Bad news for Hanife's PKK terrorist organization.
sutten
Hanife is an active member and supporter of PKK, one of the most
brutal terrorist organizations of the World's history which massacred
nearly 40 thousands innocent lives in Turkiye and ruined health and
property of many millions of others to destroy Turkish goverment and
establish a maxist-lennist-communist dictatorship in Turkiye.
../..
t...@turkradio.org (TRH) wrote in message news:<2001100804...@turkradio.org>...
* As we have reported to you last week, Turkish officials have been more
vocal about the support of the Western countries, especially the
Europeans, to various pro-Islamic groups and Kurdish insurgents after the
Sept. 11th attacks in New York and Washington.
Turkey's minister of justice Mr. Hikmet Sami Turk is the last official
who joined the criticism of the European countries for their "supportive"
attitude towards these groups.
According to the Turkish Daily News, Mr. Turk was speaking at the
European Justice Ministers Conference in Moscow, at a session titled "The
Measures Against International Terrorism".
In related news, the German foreign affairs minister Mr. Joschka Fischer
promised his Turkish counterpart that Germany would eradicate the
financial resources of a fundamentalist group of Turks based in Germany.
The group is saying that they are aiming to set up and Islamic republic
in Turkey.
Also in Belgium, officials raided the offices of organizations that they
claimed are affiliated with the Turkish Kurdish rebel organization
Kurdistan Workers Party this week. The Turkish News says that many Kurds
were arrested.
ARC@DIAN
"sutten" <sut...@att.net> wrote in message
news:52f7da1b.01100...@posting.google.com...
> Bad news for Hanife's PKK terrorist organization.
>
> Hanife is an active member and supporter of PKK, one of the most
> brutal terrorist organizations of the World's history which massacred
> nearly 40 thousands innocent lives in Turkiye
Unbelievable, Turkish 'security' forces devastate 3,000 Kurdish villages and
massacre their inhabitants Vietnam style, and it's ONLY PKK's fault.
REAL
sutten wrote:
> Bad news for Hanife's PKK terrorist organization.
>
> Hanife is an active member and supporter of PKK, one of the most
> brutal terrorist organizations of the World's history which massacred
> nearly 40 thousands innocent lives in Turkiye and ruined health and
> property of many millions of others to destroy Turkish goverment and
> establish a maxist-lennist-communist dictatorship in Turkiye.
and the substantiation for this is where?
WolfWolf
news:mFow7.46786$My2.22...@news1.mntp1.il.home.com...
>
> "sutten" <sut...@att.net> wrote in message
> news:52f7da1b.01100...@posting.google.com...
> > Bad news for Hanife's PKK terrorist organization.
> >
> > Hanife is an active member and supporter of PKK, one of the most
> > brutal terrorist organizations of the World's history which massacred
> > nearly 40 thousands innocent lives in Turkiye
>
> Unbelievable, Turkish 'security' forces devastate 3,000 Kurdish villages
and
> massacre their inhabitants Vietnam style, and it's ONLY PKK's fault.
Unbelievable? Where are these "villages"? How many Kurdish (and other)
people are massacred by PKK?
Where are the criminals?
It's time to end this plague!
REAL
WolfWolf wrote:
> "ARC@DIAN" <OXI.arca...@hotmail.com.SPAM> wrote in message
> news:mFow7.46786$My2.22...@news1.mntp1.il.home.com...
> >
> > "sutten" <sut...@att.net> wrote in message
> > news:52f7da1b.01100...@posting.google.com...
> > > Bad news for Hanife's PKK terrorist organization.
> > >
> > > Hanife is an active member and supporter of PKK, one of the most
> > > brutal terrorist organizations of the World's history which massacred
> > > nearly 40 thousands innocent lives in Turkiye
> >
> > Unbelievable, Turkish 'security' forces devastate 3,000 Kurdish villages
> and
> > massacre their inhabitants Vietnam style, and it's ONLY PKK's fault.
>
> Unbelievable? Where are these "villages"? How many Kurdish (and other)
> people are massacred by PKK?
> Where are the criminals?
> It's time to end this plague!
Including the plague of Turkish state terrorism which allowed the PKK to form.
The evidence is staggering and overwhelming!
March/April 1999
Vol. 55, No. 2
Turkey's War on the Kurds
Story and photos by Kevin McKiernan
Editor's note: While the March/April 1999 issue was at the printer, Turkish
security forces arrested PKK leader Abdullah Oçalan in Nairobi, Kenya and
transported him to a Turkish prison, where he awaits trail on charges of
treason. For an update on the situation, please see the February 18 edition of
Bulletin Wire.
Behind army lines in the Turkish province of Siirt, scores of frightened
refugees were on the run. They were Kurdish families, fleeing a village that had
recently been burned by the Turkish army. When I caught up to them, they were
fording the Tigris River, guiding a long line of donkeys laden with
refrigerators and other goods.
In the village, most of the houses were in ashes. Only a handful of residents
had returned to scavenge some of their belongings. The local mayor told me that
an army commander, accompanied by a group of government-armed village guards,
had arrived and given residents 24 hours to get out of town. Some quickly dug
holes in the outlying fields to bury valuables; others just gathered up what
they could carry and abandoned the rest.
I walked through the rubble, taking pictures. The destruction was fresh, maybe a
couple of days old, and some of it was still smoldering. I heard an army
helicopter overhead. It was American-made, a Sikorsky Black Hawk, the type the
Turkish army uses to land troops in the villages. But it was high in the air, on
a different mission. I finished my work and moved on.
A Kurdish refugee--his villages destroyed by the Turkish army--pauses by the
Tigris River.
Roots run deep
At 25 million, the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without their
own state. With a similar language, religion, and culture, the Kurds have lived
for thousands of years in an area that is now part of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria,
and the former Soviet Union. Today, the 15 million Kurds who live in Turkey
constitute about 25 percent of that country's population.
After World War I, Kurds hoped to create a homeland from the wreckage of the
Ottoman Empire, but those dreams vanished with the birth of the Turkish Republic
in 1923. Riding a wave of nationalism, Mustafa Kemal--known as Ataturk, "the
Father of the Turks"--imposed a single identity on the multicultural population
of Turkmans, Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds, and others. Most minorities were
forcibly assimilated; everyone became a Turk. (The Kurds were called "Mountain
Turks" until after the Gulf War in 1991.)
In the first 25 years of the Turkish Republic there were dozens of Kurdish
uprisings. All were crushed, but discontent continued. In 1984, a Marxist-led
group called the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers Party, began an armed struggle
against the government.
The war in Turkey represents the single largest use of U.S. weapons anywhere in
the world by non-U.S. forces, according to Bill Hartung of the World Policy
Institute. "I can think of no instance since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in
1982," he said, "where American weaponry has been put to this concentrated a
use." In 15 years of fighting in Turkey nearly 40,000 lives have been lost, more
than in the conflicts on the West Bank and in Northern Ireland combined. The two
million refugees produced by the war in Kurdistan are roughly the number of
homeless created by the widely reported war in Bosnia, where U.S. weapons were
not a factor. In contrast, 75 percent of the Turkish arsenal was made in the
United States, according to estimates.
Despite these statistics, the civil strife in Turkey has received comparatively
little coverage in the U.S. media. Television news rarely mentions the Kurds,
unless the story relates to the Iraqi Kurds. It is almost as though there are
two sets of Kurds--the Kurds in Iraq, who seem to be viewed as the "good" Kurds
because they oppose Saddam, and the Kurds in Turkey, who are "bad" because they
oppose a U.S. ally. It doesn't seem to matter that there are four times as many
Kurds in Turkey, or that both populations have suffered repression from their
respective governments.
Until 1991, Kurdish music and language, dress, associations, and newspapers were
banned by the Turkish government. After the Gulf War, Kurdish printing was
legalized, but in the intervening years numerous Kurdish newspaper offices have
been bombed and closed. More than a dozen Kurdish journalists, as well as
numerous politicians and activists, have been killed by death squads (human
rights groups list more that 4,000 extrajudicial killings during the period).
Despite 15 years of fighting the PKK, Turkey today has no POWs; most rebels,
according to the government, have been "captured dead." But there are large
numbers of civilian Kurds in Turkish prisons where, according to organizations
like Amnesty International, the use of torture is routine.
Kurdish TV and radio are still illegal in Turkey, although the government has
promised to soften the ban. The Kurdish language still may not be taught in
schools or used by merchants on storefronts or in advertising. It is illegal in
Turkey for parents to give their child a Kurdish name.
Shepherds and soldiers
In June 1995, the army commander from the city of Mardin informed residents of
the village of Alimlikoy--called Bilalya by the Kurds--that they would have to
go on the payroll of the state as village guards. The villagers were reluctant
to become guards because that would put them in the middle of the war with the
PKK rebels. They were shepherds who spent long, isolated hours in the mountains
with their flocks; they feared that if they accepted weapons from the
government, they would become targets for the guerrillas. The Turkish officer
gave them two weeks to think about it. When no answer was forthcoming, he
arrested the "muhtar," or village elder. The shepherd who walked me into
Alimlikoy--overland, around the blockaded road-- told me the muhtar had been
kept in jail for several days. He had been beaten, according to the shepherd,
"but not badly."
On the day the muhtar was released, which was shortly before my arrival, the
villagers hired trucks to haul away household goods and as much of the ripening
harvest of lentils and barley as they could carry. I arrived in time to see some
of the harvests, piled in heaps by the side of the road. The Kurds were pouring
salvaged grain into plastic bags, which they hoped to sell at the market. On a
hillside, a giant sign read: "Happy is He Who Can Call Himself a Turk."
Back in Alimlikoy, I asked the shepherd why he hadn't just agreed to become a
guard. "Why would we?" he asked. "We have our fields and our animals. We have an
income.
"Besides," he said with some emphasis, "why should we try to do a job that not
even the state can accomplish?"
U.S. arms and human rights
Since 1980 the United States has sold or given Turkey--a NATO ally--$15 billion
worth of weapons. In the last decade the Turkish army has leveled, burned, or
forcibly evacuated more than 3,000 Kurdish villages. That is roughly
three-quarters the number of Kurdish settlements destroyed in Iraq in the 1980s
during Saddam Hussein's infamous "Anfal" campaign, when the West was arming Iraq
and turning a blind eye to widespread human rights violations.
Most of the destruction in Turkey took place between 1992 and 1995, during the
Clinton administration's first term. In 1995 the administration acknowledged
that American arms had been used by the Turkish government in domestic military
operations "during which human rights abuses have occurred." In a report ordered
by Congress, the State Department admitted that the abuses included the use of
U.S. Cobra helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and F-16 fighter bombers. In
some instances, critics say, entire Kurdish villages were obliterated from the
air.
The administration conceded that the Turkish policy had forced more than two
million Kurds from their homes. Some of the villages were evacuated and burned,
bombed, or shelled by government forces to deprive the PKK of a "logistical base
of operations," according to the State Department report, while others were
targeted because their inhabitants refused to join the "village guards," a
brutal military tactic-- patterned on the Vietnam-era "model villages"
program--that requires civilian Kurds to fight Kurdish guerrillas.
Human Rights Watch, the New York-based watchdog group, said the State Department
had issued only "half conclusions" in its report, so as to avoid offending the
Turkish government. Human Rights Watch, which has also criticized the PKK rebels
for serious rights violations, said the U.S.-supplied Turkish army was
"responsible for the majority of forced evacuation and destruction of villages."
In a 1998 interview, John Shattuck, the assistant secretary of state for human
rights, defended U.S. arms deliveries to Turkey. Shattuck, a one-time professor
at Harvard and a former member of the advisory board at Amnesty International,
said that although abuses against Kurds were "a matter of grave concern" to the
United States, Turkey's human rights record was improving. And in any case, he
added, "I don't think the United States is responsible for Turkey's internal
policies."
Some members of Congress strongly disagree. Cong. Cynthia McKinney, a Democrat
from Georgia, believes that human rights, democracy, and nonaggression criteria
should be applied before American weapons are sold or given to countries like
Turkey. "If they are going to be our ally and they are also going to receive our
weapons," McKinney said, "the least that we can do is to suggest to them that
they not use the weapons against their own people." McKinney led the fight in
1997 for a code of conduct, which would have mandated congressional review of
such transfers. The code, which was opposed by the White House, passed in the
House but did not receive adequate support in the Senate, where it died in
conference committee.
Last September the code was reintroduced with 80 co-sponsors in the House, but
the session adjourned before a vote could be taken. Congress did pass a less
comprehensive measure, an amendment introduced by Sen. Patrick Leahy, a Vermont
Democrat, which prohibits U.S. military aid to foreign security units that the
State Department has found to have "committed gross violations of human rights."
The so-called "Leahy Amendment" also bars funding for military training programs
if a member of a unit has been found to have committed "gross human rights
violations."
Many Europeans are also uneasy with Turkey's current policies. Turkey has been
angling for admission to the European Union for years, but the EU, citing the
lack of freedom of expression, the jailing and torture of dissidents, and the
state of emergency in Kurdish areas, has locked the door. The Kurdish problem,
according to Hugo Paeman, the EU's ambassador to the United States, "is only a
reflection of the fact that we don't have the type of government [in Turkey]
which we would feel comfortable with within the European Union."
Paeman, a Belgian, said it was difficult for the EU to negotiate in good faith
with the civilian government in Ankara when the army generals behind the scenes
held the real power. "Do you feel that you are actually not talking to the
people who are running Turkey?" I asked him. "Up to a certain point, yes," he
responded.
