Turkish crimes against humanity. MORPHOU MUNICIPALITY resolution
Agamemnon
The Municipality and organizations of the occupied town of Morphou
since Turkish invasion in 1974 handed over Monday to the Ambassadors of
the five UN Security Council permanent members a resolution requesting
the contribution of their countries on the search for justice and peace
in Cyprus.
The resolution was handed over on the occasion of the 35th anniversary
since Morphou was captured by the advancing Turkish troops in the
August 16, 1974.
The Mayor and the Members of the Municipal Council of the occupied town
visited consecutively the Embassies of USA, Russia, France and China,
the UK High Commission and the EU Permanent Representation.
Speaking after the meeting with the Ambassador of the Russian
Federation Vyacheslav Shumskiy, Morphou Mayor Charalambos Pittas
stressed that the Resolution condemns above all the ongoing Turkish
occupation reminding the five permanent members of the UN SC of their
responsibilities.
Indeed, UN have a responsibility for the ongoing violation of human
rights in Cyprus, Pittas said, noting that the Morphou representation
during their meetings with the Ambassadors underlined that the UN SC
and its five permanent members are obliged to exeet more pressure on
the Turkish side to cooperate for a solution of the Cyprus problem.
He also said that the property issue was discussed during the
meetings.
We said that it is even more unacceptable now when negotiations are
taking place, the other side to continue the illegal exploitation of
our property and to continue the destruction of our cultural heritage,
he said.
The resolution which is also signed by cultural and sports
organizations of Morphou refers to the ongoing occupation of Cyprus by
Turkey for 35 years, the violent partition of the island, the violation
of human rights, the Turkish settlers, the destruction of the cultural
heritage and the exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties in the
occupied areas.
Among others, the Municipality of Morphou, requests from the five UN SC
permanent member states to contribute towards a just, viable and
functional solution that will end occupation and settlement of the
island, will restore the sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus, will abolish any rights
for foreign military intervention to Cyprus and will unite the
territory, the people and the institutions in the framework a bizonal
bicommunal federation with a single sovereignty and one international
personality, based on the UN resolutions for Cyprus and compatible with
the International Law and the principles of the EU.
Mr.Smartypants
I keep telling you Aggy!!.............declare yourself Field Marshal
and raise an army of pussycats and invade Cyprus.
rich murphy
http://www.ataa.org/reference/trnc/genocide_trnc.html
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus-TRNC
Attempted Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in Cyprus (by Greeks)
By Michael Stephen
Former British Parliamentarian (1992-97)
The assertion by Mr. Christides (May 10, 1999) that there was no
ethnic cleansing or attempted genocide of Turkish Cypriots by Greek
Cypriots is ridiculous. Until influential Greek Cypriots come to terms
with the appalling behavior of their community toward the smaller
Turkish Cypriot community and stop trying to persuade themselves and
the world that each side was as much to blame as the other, there will
be no reconciliation in Cyprus.
What did George Ball and Sir Alec Douglas say about the intentions of
Archbishop Makarios vis a vis the Turkish Cypriots?
In his memoirs, American Undersecretary of State George Ball said:
"Makarios's central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so
that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish
Cypriots. Obviously we would never permit that. "The fact is, however,
that neither the United Nations, nor anyone, other than Turkey ever
took effective action to prevent it. On Feb. 17, 1964 the Washington
Post reported that "Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent on a policy of
genocide."
Former British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home said, "I was
convinced that if Archbishop Makarios could not bring himself to treat
the Turkish Cypriots as human beings he was inviting the invasion and
partition of the island."
On July 28, 1960 Makarios, the Greek Cypriot president, said: "The
independence agreements do not form the goal they are the present and
not the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their national
cause and shape their future in accordance with THEIR will." In a
speech on Sept. 4, 1962 at Panayia Makarios said, "Until this Turkish
community forming part of the Turkish race that has been the terrible
enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can
never be considered terminated."
The Constitutional Coup
In November 1963 the Greek Cypriots demanded the abolition of no less
than eight of the basic articles that had been included in the 1960
agreement for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish
Cypriots, naturally, refused to agree. The aim of the Greek Cypriots
was to reduce the Turkish Cypriot people to the status of a mere
minority, wholly subject to the control of the Greek Cypriots, pending
ultimate destruction or expulsion of the Turkish Cypriots from the
island.
"When the Turkish Cypriots objected to the amendment of the
Constitution, Makarios put his plan into effect, and the Greek Cypriot
attack began in December 1963," wrote Lt. Gen. George Karayiannis of
The Greek Cypriot militia ("Ethnikos Kiryx" 15.6.65). The general was
referring to the notorious "Akritas" plan, which was the blueprint for
the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots and the annexation of the
island to Greece.
Events leading to the sending of the UN Peace-Keeping Force to the
island
On Christmas Eve 1963 the Greek Cypriot militia attacked Turkish
Cypriot communities across the island. Large numbers of men, women,
and children were killed and 270 mosques, shrines and other places of
worship were desecrated.
On Dec. 28, 1963, the Daily Express carried the following report from
Cyprus: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot quarter
of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last
five days. We were the first Western reporters there, and we have seen
sights too frightful to be described in print. Horror was so extreme
that the people seemed stunned beyond tears."
On Dec. 31, 1963, The Guardian reported: "It is nonsense to claim, as
the Greek Cypriots do, that all casualties were caused by fighting
between armed men of both sides. On Christmas Eve many Turkish Cypriot
people were brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes,
including the wife and children of a doctor-allegedly by a group of 40
men, many in army boots and greatcoats." Although the Turkish Cypriots
fought back as best they could and killed some militia, there were no
massacres of Greek Cypriot civilians.
On Jan. 1, 1964, the Daily Herald reported: "When I came across the
Turkish Cypriot homes they were an appalling sight. Apart from the
walls they just did not exist. I doubt if a napalm attack could have
created more devastation. Under roofs springs, children's cots, and
gray ashes of what had once been tables, chairs and wardrobes. In the
neighboring village of Ayios Vassilios I counted 16 wrecked and burned
out homes. They were all Turkish Cypriot's. In neither village did I
find a scrap of damage to any Greek Cypriot house."
On Jan. 2, 1964, the Daily Telegraph wrote: "The Greek Cypriot
community should not assume that the British military presence can or
should secure them against Turkish intervention if they persecute the
Turkish Cypriots. We must not be a shelter for double-crossers."
On Jan. 12, 1964, the British High Commission in Nicosia wrote in a
telegram to London: "The Greek [Cypriot] police are led by extremist
who provoked the fighting and deliberately engaged in atrocities. They
have recruited into their ranks as 'special constables' gun-happy
young thugs. They threaten to try and punish any Turkish Cypriot
police who wishes to return to the Cyprus Government... Makarios
assured Sir Arthur Clark that there will be no attack. His assurance
is as worthless as previous assurances have proved."
On Jan. 14, 1964, the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish
Cypriot inhabitants of Ayios Vassilios had been massacred on Dec. 26,
1963 and reported their exhumation from a mass grave in the presence
of the Red Cross. A further massacre of Turkish Cypriots, at Limassol,
was reported by The Observer on Feb. 16, 1964; and there were many
more.
On Feb. 6, 1964, a British patrol found armed Greek Cypriot police
attacking the Turkish Cypriots of Ayios Sozomenos. They were unable to
stop the attack.
On Feb. 13, 1964, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish
Cypriot quarter of Limassol with tanks, killing 16 and injuring 35.
On Feb. 15, 1964, the Daily Telegraph reported: "It is a real military
operation which the Greek Cypriots launched against the 6,000
inhabitants of the Turkish Cypriot quarter yesterday morning. A
spokesman for the Greek Cypriot government has recognized this
officially. It is hard to conceive how Greek and Turkish Cypriots may
seriously contemplate working together after all that has happened."
Further attempts for ENOSIS
On Sept. 10, 1964, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that "UNFICYP"
carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout
the island during the disturbances... It shows that in 109 villages,
most of them Turkish-Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been
destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In
Ktima 38 houses and shops have been destroyed totally and 122
partially. In the Orphomita suburb of Nicosia, 50 houses have been
totally destroyed while a further 240 have been partially destroyed
there and in adjacent suburbs."
The U.K. House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs reviewed
the Cyprus question in 1987 and reported unanimously on July 2 of that
year that "although the Cyprus Government now claims to have been
merely seeking to 'operate the 1960 Constitution modified to the
extent dictated by the necessities of the situation,' this claim
ignores the fact that both before and after the events o#, December
1963 the Makarios Government continued to advocate the cause of ENOSIS
and actively pursued the amendment of the Constitution and the related
treaties to facilitate this ultimate objective."
The committee continued: "Moreover, in June 1967 the Greek Cypriot
legislature unanimously passed a resolution in favor of enosis, in
blatant contravention of the 1960 Treaties and Constitution." (Art. I
of the Treaty of Guarantee prohibited any action likely to directly or
indirectly promote union with any other state or partition of the
island, and Art. 185(2) of the Constitution is to similar effect.)
Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral president of the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Cyprus, told Die Welt on Dec. 27, 1963:
"Makarios bears on his shoulders the sole responsibility for the
recent tragic events. His aim is to deprive the Turkish community of
their rights". In an interview with the UPI press agency on Dec. 30,
1963 he said, "All this happened because Makarios wanted to take away
all constitutional rights from the Turkish Cypriots."
The Failure of the UN and the others
The United Nations not only failed to condemn the forcible usurpation
of the legal order in Cyprus, but actually rewarded it by treating the
by then wholly Greek Cypriot administration as if it were the
government of Cyprus (Security Council Res. 186 of 1964). This
acceptance has continued to the present day, and reflects no credit
upon the United Nations, nor upon Britain, nor the other countries who
have acquiesced.
On Aug. 12, 1964, the UK representative to the United Nations wrote to
his government in London as follows:
"What is our policy and true feelings about the future of Cyprus and
about Makarios? Judging from the English newspapers and many others,
the feeling is very strong indeed against Makarios and his so-called
government, and nothing would please the British people more than to
see him toppled and the Cyprus problem solved by the direct dealings
between the Turks and the Greeks. We are of course supporting the
latter course, but I have never seen any expression of the official
disapproval in public against Makarios and his evil doings. Is there
an official view about this, and what do we think we should do in the
long run? Sometimes it seems that the obsession of some people with
"the Commonwealth" blinds us to everything else and it would be high
treason to take more active line against Makarios and his henchmen. At
other times the dominant feature seems to be concern lest active
opposition against Makarios should lead to direct conflict with the
Cypriots and end up with our losing our bases."
Exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots from representation at the
international fora
Thereafter Turkish Cypriot MPs, judges, and other officials were
intimidated or prevented by force from carrying out their duties.
According to the Select Committee, "The effect of the crisis of
December 1963 was to deliver control of the formal organs of
government into the hands of the Greek Cypriots alone. Claiming to be
acting in accordance with the doctrine of necessity, the Greek Cypriot
members of the House of Representatives enacted a series of laws which
provided for the operation of the organs of government without Turkish
Cypriot participation."
