The Church of Science
Christopher Ogden
definition of religion by Clifford Geertz. According to Geertz, a religion is
a cultural "blueprint or template" that is:
"(1) a system of symbols which acts to
(2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in
men [sic] by
(3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and
(4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
(5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." ("Religion as a
Cultural System," _The Interpretation of Cultures_ (New York: Basic Books,
1973), 92,93.)
Certainly all the religious organizations that I am aware of fit this
description, but it seems to me that this definition could also be made to
apply to science. Science is a system of symbols, be they mathematical,
graphical, or verbal, that has established powerful, pervasive, and
long-lasting moods and motivations in Western society since the 17th Century.
Today, no matter what your carrer, you almost cannot be taken seriously unless
you couch your language in terms of the Language of Science.
Next, science formulates conceptions of a general order of existence in the
universe. It establishes such concepts as "time", "space", "velocity",
"gravity", "matter", "energy", and "empiricism" that are clothed in an aura of
factuality that most people take them for granted. In fact, these conceptions
of reality have been taken as being the Ultimate Truth by the bulk of Western
society since the Enlightenment.
Since Science fits all the generally-accepted criteria for being a religion,
perhaps we should rename it the Church of Science.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Kelly Hall
In article <44%@byu.edu> OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden) writes:
> I was reading a book yesterday that quoted an apparently well-accepted
> definition of religion by Clifford Geertz. According to Geertz, a religion is
> a cultural "blueprint or template" that is:
>
> "(1) a system of symbols which acts to
> (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in
> men [sic] by
> (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and
> (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
> (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." ("Religion as a
> Cultural System," _The Interpretation of Cultures_ (New York: Basic Books,
> 1973), 92,93.)
>
> universe. It establishes such concepts as "time", "space", "velocity",
> "gravity", "matter", "energy", and "empiricism" that are clothed in an aura of
> factuality that most people take them for granted. In fact, these conceptions
> of reality have been taken as being the Ultimate Truth by the bulk of Western
> society since the Enlightenment.
That 'aura' of factuality is more than an aura:
au.ra \'o.r-*\ n [ME, fr. L, air, breeze, fr. Gk, akin to Gk ae-r air] 1a:
a subtle sensory stimulus 1b: a distinctive atmosphere surrounding a given
source 2: a luminous radiation : NIMBUS 3: a subjective sensation (as of
lights) experienced before an attack of some nervous disorders
The facts of science aren't 'subtle sensory stimuli' but hard,
physical evidence. If you consider scientific facts as 'a distinctive
atmosphere surrounding a given source', you've got me confused: what
claims does science make that isn't backed up by empirical evidence?
> Since Science fits all the generally-accepted criteria for being a religion,
> perhaps we should rename it the Church of Science.
One of your assumptions is false, thus your argument is vacuous.
One nice thing that makes science different from most religions is
addressed by item #2: science does not attempt to establish
long-lasting moods and motivations. What we explain today with theory
A can be tossed out tomorrow for theory B. Science doesn't care which
theory is held in favor, but whichever theory it is must explain the
empirical evidence best. The same cannot be said about religion,
where people *will kill each other* over who's theory explains
nonempirical nonevidence.
For more fun, get and read the sci.skeptics FAQ, available at
rtfm.mit.edu in /pub/usenet-by-hierarchy/sci/skeptic and also the
alt.atheism FAQ in a related directory.
Kelly
--
Kelly Hall ::= ha...@bert.cs.byu.edu <P>
<A HREF="http://lal.cs.byu.edu/people/hall.html"> Info </A> <P>
GAT d? p--- c+++ !l u++ e++ m+ s+/+ !n h* f g+ w+ t@ r@ y+
Michelle Murrain
ha...@bert.cs.byu.edu writes:
>In article <44%@byu.edu> OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden)
writes:
>> definition of religion by Clifford Geertz. According to Geertz, a
religion is
>> a cultural "blueprint or template" that is:
>>
>> "(1) a system of symbols which acts to
>> (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and
motivations in
>> men [sic] by
>> (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and
>> (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
>> (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." ("Religion as
a
>> Cultural System," _The Interpretation of Cultures_ (New York: Basic
Books,
>> 1973), 92,93.)
>>
in the
>> universe. It establishes such concepts as "time", "space",
"velocity",
>> "gravity", "matter", "energy", and "empiricism" that are clothed in an
aura of
>> factuality that most people take them for granted. In fact, these
conceptions
>> of reality have been taken as being the Ultimate Truth by the bulk of
Western
>> society since the Enlightenment.
>
>
>au.ra \'o.r-*\ n [ME, fr. L, air, breeze, fr. Gk, akin to Gk ae-r air]
1a:
> a subtle sensory stimulus 1b: a distinctive atmosphere surrounding a
given
> source 2: a luminous radiation : NIMBUS 3: a subjective sensation (as
of
> lights) experienced before an attack of some nervous disorders
>
>The facts of science aren't 'subtle sensory stimuli' but hard,
>physical evidence. If you consider scientific facts as 'a distinctive
>atmosphere surrounding a given source', you've got me confused: what
>claims does science make that isn't backed up by empirical evidence?
Yes, hard physical evidence within a specific framework and worldview.
>> Since Science fits all the generally-accepted criteria for being a
religion,
>> perhaps we should rename it the Church of Science.
>
>One of your assumptions is false, thus your argument is vacuous.
>
>One nice thing that makes science different from most religions is
>addressed by item #2: science does not attempt to establish
>long-lasting moods and motivations. What we explain today with theory
>A can be tossed out tomorrow for theory B. Science doesn't care which
>theory is held in favor, but whichever theory it is must explain the
>empirical evidence best. The same cannot be said about religion,
>where people *will kill each other* over who's theory explains
>nonempirical nonevidence.
You've gotta be kidding (or you've swallowed the *whole* thing). Science
does, and has established long lasting moods and motivations. Within
science, yes, you are right theory A is tossed out by theory B all the
time. But the basic fundamental premise of science, the way that science
looks at the world is imbedded in a western worldview which it continues
to fuel. Science is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and
measurable phenomena, yet *insists* upon claiming that this makes up the
whole of the universe.
I am a scientist, and a good friend and I (also a scientist - and a
devout catholic) have had numerous conversations about this. We both
agree. Science in our society as practiced has most if not all of the
qualities of a religion.
Michelle
Stryder
[snip]
>You've gotta be kidding (or you've swallowed the *whole* thing). Science
>does, and has established long lasting moods and motivations. Within
>science, yes, you are right theory A is tossed out by theory B all the
>time. But the basic fundamental premise of science, the way that science
>looks at the world is imbedded in a western worldview which it continues
>to fuel. Science is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and
>measurable phenomena, yet *insists* upon claiming that this makes up the
>whole of the universe.
Bull shit. What science insists this? George Science? Maybe his sister
Georgette? Perhaps the science referred to from church pulpits?
By the way, we are speaking english here. The definition of "religion"
from some obscure philosopher hardly rates as standard.
> I am a scientist
Are you the scientist that gets quoted on the cover of the National
Enquirer all the time? That would explain a lot.
"ELVIS'S FACE SEEN ON MOON, Claim Scientists". Are you one of those?
>, and a good friend and I (also a scientist - and a
>devout catholic) have had numerous conversations about this. We both
>agree. Science in our society as practiced has most if not all of the
>qualities of a religion.
> Michelle
Ok, you've toned your argument to not entirely claim that science is a
religion, but that it has "many of the qualities". Even that watered
down version of "science is a religion" is nonsense.
From the 1993 edition of the American Heritage dictionary (other dic-
tionaries, including Oxford, have very similar definitions):
==========================================================================
re-lig-ion:
n. 1. a. Belief in and reverence for a supernatural power recognized as
the creator and governor of the universe. b. A particular integrated system
of this expression: the Hindu religion. 2. The spiritual or emotional
attitude of one who recognizes the existence of a superhuman power or powers.
3. An objective pursued with zeal or conscientious devotion: A collector
might make a religion of his hobby. [ME religioun < OFr. religion < Lat.
religio.]
==========================================================================
In no way shape or form can you call science a religion, unless you
stretch the meaning of both words to almost an absurd degree. Of course,
many people do just that. They (you) stretch the meanings of words in
order to bring about a world view that somehow matches your religious
beliefs. And there is a motivation behind your convoluted thinking, and
it is obvious what it is.
You're trying to elevate religion to the level of science. And you have
your own reasons for doing this. It doesn't work, at least not here.
Maybe in church.
Science does not claim to have answers for everything. Religion DOES claim
exactly that, that someone, somewhere "knows" everything. Therefore, I
say that RELIGION is the cowards way out, the philosophy that insists on
labeling everything, the philosophy that doesn't have the courage to admit
that human beings can't possibly "know" everything.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Prove to me that you're no fool,
Walk across my swimmin' pool.
(Andrew Loyd Weber, Jesus Christ Superstar)
_____________________________________________________________________________
Benjamin J. Tilly
str...@access1.digex.net (Stryder) writes:
[...]
> You're trying to elevate religion to the level of science. And you have
> your own reasons for doing this. It doesn't work, at least not here.
> Maybe in church.
>
> Science does not claim to have answers for everything. Religion DOES claim
> exactly that, that someone, somewhere "knows" everything. Therefore, I
> say that RELIGION is the cowards way out, the philosophy that insists on
> labeling everything, the philosophy that doesn't have the courage to admit
> that human beings can't possibly "know" everything.
You obviously do not know very much about different religeons. For
example in Buddism it is accepted that nobody knows everything, but
that meditation will tell you what is really important. In many other
religeons there is again no insistence upon knowing everything.
Christianity, of course, is an exeption.
I also agree that there is a lot that seperates science from religeon.
However science is systematically misused in a way that is close to
religeon. Furthermore historically there was a lot less of a seperation
between science and religeon than there is today. And lastly many of
the topics that science addresses today were traditionally within the
sphere of influence of religeon. In short, the poster who was
commenting on science as a type of religeon likely has some good
reasons for thinking so.
Cheers,
Ben Tilly
benjamin franz
: You've gotta be kidding (or you've swallowed the *whole* thing). Science
: does, and has established long lasting moods and motivations. Within
: science, yes, you are right theory A is tossed out by theory B all the
: time. But the basic fundamental premise of science, the way that science
: looks at the world is imbedded in a western worldview which it continues
: to fuel. Science is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and
: measurable phenomena, yet *insists* upon claiming that this makes up the
: whole of the universe.
You have "observable, repeatable and measurable" *evidence* for _any_
other world view? If not - you are playing word games. *OF COURSE* science
is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and measurable
phenomena. It is part of the definition of _science_. You would rather it
tryed to understand non-observable, non-repeatable, non-measurable
phenomena? Sounds like a pretty good description of *non-existant*
phenomena to me. :^|
: I am a scientist, and a good friend and I (also a scientist - and a
: devout catholic) have had numerous conversations about this. We both
: agree. Science in our society as practiced has most if not all of the
: qualities of a religion.
: Michelle
Perhaps. But science seems to posses the one quality that no religion I am
aware of does: a phenomenal ability to predict future events with verifiable
precision, repeatability and unambiguity.
Please show me *one* religion that can correctly and reliably *predict* the
location of Pluto on an arbitrary date, the result of adding 1 gm of pure
Lithium to pure water, or the frequency distribution of the thermal
radiation from a blackbody for an arbitrary temperature.
Oh yes - please do not use tabs in your text. It royally messes up many
newsreaders.
Ray Ingles
[deletions]
>Science is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and
>measurable phenomena, yet *insists* upon claiming that this makes up the
>whole of the universe.
No, it just claims that that's all that has been needed to explain things
up to now. Got any new evidence? :->
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles || The above opinions are probably
|| not those of the University of
ing...@engin.umich.edu || Michigan. Yet.
Daniel E. Platt
|> I was reading a book yesterday that quoted an apparently well-accepted
|> definition of religion by Clifford Geertz. According to Geertz, a religion is
|> a cultural "blueprint or template" that is:
|>
|> "(1) a system of symbols which acts to
Agreed science does this.
|> (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in
|> men [sic] by
It isn't clear as to whether intent must be necessary in order
for this to be a valid component in this definition. If it
is the intent of a religion to establish the mood, then science
isn't guilty. Neither are some religions.
|> (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and
Some science is concerned with this. But science seems to be more
interested with the hows than they whys. In the sense that even
childrens' games and playtime, or business life, or virtually any
other human endeavor involves formulating conceptions which involve
symbols and motivations (measuring worth by profit, etc), then
everything qualifies up to now...
|> (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
This also depends on the nature of 'fact.' Some religious thinking
tends to shun this word. Primarily fundamentalists in the strictest
sense, creationists, etc, take fact in a way that you mean.
|> (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." ("Religion as a
|> Cultural System," _The Interpretation of Cultures_ (New York: Basic Books,
|> 1973), 92,93.)
As it stands, without a lot more effort on definition, it would be
hard to figure out what distinguishes the above from any human
activity which has cultural components.
Is it possible to conclude something particular about the
relationship between religion and science if the criterea
doesn't really distinguish between them?
|>
|> Certainly all the religious organizations that I am aware of fit this
|> description, but it seems to me that this definition could also be made to
|> apply to science. Science is a system of symbols, be they mathematical,
|> graphical, or verbal, that has established powerful, pervasive, and
|> long-lasting moods and motivations in Western society since the 17th Century.
|> Today, no matter what your carrer, you almost cannot be taken seriously unless
|> you couch your language in terms of the Language of Science.
|>
|> Next, science formulates conceptions of a general order of existence in the
|> universe. It establishes such concepts as "time", "space", "velocity",
|> "gravity", "matter", "energy", and "empiricism" that are clothed in an aura of
|> factuality that most people take them for granted. In fact, these conceptions
|> of reality have been taken as being the Ultimate Truth by the bulk of Western
|> society since the Enlightenment.
|>
|> Since Science fits all the generally-accepted criteria for being a religion,
|> perhaps we should rename it the Church of Science.
|>
|> -----------------------------
|> Christopher Ogden
|> ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel E. Platt pl...@watson.ibm.com
The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of my employer.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel E. Platt
|>
|> That 'aura' of factuality is more than an aura:
|>
|> au.ra \'o.r-*\ n [ME, fr. L, air, breeze, fr. Gk, akin to Gk ae-r air] 1a:
|> a subtle sensory stimulus 1b: a distinctive atmosphere surrounding a given
|> source 2: a luminous radiation : NIMBUS 3: a subjective sensation (as of
|> lights) experienced before an attack of some nervous disorders
|>
|> The facts of science aren't 'subtle sensory stimuli' but hard,
|> physical evidence. If you consider scientific facts as 'a distinctive
|> atmosphere surrounding a given source', you've got me confused: what
|> claims does science make that isn't backed up by empirical evidence?
You've taken the wrong definition. The meaning intended was #2 -- luminous
radiation. Sort of like the haloes from religious paintings. It refers
to the idea that scientific ideas are more true than other ideas.
As for things being 'hard physical evidence,' you get tied up in
objectivism, which comes down to the idea that a community of researchers
are supposed to be able to reproduce the same results, that they
are supposed to be able to observe things, etc. There are factors
of operationalism -- you have to be able to define things by what they
do, ultimately getting back to some kind of empirical definitions, etc.
Essentially, a lot of the above *does* involve cultural forces -- people
have to be able to agree on what is the basis for discussion. Psychology
has been called the science of behavior because science of the mind (which
is what the word would mean) cannot be observed. Skinner, who took a
hard line of rejecting the reality of things which could not be observed
by everyone seemed to suggest that conciousness wasn't real because
nobody could devise a way to show one person's concious experience to
another except by verbal report (not repeatable or subject to external
observation). That doesn't mean that our experience of conciousness
isn't real. Pathologies involving that experience make major impacts
on people's lives (street people who are mentally impaired, for instance).
|>
|> > Since Science fits all the generally-accepted criteria for being a religion,
|> > perhaps we should rename it the Church of Science.
|>
|> One of your assumptions is false, thus your argument is vacuous.
|>
Actually, I think you missed the point. Its a good question.
The problem is that the definition is true about everything
people do as far as I can tell. Its true about religion,
science, law enforcement, business, sports, etc.
|> One nice thing that makes science different from most religions is
|> addressed by item #2: science does not attempt to establish
|> long-lasting moods and motivations. What we explain today with theory
|> A can be tossed out tomorrow for theory B. Science doesn't care which
|> theory is held in favor, but whichever theory it is must explain the
|> empirical evidence best. The same cannot be said about religion,
|> where people *will kill each other* over who's theory explains
|> nonempirical nonevidence.
It wasn't clear from the definition whether the activity had to intend
to establish moods, only that it did establish them.
Dan
Benjamin J. Tilly
bf6...@u.cc.utah.edu (benjamin franz) writes:
> Michelle Murrain (mmur...@hamp.hampshire.edu) wrote:
> : You've gotta be kidding (or you've swallowed the *whole* thing). Science
> : does, and has established long lasting moods and motivations. Within
> : science, yes, you are right theory A is tossed out by theory B all the
> : time. But the basic fundamental premise of science, the way that science
> : looks at the world is imbedded in a western worldview which it continues
> : to fuel. Science is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and
> : measurable phenomena, yet *insists* upon claiming that this makes up the
> : whole of the universe.
>
> You have "observable, repeatable and measurable" *evidence* for _any_
> other world view? If not - you are playing word games. *OF COURSE* science
> is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and measurable
> phenomena. It is part of the definition of _science_. You would rather it
> tryed to understand non-observable, non-repeatable, non-measurable
> phenomena? Sounds like a pretty good description of *non-existant*
> phenomena to me. :^| [...]
>
Actually there is. Medicine men come up with solid repeatable evidence
that their cures work. (We actually base many of our medicines on the
active ingredients of their stuff.) Meditators believe that they get
observable and repeatable evidence for their beliefs, to measure it you
merely have to meditate for a few months... :-) In general from within
most world beliefs it is possible to get lots of observable and
measureable things that, within that world view, are evidence for it.