In view of that, I asked, is Turkish democracy merely a façade? Ambassador
Paeman paused to make eye contact with his aide, a Danish official, before
answering. "One can say that," he replied.
Feeding the spirit
When I met Ali in 1996, he was drinking tea and playing cards in Midyat, one of
dozens of Kurdish towns overflowing with refugees. Ali and his wife and nine
kids had all fled Shekhir, a farming village known for its sweet cherries. Long
ago the Turks had changed the name of the place to Kocasirt, which is how it
appeared on the map. But Ali, like others who had lived there, still called it
Shekhir.
Having agreed to take me to the village, Ali drove gingerly down a hill toward
his old home, carefully scanning the rock-studded road for signs of surface
digging. He said the army often mines access to abandoned Kurdish villages. The
week before, on the road to another vacated settlement, a man and a woman were
badly injured when a land mine exploded under their donkey. "I have seen
President Clinton on television," he told me in a trusting tone. "I don't think
he would permit these bad things to happen if he knew about them."
Ali said that in the summer of 1994, 16 army tanks rolled through his village
searching for Kurdish guerrillas. Some of the tanks had rubber wheels, like the
kind the Germans sell to Turkey; the others were track vehicles, like the M-48
and M-60 tanks made in the United States.
Even though no rebels were found, the soldiers returned a few months later and
delivered an ultimatum to the people: Become village guards or abandon your
homes. The 70-year-old muhtar insisted the villagers had never fed or otherwise
assisted the rebels; they just wanted to grow their crops. He told the soldiers
that the people chose to be left alone. It was the wrong choice.
A few nights later, the muhtar was dragged from his home and shot. The
townspeople still refused to take arms from the government. Instead, they
gathered their furniture and household belongings and moved away.
Whatever Kocasirt had been before, it was now a collection of deserted, burned,
and dynamited houses. It was a ghost town, except for the cemetery. There we
encountered an old woman who had just returned to the village by foot. She was
wailing softly and sprinkling red cherries on a tombstone. She said she was
"feeding the spirit" of her dead brother. My guide recognized her: She was the
sister of the muhtar. Reaching for a weed in the overgrown graveyard, the woman
made a sweeping motion with one hand. "They just plucked him like a flower," she
said.
The Washington-Ankara alliance
Because of its strategic location in the Middle East, between the Balkans and
the southern republics of the former Soviet Union, Turkey has served as a major
U.S. ally for more than 50 years. The low point in the alliance came in 1974,
when in response to the invasion of northern Cyprus by Turkey's U.S.-equipped
armed forces, Congress placed a total embargo on U.S. arms transfers to Turkey.
The invasion, which has been condemned by numerous U.N. resolutions, might have
permanently altered the U.S.-Turkish relationship--had it not been for the fall
of the U.S.--backed regime in Iran in 1979.
For the United States, a decades-old strategy in the Gulf collapsed with the
demise of the Shah. Not only was its Cold War containment strategy threatened,
the United States now regarded Islam, stretching from North Africa through the
Gulf to southwest Asia, as the single biggest threat to U.S. interests in the
region. Turkey, like Israel and Egypt, would form the cornerstone of the new
policy to contain Iran and the further spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
Good relations between the United States and Turkey weathered a 1980 coup, in
which Turkish army generals overthrew the country's democratically elected
leaders. (Almost 20 years later the army's power over the constitution and other
Turkish laws is unquestioned.) Within months of the coup, the United States and
Turkey signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, a treaty which
gave the United States the right to locate military bases in Turkey, which
borders both Iran and Iraq, in exchange for a promise to modernize Turkey's
armed forces.
The agreement proved vital to U.S. strategy against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf
War. The Allies flew hundreds of bombing missions against Iraqi targets from
Turkish air space. The Turks also agreed to shut down the Iraqi pipeline where
it entered Turkey's southeast border. That decision, made at considerable cost
to Turkish interests, was key to the post-war embargo of Iraq.
Turkey's value to U.S. policy-makers today is more than just its proximity to
Iran and Iraq or the perceived need to contain the spread of Islam. There is
also the issue of petroleum. The Caspian Sea to the east is thought to contain
more than 100 billion barrels of oil. Capturing the deposits is a mammoth
project, the stakes are high, and the parties play hardball. The agreement
signed by a consortium of global companies to recover the oil represents the
most lucrative contract of any kind in the twentieth century.
No one yet knows how the crude oil will be transported to the West, but the
United States is pushing for a pipeline to be built through Turkey to the
Mediterranean Sea. Amoco and British Petroleum, the largest companies in the
consortium, want to build a shorter pipeline through Georgia and then ship the
oil by tanker through the Black Sea. But both companies are currently involved
in other projects in Turkey, and Turkey has threatened to revoke their operating
permits if they fail to support the Turkish route for Caspian oil. As it turns
out, such a route would pass through the center of Kurdistan. Kurdish
guerrillas, who already have blown up sections of the Iraqi pipeline and Turkish
oil fields in the southeast, have vowed to block the project.
A PKK antiaircraft position along the Turkish-Iraqi border.
Kurds v. Kurds
In 1994, when I last visited Gorumlu--a settlement tucked into the base of a
mountain on the Turkish side of the Iraqi border--the village showed signs of
support for the rebels, and the area was often the scene of firefights with the
army. But today the local Kurds are on the government payroll. The village
guards in Gorumlu had joined the widespread program of rural pacification, the
army strategy introduced in 1985. In this area the guards were especially
valuable because they knew the PKK trails along the border; they had served as
scouts for soldiers in several incursions into Iraq in search of rebel base
camps.
Because of their decision, the villagers were able to keep their homes. The
state was giving them weapons, bullets, U.S.-made Motorola radios, and a salary
of $250 a month-far more than they could make as farmers. With their help, the
Turkish army had driven the guerrillas deep into the mountains, and clashes in
the village had become less frequent. But Gorumlu's switchover was not without
cost.
The PKK, many of whose local members had been recruited from Gorumlu, views both
the guards and their families as Turkish collaborators, and claims that both are
legitimate military targets. Soon after one army incursion into nearby Iraq, the
guerrillas launched a coordinated attack against the village and the nearby army
garrison, resulting in civilian deaths.
During the battle, the army commander told me he had intercepted a radio
transmission, which he said came from a PKK superior, urging his fighters to
"hit the little mice as well as the big mice." According to the Turkish officer
and several villagers, four children were killed and several adults were injured
when the PKK threw a grenade through a window of one of the houses. For its
part, the PKK has denied responsibility for the attack, blaming instead the
Kontra Gerilla--death squads they say are linked to the Turkish security forces.
Buyers and suppliers
Today, the United States has several intelligence-gathering posts in Turkey,
including a radar installation in Mardin, a largely Kurdish city. The Mardin
facility was built by GM Hughes of El Segundo, California, the parent company of
Delco Systems. The radar site is said to be capable of "seeing" deep into Iraq,
Iran, and south central Asia.
NATO has major installations in Turkey, the most prominent of which is at
Incirlik, near the city of Adana. U.S. intelligence planes, including the giant
AWACS, take off daily from Incirlik for flights over northern Iraq, monitoring
traffic both in Iraq and Iran. U.S. F-15s and F-16s, as well as British
aircraft, make regular sorties into northern Iraq, patrolling the "no-fly" zone
for violations by Saddam Hussein's air force.
Turkey's war with the Kurds draws on weaponry from dozens of American companies,
including McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, Hughes, Boeing, Raytheon, and
Bell Textron. Kurdish refugees driven into northern Iraq from destroyed villages
in Turkey rarely know any English, but in recounting the rocketing of their
settlements, they regularly use the words "Cobra" and "Sikorsky," the U.S.-made
helicopters used to clear Kurdish villages.
The "King Cobra," the gunship produced by Bell Textron in Texas, is a strong
contender for a new Turkish arms contract worth almost $4 billion. In 1997 the
State Department granted market licenses to Bell and to Boeing Aircraft for
attack helicopters (Boeing makes the "Apache" gunship), but future sales by
either company could be delayed if human rights concerns are raised again in
Congress. In 1996 Turkey canceled the purchase of 10 Super Cobra helicopters
when Congress delayed that deal to consider whether Turkey was using the Cobra
against Kurdish civilians. If that happens again, Turkey could buy attack
helicopters from France or could turn to a version of the weapon built jointly
by Russia and Israel, without strings attached. In fact, the burgeoning
relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem-which includes Israeli upgrades of
Turkey's F-4, F-5, and F-16 fighters; the development of medium-range missiles;
and the conduct of joint military exercises-has increasingly allowed Turkey to
circumvent U.S. and European embargoes.
The giant helicopter sale is one of two prospective U.S. arms transfers that
have generated strong opposition from human rights groups. The other is a $45
million sale by AV Technologies in Michigan for 140 armored personnel carriers
(APCs) to Turkey. Turkey already has an estimated 2,800 U.S.-made APCs (most of
which were made in California by FMC--the Food Machinery Corporation).
The new APCs are intended for use by Turkey's "anti-terror" police units.
Amnesty International USA conducted a three-year study on these police groups,
which it sent to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in an effort to block the
transfer. The report provides examples of identified "anti-terror" units
torturing children, sexually assaulting prisoners, using electric shock torture,
beating, burning, and the near-drowning of suspects, as well as other gross
violations. Among 280 victims of the "anti-terror" units mentioned in the report
were "infants, children, and the elderly." But last December, despite such
evidence, the State Department OK'd the arms deal. Because of the recently
enacted Leahy Amendment, some restrictions were placed on the use of U.S. loans
for APCs destined for areas of conflict, but the export license for all 140
vehicles to the "anti-terror" police was approved.
That was consistent with past practices, in which arms deals involving Turkey
have moved along expeditiously. In 1992 and 1993 the Pentagon quietly
facilitated a mammoth military shipment to Turkey at no cost. According to the
U.N. arms registry, the U.S. government turned over 1,509 tanks, 54 fighter
planes, and 28 heavily armed attack helicopters to Turkey. The weapons were
slated for reduction after the Cold War under a 1990 treaty on conventional
forces in Europe. Instead of scrapping them, the United States simply gave them
away. There was no congressional oversight or public debate about the transfer,
nor was there much question about the purpose of the unprecedented arms
shipment. As Jane's Defence Weekly revealed as early as 1993, "a high proportion
of defense equipment supplied to Turkey is being used in operations against the
PKK."
Military assistance to Turkey has even included the use of American soldiers.
Last year, according to the Washington Post, a special operations team
authorized by the Joint Combined Exchange Training Act, a little-known law
passed by Congress, conducted its first mission to Turkey. The U.S. team was
sent to train the Turkish Mountain Commandos, "a unit whose chief function is to
fight Kurdish guerrillas."
Turkey also benefits from the International Military Education and Training
program, a Pentagon program funded through the foreign aid budget. From 1984,
when the PKK's uprising began, to 1997, about 2,500 Turkish officers received
training. Bill Hartung of the World Policy Institute says that much of the
training of the Turkish military focuses on how to use weapons already purchased
from American companies. Hartung estimates U.S. taxpayers have already paid
"tens of millions of dollars" to train Turkish forces to fight the Kurds.
Cleaning up
Çizre has been "cleaned," the Turkish policeman said proudly. And in one sense
he was right. The largely Kurdish town of 25,000, located about 50 miles north
of the Iraqi border, was firmly under the control of the Turkish security
forces.
When I was there in 1994, Çizre was a hotbed of PKK resistance. That memory was
still fresh as I rented my old room at the ratty Kadioglu, where an
intermittently lit sign said "Turistik Hotel." The room had an outdoor balcony,
which overlooked the sign, and from there I used to watch the exchange of tracer
fire after dark, the surreal streams of yellow lighting up the intersection
below. In 1992, during "Newroz," the Kurdish new year, the Turkish army shot and
killed a photojournalist near the Kadioglu. Since my last visit, someone had
repaired the concrete balcony by my room, patching over the bullet-pocked walls.
The reception clerk told me he was getting tired of it all-tired of the war and
tired of all the unpaid tasks he was forced to perform. He was still cooperative
with the police, and he had no use for the rebels. But, like many accommodating
Kurds, he was growing progressively alienated. It was true that the guerrillas
had been driven into the tops of the mountains, their logistical base disrupted
by deforestation and the widespread destruction of villages. But the government
seemed to be losing the battle for the hearts and minds of ordinary Kurds.
The hotel clerk complained that he had to inform the police of all movements by
reporters: "When you get up, when you go out, and when you return. It's
incredible," he said. "We have to telephone three different places each time:
the Army, MIT (military intelligence), and the regular police. Why can't we just
call one place, and let them handle the rest?" What he really wanted was a sort
of clearinghouse for the surveillance of the press, and we got to joking about
it. In jest, I asked him to notify the police that I had used a hotel toilet at
6 a.m. that day, and again at 7:30.
He smiled, shrugging his shoulders and rolling his eyes. "What can we do?" he
said.
Turkish soldiers patrol the streets of Çizre
in an American-made M-60 tank
Internationalizing the conflict
The case of PKK leader Abdullah Oçalan has raised the profile of the Kurds in
recent months. Oçalan--widely known as Apo--was arrested in November 1998 in the
Rome airport after arriving from Moscow. After a decade of directing PKK
activities from Damascus, Oçalan and other PKK officials had been expelled from
Syria a month earlier when Turkish troops began massing on the border,
threatening to escalate a long-running political feud between Turkey and Syria.