The report of the Select Committee continued: "Equality damaging from
the Turkish Cypriot point of view was what they considered to be their
effective exclusion from representation at and participation in the
international fora where their case could have been deployed... An
official Turkish Cypriot presence in the international political scene
virtually disappeared overnight." It is not therefore surprising that
the world has been persuaded to the Greek Cypriot point of view.
Atrocities of the Greek Cypriots
More than 300 Turkish Cypriots are still missing without trace from
these massacres of 1963/64. These dreadful events were not the
responsibility of "the Greek Colonels" of 1974 or an unrepresentative
handful of Greek Cypriot extremists. The persecution of the Turkish
Cypriots was an act of policy on the part of the Greek Cypriot
political and religious leadership, which has to this day made no
serious attempt to bring the murderers to justice.
The UK Commons Select Committee found that "there is little doubt that
much of the violence which the Turkish Cypriots claim led to the total
or partial destruction of 103 Turkish villages and the displacement of
about a quarter of the total Turkish Cypriot population was either
directly inspired by, or connived at, by the Greek Cypriot
leadership."
The UN secretary-general reported to the Security Council: "When the
disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued during the first
part of 1964, thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled their homes, taking
with them only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge in
safer villages and areas."
On Jan. 14, 1964, "ll Giorno" of Italy reported: "Right now we are
witnessing the exodus of Turkish Cypriots from the villages. Thousands
of people abandoning homes, land, herds. Greek Cypriot terrorism is
relentless. This time the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the statues of
Plato do not cover up their barbaric and ferocious behavior."
The Greek Cypriots sometimes allege that it was they who were attacked
by the Turkish Cypriots, who were determined to wreck the 1960
agreements. However, the Turkish Cypriots were not only outnumbered by
nearly four to one; they were also surrounded in their villages by
armed Greek Cypriots; they had no way of protecting their women and
children, and Turkey was 40 miles away across the sea. The very idea
that in those circumstances the Turkish Cypriots were the aggressors
is absurd.
The role of the mainland Greek troops in overthrowing of Makarios
There were further attacks on the Turkish Cypriots in 1967. In 1971,
General Grivas returned to Cyprus to form EOKA-B, which was again
committed to making Cyprus a wholly Greek island and annexing it to
Greece. In a speech to the Greek Cypriot armed forces at the time
(quoted in "New Cyprus," May 1987) Grivas said: "The Greek forces from
Greece have come to Cyprus in order to impose the will of the Greeks
of Cyprus upon the Turks. We want ENOSIS but the Turks are against it.
We shall impose our will. We are strong, and we shall do so."
By July 15, 1974, a powerful force of mainland Greek troops had
assembled in Cyprus and with their backing, the Greek Cypriot National
Guard overthrew Makarios and installed one Nicos Sampson as
"president." On July 22, the Washington Star News reported: "Bodies
littered the streets and there were mass burials... People told by
Makarios to lay down their guns were shot by the National Guard."
Missing persons, what is the truth?
On April 17, 1991, Ambassador Nelson Ledsky testified before the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "most of the 'missing persons'
disappeared in the first days of July 1974, before the Turkish
intervention on the 20th. Many killed on the Greek side were killed by
Greek Cypriots in fighting between supporters of Makarios and
Sampson."
On Nov. 6, 1974, Ta Nea reported that dates from the graves of Greek
Cypriots killed in the five days between July 15-20 were erased in
order to blame these deaths on the subsequent Turkish military action.
On March 3, 1996, the Greek Cypriot Cyprus Mail wrote: "(Greek)
Cypriot governments have found it convenient to conceal the scale of
atrocities during the July 15 coup in an attempt to downplay its
contribution to the tragedy of the summer of 1974 and instead blame
the Turkish invasion for all casualties. There can be no justification
for any government that failed to investigate this sensitive
humanitarian issue. The shocking admission by the Clerides government
that there are people buried in Nicosia cemetery who are still
included in the list of the 'missing' is the last episode of a human
drama which has been turned into a propaganda tool."
On Oct. 19 1996, Mr. Georgios Lanitis wrote: "I was serving with the
Foreign Information Service of the Republic of Cyprus in London... I
deeply apologize to all those I told that there are 1,619 missing
persons. I misled them. I was made a liar, deliberately, by the
government of Cyprus . .... today it seems that the credibility of
Cyprus is nil."
Had Turkey not intervened, what would have happened?
Turkish Cypriots appealed to the guarantor powers for help, but only
Turkey was willing to make any effective response. On July 20, 1974
Turkey intervened under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. The
Greek newspaper Eleftherotipia published an interview with Nicos
Sampson on Feb. 26, 1981 in which he said, "Had Turkey not intervened
I would not only have proclaimed ENOSIS, I would have annihilated the
Turks in Cyprus."
More attacks against the Turkish community
The Times and The Guardian reported on Aug. 21, 1974 that in the
village of Tokhni on Aug. 14, 1974 all the Turkish Cypriot men between
the ages of 13 and 74, except for eighteen who managed to escape, were
taken away and shot.
There were also reports that in Zyyi on the same day all the Turkish-
Cypriot men aged between 19 an 38 were taken away and were never seen
again and that Greek-Cypriots opened fire on the Turkish-Cypriot
neighborhood of Paphos killing men, women, and children
indiscriminately.
On July 23, 1974, the Washington Post reported that "in a Greek raid
on a small Turkish village near Limassol 36 people out of a population
of 200 were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to
kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces
arrived." The Times and The Guardian also reported on the killings.
"The Greeks began to shell the Turkish quarter on Saturday, refugees
said. Kazan Dervis, a Turkish Cypriot girl aged 15, said she had been
staying with her uncle. The [Greek Cypriot] National Guard came into
the Turkish sector and shooting began. She saw her uncle and other
relatives taken away as prisoners, and later heard her uncle had been
shot." (Times 23.7.74)
On July 28, 1974 the New York Times reported that 14 Turkish-Cypriot
men had been shot in Alaminos. On July 24, 1974 France Soir reported
that "the Greeks burned Turkish mosques and set fire to Turkish homes
in the villages around Famagusta. Defenseless Turkish villagers who
have weapons live in an atmosphere of terror and they evacuate their
homes and go and live in tents in the forest. The Greeks' actions are
a shame to humanity."
On July 22, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit called upon the United
Nations to "stop the genocide of Turkish Cypriots" and declared,
"Turkey has accepted a cease-fire, but will not allow Turkish Cypriots
to be massacred."
The German newspaper Die Zeit wrote on Aug. 30, "The massacre of
Turkish Cypriots in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof of how justified
the Turks were to undertake their intervention."
"Turkish Cypriots, who had suffered from physical attacks since 1963,
called on the guarantor powers to prevent a Greek conquest of the
island. When Britain did nothing Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied
its northern part. Turkish Cypriots have constitutional right on their
side and understandably fear a renewal of persecution if the Turkish
army withdraws", the Daily Telegraph wrote on Aug. 15, 1996.
At last, peace for the Turkish Cypriots
"Turkey intervened to protect the lives and property of the Turkish-
Cypriots, and to its credit it has done just that. In the 12 years
since, there have been no killings and no massacres" Lord Willis
(Labor) told the House of Lords on Dec. 17, 1986.
On March 12, 1977, Makarios declared, "It is in the name of ENOSIS
that Cyprus has been destroyed."
The United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the rest of the world have
put political expediency before principle and failed to condemn this
appalling behavior. Greek Cypriots are guilty of attempted genocide
but no action has ever been taken against them. Instead they have been
rewarded by recognition as the government of all Cyprus. The Turkish
Cypriots by contrast were frozen out of the United Nations, the
Commonwealth and almost every other international organization.
©Assembly of Turkish American Associations
Home of Turkish American Associations across U.S., Canada and Türkiye
1526 18th St, NW,Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 483-9090, Fax: (202) 483-9092
E-mail: asse...@ataa.org, Website: www.ataa.org
Agamemnon
"rich murphy" <Richard...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:4a456b5b-bbba-4282...@o9g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
Turkey's invasion in Cyprus and aftermath
(20 JULY 1974 - 18 MAY 1976)
Part of the Introduction
After overruling Turkey's objection the Commission of Human Rights
considered: "the evidence before the Commission and the facts established on
the basis of this evidence cannot be seen as presenting a view of the events
and incidents complained of mainly from the Greek Cypriot side. The
Commission observes in this connection that: - certain events and incidents
referred to in the applications are in great part a matter of public
knowledge. In particular, the massive movement of population from the
northern to the southern part of Cyprus after 20 July, 1974 is an
indisputable fact which, as such, calls for no particular investigation; the
Commission has based its findings in part on reports of other international
organizations, in particular the United Nations; - the witnesses heard by
the Commission's Delegation in Cyprus testified, with little exception, with
a restraint and objectivity that gave credibility to their testimony; some
of them confirmed a number of statements in the Particulars of the
Applications about which they could not have had any direct knowledge; - in
the evaluation of the evidence before it, the Commission has refrained from
drawing any conclusions from the fact that the respondent Government,
despite every opportunity being offered to them, failed to make any
statements, or to proposed counterevidence on the applicant Government's
allegations". (Report, p.31)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here are the Contents:
a.. Killings
b.. Displacement of persons (Creating refugees)
c.. Deprivation of liberty
d.. Mass rapes
e.. Torture & inhuman treatment
f.. Deprivation of possessions, looting and wanton destruction
g.. Discrimination
h.. No remedy
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Killings
Relevant Article of the European Convention on Human Rights:
" Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally." (Article 2)
Charge laid against Turkey:
The Turkish Army embarked upon a systematic course of mass murders of
civilians unconnected with any war activity, including women and babies in
arms, and soldiers who had surrendered.
Turkish defense:
No answer was given to these charges. Turkey boycotted the Commission's
proceedings once her jurisdictional objection was rejected.
Commission's verdict:
By 14 votes to 1 the Commission, after examining a number of killings at
specific places, held that the evidence before it constituted "strong
indications of killings committed on a substantial scale" (para.346). The
Commission concluded: " In view of the very detailed material before it on
other killings alleged by the applicant Government, the Commission, by
fourteen votes against one, concludes from the whole evidence that killings
happened on a larger scale than in Elia. There is nothing to show that any
of these deprivations of life were justified... " (Report, p.165)
Further relevant facts:
Greek National Guardsmen and civilians were killed in the field and in
bombing raids on civilian targets, including hospitals. In these raids the
Turkish Air Force used napalm. These killings were not the subject of the
application to the European Commission on Human Rights, being rather
breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
[Go back to Contents]
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Displacement of persons (Creating refugees)
Relevant Article of the European Convention on Human Rights:
" Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life and his
home..." (Article 8)
Charge laid against Turkey:
The Turkish Army displaced 200,000 Greek Cypriots (more than one third of
the population) from their homes. This was effected partly by physical
expulsion and partly by a systematic campaign of terror, causing Greek
Cypriots to flee in the face of Turkey's advancing armed forces. Refugees
and expellees were not permitted by the Turkish Army to return to their
homes in the Turkish occupied area.
Turkish defense:
No answer was given to these charges. Turkey boycotted the Commission's
proceedings once her jurisdictional objection was rejected.