(Just look at fundamentalist Christians... :-O ) This is not special
about science. What *is* special about science is its tendancy to push
the limits of what it can do, and then to modify its world view. To the
best of my knowledge no other world view has ever done that.
So while I prefer science to other belief systems, it is *far* from the
only world view with data supporting it from within its own belief
system.
Ben Tilly
Daniel E. Platt
|> From the 1993 edition of the American Heritage dictionary (other dic-
|> tionaries, including Oxford, have very similar definitions):
|>
|> ==========================================================================
|> re-lig-ion:
|> n. 1. a. Belief in and reverence for a supernatural power recognized as
|> the creator and governor of the universe. b. A particular integrated system
|> of this expression: the Hindu religion. 2. The spiritual or emotional
|> attitude of one who recognizes the existence of a superhuman power or powers.
|> 3. An objective pursued with zeal or conscientious devotion: A collector
|> might make a religion of his hobby. [ME religioun < OFr. religion < Lat.
|> religio.]
|> ==========================================================================
|>
This definition would leave out large gaps in the more liberal
mainstream religions, such as large chunks of Episcopaleans,
Unitarian Universalists, etc.
Since the 1800's, with people such as Bultmann, and liberal
theological movements, such as the social gospel, the above
definition would fail miserably to encompass these.
This leads to the problem that definition is difficult. The
problem with the definition that started this thread is that
it is too broad... it encompasses science, our judicial and
legal systems, our business culture, etc. It doesn't really
say anything unique about religion.
|> You're trying to elevate religion to the level of science. And you have
|> your own reasons for doing this. It doesn't work, at least not here.
|> Maybe in church.
'Elevate?' This demonstrates a kind of bias, don't you think? For
many current religions, science is considered to be something to
be embraced. Their view of religion should be one that makes a
good distinction between what is a religious discipline and what
is science.
The only people who have problems are a peculiar subset of
fundamentalists who accept ancient Babylonian cosmogony.
Many mainline denomenations accept that these sources were
taken by Isrealites to challenge the role of polytheism
in their culture by claiming Yahweh had the position of supremecy
in all the other gods' myths. The creationists take things so
literally that they believe these traditions as if they were
eyewitness reports of the creation. Since geology, paleontology,
astronomy and cosmology, genetic biology, etc, challenge their
picture of who they believe God is, they'd rather throw out
most of science than throw out their picture of God. This isn't
what most Christian denominations accept. As a matter of fact,
in the early '80s, when a bill was passed in Arkansas giving
equal time to the creation science material in classrooms,
the challenge in court was presented by a group including
one scientific society, and quite a few religious parties.
|>
|> Science does not claim to have answers for everything. Religion DOES claim
|> exactly that, that someone, somewhere "knows" everything. Therefore, I
|> say that RELIGION is the cowards way out, the philosophy that insists on
|> labeling everything, the philosophy that doesn't have the courage to admit
|> that human beings can't possibly "know" everything.
|>
Funny, there's a parallel here too... Many scientists appeal to some sense
of a universe that everyone shares, and which must respond the
same way for everyone. That universe must be testable. However,
that testability is limited (we cannot share our individual sense of
conciousness -- for this reason 'psychology' is defined as the science
of behavior rather than the science of mind). Most religions, whether
they even accept some sense of a God (I'm not sure the Ethical Society
does, for instance), don't believe religious information is any more
accessible, and some of them have depended on the idea that the gods
were not omniscient.
The question as phrased actually was interesting. It isn't just an
attack on science (it wouldn't have used that definition of 'religion'
if it were) in the same way that creationists have via 'secular humanism.'
It is an honest question about religion. As it stands, the problem is
more in the breadth of the definition, not in the question itself.
This isn't just an abstraction. It is having practical impact in
the courts, in our society's attitudes towards science funding and
the role technology will play in our future economic, ecological,
and cultural lives, as well as congressional directives and other
governmental participation. The kind of indignant dismissal of
the cultural forces, as well as the rejection of some potential
alies in these changing conditions, reflects a rather dangerous
self-centered ignorance of the cultural forces that are revolving
around the current conditions in this country.
Christopher Ogden
>You have "observable, repeatable and measurable" *evidence* for _any_
>other world view? If not - you are playing word games. *OF COURSE* science
>is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and measurable
>phenomena. It is part of the definition of _science_. You would rather it
>tryed to understand non-observable, non-repeatable, non-measurable
>phenomena? Sounds like a pretty good description of *non-existant*
>phenomena to me. :^|
Let's take a look at some of the metaphysical beliefs that make up your
worldview. First of all, you use the word "observable". What is that? The
quantum physicist would say that observation is a very subjective thing. The
solipsist would say that observation is an illusion. You define a
metaphysical dialictic, observable/nonobservable, that is vague and ambiguous.
How do you know when something is observable? With an observable-o-meter?
Did God tell you that what you see with your eyes and with your machines is
what really exists?
Repeatable. What is that? All experiments are done under different
conditions. All experiments obtain different results. They take place at
different times and different places. The scientist has to take a leap of
faith and assume that time moves uniformly, that space is the same everywhere,
that all materials are alike and interchangeable, and that the Doctrine of
Statistics is true. Then, the scientist has to define a dividing line between
the repeatable and the non-repeatable. Does a difference in results of 1.01
miliseconds mean "unrepeatable", while 0.99 miliseconds is "repeatable"?
Where is the dividing line? It comes down to an aesthetic judgement.
>Perhaps. But science seems to posses the one quality that no religion I am
>aware of does: a phenomenal ability to predict future events with verifiable
>precision, repeatability and unambiguity.
Here are some more ambiguous metaphysical dialectics: verifiable/
nonverifiable, precise/imprecise, ambiguous/nonambiguous, predict/not predict,
phenomenal/non-phenomenal. We could just as well add good/bad, love/hate,
beautiful/ugly, to be/not to be, tomayto/tomahto. It's all a matter of taste.
>Please show me *one* religion that can correctly and reliably *predict* the
>location of Pluto on an arbitrary date, the result of adding 1 gm of pure
>Lithium to pure water, or the frequency distribution of the thermal
>radiation from a blackbody for an arbitrary temperature.
Correctly/incorrectly, location/non-location. Date according to time system
X/ date according to relativistic time frame, pure/impure, high
temperature/low temperature, tall/short, fat/thin. What if I don't want to
know these predictions? What's so great about the ability to predict things?
Perhaps I prefer the ability to make me feel like a meaningful part of the
universe.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Sangyong Jeon
Fine, so be it, and excommunicate all scientists
for believing another religion and/or heresy. Declaring science
a religion (I mean just declaring it, regardless whether you believe it so)
may be the best move we can ever make!
jeon
Opinions here are mine and mine only.
Håvard Fosseng
> Are you the scientist that gets quoted on the cover of the National
> Enquirer all the time? That would explain a lot.
>
> "ELVIS'S FACE SEEN ON MOON, Claim Scientists". Are you one of those?
Ad hominem. How very scientific.
> From the 1993 edition of the American Heritage dictionary (other dic-
> tionaries, including Oxford, have very similar definitions):
>
> ==========================================================================
> re-lig-ion:
> n. 1. a. Belief in and reverence for a supernatural power recognized as
> the creator and governor of the universe. b. A particular integrated system
> of this expression: the Hindu religion. 2. The spiritual or emotional
> attitude of one who recognizes the existence of a superhuman power or powers.
> 3. An objective pursued with zeal or conscientious devotion: A collector
> might make a religion of his hobby. [ME religioun < OFr. religion < Lat.
> religio.]
> ==========================================================================
Dictionary definitions are meant to be suitable for day-to-day needs,
a category in which discussions like this do not necessarily figure.
The attempts to define religion range far and wide enough that some of
the *will* include science as a religion. So what?
> In no way shape or form can you call science a religion, unless you
> stretch the meaning of both words to almost an absurd degree. Of course,
> many people do just that. They (you) stretch the meanings of words in
> order to bring about a world view that somehow matches your religious
> beliefs. And there is a motivation behind your convoluted thinking, and
> it is obvious what it is.
Even if this *was* her motivation -- which I doubt -- that would in no
way whatsoever prove her wrong.
-- Håvard Fosseng
--
Håvard Fosseng What the world needs is not dogma but an attitude of
Physics Institute scientific inquiry combined with a belief that the torture
University of Oslo of millions is not desirable, whether inflicted by Stalin
haav...@fys.uio.no or by a Deity imagined in the likeness of the believer.
-- Bertrand Russell
Håvard Fosseng
> to fuel. Science is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and
> measurable phenomena, yet *insists* upon claiming that this makes up the
> whole of the universe.
Science itself can't insist on anything whatsoever. Scientists can and
do. However, I have met very few scientists who claim that what
science works with constitutes the entirety of existence.
Michelle Murrain
writes:
>Bull shit. What science insists this? George Science? Maybe his sister
>Georgette? Perhaps the science referred to from church pulpits?
Step back one moment, and think about what I said. Although indeed
individual scientists think independently, do you deny that science is an
institution, and as such has a specific point of view?
>By the way, we are speaking english here. The definition of "religion"
>from some obscure philosopher hardly rates as standard.
>
>> I am a scientist
>
>Are you the scientist that gets quoted on the cover of the National
>Enquirer all the time? That would explain a lot.
>
>"ELVIS'S FACE SEEN ON MOON, Claim Scientists". Are you one of those?
I don't appreciate this characterization, but I'll go on...
>>, and a good friend and I (also a scientist - and a
>>devout catholic) have had numerous conversations about this. We both
>>agree. Science in our society as practiced has most if not all of the
>>qualities of a religion.
>> Michelle
>
>Ok, you've toned your argument to not entirely claim that science is a
>religion, but that it has "many of the qualities". Even that watered
>down version of "science is a religion" is nonsense.
>
>From the 1993 edition of the American Heritage dictionary (other dic-
>tionaries, including Oxford, have very similar definitions):
[snip]
I wasn't using the dictionary definition, and the definition in my head
differs from the one you quote. Basically, when I talk of science as
having the qualities of a religion, I mean as follows:
1) There is a specific worldview in which science is based, and it has to
do with how one looks at reality
2) There are "practitioners" and "laypeople"
3) There is (somewhat changing) set of "rules"
>
>In no way shape or form can you call science a religion, unless you
>stretch the meaning of both words to almost an absurd degree. Of course,
>many people do just that. They (you) stretch the meanings of words in
>order to bring about a world view that somehow matches your religious
>beliefs. And there is a motivation behind your convoluted thinking, and
>it is obvious what it is.
What I think is so funny here is that I talked about my friend who is a
devout catholic. In fact, I'm not christian. I wouldn't even call myself
religious, really, although I do have a spirituality, but it has more to
do with how I relate to other human beings, than any supernatural stuff.
You made assumptions about my worldview, based on what you *think* I am
saying. Gee, did I push a button of yours?
>You're trying to elevate religion to the level of science. And you have
>your own reasons for doing this. It doesn't work, at least not here.
>Maybe in church.
Nope. I want to make the point that they are on the same level. I'm not
elevating religion to the level of science. I don't see one or the other
as superior. It all depends on the individual. In fact, you kind of gave
it away, in that last paragraph. "Elevate religion to the level of
science" If science weren't your religion (hey, I'll admit it's pretty
much mine, OK?) you wouldn't feel the need to respond that way.
>Science does not claim to have answers for everything. Religion DOES
claim
>exactly that, that someone, somewhere "knows" everything. Therefore, I
>say that RELIGION is the cowards way out, the philosophy that insists on
>labeling everything, the philosophy that doesn't have the courage to
admit
>that human beings can't possibly "know" everything.
Some religions claim to have answers to everything, many do not. You
should bone up on world religions. It might help a bit. Many world
religions in fact claim to know very little of the truth. And, certainly
no scientist would claim to know all the answers. But how many do you
think would say that all of them are *eventually* answerable by science?
Kelly Hall
> Let's take a look at some of the metaphysical beliefs that make up your
> worldview. First of all, you use the word "observable". What is that? The
> quantum physicist would say that observation is a very subjective thing. The
> solipsist would say that observation is an illusion. You define a
> metaphysical dialictic, observable/nonobservable, that is vague and ambiguous.
> How do you know when something is observable? With an observable-o-meter?
> Did God tell you that what you see with your eyes and with your machines is
> what really exists?
I'd take this argument seriously if you were to repeat it while
standing in the middle of northbound lanes of I-15. How do you know
that the oncoming traffic exists? Did God tell you that the semi
about to flatten you really exists?
The concept of 'observable' works very, very well in the real world.
> Repeatable. What is that? All experiments are done under different
> conditions. All experiments obtain different results. They take place at
> different times and different places. The scientist has to take a leap of
> faith and assume that time moves uniformly, that space is the same everywhere,
> that all materials are alike and interchangeable, and that the Doctrine of
> Statistics is true. Then, the scientist has to define a dividing line between
> the repeatable and the non-repeatable. Does a difference in results of 1.01
> miliseconds mean "unrepeatable", while 0.99 miliseconds is "repeatable"?
> Where is the dividing line? It comes down to an aesthetic judgement.
Depends on the context, doesn't it? if I'm dropping rocks out of
windows and measuring how long they take to hit the ground, then a few
milliseconds doesn't count much. If I'm writing interupt handlers on
an AtoD converter, then a couple milliseconds is really important.
Is this a bad thing? Seems like common sense to me.
It sounds like you're having a problem with the concept of
generalization in the face of real world, sometimes contradictory,
empirical results. Knowing what data is 'good' and what is 'flawed'
isn't cut and dried. There are value judgements to be made. But it
all works out, in the end. You can spell English words, right? And
there is less structure to spelling than to any scientific field I can
think of.
My point is this: knowing what's good data and what's bad data, what's
reproducible and what's not, is a function of judgement and
experience. But I'll take a one-term Taylor expansion of *any*
physics formula as a predictor over the book of revelation any day of
the week.
> Here are some more ambiguous metaphysical dialectics: verifiable/
> nonverifiable, precise/imprecise, ambiguous/nonambiguous, predict/not predict,
> phenomenal/non-phenomenal. We could just as well add good/bad, love/hate,
> beautiful/ugly, to be/not to be, tomayto/tomahto. It's all a matter of taste.
But it still won't make religion a good prediction device. Science
works *really* well that way. Since one predicts well and the other
doesn't, it's reasonable to differentiate the two on this criteria, no?
> Correctly/incorrectly, location/non-location. Date according to time system
> X/ date according to relativistic time frame, pure/impure, high
> temperature/low temperature, tall/short, fat/thin. What if I don't want to
> know these predictions? What's so great about the ability to predict things?
> Perhaps I prefer the ability to make me feel like a meaningful part of the
> universe.
Oh, good retort. Someone points out a major difference between
between 'religion' and 'science' and you cast it aside by saying
"what's so great about the ability to predict things?" Your argument
that science is a religion is shot down, and your response is "I
prefer the ability to make me feel like a meaningful part of the
universe". I guess you'd rather *feel* "like a meaningful part" than
to understand the universe you are a part of.
Please, don't build any large engineering structures that me, my
friends, or my relatives might use. I'd hate to have your work fail
in a catastrophic way, with your response something like "I used
religion to help me build this because I felt better about it when I
was done."
Science isn't in the business of making anyone feel good, bad or
indifferent about the universe. It is in the business of explaining
the universe based upon repeatable, observable events.
Is the difference between science and religion clear to you now?
James F. Tims
>Org: Computer Science Dept. BYU
.
.
>
>A can be tossed out tomorrow for theory B. Science doesn't care which
>
>Kelly
Theories, the aircraft carriers of reason, don't go down easy,
either. There's glory to be had. An altogether new idea (the
double helix re DNA, for example) wins prizes and fame, movie
rights, etc. Putting aside quibbles involving revelation of a
new religion to some lucky seeker after truth, one does not
normally think of a Xian or Muslim looking for a better version
of Jesus or Allah. That's precisely the case, however, with
General Relativity, QED, or what have you. Science could be
called "rental" religion, perhaps, where gods are ever new; today
Plank's Constant, tomorrow pi in the sky -- DisposaGod, Gods for
Every Purpose Under Heaven [Flexible Rates!]. At the very least,
dianalogically speaking, Science would be an ephemeral, metamorphing
polytheism!
How would the Supreme Court deal with a religion whose believers demanded
the best currently available gods, gods subject to change, rituals
obsolete and obsolescent?
,...,.,,
/666; ', You can call me weak, and you can call me atheist,
////; _~ - but don't call me a weak atheist.
(/@/----0-~-0
;' . `` ~ \'
, ` ' , >
;;|\..(( -C---->> jim tims p00...@psilink.com
;;| >- `.__),;;
Daniel E. Platt
|> In article <2ii2a9$k...@u.cc.utah.edu> bf6...@u.cc.utah.edu (benjamin franz) writes:
|>
|> >You have "observable, repeatable and measurable" *evidence* for _any_
|> >other world view? If not - you are playing word games. *OF COURSE* science
|> >is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and measurable
|> >phenomena. It is part of the definition of _science_. You would rather it
|> >tryed to understand non-observable, non-repeatable, non-measurable
|> >phenomena? Sounds like a pretty good description of *non-existant*
|> >phenomena to me. :^|
Awareness is something that is not objectively measurable. Does this
mean it is a *non-existant* phenomena?
|>
|> Let's take a look at some of the metaphysical beliefs that make up your
|> worldview. First of all, you use the word "observable". What is that? The
|> quantum physicist would say that observation is a very subjective thing. The
|> solipsist would say that observation is an illusion. You define a
|> metaphysical dialictic, observable/nonobservable, that is vague and ambiguous.
|> How do you know when something is observable? With an observable-o-meter?
|> Did God tell you that what you see with your eyes and with your machines is
|> what really exists?
|>
There are some scientists who are happy to just 'do' science without
really thinking about those questions, having been informed of their
existance.
|> Repeatable. What is that? All experiments are done under different
|> conditions. All experiments obtain different results. They take place at
|> different times and different places. The scientist has to take a leap of
|> faith and assume that time moves uniformly, that space is the same everywhere,
|> that all materials are alike and interchangeable, and that the Doctrine of
|> Statistics is true. Then, the scientist has to define a dividing line between
|> the repeatable and the non-repeatable. Does a difference in results of 1.01
|> miliseconds mean "unrepeatable", while 0.99 miliseconds is "repeatable"?
|> Where is the dividing line? It comes down to an aesthetic judgement.
|>
It tends to come down to a cultural judgement more than simple aesthetic.