Turkish officials were jubilant when Oçalan was detained, but their euphoria
soon turned to outrage. The Kurdish leader, whom the government charged with
"tens of thousands of murders" in the 15-year-old uprising, would have faced
execution if returned to Turkey. But the Italian constitution bars extradition
to countries where the death penalty is in force. Within days Italy announced it
would not extradite, and Oçalan was released.
Turkish politicians unleashed a firestorm of protest. Across Turkey the police
reacted by staging raids on the offices of HADEP, the legal Kurdish party. More
than 3,000 HADEP members were jailed within a few days. According to human
rights groups, a number of party members were subjected to torture; two died in
custody.
In Istanbul, the nation's top business lobbies urged a total boycott of Italian
goods (Italy ranks as the world's second largest exporter to Turkey). But the
European Union immediately threatened Turkey with economic sanctions if it
followed through with the boycott.
Turkey's harsh attacks on EU-member Italy seemed especially inflammatory,
considering Turkey's persistent efforts to be accepted for membership in the EU.
But the Oçalan affair was shaping up to be the nastiest row in memory between
NATO members, and the dispute was widening.
Massimo D'Alema, Italy's prime minister, called on the Kurdish leader to
renounce violence, a minimum requirement to be considered for political asylum.
Oçalan responded by saying: "I am ready to do my part to halt terrorism." He
called for a political solution to the war, a demand that Turkey had repeatedly
rejected. The disavowal of violence was welcomed by D'Alema, but the Italian
leader further angered Turkey by declaring that the struggle of the Kurdish
people was an ancient and complex problem that could not be regarded solely in
the context of terrorism.
The PKK leader likened his cause to that of the PLO, the IRA, and Basque
separatists, movements that sought to make a transition from warfare to
diplomacy. He asserted that he had come to Italy to launch the political phase
of the Kurdish struggle. Meanwhile, 40,000 Kurds from across Europe gathered in
Germany to demonstrate on Oçalan's behalf.
Others condemned the Kurdish leader. Human Rights Watch, which had repeatedly
attacked Turkey for abuses against the Kurds, sent a letter to D'Alema charging
Oçalan's PKK with massacres in Turkey's southeast, primarily in the early 1990s.
The majority of the victims were village guards and their families and Turkish
teachers who were targeted by the guerrillas as state collaborators. Opposing
extradition to Turkey, Human Rights Watch called instead for Oçalan to be tried
under international law in Italy or another EU country.
In January, Oçalan left Italy of his own accord, reportedly aboard an Italian
secret service airplane to Moscow, from which he transited to an undisclosed
location. His brief appearance on the European stage-and the diplomatic tornado
it whipped up-had received more publicity in two months than he or the PKK had
generated in 15 years of guerrilla warfare. But it was increasingly clear that
he would not be awarded political asylum and, with relations deteriorating with
Turkey, Italy warned Oçalan that if he stayed in the country, he might be
brought to trial on terror charges. Ironically, such a trial could also have
been Turkey's worst nightmare if it had exposed state terror as well as rebel
terror and if it had sparked an international review of the long-standing civil
war in that country.
Until now, Turkey has been able to ignore Western demands for dialogue with the
Kurds. The brutal scorched earth campaign in the southeast has been a military
success. The deforestation and village burnings have been accomplished with
little press attention, a minimum of public debate, and no censure from the
United Nations. And the PKK, though still a force to be reckoned with, recently
has been beset by internal conflicts and beleaguered by defections. Oçalan's
arrest, in Turkey's eyes, could have finished the rebels once and for all. But
now his fate, the "Kurdish question," and Turkey's suitability as a member of
the European Union have once again been postponed.
In early February, two months in advance of the increasingly important national
elections, Turkey took steps to ban the HADEP party. Officials said that some
members of HADEP, which has more than 3,000 registered members, had shown
sympathy for the guerrillas by participating in hunger strikes and other
non-violent activity following Oçalan's arrest in Rome.
HADEP represents the Kurds' only potential interlocutor with the government
other than the rebels. The bid to outlaw the party, which would deny the Kurds
any representation in the Turkish parliament, startled the United States and its
allies, alienated moderate Kurds, and further undermined the country's fragile
democracy.
For all the military assistance the United States has provided its ally over the
years, Turkey remains politically unstable. The ruling coalition in Ankara
recently collapsed in a corruption-related scandal, and the Islamic party, the
scourge of the Turkish army, is stronger today than at any time in history.
While still a minority party, it is widely expected to win the national
elections this spring. The country is unstable economically as well, and
inflation is rampant, a reflection of the fact that $100 billion has been spent,
just since 1991, to defeat the rebels.
On the surface, very little seems to have changed. The government still has
300,000 security forces in the southeast, and Apo is underground once again.
Notwithstanding recent events, the battleground has yet to shift from the
Turkish-Iraqi mountains to the political salons of the Continent. Turkey still
boasts the largest army in NATO (after the United States), but the path to
diplomatic acceptance in Europe--despite dogged U.S. efforts--will be clouded by
the Kurds for some time to come.
Kevin McKiernan, a photojournalist, has visited Turkey and northern Iraq a dozen
times since the Gulf War. His work has appeared in Time, Newsweek, the New York
Times, and on ABC, CBS, and NBC.
http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999/ma99/ma99mckiernan.html (with pictures)
also
'We'll finish terrorism but we are being held back by democracy and human
rights.'
Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff, General Ahmet Corekci, July 1995
also
The Kurdish tribes of Anatolia, which predate the Turkish presence in the Middle
East, sided with Ataturk against the British and Greeks in the early 1920s, but
the Turks quickly turned on their Muslim brothers. From 1923 on, Ataturk's
repression of Kurdish nationalism and even Kurdish identity was savage and
predatory. He filled the Kurdish southeast with Turkish administrators, gave
land to Turkish war veterans, forbade the use of Kurdish language in court, and,
most important, banned the native tongue in schools, effectively denying formal
education to Kurdish children. The measures quickly spurred a Kurdish uprising,
led by Sheik Said, which erupted throughout the southeast in 1925. It was
quashed by overwhelming Turkish force: Ataturk, using the ragtag revolt as a
pretext for assuming dictatorial powers which he never completely relinquished,
crushed the Kurdish insurgents. Sheik Said and 660 of his compatriots were
executed, most by public hanging, and another 7,500 were arrested. Villages were
destroyed, massacres reported. The response was well in excess of the challenge,
and the army's terrorism bred more resistance; individual towns and villages
rose up through the ensuing years. The army's reply was again harsh: hundreds of
villages were razed, thousands of Kurds killed, and perhaps half a million were
deported. The tribal rebellions persisted through the 1930s, the bloodiest of
which (in Dersim, now Tunceli province) may have taken 40,000 lives as a result
of army reprisals. Turkish Kurdistan was placed under a nearly permanent state
of martial law and a news blackout.
The basis of the confrontation was Turkish nationalism. The Turkish state from
1923 onward simply refused to acknowledge that Kurds even existed--they were
known, until the 1990s, as "Mountain Turks." The new mythology of Turks as
founders of the great Asian civilizations neatly folded the Kurds into that
conceit. Scholarly work on Kurdish history was outlawed. A "Turkification"
program was instituted in the southeast, raising the visibility of Turkish
culture, moving Turks into the area, and earnestly promoting the cult of
Ataturk. At the same time, the area, so long a pastoral and agrarian economy,
was steadily impoverished by pogroms, deportations of Kurdish elites, and the
disappearance of the Christian entrepreneurial class.
Chief among the insults was the attack on language, which penetrated beyond the
formal venues of court or schoolroom. The Ankara regime replaced Kurdish village
names with Turkish equivalents, forbade the naming of children with Kurdish
names, and outlawed the singing of Kurdish folk songs. Because only one Kurd in
twenty could speak Turkish in the first years of the Republic, the denial of
their own language was economically devastating.
In the 1960s and 1970s, as David McDowall explains in his excellent Modern
History of the Kurds, the situation became more desperate. Unemployment among
Kurds rose by 150 percent between 1967 and 1977. By the early 1990s, less than
10 percent of adults in the Kurdish southeast had industrial jobs, and those
tended to be in low-skilled industries. On the large landowners' estates,
peasants would work eleven hours a day for $2. Children--the fortunate survivors
of a 30 percent mortality rate--would work alongside their parents. Less than a
third of the population received any formal education and less than one in five
women attended school.
The demise of viable agrarian life and the growth of urban poor and unskilled
youth radicalized large segments of the Kurdish people--20 percent of Turkey's
population. However varied in social outlook and separated by tribes, dialects,
and rates of assimilation, the Kurds were ripe for rebellious nationalism. Their
chance came with the creation of the PKK in 1974 on the campus of Ankara
University. The founder, Abdullah Ocalan, modeled the PKK on other Marxist
liberation movements that employed revolutionary violence. By 1980, the PKK was
poised to respond to the pivotal event of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict: the
September 12 coup.
For the outside world, the coup was a bloodless, temporary measure, engineered
by a "reluctant" military, and essential to eliminating terrorist threats and
restoring order. To the Kurds in southeastern Turkey, the generals' reign was a
new wave of terror and repression, rivaled only by the sanguinary pogroms of the
1930s. While many Turkish militants of left and right were prosecuted, vast
numbers of Kurdish nationalists were targeted. The new constitution promulgated
by the junta (which remains in force today) was designed to punish Kurdish
nationalism: the mere recognition of a distinct Kurdish identity was
criminalized, and the Kurdish language was effectively outlawed. The statements
by junta leader General Evren at the time of the coup, which focused on keeping
Turkey undivided, and the arrests and trials of so many prominent Kurds
immediately after the military seized power, clearly exposed the junta's
primary, obsessive fear of Kurdish nationalism.
That nationalism did grow quickly in response to the dictatorship's harsh
measures. From 1984 the PKK became a force to be reckoned with, a genuine
guerrilla movement significantly supported by ordinary Kurdish peasants. What
began as a nuisance to the Turkish state grew over the 1980s into a large-scale
civil war. By 1990, some 300,000 troops were deployed in the southeast, and an
enormous amount of the national budget (with reports ranging from 25 to 40
percent) was going to support police and military operations there. In 1992, the
government began a policy of forcibly evacuating villages in order to deprive
the PKK of its popular support. Some 3,000 villages have been emptied, and as
many as two million Kurds driven from their homes into shantytowns and
overcrowded apartments in Diyarbakir, Adana, Izmir, and Istanbul--a population
of "internally displaced" second in the world only to Sudan.
At issue was not so much a separate Kurdistan (the PKK dropped this goal in
1993), but cultural rights--principally the right to speak, publish, educate,
and broadcast in Kurdish, aspirations confirmed in an exhaustive survey of
Kurdish attitudes conducted by Ankara University Professor Dogu Ergil in 1995.
President Turgut Ozal had granted limited rights to speak Kurdish in 1991, but
other cultural freedoms--for example, broadcasting and educating in
Kurdish--were denied. Kurdish activists were also concerned with economic
development in the southeast, which the government had long promised and never
delivered. Firmly in control of the civilian governments' policy toward the
southeast, the military would not allow broader cultural rights or the emergence
of Kurdish political parties. Turkish nationalism, the bedrock tenet of
Kemalism, could not be modified even to accommodate harmless cultural longing.
This rigidity is especially pernicious. In an insightful essay in Nationalism
and Ethnic Conflict, MIT professor Stephen van Evera presents ten hypotheses on
war and nationalism. One focuses on the content of nationalist ideology: "Does
the ideology of the nationalism incorporate respect for the freedom of other
nationalities," he asks, "or does it assume a right or duty to rule them?" Those
that exclude, he says, are forms of "hegemonistic, or asymmetrical,
nationalism," which "is both the rarest and the most dangerous variety of
nationalism." The hegemonistic type--of which Kemalism is an instance--is
especially dangerous both because it cannot permit even mild deviations and
because violent suppression begets violent reaction, especially against a
minority with the muscle to fight back. The PKK, whose vague Marxism and violent
acts alienated many Kurds, remained the only vehicle for Kurdish aspirations and
the only protector against state-sponsored cultural genocide, which was
rationalized by an inflexible, unitary, racialist ideology, and enforced with
organized violence.
The second challenge to Kemalism--a vibrant political Islam--has also appeared
often in the years of the republic. The September 12 coup occurred just six days
after Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of an Islamic political party and the deputy
prime minister, gave a rabble-rousing speech condemning Israel. Erbakan was
arrested during the coup, and the incident renewed the tensions between Islam
and the military. Like Ataturk, the generals of the 1970s and 1980s used Islam
to their advantage: Marxists and Kurdish leftists were countered with military
support for the so-called imam-hatip schools--religious instruction for
adolescents meant to divert them from leftist politics. Meanwhile, in the junta
and its aftermath, Turkish politics barely tolerated the likes of Erbakan and
his new party, Refah.
But with the civil war draining the treasury, boosting inflation to more than
100 percent, piling on more debt, and strangling foreign investment, low-skilled
workers and farmers--the most religious strata in Turkish society--were the
first to suffer. The economic impacts of war and "globalization" drove
increasing numbers to Refah. Students of the imam-hatip schools were coming of
age politically. And the swarms of Kurdish refugees were given aid and comfort
by Refah and other Islamic organizations. This combination of factors boosted
Refah's fortunes in 1994 municipal elections (electing mayors in Ankara and
Istanbul) and December 1995 national elections, when the party won a slight
plurality, enabling Erbakan to form a government six months later.
The secularist military would not tolerate Erbakan in power, however, and within
a few months was demanding that he rescind his mild reforms, which permitted
greater religious expression--allowing women to wear head scarves in court, for
example. When he balked, the military forced a "soft coup," threatening to oust
him; finally, in June 1997, he resigned. Democratic governance would again not
stand in the way of Kemalism. The military has made it clear that Erbakan will
not be permitted to become premier again, even if Refah is the top vote
recipient in the next election.