Commission's Verdict:
" Displacement of persons:
1. The Commission concludes by thirteen votes against one that, by the
refusal to allow the return of more than 170,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to
their homes in the north of Cyprus, Turkey violated, and was continuing to
violate Art. 8 of the Convention in all these cases. When hostilities ended
some Greek Cypriots were able to return to their homes near the cease-fire
lines in areas under UN or Government control thus reducing the number of
refugees to 170,000.
2. The Commission concludes by twelve votes against one that, by the
eviction of Greek Cypriots from houses, including their homes, by their
transportation to other places within the north of Cyprus, or by their
deportation across the demarcation line, Turkey has equally violated Art. 8
of the Convention.
3. The Commission concludes by thirteen votes against one that by the
refusal to allow the return to their homes in the north of Cyprus of several
thousand Greek Cypriots who had been transferred to the south under
inter-communal agreements, Turkey violated, and was continuing to violate
Art. 8 of the Convention in all these cases.
4. The Commission concludes by fourteen votes against one with one
abstention that, by the separation of Greek Cypriot families brought about
by measures of displacement in a substantial number of cases, Turkey has
again violated Art.8 of the Convention." (Report, p.163).
[Go back to Contents]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deprivation of liberty
Relevant Article of the European Convention on Human Rights:
" No one shall be deprived of his liberty.." (Article 5)
Charge laid against Turkey:
The Turkish armed forces detained thousands of persons arbitrarily and
without lawful authority. On entering any inhabited area they immediately
rounded up all Greek Cypriot inhabitants (many women & children were hiding
in their homes). On capture men were separated and detained apart from old
people, women and children, who were either put in "concentration camps" or
expelled. On the hundreds kept in such camps small babies to old people of
90 were crowded together under atrocious conditions without sanitary
facilities at the height of summertime, when temperatures reach over 40 o C.
The worst such "concentration camps" were Voni, Marathovouno, Vitsada and
Gypsou. In addition, Turkish authorities held some 3,000 inhabitants of the
Kyrenia district in the Kyrenia Dome Hotel & in Bellapais village. Many male
Greek Cypriots were temporarily sent as "prisoners of war" to places like
Saray Prison & Pavlides Garage in the Turkish part of Nicosia, later being
transported to Turkey and detained in prisons in Adana, Amasia and Atiama.
It is notable that the great majority of those shipped to Turkey were
civilians of all ages between 17 and 70. Article 49.1 of the Geneva
Convention, 1949, Fourth Schedule, provides that: "individual or mass
forcible transfers,as well as deportations of protected persons from
occupied territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country,
occupied or not are prohibited, regardless of their motive." The transfer of
civilians to Turkey show the contempt exhibited by the Turkish Army for the
principles of international law. Turkey has never provided complete lists of
detainees and the fate of about 3,000 Greek Cypriots was unknown at the time
of the first applications to the Commission. Because evidence showed numbers
of these missing persons had been in custody in Turkey the Commission was
asked to investigate whether they were still imprisoned there.
Turkish defense:
No answer was given to these charges. Turkey boycotted the Commission's
proceedings once her jurisdictional objection was rejected.
Commission's Verdict:
" Detention centers:
1. The Commission,by thirteen votes against one, concludes that, by the
confinement of more than two thousand Greek Cypriots to detention centres
established in schools and churches at Voni, Gypsou and Morphou, Turkey has
violated Art.5(1) of the Convention.
2. The Commission by thirteen votes against one, further concludes that, by
the confinement of Greek Cypriots to private houses in Gypsou and Morphou,
where they kept under similar circumstances as in the detention centres,
Turkey has equally violated Art.5(1).
3. The Commission, by ten votes against two with two abstentions, finally
concludes that, by the CONFINEMENT of Greek Cypriots to the Kyrenia Dome
Hotel after 14 August 1974, Turkey has again violated Art.5(1).
Prisoners and detainees:
1. The Commission, by thirteen votes against one, concludes that the
detention of Greek Cypriot military personnel in Turkey was not in
conformity with Art.5(1) of the Convention.
2. The Commission, by thirteen votes against one, concluded that the
DETENTION of Greek Cypriot civilians IN Turkey was equally not in conformity
with Art.5.(1)" (Report, p.164). Evidence on missing persons: The evidence
before the Commission does not allow a definite finding with regard to the
fate of Greek Cypriots declared to be missing. This is partly due to the
fact that the Commission's Delegation was refused access to the
northern/occupied/part of Cyprus and to places in Turkey where Greek Cypriot
prisoners were or had been detained. In the present Report the Commission is
only concerned with the fate of persons declared to be missing as from the
beginning of the military action of Turkey on 20 July 1974. It is not
concerned with any person missing due to the coup d'etat which on 15 July
1974 preceded the above action... It appears, however, from the evidence
that: it is widely accepted that "a considerable number of Cypriots" are
still " missing as a result of armed conflict in Cyprus" i.e. between Turkey
and Cyprus; a number of persons declared to be missing have been identified
as Greek Cypriots taken prisoner by the Turkish army. The Commission
considers that there is a presumption of Turkish responsibility for the fate
of persons shown to have been in Turkish custody. However,on the basis of
the material before it, the Commission has been unable to ascertain whether,
and under what circumstances, Greek Cypriot prisoners declared to be missing
have been deprived of their life" (Report, paras. 347-349, and 351)
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Mass rapes
Relevant Article of the European Convention an Human Rights:
" No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment..." (Article 3)
Charge laid against Turkey:
Turkish troops were responsible for wholesale and repeated rapes of women of
ALL AGES from 12 to 71, sometimes to such an extent that the victims
suffered haemorrages or became mental wrecks. In some areas, enforced
prostitution was practiced, all women and girls of a village been collected
and put into separate rooms in empty houses where they were raped
repeatedly. In certain cases members of the same family were repeatedly
raped, some of them in front of their own children. In other cases women
were brutally raped in public. Rapes were on many occasions accompanied by
brutalities such as violent biting of the victims causing severe wounding,
banging their heads on the floor and wringing their throats almost to the
point OF suffocation. In some cases attempts at rape were followed by the
stabbing or killing of the victims. Victims included pregnant and mentally
retarted women.
Turkey's defense:
No answer was given to these charges and Turkey boycotted the Commission's
proceedings once her jurisdictional objection was rejected.
Commission's verdict:
" The evidence shows that rapes were committed by Turkish soldiers and at
least in two cases even by Turkish officers, and this NOT ONLY in some
isolated cases of indiscipline. It has not been shown that the Turkish
authorities took adequate measures to prevent this happening or that they
generally took any disciplinary measures following such incidents. The
Commission therefore considers that the non-prevention of the said acts is
imputable to Turkey under the Convention.
The Commission, by 12 Votes against one, finds that the incidents of rape
described in the above cases and regarded as established constitute "inhuman
treatment" in the sense of Art.3 of the Convention, which is imputable to
Turkey" (Report, paras. 373-4)
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Torture and inhuman treatment
Relevant Article of the European Convention on Human Rights:
" No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment..." (Article 3)
Charges laid against Turkey:
Hundreds of persons, including children, women and elderly people, were the
victims of systematic torture and SAVAGE and humiliating treatment during
their detention by the Turkish army. They were beaten; sometimes to the
extent of being incapacitated. Many were subjected to tortures such as
whipping, breaking of the teeth, knocking their heads on the wall, beating
with electrified clubs, extinction of cigarettes on their skin, jumping and
stepping on their chest and hands, pouring dirty liquids on them, piercing
them with bayonets etc. Many of these detainees were ill-treated to such an
extent that they became mental and physical wrecks. Among the persons so
treated were those deported to and imprisoned in Turkey (of whom most were
civilians). During their transportation and detention they were savagely
ill-treated, being wounded, beaten, kicked, whipped, blindfolded,
handfettered punched to the extent of bleeding, etc. These brutalities
reached their climax after the cease fire agreements and resolutions of the
U. N. Security Council calling for an end to hostilities. In fact most of
these acts were committed when Turkish armed forces were not engaged in any
war activities. More than 1,000 statements obtained from witnesses described
their ill-treatment. Such statements showed a pattern of behaviour by the
Turkish forces, proving that the atrocities were deliberate tactics which
the invading forces were to follow. The aim was to terrorise, destroy and
eradicate the Greek population of the Turkish occupied area so that it would
be vacant to move in Turks, thus creating an area populated virtually only
by Turks.
Turkey's defense:
No answer was given to these charges and Turkey boycotted the Commission's
proceedings once her jurisdictional objection was rejected.
Commission's verdict:
" The Commission by twelve votes against one,concludes that prisoners were
in a number of cases physically ill-treated by injuries and at least in one
case the death of the victim. By their severity they constitute "inhuman
treatment" and thus violations of Art.3, for which Turkey is responsible
under the Convention.
The Commission by twelve votes against one, concluded that the withholding
of an adequate supply of food and drinking water and of adequate medical
treatment from Greek Cypriot prisoners held at Adana and detainees in the
northern area of Cyprus, with the exception of Pavlides Garage & Saray
prison, again constitutes, in the cases considered as established and in the
conditions described, "inhuman treatment" and thus a violation of Art.3, for
which Turkey is responsible under the Convention" (Report, pp.165-166) The
Commission did not find sufficient evidence that prisoners held in these two
locations in the Turkish sector of Nicosia were guarded by Turkish
soldiers - as opposed to Turkish-officered Turkish Cypriot "forces" (para.
308)
"The evidence obtained established that, in a considerable number of cases
prisoners were severely beaten or otherwise physically ill-treated by
Turkish soldiers" (Report, para.393) The Commission, by twelve votes against
one,concludes that the written statements submitted by the applicant
Government constitute indications of ill-treatment by Turkish soldiers of
persons not in detention" (Report, p.166)
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Deprivation of possessions, looting and wanton destruction
Relevant Article of the European Convention on Human Rights:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions..." (Article 1 of
Protocol No.1)
Charge laid against Turkey:
Greek Cypriots were deprived of their possessions either by eviction or by
seizure of movable property and its subsequent removal by Turkish soldiers,
or by conditions making abandonment of home and property the only wise
course as life and limb were at risk from the Turkish army. When privately
owned land & houses belonging to Greek Cypriots in the Turkish occupied
areas came under Turkey's control,most of this was distributed to Turkish
Cypriots and to Turks brought from Turkey to settle in those areas. To
preclude any Greek Cypriots from reclaiming their possessions,Turkish
authorities forcibly prevented their return and continued to expel most
remaining Greek Cypriots. In various official statements the Turkish
Government made it clear that Turkey was organizing marketing of all
agricultural production in the occupied area. The same applied to tourism
and Turkey took over all Greek Cypriot manufacturing industry. Goods already
manufactured & agricultural produce ready for marketing were shipped abroad
in Turkish vessels. In addition, the Turkish Army systematically looted
houses and business premises belonging to Greek Cypriots. Even properties of
those Greek Cypriots who had remained in the Turkish occupied army part not
escape this fate. Most loot was loaded into Turkish army vehicles & buses
seized from Greek Cypriots, and a substantial part, including vehicles,
animals, household goods,and building equipment, was transported by Turkish
naval vessels to the mainland. The Turkish Army also engaged in wanton
destruction. Turkish soldiers attempted to burn down all buildings along
"the green line" in Nicosia, and orchards and crops belonging to Greek
Cypriots were set on fire after cessation of hostilities. Witnesses also
described breaking of doors and windows of houses, the smashing of furniture
icons, candles and other church property and killing of animals. The
destruction of Christian & Hellenic monuments was a significant feature of
Turkey's occupation. Religious property was a particular target in an
attempt to destroy the cultural identity of the occupied area. Not only were
religious items & church equipment smashed, set on fire or looted, but most
Greek Orthodox churches not converted into mosques were vandalized. Mosaics
and even frescos were either defaced or removed. This occurred in military
zones under control of the Turkish Army and from which Turkish Cypriots were
excluded. Even archaeological museums and sites did not escape vandalisation
and initial looting.