People in the community of researchers have to come to a concesus on
the question.
|> >Perhaps. But science seems to posses the one quality that no religion I am
|> >aware of does: a phenomenal ability to predict future events with verifiable
|> >precision, repeatability and unambiguity.
There seems to persist some level of ambiguity on the issue of
quantum measurement, regardless of the fact that quantum mechanics
has been a regular participant in our lives, and that large pieces
of engineering depend on it (computers, for instance, in the role
of solid-state electronics design).
|>
|> Here are some more ambiguous metaphysical dialectics: verifiable/
|> nonverifiable, precise/imprecise, ambiguous/nonambiguous, predict/not predict,
|> phenomenal/non-phenomenal. We could just as well add good/bad, love/hate,
|> beautiful/ugly, to be/not to be, tomayto/tomahto. It's all a matter of taste.
You are somewhat correct that it is a matter of taste; though it is
more a matter of convention and concensus. The question that arises
is whether one group using roughly the same rules would come to the
same developments and concensus over time as another completely isolated
group? If the answer is yes, then you have what science dreams for.
If the answer is no in some fundamental way, then science is shot.
As it stands, it is not uncommon for researchers (particularly
cross-disciplinary work) who aren't familiar with each other
to draw the same conclusions about some phenomena, or to discover
new phenomena. Sometimes, the same phenomena will be discovered
by different techniques by different groups at the same time.
There is a statement of faith that there is some objective reality.
The best that science has come up with is that, given the premise
that there is a reality that it should be measurable by anyone
(repeatability), and that general physical principles should be
the same anywhere, that the best humans can do to try to find out
what those principles are is to do so via community and concensus.
At least, that's what has emerged.
|>
|> >Please show me *one* religion that can correctly and reliably *predict* the
|> >location of Pluto on an arbitrary date, the result of adding 1 gm of pure
|> >Lithium to pure water, or the frequency distribution of the thermal
|> >radiation from a blackbody for an arbitrary temperature.
|>
Virtually any religion that has embraced modern scientific endeavors.
Many Christian sects so qualify (or are you going to disqualify any
group that doesn't fit your conception of religion?). One of the
central theological questions (at least, in 'liberal theology') since
the elightenment has been to try to define 'faith' and its relationship
to developing science. Note that science had been going through the
same problems at the same time. People like Poincare, Mach, Bridgeman,
Popper, etc, had significant impact on how people think about science;
at the same time, people like Bultman, Heideger, Jung, von Rad, etc,
were picking apart religion and re-examining what 'faith' means in
the light of the practical realities of science and technology in
a modern society.
|> Correctly/incorrectly, location/non-location. Date according to time system
|> X/ date according to relativistic time frame, pure/impure, high
|> temperature/low temperature, tall/short, fat/thin. What if I don't want to
|> know these predictions? What's so great about the ability to predict things?
|> Perhaps I prefer the ability to make me feel like a meaningful part of the
|> universe.
Some people feel that they've obtained some sense of being a meaningful
part of the universe if they've been able to grasp some aspect of
the behavior of the universe. There's a sense of creation that can
come with discovery and understanding. I figure that's why it is
attractive for some people. It has felt that way for me.
At the same time, there is the issue of value in interpersonal
relationships, in the expression of endeavors in a world where
opportunities to pursue science seem to be shrinking (or competition
for a small finite number openings is increasing significantly),
where the cultural values are shifting, where kids shoot each
other for sneakers, where we're happier to incarcerate people after
they are criminals than we are to educate 10 of them before even
if the cost is the same... There is a sense that something is out
of balance. Egyptians might have called it Maat. Science can say
a lot about *what* is happening. However, regardless of what
is used to evaluate it, whether simple ethics (there is a group
called the 'Ethical Society'), or whether it includes some sense
of diety (a more liberal expression of the God of history would
be to recognize the sense of unbalance... or perhaps that it
is the judgment of a fundamentalist God punishing us for not
being good conservatives), the questions of valuation imply some
kind of non-objective metric. My feeling about all of this is
that the core involves understanding and motivation. It should
include science as well as other dimensions.
Ray Ingles
[deletions]
>differs from the one you quote. Basically, when I talk of science as
>having the qualities of a religion, I mean as follows:
>1) There is a specific worldview in which science is based, and it has to
>do with how one looks at reality
>2) There are "practitioners" and "laypeople"
>3) There is (somewhat changing) set of "rules"
Sounds like virtually anything, including short-order cooking and being
in the Senate, could be a religion under this definition... can you name
a human activity that would *not* be a religion under this definition?
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles ing...@engin.umich.edu
"Icky icky icky icky fKANG zoop-boing n zowzyin..." -The Knights Who
So Recently Said "NI!"
Gordon Fitch
| I'd take this argument seriously if you were to repeat it while
| standing in the middle of northbound lanes of I-15. How do you know
| that the oncoming traffic exists? Did God tell you that the semi
| about to flatten you really exists?
|
| The concept of 'observable' works very, very well in the real world.
I'm surprised at this sort of argument showing up again and
again, as if there were a Gresham's law of philosophy. That
a semi will flatten you on I-15 may be observable, but it
tells you little or nothing about what I-15 and the semi
really, really are; all you know is that certain
observations are likely to be followed by certain other
observations. "Thus do I refute Berkeley!" Could we get
down the road a bit?
--
)*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
Russell Turpin
In article <2imrc5$9...@panix.com>, Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
> ... That a semi will flatten you on I-15 may be observable, but
The really real? How quaint. Will coming posts bring in all
those fancy metaphysical phrases, like Ding an Sich and noumena?
I would have thought that philosophy's ruminations on language
would have ended this kind of debate. The problem is this: how
can two metaphysicians who say the same thing know that they
agree, or two metaphysicians who say different things know that
they disagree? Because the only way to define these abstract
metaphysical concepts is through words piled on words, there is
little hope for knowing when meanings converge or diverge. One
metaphysician says that the really real is just what God imagines
(Spinoza) or how Spirit evolves (Hegel) or an infinite sequence
of turtles (anecdotal). Are these different ideas? Is one
speaker's Spirit the same as another person's God and yet
another's turtle? Or for that matter, the same as another
person's Spirit? We can compare theory to theory, but then what
is the meaning of the words in which the theory is expressed?
It's nothing but rhetoric ... all the way down.
With more ordinary language, first we learn concrete terms, and
from those abstract to more conceptual ones. What is a dog?
Well, it is the kind of animal that people pointed to when we
first heard the word "dog". Later, we learned how to abstract
from "dog" to "vertebrate" and "animal," and even more abstract
concepts such as species. And as we learn and use these notions,
that process may modify our notion of "dog". But the web of
ordinary language remains tied at the edges to non-verbal
behavior; if we disagree about what should count as a "dog" (for
example, are hyenas included?), we can determine this when we
point to the same beast and one of us says "dog" and the other
says "nope." (I am aware, of course, that even ostensive
definition is theoretically indeterminate, a la Quine's
indeterminacy of translation and his "rabbit stages," and other
problems. But this does not obviate the point that the meaning
of ordinary language is constrained by non-verbal behavior. If
it weren't, we could not communicate; or to put it another way,
if you believe this were not so, you would have no faith in our
ability to communicate.)
But what about the "really real"? The only thing I know for sure
about it is that it is *not* about anything I can observe; that,
after all, is the whole point. So when the metaphysicians spin
their yarns, the problem is not just that we have no way of
knowing whether they are true or not, but that we do not even
have anyway of knowing what they mean, and which metaphysical
theories spun by other speakers are the same or different
(regardless of whether they use the same words or not).
Russell
--
There is more to life than avoiding death. -- Jeffrey R. Hummel
Brian Yamauchi
>I would have thought that philosophy's ruminations on language
>would have ended this kind of debate. The problem is this: how
>can two metaphysicians who say the same thing know that they
>agree, or two metaphysicians who say different things know that
>they disagree?
>We can compare theory to theory, but then what
>is the meaning of the words in which the theory is expressed?
>It's nothing but rhetoric ... all the way down.
>But what about the "really real"? The only thing I know for sure
>about it is that it is *not* about anything I can observe; that,
>after all, is the whole point.
This is actually quite illuminating. I think I realize why so many of
the philosophical debates on Usenet (soc.culture.scientists,
comp.ai.philosophy, etc.) seem to have people talking right past each
other. It's not just a matter of different backgrounds and different
terminology -- it's a matter of fundamentally different worldviews at
the most basic level.
As far as I'm concerned, the only thing I know for sure is what I can
observe, and the only reality which matters is that which makes these
observations more-or-less consistent and predictable.
There are those, like Russell, who seem to view reality as something
that is built out of language. Periodically, someone jumps up and
claims that reality is "socially constructed". Every time this
comment has been made, I've thought that it was absurd. The sun isn't
socially constructed; the moon isn't socially constructed -- both are
part of reality and have existed long before there were humans to name
them. But now I see that for "symbolists", there is no sun or moon
independent of the words "sun" and "moon" and their definitions in the
culture.
In contrast, for "empiricists", at the most basic level, the sun and
moon are things that we _see_ -- and this is entirely independent of
language. Empiricists generate abstract models in order to predict
what they will see (and hear and sense in other ways) based on what
they have seen in the past. "The sun is here; the Earth is here; the
moon rotates like this. Therefore, since we saw a third quarter moon
a week ago, we should see a full moon tonight." The model may involve
the use of symbols, and the development and dissemination of that
model may require language, but, for the empiricist, the fundamental
reality is not in the model itself, but in the sensations (possibly
mediated by mechanical means) that it can predict.
--
_______________________________________________________________________________
Brian Yamauchi Case Western Reserve University
yama...@alpha.ces.cwru.edu Department of Computer Engineering and Science
_______________________________________________________________________________
Gordon Fitch
| ... Science could be
| called "rental" religion, perhaps, where gods are ever new; today
| Plank's Constant, tomorrow pi in the sky -- DisposaGod, Gods for
| Every Purpose Under Heaven [Flexible Rates!]. At the very least,
| dianalogically speaking, Science would be an ephemeral, metamorphing
But it will not throw itself out. Or will it?
Gordon Fitch
| > ... That a semi will flatten you on I-15 may be observable, but
| > it tells you little or nothing about what I-15 and the semi
| > really, really are; ...
tur...@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin):
| The really real? How quaint. Will coming posts bring in all
| those fancy metaphysical phrases, like Ding an Sich and noumena?
"It's a dark and lonely job, but goddamnit, somebody's
got to do it!" You're next for the quaint ideas detail:
catching laggards up on Hume and Kant. That means you
have to read alt.postmodern. Sorry about that.
Heh.
Russell Turpin
I *did* write, as Brian Yamauchi quoted:
>> I would have thought that philosophy's ruminations on language
>> would have ended this kind of debate. The problem is this: how
>> can two metaphysicians who say the same thing know that they
>> agree, or two metaphysicians who say different things know that
>> is the meaning of the words in which the theory is expressed?
>> It's nothing but rhetoric ... all the way down.
But this excerpt omits a context that is very important to what I
said. In what was omitted, I *explicitly* described the kind of
theory about which I wrote: that which has no tie to the
observable. (Hence, my use of the term metaphysics.) I gave
examples of this kind of language, the philosophers' "noumena"
and "really real," and contrasted it to language whose meaning
*is* tied to non-verbal behavior and observation, such as "dog"
and "vertebrate" and "animal".
After excerpting the above passages without that very important
context, Brian Yamauchi <yama...@ces.cwru.edu> upbraids me:
> There are those, like Russell, who seem to view reality as something
> that is built out of language. ...
Which is supposed to stand in contrast to:
> As far as I'm concerned, the only thing I know for sure is what I can
> observe, and the only reality which matters is that which makes these
> observations more-or-less consistent and predictable.
If Brian Yamauchi will go back to my post and read the sentences
he omitted from his excerpts, he will find that I was critizing
philosophical language that claims to discuss the nature of
reality, but whose meaning is divorced from anything observable.
(His first clue should have been that I was defending empiricism
from Fitch's criticisms.) There *are* those who believe that
"reality [is] something that is built out of language," but I am
not among them.
hell...@cc.weber.edu
<What is the problem? Science is a religion?
<
<Fine, so be it, and excommunicate all scientists
<for believing another religion and/or heresy. Declaring science
<a religion (I mean just declaring it, regardless whether you believe it so)
<may be the best move we can ever make!
<
<jeon
Wrong, both of you.
Science is a banana.
HME
Boucher David
#ha...@bert.cs.byu.edu writes:
#>In article <44%@byu.edu> OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden)
#writes:
#>>
#>> Next, science formulates conceptions of a general order of existence
#in the
#>> universe. It establishes such concepts as "time", "space",
#"velocity",
#>> "gravity", "matter", "energy", and "empiricism" that are clothed in an
#aura of
#>> factuality that most people take them for granted.
I don't belief that "science" invented the concepts of time, space, velocity,
matter, or energy. Even people in pre-scientific cultures lived in a world
of objects ("matter"), knew that some animals could run faster than others
("velocity"), could distinguish nearby objects from those that were far
away ("space"), etc. And "empiricism" is simply learning by observation --
I believe that even animals do that.
#>The facts of science aren't 'subtle sensory stimuli' but hard,
#>physical evidence. If you consider scientific facts as 'a distinctive
#>atmosphere surrounding a given source', you've got me confused: what
#>claims does science make that isn't backed up by empirical evidence?
#
#Yes, hard physical evidence within a specific framework and worldview.
The "specific framework/worldview" being that observation is a good
way to learn -- more specifically, that observation is better than
speculation as a means of finding out about anything that can be
observed.
#> Science doesn't care which
#>theory is held in favor, but whichever theory it is must explain the
#>empirical evidence best. The same cannot be said about religion,
#>where people *will kill each other* over who's theory explains
#>nonempirical nonevidence.
#
#Within
#science, yes, you are right theory A is tossed out by theory B all the
#time. But the basic fundamental premise of science, the way that science
#looks at the world is imbedded in a western worldview which it continues
#to fuel.
If that were true, then Muslims, Hindus, and Asiatic peoples would be
unable to comprehend or do science. But such is not the case -- in fact,
a majority of the graduate students in most Chemistry departments I have
seen have been from India, China, or the Middle East. This whole canard
about science being "imbedded in a western worldview" is little more than
a P.C. slur -- "science" belongs to the whole world now.
#Science is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and
#measurable phenomena, yet *insists* upon claiming that this makes up the
#whole of the universe.
The first clause is true, the second is not. However, considering the
rather dismal track record of religion as a means of aquiring knowledge
of those things which *can* be observed, it's not surprising that some
might tend to doubt its usefulness as a means of aquiring knowledge of
things which *can't* be observed.
- db
--
****** "It is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data. ******
****** Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories ******
****** instead of theories to suit facts." - Sherlock Holmes ******
*************************************************************************
Daniel E. Platt
|> In article <s5%@byu.edu> ha...@bert.cs.byu.edu (Kelly Hall) writes:
|>
|> >I'd take this argument seriously if you were to repeat it while
|> >standing in the middle of northbound lanes of I-15. How do you know
|> >that the oncoming traffic exists? Did God tell you that the semi
|> >about to flatten you really exists?
|>
|> >The concept of 'observable' works very, very well in the real world.
|>
|> which you base upon the scientific doctrine of Empiricism. You say that
|> something "works well", and you define this symbol to mean what the prophets
|> of Science told you to define them to mean. "Works well" is hardly even a
|> well-defined concept anyway, even according to the standards of the symbolic
|> word games that Science likes to play.
Works well has an implication that goes beyond what the "prophets of
science" say. It shows up in such practical issues as making a profit.
For example, all that metaphysical quantum mechanics is involved in
the solid state electronics, laser driven fibre-optic communications,
and other components that make the internet work. On a more basic
level, while it might not have much to say about the reality of trucks
at some metaphysical level, it does say something about the concrete
experience of getting hit by trucks (on I-15 or anywhere else for that
matter...).
|>
|> Second, you define some mystical idea you call the "real world". Of course,
|> *your* real world is that would constructed by the prophets of Science.
|> Science *tells* you what the "real world" is, and you believe it because you
|> are indoctrinated by Science and Science rules over you. There are other
|> perfectly self-consistent, reasonable definitions of what the "real world" is,
|> but you and I choose not to accept these ideas, because we would be committing
|> blasphemy against Science.
Its not just what the "prophets of science" say; its what the kids who
want their Nintendo say (another quantum mechanical device) who are
defining 'real world.'
|>
|> >Depends on the context, doesn't it? if I'm dropping rocks out of
|> >windows and measuring how long they take to hit the ground, then a few
|> >milliseconds doesn't count much. If I'm writing interupt handlers on
|> >an AtoD converter, then a couple milliseconds is really important.
|>
|> So it all comes down, then, to an aesthetic judgement about what is
|> "important". Religion makes these same aesthetic judgements.
|>
Now we're down to the real basis of the argument (I feel). The question
is what defines the aesthetic? There are a lot of religious people who
wish to incorporate or harmonize their philosophic understanding of their
religion with the philosophic understanding of science that has been
growing and changing over time. While that's been happening, so has
the understanding of the foundations of science. It has been recognized
that science has its mythology and symbols; it has been recognized that
both share many of the characteristics of human endeavors -- to the point
that it is difficult to construct a definition that discriminates between
them if the definitions are encompassing. It is also true that the
tradition of relition (particularly in the US) supports fundamentalism,
which, in its most extreme case of creationism, has challenged the
teaching of science in our courts. At the same time, science is facing
other cultural pressures from environmental groups and others who don't
seem to feel that science or technology is a good place to try to look
to solve our technologically based problems (heat and power in the
north-east US would be impossible at this population density would
be impossible without technology; the question is how to do it less
destructively). Are those concerns religious or non-religious? How
can we tell the difference? Do we have good enough definitions to
really make a practical distinction? Surely, behavior as reflected
in actions and decisions would make it hard to tell the difference.