As Jonathan Randal deftly puts it, "Only a state as slavishly faithful to the
ossified letter of its founding dogma could have backed itself into a corner as
totally as Turkey did in this final decade of the twentieth century." Randal
makes a compelling case: Kemalism, sclerotic and corrupt but clinging to the
rigid mindset of Turkish nationalism, could not allow the pluralism that makes
Western democracies so adaptive. The obdurate military dashed hopes for economic
growth and democracy, and turned perhaps a third of the electorate toward
traditionalist reactionaries like Refah. Randal, whose reporting skills are
legendary (while his book is oddly gossipy and repetitive), has it exactly
right. McDowall's more measured and conventional history also pinpoints Turkish
nationalism as the core problem, whereas neither Huntington nor Kaplan frame the
issue with quite such clarity. Huntington, to his credit, does offer a
remarkable answer to this question: What follows Kemalism, if (as Huntington
supposes) Turkey cannot totally escape its Islamic past and will never be
accepted by Christian Europe? Turkey could, he replies "be ready to give up its
frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar pleading for membership in the West
and to resume its much more impressive and elevated historical role as the
principal Islamic interlocutor and antagonist of the West." (Erbakan's inability
to deliver such a vision is due to his personal failures as a politician.)
Huntington says Turkey could "become a South Africa . . . changing itself from a
pariah state in its civilization to the leading state of that civilization." But
the possibility of a Turkish Mandela emerging to turn that trick--to reject
"Ataturk's legacy more thoroughly than Russia has rejected Lenin's"--is
difficult to imagine among Turkey's corrupt, obsequious, and aging elite.
Moreover, a visionary, Islamic Turkey is everything America would abhor.
American backing of Ankara, lavish since the time of the 1980 coup, is
predicated on precisely the opposite: that Turkey will remain not only secular
and Western-oriented, but will serve as a bulwark against Islamic and Arab
militancy in the region. Until the anti-foreign aid virus infected Capitol Hill,
Turkey was the third-largest recipient of military assistance. The dispatch of
sophisticated weaponry--F-16 fighter jets, Black Hawk and Cobra helicopters,
tanks, etc.--is justified by Turkey's "bad neighborhood": Syria, Iraq, and
especially Iran.
But the bad 'hood rationale is a canard. As Henri Barkey and his colleagues
point out in Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, the relations
Ankara pursues with these difficult states are complex and not without some
danger (partially stemming from Kurdish restiveness). But they neither justify
the weapons flow to Turkey nor fulfill the US policy of "dual containment" of
Baghdad and Teheran. One could instead view Turkey as the meddlesome neighbor:
sending arms to Chechen rebels and Azeri belligerents, occupying northern
Cyprus, repeatedly bombing Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, threatening Syria
(which harbors Ocalan), and huffing about Greece, Bosnia, Macedonia, Bulgaria,
and Russia.
In any case, the neighborhood where the Turks use the weapons conveyed from
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Texas is its own southeast, where jets and
helicopters attack PKK camps and empty out Kurdish villages. It is by far the
most significant use of US weapons in the world. America has supplied the muscle
for Turkey's war, and winked at the military's actions--including its violent
supression of free expression--to sustain Turkey as a platform for the
protection of US "strategic interests" in the Persian Gulf and in the newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union, especially the flow of Caspian
Sea oil. This, in essence, is what Nixon, Kissinger, and Carter did in the
Shah's Iran in the 1970s, and, in a different way, what Reagan and Bush did in
Saddam's Iraq in the 1980s: bribe tyrants in exchange for their fidelity to
American interests. Both ended badly, indeed disastrously for nearly everyone.
Now the disaster unfolds in Turkey: tens of thousands dead and wounded, millions
homeless.
The new attention to this debacle is welcome, but the regard of a few
intellectuals and journalists is unlikely to unlock the grip of ideology in
Turkey or overcome American inertia. Of the former, one can say that Kemalism
will ultimately lose its power; the current crisis, which includes official
corruption of the dirtiest kind, indicates how tenuous Ataturk's legacy may be,
how easily it may disassemble with the right combination of charismatic
leadership and the internal will to change. As to the policies of Turkey's most
stalwart ally: Washington's embrace of the status quo is simply thoughtless and
reflexive. America's major news media regard Turkey as some sort of exotic
Muslim sideshow. But the show has been running for a long time, and features a
sustained pattern of massive human rights violations, among the most egregious
in the twentieth century.
Would it be different, one wonders, if we saw Turkey as a fascist bully
engendering its own collapse? If we saw the "white genocide" of the Kurds in a
more compelling historical light, and the peril in Turkey's re-running the "Iran
precedent"? That fascism still lives in Europe is a disturbing idea. That
America is its closest ally is an abhorrent one.
John Tirman's Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America's Arms Trade
"The number of burned and destroyed villages is far more than in this list. The
number written in unofficial documents is around 2600 (1994). But I have only
1460 names here."
-Serdar Celik, the Author of "Killing Machine: Turkish Contra-Guerilla"
(September 1995)
(Today [1999] there have been reports of more than 6000 burned villages,
including the villages that got destroyed because of the turkish army offensives
in South Kurdistan. I haven't been able to gather the names for these. Here is a
list from the book "Killing Machine: Turkish Contra-Guerilla" by Serdar Celik.
The list is from 1995. /Mazlum)
Burned Villages
North Kurdistan (South-eastern Turkey)
ÇOLEMERG (Hakkari)
Balekân, Çarkelan (Durak), Bileh (Aksu), Binevsan (Çiçekli), Dęrzengil
(Güngören), Gundik (Çigi), Gelyę Kurdik, Xendek, Kermitę, Govik, Kanimehan,
Mafka (Atbasi), Yaprakli, Ugurlu, Yeniyol, Yukari Sarigöl, Asagi Sarigöl, Tüzek,
Kayalik, Yoncali, Geçitli, Cevizdibi, Kaval, Kavakli, Yetimli, Bazę (Çanakli),
Beyyurdu, Göksu, Nivaner, Geliye Suxę, Sulak, Yüce, Gelezo, Girę Dina, Selmana,
Pinarli, Sarp, Taslik, Degirmen, Cimenli, Hari, Igdeli, Samunan, Kotranis
(Ördekli), Nergiz, Gümüslü, Orta Derecik, Berus Kilisesi, Doganli, Gelinli,
Gecimli, Seriya, Baglica, Kost, Kinik, Kandil, Karasu, Güllüce, Küçükköy,
Sergeli, Tahi, Çemtox, Herge, Zerekli, Melota, Evetunus (Alantus), Begir
Yüksekova
Sevę (Yukari Pirinççeken), Çeme Pehn (Genisdere), Sexmeman (Ünlüce), Rezik
(Rezok), Veregos, Serpil, Zere, Talanę, Matę, Birixan, Zerenę, Elsan, Pagenk
Semdinli
Ankay, Kepirli, Ikiztas, Yumrukkaya, Bęgalte, Begor, Mugeyla, Betkar, Będav,
Sivaherk
Çukurca
Kavusak, Cevizli, Yesiltas, Adakli, Duri, Isikli, Köprülü, Ormanli, Harli,
Kavsak, Çayirli, Üzümlü, Çinarli (Kismen)
BILÎS (Bitlis)
Lard (Kayalibag), Hevek (Cevizdali), Otlu, Hevene, Çeman (Yolak), Hivanis
(Esenburun), Karukęn, Suwę (Konak), Gomsek, Herdę (Çobansuyu), Ingol
(Agaçpinar), Perematę, Miryanis (Ayrancilar), Xumaç (Içgeçit)
Tatvan
Uranis (Anadere), Pertevküt (Kut), Pancas (Sallica), Engesor, Pihok, Inzan,
Axkis, Kirtvan (Çavuslar), Kurtikân (Tikaçli), Çanges (Dönertas), Çorsin
(Düzcealan), Ez (Çevreköy), Sülü (Dibekli), Avetax (Oruçlu), Sargaç, Vanik
Mutki
Virkol, Seransor (Alatoprak), Qeflike, Hemamekan, Paręzan, Çeman (Çaygeçit),
Aspencir (Üstyayla), Geręgir, Lafęna, Berganę
Hizan
Gülpik (Süttasi), Hiset (Kolludere), Pars (Ürünveren), Serik, Pista Resan
(Sagirkaya), Giradifin, Giraziyaret, Cinda, Aviyan, Geval, Tavlik, Beru, Arpans,
Sersere, Begri, Kunduz, Us, Çakiran, Nernis, Hanzrat, Ase, Beruj, Sukur, Oris,
Telas (Elmacik), Tisun (Yelkecik)
WAN (Van)
Çatak
Simanis (Kiyicak), Ferkinis (Övecik), Xumar (Dalbasti), Ting (Büyükagaç),
Teresan (Doganköy), Heldan (Önlüce), Bezanis, Çiçan, Martinis, Turanis, Kurk,
Destan, Xaçęsor, Hacibey, Xwarg, Turbęset, Ezdinan, Enines, Kętę, Koranan,
Zeferan, Cenefę, Sul, Qoranan, Orik, Konarga, Mela Keles, Kelehę, Salat
Bahçesaray
Memode, Telefan, Kanuxumar, Perz, Gunde Zilan, Giyanis, Malesavuwar, Zoravan,
Minikas, Xirabsork
Baskale
Çox (Gedikbasi), Beblesin (Düztepe), Tigi (Askitan), Karabilyan (Yukariçayir)
ĘLIH (Batman)
Hasankeyf
Himediyę (Geçitköy), Dazcana (Gökdere), Mirdesę (Kumluca), Atlihan, Pegrafę
(Tasli), Eynbolatę, Xirbakűr (Palamut), Kaniyamezin (Sogucak), Kędil (Yolüstü),
Girębekir (Büyükdere), Kâneyne (Bayirli), Alinę (Akalin), Çatalsu, Izdara
Besiri
Avtaxwarę (Asagiçelikbasi), Xenduk (Kasüstü), Qubabę, Bisira Jori, Bisira Xwari,
Awtajori (Yukariçelikbasi)
Gerçüs
Kelehę (Atlica), Gundik (Yayladüzü), Berdehol (Poyraz), Bilaksę (Dereiçi),
Seyare (Aydinca), Hirmesę (Yakitli), Derifkân (Nurlu), Bęcirman, Gundikę Kolan
(Yayladüzü), Ecibę, Çalikę, Malamihę, Zivinga Abirbinya, Habizbinę, Bervena,
Derefe, Berkolinę, Xina, Zeviya Sor, Dizdara, Botika
Kozluk
Newala (Koludere), Tirop, Gola (Beskonak), Aynras (Tosunpinar), Serika, Timox
(Gümüörgü), Merga mezrasi (Çayirli), Hergemo (Bölükkonak), Cindo, Mursifan,
Papur, Melamesurę, Dersewan (Karsiyaka), Cezne (Yazpinar)
Sason
Herendę (Acar), Sexika (Yeni Karamese), Permisa Sexa (Aydinlik), Sebanę
(Karamese), Teras (Ömürlü), Heribę (Belbasi), Horsale, Herdaye (Günesli),
Sexhamza, Cacasę (Yücebaglar), Belav, Helîz (Cagli), Tanzę (Heybeli), Gomik,
Gürgenli, Kaçiring, Mitheng, Belesewa, Malamele, Çeme Miratę, Gerok, Malademira,
Çay, Gawistę, Hergok, Darabiye
SĘRT (Siirt)
Gęra Usę (Baglica), Biloris (Saglarca), Lęfe (Kislacik), Gewat (Meselidere),
Zila, Zuvęk (Yokusbaglar), Qesrik, Dodayis, Kalender, Derxalb, Semse (Günesli),
Mehine (Kayikçi), Miwela (Kelekçi), Tevlik, Gűhera (Gaziler), Qesrik, Geravis,
Seyfiye, Soranę
Kurtalan
Behavs, Beytil, Kendale, Kasirke, Hüseyniye, Gozik, Çemkurik, Commaniye
(Atabaglar), Tavlikę, Cefanę (Tulumtas), Usiyę (Kayalisu), Merge, Belekę, Asik,
Anderę, Xirbę, Beysatun, Aynkesir, Bacriye, Dimserk (Yuvali), Til (Çattepe)
Sirvan
Mezra Sexan (Akçayir), Saras (Yayladag), Ende, Merç (Suluyazi), Hesko
(Çeltikyolu), Xerxas (Özpinar), Zuzaht (Akyokus)