Turkey's defense:
No answer was given to these charges and Turkey boycotted the Commission's
proceedings once her jurisdictional objection was rejected.
Commission's verdict:
"The Commission accepted that the 170,000 Greek Cypriots displaced from the
occupied area had left behind their movable & immovable possessions and
referred to "the established fact that these displaced persons are not
allowed to return to their homes in the north, and thus to property left
there" (Report para.471)
The Commission went on to find "proof of taking and occupation of houses and
land by Turkish Cypriots and Turks from the mainland, both military
personnel and civilians" (Report para. 472) Moreover the Commission accepted
" testimony as proving beyond reasonable doubt that looting and robbery on
an extensive scale by Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriots have taken
place... As regards such deprivations of possessions by Turkish Cypriots,
the Commission considers that, insofar as the persons committing them were
acting under the direct order or authority of the Turkish forces of which
there is evidence, the deprivation must equally be imputed to Turkey under
the Convention..."
The Commission, by 12 votes against one, finds it established that there has
been deprivation of possesions of Greek Cypriots on a large scale, the exact
extent of which could not be determined. This deprivation must be imputed to
Turkey under the Convention and it has not been shown that any of these
interferences were necessary for any of the purposes mentioned in Article 1
of Protocol No.1" (Report, paras 472-486)
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Discrimination
Relevant Article of the European Convention on Human Rights:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such... as race, ...
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority... or other status" (Article 14)
Charge laid against Turkey:
The acts of the Turkish Army were exclusively directed against the Greek
Cypriot community with the object of destroying and, eradicating the Greek
population of the Turkish occupied area so as to move therein Turks, thereby
artificially creating a Turkish populated area. All Turkey's atrocities were
directed against Greek Cypriots (though some foreign subjects who happened
to be or have property in the Turkish occupied area were also affected by
some such acts e.g. looting and wanton destruction of property).
Turkish defense:
No answer was given to these charges and Turkey boycotted the Commissions
proceedings once her jurisdictional objection had been rejected.
Commission's Verdict:
" The Commission has found violations of a number of Articles of the
Convention. It notes that the acts violating the Convention were exclusively
directed against members of one of the two communities in Cyprus, namely the
Greek Cypriot community. The Commission concludes by eleven votes to three
that Turkey has thus failed to secure the rights and freedoms set forth in
these Articles without discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, race
and religion as required by Art.14 of the Convention (Report, para. 503)
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No remedy
Relevant Article of the European Convention on Human Rights:
" Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy..." (Article 13)
Charge laid against Turkey:
None of the victims of the ruthless and evil deeds by Turkish State organs
and her Armed Forces was ever given any opportunity to vindicate his rights
before an authority or tribunal as provided by Articles 6 and 13 of the
Convention. Persons under Turkish control were not even permitted to talk
without Turkish supervision to the International Red Cross. In short, no
effective remedy of any kind was afforded either in the Turkish occupied
area or in Turkey itself in respect of Turkish atrocities.
Turkish defense:
In its jurisdictional objection, Turkey argued that remedies were availale
before the competent judicial authorities in Turkey or before the military
courts of the Turkish forces in Cyprus.
Commission's findings:
The Commission held that such remedies had not been shown to be "practicable
and normally functioning". Nor had it been established that such complaints
could be effectively handled. (Admissibility Report, at p. 22 of the
Report). The Commission at the hearing on the merits reiterated that it had
found no evidence that effective and suficient remedies were available.
(Report, paras. 499-501)
Agamemnon
"rich murphy" <Richard...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:4a456b5b-bbba-4282...@o9g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
In Cyprus, during the late 1950s a Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organisation
known as Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (TMT) was formed. It was armed and
supported by Turkey and it had an extreme pro-partition agenda.
The great difficulty with TMT's programme was that it required the uprooting
of a quarter of a million people - both Greek and Turkish Cypriots - and
their removal from their historic and ancestral lands. It is not surprising
therefore that it was opposed by the vast majority of the island's
population. It would only have been possible to do this forcibly. The
Turkish invasion can therefore be traced back to the formation of TMT and
the need to forcibly separate the populations.
TURKISH INCITEMENT
TMT emerged with Ankara's support as a powerful force, and exercised a
crucial influence over the affairs of the Turkish-Cypriot community. One of
its founders was Rauf Denktash, the current Turkish Cypriot political
spokesman in occupied Cyprus.
The decision to create TMT was taken at the highest levels of the Turkish
Menderes Government in Ankara. While facing mounting pressure from public
opinion, the Turkish Government decided to use the Cyprus question as a
diversion to keep the Turkish military quiet, an ever present factor in
Turkish politics: that is how TMT was conceived. TMT fighters were trained,
armed and led by a small group of well-disciplined Turkish officers. It
established cells in towns and villages throughout Cyprus, and it selected
personnel who were to be sent to Turkey for military training. It was also
to become the organisational tool through which the geo-political
partitionist policy of Turkey was to be enforced in Cyprus. It was a policy
which aimed at segregating the Turkish and Greek Cypriots from each other as
a prelude to the physical division of the island.
During the course of 1957, TMT pressured the Turkish Cypriots into
withdrawing from any co-operative ties they had with the Greek Cypriots and,
on the whole, they were successful; this policy later became known as the
`from Turk to Turk policy'. Such encouragement was entirely alien to the
co-operation and quiet existence which had always prevailed between Greek
and Turkish Cypriots, but was necessary to sow the seeds of partition. A
similar policy was followed in Istanbul, organised by the Turkish National
Student Federation, which had worked closely with Kibris Turktur in its
planning of the anti-Greek riots there back in 1955.
In Cyprus this crude policy of enforced segregation did not go unopposed
amongst the Turkish Cypriots. TMT's answer to criticism was however rapid
and brutal. It assassinated prominent Turkish Cypriots who dared to publicly
voice opposition or advocated co-operation between Greeks and Turks. The
most widely known such murders were those of Fazil Ondur, the chief editor
of the weekly newspaper Inkilapci, who was killed on 29 May 1959; and Ahmet
Yahaya, a committee member of the Turkish Cypriot Athletic and Culture
centre, who was killed on 5 June 1958. An attempt was also made on the life
of Arif Barudi on 3 July 1958, and another one on Ahmet Sadi, the director
of the Turkish office of the Pancypriot Labour Federation who, soon after
the attempt against his life, left Cyprus to settle in England. The same
policy continues today with the assassination in July 1996 of Kutlu Adali,
the Turkish Cypriot journalist, who had the courage to condemn the
partitionist project of the Turkish military establishment which leads the
foreign policy of Ankara, and who advocated closer co-operation between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
TMT's strategy was one of incitement in the hope of provoking inter-ethnic
conflict with the aim of securing the separation of the two communities. It
did so without any consideration to likely casualties amongst innocent Greek
and Turkish Cypriots. The first such serious inter-communal fighting began
in June 1958 and was the result of such incitement which the Turkish
authorities have subsequently been candid on a number of occasions. Mr Emin
Dirvana, a former Turkish diplomat, said: `I was informed that on 7 June
1958 a bomb had been planted in the Turkish press office in Nicosia by
persons who, as was later established, had nothing to do with the Greek
Cypriots. The Turks of Nicosia were then incited to be overwhelmed by holy
indignation and perpetrated acts similar to those committed on 6 and 7
September 1955 in Istanbul.'
In the ITN documentary `Cyprus, Britain's Grim Legacy' the account
continues:
`The explosion sparked off a night of riot in Nicosia. Turkish Cypriots
burned and looted Greek shops and homes. Soon came counter attacks and the
fighting spread around the island. A friend of mine, whose name must still
be kept secret, was to confess to me that he had put this little bomb in the
doorway in order to create an atmosphere of tension so that people would
know that the Turkish Cypriots mattered.'
In fact, nobody had ever claimed that the Turkish Cypriots did not matter.
This reveals the essence of the matter, that the Turkish Cypriot leadership,
first in Ottoman times and then during the British administration, had
always occupied a position of political privilege as an ally of the
occupying power. These privileges were not something the leadership were
willing to give up. During early British rule, the alliance with the Turkish
minority became clear in the legislative council. It worked on the principle
that the British and Turkish members at least equalled or outnumbered by one
vote the Greeks.
The tactics of TMT, to provoke ethnic conflict when none would otherwise
have arisen, were soon to be successful. On 12 June 1958, following the
press office bomb explosion, British security forces rounded up eight Greek
Cypriots from the village of Kondemenos and subsequently released them near
the Turkish Cypriot village of Guenyeli, approximately seven miles from
where they were arrested, and a good distance from the nearest Greek
villages; the released Greek Cypriots were subsequently massacred by Turkish
Cypriots acting on the orders of TMT. These were the first reported
inter-communal killings. These killings were carried out in the certain
knowledge that Greek Cypriots would also carry out revenge attacks.
Turkey rushed to put forward a formal protest to Britain the day following
the press office bomb, alleging that the Cyprus administration had failed to
give the Turkish minority adequate protection. `Cyprus, partition or death,
was the slogan constantly repeated by Turkish leaders and the armed
paramilitaries. The claim was that Turkish Cypriots could not think of
themselves as being integrated into Cypriot society. The fact that they
already were, necessitated a strategy of tension and forced separation.
The principle of partition was not based on the realities of Cypriot society
at the time, but on Turkey's perceived security requirements alone. In the
Summer of 1958, in the mixed suburb of Omorphita in Nicosia, TMT evicted 700
Greeks from their homes. By the end of July 1958 a much clearer line had
been drawn between the Greek and Turkish quarters. The reluctance of British
authorities to deal even-handedly with the violence became clearer when the
partisan decisions made by the Courts at the time is taken into account.
Whereas Turks arrested for participating in the riots were released, Greeks
received custodial sentences for minor offences.
Sixteen Turks were, for example, arrested by the British authorities for
complicity in the Nicosia riots, but they were released on condition that
they stayed in at night. A Turkish policeman, sergeant Tuna, was charged
with possessing a bomb and ammunition for which the mandatory penalty was
clearly the death penalty. He was released and left immediately for Turkey.
The only official piece of evidence that Turkish policeman were involved in
bomb attacks had conveniently `disappeared'. By contrast, two Greeks who
pulled down a Union Jack were each given 18 months prison sentences, whilst
those subsequently involved with the possession of fire arms were hanged. In
hindsight, it is hardly surprising that Greek Cypriots saw a conspiracy
against their struggle for self-determination from British and Turkish
Cypriot sources.
