about Ukrainian history

[Oleg Smirnov]

Putin has written an article.
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> EN
<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> RU

Besides the current transient issues, it's useful because it inter alia
includes a brief review of the Ukraine's history since ancient time to the
modern post-Soviet period. It's not a Putin's "original research", of
course, it's based on the set of notable and basic facts commonly known in
Russia and near Russia. It's compact and pretty accurate.

So it's recommended for reading to any interested one.

Ukrainian Kiev-controlled outlets have issued numerous responses (they are
very attentive to what is said in Russia). I have scanned them and haven't
found someone who disputed the facts. Those who pusrue anti-Russia agenda,
mostly issued claims like "it's all is more propaganda and disinformation",
some issued acrimonies, but no one dared to refute specifically (like
"this claim is wrong" or "this is a misinterpretation"), which means they
have nothing but empty obstructionist noise against the facts.

* * *

After the anti-constitutional and anti-democratic coup in 2014, the neo-
Ukrainanin nationalists together with their foreign supporters were
desperate to falsify the Ukraine's history, and some drivelous claims were
added to the Wikipedia and elsewhere. Popular sources like the Wikipedia
cannot be considered reliable nowadays when it comes to politicaly charged
"hot" issies. They said recently that it has become "a big nasty complex
game" <https://bit.ly/2US6KWI>.

* * *

The below are some considerations from myself.

After the 13th century Mongol invasion, the north-eastern part of Russia
fell into a vassalage to the Golden Horde, and the rest soon shifted under
direct Polish rule. Later, while 'Moskovia' increasingly freed itself from
the dependence, the very opposite process took place for the Poland's
Russians. When the Moscow-led state became recognizable and strong, the
Poland's Russians were a distinguishable group within the Polish state,
but in no way a state. Since the 15th century, foreigners applied the term
'Russia' mainly to the Moscow state, - because it was commonly seen as the
contemporary continuation of Russia.

Besides, there was also a discernment between "big" or "great" Russia (the
Moscow-Novgorod state) and "little" or "minor" Russia (the Poland's area).
These "big" and "little" terms were invented not by the Muscovites but by
the Byzantine Orthodox church, which at the time patronized the both
"great" and "minor" Russias. The Russian Russia was called 'great' not
just because of its political significance, but also because it was much
larger in size <https://bit.ly/3euSrOX>. The nothern part of Russia hadn't
been ravaged by the nomadic looters, and the Russian expansion north and
and north-east continued even during the "Mongol Yoke" period.

Oppressive colonial policies toward the Russians in Poland led to a series
of uprisings since the late 16th century, until one of them (which
happened even without any support from Moscow) turned out successful, and
thus, in the 1650s, a large part of the Poland's Russian area had switched
to Russia. The increased pressure against the 'minor' Russians in Poland
happened not for no reason, it was correlated with the internal weakening
of Russia, which led it to the Time of Troubles since the late 16th
century. The Time of Troubles, the events within Poland, and then the
Russian recovery from the Time of Troubles and the start of transition of
"minor Russia" into Russia from Poland was, overally, one complex trend of
the regional development.

The term "Ukraine" literally meant "borderland", - it was originally used
in this literal sense, but after adding the part of the Poland's Russian
area to Russia, the actual borderland shifted westward, so the term was
expanded to the whole new area. I.e. the area between the previous literal
borderland and the new literal borderland started to be called Borderland
(the Ukraine) in more figurative sense, and thus it had become a proper
noun. The size of this area in the 17th century was much smaller than the
present day Ukraine. Later, most of the rest of the Poland's Russian area
was retaken by Russia, so "the Ukraine" was expanded further westward.

The Poland's Russians considered themselves Russians, ie. the same people
as the Muscovites, which may be seen from many sources (various writings
and poetries left by various authors who were living within 'minor Russia'
in the 15-17th centuries). The Poles called them Russian as well. However,
until the 19th century, there was no national sentiment close to the
modern meaning. Knowledge of ancestry, religious affiliation and language
were the basis for an identity. The "minor Russians" started to better
realize some differences from the Muscovites after most part of the "minor
Russia" had been included into Russia. Colonization had left its marks.

In the 18th century, Russia shifted its "borderland" southward up to the
Black Sea through conquest of the Crimean Khanate (a formation somewhat
analogous to the Barbary Pirates in the west-European context). The new
lands (non-domesticated steppe, originally) were named Novorossiya, and
then, in the Soviet design, they were included into the Soviet Ukraine.
The present day territory of the Ukraine is a Soviet product. The Soviets
generously appended to the post-Poland area not only the Novorossiya lands
in the south, but also some non-Ukrainian lands in the east (Donbas and
more), - so, the 'true' Ukraine (the post-Poland lands) is less than half
of the post-Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainization of the whole territory happened
within the USSR.