I agree that there are aesthetics in both areas. I don't agree that
science can be 'arbitrary' (honing definitions a bit -- science has
to be able to support Nintendo -- like the anthropomorphic principle,
I'll construct a Nintendo-centric principle); however, religion can be
anything.
Benjamin J. Tilly
OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden) writes:
> In article <2ih88s$k...@dartvax.dartmouth.edu> Benjamin...@dartmouth.edu (Benjamin J. Tilly) writes:
>
> >I also agree that there is a lot that seperates science from religeon.
> >However science is systematically misused in a way that is close to
> >religeon. Furthermore historically there was a lot less of a seperation
> >between science and religeon than there is today. And lastly many of
> >the topics that science addresses today were traditionally within the
> >sphere of influence of religeon. In short, the poster who was
> >commenting on science as a type of religeon likely has some good
> >reasons for thinking so.
>
> I don't think it's fair to say that either science or religion is "misused".
> The fact that something is metaphysical does not necessarily mean that it is
> bad. All of us must construct our universe in the way that is most
> aesthetically pleasing to us. In order to construct this universe, we draw
> upon elements from the many overlapping cultures and communities that rule
> over us. I have constructed my own reality, and it takes elements from all
> the communities of which I am a part, largely from the Church of
> Science and the Church of Religion. Whenever there is a conflict between
> these two churches, I make a value judgement about which one I'm most loyal
> to, or I construct an alternate reality to accomodate both cultures.
>
Here is what I meant. Science supposedly works in a certain way. As
such it has implicit standards for how it should be used. IMO using it
like many (not all) people do to create a sense of authority for your
view is a misuse of science *by thea normative standards which science
works under*. For examples of what I mean read some of the history of
social Darwinism, look at how unsupported theories in psychology (like
Freud) are taken as gospel, and look at how statistics are constantly
misused to come to conclusions that they do not really support. These
are examples of what I mean by misuse.
Incidentally I never would have said that metaphysical things are all
bad. (In fact I would point out that we have to make some sort of
metaphysical assumptions to be able to learn from experience.) Perhaps
I should have been more clear on exactly what I meant.
Ben Tilly
gerry harbison
That's an amusing question. Can empiricism reject empiricism if
favor of.... what? Some non-empirical -ism? On what grounds? Well
there could be only one; an empirical decision that empiricism doesn't
work. But having decided that empiricism doesn't work, we've
contradicted the grounds which we used to make the decision. Which is
absurd.
So it appears to me that science can't throw itself out. Because if it did,
in favor of magic (say), it would have to be on the grounds that magic
works. In which case magic wouldn't be magic, it would be science.
In fact, some areas of human knowledge have been coopted this way
(e.g. some herbal medicines). And some haven't, such as religion. As
a scientist, I claim this is because these have no value, in my terms.
And why should I fight on a battleground of another's choosing?
ObSolipsism. There really isn't any way to counter Ogden's arguments,
at least not on his terms.
One can't prove to a solipsist that the real world exists. The choices are
(1) ignore such arguments as unscientific, and accept the fact that
navel gazers will never become either extinct or important.
(2) Chuck a brick at their heads. if they duck, you've just
demonstrated they too believe in objective reality, and their
protestations are either hypocritical or self-deluding.
If they don't duck, well you've lost a solipsist, but you've found an
honest man!
>--
> )*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
Gerry Harbison
Gordon Fitch
| ...
| There are those who seem to view reality as something that is built
| out of language. Periodically, someone jumps up and claims that
| reality is "socially constructed". Every time this comment has been
Could you state who these people are, and exactly what
it is they say?
By the way, the term _reality_ here is pretty slippery.
Certainly the _idea_of_reality_ is socially constructed,
but if someone says this, it does not (necessarily) mean
that she thinks everything that anyone refers to when
they talk about "reality" is socially constructed.
Russell Turpin
In article <YAMAUCHI.9...@yuggoth.ces.cwru.edu>,
Brian Yamauchi <yama...@ces.cwru.edu> wrote:
> I apologize for misstating your position, ...
No biggie.
> As far as Russell and I are concerned, the only thing we know for sure
> is what we can observe, ...
Sigh. I dislike the "only." Or maybe the "Russell and." There
are many camps between the two extreme ones being discussed.
> There are those who seem to view reality as something that is built
> out of language. Periodically, someone jumps up and claims that
> reality is "socially constructed". Every time this comment has been
> made, I've thought that it was absurd. The sun isn't socially
> constructed; the moon isn't socially constructed -- both are part of
> reality and have existed long before there were humans to name them.
> But now I see that for "symbolists", there is no sun or moon
> independent of the words "sun" and "moon" and their definitions in the
> culture.
I was engaged in long discussion with such a "symbolist" on
soc.feminism. It came up there because modern feminist theory
is based on these crazy notions. In my opinion, this dooms
it to becoming a footnote in future history texts.
The phrase I prefer to label these notions is French philosophic
fog. This is not intended as a slur on the French, but is a
reference to the fact that the philosophers who have spread this
fog are modern French academics: Derrida, etc. (I also like the
alliteration.) Obviously, this should deter no one from reading
other French authors. (I highly recommend Maupassant's short
stories.)
Malgosia Askanas
>By way of example, Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron, the
>editors of "The New French Feminisms: An Anthology," begin the
>introduction to that book thusly:
>
> ... The unwillingness
> to move outside the text, to move from the word to the
> referent is unacceptable to most feminists.
>
>This, of course, is a lie. Most feminists are more than happy to
>"move from the word to the referent."
But that's exactly what the above quote says. It says that the
unwillingness to move from word to referent is unacceptable, i.e.
that most feminists do want to make this move. Where is the lie?
James J. Lippard
:Here's two more metaphysical doctrines. First of all, you say "works well",
:something "works well", and you define this symbol to mean what the prophets
:of Science told you to define them to mean. "Works well" is hardly even a
:well-defined concept anyway, even according to the standards of the symbolic
:word games that Science likes to play.
You should really read the last chapter of Larry Laudan's _Science and
Relativism_ and chapters four and five of Philip Kitcher's _The Advancement
of Science_. While you're at it, take a look at John M. Ellis' _Against
Deconstruction_.
:Second, you define some mystical idea you call the "real world". Of course,
:*your* real world is that would constructed by the prophets of Science.
:Science *tells* you what the "real world" is, and you believe it because you
:are indoctrinated by Science and Science rules over you. There are other
:perfectly self-consistent, reasonable definitions of what the "real world" is,
:but you and I choose not to accept these ideas, because we would be committing
:blasphemy against Science.
What are some of these other definitions?
[remaining drivel deleted]
Jim Lippard Lip...@CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU
Dept. of Philosophy Lip...@ARIZVMS.BITNET
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
Brian Yamauchi
>There *are* those who believe that
>"reality [is] something that is built out of language," but I am
>not among them.
I apologize for misstating your position, and for putting you into the
wrong camp. My main point wasn't to "upbraid" you, but rather to
discuss some of the issues which your post raised.
I think the underlying question is an important one:
Are these philosophical differences really basic psychological
differences in the way people interact with the world?
So replace the corresponding paragraphs in my last post with:
As far as Russell and I are concerned, the only thing we know for sure
is what we can observe, and the only reality which matters is that
which makes these observations more-or-less consistent and
predictable.
There are those who seem to view reality as something that is built
Malgosia Askanas
>You should really read the last chapter of Larry Laudan's _Science and
>Relativism_ and chapters four and five of Philip Kitcher's _The Advancement
>of Science_. While you're at it, take a look at John M. Ellis' _Against
>Deconstruction_.
Why, do you sell these books? Has alt.postmodern become such a
respectable forum that we have to deal with product advertisements?
Kelly Hall
>The concept of 'observable' works very, very well in the real world.
> OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden) writes:
> Here's two more metaphysical doctrines. First of all, you say "works well",
> which you base upon the scientific doctrine of Empiricism. You say that
> something "works well", and you define this symbol to mean what the prophets
> of Science told you to define them to mean. "Works well" is hardly even a
> well-defined concept anyway, even according to the standards of the symbolic
> word games that Science likes to play.
While 'works well' doesn't impose a total ordering upon predictive
systems, it sure imposes a partial ordering. I still say that in the
realm of 'working well', science does a much better job than religion.
> Second, you define some mystical idea you call the "real world". Of course,
> *your* real world is that would constructed by the prophets of Science.
> Science *tells* you what the "real world" is, and you believe it because you
> are indoctrinated by Science and Science rules over you. There are other
> perfectly self-consistent, reasonable definitions of what the "real world" is,
> but you and I choose not to accept these ideas, because we would be committing
> blasphemy against Science.
I notice that you're still arguing this from a nice safe terminal
room. Like I said, I'll take this argument seriously if you'll
repeat it while standing in the middle of the highway. Whether or not
science's idea of the real world is right or wrong, your not going to
step in front of a truck, are you? Did Moses bring us a formal model
of momentum, or did science?
> So it all comes down, then, to an aesthetic judgement about what is
> "important". Religion makes these same aesthetic judgements.
But religion does a lousy job of predicting future behavior. So I
separate science and religion on this basis. Don't you?
> And *I'll* take a ham and cheese sandwich over tunafish any day of the week,
> too. It all depends upon which narratives you find most aesthetically
> pleasing: the symbols of prophetic narrative or the symbols of empirical
> narrative.
I find music to be aesthetically pleasing, but I won't use it when
it's not appropriate. EG, I write music, and I write software. But I
don't use the same techniques for both. Software runs in the real
world, and so I use sound engineering methods, grounded in science, to
create the code. Music runs in my head (and the listners' head) and I
use artistic methods to create the music.
In both cases (engineering and art) the methods are grounded in
empirical evidence. Structured coding is much easier to verify than
spaghetti code. Music in AABA forms is generally easier to listen to
than music with no form.
Religion offers little to help me in either event.
> If you have previously constructed a work-well-o-meter that allows you to
> measure the work-well-icity of your particular set of simulacra. But you also
> must admit that this work-well-o-meter is itself a simulacrum, and that there
> is no absolute, infallible work-well-o-meter "out there" in the universe. The
> work-well-o-meter is just a word game based upon metaphysical conceptions.
Might be, might not. But it's a useful tool, and hard to refute.
> I said "what if" I felt that way. The point I was making is that, according
> to the prophets of Science, symbol X is more aesthetically pleasing than
> symbol Y because it has jumped through the metaphysical hoops of the Doctrine
> of Empiricism. According to the prophets of Buddhism, symbol Y is more
> aesthetically pleasing than symbol X because symbol Y has jumped through the
> metaphysical hoops that say that symbol Y decreases suffering and empties the
> Self. Which symbol do you prefer? You pick the one that is most
> aesthetically pleasing to *you*, which I assume would be symbol X. And like a
> TV ad, you would probably claim that since "four out of five people surveyed
> find symbol X more aesthetically pleasing than symbol Y", that therefore,
> symbol X must be in some way superior. Right? The fact is, which symbol we
> "buy" depends on which symbol best suits our tastes. Neither symbol is
> "superior" to the other because they are both nothing but simulacra. These
> symbols might as well be paintings upon a wall, where you might choose the one
> that goes best in your living room.
I'd be happy to switch brands if you could only show me how your brand
is better than mine.
> >Science isn't in the business of making anyone feel good, bad or
> >indifferent about the universe. It is in the business of explaining
> >the universe based upon repeatable, observable events.
>
> Yes it is. It is in the business of satiating the aesthetic tastes of those
> who want to find a very "pretty" symbol that they can paste upon the universe.
> If science were not an aesthetic quest, no scientist would be motivated to do
> all the hectic symbol-manipulations and word games that the Church of Science
> requires of its devout followers.
Umm, science, by and large, doesn't require much symbol manipulation.
Math does though, as does philosophy. All science requires is
empirical evidence.
I think you're just mad that science brought about the end of
(western) religion's most potent recruiting methods: miracles.
It also gave us the industrial revolution and indoor plumbing. I've
yet to find a religion that keeps my feet warm when I use the privy.
Science has given us TV and movies: before that, you had to ingest
drugs or fast to see pretty pictures.
If religion had made one 1/1000th the progress that science has, then
we wouldn't be killing each other all over the planet. Even people
who believe in the same god kill each other over religion. I've yet
to see large scale killing (even small scale killing) (even a knife
fight) over a unified field theory.
Dmitri Manin
>ha...@bert.cs.byu.edu (Kelly Hall):
>I'm surprised at this sort of argument showing up again and
>again, as if there were a Gresham's law of philosophy. That
>a semi will flatten you on I-15 may be observable, but it
>tells you little or nothing about what I-15 and the semi
>really, really are;
So you don't know what these "really, really" are? Or there are other
observations/revelations that do tell you what I-15 "really, really"
is? If so, what _is_ I-15, really? I'm not quite joking, actually. I'm
very intrigued by what you said and look forward for a continuation.
- DM
Gordon Fitch
| >> There are those who seem to view reality as something that is built
| >> out of language. Periodically, someone jumps up and claims that
Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
| > Could you state who these people are, and exactly what
| > it is they say?
tur...@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin):
| By way of example, Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron, the
| editors of "The New French Feminisms: An Anthology," begin the
| introduction to that book thusly:
|
| The recent French interest in discourse ... has made it
| easier and more difficult to write about how women have been
| written about. Easier because we have provocative models,
| more difficult because their analyses relate discourse to
| discourse and divorce it from experience. The unwillingness
| to move outside the text, to move from the word to the
| referent is unacceptable to most feminists.
| ...
| ... Derrida ...
| ... Lyotard ...
| ... Foucalt, sometimes.
|
| Are these enough references?
Certainly not. I want a reference to someone saying that
"reality" is socially constructed, where the word _reality_
does not mean the _idea_of_reality_ but its supposed
contents, e.g. the sun and the moon. This is what Brian
Yamauchi says someone periodically jumps up and claims; so
there is either more than one, or one who does this more
than once. In fact, elsewhere he refers to a "camp" so
I have to suppose there is a veritable army of them, pro-
ducing, as you say, a veritable _fog_. Well, where is it?
Gordon Fitch
| >| ... Science could be
| >| called "rental" religion, perhaps, where gods are ever new; today
| >| Plank's Constant, tomorrow pi in the sky -- DisposaGod, Gods for
| >| Every Purpose Under Heaven [Flexible Rates!]. At the very least,
| >| dianalogically speaking, Science would be an ephemeral, metamorphing
| >| polytheism! ...
g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
| >But it will not throw itself out. Or will it?
harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison):
| That's an amusing question. Can empiricism reject empiricism if
| favor of.... what? Some non-empirical -ism? On what grounds? Well
| there could be only one; an empirical decision that empiricism doesn't
| work. But having decided that empiricism doesn't work, we've
| contradicted the grounds which we used to make the decision. Which is
| absurd.
|
| So it appears to me that science can't throw itself out. ...
So belief in Science isn't falsifiable. So Science is some
kind of religion -- where religion means what I mean when I
use the word, an intuitive rather than a rational or empiri-
cal understanding or belief. I think someone was trying to
prove that.
However, on reflection, I think that Science _could_ throw
itself out, or at least partially throw itself out -- throw
its back out, as it were -- it could decide that certain
aspects of "reality" were beyond its ken, while still
claiming control or at least understanding of other
territories, based on what worked, and what didn't, and how
and whether one could tell whether something worked or not.
Science -- my ideal of Science -- is unique in the humility
with which it submits itself to the world, with which it
abjures the role of authority.
Laurence Mailaender
Part of Geertz' definition of religion that is really
fuzzy is:
a) a system of symbols which acts to....
What does he mean by "symbol"? Certainly mathematical
symbols do not have the status of, say, the Christian
cross. Scientific symbols (in this sense) come and go
all the time. They are tools, and we use what is
convenient. On the other hand, Christianity without
the symbol of the cross would be vitiated. Just what
"symbols" of science is he talking about?
What if we changed his definition to "allegorical symbols"?
(or more specifically, symbols charged with feeling,
mystery or awe).
Then mathematical symbols would be disqualified. We may
use the same word "symbol" in both mathematics
and religion, but I'm sure we all realize that these are
not the same kind of thing. Geertz is playing deliberately
on the two senses of the word.
At some level, science does depend on faith, as does
the belief you hold that you exist. The scientific
view requires faith that phenomena are explainable, for
example that they follow the idea of cause-and-effect.
You must have faith in the ability of the human mind
to comprehend and model its surroundings. If you
can not hold these simple tenets, then science is not
for you.
The most powerful argument for science is simply that it works.
Any claims of absolute truth are absurd, as any theory or
explanation could be overturned by new evidence. But I hope
no one would argue that we'd be better off without it.
Geertz' definition is typically postmodern; it bends the
meaning of well-known words to suit the purpose at hand.
You could define any fixed belief, such as the belief that
you exist, to be a religion if you want. This is only a
word game. If he wishes to define "religion" this way,
to conflate fact and fiction, then fine. We could
also redefine "definition" or "academic" for that matter.
Science is obviously a product of a cultural and historical
environment. So what? So is all human understanding.
-Laurence
Gordon Fitch
| >I'm surprised at this sort of argument showing up again and
| >again, as if there were a Gresham's law of philosophy. That
| >a semi will flatten you on I-15 may be observable, but it
| >tells you little or nothing about what I-15 and the semi
| >really, really are;
ma...@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Dmitri Manin):
| So you don't know what these "really, really" are? Or there are other
| observations/revelations that do tell you what I-15 "really, really"
| is? If so, what _is_ I-15, really? I'm not quite joking, actually. I'm
| very intrigued by what you said and look forward for a continuation.
Sorry, but I've put Russell in charge of _Ding_an_sich_
and other antiquities.
Mujibur
yama...@ces.cwru.edu (Brian Yamauchi) writes:
[deleted]
> There are those who seem to view reality as something that is built
> out of language. Periodically, someone jumps up and claims that
> reality is "socially constructed". Every time this comment has been
> made, I've thought that it was absurd. The sun isn't socially
> constructed; the moon isn't socially constructed -- both are part of
> reality and have existed long before there were humans to name them.