Baykan
Bayikę (Yesilçevre), Bilvanis (Ormanpinar), Bestan, Çukurtas, Mezre
Pervari
Xerxor (Doganca), Besa, Beruk (Sungurlu), Erkent, Kundes (Tosunatar), Medrese,
Mexęs (Igneli), Serhel (Tuzluca), Keverok, Suxęya (Köpruçay), Hot (Yanikses),
Hol, Kal, Nejeç, Zoravan, Keleh, Aqęr (Sariyaprak), Meseh, Baglica, Omyanus,
Kesrik, Kevsin, Axiyan, Çema, Geliye Osman, Sikeytiya (Taskonak), Kerxar
(Demirbogaz), Bane Aziza, Kaę Nizir, Koçnis, Berük, Tosuntarla, Hertevina
(Ekindüzü), Çeleka, Tiri (Okçular), Gurzuvan, Tal (Kovanagzi)
Eruh
Sehveli (Erenkaya), Bilcuna (Narlidere), Isxasa, Baluka, Kaniya Biyę, Eleziz,
Torik (Yanilmaz), Diriskę (Akmese), Daran, Milan, Garisan, Bęngov, Qesir Celo,
Nęhkę, Sisil, Emtę, Shextűrk, Geli, Serkar, Firisan, Bikęt (Dagdusu), Terhęm
(Bayramli), Memira (Görendoruk), Girdara (Ormanardi), Hesinkâ (Özlüpelit), Awal
(Tünekpinar), Guvesil (Ekinyolu), Difni, Ebubekran, Zivinga Haciali
(Yagizoymak), Paręs (Üzümlü), Hergulę (Yediyaprak), Kanka (Dalkurur), Rexęne
(Kavakgülü), Misęfra (Çirpali), Ginyanis (Yesilören), Büzikra (Cintepe), Diriskę
(Demiremek), Sukav, Derawud (Payamli), Sewera, Ifaça (Ufaça), Aktikan (Solgun)
SIRNEX (Sirnak)
Turkiz (Saridalli), Biyâva (Görmeç), Gundikę Mele (Balveren), Gundik, Gundikę
Remo (Anilmis), Medikân (Besagaç), Kendala (Çadirli), Neręx (Dagkonak), Banę
Botuyan (Güneyce), Glindor (Kemerli), Fęrisa (Atbasi), Kürüm (Araköy), Spindarok
(Boyunyaka), Silyan (Çakirsögüt), Avyan (Dereler), Navyan (Güneyçam), Avka Masya
(Toptepe), Cinet (Balpinar), Qarnę (Günedönmüs), Basret (Inceler), Spivyan
(Karageçit), Serefiya (Karaburun), Bezokę (Kocagili), Gundmitrip (Tekçinar),
Banę Mehinda (Koçbeyi), Hestan (Yogurtçular), Hema, Gezerok, Dera, Kopani, Banę
Cindiya, Divin, Zeytunik, Dihde, Sara, Xudan, Destik, Xware Pizo, Kani Ferske,
Zorava (Gölluce), Berezan, Banabiyę, Girę Spi, Çolya, Sarbitme, Derik, Semka,
Cüneyt, Gundikę Uso, Derye Kera, Zifka, Derye Duvyan (Ikizce), Ziyaret,
Xirabelisa, Benderuk, Meydin (Seslice), Dęrsew (Alkemer), Berę Mire (Gülerli),
Dimiyla, Rusor, Sehrebon, Belüze, Cuniver, Çeme Mezin, Korkita Xane, Mendik,
Girok, Tenge, Diryan, Xirbike Beste (Kirkagaç), Çala, Mehujke, Reneris, Sorgoze,
Berkesir, Talika, Gurdila, Sinę, Balkaya, Kavuncu, Geliye Kazi, Mindikera,
Seredęhle, Silerut, Riyan (Geçitboy), Milga, Bilmat, Gewer (Kuskonak), Diranę
(Cevizdüzü), Zivingok, Gurdila, Gulindil, Avka Tehlo, Ramuran, Dehreban, Geli,
Mistaxe, Talga, Bacrit, Bertül, Dedeören, Guzagurka, Bisires, Nanif, Geli
Güclükonak
Banę (Ormaniçi), Keresa (Damlarca), Sewę, Sehrika, Ziving, Hanihejira, Neviya
(Dagyeli), Meydana Sele (Kummeydani), Hirares, Newiyan ? (Dagyeli), Sikefta
Yusufan (Taskonak), Çeme Gewr, Gerę, Zewę (Akdizgin), Guyina (Çetinkaya),
Ziwinga Sikaka (Agacyurdu), Xurse (Bulmuslar), Kerxor (Demirbogaz)
Beytüssebap
Kehnires, Kűtnis, Gelikân, Derahine (Uzungeçit), Mehriye, Surge, Germok,
Hewsebe, Komir, Kelehok, Suxurpasa, Bilbes, Sętkâr, Nevala Genima, Bordikęl,
Pirana, Torane, Xinzorik, Hozę, Gunike Siparkiyan, Hęnik, Kizvankę, Pirdoda,
Xirabelyas, Hecelya Jer, Hecelya Jor, Kaçit, Męlixa, Bersekera, Govik, Çeme
Pire, Hevsa Berę, Sirkę, Gurgavik, Girę Gebelya, Gakela, Merkite, Pertavin,
Zoravan, Kolka, Derabahmik, Meydana Qolya, Evrex, Sulav, Berman, Geznex, Halę,
Zerhel, Balekan, Mergazer, Gelikân, Beyar, Beskare, Hewsa Bekir
Uludere
Siris (Sapaca), Mijin (Akduman), Kadün (Baglica), Ziravik (Inceler), Delekâ
(Kalemli), Kolge (Bagli), Siwet (Bagli), Bileh (Isikveren), Nerweh (Tasdelen),
Alos (Kayadibi), Hedris, Zeviyan (Tarlabasi), Çeman, Ripin (Yesilova), Heletę
(Gündogdu), Robosk (Ortasu), Kelhesna (Ödüllü), Mehraw (Küçükçay), Sipazyan
(Onbudak), Niręh (Bulakbasi), Kror (Ortabaglar), Baziyan (Dogan), Ewîl, Yekmal,
Mergeh, Hilal, Becühe, Mutluca, Cevizlidere, Kolik (Küllük), Evil, Revenka,
Qalik
Silopi
Derebasi, Herbül, Dęrasor (Derecik), Dęradevs (Selçuk), Baspin (Gürümlü), Gitę
(Çaliskan), Besere (Koyuören), Hesena (Kösrali), Xinis, Silp (Damlica),
Girabiya, Bezgin, Danesor, Seravik, Devis (Ulas), Blikâ (Ballikaya), Mehra
(Küçükçayir)
Cizre
Bunisra, Hebler (Hisar), Sax (Çaglayan), Rewęni (Akarsu), Bazifte (Katran),
Bakertal, Ernebat (Çavuslu), Baskâ (Dirsekli), Genda, Bakosk, Dęra Jęr
(Asagidere), Dęra Jor (Yukaridere), Dęra Bilind, Basisik (Kustepe), Seravę,
Robara Jor (Yukarikonak), Robara Jęr (Asagikonak)
Idil
Bakvan (Çinarli), Xaltan (Sikli), Xenduk (Çukurlu), Hespist (Yarbasi), Guriza,
Kasroq (Ovaköy), Temerzę (Uçarli), Soran (Yaylalar), Axrit (Toklu), Bayrik
(Topak), Kivex (Magara), Bertal (Kurtulus), Xirapdarik (Ortaca), Delave Qesrę
(Oyali), Narinci (Yolaçan), Bęzirkę (Koyunlu), Basak, Zinarix (Bozburun), Kefsur
(Dumanli), Basibirin (Haberli), Xaltan (Sikli), Midih (Övündük), Zengilox
(Akdag), Hędil (Kayi), Siftik (Okçu), Xirabę Tüya (Özen), Bafę (Sulak), Tilęlâ
(Sirt), Karaxirap (Varimli), Xęlani (Yagmurca), Erzenix (Yalaz), Dupiçe
(Köycegiz), Destedare, Mizgevtog (Camili), Xirbak (Harbak), Bahrim (Yüksek),
Fîrfęl, Fil (Bereketli), Xendek (Hendek)
MĘRDÎN (Mardin)
Midyat
Taka, Koçane, Deyvanke, Nemirdane, Kevnase
Kiziltepe
Babine (Arakapi), Amrut (Basdegirmen), Biloka (Uzunkaya), Wardimsa Jor
(Yukarisalkim), Wardimsa Jer (Asagisalkim), Faris, Alipasa, Xubat, Heft Xweh
(Yedikardes)
Savur
Tizyan (Elmabahce), Bakeysę, Bakustan (Bagyakan), Cizrę (Taslik), Kunifir
(Durusu), Kose (Kocahile), Elfan, Quzerip
Çiyayę Mazî (Mazidagi)
Korco, Külüka Xeryayi, Lolan (Çayönü), Xirbemęzin, Xarok (Atalar), Melebiyę
(Atalar), Kanya Ali, Halelyali, Mendila (Ikisu), Golagule (Arisu), Semika
(Karatas), Hesena (Ulutas), Yęwre, Kelek, Kebapçi, Gat (Sadan), Mixat, Hilbelus,
Shexamed (Kuludere), Xirbęaryę (Kultepe), Tawisî (Derecik), Usubę Pirę,
Hindiliz, Melebik (the smaller), Durakli, Golika Geryayi, Simak, Golikę,
Melebik, Sebe, Xirbebîran, Tavisî, Pîran, Mendela, Tarin, Hezazę, Xirbe Azim
Derik
Majmajkę (Incesu), Siçâna (Karabayir), Meskina (Bozok), Girik, Sere Mergę, Mixat
(Kayacik), Girxanik (Bahçe), Sisan, Sexadem (Kurudere), Qubik Çagil, Sevtege
(Gülçiçek), Serbę (Budakli), Xirar (Bahçe), Demürliyę (Demirli), Selme, Mezrajor
(Baglarbasi), Remok (Konik), Xirbagura, Giresor (Bayrakli), Germik, Seba Jer
(Asagi Konak), Seba Jor (Yukari Konak), Xani Sor
Nusaybin
Çalę, Serękaniyę (Pinarbasi), Cilibgrave (Kuyular), Küçükkardes, Görentepe,
Mezra Geliyę Pira, Sęderi, Qęsrik, Dęra Çomera, Bazar, Kunar, Mendikân, Fiskîn,
Misavil, Xanika Sexa, Baminmin, Mezra Hesenkâ, Hemzo, Geliye Sora, Sęvtilik,
Badip, Xirbę Miska, Marinę, Kunarę, Sarinke (Tandirli)
Ömerli
Yeste (Duygulu), Xanisore (Taslica), Shexmahmut (Fistikli), Kevaręye
(Harmankaya), Kayabali, Kömürlü, Ovabasi, Sulakdere, Kocakuyu, Sivritepe,
Tasgedik, Xirbęmamita, Xirbelik (Sivritepe), Xirbę Kermędi
Dargeçit
Derikvân, Dirusk, Zevik, Gundikę Azimę, Çelikâ Aliyę Remo, Berzew, Mistę, Dereca
(Akyol), Gurdikehaci, Firava, Batkim, Sadan, Giremeyro, Berkewan, Mistę (the
smaller), Dinare, Basrut, Germavę, Pirvan, Izaję
AMED (Diyarbakir)
Kerkula (Seyarlar), Saklat (Kocaköy), Azraoglu (Kervansaray), Hanifi,
Çavselikiya (Karayolu), Tiltepan
Farqin (Silvan)
Bilbil (Gündüz), Gundikę Heci Ibrahim (Güzderesi), Semrax (Yukarigören), Bayik
(Yayik), Hiskęmerg (Kuruçayir), Ferhend (Kayadere), Pileka (Bölükçayir),
Belawela (Çigil), Hîleliyę (Gündüzlü), Göltepe, Sevlera (Babakaya), Gormez,
Hesendeliye, Heciçerkez, Çiçika (Ormandisi), Hüseynkâ, Deykâ, Kizlal, Miranga,
Kanispiyę, Bezwan, Baskę (Altinkum), Derika Mikure, Kâniya Gula, Kűrbeyt,
Basimt, Fisatę (Çaldere), Zinzin, Mereni, Seręli, Malâ Sau, Barkus, Kâniya Kewa,
Korit, Veysika, Mireliya, Çirike, Sehbe Derün, Karamusę, Sergewre
Pîran (Dicle)
Prejman (Kursunlu), Xaçek (Tasagi), Saruli (Basköy), Alizilfiya (Köprübasi),
Silbetan (Koru), Heridan (Kirkpinar), Enbil (Çavli), Mezirkę (Kiraçtepe), Quye
(Islamköy), Tonekrag (Kayas), Govele (Bogazköy), Arusek (Gelincik), Pishasan
(Özbek), Kelkom (Kelekçi), Kendalę, Holę, Alabengi, Zigre (Degirmenci), Bawodin,
Derik
Kulp
Lîce (Lice)
Fis (Ziyaret), Derxus (Dibek), Bawerde (Üçadamlar), Peçar (Güldiken), Xanagale
(Çapar), Mehme (Hasbeg), Xiraba, Xumbas, Pasçiya, Hezan (Kayacik), Sise
(Yolçati), Bamitni (Kutlu), Malamihe Biro (Ecemis), Gozę (Gözerek), Karęz
(Kocaköy), Henvih, Pirinsk, Feytere, Herę, Hesik (Yaka), Pęçar, Mastak, Neban,
Kevnor, Hirboç, Herek (Çirali), Daragol, Baset, Resan, Cimar, Çeme Elika,
Kafirun, Shexmus, Hesrit, Mustak, Fum, Piręk, Kijikbihiv, Darli, Savat, Soga
(Durak), Hüseynik (Arikli), Liçok (Çavundur), Koruca, Piroz, Nayi, Goztik,
Zengesor, Barav, Bawerd, Sertut, Xilboç, Bubik, Gozrik, Herpę (Kalkanli), Bęsist
(Turanli), Multik, Dehlazęri, Hindiliz (Yorulmaz), Mizrak (Kilicli), Zengę
(Dolunay), Henyat, Eloxiso, Kuruçay, Cinesor (Çagdas), Zara (Gökçe), Hewrę,
Celkę (Güçlü), Goma Heci Kadir, Pirik (Seren), Goma Çelebiye, Saklat, Balince
(Esenler), Firdeys (Uçarli), Goma Heci Emrexan, Engül (Günes), Binemeryan,
Cumarę, Pirę, Entaq (Kabakaya), Xanegela (Çeper), Combelas (Daralan), Derkâm
(Duru), Kiledar, Puneyn, Ekro, Misirf, Goma Arif Beg, Goma Bekiran (Asagi Duru)
Hezro (Hazro)
Köfercin (Varinca), Cumat, Selima, Hindez, Hâlhal, Simsim, Xodik, Kani, Xondof
(Koçbaba), Beskel, Kaniyaspi, Bazman
Erxen (Ergani)
Hindis, Kavurma, Küpü (Büyükkiner), Ceyda (Pinarkaya), Malan, Gizgin, Çavak,
Kaydali, Hilar, Üçkardes
Henę (Hani)
Sera (Keledibi), Commanas, Derkâm, Batelt (Çagil), Kuyular, Eskin, Goma Bekira,
Serdę (Seren), Koçeran, Hurik (Gömeç), Derno (Akçayurt), Topçular, Xorsę
(Saklica), Turalî, Kaledibi
Bismil
Kurthaci (Kazanci), Birlik (Agilli), Çavusoglu (Karagöz), Basköy, Köpekli
(Kurudegirmen), Malamuse (Meydanlik), Zengile
Çermik
Asagi Sehler, Giręgűz (Fistikli), Çepal
ÇEWLÎK (Bingöl)
Güzeldere, Hamek, Matun (Balpinar), Çirik
Dara Henę (Genç)
Piroz, Riz, Dedebag, Kesan, Hesbern, Saferun, Gerçekli, Mimkun, Mezrakuzę,
Zülfün, Satos (Yazkonagi), Lędilę, Karzęl, Vartuk, Angesor, Anaxsir, Mordarik,
Herkin, Prons, Xisqonis, Avdos, Azgler (Geyikdere), Misware, Saxuk, Gelbe,
Xedesimat, Tiryar, Xursiye, Sergewrik, Arxat, Yaxmuk, Diri (Çobançesmesi)
Kigi
ELAZIG
Karakoçan
Çayir Gülü, Findik, Mama Agę (Agagömü), Üçbudak köyü, Koma Mala Bapire,
Seymamudan (Pamuklu), Pas (Akkus), Çelexas (Balicali), Oxçiyan (Okçular),
Elbegyan (Deliktas), Birik (Bürkardi)
MŰS (Mus)
Geli Aliya (Ariköy), Geliye Gűzan (Cevizlidere), Kexasen (Ekindüzü), Karlidere,
Semol (Üçevler), Xerbiya (Yoncali), Kepenek, Yolgözler, Yünören, Zengok
(Yörecik), Kęran (Yamaç), Eralan, Hovit, Kabus, Nevala Mülkę, Kösk, Mezra Mome,
Kewar, Orix (Ulukaya), Ajmanük, Shex Xelan, Guzu, Bozikân, Axinok (Kardesler),
