackmail state, before Orange, Ukraine had a parliament more
autonomous than in Russia and an electoral process far more contested
than in Russia. For Way, Ukraine had developed into a case of
"democracy by default," a democracy whose rules were constantly
assaulted by the executive branch, but which was strong enough to
prevent the regime from safely controlling the results of an election
in its favor. Back in October 2004, no one could predict the Orange
Revolution, but no one either, including the regime itself, could
predict exactly how the election would play out. (The doomsayers of
the Ukrainian intelligentsia were predicting a dark apocalypse, and
they were proven spectacularly wrong). This was the real story,
pre-Orange: despite the Herculean efforts by the Kuchma regime to
subvert the election, they could not prevent a challenger from making
a credible bid to win. That degree of pluralism in the system,
annihilated in Belarus, considerably enfeebled in Russia, but
intriguingly potent in Moldova and Ukraine, Way ascribed to the
existence of a structural division at the elite level over
nationalism. The neo-Soviet state was unable to fully re-centralize,
to reestablish what Russians and Ukrainians call the "vertikal" of
state power, because of an incentive for elites to coalesce around two
poles, an incentive that instilled a degree of pluralism in the
system, "by default."
Why were elites in rural Ukraine able to withstand the
infamous adminresursy pressures from the center? Is it because they
sensed a profound change of allegiance among their constituents? Or is
there something else at work that make them receptive to the Orange
discourse? This is where I would like to introduce the variable of
language. Ukraine is a bilingual country-not as a matter of state
policy, but in terms of sociological observations-whose inhabitants
have a complex relationship with language. Ukrainians make
distinctions between the language they identify with, the language
they actually prefer to speak when given the opportunity, and the
language they would like their children to learn in school. What we
know is that there is a remarkable correlation between language of
preference and support for Yanukovych or Yushchenko in regions. In
Central and Western Ukraine, the proportion of people using Ukrainian
as their language of preference is within the range of 75-80 percent,
and their support for Yushchenko is within the same range. In Eastern
and Southern Ukraine, 75 to 80 percent of the people prefer to speak
Russian, and the support for Yanukovych is similarly within that
range. The Orange Revolution caught fire in Ukrainian-speaking areas,
where "speaking" refers to empirical behaviour, rather than symbolic
attachment. Using the empirical criteria, the peasantry in Central
Ukraine, the group that brought Yushchenko to victory, is 99 percent
Ukrainian-speaking. Which brings us back to our question. What makes
the peasantry and/or the rural elite recipient to an Orange message?
Could it have to do with the fact their world is predominantly
Ukrainian-speaking?
Between the second and third rounds of election, the national
media opened up, as observers noted that the coverage of the two
campaigns became balanced, and Yanukovych, suddenly on leave from his
post of Prime Minister, lost the support of the much-vaunted
administrative resources. Remarkably enough, three weeks of Orange
fever had no discernable effect in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. The
fabricated turnout of Donetsk was readjusted, to be sure, plunging
from 97 percent to 84 percent, still seven percent higher than the
national average, but this time with plausibility. Support for
Yanukovych remained the same in these predominantly urban areas and
whatever little change there was occurred, once again, in rural areas.
In Central Ukraine, however, the Yanukovych vote, already quite low,
collapsed. Once the turnout falsification in Donetsk was accounted
for, the main difference between the second and third round was the
Orange zone becoming even more Orange, furthering the polarization.
What should we make of this polarization? One approach in
Ukrainian studies is to dismiss it as illegitimate, that is to say, to
consider, on the one hand, the vote for Yushchenko in the third round
as reflecting the true preferences of his electors, while, on the
other hand, refusing to consider the vote for Yanukovych as reflecting
the true preferences of his own electors. In other words, the
Yushchenko vote is valid, but the Yanukovych vote is questionable. But
what exactly is the point of sending planeloads of foreign observers
(more than 12,000, apparently), deploying them predominantly in the
Yanukovych zone, having the international monitoring organizations
they were working with, and even the indigenous Committee of Voters,
declare the process fair and free, yet still somehow cling to the
notion that the Yanukovych vote was illegitimately inflated? By any
reasonable standards, no systematic pattern of falsification, enough
to significantly impact on the national vote, was uncovered in the
third round. Nevertheless, once turnout was controlled for, the
preference for Yanukovych in the East and South remained identical to
what it had been on November 21.
A variation of the argument, one that appears to animate Prime
Minister Tymoshenko and probably President Yushchenko, goes like this:
While the voting count in the third round was legitimate, the
conditions that led people to vote the way they did were not. Civil
society has not taken root in Eastern and Southern Ukraine and people
are far more vulnerable to being manipulated by their elites. The
Yanukovych vote is illegitimate because it is the product of a closed
society. Opening up the system will alter significantly popular
preferences in the East and this will take care of the polarization.
Since the drive for an open society originates from Central and
Western Ukraine, systemic reform must be imposed from outside Eastern
Ukraine. The corollary of this premise is the formation of a Cabinet
not dominated by Eastern Ukrainians, which never happened before. Four
of twenty-three ministers were born or lived a long portion of their
life in Eastern or Southern Ukraine, two of whom, including the Prime
Minister, from a coalition (the Tymoshenko Bloc) which received a
grand total of 4 percent of the vote in its homebase of Dnipropetrovsk
in the parliamentary elections of 2002. Politicians recognized by the
Eastern electorate as representing them are virtually absent from the
Cabinet.
This approach certainly has merits, as one is struck by how
asymmetrical the Yanukovych and Yushchenko zones are in terms of their
capacity for social organization. If civil society revealed itself in
Central Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, it hardly exists in the
East and South. It is as if Ukraine is inhabited by two different
worlds: one aiming to break with the Soviet societal model, the other,
even if undergoing profound economic changes, still devoid of
initiative vis-à-vis the state. What makes its population so resistant
to change? After all, we are talking about a highly educated
population, by world standards. What makes its younger generation
apparently less open to change than its counterpart in Central and
Western Ukraine?