The riots in Nicosia caused by the bomb in the Turkish press office,
resulted in the deaths of 56 Greek and 53 Turkish Cypriots. The higher
number of Greek casualties demonstrates that the Turkish Cypriots (who of
course were outnumbered in Cyprus 5:1 by Greek Cypriots) had, on the orders
of TMT, pre-arranged strongholds and were thus able to fight from a much
stronger position than their numerical inferiority would suggest. Clearly,
by the end of 1958 the Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination was still
unacceptable to both Britain and Turkey, although a new compromise needed to
be worked out.
The London-Zurich agreements of 1959 finally set up the Republic of Cyprus
with Archbishop Makarios III being duly elected its first President, and Dr
Fazil Kutcuk its Turkish Cypriot Vice President, by their respective
communities in December 1959. The Republic of Cyprus officially came into
being on 16 August 1960.
Under the terms of the 1960 constitution, there was to be a fixed ratio of
70 Greek Cypriot employees for every 30 Turkish Cypriots employed by
government agencies. The Turkish Cypriot leadership demanded that this
parity of employment be attained within five months of independence. The
public service commission pointed to the numerous difficulties of drawing
30% of the civil service including the police force from just 18% of the
population. As a result, numerous posts remained unfulfilled in the search
for suitably qualified Turkish Cypriot candidates.
Since a majority vote of the Turkish Cypriot deputies in the house was
needed to pass tax legislation, the Turkish Cypriots used it as a bargaining
tool to force compliance over the 70:30 ratio and various other issues which
had as their objective the continued segregation of the two ethnic groups.
For example, colonial laws had to be extended eight times while both
communities discussed legislation relating to separate municipalities. This
provision had been the greatest victory for Turkey in this settlement. The
President offered the Turks compensating safeguards, but was not prepared to
implement provisions which opened the way to partition. Deadlock inevitably
resulted again and again in a number of other areas.
Already by the end of the 1961 the Turkish language press was calling for
intervention by the powers, meaning the UK and the US. In essence, there was
a fundamental belief on the part of the Turkish Cypriots in the eventual
intervention of Turkey to establish the partition of Cyprus. This belief
underpinned their unco-operative attitude towards the Greek Cypriots and,
not surprisingly, created the cycle of mistrust amongst Turkish Cypriots
which culminated in the crisis of 1963. Indeed, one of the starkest
indications of the Turkish Cypriot mistrust were the brutal political
murders of Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet Gurkhan in 1962 by TMT. Both Hikmet and
Gurkhan were publishers who advocated closer association and co-operation
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. TMT was again in action to ensure that
the genuine voice of the Turkish Cypriots was silenced, and this applied not
only to journalists and publishers, but to many political activists and
ordinary people too.
THE CRISIS OF 1963
From independence to 1963, it proved impossible to construct any basis of
trust, and many areas of government were unable to function. The Cypriots
found themselves in the position of not even being able to execute simple
tax laws due to the way in which legislation was being used by the Turkish
Cypriot leadership and their political mentors in Turkey. The Greek Cypriots
claimed with some justification that the Turkish Cypriots were using
partitionist and non co-operative tactics, which was made possible by the
constitution itself.
It was against this background that the Akritas plan emerged as a political
strategy to remove the restrictions imposed by the 1960 constitution, and to
abrogate both the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance, which
allowed for armed intervention in Cyprus by Britain, Greece and Turkey, not
unilateral intervention (but not by military action by any one state).
President Makarios sought a way of breaking the deadlock in the
administration and submitted for discussion, in accordance with the Akritas
plan, 13 possible constitutional amendments. Copies of the proposed
amendments were sent to Ankara for information purposes only since Turkey
was a guarantor power. Yet even before the Turkish Cypriot leadership could
reply, Ankara rejected the proposals as impossible, even as a basis for
discussion, though the opinion of Turkish Cypriots had not been sought and
this effectively ended the Akritas plan. Makarios had not referred to Athens
before making his proposals, but was acting quite properly as the head of
state of what was, after all, an independent state. Turkish Cypriot
propagandists, however, cite the Akritas plan as proof of a Greek Cypriot
plot to commit genocide against them, by somehow equating enosis, the
subject of the plan, with genocide. This is clearly a nonsense; it was
simply a constitutional framework devised to break a constituted social
cohesion.
The inter-communal violence that followed was triggered on 21 December 1963
by an incident in Nicosia involving the shooting of a policeman. A police
patrol car with Greek Cypriot officers driving down Hermes Street in the old
city of Nicosia stopped a car for a routine check. Shots were fired and a
young Turk was killed. The dispute that had been going on for the past three
years relating to the way in which the constitution was operating, and the
resultant tensions (all entirely of a political nature), now exploded into a
spate of shootings which spread right across the island. On 22 December 1963
all Turkish Cypriot Government officials and politicians left their posts in
a mass political protest. Overnight, all these individuals quit their jobs
before any investigation had taken place. This organised reaction suggests
that their actions were part of a pre-planned strategy in accordance with
the tactics followed during the last few years.
Between 21 and 26 December 1963 the conflict was again centred in the
Omorphita suburb of Nicosia, which had been an area of tension back in 1958.
The participants now were Greek Cypriot irregulars and Turkish Cypriot
paramilitaries, and numbers of civilians who were caught in the crossfire
and chaos that ensued over the Christmas week. Both President Makarios and
Dr Kutcuk issued calls of peace, but they were ignored. The two leaders met
for the last time on 24 December 1963. Meanwhile, within a week of the
violence flaring up, the Turkish army contingent had moved out of its
barracks and seized the most strategic position on the island across the
Nicosia to Kyrenia road, the historic jugular vein of the island. So crucial
was this road to Turkish strategic thinking that they retained control of
that road until 1974, at which time it acted as a crucial link in Turkey's
military invasion. From 1963 up to the point of the Turkish invasion of 20
July 1974, Greek Cypriots who wanted to use the road could only do so if
accompanied by a UN convoy. It was, however, a baffling strategy for
protecting the Turkish Cypriot minority. Again, this demonstrated the true
motivation of Turkey.
The fighting over Christmas week 1963 saw numerous civilian casualties.
Hostage taking emerged on both sides, as did acts of arson and murder.
Although many hostages were returned, many remained missing, presumed dead.
The worst incidents yet again occurred in Omorphita. False rumours were
spread that some Turkish Cypriot patients were taken from Nicosia general
hospital and killed by paramilitaries in order to provoke revenge. In Ayios
Vasilios, on 12 January 1964, a mass grave was discovered which contained
the bodies of 21 Turkish Cypriots who were presumed to have been killed in
or near Ayios Vasilios on 24 December 1963. One of the most tragic acts of
the period was the killing of the wife and children of a Major, Nihat Ilhan,
attached to the Turkish army contingent. Their bodies were later discovered
in the bath of their home. Hasan Kudum who was hurt but survived the
carnage, when asked by his friends if those that came to kill them spoke
between them Greek or Turkish stated: There were persons who spoke Greek and
there were persons who spoke Turkish. Nihat Ilhan, believing that the
Turkish nationalist MHP Grey Wolves were responsible went to Kenan Coskun,
known as Bozkurt (or Grey wolf) and asked him: Has the organisation killed
my family in order to secure the intervention of Turkey in the island? The
answer given by Kenan Coskun and which bothered Nihat Ilhan was the
following: Go and take revenge. He did not tell him from where to take
revenge, writes journalist Sener Levent (Africa 28/8/2007). The tactics of
TMT were now fully reaping their rewards. The casualty figures over that
Christmas week in 1963 vary. British military sources on the ground estimate
about 100 dead on each side.
Considerable fear was felt throughout the island and about 20,000 Turkish
Cypriots left their homes. Much of this movement was spontaneous and hasty
following some local incident of violence. However, once they had moved,
many Turkish Cypriots were placed under heavy pressure by TMT not to return
to their homes. Clearly, the necessary territorial basis for partition was
being established.
Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots were displaced during the period of
inter-communal strife in 1963 and 1964. A Liaison Committee was established,
comprising of representatives of the three guarantor powers and the two
communities. This established that in February 1964 5,500 Turkish Cypriots
and 1,600 Greek Cypriots had been displaced because of the fighting. The UN
Secretary General estimated that eventually 25,000 Turkish Cypriots moved
from their homes to nearby villages/towns. It therefore appears that 5,500
Turkish Cypriots were displaced, and that a further 19,500 were moved on the
directions of the Turkish military and Turkish Cypriot leadership.
A number of points are worth noting. The Liaison Committee consisted of
representatives of Britain, Greece and Turkey and the Greek and Turkish
communities. The first session took place on 29 December 1963, and was
chaired by Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and
subsequent meetings were chaired by the British High Commissioner Sir Arthur
Clark. A sub-committee was given the task to examine the number of displaced
persons, in its report of 1 February 1964, found that there were 5,500
Turkish Cypriots and 1,600 Greek Cypriots displaced. Yet, the UN Secretary
General's Report to the Security Council (15/6/64 Doc. S/5764) found that:
`a large number of Turkish Cypriot villages from some villages with a mixed
population, and from some very small Turkish Cypriot villages, moved out
into more predominantly Turkish villages and towns.' It appears that most of
the Turkish Cypriots displaced were moved from their villages by the Turkish
Cypriot leadership in order to back their policy of partitioning the island.
The partitioning of the island was not possible without segregation and
movement of population, because Greek, Turkish and mixed villages were
scattered around the island, with few concentrations of homogeneous
population.
Fighting in Nicosia ended when British forces intervened at the request of
President Makarios. The Green line was established between the Greek and
Turkish quarters of Nicosia and became a permanent feature of the city. The
demarcation of the capital was followed by the eviction of the entire
Armenian community which happened to fall in the Turkish sector. The Turks
believed that the Armenians were politically aligned with the Greeks and
used this as justification for their forced expulsion. However, it was also
a necessity in the long term goal of creating an ethnically pure Turkish
zone.
Between January and August 1964 much of the violence that took place was of
a sporadic nature. The size of Cyprus, with its customs and strong
traditions, the news of an incident in one village would spread fear and
apprehension to neighbouring villages. The most innocuous incident was
capable of sparking off confrontation in this highly charged atmosphere. Two
examples serve to illustrate this point. The first occurred in Ayios
Sozomenos, an ethnically mixed village in the district of Nicosia. On 6
February 1964 the Greeks were attacked and two were killed. Retaliation
followed by the Greeks, and seven Turks were killed in further clashes, as
well as a further nine Greeks.
The second incident was triggered in Paphos where a Turk was killed by a
sniper. The Turks retaliated and a heated exchange followed. Six Greeks and
a Turk were killed. Further violence flared on the nights of 8/9 March when
14 Turks and 11 Greeks were killed. These incidents demonstrate that in an
atmosphere as highly charged as that of Cyprus in 1964, shootings were
triggered by the slightest prompting and could quickly escalate.
Most incidents were local and retaliatory in nature, usually a specific
response to a particular incident. This is, for example, illustrated by the
hostage exchange that took place in March 1964. Following numerous
kidnappings and hostage taking, an exchange was organised on 7 March. About
225 Turkish hostages had been seized by Greek paramilitaries, of which
around 175 had never returned, while about 41 Greeks remained missing. The
exchange was designed to reduce tension, but in fact it had the opposite
effect. Within 24 hours of the exchange a number of shooting incidents
occurred throughout Cyprus. Again, revenge appears to have been the main
motivating factor.