Susemerg, Serefkan, Komis, Vartinis (Altinova)
Malazgirt
Nordin, Gölagli, Tendürek
Bulanik
Axpiris (Sazlikbasi), Dungok
Kizilagaç
Senköy, Laçika, Welika, Geliyę Aliyân
RIHA (Urfa)
Gergeli, Igdeli, Tahi, Herke, Centox, Türbeli, Bay, Beyyurdu, Binevsiyan, Göksu,
Dargezil, Mezincik, K. Servan
Węransar (Viransehir)
Zevra, Mozik, Qedaosman, Temkirik, Çeçena, Çerxa (Dereli), Nohut, Üçgöl, Burç,
Oglakçi
AGIRÎ (Agri)
Heciheci, Rume, Gunde Kuçik, Extę-1, Extę-2, Extę-3, Aktas, Akçay, Karacerân,
Mestaf, Zeyt, Gezgezg, Buruka, Dado, Semo, Darik, Ereb, Keso, Ferxi, Dosmin,
Yukari Pamuktasi, Asagi Pamuktasi, Çatalipasa, Agdana
Diyadin
Yukari Tütek, Hacixalid, Çoban, Koco, Sikeftaneriya (Yukari Zorava), Asagi
Zorava, Çobana Qaska, Darik
Tasliçay
Geliye Heci, Ziyaret-1, Ziyaret-2, Kustiya
Dogu Beyazit
Elę, Çevirme, Karabulak, Örtülü, Halaç, Noresin (Burhanettin), Mixtepe,
Kavaktepe, Inek, Yedimilet, Goma Temir
QERS (Kars)
Hamur
Taik, Kozlo, Doma Duderi, Musabeg
Digor
Seban, Kocaköy, Arpali, Varli, Sorgulu, Basköy, Aydinkavak, Sorguç, Xinis,
Çatag, Qercewęr (Karacaören), Gęvreker (Sagirtas)
IGDIR
Asagi Gevro, Yukari Gevro, Gomik, Mexza, Milik
Aralik
Mexzo Zilo, Korxan, Aticilar, Bilcan
DERSIM (Tunceli)
Kizilmescit, Kevat, Çatan, Göl, Gabzo, Hanikân, Kushani, Kilköy, Güdeç,
Gürbüzler, Çevrecik, Kizilveren, Burnak, Koçkozuca, Buzlutepe, Koçeri, Pak,
Tasitli, Hirsizpinar
Ovacik
Isikvuran, Topuzlu, Karaoglan, Çölbasi, Merxo (Cevizlidere), Kiçikli, Hanusagi,
Mekikusagi (Tepsili), Kalikusagi (Egrikavak), Bektasiusagi, Gökusagi, Molaliler,
Yaziören, Xalpinar (Halitpinar), Babamansur (Tokmak), Kakber (Buzlutepe),
Sarioglan, Qozca (Koçkozluca), Karsi (Isikvuran), Zaruk (Yakatarla), Çet
(Çatköy), Birnan (Eskigedik), Kalanbüyük (Yalmanlar), Maras (Egimli), Budik
(Karaçali), Çalbasi, Arzumak (Yaylagünü), Kusluca, Xandalar, Cixber, Tilek
(Yogunca), Bozikusagi (Çogurluk), Yoncali, Tornova (Nahiye)
Pülümür
Nazmiye
Kilköy, Iresi (Dallibahce), Xodik (Yazgeldi), Xosom (Güzeltepe), Ciravik
(Sariyayla), Kirik (Yigitler), Boziya, Albeso, Dizik (Demirci), Kabat Bostanli
(Panan)
Hozat
Xosan (Uzundal), Sirtikan (Yüceldi), Tanzi (Kurukaymak)
Męzgir (Mazgirt)
Ambar, Kalayci, Kavun, Çandur (Akyünlü), Karatas, Ocanir, Gusxane (Kushane),
Beroç (Dallibel), Köklüce
MERES (Kahraman Maras)
Serbet, Gürsel, Çelikli
Elbîstan (Elbistan)
Sevdilli, Çiftlik, Kantarma, Hasanlili, Atmalikasanli, Topkirankale
Bin Laden In Turkey Twice
ISTANBUL, Sept 21 (NTV-MSNBC) - Records show that Osama Bin Laden, the prime
suspect in the terrorist attacks
against the US last week, visited Turkey in 1996 and 1998. However, the curtain
over who he has met with has yet to be
lifted.
The Saudi dissident bin Laden arrived in Turkey on 28 August 1996 in his private
plane and stayed for 33 hours. bin Laden’s
plane is reported to have landed at Adana’s Sakirpasa airport in the south of
Turkey from the city of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia.
The plane flew then to Istanbul and left Turkey the next day. During this trip
to Turkey bin Laden was accompanied by one
person apart from the crew.
bin Laden paid another visit to Turkey on 17 February 1998, just six months
before bombing attacks on the American
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This visit also had a stop over in Adana before
flying to Istanbul. According to the records
of Havas, which provided on the ground services to the plane, apart from bin
Laden himself who was listed as “Muhammad
Osama” there was one other passenger named El Sawaf.
Although bin Laden was on Interpol’s wanted list at the time of both his visits
he has faced no difficulties while in Turkey.
Airways experts say that bin Laden could have flown from Jeddah to Istanbul
without his plane having to refuel. One official
from the State Airports Management said that it was noteworthy that in both
cases bin Laden used the Adana airport and that
this could have been a conscious choice.
Adana’s Sakirpasa airport is known for its poor record of security in recent
years, with a number of hijackings taking place.
The official stated that Adana could have been chosen to avoid passport
controls.
Another interesting detail about the visits of bin Laden to Turkey is that the
first visit was reported to the Ankara State Airport
Management Directorate, as is compulsory for all private planes. The first visit
has been recorded in Istanbul among in secret
files. Another point was that the documentation for ground services given to the
bin Laden plane were not put on computer and
was filled by hand with the registration number left blank.
The American newspaper the Wall Street Journal in a news piece citing CIA
sources, has claimed that bin Laden held talks
with the Iraq intelligence service El Muhaberat.
NTV-MSNBC 9/21/01 8:13:29 AM
Terrorist Grey Wolves and terrorist Turkey?
What like the previous support of Hizbollah and the current support of the Grey
wolves/MHP who are part of the coallition
government?
MHP was founded in the 1960s by Alparslan Turkes, an army colonel who, according
to Christopher Hitchens in his book
Hostage to History, "got into trouble during the second world war for his
pro-Nazi activities". The Gray Wolves, MHP's
paramilitary arm, is known throughout Europe as one of the largest and most
violent terrorist organizations in the world.
Through the use of death squads, kidnappings, bombings and other violent
methods, the Gray Wolves are credited for having
killed thousands of leftists, Kurds, journalists, professors and other
dissidents who opposed their racially-inspired nationalist
vision. This vision was chillingly revealed in an MHP pamphlet distributed to
Turkish workers in Germany:
"Those who have destroyed [the Ottoman Empire] were Greek-Armenian-Jewish
converts, Kurds, Circassians, Bosnians, and
Albanians. As a Turk, how much longer will you tolerate these dirty minorities?
. . . throw out the Armenian, throw out and
kill the Kurd, purge from your midst the enemy of all Turkdom."
Turkey: new wave of repression against Kurds and Islamic forces
By Justus Leicht
13 March 2000
The last several weeks have seen a new wave of state repression and
arbitrary violence in Turkey. The arrests, repressive measures and
attacks on democratic rights are an expression of a deep crisis wracking
the widely hated Turkish political establishment.
Three mayors from southern Anatolia belonging to the legal Kurdish
nationalist party HADEP (Democratic Peoples Party) were arrested in broad
daylight. All three, who just last year were President Suleyman Demirel's
official guests, were interrogated for four days, accused of supporting
the illegal Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), and locked up.
There are indications that all three were tortured. Their homes and
offices were searched as well as other branch offices of the party. The
peaceful protests against their arrests were quickly dispersed, mostly by
use of brutal force and dozens of arrests. On the following day the three
mayors, joined by a fourth, were suspended from office and charged with
"separatism".
On February 24, 18 leading members of HADEP, including the former and
present chairman of the party, were condemned to long prison sentences
for "supporting the PKK". The arrests came only a few days after Social
Democratic Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit refused to meet a delegation of
the mayors and instead launched a vicious attack on them.
It is possible that these moves are part of preparations to ban the
party, which governs most towns in the mainly Kurdish region of
southeastern Turkey. The legal proceedings for such a move were initiated
long ago. They may also be part of a strategy to put pressure on HADEP
and bend it into shape, so it can be of more use to the state in the
future. The arrested mayors have since been freed pending their trial.
The state has also attacked the Islamic opposition once again. Tayip
Erdogan, the former mayor of Istanbul and a well-known functionary of the
Virtue Party (FP—the largest opposition party in parliament), who is in
jail at the moment for quoting a "subversive" poem, is once again to face
trial together with 13 of his former colleagues. An office of the party
was searched by the police and documents were confiscated. Legal
proceedings to ban the FP have also been initiated.
At the same time, following parliamentary horse-trading, the constitution
is to be changed to make it more difficult to ban political parties. In
exchange, the FP is to approve a change making possible a second term in
office for President Demirel.
Behind this zigzag course a bitter conflict is brewing over how Turkey
can be kept stable and who is to do it, under conditions where Turkey is
opening itself up to Western capital and building up its military forces.
This process is accompanied by growing social polarisation, which is
alienating broad sections of the population from the state.
The Islamists have in the past proved their loyalty to the state. Last
year they approved a compendium of laws dictated by the IMF in exchange
for an alteration in the party statutes. As for the Kurdish nationalist
forces, the PKK called off the armed struggle at its Seventh Party
Congress earlier this year. It has dropped the demand for autonomy and is
now calling for the "democratisation" of the existing order by
"democratic-political" means.
The PKK reacted to recent political developments by complaining that they
impede the integration of the Kurdish people into the political system.
Nevertheless they (the PKK) would stick to their new course. The PKK
insisted that the leadership of HADEP had nothing to do with the PKK.
They advised the Kurdish people to remain loyal to their elected
representatives and react democratically and peacefully when their
leaders were arrested.
HADEP itself has been trying to limit the protests and demonstrations of
the Kurds, stressing its commitment to "stability", "peace" and
"democracy".
The European Union in particular has been attempting to tame the Kurdish
nationalists by enhancing their status and encouraging their cooperation
with the Turkish state. The EU seeks to stabilise the state by defusing
the Kurdish conflict.
Accordingly the EU and the US expressed their "concerns" over the arrests
and issued vague warnings, which were notably mild in form as well as
content. A spokesman for the commissioner responsible for the expansion
of the EU, Gunther Verheugen, stressed that the dialogue with Turkey will
continue.