I would suggest that we look beyond the assumption of people not yet
realizing what their true interests are and factor in the national
question. The geographical polarization in Ukraine is not ethnic. The
majority of the population in Eastern and Southern Ukraine has
internalized a Ukrainian identity, as promoted by Soviet nationality
policy. This is why the specter of separatism is nonsense, since it is
hard to imagine why people who self-identify as Ukrainians would want
to separate from a territory called Ukraine, and which they have
essentially run for eighty years. The one exception here is Crimea,
where ethnic Russians still form the majority, and where a
secessionist movement had real potential in the 1990s. But Crimea
remained passive throughout Orange and its turnout, contrary to the
Donbas, was lower than the national average.
Eastern Ukrainians call themselves Ukrainians, but not in the
same way as Western Ukrainians do. [As a shorthand here, "Eastern"
will refer to Eastern and Southern Ukrainians, while "Western" will
refer to Central and Western Ukrainians] Eastern Ukrainians tend not
to think of identity in exclusive terms. In the Soviet era, they felt
simulteanously Ukrainian and Soviet. With the disappearance of the
Soviet identity, they feel adrift, unsure of where to affix their
Ukrainian identity. Western Ukrainians, by contrast, think far more in
exclusive terms. And the last decade may very well have crystallized
Ukrainian identity in Central Ukraine. What I am emphasizing here is
national identity cohesion, how people situate their identity in the
larger whole. Cohesion breeds self-confidence. And self-confidence
generates a whole different way of dealing with Russia, something the
Russian government, and Russians more generally, are not accustomed
to, and something Eastern Ukrainians are not comfortable with.
Eastern Ukrainians are not Russians, but in how they interpret their
past and future, they feel intimately connected to Russia. Western
Ukrainians do not feel that connection, or if they do, to a far lesser
degree. The crux of the matter is this. Western Ukrainians tend to
believe that this two-layered sense of identity in the East can be
remodeled. This is what could be called "nation-building" in the
ethnic sense; in the language of national activists: making "true"
Ukrainians out of Eastern Ukrainians. But it could very well be that
there is something resilient in the Eastern regional experience that
make this project illusory. This is not a matter of language per se,
but of language situated in a given historical region. Eastern
Ukrainians look at the Orange Revolution through the prism of their
perceived regional experience, and the language they speak, Russian,
becomes a symbol of that self-perception. They reject Orange, not
because they are innately inimical to the project of an open society,
but because of a sense that this is a project that excludes them.
The Orange Revolution was about the birth of the Ukrainian
political nation, that is, of the capacity for a population to
organize independently of the state and, in times of crisis, to defy
the state. Yet this political nation is, as of yet, circumscribed to
specific historical regions: the West and the Center. Ukraine's
biggest challenge, in the years ahead, is to extend the political
nation to the East and South, to make that population feel that it
belongs to Ukraine in an active sense, to put substance to their
citizenship (or civic identity). But inclusion in the political nation
can hardly come from a unilateral vision of how national identity
ought to be construed. If Russians in Russia have to understand that
they cannot unilaterally impose their vision of Ukrainian identity on
Ukrainians, Western Ukrainians [again, used as a shorthand for Western
and Central] cannot unilaterally impose their vision of Ukrainian
identity on Eastern Ukrainians. This is all about accommodating
identity-based differences. Perhaps we should start deciphering all
these claims for "federalism" in the East as a codeword for
accommodation. What we need to bear in mind is that Eastern Ukrainians
may interpret the first signals of post-Orange-with Yushchenko
outlawing the very word "federalism" and the Tymoshenko Cabinet
including no one deemed by the East as representative of the region-as
a self-fulfilling prophecy: the heroes of the Orange Revolution are
bent on excluding them.
Fingal
>The best analysis of what traspired and why that I've seen to date.
>
>Trident
>
>************************************************************************
>March 9, 2005
>
>Dominique Arel
>Chair of Ukrainian Studies
>University of Ottawa
>
> The Orange Revolution was the most momentous political event in
>Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. But it rests on a
>paradox. The Revolution was about the creation of a political nation,
>about changing the nature of the political regime in Ukraine, and
>redirecting the arrows of political development towards an "open
>society" which, in the current political vocabulary, is synonymous
>with one word: Europe. And yet, the Orange Revolution owes its
>existence to a strong national movement in Ukraine. National as in
>nationalism.
Arel was putting out his list at warp speed all through the time the
events were taking place. I found it very useful.
I would put a question to him, however: what about all those stories
of Russian troops in Kiev and environs? Where have the stories gone
now?
Evgenij Barsukov
> The best analysis of what traspired and why that I've seen to date.
>
> Trident
>
> ************************************************************************
> March 9, 2005
>
> Dominique Arel
> Chair of Ukrainian Studies
> University of Ottawa
Despite the lengly and seemingly knowledgeable article, the guy
completely misses the point on the origins and driving force of Orange
revolution. His conclusion is it is nationalism (even if he does not
mean it negatively). Regardless of the accent he puts on it, it is just
a mistaken judgenent.
Ukrainian nationalism was always a fringe activity of very few elite
individuals, who have been hanging out around independence square for
last 10 years. It started with Ruh, and people who used to be in Ruh
obviously joined Orange revolution (just as they would have joined any
other political upheaval just for the fun of it). But Ruh had never any
preyer in terms of wining any election. Its "success" was always in
single % digits (as it was in all parlamentary and presidential
elections). Chornovil (leader of ukrainian nationalists Ruh) has got
something like 7% vote in presidential elections. More radical
nationalists such as UNA-UNCO never even got a single candidate in
parlament.
Why such miserable performance? Because average ukrainian
never gave a damn about nationalists, considering them strange and
dangerous crowd. Their rythoric was producing a "yawn" at best.
Remarceable, the annonecement that soviet union was disolved and ukraine
became independent was greated with what? - demonstrations?? outpuring
of joy? dancing on the streets? - right answer: nothing of the above.