In Ktima, Turkish Cypriots took as hostages hundreds of Greek Cypriots who
were shopping in the local market. The Turkish Cypriots claimed that their
action was prompted by the reports of the Turkish Cypriot hostages who had
gone missing. In total, 14 Turks and 11 Greeks lost their lives in Ktima.
Inter-communal contact within Ktima virtually ceased. However, such
confrontations, far from being a Greek Cypriot strategy to annihilate the
Turks, were symptomatic of the fear which had spread all over the island.
There is no evidence to suggest that there was anything pre-meditated about
any of this conflict.
In mid-February 1964, inter-communal fighting intensified in Limassol which
looked like provoking a Turkish invasion. This prompted Britain to appeal to
the Security Council of the UN. Subsequently, on 4 March 1964, the Security
Council passed a resolution to establish a peace keeping force in Cyprus.
By 27 March 1964 the first UN units arrived to take up official duties.
Their arrival did not prevent the procurement of arms to Cyprus for both
sides. Evidently, Turkish Cypriot nationalists were trying to increase the
temperature. The Greek Cypriots formed a National Guard, and on 4 April 1964
launched an attack on the north Western coastal villages of Kokkina and
Mansoura, where the Turks had established a bridgehead for the importation
of arms and the landing of heavily armed troops from Turkey.
There was a violence pattern which was repeated throughout the island:
arming Turkish nationalists and securing strategic positions for them; in
the meantime, armed Greeks were bound to respond with force. Although
Turkish Cypriots were sparse in the Kokkina area, they had nevertheless
allegedly been led there in order to provide safety. The clear intention,
however, was to establish an enclave to justify the opening of a salient
within easy reach of Turkey. In the meantime, the most significant
consequence of the conflict on the island was the return of General Grivas
to head the newly formed National Guard, and to bring discipline to the
Greek paramilitary irregulars. From this point on, Grivas and Makarios were
increasingly at odds over policy matters. Grivas had always put loyalty to
Greece above that of a commitment to Cyprus as an independent republic.
In August 1964, another major battle took place in the Kokkina Mansoura
area. Fighting broke out on 3 August and continued until 6 August, during
which the Turkish air force bombed Greek villages indiscriminately with
napalm. The clash at Kokkina drew sharp attention to the realities of
Cypriot vulnerability to the power politics of Turkey. A cease-fire was
reached on 9 August and drew to a close this latest serious outbreak of
violence.
The resulting casualties, however, give an interesting insight into these
events. According to Turkish sources, the fights at Kokkina resulted in 53
Greek Cypriots dead and 125 injured. On the Turkish side, only 12 fatalities
and 32 wounded are recorded. These figures reflect the degree of military
preparedness on the Turkish side and again emphasise that the Turkish
Cypriot strategy was one of occupying strategic positions to facilitate
territorial gain through armed rebellion, although camouflaged in the
language of minority protection.
By the time that the cease-fire was achieved, every Turkish enclave in
Cyprus had become an entrenched position, protected by UNFICYP forces.
Enclaves now existed in every major town except Kyrenia. In the Lefka area
there were 8,000 well-armed Turkish Cypriots and 1,000 TMT fighters
strategically positioned to join up with any landing near Xeros. The big
enclave north of Nicosia almost reached the sea at Temblos in the Kyrenia
district. At Ktima, the Turkish position overlooked the coast from a strong
defensive position. The Larnaca enclave commanded a piece of coast ideal for
the use of light landing craft. At Kophinou in the Larnaca region, Turkish
positions controlled the main roads from Nicosia to Limassol and Larnaca.
The Castle at St Hilarion to the Pentadactylos mountain which dominates the
main road from Nicosia to the northern port of Kyrenia, was another
strategic position where skirmishes occurred and which became a crucial
Turkish stronghold. Military analysis suggests that on instructions from
Turkey, Turkish Cypriots began deliberately to occupy these strategic areas
in preparation for further conflict.
The creation of enclaves was also a flagrant violation of land property
rights at the expense of Greek Cypriots.
Land Ownership by Ethnic Group:
Greek/Armenian/Maronite Cypriots 4,123,813 -> 60.9%
Turkish Cypriots 848,858 -> 12.3%
Others 32,120 -> 0.5%
State Land -> 26.3%
Source:Department of Lands and Surveys (refer to Annex 14 in Volume II of
the"Memorandum by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus"
submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, 27
February 1987.
The table demonstrates in fact that the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots
into enclaves was inconsistent with their ownership of land on the island.
During this period of prolonged crisis in Cyprus, the Turkish Government
forcibly expelled Greeks from Constantinople. The Greek Government, on the
contrary, took no retaliatory measures against the Moslem minority in Greek
Western Thrace. However, this did not stop the Turkish air force from
harassing the Dodecanese (Rhodes) and Greek islands lying closest to the
Turkish Aegean coast.
In Cyprus, the total reported number of casualties over the period 21
December 1963 to 9 August 1964 vary only slightly. Turkish sources estimate
about 350 Turkish deaths and about 200 Greek fatalities. The numbers include
deaths resulting from rogue paramilitary action, as well as from exclusively
military confrontations.
Below is a set of rules issued by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to the
Turkish Cypriots on 18 December 1964:
Turkish Cypriots not in possession of a permit are prohibited to enter the
Greek sector.
1. Those who disobey the order with a view to trading with Greek Cypriots
should pay a fine of �25 or be punished with imprisonment.
2. A fine will be imposed on:-
(a) Those who converse or enter into negotiations with Greek Cypriots or
accompany any stranger into our sector.
(b) Those who come into contact with Greek Cypriots for any official work.
(c) Those who appear before Greek Cypriot courts.
(d) Those who visit the Greek Cypriot hospitals for examination or in order
to obtain pharmaceuticals ....
3. A fine of �25 or other severe punishment and one months imprisonment or
whipping should be imposed on those who enter the Greek Cypriot sector:-
(a) For Promenade.
(b) For friendly association with Greek Cypriots.
(c) For amusement....
This remarkable quarantining of the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots
was effected entirely by the Turkish nationalist leadership, since such a
separation was needed in order to pave the way for the eventual partition of
the island.
The murder of Dervis Kavazoglu in 1965 further illustrates the point.
Kavazoglu was a Turkish Cypriot journalist and trade unionist who had
criticised the enforced separation of the Turkish Cypriots and also the
leadership's policies. He and his Greek Cypriot friend, Costas Michaoulis,
were on their way to Larnaca when they were both killed near the Turkish
village of Lourougina. The are allegations that these murders were carried
out on the instructions of the Turkish leadership. This again demonstrates
that Turkish strategy was to divide the Greeks from the Turks.
Yet, by 1972 about 7,000 Turkish Cypriots, or 15% of the 46,000 strong
Turkish Cypriot work force, worked outside the enclaves. The employment of
Turkish Cypriots was closely controlled by the Turkish leadership and
Turkish Cypriots needed a work permit. The stagnant Turkish Cypriot economy
and rising unemployment in the enclaves were the main reasons for the
decision to allow this policy. This demonstrates that the "from Turk to
Turk" policy was never viable, but was simply a political nationalist ploy.
It seems that Cypriots could work together amicably when it suited economic
interests; but it was not possible when adopted for nationalist arguments by
Turkey to advance the cause of partition.
The political significance of the enclaves far exceeded their size. The
Turkish officers who were the real power behind the Turkish Cypriot throne,
developed a highly militarised and rigid regime. The Turkish Cypriot
leadership's policies helped fuel the fear and suspicion which was necessary
to maintain their position of authority. The UN Secretary General, U. Thant,
was critical of the self-isolation policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.
In effect, the Turkish Cypriots became hostages to the imposed policy of
cessation dictated by TMT. It is now impossible to know what the true
position of the majority of Turkish Cypriots was since their views were not
sought and never publicly debated by their leaders. This treatment of the
Turkish Cypriots by Turks as a political irrelevance continues to date. The
lack of a genuine Turkish Cypriot voice, with the ability to put forward its
own voice, rather than that of Turkey, is probably the greatest cause of the
inability to resolve the Cyprus problem over the last three years.
1964 - 1966
Following the crisis of 1963 the island returned to general normality. The
worst of the violence was over. The Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries had taken
their positions and were determined to defend them, while the Greek Cypriot
National Guard was obliged to take defensive positions in an attempt to
prevent further no-go areas being created by the Turkish Cypriots. The
Turkish Cypriot enclaves by now covered about 2% of the island's total area.
Never at any time prior to the Turkish invasion Turkish Cypriots had
occupied more than 12% of the total land of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots,
however, declared their own administration and refused to recognise the
Government of Cyprus as legitimate. Not surprisingly, the Government of
Cyprus regarded the Turkish Cypriot position as one of rebellion.
The atmosphere on the island can be illustrated by the kind of incidents
that occurred during these years. In 1965 there occurred 550 technical
breaches of the cease-fire. However, a closer look reveals a total of only
26 casualties. 1966 saw far less shooting, and therefore even fewer
casualties.
THE CRISIS OF 1967
The most significant event of 1967 in the SE-mediterranean was the
downfall of democracy in Greece and its replacement by a military junta. It
has frequently been alleged that George Papadopoulos, who led the coup, had
been on the CIA pay-roll since 1952 and had acted as chief liaison officer
between the KYP (the Greek subsidiary of the American CIA) and the USA. The
US administration provided training and material to the anti-constitutional
forces before the coup and became their protector for seven years after.
For Cyprus, however, the consequences were to prove catastrophic. The
emergence of the junta marked the beginning of a severe deterioration in
relations between Athens and Nicosia, a sad affair that culminated in the
military coup against Makarios in July 1974.
Since the Second World War, the US had funded an enormous military
complex in Greece, and almost the entire Greek officer corp received US
training. Greece was at the hub of CIA activity for the Eastern
Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Greek military even named their
headquarters in Athens (the Pentagon) as a gesture of admiration.
Athens was the switching centre for all communications east and south
of Greece, which had been received from the Middle East and Africa and then
relayed to Washington. As a consequence, it was Washington who wished the
Cyprus issue resolved, especially following the six day Arab-Israeli war,
which acted as a timely reminder of how essential US facilities in Greece
and Turkey were for the defence of Israel, as well as of NATO. The colonels
agreed to meet officials of the Turkish Government, but no solution was
found. In Turkey anti-Greek propaganda was yet again deliberately and
cynically fuelled using protests over the alleged maltreatment of the Muslim
minority in (Greek) Western Thrace. It is significant that the status of the
Turkish Cypriots had improved to such an extent that Turkey was unable to
continue to use this pretext. The enosis issue, however, became the chosen
tool of the junta in its efforts to destabilise the Cypriot Government.
Against this background, a second major clash occurred in Cyprus on 15
November 1967. The Turkish Cypriot village of Kophinou is situated in the
Larnaca area and sits on the junction where the road from Larnaca joins the
road from Limassol. If cut, road communications would be disrupted and
freedom of movement would be denied between the South-west and the remainder
of the island. The appointment of a new Turkish officer in January 1967 to
head the Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries heightened tension in the area.