The Soviet generosity at the time is not an exaggeratioon, it was
doctrinally motivated by the [naive] Communist expectations. They believed
that the World Communism may be achieved in quite a close future, and then
ethnicities / nations / states will simply become of little significance.
So the Soviet republics formed.

* * *

Among the present day Russians, there's a variety of Russian nationalisms
(every nationalism is linked with some common experience in the past, and
Russia had many [sharp] turns). There are different kinds of nationalism
among the Ukrainians as well. The kind driving the post-coup development
is not from the grassroots. The Ukrainians did not know much good from
their western colonizers. This post-2014-coup neo-Ukrainian nationalism is
linked with a part of their ruling class that believes it would be more
prestigious to attach the Ukraine to Europe, and alienate it from Russia.
After the 2014 coup, life of the regular people in the Ukraine turned to
the worse, but their ruling class has become closer to the West, so they
continue to indoctrinate the populace that their course is good for them.

The problem with this neo-Ukrainian kind of nationalism is that it
basically cannot be non-hostile to Russia. Every nationalism / patriotism
needs some 'anchors': its national heroes and victories, national cultural
achievents. In the case of the Ukraine, most of their decent national
heroes and victories and achievements turn to be inextricably linked with
Russia in some or another way. So the neo-patriotic ideologists, who serve
for the post-coup regime, desperately seek to find or invent something
'purely Ukrainian'. In their desperation, they pick up some ugly persons
from the past (eg. those served to the German Nazis) and misrepresent them
as heroes. They pick up some controversial and dubious 'heroes' from more
distant past too. They seek to invent fictitious history, not only through
distorted interpretation of real historical facts, but even in a frankly
blatant mythical way.

Borscht Question may serve as a comic illustration of this desperation.
Borscht is an ancient and common east-Slavic/Baltic dish, it was invented
long before apperance of the Ukraine, but they struggle fiercely to make
the world believe that borscht is solely 'ukrainian'. This is pathetic.
And the English Wikipedia article attributes it strictly to the Ukraine,
despite that at the time when borscht was invented there was neither the
Ukraine nor an idea of the Ukraine, and it's even impossible to claim it
was invented within the lands of the present day Ukraine. The only special
link between borscht and the Ukraine is that the Ukrainians love borscht
more than other peoples who also eat it. It would be similar as if tea was
attributed to Russia because the Russians love it more than other nations.

Given that the Ukrainian history is organically inseparable from Russia,
the neo-Ukrainian nationalism needs concepts that would artificially
alienate populace from Russia. For this, they have invented two narrative
lines (which don't go very well with each other). The first is that Russia
was a persistent oppressor and enemy of the Ukrainians since the very
ancient time (some feuds in the 12th century within the early Russia are
misinterpreted in this way). The second is essentially racist-like, which
suggests the Ukrainians are True Slavs whereas the Russians are "finno-
mongolic genetic rabble" (this idea was picked up from the Polish Catholic
ideologists). The both are for ignorant people, but it's enough for a part
of the populace that accepts it. Another part can't accept it, and this is
why the post-coup regime faces not just "dissidents", but the internal
insurgency. Russia cannot stay apart from these issues, so it has accepted
Crimea and won't abandon its support for the Donbas resistance.

I tend to believe the post-coup Ukraine won't last too long. It's
impossible to build something reliable and durable on the basis of hateful
and dense falsities. The fact the Western policy makers have chosen to
support the neo-Ukrainian nationalism means they've chosen enmity towards
Russia. All their righteous "democracy-values" rhetorics are undermined by
the fact they back up a baser and hateful agenda with action. I also tend
to believe that one day these folks will get what they deserve.

[Oleg Smirnov]

> some issued acrimonies, but no one dared to refute specifically (like
> "this claim is wrong" or "this is a misinterpretation"), which means they
> have nothing but empty obstructionist noise against the facts.

I've also scanned "western" responses to the Putin's essay. They are quite
many, and the whole scenery is about the same ugly. Most part of the
responses represents an attept to undermine the essay's message with noise
made up of non-specific phrasings and acrimonies. One rampant German clown
has boldly written "historians .. found scores of inconsistencies, logical
fallacies and plain fact-rigging" <https://tinyurl.com/yeamyqwj>. It would
be nice if someone pointed specifically to at least one critic who managed
to find at least one specific contradiction, logical error or "plain fact-
rigging" in the essay.

Many 'critics' abuse strawman fallacy in their responces by claiming that
Putin rejects the very idea of the Ukraine's independence and the like, -
one should read the essay theirselves to know it's not really the case.