Basicaly it was a non-news, hardly worth lazy discussion in a bus. But
specialy after creation of Ukrainian state nationalists arguments
started looking a lot like trying to break down an open door - "we
already have our state, so what is your point?".
Did this attitude change during 10 years of independence? Of cause
not. If anything, disregard of nationalists became more pronounced, as
everybody got more used to this as a non-issue. What did change is a
gradual development of a pride and satisfaction of the way how things
were developing both economicaly and socialy. That pride contributed to
Ukrainian peoples's feeling "at home" in their own country. This was
however not etnicaly specific. Feeling of having your house in order and
being proud of it is not nationalism, just a neiborhood cohesiveness.
When you play as a teem with a bunch of people you dont know, and
suddently win, you suddently have this "team spirit" feeling. That is
what have been developing duirng 10 years of independence:
- social cohesion
- personal pride and satisfaction
- hope that we are on the right track
- personal participation in open economy
But how would this cause a revolution? What were the 2 forces that
clashed in ukraine, if nationalism was not a force to talk about?
Why east agains west?
This question is surprizingly easy to answer, if we just _try_ to
look at other factors except language. What else differentiates this
areas? Once put this way, answer becomes obvious. It is the
type of industry. One one side (mostly east) industrial areas, "one
factory towns" where life was going the old socialist way where workers
were getting wages, everybody had fixed income and little has change
economicaly since communists fall (except the single monopolist owner -
state, was changed to single monopolist owner-person).
On other side areas with agricultural and diversified economy which
has benefited most from decentralization and was consistently showing
doubling of their contribution to GDP every year since 2000. This
includes western and central ukraine. The patern of Janukovich vs
Yushenko vote almost exactly coinsides with the pattern of industrial
(e.g centralized) economy vs consumer oriented (e.g. free, open) economy.
Most striking proof that the true separation is economical and not
language based is that Kiev (that is predominantly russian speaking)
has voted (totaly against the "nationalist" theory) 77% for Yushenko,
while Krivoj Rog (purely ukrainian speaking) voted disproportionaly
for Janukovich. Why this both _deviations_? Because Kiev has
decentralized economy, and Krivoj Rog is an industrial city!
So what were than the force that were fighting to decide the
fate of Ukraine? It is in fact two types of state - one with
closed to the world centralized and highly structured economy
(soviet type) vs an open to the world exploding self-organizing
free economy, which is perfectly represented by Yushenko being
a world recognized banker. This is the secret while he succeded
where nationalists miserably failed. He was representing the
new type of state (regardless of language), and that is what
found resonance with people in eastern and central Ukraine
who had a chance to get a taste of the economical freedom
and wanted more!
Strange that this obvious key issue (btw often repeated by
Yushenko himself) was overlooked by both western and local
observers. They were trying to jump onto convenient natioinalist
horse, while forgeting that the only thing that actually _needed_
a revolution in post-soviet space was social and economical
personal conciosness. And when that actually happened, suddently
everybody went blind and refuses to see the most obvious thing.
Regards,
Evgenij
Trident
> Trident wrote:
> > The best analysis of what traspired and why that I've seen to date.
> >
> > Trident
> >
> > ************************************************************************
> > March 9, 2005
> >
> > Dominique Arel
> > Chair of Ukrainian Studies
> > University of Ottawa
>
> Despite the lengly and seemingly knowledgeable article, the guy
> completely misses the point on the origins and driving force of Orange
> revolution. His conclusion is it is nationalism (even if he does not
> mean it negatively). Regardless of the accent he puts on it, it is just
> a mistaken judgenent.
> Ukrainian nationalism was always a fringe activity of very few elite
> individuals, who have been hanging out around independence square for
> last 10 years. It started with Ruh, and people who used to be in Ruh
> obviously joined Orange revolution (just as they would have joined any
> other political upheaval just for the fun of it). But Ruh had never any
> preyer in terms of wining any election. Its "success" was always in
> single % digits (as it was in all parlamentary and presidential
> elections). Chornovil (leader of ukrainian nationalists Ruh) has got
> something like 7% vote in presidential elections. More radical
> nationalists such as UNA-UNCO never even got a single candidate in
> parlament.
You are still thinking of nationalizm in the old traditional sense.
The author was describing nationalizm as civic nationalism, or
national self awareness. You cannot argue that generally speaking,
Ukrainians in the Yanukowych strongholds are primarily backwards when
it comes to national self-awareness. They are very insecure in
understanding who they are as a people, hense see themselves in a
maloross prism - and have a psychological need to clutch on to
Russia's apron strings.
Trident
Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj
>
> Arel was putting out his list at warp speed all through the time the
> events were taking place. I found it very useful.
>
> I would put a question to him, however: what about all those stories
> of Russian troops in Kiev and environs? Where have the stories gone
> now?
Well I expect that the stories are still where they were published.
I strongly doubt that anyone has atempted to go back and erase them.
After all this is not Soviet Russia and especially not Communist
of the Stalinist era.
Otherwiase, any troops that might have been there, would, are,
surely gone now, back whence they came.
Anybody who might propose that they are still there, hiding
in the woods, must surely be very paranoid.
--
Rostyk
daniloff
"Trident" <wyn...@idirect.com> wrote in message
news:8b72a662.05031...@posting.google.com...
> Evgenij Barsukov <evgenij_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:<d0q9an$61a$1...@home.itg.ti.com>...
>> Trident wrote:
>> > The best analysis of what traspired and why that I've seen to
date.
>> >
>> > Trident
>> >
>> >
************************************************************************
>> > March 9, 2005
>> >
>> > Dominique Arel
>> > Chair of Ukrainian Studies
>> > University of Ottawa
> You are still thinking of nationalizm in the old traditional sense.
> The author was describing nationalizm as civic nationalism, or
> national self awareness. You cannot argue that generally speaking,
> Ukrainians in the Yanukowych strongholds are primarily backwards when
> it comes to national self-awareness. They are very insecure in
> understanding who they are as a people, hense see themselves in a
> maloross prism - and have a psychological need to clutch on to
> Russia's apron strings.