Known by his nom de guerre, Mehmet, a campaign of stopping traffic, altering
road signs and a generally belligerent attitude aimed quite often at the
local UN contingent was adopted by his paramilitaries. It was calculated to
annoy, intimidate, and precipitate all but the Turkish Cypriots.
Turkish paramilitaries occupied positions on the high ground above
Ayios Theodoros, the neighbouring village to Kophinou. By the Summer of
1967, the Greeks of Ayios Theodoros began to experience difficulties getting
to their part of the village which could only be reached by travelling
through the occupied Turkish sector. Whilst this was going on, the Greek
Cypriot police decided to suspend their patrols in order to avoid any
increase in tension. In September, Mehmet assaulted a UN major and was
relieved of his command. The police then sought to resume their patrols, but
were prevented from doing so by the Turkish paramilitaries. The tension
imported by Mehmet, however, did not leave with him.
There followed two months of protracted negotiations in an attempt to
restart the patrols which had taken place since the early 1960s and had only
temporarily been stopped. UNFICYP agreed on the resumption of the patrols,
and by mid October the UN Secretary General himself was becoming impatient
at Turkish prevarication, which was clearly emanating from the Turkish
leadership, and complained bitterly at Turkish Cypriot behaviour. The
possibility of another no go area was unacceptable to the Cypriot
Government, especially in view of the strategic significance of the junction
of the Larnaca-Limassol road.
On 27 October 1967, the UN Secretary General was therefore driven to
make a personal appeal to the Turkish Government, asking them to co-operate
with the UN authorities in Cyprus in order to restore freedom of movement in
the Kophinou area. However, his pleas were met with an obstinateness and
stubbornness that has characterised Turkey's involvement in Cyprus ever
since. There followed more prevarication and on 13 November 1967 the UN met
with the Cyprus government, followed on 14 November by two police patrols
moving through the area. They completed their patrol unhindered. The
following day, however, another police patrol following the same route was
shot at by Turkish-Cypriot nationalists.
The National Guard, by this time joined by Grivas, retaliated, as the
Turks knew they would, and the result was a battle which went on through the
night. On 16 March, inevitably, the National Guard and the police were
withdrawn. However, by then the death toll amounted to 22 Turkish casualties
and one Greek. This event was isolated and did not escalate into island wide
violence, as had been the case in 1963/64. This episode has since been
described by Turkish propagandists as a "genocide" committed against the
Turkish Cypriots. The sad reality is that it had been deliberately
instigated by Turkey, who was by now playing with the lives of the Turkish
Cypriots. The Turkish response was immediate and pre-meditated. Turkish war
planes made sorties over Greek Thrace and troops were concentrated on the
Greco-Turkish border. Yet again, the threat of war and a danger to the
cohesion of NATO's southern flank emerged.
There followed an intense period of American shuttle diplomacy by
President Lyndon Johnson's envoy Cyrus Vance. The outcome was the
presentation of a set of stiff demands on the Greek Junta by the Turkish
Government. The result was the Junta's agreement to virtually every Turkish
demand. The colonels agreed to withdraw Grivas and all their excess troops
who had entered Cyprus. Significantly, no Turkish troops from the
inestimable number who had also joined the Turkish contingent since 1959
left the island. Any economic restrictions were also withdrawn from the
Turkish enclaves, a gesture not reciprocated by the Turkish side, who
continued to maintain their road blocades.
The political repercussions were devastating for the Greek Cypriots.
The island was now virtually undefended and any threat of invasion could
only be met by token resistance. The Turks could see that the Greeks were
unable to use their numerical strength to establish government control over
the whole island, and that Greece was unwilling to risk a war, whatever the
outcome. This assured, the Turkish Cypriots proceeded to declare their
"separate Turkish administration" on 29 December 1967 over those areas under
their control. A few Turkish Cypriot lives had given Turkey the perfect
pretext to begin its incremental annexation of Northern Cyprus.
Although the crisis had now passed, the relationship between Athens
and Nicosia had irrevocably changed. From this point on the Greek military
junta became convinced that the `Cyprus problem' could only be solved by
eliminating Makarios, because the price of a settlement with the Turks would
inevitably be beyond anything Makarios would accept. The junta, anxious to
appeal to its US masters, wanted a solution acceptable to Turkey, and this
would involve some form of partition. On 12 January 1968, Makarios declared
enosis officially no longer feasible. The tilt towards the acceptance of
independence as the new reality was now given unambiguous official approval.
Makarios followed this declaration by an election victory, in which he
received 96% of the vote, an increase of 32% over the 1960 election due to
communist support.
The political problem now emerging was how to present an agenda which
could deal effectively with democratic imperative (Cyprus had had a
legitimate communist party and a new socialist party) while making clear
Cyprus's disinterest to the Greek dictatorship.
Cyprus knew, however, that it was only a matter of time before Turkey
chose to invade and complete its objectives. The primary function of the
officer corp was to erode the authority of the Cyprus Government, rather
than to plan for the defence of the island against the expected Turkish
invasion. Indeed, given the seven year notice Cyprus had of Turkey's
intention to invade, it is remarkable that no coherent defence strategy was
adopted. The Greek colonels saw this as the achievement of a common front
with its NATO ally Turkey against communism. Any resistance on the part of
the Cypriots to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of their state
was branded anti-enosist and anti-Hellenist.
Agamemnon
"rich murphy" <Richard...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:4a456b5b-bbba-4282...@o9g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
On 15 July 1974 extreme elements nationalist of the National Guard led by
its Greek officers launched a military coup with the objective of
overthrowing the Government. The Presidential Palace was bombed but, for the
third time Makarios escaped and was flown out of Cyprus by British forces.
Nicos Sampson was installed as President. Sampson was well known for his
paramilitary involvement, and as the owner of a news paper, with fanatical
pro-Greek nationalistic leanings. The coup was, in essence, a short term
civil war between Greek factions and was completely unrelated to the
inter-communal issue which had been dormant for seven years. Indeed, the
perpetrators of the coup went out of their way to tell the world that this
was an internal Greek matter. The situation was now quite different to that
of 1963/64. The coup involved only the Greek Cypriots and, as Denktash had
acknowledged, the Turkish Cypriots were mere spectators.
Between 1967 and 1974 relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots had much
improved, with no further incidents of violence by either government or
paramilitary groups. The Turks moved freely around the island. The enclaves
existed only to sustain the argument for separation, although about 6,000
Turkish Cypriots had drifted back to their homes outside of the enclaves by
the early 1970s. Only four months before the coup, Denktash was invited to
speak at a Greek Cypriot gathering of businessmen and professionals. There
was a readiness on the part of various groups of both communities to take
part in seminars organised to promote inter-ethnic understanding. The
improvement in relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is acknowledged,
even by the most partisan of Turcophile commentators. It is therefore
extremely difficult to identify a legitimate fear on the part of the Turkish
Cypriot as a result of the coup. The only human victims of the coup were the
Greek Cypriots.
Having received reports of an impending coup, the US State Department and
Kissinger in particular chose not to prevent it, fuelling the allegations
that it had tacitly supported it. Thomas Boyatt, the Cyprus Desk officer in
the State Department warned consistently of a coup and the inevitable
Turkish response. Boyatt had served as a diplomat on the island. He
confirmed that the Junta was planning an attack on Cyprus. His pre-coup
memoranda were classified as secret and have never been released. Indeed,
after the invasion Boyatt was forbidden by Kissinger to testify before
Congress, and finally did so only in order to avoid being cited for
contempt. Evidence was only taken in executive session of Congress, so
sensitive was it considered to be. In July 1974, even the Greek Cypriot
daily Apogevmatini described in its editorial the impending coup to be
carried out by EOKA-B. The US responded with a wait and see policy. After
all, the outcome could well suit them, and it did. Five days after the coup
Turkey invaded, and unlike 1964, there was no urging of restraint by the US
State Department. There was now no need because the US-backed Junta would
not go to war against Turkey without American consent. Turkish troops landed
in Kyrenia in the early hours of 20 July 1974.
From 1967 until the time of the coup in 1974, there had been no further
recorded incidents of inter-communal violence in Cyprus. Turkey's alleged
legal justification for her invasion in 1974 was founded under article (iv)
of the Treaty of Guarantee which permits intervention, but for the sole
purpose of restoring the constitutional arrangements as laid down in the
London-Zurich agreements of 1959, not for the purpose of over-throwing them
altogether. The article is also silent about the use of armed force in this
restoration as a result of unilateral intervention. The British, who had
imposed themselves as one of the three guarantor powers, and in the defence
of many having caused an inter-communal problem where one had existed by
abusing the status of the Turkish-Cypriot minority, now decided to avoid
their obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Having insisted on the
treaty in 1960, Britain's Foreign Secretary in 1974, James Callaghan,
although greatly dissapointed by Kissinger's attitude, abdicated all
responsibility to US Secretary of State.
In response to the Turkish invasion, the Greek army attempted to mobilise,
but the mobilisation never really got off the ground. In addition, in Cyprus
Greek troops were repeatedly withdrawn by the officers from the front-line
offering an unfettered line of advance to the Turks. It was almost as if the
partition of the island was pre-arranged. The corruption and incompetence of
the junta over the previous six years had taken its toll. Within a few days
of the invasion, the junta in Athens collapsed, followed by its puppet
regime in Nicosia. Power returned to civilians under Constantine Karamalis
in Greece, while the Greek Presidency went to Glafkos Clerides, Makarios'
deputy. Constitutional order, under which Turkey attempted to justify her
invasion, was now restored. The cease-fire arranged by the UN now simply
acted as a respite to give Turkey an opportunity to consolidate her gains
and bringing in massive reinforcements to complete her strategic contingent.
It is, however, very hard to find any legal justification for Turkey's
appalling violations of human rights in Cyprus as witnessed by the findings
of the Council of Europe. We know today that thousands of Cypriot civilians
were murdered or tortured. Many women and children still remain missing.
Over 1,000 women were raped. How can this appalling brutality be justified
by an attempt to restore a constitution?
Further support for the argument that the Turkish Government's real goal was
not the restoration of constitutional order but sheer order, becomes
apparent when looking at the Geneva peace conference called in the wake of
the original July invasion.
On 9 August 1974, when Turkey held only the narrow Kyrenia-Nicosia corridor,
the Turkish foreign minister handed an ultimatum to the Greek Cypriot
negotiator Glafkos Clerides demanding the immediate cessation of 35% of
Cypriot territory to the Turkish army. When Clerides requested 36 hours to
discuss it with his Government, not a wholly unreasonably request given the
circumstances, his request was denied.
As regards Gunes, Turkish negotiator, the demand was non-negotiable. Turkey
then launched a second invasion on 14 August 1974, this time conquering 37%
of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. By then the Sampson regime had
fallen, as had the Greek Junta. Following this second offensive begun on 14
August, Greek-Cypriot retaliatory action began against the Turks after the
ethnic cleansing of Greek Cypriots from their homes had occurred, and the
majority of the human rights violations were becoming known. In the village
of Tokni, 69 Turkish Cypriots were killed and later found in a mass grave.
In Aloa, 57 Turkish Cypriots were killed, while in Maratha a further 88
corpses were discovered in a mass grave.