Influential Turkish businessmen would also like the Islamic and
pro-Kurdish forces to be integrated. This is why malicious campaigns
against HADEP and FP in the media alternate with journalistic support for
the "moderate" or "reformist" wings of these parties and demagogic calls
for the "rule of law” and “democracy".
Opposition to this line comes from the so-called "state within the
state". This is an influential, Mafia-like network of right-wing
gangsters linked to parts of the state apparatus and business and
political establishment. Some of these connections came to light in the
course of the state-led campaign against the Islamic terrorist
organisation Hezbollah.
Former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, together with the fascist party MHP
("Grey Wolves"), which is part of the current ruling coalition, have been
the spokesmen of these forces for some time. When it was revealed that
under her government irregular special forces, possibly including the
Hezbollah, were illegally financed to fight the PKK, Ciller reacted by
saying she had done no wrong and would do the same again.
Current Prime Minister Ecevit and President Demirel also defended these
special forces. Last week the minister of the interior, Tantan, announced
there would be no investigating committee into the Hezbollah h or those
behind it.
A large part of the military leadership thinks that the government has
been far too soft in its dealings with the Kurdish and Islamic
opposition. The generals have always vehemently rejected even the most
basic cultural rights for the Kurdish people. They are concerned that any
relaxation of the previous hard line could encourage separatist demands,
under conditions where most Kurdish people are already alienated from the
state because of the social crisis and decades of merciless repression.
The generals are suspicious of the HADEP mayors' international contacts,
especially with countries of the EU, which enable the mayors to bypass
the central government. At the latest session of the National Security
Council, which is dominated by representatives of the military, a
prominent issue on the agenda was foreign delegations travelling into the
Kurdish regions.
There are also conflicts over how to deal with the immensely rich Islamic
clergyman Fethullah G?len. Parts of the military demand more radical
measures against his empire, which consists of religious schools,
companies and parts of the media. Such an approach is rejected by Prime
Minister Ecevit.
It is to be expected that conflicts between the traditional
establishment, the Kurdish nationalists and Islamic forces will continue.
But the notion that a break-up of the country along ethnic or religious
lines can be prevented by the use of state force and repression is an
illusion. On the other hand, it is a potentially fatal mistake to believe
that the justified demands for democratic rights and social justice can
be realised by HADEP, the PKK or the Islamic forces. What is needed is a
socialist perspective uniting all the oppressed against the profit
system.
Government crackdown against the Hezbollah in Turkey
By Justus Leicht
16 February 2000
Use this version to print
For weeks state security forces in Turkey have been carrying out an
extensive operation against the Islamic terror organisation Hezbollah
(Arabic for the “Party of God”). The group does not have a mass base in
Turkey and reportedly has no ties to the one operating in Lebanon and
other Middle Eastern countries under the same name.
Up to now 900 persons are said to have been arrested and interrogated and
numerous houses have been searched. In the course of the raids police
have confiscated thousands of documents, as well as innumerable computer
discs, weapons, money and credit cards.
The corpses of several dozen persons have been found. The bodies are of
victims who were kidnapped, tortured and then killed by the group. The
Hezbollah made many video films of their victims as they were being
tortured to death.
Amongst those apprehended is the majority of the organisation's
leadership. At the beginning of the operation, the group's head and
founder, H?seyin Velioglu, was shot by police snipers during a raid on a
villa.
At the same time the state has undertaken action against another Islamic
organisation, the IBDA-C (Turkish for “Islamic Great East Raiders
Front”). On January 25 security forces stormed the prison wings where
IBDA-C members are being held. These prisoners had, as a result of a
number of prison revolts, achieved most of their demands and established
de facto control of their own prison wings. The security forces brutally
broke the prisoners' resistance and proceeded to distribute members of
the group to various other prisons, confining them to smaller cells.
Although the Turkish state has carried out individual actions against the
Islamists over the past three years, the latter were able to operate
virtually without hindrance throughout the 1990s. The Turkish army,
police and secret police worked closely with Hezbollah as well as
right-wing death squads and Mafia terror groups. The result is over 3,000
“unsolved (political) murders”. This state of affairs has been an open
secret for some time in Turkey and is now being more or less openly
admitted by the media and many well-known politicians.
Right-wing militias have been especially active in the predominately
Kurdish south-east of Turkey, terrorising the population and killing
mainly Kurdish nationalists and intellectuals, as well as human rights
activists, critical journalists, left-wingers and trade unionists.
A series of articles in the pro-Kurdish newspaper ?zgur Politika referred
to numerous sources which confirmed that it was not a question of “an
individual traitor in the state apparatus” closing his eyes to what was
going on, but rather the state as a whole systematically supporting and
sponsoring the Hezbollah as part of the so-called “counter-guerrilla”
forces. The population in south-eastern Turkey used to call Hezbollah
“Hizb-i Contra” (“Party of the Contra”).
In February 1991 the magazine 2000'e Dogru published a report based on
the testimony of witnesses and sympathisers of Hezbollah which stipulated
that the organisation had been trained at the headquarters of the local
mobile state task force in the town of Diyarbakir. Two days after the
publication of the report, its author was murdered.
In an interview with the Turkish Daily News the lawyer Mustafa Yilmaz,
who in 1993 was a Social Democratic member of the inquiry into unsolved
murders, declared that the Hezbollah occupied training camps alongside
quarters of the Turkish special police in a number of south-eastern
Turkish towns. In response to the report, a few security officials who
were willing to give a statement were sacked. The claims were never
properly followed up or brought to the attention of parliament by any of
the parties.
Over the past weeks there have been continued reports in Turkish papers
about connections between the Hezbollah, right-wing Mafia circles and
organs of the state. The papers have expressed the conjecture that
Hezbollah leader Velioglu was shot because he knew too much.
On January 25 the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet quoted President Suleyman
Demirel, who contested allegations of collaboration between state forces
and the right-wing groups, but in the same breath indirectly and
cynically confirmed such collaboration: “Hezbollah is a derivative of the
PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). It began life with the aim of having
people defend themselves from the PKK. But [later] it became a terrorist,
separatist and ‘religionist' organization.”
It does appear that in recent years the Hezbollah has increased its
independence and has also kidnapped and murdered Islamic businessmen from
the Kurdish south-east loyal to the Turkish state. This is why Hezbollah
has now become a threat to the stability of the Turkish state, something
which the European Union (EU) and the United States are insisting must be
maintained, under the euphemism “democratisation”.
Turkey is regarded as a decisive Western bridgehead to the countries of
the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The country is being
transformed into a fortress bristling with weapons from which Western
powers will be able assert their demands in the region.
Turkey cannot seriously fulfil the role of regional power and a bastion
for NATO if it is continually being rocked by domestic conflicts between
the Kemalists, the Islamists and Kurdish nationalists. This is why the EU
and the US are putting pressure on the Turkish government to end these
conflicts in the name of “democratisation”.
The PKK no longer poses an obstacle to such a development—quite the
opposite. In a statement published in the ?zgur Politika on January 16
the central committee of the PKK declared: “The internal and external
forces which are trying to prevent Turkey from going forward need to be
stopped. Then it will be seen that everybody is proud to be part of
Turkey and Turkey is a strong country in the region and the world....
Turkish leaders with common sense, democratic forces and nationalists can
be sure that our party will not tolerate any force weakening Turkey or
harming its interests. The Kurdish people will help to build a democratic
republic like they did during Turkey's liberation struggle. Our party and
people will co-operate with the democratic forces of Turkey.” (Kurdistan
Observer, January 17).
Following the neutralisation of the PKK, the state is levelling its blows
at the Hezbollah. The Islamic terror group is, however, only the most
extreme excrescence of the web of Mafia and death squads, which has
penetrated so deeply into the state and economic structures of Turkey
that it is referred to as the “deep state”.
The present action against the Hezbollah does not change these
structures, but rather serves to secure and stabilise them. One arm of
the structure which is proving more harmful than beneficial is being
severed. This will not resolve the deeper lying conflicts inside the
establishment.
The export-orientated, neo-liberal economic policy introduced first by
Turgut ?zal following the military putsch of 1980 and continued since
then has produced a new layer of unscrupulous social climbers and newly
wealthy employers, mainly from the east of the country. These now find
themselves in conflict with the old Kemalist establishment and the “deep
state” over rich pickings to be had in the country.
Accordingly, the Turkish army has reacted in hysterical fashion to
charges by the Islamic Virtue Party (FP—the largest oppositional party in
parliament) that the military had tolerated the Hezbollah. The army
general staff issued a statement levelling abuse at the FP, which had
also called for the establishment a parliamentary committee of
investigation.
The general staff virtually demanded a ban of the party, which is
currently subject to an official procedure with the same aim. The
procedure is entering its final stages.
There have also been reports of sharp disputes within the ruling elite
about what to do once Hezbollah, the Frankenstein monster of the state,
is eliminated. Sections of the military, in particular, are said to be
pressing behind the scenes for a wholesale campaign of oppression against
all independent manifestations of Islamic tendencies, no matter how
moderate or conservative they may be.
Following sharp warnings from Washington and Europe, all sides are now
concerned to de-escalate the conflict. Leading representatives of the FP
emphasise that they would never harm the image of the army or seek to
question Kemalism or the state order. The military has refrained from
further statements and Vural Savas, the highest state prosecutor who
enjoys the closest relations with the army, has made assurances he will
not use the dispute as ammunition in the official process weighing the
legal status of the FP.
WolfWolf
news:3BC3CDD5...@SPAMTRAPPEDhotmail.com...
>
>
> WolfWolf wrote:
>
> > "ARC@DIAN" <OXI.arca...@hotmail.com.SPAM> wrote in message
> > news:mFow7.46786$My2.22...@news1.mntp1.il.home.com...
> > >
> > > "sutten" <sut...@att.net> wrote in message
> > > news:52f7da1b.01100...@posting.google.com...
> > > > Bad news for Hanife's PKK terrorist organization.
> > > >
> > > > Hanife is an active member and supporter of PKK, one of the most
> > > > brutal terrorist organizations of the World's history which
massacred
> > > > nearly 40 thousands innocent lives in Turkiye
> > >
> > > Unbelievable, Turkish 'security' forces devastate 3,000 Kurdish
villages
> > and
> > > massacre their inhabitants Vietnam style, and it's ONLY PKK's fault.
> >
> > Unbelievable? Where are these "villages"? How many Kurdish (and other)
> > people are massacred by PKK?
> > Where are the criminals?
> > It's time to end this plague!
>
> Including the plague of Turkish state terrorism which allowed the PKK to
form.
There is no such thing as "Turkish state terrorism". Turkey has reacted in a
sensible, yet decided way against attacks of terrorists. The fact that PKK
is a terrorist organisation OF THE WORST KIND is universally recognized,
even by former members of this organisation and by the chief terrorist
himself.
WolfWolf
REAL
WolfWolf wrote:
Turkeys state terrorism allowed the PKK to form, allowed Kurds to this day to
suffer under Turkey intolernace for its minorities.
-------
--------
Amnesty International: Turkey campaign
The human rights picture in Turkey is bleak. Torture and ill-treatment have long
been routine. The 1990s have seen the emergence of "disappearances" and
extrajudicial executions. Turkey's citizens do not enjoy true freedom of
expression. The security forces are the most powerful group in the country and
they have treated human rights with contempt.
Political violence has been a serious problem for almost three decades. Recent
Turkish history has seen three military coups and, since the 1980s, armed
conflict between the security forces and opposition groups based in the
mountains of the southeast and the cities of west Turkey. Armed opposition
groups have also abused human rights. The largest armed opposition group is the
Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).
Successive governments have either denied that human rights violations occur, or
justified them as the inevitable consequence of defending national security. The
result is that no one in Turkey enjoys true personal security. Despite repeated
promises of reform, Turkish citizens can still be arbitrarily detained. In
custody, they will be unprotected against torture, still a standard method of
interrogation. Since 1980 more than 400 people have reportedly been tortured to
death in custody. "Disappearances" and political killings have claimed thousands
of victims since 1991.
Even people fighting alongside the security forces are put at risk by the
state's lawless methods. In January 1996 the government announced that the PKK
had massacred 11 men near the remote village of Guclukonak. Seven of the victims
were members of the local village guard force. Independent investigations
suggested that the massacre was the work of the security forces. The
international community has turned a blind eye to Turkey's human rights record.
They have echoed the Turkish Government's claim that the threat to national
security must be defeated at any cost to human rights. They have accepted
official window-dressing as progress towards human rights protection. They have
put the interests of trade and political allegiance before the security of
Turkish citizens.
-------
'We'll finish terrorism but we are being held back by democracy and human
rights.'
Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff, General Ahmet Corekci, July 1995
-------
Turkey Destroys Assyrian Villages
"Colorful, mosaic Turkey..." -- Turkish Government
by Turkish Daily News
August 29, 1996
ISTANBUL, Turkey (TDN) -- The unjust treatment of Assyrians in Turkey despite
the definition used by political leaders of a "colorful, mosaic Turkey", the
disappearance of those colors cannot be hidden any more - and the most blatant
example of colors that are about to disappear altogether are the 45,000
Assyrians out of a total of 50,000 who have emigrated from Turkey in the last 20
years.
The number of Assyrians in Turkey today is about 5,000. This population is
limited to the big cities only because every single once-thriving Assyrian
village has now become a ghost town. The Assyrians have been forced to look for
a future outside Turkey. Their burnt villages, unequal education, and other
pressures have forced them to seek a country where they can live in a more
democratic way. It will be enough to look at recent history without rose-tinted
spectacles to see and judge all these developments in a more objective way.