You and author of the article are quite right, East Ukraine havs a
psychological need to clutch on to Russia's apron strings, so as West
Ukrainians have need to clutch on to West ones. It s not split of
industrial and agicuturial, but it is split of west and east slavonic
ethnos. When after some years everybody will understand promises of
Yushchenko to build ukrainian economy into west one are unrealizable,
this split will be greater.
daniloff
> Trident
<snip>
Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj
Well I'm sure that positive steps can and will be taken to help
these areas grow out of this infantile condition.
> so as West
> Ukrainians have need to clutch on to West ones.
Here as well that tendency needs to be changed. Hopefully the west
will offer its hand instead of the apron strings.
> It s not split of
> industrial and agicuturial, but it is split of west and east slavonic
> ethnos. When after some years everybody will understand
> promises of
> Yushchenko to build ukrainian economy into west one are unrealizable,
And why do you believe that, Mr. Daniloff?
And what will be your contribution towards the realization of your
predictions and hopes? :(
> this split will be greater.
Anyway if the split depends on Yushchenkos success in the economic
field, then it isn't anykind of an ethnos split, but is an economic
split.
You contradict your own arguements.
>
> daniloff
>
>
>>Trident
>
> <snip>
>
MirTopolskiRexPrez
Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj
> http://www.rbcdaily.ru/index2.shtml
Maybe that's an old headline that you are refering to.
In todays issue the top story is a film review for the
about to be released Sidorow film "Boy s tenu" =
"Battling the shadow" or "A battle with shadows"
or "shadow boxing" , however they decide to tanslate
the title.
But in the sidebar links there are two that might be
of interest: one is to an article " Russia is dying out
what should be done" the second is to a related topic
"Russian women have no desire for men" :) :-D
http://daily.rbc.ru/mainthemes/index.shtml?2004/11/16/30673
Down near the bottom of the page is a link to
"It's time for Putin to finish with <orange games>"
A hostile article in which it is suggested that russia
should renounce the agrements on the territorial
integrity of Ukraine.
But nothing anywhere about why they think the
Orange revolution happened.
--
Rostyk
MirTopolskiRexPrez
> MirTopolskiRexPrez wrote:
>> http://www.rbcdaily.ru/index2.shtml
> Maybe that's an old headline that you are refering to.
Yes, shit happens.
http://www.rbcdaily.ru/news/policy/index.shtml?2005/03/16/200392
Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj
> Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj wrote:
>
>> MirTopolskiRexPrez wrote:
>>
>>> http://www.rbcdaily.ru/index2.shtml
>>
>> Maybe that's an old headline that you are refering to.
>>
>>In todays issue the top story is a film review for the
>>about to be released Sidorow film "Boy s tenu" =
>>"Battling the shadow" or "A battle with shadows"
>>or "shadow boxing" , however they decide to tanslate
>>the title.
>>
>>But in the sidebar links there are two that might be
>>of interest: one is to an article " Russia is dying out
>>what should be done" the second is to a related topic
>>"Russian women have no desire for men"
>> http://daily.rbc.ru/mainthemes/index.shtml?2004/11/16/30673
>>
>>Down near the bottom of the page is a link to
>>"It's time for Putin to finish with <orange games>"
>>A hostile article in which it is suggested that russia
>>should renounce the agrements on the territorial
>>integrity of Ukraine.
>>
>>But nothing anywhere about why they think the
>>Orange revolution happened.
>
> Yes, shit happens.
> http://www.rbcdaily.ru/news/policy/index.shtml?2005/03/16/200392
Yes Mr. Topolski. It does. :)
Even in the best of families.
But the article is about the mysterious deaths in Ukraine and
specifically focuses on the death of David Nicolass (sp?)
So although it is connected with Orange Revolution events it
does not discuss anything to do with the reasons for the
Orange Rvolution.
--
Rostyk
MirTopolskiRexPrez
> MirTopolskiRexPrez wrote:
>> Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj wrote:
>>> MirTopolskiRexPrez wrote:
>>>> http://www.rbcdaily.ru/index2.shtml
>>> Maybe that's an old headline that you are refering to.
>> http://www.rbcdaily.ru/news/policy/index.shtml?2005/03/16/200392
> Yes Mr. Topolski. It does. :)
> Even in the best of families.
> But the article is about the mysterious deaths in Ukraine and
> specifically focuses on the death of David Nicolass (sp?)
> So although it is connected with Orange Revolution events it
> does not discuss anything to do with the reasons for the
> Orange Rvolution.
=-o The "why" is trivial. The consequences are less.
brody
> MirTopolskiRexPrez wrote:
>
>> http://www.rbcdaily.ru/index2.shtml
>
>
> Maybe that's an old headline that you are refering to.
>
> In todays issue the top story is a film review for the
> about to be released Sidorow film "Boy s tenu" =
> "Battling the shadow" or "A battle with shadows"
> or "shadow boxing" , however they decide to tanslate
> the title.
>
> But in the sidebar links there are two that might be
> of interest: one is to an article " Russia is dying out
> what should be done" the second is to a related topic
> "Russian women have no desire for men" :) :-D
does it specify no desire for all men ? or just russian men ?
Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj
> Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj wrote:
>
>> MirTopolskiRexPrez wrote:
>>
>>> http://www.rbcdaily.ru/index2.shtml
>>
>>
>>
>> Maybe that's an old headline that you are refering to.
>>
>> In todays issue the top story is a film review for the
>> about to be released Sidorow film "Boy s tenu" =
>> "Battling the shadow" or "A battle with shadows"
>> or "shadow boxing" , however they decide to tanslate
>> the title.
>>
>> But in the sidebar links there are two that might be
>> of interest: one is to an article " Russia is dying out
>> what should be done" the second is to a related topic
>> "Russian women have no desire for men" :) :-D
>
>
> does it specify no desire for all men ? or just russian men ?
>
What's the matter, can't you load the page, and follow the links.