> But now I see that for "symbolists", there is no sun or moon
> independent of the words "sun" and "moon" and their definitions in the
> culture.
>
> In contrast, for "empiricists", at the most basic level, the sun and
> moon are things that we _see_ -- and this is entirely independent of
> language.
[much deleted]
Our ideas about the sun and the moon are socially constructed because they are
formed primarily from information mediated to us by our social institutions.
When young children want to learn about the sun or moon, they ask their parents
and teachers, and will probably get an answer in agreement with prevailing
discourses (meaning the scientific/empirical ones). As individuals get older,
they read books about astronomy and physics. A person's relationship to his or
her parents, teachers, and books publishers can be defined socially.
You might counter that the prevailing view of the sun's and moon's behavior is
established by observation. Well, have _you_ observed the earth move around the
sun? You can say that the models presented by social institutions are in
agreement with what you _can_ observe: day and night, the seasons. And for the
truly interested, more experiments can be done to ascertain the "truth" of this
model. But the fact is, it is just a model, and it has been mediated to you
by society. Societies past have had different models, ones that agreed just as
well with what they could observe. Individuals in those societies learned those
models from their social institutions, just as we do.
The person above writes that the sun and moon have been here since long before
humans could observe them. How can you know the truth of that statement if you
did not observe them? It is because your model demands the creation of other
facts.
He also writes that observation and language are completely separate. What will
you do with observation, other than record it or share it with others? And how
will this happen without some form of symbolic language?
> ______________________________________________________________________________
>
> Brian Yamauchi Case Western Reserve University
> yama...@alpha.ces.cwru.edu Department of Computer Engineering and Science
> ______________________________________________________________________________
Jeff Olson
jol...@macalstr.edu
Russell Turpin
In article <CKM5F...@inmet.camb.inmet.com>,
Malgosia Askanas <m...@bogart.camb.inmet.com> wrote:
> But that's exactly what the above quote says. It says that the
> unwillingness to move from word to referent is unacceptable, i.e.
Oops. I misread the last sentence of the passage I quoted.
Mea culpa.
My main point stands, that many feminist theoreticians
(unfortunately) start from a theoretical viewpoint that severs
any connection between word and referent.
Russell Turpin
In article <2ipcid$j...@panix.com>, Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
> ... I want a reference to someone saying that "reality" is
> socially constructed, where the word _reality_ does not mean
> the _idea_of_reality_ but its supposed contents, e.g. the
> sun and the moon. This is what Brian Yamauchi says someone
Brian Yamauchi's criticism was a bit too blunt. In fact, what
these writers seem to claim is that the word "reality" CANNOT
refer to "its supposed contents, e.g., the sun and the moon," and
indeed, that no word can ever refer in this sense. This notion
is *explicitly* stated by the writers I quoted, and I think it
gives rise to a valid criticism every bit as deep as Yamauchi's.
True, these writers do not claim that reality (in the sense that
Fitch asks) is socially constructed; they merely claim that
reality (in the sense that Fitch asks) cannot be discussed
because it cannot be referenced, that the word reality CANNOT
refer to what Fitch and Yamauchi thinks it refers. Is this not
bad enough?
Brian Yamauchi
>In article <s5%@byu.edu> ha...@bert.cs.byu.edu (Kelly Hall) writes:
>>My point is this: knowing what's good data and what's bad data, what's
>>reproducible and what's not, is a function of judgement and
>>experience. But I'll take a one-term Taylor expansion of *any*
>>physics formula as a predictor over the book of revelation any day of
>>the week.
>And *I'll* take a ham and cheese sandwich over tunafish any day of the week,
>too. It all depends upon which narratives you find most aesthetically
>pleasing: the symbols of prophetic narrative or the symbols of empirical
>narrative.
It also depends on whether you care about whether the narrative
corresponds to the world that you perceive through your senses. If
you don't care, then it doesn't really matter -- you can believe
science, believe any of the world's religions, or go ahead and invent
your own if you prefer.
But if you do care then your options are a little more constrained.
If Rev. Joe Prophet predicts that San Francisco is going to fall into
the sea on Dec. 31, 1999 as a punishment from God, and Caltech
geologists predict that it won't, then you have a testable prediction.
If SF slides into the bay on schedule, the credibility of Rev.
Prophet's worldview is boosted, and that of Caltech's is reduced --
but if it's still standing, then the reverse is true.
>>But it still won't make religion a good prediction device. Science
>>works *really* well that way. Since one predicts well and the other
>>doesn't, it's reasonable to differentiate the two on this criteria, no?
>If you have previously constructed a work-well-o-meter that allows you to
>measure the work-well-icity of your particular set of simulacra. But you also
>must admit that this work-well-o-meter is itself a simulacrum, and that there
>is no absolute, infallible work-well-o-meter "out there" in the universe. The
>work-well-o-meter is just a word game based upon metaphysical conceptions.
Which definition of "simulacrum" are you using -- representation or
illusion? Are you arguing that science requires representations? Or
that it is impossible to tell whether anything is an illusion? Both
are true, but the former seems obvious and the latter is another
variant of the brains-in-vats arguments. Yes, we could all be
brains-in-vats with all of our senses being stimulated artificially --
but most people don't find that a particularly appealing or useful
worldview. And, yes, I suppose that is a matter of aesthetic
preference...
Science provides a way of predicting the things we will sense, based
on the things that we have sensed. If you're a solipsist, then
there's no way I can convince you that these sensations correspond to
any form of objective reality. If you don't care about what you
sense, then there's no way I can convince you that you should.
However, most people do believe in reality and do care about what
they experience, so to the extent that you feel this way, science
"works well".
>>Oh, good retort. Someone points out a major difference between
>>between 'religion' and 'science' and you cast it aside by saying
>>"what's so great about the ability to predict things?" Your argument
>>that science is a religion is shot down, and your response is "I
>>prefer the ability to make me feel like a meaningful part of the
>>universe". I guess you'd rather *feel* "like a meaningful part" than
>>to understand the universe you are a part of.
>I said "what if" I felt that way. The point I was making is that, according
>to the prophets of Science, symbol X is more aesthetically pleasing than
>symbol Y because it has jumped through the metaphysical hoops of the Doctrine
>of Empiricism. According to the prophets of Buddhism, symbol Y is more
>aesthetically pleasing than symbol X because symbol Y has jumped through the
>metaphysical hoops that say that symbol Y decreases suffering and empties the
>Self. Which symbol do you prefer? You pick the one that is most
>aesthetically pleasing to *you*, which I assume would be symbol X. And like a
>TV ad, you would probably claim that since "four out of five people surveyed
>find symbol X more aesthetically pleasing than symbol Y", that therefore,
>symbol X must be in some way superior. Right? The fact is, which symbol we
>"buy" depends on which symbol best suits our tastes. Neither symbol is
>"superior" to the other because they are both nothing but simulacra. These
>symbols might as well be paintings upon a wall, where you might choose the one
>that goes best in your living room.
Neither symbol is _inherently_ superior, but one may be better than
another for a given purpose. The choice of the purpose may be purely
subjective (or "aesthetic"), but the applicability of the symbol
system to that purpose is not.
Suppose you make the "aesthetic" choice that you want to fly. You can
get a pilot's license. Or you can jump off a cliff and try to use
magic powers to transform yourself into a bird. The symbol system of
aeronautics isn't inherently "superior" to the symbol system of magic,
but the former will make your flight a lot less painful...
--
_______________________________________________________________________________
Brian Yamauchi Case Western Reserve University
yama...@alpha.ces.cwru.edu Department of Computer Engineering and Science
_______________________________________________________________________________
Euan Troup
In article <44%@byu.edu>, OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden) writes:
>I was reading a book yesterday that quoted an apparently well-accepted
>definition of religion by Clifford Geertz. According to Geertz, a
>religion is
>a cultural "blueprint or template" that is:
>
>"(1) a system of symbols which acts to
>(2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and
>motivations in
>men [sic] by
>(3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and
>(4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
>(5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." ("Religion as a
>>Cultural System," _The Interpretation of Cultures_ (New York: Basic
>Books,
>1973), 92,93.)
>
>
[stuff deleted]
>Since Science fits all the generally-accepted criteria for being a religion,
>perhaps we should rename it the Church of Science.
>
>-----------------------------
>Christopher Ogden
>ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
>
Your definition doesn't include the ethical and spiritual authority which
most (conventional) religions claim, and science doesn't. Your definition
could be used to include sport or music. A bunch of scientists organise
themselves in much the same way as any other group because of human nature,
not because science is a religion.
Euan "soc.religion.football.aussie-rules" Troup
--
Euan Troup, etr...@atnf.csiro.au Australia Telescope, Parkes Observatory.
..mostly harmless.
Paul Andrew King
: The fact that something is metaphysical does not necessarily mean that it is
: bad. All of us must construct our universe in the way that is most
: aesthetically pleasing to us.
I hope you find your engineering knowledge "aesthetically pleasing".
Or are you claiming that anyone could do your job with whatever ideas
they found "aesthetically pleasing" ?
: In order to construct this universe, we draw
: upon elements from the many overlapping cultures and communities that rule
: over us. I have constructed my own reality, and it takes elements from all
: the communities of which I am a part, largely from the Church of
: Science and the Church of Religion.
Hate to point this out, but engineering is a branch of *technology* not
science.
Besides which the "Church of Science" doesn't exist. I find the idea
aesthetically displeasing (:-)
: Whenever there is a conflict between
: these two churches, I make a value judgement about which one I'm most loyal
: to, or I construct an alternate reality to accomodate both cultures.
: -----------------------------
: Christopher Ogden
: ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Paul K.
Gordon Fitch
| > ... I want a reference to someone saying that "reality" is
| > socially constructed, where the word _reality_ does not mean
| > the _idea_of_reality_ but its supposed contents, e.g. the
| > sun and the moon. This is what Brian Yamauchi says someone
| > periodically jumps up and claims; ...
tur...@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin):
| Brian Yamauchi's criticism was a bit too blunt. In fact, what
| these writers seem to claim is that the word "reality" CANNOT
| refer to "its supposed contents, e.g., the sun and the moon," and
| indeed, that no word can ever refer in this sense. This notion
| is *explicitly* stated by the writers I quoted, and I think it
| gives rise to a valid criticism every bit as deep as Yamauchi's.
| True, these writers do not claim that reality (in the sense that
| Fitch asks) is socially constructed; they merely claim that
| reality (in the sense that Fitch asks) cannot be discussed
| because it cannot be referenced, that the word reality CANNOT
| refer to what Fitch and Yamauchi thinks it refers. Is this not
| bad enough?
Maybe, but what you say is not what I've gotten out of
reading Foucault's _Archaeology_of_Knowledge_ (or, to be
precise, the alleged translation of it). I can't reduce
poor Foucault to a few phrases, but what he seems (to me)
to be saying is not that the things referred to by a
discourse (e.g. botany) change (although they might) but
that the rules and direction of the discourse change. In
the case of botany, it was once considered appropriate to
study the symbolic associations of plants; now, it isn't;
maybe at some point in the future it again will be. In
other words, not only does botany not get to to the
ultimate reality of the plant, its _Ding_an_sich-ness, but
it also excludes many phenomena from consideration, as part
of the social procedure of its formation. The inescapable
fact of that procedure often becomes important politically,
as when we go about deciding who is sane or insane, or
female or male, and yet it is often covered up in order to
enhance the authority of the procedure, making it seem to
emanate from Nature itself.
Now, I may misunderstand Foucault, but I do not think he
says we can't refer to the contents of "reality"; what he
does say is that we can't talk using these references
without invoking the social procedures I've described. As
far as "reality" goes all this doesn't seem to be much more
radical than Hume. Buddhism goes a lot further, but we
can't accuse most Buddhists of being French.
Gordon Fitch
| Here is a reference and a quote. Nelson Goodman, in an exchange with
| Israel Scheffler on Goodman's _Ways of Worldmaking_ says:
|
| "we do not make stars as we make bricks; not all making is a matter of
| moulding mud. The worldmaking mainly in question here is making not with
| hands but with minds, or rather with languages or other symbol systems.
| Yet when I say that worlds are made, I mean it literally; and what I mean
| should be clear from what I have already said." ("On Starmaking"
| _Synthese 45, 213)
|
| Scheffler, of course, finds this absurd.
I guess there's one of everything. I've seen Goodman
quoted before as a kind of bad boy of postmodernism. It's
probably a good way to sell books. I don't know much about
his work, though, and whether it has any influence. Well, I
don't find the quote absurd, because it could refer to the
modeling of the world that takes place inside our nervous
systems. If that is indeed the case, my next question would
be, "Yeah, well, what else is new?" We're still back with
Hume and Kant and the _Ding_an_sich_ out there across the
abyss. Or does he say that the sun and moon wouldn't exist
at all if we didn't make them up?
Brad Owen
: bo...@orion.it.luc.edu (Brad Owen):
I can't make enough sense of him to tell what he says. Take a look at the
first chapter of _Ways of Worldmaking_ and see if you can make any sense
of it. But he is not just talking about modeling here--he says "making"
and he means it literally--whatever that means.
It seems to me that a plausible view would be to just say that the "sun"
and "moon" would exist, but Goodman is saying that the sun and moon
wouldn't exist unless we make them up.
He says elsewhere that this is not Idealism, but I can't see the difference.
....Brad
Russell Turpin
In article <2iqr1s$m...@panix.com>, Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
> Maybe, but what you say is not what I've gotten out of
> Now, I may misunderstand Foucault, but I do not think he
> says we can't refer to the contents of "reality"; what he
> does say is that we can't talk using these references
> without invoking the social procedures I've described.
There is much that Foucalt says that is quite sensible. It is
that he goes as far as other critical theorists -- such as
Derrida -- in separating word from reference. As some of the
passages quoted in this thread show, some critical theorists
go to this extreme.
Daniel E. Platt
|>
|> Part of Geertz' definition of religion that is really
|> fuzzy is:
|> a) a system of symbols which acts to....
|>
|> What does he mean by "symbol"? Certainly mathematical
|> symbols do not have the status of, say, the Christian
|> cross. Scientific symbols (in this sense) come and go
|> all the time. They are tools, and we use what is
|> convenient. On the other hand, Christianity without
|> the symbol of the cross would be vitiated. Just what
|> "symbols" of science is he talking about?
There's a whole literature that would have no problem with
his use of 'symbols' in this context. They have many
classes of symbols (they have categorized mathematical
symbols within their system of symbols). Jung (psychologist)
among others uses symbols in this context. You might also
look up Paul Riccoeur (sp?)'s work.
|>
|> What if we changed his definition to "allegorical symbols"?
|> (or more specifically, symbols charged with feeling,
|> mystery or awe).
There isn't a need to redifine things just because
you're not familiar with the literature... :-)
|> Then mathematical symbols would be disqualified. We may
|> use the same word "symbol" in both mathematics
|> and religion, but I'm sure we all realize that these are
|> not the same kind of thing. Geertz is playing deliberately
|> on the two senses of the word.
Uh... no he's not. You might go to the library and look
up some of this stuff -- you might find it sort of fun (I'm
not trying to be snotty -- I really mean it; it could be
entertaining).
|> Science is obviously a product of a cultural and historical
|> environment. So what? So is all human understanding.
|>
Given all the kinds of religions in the world, some of which
were designed as a kind of animism to explain why nature behaves
the way it does, to pantheism (a sort of extended version) presenting
cosmology as the stage for the actions of gods, to shamanism and
magic, to cargo cults (one of the major selling points of
reactionary conservativism in this country today :-) ),
how do you capture in a definition all the flavors and characteristics
of how people thought about these religions?
|> -Laurence
Benjamin J. Tilly
harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison) writes:
> ObSolipsism. There really isn't any way to counter Ogden's arguments,
> at least not on his terms.
> One can't prove to a solipsist that the real world exists. The choices are
>
> (1) ignore such arguments as unscientific, and accept the fact that
> navel gazers will never become either extinct or important.
>
> (2) Chuck a brick at their heads. if they duck, you've just
> demonstrated they too believe in objective reality, and their
> protestations are either hypocritical or self-deluding.
> If they don't duck, well you've lost a solipsist, but you've found an
> honest man!
You should read Feyerabends explanation of why it is that he does not
jump out of windows. He manages to make it sound halfway reasonable
that he would not even though he is willing to argue that he does not
know that gravity exists. :-)
Ben Tilly
Gordon Fitch
| > I'm surprised at this sort of argument showing up again and
| > again, as if there were a Gresham's law of philosophy. That
| > a semi will flatten you on I-15 may be observable, but it
| > tells you little or nothing about what I-15 and the semi
| > observations are likely to be followed by certain other
| > observations. "Thus do I refute Berkeley!" Could we get
| > down the road a bit?
Just a note here. Dmitri noted that if a semi flattened
you on I-15, you would not be able to observe a second
instance of the phenomenon, and in fact would probably
have trouble completing your observation of the first
instance. However, what a phrase like that usually is
taken to mean is that (a) it is observable that semis
[ large trucks [ lorries] ] flatten things in their
paths, and (b) one is similar enough to the things
flattened to suppose that if one were to be in the path
of a semi, one would be similarly flattened. (The
future tense is used to denote probable habitual
behavior.) Needless to say, statements (a) and (b) can
be broken down into further and ever more tedious
propositions, definitions, and axioms.
l...@cbnewsd.cb.att.com (lewis.h.mammel..jr):
| OK, how about the moon? Is it "real" ? I mean, as a place - dusty
| rocky, airless, etc. Remember it was an object of quite some
| contention at one time. Was Galileo actually right about it?
| Did science "create" it as one of its "facts"?
In my opinion? I assume the collection of phenomena I
categorize as "the moon" refers to something other than
my own thoughts. I do not think I know much about it.
To say that it is a "place" or that it is "dusty, rocky,
airless," etc., are probably debatable; i.e. "Dusty com-
pared to what?" or "What do we mean by 'a place'?"
Galileo, and Science in general, created a certain _view_
of the moon, working with a similar set of phenomena.