I managed to find only one response taking the history review more or less
honestly <http://tinyurl.com/yg2z3p9j>, but the writer doesn't dispute the
history as such, only speculates on how it could be applied politically.

One pig-like freak at the Atlantic Council was so much excited that issued
two articles with a break of two days: <https://tinyurl.com/yf4v9hfy> and
<https://tinyurl.com/yjtc2yr2>. And the both are under #Disinformation tag.
Of course, there's no any specific / factual rebuttals but only high-flown
rhetorics with cliches like "myths and conspiracy theories". To compensate
for the lack of specifics in his rants, the pig fellow referred to "senior
fellow Anders Aslund" who "branded the article a masterclass in
disinformation", so the readers are supposed to believe that Aslund has
presented some arguments about what specifically dis-informative is there.

The Aslund's response is really extraordinary because this is, so far, the
only response that tries to dispute something specific about history, so I
answer some of his claims below.

| <https://tinyurl.com/dw3htsw4> project-syndicate.org
|
| Putin begins his tale in Ancient Rus, where Russians, Ukrainians, and
| Belarusians were united by one language and - after the "baptism of
| Russia" into the Orthodox religion - one faith until the fifteenth
| century. Even amid fragmentation, Putin writes, the people perceived
| Russia as their shared motherland.

The Aslund's first lie is that he points to the Russians, Ukrainians, and
Belarusians in the context of Ancient Rus. At the time, the Ukrainians or
the Belarusians simply did not exist, were not known, such names did not
exist, the areas of the present day Ukraine or Belarus were not somehow
"delineated" or "singled out" from the rest of then early Russia. Compare
it with what Putin wrote and feel the difference: "Russians, Ukrainians,
and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus".

"Fragmentation" of the early Russia (due to sharing of inheritance between
sons of one ruling dynasty) happened mainly since the 12th century. Indeed
it was perceived at the time like 'brotherly' feuds within a family, - in
contrast to attitudes towards 'non-Russian' neighbors. Old chronicles and
Russian/Belarusian/Ukrainian folklore clearly testify to this.

About "the Orthodox religion .. until the fifteenth century", - it was a
part of the Poland's oppression against 'minor' Russians since the 15th
century when it started pressuring them to convert to the Catholicism.

| According to this (OS: Which?) narrative, the Polish-Russian War of
| 1605-18 was, for the people, "liberating." Ukrainians were "reunited"
| with the rest of the Russian Orthodox people, forming "little Russia,"

Here is the Aslund's greater lie where he sarcastically claims that Russia
took the Ukrainians forcibly from Poland, - as a result of "Polish-Russian
War of 1605-18" (while blatant Putin seeks to claim it was 'liberation').

The passage is utterly ridiculous and reveals the Aslund's utter ignorance
about the history, which is proportional to his unhealthy self-conceit.
One should better learn about the Polish participation in the Russian Time
of Troubles. The Polish-Russian War of 1605-18 ended with defeat of Russia,
and Russia had lost quite large territories to Poland.

The "little Russia" term, as I've written above, was not invented *after*
joining the Poland's Russian area to Russia. It existed long before that.
It didn't represent a Moscow's arrogant or patronical attitide, the "minor
Russians" themselves willingly used this term with regard to themselves,
which may be seen in historical documents from the 15 - 18th centuries.

| In Putin's story, the creation of Novorossiya in 1764 and the expansion
| of the Russian Empire also reflected the will of the people. "The
| integration of the western Russian lands into the common state ..

The cited Pitin's sentence does not apply to Novorossiya, - one should
read the article to see that the sentence starts the summary conclusions
part after review of the developments throughout the 16 - 18th centuries.

| But Putin suggests that the shared language - separated only by
| "regional linguistic features and dialects" - all but nullifies the
| possibility that Ukraine could have developed its own culture. For
| example, while Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's national poet, wrote poems
| in Ukrainian, he wrote prose mainly in Russian. Similarly, Nikolai Gogol
| - born in the Poltava Governorate of Ukraine, then part of the Russian
| Empire - was a "patriot of Russia," and wrote in the Russian language.
| "How can this heritage be divided between Russia and Ukraine?"

Here the ignorant moron abuses the strawman fallacy. Putin has not said
that the Ukrainians don't have their cultural specifics, he simply points
to the fact that it's hardly separable from Russia. Because, yes, the
historical figures like Shevchenko and Gogol, and not only, can not be
attributed either solely to Russia or solely to the Ukraine. They are both
as Russian as Ukrainian, and this is a matter of fact, regardless of what
[mis]interpretations one would like to derive from this fact.