Or is it a language problem? If you read Ukrainian, you'll be
able to struggle through with the russian. It's not really an
article, but a newgroup type of discussion thread. And like
most such discussions it branches.
daniloff
"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" <urj...@bellsouth.net>
сообщил/сообщила в новостях следующее:
news:i7lZd.28559$Q83....@bignews5.bellsouth.net...
<snip>
> Well I'm sure that positive steps can and will be taken to help
> these areas grow out of this infantile condition.
>
I do not think they are apron strings indeed. It is east or west world
every part of Ukraine people attribute themselves to, like Taras and
Ondrij Bulba did.
> > so as West
> > Ukrainians have need to clutch on to West ones.
>
> Here as well that tendency needs to be changed. Hopefully the west
> will offer its hand instead of the apron strings.
West did not anything except promises, like it did for Russia too/
>
> > It s not split of
> > industrial and agicuturial, but it is split of west and east
slavonic
> > ethnos. When after some years everybody will understand
>
> > promises of
> > Yushchenko to build ukrainian economy into west one are
unrealizable,
>
> And why do you believe that, Mr. Daniloff?
> And what will be your contribution towards the realization of your
> predictions and hopes? :(
Yushchenko have lowered or repealed at all import duties for West
goods. I believe it is repayment of his debts to West for his
supporting. It signify death for Ukrainian industry. West do not need
Ukraine as strong industial country, but market for their goods' sale
only. The further, all will be worse. West need not concurrent.
>
> > this split will be greater.
>
> Anyway if the split depends on Yushchenkos success in the economic
> field, then it isn't anykind of an ethnos split, but is an economic
> split.
> You contradict your own arguements.
It did not contradicts because I think it will be worse situation in
economy in Ukraine and every irreconcilable part of Ukrainian people
will bame another part for this change for the worse.
daniloff
Captain!
"brody" <jbr...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:6j3_d.699404$Xk.183710@pd7tw3no...
> Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj wrote:
>> MirTopolskiRexPrez wrote:
>>
>>> http://www.rbcdaily.ru/index2.shtml
>>
>>
>> Maybe that's an old headline that you are refering to.
>>
>> In todays issue the top story is a film review for the
>> about to be released Sidorow film "Boy s tenu" =
>> "Battling the shadow" or "A battle with shadows"
>> or "shadow boxing" , however they decide to tanslate
>> the title.
>>
>> But in the sidebar links there are two that might be
>> of interest: one is to an article " Russia is dying out
>> what should be done" the second is to a related topic
>> "Russian women have no desire for men" :) :-D
>
> does it specify no desire for all men ? or just russian men ?
>
you're in luck brody, they'll even accept you!
Trident
>
> I do not think they are apron strings indeed. It is east or west world
> every part of Ukraine people attribute themselves to, like Taras and
> Ondrij Bulba did.
Only the eastern half had to endure centuries of heavy handed
Russification, famine, firing squads, the result of which was
effectively a cultural lobotomy on the population.
> > > so as West
> > > Ukrainians have need to clutch on to West ones.
Not true. Western Ukrainians have no desire or admiration for all
things Polish.
> >
> > Here as well that tendency needs to be changed. Hopefully the west
> > will offer its hand instead of the apron strings.
>
> West did not anything except promises, like it did for Russia too/
>
Please note that it is quite easy to blame the west for the Yeltsin
years. It absolves Russians of any responsibility for their own
corruption.
> >
> > > It s not split of
> > > industrial and agicuturial, but it is split of west and east
> slavonic
> > > ethnos. When after some years everybody will understand
> >
> > > promises of
> > > Yushchenko to build ukrainian economy into west one are
> unrealizable,
> >
> > And why do you believe that, Mr. Daniloff?
> > And what will be your contribution towards the realization of your
> > predictions and hopes? :(
>
> Yushchenko have lowered or repealed at all import duties for West
> goods. I believe it is repayment of his debts to West for his
> supporting. It signify death for Ukrainian industry. West do not need
> Ukraine as strong industial country, but market for their goods' sale
> only. The further, all will be worse. West need not concurrent.
>
Ukrainian industry is not unlike the US auto industry of the 1970s -
which successfully lobbied for high import duties as a way to continue
their monopoly and inefficient productions. But just like the US auto
industry of the 1970s, the outcome of all this is sub-standard
products for consumers. Competition in the market place is a good
thing - not a bad thing. It forces innovation, better goods and more
variety. The soviet economic model is dead. Ukraine must move on and
build a competative and open market with Europe.
> >
> > > this split will be greater.
> >
> > Anyway if the split depends on Yushchenkos success in the economic
> > field, then it isn't anykind of an ethnos split, but is an economic
> > split.
> > You contradict your own arguements.
>
> It did not contradicts because I think it will be worse situation in
> economy in Ukraine and every irreconcilable part of Ukrainian people
> will bame another part for this change for the worse.
>
> daniloff
I think the amount of investment in Ukraine in the coming months and
years will vastly outweigh what has transpired in the past 10 years -
if Yushchenko makes the system transparent and accountable. Don't you
find it funny that only Russian businesses seemed willing to operate
in corrupt Ukraine? Most western businesses viewed it as a major
constraint. Not Russia though (what does that tell you).
Trident
cherni...@hotmail.com
Trident wrote:
> "daniloff" <mdan...@newmail.ru> wrote in message
news:<1111085342.0...@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com>...
> >
> > Yushchenko have lowered or repealed at all import duties for West
> > goods. I believe it is repayment of his debts to West for his
> > supporting. It signify death for Ukrainian industry. West do not
need
> > Ukraine as strong industial country, but market for their goods'
sale
> > only. The further, all will be worse. West need not concurrent.
> >
> Ukrainian industry is not unlike the US auto industry of the 1970s -
> which successfully lobbied for high import duties as a way to
continue
> their monopoly and inefficient productions. But just like the US
auto
> industry of the 1970s, the outcome of all this is sub-standard
> products for consumers. Competition in the market place is a good
> thing - not a bad thing. It forces innovation, better goods and more
> variety. The soviet economic model is dead. Ukraine must move on
and
> build a competative and open market with Europe.