In some mystical sense "we" may have created the moon
_ex_nihilo_, but I am unaware, at this time anyway, of
participating in such an enterprise.
Gordon Fitch
| Well, Gordon, I'd perhaps prefer to talk to Socrates, Plato, or Kant,
| for that matter. I'm confronted with you instead... and this
| _ding-dong_an_Ihr.
|
| Jokes aside, I'm interested in your personal opinion (if you have
| any). What do _you_ think about the really real reality of I-15?
|
| Dialogue, this is what the Net is all about, isn't it?
Well, I posted my apprehension of the moon's reality a few
hours ago. My opinions of I-15 are similar, but somewhat
weaker, as I have never observed I-15 but only heard tell
of it. Also, I-15 has some characteristics the moon
doesn't have, like a legal existence and an official-map
existence -- that is, if someone didn't just make it up.
Both the moon and highways have been addressed in poems,
but I don't know if I-15 has made this grade (yet).
Gordon Fitch
| >I want a reference to someone saying that
| > "reality" is socially constructed, where the word _reality_
| > does not mean the _idea_of_reality_ but its supposed
| > contents, e.g. the sun and the moon.
Andrew...@Brown.edu (Andy Perry):
| The standard (post-)structuralist example, used by Catherine Belsey and
| Jonathan Culler among others, is color. All of the available sociological
| data indicates that color delineation is completely different in different
| cultures. ...
But this is an observation that people categorize phenomena
differently, which even hard-reality folks admit, not a
contention that color (the differing of sensation based on
differing of wavelength of perceived light, and the physical
processes or conditions which provoke this sensed radiation)
is entirely a social invention. We had two people in here
claiming there was some kind of conspiracy to deny the
existence of anything not socially constructed, and so far
they've only come up with this fellow Goodman. My desultory
readings of Foucault, Derrida, Beaudrillard, Lacan, and
Kristeva, have not given me the impression that any of them
are of this opinion; but I am willing to be enlightened.
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>In article <CKpEs...@uwindsor.ca> bou...@server.uwindsor.ca
(Boucher David) writes:
>>My universe would be more esthetically pleasing to me if had 100
>>billion dollars, possessed the power to read minds and to teleport
>>myself to distant galaxies, and was living in a menage a trois with
>>Sharon Stone and Whitney Houston. Please tell me how I can "construct
>>my own reality" such that all these things will be as real and solid
>>as this keyboard I am typing on.
>
CO>Obviously this universe is *not* aesthetically pleasing to you, because you
>are ruled by another signifier, "touchability". According to your
>self-constructed world, Sharon Stone and Whitney Houston are not real unless
>you can touch them, and 100 billion dollars is not real unless you can see the
>money somewhere, or at least have the capability of touching it by withdrawing
>it from a bank and touch it. And even if you could have it both ways, keeping
>your "touchability" signifier, yet at the same time construct a universe with
>the signifiers "Sharon Stone", "Whitney Houston", and 100 billion dollars. I
>doubt that such a universe would truly be aesthetically pleasing to you,
>because most humans like to suffer. Through suffering, we experience
>suffering's Other--happiness. Without suffering there would be no happiness
>because we wouldn't know what it was; we'd have nothing to compare it against.
>Metaphysical qualities come in pairs. If you lived in a universe where you
>had everything you wanted, think of how bored you'd be.
>
>But if you were to abandon the signifier "touchability", it is indeed possible
>for you to construct such a dream-universe as you say. Such universes are
>constructed all the time in cyberspace, as I'm sure you are aware. Visit any
>tiny-MUD, and you'll see great examples of such self-constructed realities.
>Create virtual money. Create virtual women. If you abandon the signifier
>"touchability", such things can be as real to you as the keyboard you are
>typing on.
>
Why don't you just abandon the signifier "readability", construct a
dream-universe in which we all agree with you and never bother to read
Usenet alt.atheism again? If you have been telling us what you honestly
think, then that dream-universe would be just as meaningful as any other,
but we would not be bothered by nonsense like the above quote! We would
all appear to have been convinced by your "brilliant" "arguments" and it
would be as real to you as you wish. Sounds perfectly consistent with
all the other stuff you have posted.
Regards,
Dave
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. David Batchelor Space Science Data Operations Office Mail Code 632
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Greenbelt MD 20771 USA
batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov * personal opinions only, not NASA policy *
Theorem: Consider the set of all sets that have never been considered.
Hey! They're all gone!! Oh, well, never mind...
benjamin franz
: In article <2ii2a9$k...@u.cc.utah.edu> bf6...@u.cc.utah.edu (benjamin franz) writes:
: >You have "observable, repeatable and measurable" *evidence* for _any_
: >other world view? If not - you are playing word games. *OF COURSE* science
: >is limited to understanding observable, repeatable and measurable
: >phenomena. It is part of the definition of _science_. You would rather it
: >tryed to understand non-observable, non-repeatable, non-measurable
: >phenomena? Sounds like a pretty good description of *non-existant*
: >phenomena to me. :^|
: Let's take a look at some of the metaphysical beliefs that make up your
: worldview. First of all, you use the word "observable". What is that? The
: quantum physicist would say that observation is a very subjective thing. The
: solipsist would say that observation is an illusion. You define a
: metaphysical dialictic, observable/nonobservable, that is vague and
: ambiguous. How do you know when something is observable? With an
: observable-o-meter? Did God tell you that what you see with your eyes
: and with your machines is what really exists?
Ok - I think you chose a bad person to sharpen your illogic on. I am just
looking for things to practice my logical analysis skills on. Helps me
with my class in Informal Logic this quarter. 8-)
: Let's take a look at some of the metaphysical beliefs that make up your
: worldview.
Yes - lets.
" First of all, you use the word "observable". What is that?"
Analysis: Questioning of definition of term "observable".
"The quantum physicist would say that observation is a very subjective thing.
The solipsist would say that observation is an illusion."
Analysis: Attempt to show that the word has no clear meaning by showing
that it it interpreted differently by different people. Misunderstanding
of the meaning of quantum physics use of the the word "observation." An
observer in QM can be a rock. Their is no requirement of *awareness*. Thus
the assertion that quantum physicists observations are "subjective" is
invalid.
Use of solipsism as a contrast invalid as solipsism is a self-sealing world
view that can be used to deny *anything*. "The solipsist would say that
<xxx> is an illusion." Thus I can use solipsism to argue against *any* word
as having an agreed upon meaning. Additionally, considering a solipsist in
*contrast* to another person seems to be violating the idea of solipsism in
the first place. If solipsism is a correct world view - there is no
distinct class of quantum physicists to *have* differing opinions regarding
what constitutes an observation.
Considered as a unit, no disproof of there being a commonly accepted
meaning to the word "observation" was offered. The _implication_ was made
that if quantum physicists and solipsists disagree as to the meaning of
the word "observation" the word does not have an agreed upon meaning. This
falters on the problems that a solipsist would not agree that the quantum
physicist existed (to disagree with) and that the quantum physicist uses the
term "observation" without the conotation of a conscious observer.
Conclusion: Attempt to discredit the idea of "observation" fails due to
employment of logical inconsistency in the use of solipsism and
equivocation of the meaning of the word "observation".
": Repeatable. What is that?"
Analysis: Questioning of validity of term.
: All experiments are done under different conditions. All experiments
: obtain different results. They take place at different times and
: different places. The scientist has to take a leap of faith and assume
: that time moves uniformly, that space is the same everywhere, that all
: materials are alike and interchangeable, and that the Doctrine of
: Statistics is true.
Analysis: Construction of strawman. Scientists generally _would not_
assume "that time moves uniformly, that space is the same everywhere, that all
materials are alike and interchangeable". In fact *many* scientific theories
and observations directly contradict these assertions except in very
limited contexts.
Assertion that scientists believe that the "Doctrine of Statistics"
(presumably that events that occur in statistically repeatable manner are
considered to have strong evidence for their actual existance) is begging
the question in the context. Using repeatability as being a questionable
belief to argue against a belief in repeatibility is an invalid argument
when the *question* is whether repeatiblity is a questionable belief in
the first place.
: Then, the scientist has to define a dividing line
: between the repeatable and the non-repeatable. Does a difference in
: results of 1.01 miliseconds mean "unrepeatable", while 0.99 miliseconds
: is "repeatable"?
: Where is the dividing line? It comes down to an aesthetic judgement.
Analysis: Use of the "Argument from the Heap" fallacy to argue against
there being the catagories of "repeatable" and "non-repeatable" observations.
The "from the Heap" fallacy is asserting that since a small change does
not move something from one category to the other, then a lot of small
changes (ie a big change) won't either. Like so: Giving a poor person a penny
will not make them rich. Therefore - no matter how many pennies you give
them it will not make them rich. That this is fallacious is shown by
asking "How about 10,000,000,000 pennies? ($100,000,000!!!). This fallacy
exploits the blurriness of the boundary between two categories to make a
false statement that the categories do not exist.
In this particular case, the blurriness of the boundary between repeatable
and non-repeatable is exploited to try and claim that the categories do not
validly exist.
Conclusion: Use of strawman argumentation, begging the question and
"Argument from the Heap" render this attack on the word "repeatable"
invalid.
: >Perhaps. But science seems to posses the one quality that no religion I am
: >aware of does: a phenomenal ability to predict future events with verifiable
: >precision, repeatability and unambiguity.
: Here are some more ambiguous metaphysical dialectics: verifiable/
: nonverifiable, precise/imprecise, ambiguous/nonambiguous, predict/not
: predict, phenomenal/non-phenomenal. We could just as well add good/bad,
: love/hate, beautiful/ugly, to be/not to be, tomayto/tomahto. It's all a
: matter of taste.
Analysis: Extremely broad use of the Argument from the Heap to discount the
entire idea of dividing things into categories *at all*. An aid to spotting
this usage is phrases intended to discount the existence of objective
criteria for classification such as "It is just a matter of opinion," "It
comes down to an aesthetic judgement," or "It's all a matter of taste."
That there are ambiguous cases does not mean that there are not many cases
that are *unambiguous* by objective criteria. A man with a billion dollars
is rich. A man with $100 is not rich. That there are people who are in
between who are difficult to classify does not mean that there is no
meaning to the assertion that someone is rich or not.
: >Please show me *one* religion that can correctly and reliably *predict* the
: >location of Pluto on an arbitrary date, the result of adding 1 gm of pure
: >Lithium to pure water, or the frequency distribution of the thermal
: >radiation from a blackbody for an arbitrary temperature.
: Correctly/incorrectly, location/non-location. Date according to time system
: X/ date according to relativistic time frame, pure/impure, high
: temperature/low temperature, tall/short, fat/thin. What if I don't want to
: know these predictions? What's so great about the ability to predict
: things? Perhaps I prefer the ability to make me feel like a meaningful
: part of the universe.
Analysis: Argument from consequences. The argument must be wrong because you
find the consequences unacceptable. If science does in fact possess an
ability to predict not shared by religions, you discount its importance
because it does not make you "feel like a meaningful part of the
universe." (unacceptable consequence). The question was not whether or not
this ability to predict was *important to you* but whether or not it
formed a valid basis for distinguishing science from religion. This also
borders on being self-sealing because for any losing arguement you can
retreat to "It doesn't make me feel like an important part of the universe
and so does not matter."
Honestly - I wish I had checked back in on this group a couple of days ago
- I needed a really good example of a fallacious argument for my Informal
Logic class. I had to settle for a creationist who had misrepresented
Stephen Jay Gould's position on transitional fossils and strawmanned
evolution. This was a much more bogus argument.
Ray Ingles
[deletions]
>I never said that I don't believe in knowledge. Obviously knowledge exists.
Name some knowledge.
[deletions]
>We just need to realize [...] we cannot [...] assume that our bag of
>symbols "causes" phenomena in the universe to happen.
(I hacked that paragraph pretty heavily, but I think I kept the spirit.
Let me know if you disagree.)
Can you name anybody who does think this? I've never met such a person,
myself. I always though that our symbols described things in the real
world, and sometimes allowed us to predict what those things would do of
their own accord.
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles ing...@engin.umich.edu
"An apple every eight hours keeps three doctors away." - B. Kliban
Alan Rosiene (Humanities)
>observation is better than
>speculation as a means of finding out about anything that can be
>observed.
Speculation, however, is the means to find out about observation itself:
quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
Alan
Christopher Ogden
>My universe would be more esthetically pleasing to me if had 100
>billion dollars, possessed the power to read minds and to teleport
>myself to distant galaxies, and was living in a menage a trois with
>Sharon Stone and Whitney Houston. Please tell me how I can "construct
>my own reality" such that all these things will be as real and solid
>as this keyboard I am typing on.
Obviously this universe is *not* aesthetically pleasing to you, because you
are ruled by another signifier, "touchability". According to your
self-constructed world, Sharon Stone and Whitney Houston are not real unless
you can touch them, and 100 billion dollars is not real unless you can see the
money somewhere, or at least have the capability of touching it by withdrawing
it from a bank and touch it. And even if you could have it both ways, keeping
your "touchability" signifier, yet at the same time construct a universe with
the signifiers "Sharon Stone", "Whitney Houston", and 100 billion dollars. I
doubt that such a universe would truly be aesthetically pleasing to you,
because most humans like to suffer. Through suffering, we experience
suffering's Other--happiness. Without suffering there would be no happiness
because we wouldn't know what it was; we'd have nothing to compare it against.
Metaphysical qualities come in pairs. If you lived in a universe where you
had everything you wanted, think of how bored you'd be.
But if you were to abandon the signifier "touchability", it is indeed possible
for you to construct such a dream-universe as you say. Such universes are
constructed all the time in cyberspace, as I'm sure you are aware. Visit any
tiny-MUD, and you'll see great examples of such self-constructed realities.
Create virtual money. Create virtual women. If you abandon the signifier
"touchability", such things can be as real to you as the keyboard you are
typing on.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Ray Ingles
for emphasis, or does it connote some special use of the term enclosed?)
In article <|9%@byu.edu> OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden) writes:
>In article <2iv3tl...@srvr1.engin.umich.edu> ing...@engin.umich.edu (Ray Ingles) writes:
>>>We just need to realize [...] we cannot [...] assume that our bag of
>>>symbols "causes" phenomena in the universe to happen.
>> Can you name anybody who does think this? I've never met such a person,
>>myself. I always though that our symbols described things in the real
>>world, and sometimes allowed us to predict what those things would do of
>>their own accord.
>
>If you {really} believed that symbols did not "cause" things in the
>universe to happen, then you wouldn't have made the last sentence. Here, you
>{are} making a metaphysical distinction between the "symbol" and the
>"symbolized".
Golly, yes!
> According to you, the symbolized--the Universe, Reality, the
>Way Things Really Are--is distinctly different from the symbols we use to
>describe this reality. You assume that Reality "causes" *itself* to
>happen--your words were, "of their own accord".
By George, I think he's got it!
> This is where you betray your
>metaphysical biases, because {is} not your idea of the "symbolized" itself a
>symbol?
He doesn't got it.
>In other words, you {are} saying that there is some-thing ("thing" is the
^^^^^ ^^ ^^^
>symbol) "out there" that "causes" itself to happen.
^^^^^^
What you write here directly contradicts the next sentence, which I
*do* agree with:
> There is an independent
>existance, where one phenomenon "causes" another phenomenon to happen
>independently of human symbols, you say.
Yes, so the "thing" above is *not* the symbol, but *what* *the* *symbol*
*refers* *to*. Are you familiar with the C programming language? There's
a wonderful metaphor I'd like to use...
> With this metaphysical idea, symbols
>cause symbols to happen. You don't like to admit that your "true reality"
>{is} itself a symbol because you consider it to be the "symbolized", not the
>"symbol", and this is a metaphysical distinction.
We obviously have very different definitions of the word "symbol". *I*
agree with the common definition, where a symbol stands for or refers to
something else. You seem to deny that a symbol can refer to anything; we
must only deal with the symbol itself.
It's true that how we choose to think of the data we receive has a
powerful effect on how we perceive it. But that's not *all* that's going
on. I believe that we do in fact have some link, if sometimes tenuous,
to the real world.
Let me give you an example.
In one of those famous psychology experiments, subjects were told that
their reaction time was being tested. Playing cards were flashed at them,
and they were to identify them as quickly as possible.
The thing was, there were some cards of anomalous colors. A red three of
spades, perhaps, or a black queen of hearts. When the cards were flashed
quickly, no one noticed anything wrong. The 3 of spades would be confidently
identified as a 3 of hearts, or perhaps as a 3 of spades, but the color
would go unnoticed.
As the time the cards were shown increased, the subjects began to notice
the anomalies. They would suddenly realize that the colors were wrong on
some of the cards. The time varied betwen people, but everyone eventually
noticed something wrong. (One or two were unable to quite say what was
wrong, but they saw something disturbing.)
That's the point I'm trying to make. People draw a distinction between
the symbol and the thing symbolized, and notice when the relationship
between the two is broken. I ask you outright: do you deny that this
happens? Do you deny that a symbol *refers* to something, and that
something can be other than a symbol?
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles || The above opinions are probably
|| not those of the University of
ing...@engin.umich.edu || Michigan. Yet.
Malgosia Askanas
Gordon Fitch wrote:
> Science (my ideal of Science) is humble because it falls
> silent before the world and listens to it, at least for
> a moment. No doubt many of its users would prefer to
> jump up and down and pound their chests, and call down
> lightning from the skies, but first they have to coax
> the magic words out of the mysteries around them. Unless
> Science submits to the world, it learns nothing. Only
> ignorance is the beginning of knowledge.
What I found most striking about this post is that you
were contrasting science (you ideal of science) with
religion. Now I tend to think about this kind of humility
as being _religious_: the world is divine, permeated
with god, and each thing deserves complete reverence.
(In my ideal religion.)
However, even though religion may be an articulation of
this attitude of humility, I am not aware of any religion
that formulates its goals with respect to the world in such
a way that the goals are demonstrably not met unless one
has approached the world humbly. Science, on the other hand,
necessitates humility in its very practice.
The way this comes about is quite paradoxical, it seems to me.