Following the invasion a report was prepared by the Commission of the
Council of Europe as a result of a complaint by the Cyprus Government. The
report examines alleged breaches of the articles of the Convention of Human
Rights of which each member of the Council of Europe (including Turkey) is a
signatory. The following is the summary as printed by the "Sunday Times" on
23 January 1977:
KILLING Relevant Article of Human Rights Convention:- Everyone's right to
life shall be protected by law.
Charge made by Greek Cypriots: The Turkey army embarked on a systematic
course of mass killings of civilians unconnected with any war activity.
Evidence given to the Commission: Witness Mrs K said that on 21 July 1974,
the second day of the Turkish invasion, she and a group of villages from
Elia were captured when, fleeing from bombardment, they tried to reach a
range of mountains. All 12 men arrested were civilians. They were separated
from the women and shot in front of the women, under orders of a Turkish
officer. Some of the men were holding children, three of whom were wounded.
Written statements referred to two more group killings: at Trimithi,
eye-witnesses told of the deaths of five men (two shepherds aged 60 and 70,
two masons of 20 and 60, and a 19 year-old plumber). At Palekythron 30 Greek
Cypriot soldiers being held prisoner were killed by their captors, according
to the second statement.
Witness S gave evidence of two other mass killings at Palekythron. In each
case, between 30 and 40 soldiers who had surrendered to the advancing Turks
were shot. In the second case, the witness said: "the soldiers were
transferred to the kilns of the village where they were shot dead and burnt
in order not to leave details of what had happened".
Seventeen members of two neighbouring families, including 10 women and five
children aged between two and nine were also killed in cold blood at
Palekythron, reported witness H, a doctor. Further killings described in the
doctor's notes, recording evidence related to him by patients (either
eye-witnesses or victims), included;
� Execution of eight civilians taken prisoner by Turkish soldiers in
the area of Prastio, one day after the cease-fire on 16 August 1974.
� Killing by Turkish soldiers of five unarmed Greek Cypriot soldiers
who had sought refuge in a house at Voni.
� Shooting of four women, one of whom survived by pretending she was
dead.
Further evidence, taken in refugee camps and in the form of written
statements, described killings of civilians in homes, streets or fields, as
well as the killing of people under arrest or in detention. Eight statements
described the killing of soldiers not in combat; five statements referred to
a mass grave found in Dherynia.
Commission's verdict: By 14 votes to one, the Commission considered there
were "very strong indications" of violation of Article 2 and killings
"committed on a substantial scale".
RAPE Relevant Article:- No one shall be subjected to torture or to in-human
or degrading treatment or punishment.
Charge:- Turkish troops were responsible for wholesale and repeated rapes of
women of all ages from 12 to 71. Sometimes to such an extent that the
victims suffered haemorrhages or became mental wrecks. In some areas,
enforced prostitution was practised, all women and girls of a village being
collected and put into separate rooms in empty houses where they were raped
repeatedly.
In certain cases members of the same family were repeatedly raped, some of
them in front of their own children. In other cases women were brutally
raped in public.
Rapes were on many occasions accompanied by brutality such as violent biting
of the victims, causing severe wounding, banging their heads on the floor
and wringing their throats almost to the point of suffocation. In some cases
attempts to rape were followed by the stabbing or killing of the victims,
including pregnant and mentally-retarded women.
Evidence given to Commission:- Testimony of doctors C and H, who examined
the victims. Eye-witnesses and hearsay witnesses also gave evidence, and the
Commission had before it written statements from 41 alleged victims.
Dr H said he had confirmed rape in 70 cases, including:-
� A mentally-retarded girl of 24 was raped in her house by 20
soldiers. When she started screaming they threw her from the second floor
window. She fractured her spine and was paralysed.
� One day after their arrival at Voni, Turks took girls to a nearby
house and raped them. ? One woman from Voni was raped on three occasions by
four persons each time. She became pregnant.
� One girl, from Palekythrou, who was held with others in a house,
was taken out at gun point and raped.
� At Tanvu, Turkish soldiers tried to rape a 17 year-old girl. She
resisted and was shot dead.
� A woman from Gypsou told Dr H that 25 girls were kept by Turks at
Marathouvouno as prostitutes.
Another witness said his wife was raped in front of their children. Witness
S told of 25 girls who complained to Turkish officers about being raped and
were raped again by the officers. A man (name withheld) reported that his
wife was stabbed in the neck while resisting rape. His grand-daughter, aged
six, had been stabbed and killed by Turkish soldiers attempting to rape her.
A Red Cross witness said that in August 1974, while the island's telephones
were still working, the Red Cross Society received calls from Palekythrou
and Kaponti reporting rapes. The Red Cross also took care of 38 women
released from Voni and Gypsou detention camps; all had been raped, some in
front of their husbands and children. Others had been raped repeatedly, or
put in houses frequented with Turkish soldiers.
These women were taken to Akrotiri hospital, in the British Sovereign Base
Area, where they were treated. Three were found to be pregnant. Reference
was also made to several abortions performed at the base.
Commission's verdict:- By 12 votes to one the Commission found "that the
incidents of rape described in the cases referred to and regarded as
established constitute "in-human treatment" and thus violations of Article 3
for which Turkey is responsible under the Convention."
TORTURE Relevant article:- see above under Rape.
Charge: Hundreds of people, including children, women and pensioners, were
victims of systematic torture and savage and humiliating treatment during
their detention by the Turkish army. They were beaten, according to the
allegations, sometimes to the extent of being incapacitated. Many were
subjected to whipping, breaking of their teeth, knocking their heads against
walls, beating with electrified clubs, stubbing of cigarettes on their skin,
jumping and stepping on their chests and hands, pouring dirty liquids on
them, piercing them with bayonets, etc.
Many, it was said, were ill-treated to such an extent that they became
mental and physical wrecks. The brutalities complained of reached their
climax after the cease-fire agreements; in fact, most of the acts described
were committed at a time when Turkish armed forces were not engaged in any
war activities.
Evidence to Commission: Main witness was a school teacher, one of 2,000
Greek Cypriot men deported to Turkey. He stated that he and his fellow
detainees were repeatedly beaten after their arrest, on their way to Adana
(in Turkey), in jail at Adana and in prison camp at Amasya.
On ship to Turkey:- "That was another moment of terrible beating again. We
were tied all the time. I lost the sense of touch. I could not feel anything
for about two or three months. Every time we asked for water or spoke we
were beaten."
Arriving at Adana:- "... then, one by one, they led us to prisons, through a
long corridor .. Going through that corridor was another terrible
experience. There were about 100 soldiers from both sides with sticks, clubs
and with their fists beating every one of us while going to the other end of
the corridor. I was beaten at least 50 times until I reached the other end.
"In Adana anyone who said he wanted to see a doctor was beaten.
"Beating was on the agenda every day. There were one or two very good, very
nice people, but they were afraid to show their kindness, as they told us."
Witness P spoke of:-
� A fellow prisoner who was kicked in the mouth. He lost several
teeth "and his lower jaw came off in pieces".
� A Turkish officer, a karate student, who exercised every day by
hitting prisoners.
� Fellow prisoners who were hung by the feet over the hole of a
lavatory for hours.
� A Turkish second lieutenant who used to prick all prisoners with a
pin when they were taken into a yard.
Evidence from Dr H said that prisoners were in an emaciated condition on
their return to Cyprus. On nine occasions he had found signs of wounds.
The doctor gave a general description of conditions in Adana and in
detention camps in Cyprus (at Pavlides Garage and the Saray Prison in the
Turkish quarter of Nicosia) as reported to him by former detainees. Food, he
said, consisted of one-eight of a loaf of bread a day, with occasional
olives; there were about two buckets of water and two mugs which were never
cleaned, from which about 1,000 people had to drink; toilets were filthy,
with faeces rising over the basins; floors were covered with faeces and
urine; in jail in Adana prisoners were kept 76 to a cell with three towels
between them and one block of soap per eight persons per month to wash
themselves and their clothes.
One man, it was alleged, had to amputate his own toes with a razor blade as
a consequence of ill-treatment. Caught in Achna with another man, they had
been beaten up with hard objects. When he asked for a glass of water he was
given a glass full of urine. His toes were then stepped on until they became
blue, swollen and eventually gangrenous (the other man was said to have been
taken to hospital in Nicosia, where he agreed to have his legs amputated. He
did not survive the operation).
According to witness S:- "hundreds of Greek Cypriots were beaten and dozens
were executed. They have cut off their ears in some cases, like the case of
Palekythron and Trahoni ..." (verbatim record).
Verdict by Commission: By 12 votes to one, the Commission concluded that
prisoners were in a number of cases physically ill-treated by Turkish
soldiers.
"These acts of ill-treatment caused considerable injuries and in at least
one case, death of a victim. By their severity they constitute "in-human
treatment" in the sense of Article 3, for which Turkey is responsible under
the Convention."
LOOTING Relevant article:- Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
Charge: In all Turkish-occupied areas the Turkish army systematically looted
houses and businesses of Greek Cypriots.
Evidence to Commission: Looting in Kyrenia was described by witness C:- "...
The first days of looting of the shops was done by the army of heavy things
like refrigerators, laundry machines, television sets" (verbatim record).
For weeks after the invasion, he said, he had watched Turkish naval ships
taking on board the looted goods.
Witness K, a barrister, described the pillage of Famagusta:- "At two o'clock
an organised, systematic, terrifying, shocking, unbelievable looting started
... We heard the breaking of doors, some of them iron doors, smashing of
glass, and we were waiting for them any minute to enter the house. This
lasted for about four hours."
Written statements by eye-witnesses of looting were corroborated by several
reports by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Verdict of Commission: The Commission accepted that looting and robbery on
an extensive scale, by Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriots, had taken place.
By 12 votes to one, it established that there had been deprivation of
possessions of Greek Cypriots on a large scale.
OTHER CHARGES
On four counts:- the Commission concluded that Turkey had also violated an
Article of the Convention asserting the right to respect for private and
family life, home and correspondence. The Commission also decided that
Turkey was continuing to violate the Article by refusing to allow the return
of more than 170,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes in the north.
On three counts:- the Commission said Turkey had breached an Article laying
down the right to liberty and security of persons by confining more than
2,000 Greek Cypriots in schools and churches.
Finally, the Commission said Turkey had violated two more articles that
specify that the rights and freedoms in the Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any grounds, and that anyone whose rights are
violated "shall have an effective remedy before a national authority."
The European Commission on Human Rights has outlined in great detail the
actions of the Turkish armed forces and the treatment that it handed out to
those Greek Cypriot civilians with whom it came into contact. 5,000 Greek
Cypriot civilians were murdered, over 1,000 women were raped. Over 1,619
Greek Cypriots were abducted and remain missing, their whereabouts never
disclosed by the Turkish authorities. The brutality the Turkish army brought
with it was specifically designed to terrify the local Greek Cypriot
creating 200,000 refugees.
By 18 August the Turkish army had drawn a line (aptly called the Attila
line) across the island, which remains to this day and follows the proposed
line suggested in 1957 very closely. The long cherished aims of Kibris
Turktur were partly fulfilled and there have been numerous calls since 1974
from Turkish nationalist groups to go on and "finish the job".
An ethnic group, which in 1964 owned about 12% of the land of Cyprus, had
managed, by means of violence and manipulation, in gaining control of over
37%.