But pure competition is not good either. Sometimes a little
protectionism is a good thing. Compare the auto industries of
open-market Poland, Czech republic etc. versus more protectionist
Russia. In Poland it disappeared - the Polonaise company was bought
out by Dae Woo, who then experienced financial problems and never
reopened. Skoda has become a part of Volkswagon. These countries no
longer have native auto industries. Russia, in contrast, does. It's
native-owned auto companies sell something like 800,000 cars per year.
With the buffer of protectionsism, they have been able to survive and
to improve from the level of terrible to that of merely rather bad (the
newest Ladas are comparable to bad Korean cars); otherwise they would
be nonexistent.
Or look at Lviv's electronics industry. Lviv was the one of the USSR's
high tech centers (Soviet televisions among other things were
designed/produced there). When Ukraine was flooded by western or
Chinese electronics that industry simply collapsed. So now these
electrical engineers, as skilled as any in the West, are reduced to
looking for construction jobs in Russia or Poland or hoping for some
scraps of outsourcers.
Wouldn't it have been better to protect the local industry, to force
some kind of foreign partnership or give it a chance to catch up,
rather than throwing it to the wolves? This is btw what the Chinese
have done.
(having said that I admit I'm not familiar with Yushchenko's plans: he
isn't just opening up the economy completely, is he?)
regards,
BM
daniloff
"Trident" <wyn...@idirect.com> сообщил/сообщила в
новостях следующее:
news:8b72a662.05031...@posting.google.com...
<snip>
> Only the eastern half had to endure centuries of heavy handed
> Russification, famine, firing squads, the result of which was
> effectively a cultural lobotomy on the population.
This "lobotomy" was done by Pereyalsavl's treaty. Ukraine made a free
choice. She tried Rzech Pospolita and Ottoman Empire, she decided to be
in Russian Empire. It was a free choice. Naturaly russification,
famine, firing squads was consequence of this choice, she shared
Russian destiny. Ucraine might decide to be part of Poland or Turkey
nothing else. This time she cannot be independent.
>
> > > > so as West
> > > > Ukrainians have need to clutch on to West ones.
>
> Not true. Western Ukrainians have no desire or admiration for all
> things Polish.
Galicia as part of Poland was part of Dual Monarchy Empire, so they are
near one to another then to Russia.
> > >
> > > Here as well that tendency needs to be changed. Hopefully the
west
> > > will offer its hand instead of the apron strings.
> >
> > West did not anything except promises, like it did for Russia too/
> >
> Please note that it is quite easy to blame the west for the Yeltsin
> years. It absolves Russians of any responsibility for their own
> corruption.
I do not disclaim guilt of Russian thieves, but it was deal between
West an our thieves. So they respond equally.
<snip>
> Ukrainian industry is not unlike the US auto industry of the 1970s -
> which successfully lobbied for high import duties as a way to
continue
> their monopoly and inefficient productions. But just like the US
auto
> industry of the 1970s, the outcome of all this is sub-standard
> products for consumers. Competition in the market place is a good
> thing - not a bad thing. It forces innovation, better goods and more
> variety. The soviet economic model is dead. Ukraine must move on
and
> build a competative and open market with Europe.
>
This competition is like a battle between person armed to the teeth and
naked one. Competition is good thing when compete equale adversaries.
The soviet economic is dead not yet. Extraordinary monopolization and
division of labour of one great soviet factory still exists in post
Soviet countries. Who will pay for necessary structural rebuilding of
economy in Ukraine? West? Germany cannot rebuild economy of East
Germany still and you hope she will pay for Ukraine.
<snip>
> I think the amount of investment in Ukraine in the coming months and
> years will vastly outweigh what has transpired in the past 10 years -
> if Yushchenko makes the system transparent and accountable. Don't
you
> find it funny that only Russian businesses seemed willing to operate
> in corrupt Ukraine? Most western businesses viewed it as a major
> constraint. Not Russia though (what does that tell you).
Yes, due to some estimation 60% of all investments are Russian's. It is
not strange for you totalitarian China is more sweety for West
investors then both democratic Ukraine and Russia? Is China more
transparent and accountable or less corrupt? It is better to build
fascist state in Ukraine without any corruption and excellent
accountability then?
>
> Trident
Trident
I don't disagree - some protectionism is necessary in situations of
unfair competetive advantage. It is all a question of scale. In
Ukraine, the protectionism was at absurd levels designed to make the
oligarchs rich.
Here is an interesting recent article on the subject that appeared on
Maidan:
Ukrainian leaders are still stuck in the old Soviet mindset about
manufacturing
Sat, 2005-03-19 16:20.
Op-Ed-
Ukrainian leaders are still stuck in the old Soviet mindset about
manufacturing
In a story published on the Za Donbass.org web site, (see
http://zadonbass.org/en/news/message.html?id=10706 ) Alexander Moroz,
the leader of Socialist Party in Ukraine, thinks that Ukraine is not
ready to enter the World Trade Organization, (WTO). " Moroz, who was
speaking to a group of business owners in Poltava noted, "it is not
profitable for Ukraine to enter WTO on terms, which are proposed now,
because protection of Ukrainian manufacturers is not guaranteed."
Well someone here definitely needs a lesson in free market economics.
The only place that protection for manufacturers was fully guaranteed
was under the old Soviet Union. In the good old days, the State told
you where to buy your raw materials, what and how much of it to
produce and who to sell it to – back to the State. We all know what
happened to that centralized planning system. It just doesn't work.
The only way that Ukrainian manufacturers can assure themselves of
survival, growth and prosperity in the real world is to follow the
same rules that any other serious business abides by. There are no
guarantees in business life. And at some point and level, all
businesses must innovate, to stay competitive in a global marketplace.
Unfortunately in Ukraine today, many manufacturers find it easier and
more profitable to be world leaders in producing knockoffs -from
Pierre Cardin shirts to pharmaceuticals. Every university student in
Lviv will tell you which shops to visit on vul. Ivana Franka, if you
want to purchase any software on the market today – all for the
pirated price of only 15 hryvnias. The same goes for a huge open air
bazaar in Kyiv, Petrivka, which stretches as far as the eye can see.