The practical goal of science is to utilize the world for our
purposes. It can be seen as a wrestling match, an antagonistic
encounter. To successfully wrestle with an evenly-matched
opponent requires an understanding of the opponent so deep
as to be a form of love. To win the wrestling match, one
must first submit, even if for a moment. The humility you
talk about is brought about by the inner logic of wrestling.
Love, on the other hand, having no goal other than itself,
does not have this kind of inescapable inner logic.
As a result of technological progress, we, as individuals,
now rarely wrestle with what one would call Nature; rather,
we wrestle with big and small gadgets. It is to these gadgets
that we dedicate the moments of humility required by the
wrestling match.
Stryder
[discusson of Nelson Goodman snipped]
>It seems to me that a plausible view would be to just say that the "sun"
>and "moon" would exist, but Goodman is saying that the sun and moon
>wouldn't exist unless we make them up.
>He says elsewhere that this is not Idealism, but I can't see the difference.
Sounds to me like the old "if a tree fell in a forest, and no one was around,
would anyone give a shit?" argument, in my arrogant opinion.
>....Brad
Stryder.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Prove to me that you're no fool,
Walk across my swimmin' pool.
(Andrew Lloyd Weber, Jesus Christ Superstar)
_____________________________________________________________________________
Christopher Ogden
>"The quantum physicist would say that observation is a very subjective thing.
>Analysis: Attempt to show that the word has no clear meaning by showing
>that it it interpreted differently by different people. Misunderstanding
>of the meaning of quantum physics use of the the word "observation." An
>observer in QM can be a rock. Their is no requirement of *awareness*. Thus
>the assertion that quantum physicists observations are "subjective" is
>invalid.
My counteranalysis: Here you have {constructed} the metaphysical dialectic
"understand/misunderstand". According to your metaphysical worldview, there
is one, single idea "out there" that the quantum physicist takes as reality,
and that "observation" is a real, concrete thing that can be observed,
disected, and analyzed. Do you {really} believe that? Can you "observe" what
"observation" {is}? What {is} your guage that allows you to distinguish when
something {is} observed and when something {is not} observed?
(paralogical circumlocutions deleted)
>Conclusion: Attempt to discredit the idea of "observation" fails due to
>employment of logical inconsistency in the use of solipsism and
>equivocation of the meaning of the word "observation".
My counterconclusion: You have in{correct}ly assumed that I {was}
attempting to discredit the definition of "observation" using logic. Nothing
could {be} further from the {truth}. Since my argument {was} not a logical
one, you might as well try to prove that "Little Red Riding Hood" is logically
inconsistent. My point {was} that a person's metaphysical belief in what
"observation" is depends on her/his culture and aesthetic tastes.
>: All experiments are done under different conditions. All experiments
>: obtain different results. They take place at different times and
>: different places. The scientist has to take a leap of faith and assume
>: that time moves uniformly, that space is the same everywhere, that all
>: materials are alike and interchangeable, and that the Doctrine of
>: Statistics is true. --CO
>Analysis: Construction of strawman. Scientists generally _would not_
>assume "that time moves uniformly, that space is the same everywhere, that all
>materials are alike and interchangeable". In fact *many* scientific theories
>and observations directly contradict these assertions except in very
>limited contexts.
Apparently you {are} unaware of the Doctrines of Science. The scientist
be-lieves that Law of Universe X applies in all places, times, and conditions.
When Jane Chemist uses her instruments to construct a narrative in which she
measures the heat of mixing of water and ethanol, she assumes that the
a-morphous, metaphysical symbol--that which her culture has told her to label
a "number"--will be applicable in all places, all times, and with any
particular molecules of water and ethanol. The Scientific Method operates
under this metaphysical assumption, concluding that as when the narratives of
Joe, Martha, Fred, and Julie Chemist in Boston, Taiwan, London, and Mars all
reach the same mystic conclusions, that Jane Chemist's experiment is
"repeatable", and the Scientific Community accepts this narrative as absolute
truth.
>: Then, the scientist has to define a dividing line
>: between the repeatable and the non-repeatable. Does a difference in
>: results of 1.01 miliseconds mean "unrepeatable", while 0.99 miliseconds
>: is "repeatable"?
>: Where is the dividing line? It comes down to an aesthetic judgement.--CO
>Analysis: Use of the "Argument from the Heap" fallacy to argue against
>there being the catagories of "repeatable" and "non-repeatable" observations.
>The "from the Heap" fallacy is asserting that since a small change does
>not move something from one category to the other, then a lot of small
>changes (ie a big change) won't either.
Counteranalysis: In making this statement, you {are} assuming that I believe
that there are actual, real, categories "out there" in the universe between
which small metaphysical changes cannot "move". In order to have made such a
"fallacy", I would have to jump logically from the first premise to the
second premise. However, I don't be-lieve the first premise (In fact, I don't
even be-lieve the second); however obviously you {do}, be-cause this {is} the
metaphysical be-lief upon which you base your logical construction. Such
categories {are} human constructions that vary according to culture and taste.
>: Here are some more ambiguous metaphysical dialectics: verifiable/
>: nonverifiable, precise/imprecise, ambiguous/nonambiguous, predict/not
>: predict, phenomenal/non-phenomenal. We could just as well add good/bad,
>: love/hate, beautiful/ugly, to be/not to be, tomayto/tomahto. It's all a
>: matter of taste.
>That there are ambiguous cases does not mean that there are not many cases
>that are *unambiguous* by objective criteria. A man with a billion dollars
>is rich. A man with $100 is not rich. That there are people who are in
>between who are difficult to classify does not mean that there is no
>meaning to the assertion that someone is rich or not.
The key word here {is} "objective criteria". "Objective" {is} a very
unobjective idea. Why? Because you can't observe observation. Thus, the way
we define "objective" is left to culture and taste. According to *your*
definition of objective, a man with $100 is not rich. By the standards of
Bangladesh, however, this might not {be} the case. If a woman or a man from
another culture that does not share your metaphysical ideas about
"objectivity" were to make some different conclusion than your own, such as
stating that the man with a billion dollars is poor, you cannot "objectively"
disprove this conclusion, because you cannot observe the observations that
allowed this person to make this alternately "objective" conclusion.
>Analysis: Argument from consequences. The argument must be wrong because you
>find the consequences unacceptable. If science does in fact possess an
>ability to predict not shared by religions, you discount its importance
>because it does not make you "feel like a meaningful part of the
>universe." (unacceptable consequence).
Counteranalysis: Here once again, you {are} putting metaphysical words into
my mouth. Never did I say that the argument was "wrong". "Wrongness" {is}
just as much a metaphysical idea as "rightness", and if I reject one side of
the coin, believe me, I will reject the other. It is also not {true} that I
find the consequences unacceptable. I happen to find empiricism aesthetically
pleasing, and thus I have added this symbol provisionally to my working-bag of
simulacra. Though I don't accept the idea as Absolute Truth, I don't accept
it as Absolute Falsehood either.
One thing you should know {is} that logic is useful only in debunking fellow
modernists and others who {are} indoctrinated by the metaphysics of the
Enlightenment.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>[deletions]
>>We just need to realize [...] we cannot [...] assume that our bag of
>>symbols "causes" phenomena in the universe to happen.
> (I hacked that paragraph pretty heavily, but I think I kept the spirit.
>Let me know if you disagree.)
> Can you name anybody who does think this? I've never met such a person,
>myself. I always though that our symbols described things in the real
>world, and sometimes allowed us to predict what those things would do of
>their own accord.
If you {really} believed that symbols did not "cause" things in the
universe to happen, then you wouldn't have made the last sentence. Here, you
{are} making a metaphysical distinction between the "symbol" and the
"symbolized". According to you, the symbolized--the Universe, Reality, the
Way Things Really Are--is distinctly different from the symbols we use to
describe this reality. You assume that Reality "causes" *itself* to
happen--your words were, "of their own accord". This is where you betray your
metaphysical biases, because {is} not your idea of the "symbolized" itself a
symbol?
In other words, you {are} saying that there is some-thing ("thing" is the
symbol) "out there" that "causes" itself to happen. There is an independent
existance, where one phenomenon "causes" another phenomenon to happen
independently of human symbols, you say. With this metaphysical idea, symbols
cause symbols to happen. You don't like to admit that your "true reality"
{is} itself a symbol because you consider it to be the "symbolized", not the
"symbol", and this is a metaphysical distinction.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Håvard Fosseng
> In article <2iv125$e...@u.cc.utah.edu>
> bf6...@u.cc.utah.edu (benjamin franz) writes:
> >Analysis: Attempt to show that the word has no clear meaning by
> >showing that it it interpreted differently by different
> >people. Misunderstanding of the meaning of quantum physics use of
> >the the word "observation." An observer in QM can be a rock. Their
> >is no requirement of *awareness*. Thus the assertion that quantum
> >physicists observations are "subjective" is invalid.
>
> My counteranalysis: Here you have {constructed} the metaphysical
> dialectic "understand/misunderstand". According to your
> metaphysical worldview, there is one, single idea "out there" that
> the quantum physicist takes as reality, and that "observation" is a
> real, concrete thing that can be observed, disected, and analyzed.
Where does he invoke these ideas?
"Quantum physicist" is not a term that physicists generally use in
describing the world. Quantum theory is possibly *the* most general
and pervasive theory of modern physics, and underlies what just about
every physicist does. Whether quantum theory deals with "reality" is a
matter of interpretation (and disagreement); it *does* deal with
predicting the results of observations from the results of other
observations.
> Do you {really} believe that? Can you "observe" what "observation"
> {is}? What {is} your guage that allows you to distinguish when
> something {is} observed and when something {is not} observed?
Why does he need to?
> >Conclusion: Attempt to discredit the idea of "observation" fails
> >due to employment of logical inconsistency in the use of solipsism
> >and equivocation of the meaning of the word "observation".
>
> My counterconclusion: You have in{correct}ly assumed that I {was}
> attempting to discredit the definition of "observation" using logic.
> Nothing could {be} further from the {truth}. Since my argument
> {was} not a logical one, you might as well try to prove that "Little
> Red Riding Hood" is logically inconsistent.
If your argument is not a logical one, just what is it? (By my
worldview) A discussion must -- to have any hope of reaching a
conclusion -- have some common ground between the participants. Part
of the conventional common ground of the net is: An argument has to
hang together logically, and a lot of effort go into trying to show
that some conclusion follows from some premises other
participants/readers are assumed to share. If this isn't the basis for
your conclusions: what is?
> My point {was} that a person's metaphysical belief in what
> "observation" is depends on her/his culture and aesthetic tastes.
Science rests on a normative definition of what constitutes an
observation (even if this isn't spelled out explicitly), and science
concerns itself with observations _in_this_sense_of_the_word_. What --
if anything -- people in general refer to by the term is strictly
speaking irrelevant.
> >Analysis: Construction of strawman. Scientists generally _would
> >not_ assume "that time moves uniformly, that space is the same
> >everywhere, that all materials are alike and interchangeable". In
> >fact *many* scientific theories and observations directly
> >contradict these assertions except in very limited contexts.
>
> Apparently you {are} unaware of the Doctrines of Science. The
> scientist be-lieves that Law of Universe X applies in all places,
> times, and conditions. When Jane Chemist uses her instruments to
> construct a narrative in which she measures the heat of mixing of
> water and ethanol, she assumes that the a-morphous, metaphysical
> symbol--that which her culture has told her to label a
> "number"--will be applicable in all places, all times, and with any
> particular molecules of water and ethanol. The Scientific Method
> operates under this metaphysical assumption, concluding that as when
> the narratives of Joe, Martha, Fred, and Julie Chemist in Boston,
> Taiwan, London, and Mars all reach the same mystic conclusions, that
> Jane Chemist's experiment is "repeatable", and the Scientific
> Community accepts this narrative as absolute truth.
What underlies your belief that "Scientists" in general believe this?
Most scientists I have met don't (when they bother to address issues
like these). They are quite aware that it's possible that our models
simply make predictions that _in_this_particular_corner_of_space-time_
fit fairly well with observations. It would be aesthtically pleasing
if our models worked eveywhere, everytime, but we have no reason to
assume that the universe constrains itself to behaviour we find
"reasonable". Our ideas of "reasonable" are largely habitual thinking
based on our mezoscopic experiences, and observations indicate that at
scales far away from what most of us are familiar with (in both
directions), things happen differently.
> One thing you should know {is} that logic is useful only in
> debunking fellow modernists and others who {are} indoctrinated by
> the metaphysics of the Enlightenment.
I am convinced that *very* few readers follow you here. Could you
*please* explain?
-- Håvard Fosseng
--
Håvard Fosseng What the world needs is not dogma but an attitude of
Physics Institute scientific inquiry combined with a belief that the torture
University of Oslo of millions is not desirable, whether inflicted by Stalin
haav...@fys.uio.no or by a Deity imagined in the likeness of the believer.
-- Bertrand Russell
Daniel E. Platt
|> Daniel E. Platt (pl...@watson.ibm.com) wrote:
|> I wrote:
|> : |>
|> : |> >location of Pluto on an arbitrary date, the result of adding 1 gm of pure
|> : |> >Lithium to pure water, or the frequency distribution of the thermal
|> : |> >radiation from a blackbody for an arbitrary temperature.
|> : |>
|>
|> : Many Christian sects so qualify (or are you going to disqualify any
|> : group that doesn't fit your conception of religion?). One of the
|> : central theological questions (at least, in 'liberal theology') since
|> : the elightenment has been to try to define 'faith' and its relationship
|> : to developing science. Note that science had been going through the
|> : same problems at the same time. People like Poincare, Mach, Bridgeman,
|> : Popper, etc, had significant impact on how people think about science;
|> : at the same time, people like Bultman, Heideger, Jung, von Rad, etc,
|> : were picking apart religion and re-examining what 'faith' means in
|> : the light of the practical realities of science and technology in
|> : a modern society.
|>
|> Just for reference - it is really confusing to have you mix your responses
|> to my text with your responses to Christopher Ogden's text.
Apologies.
|>
|> I disagree as to your first sentence. There is a difference between
|> accepting the results of science as being not in conflict with religious
|> tenets and making science part of the religious tenets. It is the
|> difference between believing that you can own a car and still be religious
|> and believing you *must* own a car to be religious. I don't know of any
|> religion that has made belief in science a tenet of the faith.
|>
I have been trying to point out in this thread that there are lots
of mainstream religions in this country whose doctrine refuses to
form tenants that oppose scientific results. To that extent, they
embrace science, and would talk about blackbody radiation the same
way anybody else would. There is a large and active literature about
what religion *is* about given that it isn't about science.
|> By trying to claim the predictive power of science for religions that have
|> decided that science is not in conflict with their faith, you commit the
|> error of claiming someone else's work as theirs. Science does not make its
|> predictions *because of* those religions - it is just not in conflict with
|> them. That is like claiming because you don't think owning a car is a sin,
|> you are responsible for the invention of the car. More than passive
|> acceptance is required to claim it as theirs.
I didn't claim the work as being that of the church's, anymore than
I'd claim it of historians. Yet, historians and church members would
both be able to claim use of the predictive power of science, embracing
the attitudes of science towards those problems, if they were to participate
in discussions of topics such as blackbody radiation, or chemical reactions,
or any other question upon which science bears. In this sense, I have
not tried to claim the predictive power of science for religions, and
I object to that interpretation being ascribed to my statements.
|>
|> I am for sure not aware of any religion that consistently applies the
|> scientific method to examining its own core dogmas (that could, however,
|> just be my parochialism). Note - I am not saying indivduals do not, but
|> that the religions as a whole do not. The Catholic Church, for example, is
|> unlikely to look at all favorably on application of modern scientific
|> standards of evidence to the question of whether Jesus even existed at all.
Its interesting that you've picked this one. Meier, who wrote "A Marginal
Jew," which as been one of the recent books on the historical Jesus problem,
takes a distinctly Roman Catholic position on the question. Crossan, E. P.
Sanders, etc, are other people who have looked at the question in just the
way you're arguing for.
|> The Mormon's don't like close examination of the few fragments of "Reformed
|> Egyptian" they retain that Joseph Smith is supposed to have translated.
|> Creationists really don't like critical examination of the accuracy of Genesis
|> as a historical record.
|>
This too depends on which "Mormon's." The church in Utah is rather
conservative. Even so, there are those at BYU who don't act as
appologists for their faith -- at least not in the conservative guise
that the Utah church prefers. There's another group in Missouri that
is much more liberal in the way they talk about their faith. They
figure that it doesn't really matter how the whole thing started;
what has become important to them is the faith-life they've built up
since then.
|> I am not very familiar with non-Christian religions so you may be able to
|> find non-Christian religions that *do* examine core dogmas with a strongly
|> critical eye. But I am not aware of any, and I think I can reasonably argue
|> that religions shy away from examining core dogmas because of the not
|> insignificant chance the core of their religion is flawed (inferred
|> from the number of religions with incompatible core beliefs - they
|> can't *ALL* be correct).
Religions don't deal with scientific objectivity. They can say things
that don't have to be consistent with other religions, nor even do
they have to be entirely self-consistent. Some Christian sects to
question their core beliefs. For example, many Christian theologians
are very happy to look at biblical stories as myths, and very seriously
discuss what element of spirituality such myths are trying to communicate,
and how through archetypes and symbols that communication is to be achieved.
Some people have been so impressed about myths and symbols as a way of
looking at bodies of information, that they've turned around and applied
it to science saying science is "merely" a collection of myths and symbols
(Feyerabend is in this group).
|>
|> Science thrives on re-examining core beliefs - that is where its
|> power shines the most: the ability to completely re-invent itself on
|> finding a cherished belief was wrong. Even "sacred cows" such as
|> conservation of momentum are subject to being completely chucked if strong
|> contrary evidence comes to light. Always - the final arbiter is not what
|> scientists would _like_, or what is written in a book or what some person
|> says, but what they _observe_. If an indisputable case where momentum was
|> *not* conserved were to come up, scientists would then cross-check the
|> results and begin working on figuring out by what factor is was violated,
|> under what conditions, and why. And then they would apply their new
|> theories to predicting things no one had seen before.