In Turkey, Assyrian villages are burnt and people tortured. Given the fact that
this reality is not hidden, the German Federal Court, after a resolution passed
in 1996, explained that the Assyrians would be taken under consideration as a
complete group. The reason for this decision was that the Turkish government
does not pursue the complaints of the Assyrian minority so as not to risk the
loyalty to the state of the "Aghas" or local chiefs, the village guards and
Hizbullah in the South East. Another interesting point was that Germany, which
believes that Kurds can live securely outside the South East, has concluded that
the Assyrians are nowhere safe in Turkey and has given them the right to refuge.
Emigration is not something new for the Assyrians, as they have been doing it
for the last 20 years. Researchers generally agree that the reason for this
emigration has not been economic, but people have been forced to emigrate
because of pressures in the region. The Assyrian population was about 50,000 in
the South East Turkey in the 1950's, but this number has now decreased to 2,000,
with the majority in Midyat and its surrounding villages. With the majority of
Assyrians in Istanbul, the total population for the whole country is about
5,000.
A representative of the Orthodox churches, journalist and writer Isa Karatas,
draws attention to another point: "In Turkey only Armenians and Greeks have the
rights of minorities. Even though Assyrians are Christian, they cannot benefit
from these rights." In Turkey, Assyrians may be Christian, but not a minority.
Since they do not have minoity rights, they cannot establish their own schools,
and as a result cannot provide for the development and learning of their own
language. The language courses organized in the churches have not been able to
expand due to various reasons. Neither does the Turkish government tolerate
these language classes and has tried to stop them. The most blatant example of
the situation was experienced in the Deyrulzafran Monastery in Mardin. In 1979
the education of religion and language was banned. It was said that the
Assyrian children educated in this monastery were joining terrorist
organizations.
In the state-sponsored religious classes, religions other than Islam are
reviewed in only three pages of the course books, and are also not given within
the framework of their own values. While Assyrian parents introduce their
children to the Bible as the book that shows the way to God and the priests as
respected people explaining this way, the government books introduce the Bible
as something that has either been destroyed or altered and the priests as the
ones who changed it to their own advantage. The Turkish Professor Mehlika Aktot
Kasgarli, in the book entitled "Turco-Semites in Mardin and Surrounding
Populations" writes this about Assyrians: "These Turkish Christians, who
accepted our language and traditions and who do not have the status as a
minority, are called Turco-Semites, in consideration of their origin.
Turco-Semites are not a different nation from the Turkish nation, and they even
have Turkish characteristics." Kasgarli also calls Kurds "Mountain Turks."
On August 2, 1992, the Assyrian village of Catalcan was attacked. The Assyrian
graveyard and houses were destroyed. On January 21, 1993, the village of
Izbirak in Midyat was attacked and four Assyrians were kidnapped. Between 1995
and 1996 twenty Assyrian villages have been attacked in similar fashion and
evacuated. The Turkish government has gone one step further and revoked the
citizenship of many so-called "Turco-Semites." Since 1980, 20 Assyrian girls
have been kidnapped by people claiming to be the village guards (Turkish village
police). The priest of Ogunduk village, Melke Tok, was kidnapped on January 9,
1994, by people suspected of being Hizbullah supporters. After being buried
alive, he succeeded in escaping. He said he was put under pressure to convert
to Islam.
In the face of such pressures, the Assyrians of Turkey have drifted away from
the country of their birth to find a new life. And so another piece of the
mosaic is chipped away.
WolfWolf
Nobody "allowed" PKK to start their terror. They alone are responsible for
their act, and they alone are paying for it before justice.
Who ignores this, is dumb.
Who attempts to sell lies to others is dangerous.
In which group are you, UN-REAL??
WolfWolf
REAL
WolfWolf
> So why do you ignore the actions of the Turkish regime you support?
Which regime do I support?? Substantiate. S-U-B-S-T-A-N-T-I-A-T-E!!
Here are some SUBSTANTIATED information about PKK and its background:
TIME Magazine, March 30, 1998
A HELLENIC HAVEN
The flight of Kurdish refugees to Greece adds to a cycle of violence and
vengeance
By Massimo Calabresi
It's not every day one sees recruits inducted into a terrorist organization.
But at the Kurdish Cultural Center in downtown Athens it happens three or
four times a month. About that often, a self-described "political branch" of
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (P.K.K.) sets up a few dozen plastic chairs in
a room on the center's dingy first floor, hangs the red and yellow P.K.K
flag on the wall and carts in a Yamaha electric organ to pound out Ey Ragip,
a P.K.K. anthem. Grizzled P.K.K. loyalists watch as recruits proclaim their
allegiance to the armed movement that has earned a place on the US State
Department's list of terrorist organizations. "Five to 10 Kurds leave here
every week to return (to Kurdistan) and fight," says Rozerin Laser, Balkans
general director of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (E.R.N.K.),
the P.K.K political group that seeks a Kurdish homeland in parts of Turkey,
Syria, Iran and Iraq.
The P.K.K. recruitment of Kurds in Greece is an overlooked link in the
vicious cycle of refugees and revolution across Europe's southeastern
frontier. In January, an influx of thousands of Kurds into Italy and Greece
reminded the rest of the EU how permeable its borders really are. But not
all Kurdish asylum seekers end up in Western Europe. Some join the P.K.K.
and return to would-be Kurdistan to fight, fueling more Turkish repression
and a new flood of refugees and a new flood of refugees and potential PKK.
recruits. With the Greek government turning a blind eye, P.K.K.
representatives claim the recruiters are free to start the process over
again. The latest refugee crisis, says one senior Western diplomat in Athens
who specializes in terrorist issues, "unveiled Turkey's appalling human
rights record and revealed the porous frontiers of Greece and Italy." But,
he says, "It also took the wrappings off Greece's tolerance of rebel Kurds."
The E.R.N.K's induction ceremonies are just the tail end of the process for
turning refugees into revolutionaries. The real indoctrination and
recruitment goes on at places like Lavrion, 45 km southeast of Athens, one
of about five main refugee camps for the 100 or so Kurdish asylum seekers
arriving each month. Although hardly lavish, the camp boasts an 18-inch
color TV with a satellite dish to receive daily broadcasts from MED TV, the
Kurdish news station. Kurdish camp leaders use cell phones for calls to
their "brothers in battle," as they describe their cohorts on the outside.
The crumbling walls are hung with pictures of P.K.K. strongman Abdullah
Ocalan and martyrs to the Kurdish cause.
"This is the greatest help that Greece is providing us," says Ferzeyn
Iskender, a self-proclaimed P.K.K. loyalist at Lavrion. "It is here away
from their homeland that the Kurds nurture their ethnic identity, learn who
they are, what they stand for, how they've been abused by the Turkish
authorities." He points to a group of children playing in the compound's
concrete courtyard. . "Listen," he says, "They're singing Ey Ragip." P.K.K.
tutors arrive twice a week, according to camp leaders, to teach the history
of Kurdistan, its language, customs and traditions, subjects that would be
illegal in Turkey. But P.K.K. activists at the camp quickly turn such topics
into propaganda. The E.R.N.K.'s Laser admits that her success in recruitment
"is the result of a process of ideological training."
Turkey says Greece is aiding and abetting the P.K.K, citing the confessions
of P.K.K. members as proof. "We are just stating what P.K.K. terrorists
captured in Turkey are saying," says Sermet Atacanly, a spokesman for
Turkey's Foreign Ministry. "They have been trained in Greece, both
ideologically and militarily." "Lies, lies, lies!" responds Greece's fiery
Foreign Minister, Theodore Pangalos, to accusations of Greek involvement.
Western diplomats monitoring the P.K.K. say there's no hard evidence
substantiating such accusations, but that "there is a gray area in the field
of financial support."
Much sympathy and support comes from the Greek population itself, which sees
parallels between the Kurdish nationalist movement and their own 1830
liberation from the Ottoman Empire. "The same thing is happening now with
the Kurds," says English teacher Kaiti Piperopulou as she delivers school
supplies to Lavrion. "We must help them." The P.K.K. builds on that backing,
circulating fundraising leaflets festooned with symbols of Greek, Kurdish
and Greek Cypriot unity and bearing slogans like, "The solution to the
disputes in the Aegean and Cyprus goes through Kurdistan." The leaflets
always include the bank account numbers for the E.R.N.K. "We are not hiding
what we are doing," says Lavrion's Iskender.
In the U.S., such open P.K.K. activities would be a breach of the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996 and would bring prison sentences of up to 10
years for those perpetrating them. But in Greece, the P.K.K.'s terrorist
fire spreads virtually unchecked. Across the border, Turkey fans the flames
with its draconian treatment of the Kurdish minority, and year by year more
Kurds are drawn into the conflagration.
- Reported by Anthee Carassava/Athens
REAL
WolfWolf wrote:
<UNSUBSTANTIATED NONSENSE, DIVERSIONS, LIES, MORE TROLLING>
Why waste your time with a TROLL?
WolfWolf claims Neom Chomsky is a "perfidious liar" because WolfWolf claims he
doesn't reveal his sources of income! not taht he can prove such an allegation!
When WolfWolf is asked his for sources of income the troll replies with ""my
work"!!!
What an idiotic troll!
Below is the substantiatiion
WolfWolf wrote:
> "REAL" <traprea...@SPAMTRAPPEDhotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:3BC709CE...@SPAMTRAPPEDhotmail.com...
>
> > > Chomsky is a perfidious liar, hiding his real sources of income.
> > >
> > > WolfWolf
> >
> > so what are your real sources of income?
>
> My work.
>
> WolfWolf
Please don't feed the trolls!
Guray Acar
REAL wrote:
>
> WolfWolf wrote:
>
> <UNSUBSTANTIATED NONSENSE, DIVERSIONS, LIES, MORE TROLLING>
>
> Why waste your time with a TROLL?
Hang on a minute !! . He has just forwarded an article from The
Times.. Is that not substantiation ???
>
> WolfWolf claims Neom Chomsky is a "perfidious liar" because WolfWolf claims he
> doesn't reveal his sources of income! not taht he can prove such an allegation!
>
> When WolfWolf is asked his for sources of income the troll replies with ""my
> work"!!!
REAL you have turned out to be a lot worse than I remotely thought ..
Every post you write you show more of your trollic face ..Hey !!
That's a good words ain't it ?? "Trollic".. I wonder if there really is
such a word in English ..
REAL
Guray Acar wrote:
> REAL wrote:
> >
> > WolfWolf wrote:
> >
> > <UNSUBSTANTIATED NONSENSE, DIVERSIONS, LIES, MORE TROLLING>
> >
> > Why waste your time with a TROLL?
>
> Hang on a minute !! . He has just forwarded an article from The
> Times.. Is that not substantiation ???
>
Where is the times article that Neom Chomsky is a "perfidious liar" ?
>
> >
> > WolfWolf claims Neom Chomsky is a "perfidious liar" because WolfWolf claims he
> > doesn't reveal his sources of income! not taht he can prove such an allegation!
> >
> > When WolfWolf is asked his for sources of income the troll replies with ""my
> > work"!!!
>
> REAL you have turned out to be a lot worse than I remotely thought ..
> Every post you write you show more of your trollic face ..Hey !!
> That's a good words ain't it ?? "Trollic".. I wonder if there really is
> such a word in English ..
So we are to accept that Neom Chomsky is a "perfidious liar" because WolfWolf
asserts that he does not reveal his sources of income (without substantiation), yet
when WolfWolf says "My Work" in answer to the same question he is not a "perfidious
liar" ?
How Bizzare!
Guray Acar
REAL wrote:
>
> Guray Acar wrote:
>
> > REAL wrote:
> > >
> > > WolfWolf wrote:
> > >
> > > <UNSUBSTANTIATED NONSENSE, DIVERSIONS, LIES, MORE TROLLING>
> > >
> > > Why waste your time with a TROLL?
> >
> > Hang on a minute !! . He has just forwarded an article from The
> > Times.. Is that not substantiation ???
> >
>
> Where is the times article that Neom Chomsky is a "perfidious liar" ?
Oh, so if I says that Archer is a liar, do I have to bring a
printed article about it ?? .. WolfWolf was not talking about
Chomsky in the previous message..
>
> >
> > >
> > > WolfWolf claims Neom Chomsky is a "perfidious liar" because WolfWolf claims he
> > > doesn't reveal his sources of income! not taht he can prove such an allegation!
> > >
> > > When WolfWolf is asked his for sources of income the troll replies with ""my
> > > work"!!!
> >
> > REAL you have turned out to be a lot worse than I remotely thought ..
> > Every post you write you show more of your trollic face ..Hey !!
> > That's a good words ain't it ?? "Trollic".. I wonder if there really is
> > such a word in English ..
>
> So we are to accept that Neom Chomsky is a "perfidious liar" because WolfWolf
> asserts that he does not reveal his sources of income (without substantiation), yet
> when WolfWolf says "My Work" in answer to the same question he is not a "perfidious
> liar" ?
No you are not to accept jackshit. That's his personal view about
somebody. And nobody has to reveal his source of income ..
Would you ??? .. Say WolfWolf said he is an engineer. Would that
be enough for you ?? .Or would you like to see a proof ?? .
>
> How Bizzare!
That's not bizarre .. Very simple. Yet you can't see... You believe
it's only your right to trollify the Internet .. Here, a new word:
trollify..
sutten
The "substantiation" for this is in your ass in a very substantial
way; you should feel it up in your throat. Enjoy it.
REAL
sutten wrote:
Your are sick.