If Ukraine doesn't curb this illegal trade, the powerful Hollywood
motion picture and US software industry lobbies, will continue to
block Ukraine's entry into the WTO. If Ukraine wants to be a world
player, Ukrainian consumers will have to settle for world prices for
real good, not copies and fakes – a tough decision for many.
Ukrainian researchers and academics continuously complain that the
popularity of home-grown product and process innovations is
practically nil among local manufacturers. Producers in Ukraine -the
legitimate ones at least, argue that any free capital they have, that
could be invested in production or plant upgrades is instead spent on
bribes to unscrupulous tax inspectors, police and customs inspectors.
Corruption feeds this vicious never-ending circle.
This cycle must be broken at every link.
Ukraine trumpets its ambitions to join the European Union and enter
the WTO. The question that few politicians follow up with is: "with
what?"
Ask any person on the streets of Copenhagen, Frankfurt or Amsterdam-
"What's Ukraine known for today?". He or she will likely repeat what
they've read in European newspapers. That Ukraine is a world leader in
exporting illegal weapons, exporting trans-shipped narcotics, knockoff
CDs and videos, and worst of all, the global trafficking of women and
children. Yes, Ukraine needs tourism but not necessarily sex tourism.
I wouldn't want Kyiv to become the global sex capital that Berlin was
in the 1920 and 1930's
Will the Ukrainian market be able to produce the innovative product
and services demanded by the Europe Union and the rest of the world?
Japan and Korea did it several decades ago, reversing their once
popular image of "junk-producers" to one of high quality consumer
product producers.
Europe is quickly weaning itself from Russian oil and gas dependency,
ambitiously looking at alternate energy sources. Germany for example,
is a global leader in adopting wind-generated energy production and
co-generation capacity. Ukraine, on the other hand, isn't looking
forward into the future, but is still stuck in the old Soviet mind-set
of "let's build more mega-project pipelines for oil and gas, a
resource that Russia may be running out of in the coming decades.
Ukraine has no national or regional policy regarding innovation, or
innovation capacity building to speak of. The state budget for higher
education and producing qualified scientists is decidedly inadequate.
The Ukrainian government must expeditiously address these innovation
issues if they want to avoid a long, frustrating road toward the WTO
and the open global market.
Wolodymyr Derzko is a Toronto-based business development consultant,
who has been working with Canadian firms and Ukrainian scientists for
a number of years.
Op-Ed which appeared in The New Pathway Ukrainian Weekly; Thursday Feb
24, 2005, Vol 76 (7)
Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj
> "Trident" <wyn...@idirect.com> сообщил/сообщила в
> новостях следующее:
> news:8b72a662.05031...@posting.google.com...
> <snip>
>
>>Only the eastern half had to endure centuries of heavy handed
>>Russification, famine, firing squads, the result of which was
>>effectively a cultural lobotomy on the population.
>
>
> This "lobotomy" was done by Pereyalsavl's treaty. Ukraine made a free
> choice. She tried Rzech Pospolita and Ottoman Empire, she decided to be
> in Russian Empire. It was a free choice. Naturaly russification,
> famine, firing squads was consequence of this choice, she shared
> Russian destiny. Ucraine might decide to be part of Poland or Turkey
> nothing else. This time she cannot be independent.
>
"This time she cannot be independent."
And why can't Ukraine be independant?
Also the treaty of Pereyaslav was a treaty of military alliance
and not one of submission to the Russian empire. Russia turned
it into subjugation. Ie. they broke and subverted the terms
of the treaty. By the times of Mazepa, it had turned into an
outright conquest by the Russian empire.
>
>>>>>so as West Ukrainians have need to clutch on to West ones.
>>
>>Not true. Western Ukrainians have no desire or admiration for all
>>things Polish.
>
>
> Galicia as part of Poland was part of Dual Monarchy Empire, so they are
> near one to another then to Russia.
>
Halychyna as well as Poland were a part of the Austro Hungarian empire.
daniloff
"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" <urj...@bellsouth.net>
сообщил/сообщила в новостях следующее:
news:wB%_d.56057$%Y4....@bignews6.bellsouth.net...
<snip>
>
> "This time she cannot be independent."
> And why can't Ukraine be independant?
It was my language fault. It should be at that time she could not be
independent
>
> Also the treaty of Pereyaslav was a treaty of military alliance
> and not one of submission to the Russian empire. Russia turned
> it into subjugation. Ie. they broke and subverted the terms
> of the treaty. By the times of Mazepa, it had turned into an
> outright conquest by the Russian empire.
>
At 1654 Cossacks had sworn allegiance to Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich.
Later at 1654 Yriy Chmelnicky had signed new treaty according to wich
Hetman had not right of independent foreign policy. He cannot
independently designate and displace general starshina and polkovniks.
Cossacks had not right to elect Hetman without Tsar's assent.
http://www.litopys.org.ua/vzaimo/vz05.htm
http://www.russia.org.ua/explorations/350-pereyaslav-rada/
Переяславский договор 1659 года в новой
редакции лишал гетмана права на
ведение самостоятельной внешней
политики. Он больше не мог
самостоятельно назначать и устранять
генеральную старшину и полковников.
Казаки лишались права переизбирать
гетмана без согласия царя.
<snip>
> > Galicia as part of Poland was part of Dual Monarchy Empire, so they
are
> > near one to another then to Russia.
> >
> Halychyna as well as Poland were a part of the Austro Hungarian
empire.
Is Dual Monarchy not another name of Austro Hungarian Monarchy?
daniloff
cherni...@hotmail.com
daniloff wrote:
...cut...
> At 1654 Cossacks had sworn allegiance to Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich.
> Later at 1654 Yriy Chmelnicky had signed new treaty according to wich
> Hetman had not right of independent foreign policy. He cannot
> independently designate and displace general starshina and
polkovniks.
> Cossacks had not right to elect Hetman without Tsar's assent.
>
> http://www.litopys.org.ua/vzaimo/vz05.htm
>
> http://www.russia.org.ua/explorations/350-pereyaslav-rada/
> Переяславский договор 1659 года в новой
> редакции лишал гетмана права на
> ведение самостоятельной внешней
> политики. Он больше не мог
> самостоятельно назначать и устранять
> генеральную старшину и полковников.
> Казаки лишались права переизбирать
> гетмана без согласия царя.
The problem was the Ukrainians approached Pereyaslav with a European
viewpoint and the Russians with an Asian one. The two did not
understand each other:
O. Subtelny, from a work published by
Harvard:
" During the Tsar's war against Sweden, unprecedented demands were
made of the Cossacks. Rather fight Ottomans or Tatars, close to home,
they were sent off against modern Swedish armies in Livonia, central
Poland and Lithuania. Often they were placed under Russian command
and used as mere cannon fodder. Casualty rates of 50% -70% were
reported among returning units. And the same time, in Ukraine,
grievence after grievence was reported to the Hetman about the
behavior of Muscovite troops and officials. Finally, in the Swedes'
Polish ally Stanislaw Leszczynski threatened to invade Ukraine and
Mazepa turned to Peter I for help the tsar, who was gathering his own
forces for an expected Swedish invasion, replied: "I cannot even spare
10 men; defend yourself as best you can." This was the final straw;
when Peter broke his commitment to defend Ukraine from the hated Poles
- a guarantee that constituted the very basis of the 1654 Pereyaslav
treaty - Mazepa felt under no more obligation to remain loyal to him.
Mazepa's line of argument is striking in how often certain phases and
ideas are repeated and stressed: rights and privileges; overlordship
freely chosen and open to recall; and protection, always the issue of
protection. For anyone with an acquaintance with medieval political
theory, these concepts strike a familiar note. They are components of
the contractual principle, European feudalism's most common regulator
of the political relations between sovereigns and regional elites.
The contractual obligation was an act of mutual obligation. The
vassal promised his lord obedience, service, and loyalty in return for
the latter's protection and respect for the vassal's privileges and
the traditions of his land. If the vassal had good reason to believe
that his lord was breaking his obligations, he had the right - the
famous ius resistendi - to rise against him to protect his interests.
Thus, in theory, the lord as well as the vassal could be guilty of
disloyalty. The German Schwabenspiegel, one of the primary sources
for customary law in east central Europe, provided a concise summary
of the principle: "We should serve our sovereigns because they protect
us, but if they will no longer defend us, then we owe them no more
service". Mazepa's position could not have been stated more
succinctly.
----------------
regards,
BM
daniloff
<cherni...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
<snip>
> The problem was the Ukrainians approached Pereyaslav with a European
> viewpoint and the Russians with an Asian one. The two did not
> understand each other:
<snip>
>
> The contractual obligation was an act of mutual obligation. The
> vassal promised his lord obedience, service, and loyalty in return
for
> the latter's protection and respect for the vassal's privileges and
> the traditions of his land. If the vassal had good reason to believe
> that his lord was breaking his obligations, he had the right - the
> famous ius resistendi - to rise against him to protect his interests.
> Thus, in theory, the lord as well as the vassal could be guilty of
> disloyalty. The German Schwabenspiegel, one of the primary sources
> for customary law in east central Europe, provided a concise summary
> of the principle: "We should serve our sovereigns because they
protect
> us, but if they will no longer defend us, then we owe them no more
> service". Mazepa's position could not have been stated more
> succinctly.
I wouldn't idealize European style to such a degree.
Janusz Radziwill was in besieged by the loyal Commonwealth forces for
betrayal of Rzeczy Pospolitej at times of Chmelnicky and Mazepa. Was he
European model Russian Tsars had follow?
There are a lot of example of betrayal in Europe.
Charles I was betrayed by Scotts and was punished for high treason.
Jacob II Scottish had foully killed his vassal earl Duglas.. Etc.
In Europe vassal - sovereign heory was very frequently separate from
practice as in East too because of state or private interests of
suzerains or vassals.
daniloff
Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj
the treaty?
Do they make it right?
daniloff
"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" <urj...@bellsouth.net> wrote in message
news:RNG%d.50298$Q83....@bignews5.bellsouth.net...
<snip>
>> I wouldn't idealize European style to such a degree.
>> Janusz Radziwill was in besieged by the loyal Commonwealth forces
for
>> betrayal of Rzeczy Pospolitej at times of Chmelnicky and Mazepa. Was
he
>> European model Russian Tsars had follow?
>> There are a lot of example of betrayal in Europe.
>> Charles I was betrayed by Scotts and was punished for high treason.
>> Jacob II Scottish had foully killed his vassal earl Duglas.. Etc.
>> In Europe vassal - sovereign heory was very frequently separate from
>> practice as in East too because of state or private interests of
>> suzerains or vassals.
>>
>> daniloff
>>
> So do other betrayals exonerate russians betrayal? and violation of
> the treaty?
> Do they make it right?
http://litopys.narod.ru/coss4/mazk11.htm
Нордберґ згадує, що "Іван Мазепа,
гетьман або вождь козаків на Україні",
післав до польського короля
Станислава Лещинського свого емісара
з пропозицією перейти на його сторону,
"якщо він дістане підтримку й поміч від
шведського короля. Шість чи сім тисяч
москвинів, які знаходяться в околиці
його постою, він легко зліквідує і тим
способом покладе поміст для шведів. "
"Мазепа запропонував свої послуги в
боротьбі проти царя. Щоправда, король
зігнорував цю оферту, почасти тому, щоб
йому не закидували таємні зговорення,
*а особливо тому, що він не мав довір’я
покладатися на такий нарід, що покидає
союзників у критичному стані.*"
There was not any Tsars' betrayal and violation of the treaty. There
was vassal's betrayal only. And he had to be punished for high
treason, so as Radziwill was. Nothing else.
daniloff