Of course this is what science is supposed to be like, and usually is.
Science is also a social activity. Since the rules of objective observation
require repeatability, it is almost impossible to define what science
talks about without including some of the social and cultural elements
as well. Whether you like Feyerabend (who is rather radical), or the
paradigm picture (who only liked to talk about radicals), science cannot
avoid dealing with this kind of question.
|>
|> Continual testing and challenging of itself is a characteristic of science.
|> Even as I type people are seriously engaged in re-examining things so
|> "obvious" that no one would ever think to question them. For example:
|> Effects *always* follow causes...don't they? Not if you ask certain
|> theorists about the possibility of closed time-like paths. Are there
|> actually such paths? Not as far as we know. But some scientists *are*
|> thinking about them and what their effects would be. Things always try to
|> fall *down*....right? As far as we know - but then some scientists are
|> engaged in actually testing anti-matter to find out for sure if it falls
|> down - or up. The bets are on down - but a number of scientists would be
|> thrilled to be wrong.
I believe the issue that started all of this had to do with a rather
common modern definition of religion. The definition happened to
include science, as well as almost any other complex human cultural
institution. The original poster wanted to know how science what would
distinguish science from religion. Obviously, it isn't social structure.
The issue of re-examination of doctrine won't do it either. Most of
the activities you've ascribed to science apply to religion too. The
real differences, or the thing that makes science science is something
very different.
Science is built around a set of social rules designed to filter out
stuff that wouldn't reflect the objective world. In the process of
doing so, it creates mathematical positivism, operationalism, and a
bunch of other ism's from which it must be concluded that the most you
can ultimately talk about are the results of experiments, and the
theoretical constructs within which those results are interpreted
(Bridgeman's operationalism...). In that sense, you never really get
to talk about reality... just experiments and things that have been
ultimately defined in the context of those experiments. In the extreme
case, some folks have said that is all the reality there is (thus
denying their own conciousness since my conciousness isn't observable
by others -- just secondary evidence of it, such as eye movement and dialogue).
Some scientists suggest there might not really be any order below the
level of experiment and that its all myth anyway, but are happy to keep
doing science. So what? The technology that has been built on it
can support phone systems and Nintendo. I tend to think that's
one thing that distinguishes science from religion :-). On the
other hand, I don't think the question is as simple as you'd like it
to be.
Brad Owen
: In article <2iqrkj$1...@panix.com> g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
: >bo...@orion.it.luc.edu (Brad Owen):
: >| Here is a reference and a quote. Nelson Goodman, in an exchange with
: >| Israel Scheffler on Goodman's _Ways of Worldmaking_ says:
: >|
: >| "we do not make stars as we make bricks; not all making is a matter of
: >| moulding mud. The worldmaking mainly in question here is making not with
: >| hands but with minds, or rather with languages or other symbol systems.
: >| Yet when I say that worlds are made, I mean it literally; and what I mean
: >| should be clear from what I have already said." ("On Starmaking"
: >| _Synthese 45, 213)
: >|
: >| Scheffler, of course, finds this absurd.
: >
: >I guess there's one of everything. I've seen Goodman
: >quoted before as a kind of bad boy of postmodernism.
: That's kinda bizarre, since Ways of Worldmaking is pre-postmodern
: (or at least pre-people talking about it). Anyway, I think it would
: be a good idea to read the book before concluding that Goodman means
: what you think he does.
: N.B. Is it Goodman who's the author of Fact, Fiction and Forecast:
: you know, projectable predicates, grue, and all that?
: -- jd
I don't know about pre-postmodern. Personally I find talk of anybody
being post-modern about as useful as someone being an existentialist--I
recall an anthology in which Shakespeare and Jesus were considered
existentialists.
Yes Goodman is the author of _Fact, Fiction and Forecast_ and the 'grue'
stuff. He has done some good work, (especially the early funny stuff--ha
ha). However, I think he has gone a little bonkers with his talk of
making worlds. Just read the first chapter of _Ways of Worldmaking_.
....Brad
Christopher Ogden
>>According to Geertz, a
>>religion is
>>a cultural "blueprint or template" that is:
>>
>>"(1) a system of symbols which acts to
>>(2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and
>>motivations in
>>men [sic] by
>>(3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and
>>(4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
>>(5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic."
>Your definition doesn't include the ethical and spiritual authority which
>most (conventional) religions claim, and science doesn't. Your definition
>could be used to include sport or music. A bunch of scientists organise
>themselves in much the same way as any other group because of human nature,
>not because science is a religion.
First of all, it {is} not *my* definition; it {be}-longs to Clifford Geertz.
Second, ethical and spiritual authority {is} indeed maintained by the
Scientific Community. What {is} scientific ethics? Science, like religion,
sets up metaphysical standards against which the behavior of its members {is}
measured. For Religion, the standard might {be} good vs. evil. For Science,
the standard might {be} good procedure vs. bad procedure, objective vs.
nonobjective, repeatable vs. nonrepeatable, empirical vs. non-empirical. This
authority exercised by the Scientific Community {is} every bit as much an
ethical, "spiritual" authority as is the authority of a religious community.
Both communities define ethics and rules of behavior.
Second, It {is} not as easy to define sports and music as {being} a religion
as it {is} with science. Sports does indeed cause pervasive moods and
motivations in people; however, it does not take on an aura of factuality or a
unique reality. Most people who watch sports think it {is} just a game, not
the Ultimate Nature of the Universe. Music {is} the same. Music does not
claim to present itself as fact or as a unique reality. Music {is} widely
re-cognized as a human construction, without the same metaphysical baggage as
science.
Therefore, I do think that Geertz' definition of religion {is} useful, and I
think that the {fact} that science fits into this definition suggests that we
should not take such a dogmatic, metaphysical stance against either religion
or science.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Gordon Fitch
| > | >I want a reference to someone saying that
| > | > "reality" is socially constructed, where the word _reality_
| > | > does not mean the _idea_of_reality_ but its supposed
| > | > contents, e.g. the sun and the moon.
Andrew...@Brown.edu (Andy Perry):
| > | The standard (post-)structuralist example, used by Catherine Belsey and
| > | Jonathan Culler among others, is color. All of the available sociological
| > | data indicates that color delineation is completely different in different
| > | cultures. ...
gcf:
| > But this is an observation that people categorize phenomena
| > differently, which even hard-reality folks admit,
Andrew Perry:
| Not necessarily. You may say that that's all it in fact proves, but the
| CLAIM is that, for some cultures, the phenomenon which we call blue does
| not exist. Part of it is subsumed in a grey-blue color and part in a
| blue-green color. And this is supposed to show that the delineation of
| objects as separate things is socially constructed. Just as it is not
| objectively true that certain colors exist, it is not objectively true that
| the collection of forces interacting before me is three objects: two chairs
| and a table.
In my universe, phenomena exist whether they're categorized
or not. They're like messages sent out by things-in-them-
selves Out There. The receivers may handle them
differently; for instance, if light bounces off one rock and
strikes another, the latter may be slightly heated, that is,
its dominant thermal vibrations will change to a higher
frequency and it will radiate a different set of frequencies
(those are some of _its_ messages) but it won't do any more
with the phenomena. Human beings, on the other hand,
apprehending the same phenomena, have a far more complex
reaction.
Now, in some sense we don't understand, the existence of
phenomena may depend on receivers and categorizers --
certain experiments in Quantum Mechanics seem to indicate
this -- but to say that the phenomena depend for their
existence on social procedures looks like unwarranted human
chauvinism to me. (I'm assuming by "social" we're talking
about human-to-human interactions.) I think there can be
all kinds of receivers and categorizers, many of which we
may be as yet completely unaware of. So I think that
phenomena are mostly not determined by social procedures.
Or let's say "significantly" rather than "mostly" since
we are in a space where we can't count instances.
Certainly, the objectification of collections of phenomena
take place in an objectifying being, and in the case of
humans, since we are highly social, the way in which we
objectify things is strongly affected by our social context.
But it seems that there is also a biological tendency toward
objectification, judging by the behavior of dogs, cats,
mice, flies, and other creatures I have observed who share
some of our biology and little or nothing of our culture.
It is not objectively true that there is a chair in front of
you, but there is situation in which you can sit on some-
thing or fall over something and which you apprehend through
certain familiar phenomena, all of which does not appear to
me to be socially determined. You call this a "chair", as
it happens.
Jeff Dalton
>| Here is a reference and a quote. Nelson Goodman, in an exchange with
>| Israel Scheffler on Goodman's _Ways of Worldmaking_ says:
>|
>| "we do not make stars as we make bricks; not all making is a matter of
>| moulding mud. The worldmaking mainly in question here is making not with
>| hands but with minds, or rather with languages or other symbol systems.
>| Yet when I say that worlds are made, I mean it literally; and what I mean
>| should be clear from what I have already said." ("On Starmaking"
>| _Synthese 45, 213)
>|
>| Scheffler, of course, finds this absurd.
>
>I guess there's one of everything. I've seen Goodman
>quoted before as a kind of bad boy of postmodernism.
That's kinda bizarre, since Ways of Worldmaking is pre-postmodern
Jeff Dalton
>g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) wrote:
>| >I want a reference to someone saying that
>| > "reality" is socially constructed, where the word _reality_
>| > does not mean the _idea_of_reality_ but its supposed
>| > contents, e.g. the sun and the moon.
>
>Andrew...@Brown.edu (Andy Perry):
>| The standard (post-)structuralist example, used by Catherine Belsey and
>| Jonathan Culler among others, is color. All of the available sociological
>| data indicates that color delineation is completely different in different
>| cultures. ...
Whatever gave them that idea? See e.g. Berlin & Kay _Basic Colour
Terms_ for an opposing view.
-- jd
Boucher David
#Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
#
# In
#the case of botany, it was once considered appropriate to
#study the symbolic associations of plants; now, it isn't;
#maybe at some point in the future it again will be. In
#other words, not only does botany not get to to the
#ultimate reality of the plant, its _Ding_an_sich-ness, but
#it also excludes many phenomena from consideration, as part
#of the social procedure of its formation.
In my opinion it makes no sense to consider that that which we
can observe is not at least part of "the ultimate reality of
the plant".
I don't believe it would be correct to say that botany excludes
phenomena from consideration -- rather it defines what is and
is not considered to be a part of botany. People are still free
to consider or discuss the symbolic associations of plants as
much as they like.
#The inescapable
#fact of that procedure often becomes important politically,
#as when we go about deciding who is sane or insane, or
#female or male, and yet it is often covered up in order to
#enhance the authority of the procedure, making it seem to
#emanate from Nature itself.
Perhaps. But if there is a "Nature" that exists independent of
our concepts, that Nature must to some extent constrain what we
may make of it -- most notably, it constrains the effectiveness of
a given procedure as a means of achieving the goals that that
procedure was intended to achieve. To the extent that most people
desire that their actions should produce their intended outcome,
some procedures may be judged to be better than others by a metric
that does emanate from Nature. The goals themselves may not be
inherent in Nature (though they often are, as in the goals of
obtaining food, shelter, etc.), but the effectiveness of various
means of achieving those goals *is* inherent in Nature.
And as effective and useful procedures tend to be more highly
regarded than procedures which are not very effective or useful
(for whatever goals society happens to value), it is not
uncommon for practitioners of less useful procedures to complain
that they have been unfairly excluded from discourse by political
bias, and to covet the labels that have adhered to procedures that
are generally considered to be more useful.
- db
--
****** "It is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data. ******
****** Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories ******
****** instead of theories to suit facts." - Sherlock Holmes ******
*************************************************************************
Jeff Dalton
>By way of example, Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron, the
>editors of "The New French Feminisms: An Anthology," [...]
Interestingly enough, isn't this a fairly old book by now? I'm
pretty sure it came out a bit over 10 years ago.
bo...@ief.itg.ti.com
|In article <HAAVARDF.9...@boson.uio.no> haav...@fys.uio.no (Hvard Fosseng) writes:
|>...Whether quantum theory deals with "reality" is a
|>matter of interpretation (and disagreement); it *does* deal with
|>predicting the results of observations from the results of other
|>observations.
That quantum mechanics deals with reality is indisputable: it is not
a work of fiction. Whether or not the theory satisfactorily explains
the reality is in debate.
|And what {is} observation? Observations {are} narratives. An observation
|happens when a machine tells a scientist its metaphysical view of reality.
Machines do not have metaphysical views. The have responses to
stimuli. This is not metaphysical, its strictly physical.
What makes you think that machines ( I am assuming you are refering
to measuring instruments ) have views at all, much less metaphysical
ones?
|It's like when prophets tell their disciples how the universe Really Is. Only
No its not. Prophets tell of things not seen (presumably real things
that are merely unseen -- like God). A person who simply reported things
that are seen is not a prophet. Prophets also carry the concept of
uniqness -- only the 'prophet' can describe things not seen. Machines
have no personalities -- presumably any variant of the machine can get
the same results. Prophets being compared to machines is a very bad
analogy.
|in this case, the prophet {is} a computer connected to a pressure transducer,
|a thermocouple, or a flow meter. What the scientist gets {is} nothing but a
|bunch of signs: mathematical signs, graphical signs, numerical signs. Thus,
|observations {are} translated into narrative, just as prophetic experiences
|are translated into scripture. The scientist uses these signs to beget other
|signs, and from these signs, a metaphysical view of reality emerges.
I think you have a deep mis-understanding of the scientific method.
No single data point or even single experiment is translated by
scientists into scripture (presumably you mean the officially
blessed version of how the world works). Nothing could be farther
from the truth. Individual scientists may not but the community as
a whole does its best to disprove data points before accepting them
as real (i.e. it requires confirmation from research groups).
Once accepted, the data are not allowed to throw out the current
blessed model of reality unless an explanatory framework also
is available that:
1. explains all extant facts
2. explains the new facts
3. correctly predicts the outcome of more experiments whose
outcomes aren't predicted by prevailing theories.
Nobody just translates the facts directly into scripture. Your
analogy is poor.
|
|>If your argument is not a logical one, just what is it? (By my
|>worldview) A discussion must -- to have any hope of reaching a
|>conclusion -- have some common ground between the participants. Part
|>of the conventional common ground of the net is: An argument has to
|>hang together logically, and a lot of effort go into trying to show
|>that some conclusion follows from some premises other
|>participants/readers are assumed to share. If this isn't the basis for
|>your conclusions: what is?
Huh? I get the distinct feeling that theists disregard logic, so I
turn the question around to you. Why don't you belief logic applies
to God?
|
|If you are looking for me to construct absolutist metaphysical signs, you're
|looking in vain. Logic {is} nothing more than the manipulation of
|metaphysical ideas and signs according to the rules of a particular game
|invented by Descartes and other metaphysicists. Sure, I'll use logic in
|deconstructing your metaphysical biases, but you must realize what logic {is},
|and that logic cannot be used to refute dogs, cats, any symbols, narratives,
|or any discourse unless that discourse was constructed by someone using the
|rules of the logic game. Furthermore, a person will only agree with your
|logical debunking if s/he accepts the logical metaphysics of the Enlightenment.
I am ignorant of "the logical metaphysics of the Enlightment".
|
|>> My point {was} that a person's metaphysical belief in what
|>> "observation" is depends on her/his culture and aesthetic tastes.--CO
|>Science rests on a normative definition of what constitutes an
|>observation (even if this isn't spelled out explicitly), and science
|>concerns itself with observations _in_this_sense_of_the_word_. What --
|>if anything -- people in general refer to by the term is strictly
|>speaking irrelevant.
In WHICH since of the word?
|
|Yet it {is} people who use the sign "observation". The idea of observation
|{exists} only in the mind of those who observe. You cannot observe
|observation, and science does not define it. It {is} a vague, metaphysical
|idea that science takes for granted.
It is not a vague idea. Observation is the process of watching,
generally a state change is looked for and found, or not found.
Both results provide data.
Why do you think observation is a vague idea?
|
|>What underlies your belief that "Scientists" in general believe this?
|>Most scientists I have met don't (when they bother to address issues
|>like these). They are quite aware that it's possible that our models
|>simply make predictions that _in_this_particular_corner_of_space-time_
|>fit fairly well with observations.
|
|Yet still the metaphysical beast is biting your leg. Even a "limited"
|metaphysical idea of repeatability {is} still a metaphysical idea. Here, you
|use the vague, mystical signifiers "space", "time", "fairly well", and
|"observations" to construct a universal truth-o-meter that, though it might
|not apply to all parts of the universe, it at least represents Absolute Truth
|in a partucular, metaphysically-defined "corner" of the universe.
So? Repeatability is essential to proving that you understand the world.
If it refused to repeat itself, given the same conditions, how could
you possibly make any reasonable claims to know anything. If the world
didn't repeat itself, I assert that there would be no such thing as
knowledge at all. What is knowledge, but the ability to predict? If
you can't predict, why should I believe that you KNOW?
|
|>I am convinced that *very* few readers follow you here. Could you
|>*please* explain?
|
|Like any word game, to play the Game of Logic, you have to agree to the rules.
| The rules of the Logic Game {are}, you must create metaphysical signifiers,
|clothe them in an aura of factuality, and manipulate them to beget other,
|somewhat altered signifiers. But when someone is unwilling to paste
|factuality on her/his metaphysical signifiers, manipulating those signifiers
|doesn't subsequently produce any higher version of Reality. It's the old
|Garbage-in, Garbage-out theory.
Huh? It would seem that you are saying that scientists don't paste
factuality on their signifiers. I would argue that it is theists who
don't paste said reality on THEIR signifiers. After all, the scientific
method is specifically designed to help us do this pasting....
Don't you read?
Lowell
--
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Email address: bo...@ief.itg.ti.com
My employer doesn't speak for me, I don't speak for it.
Diversity is the SPICE of life.
Gordon Fitch
| You have an interesting universe. As I indicated before, it seems to me
| that things-in-themselves can't really coexist with Quantum Mechanics. And
| we all know whose side I'm on in that particular battle....In my universe
| (assuming for the moment I'm a Nietzschean, which I am on the 2nd Tuesday
| and First Wednesday of every month), phenomena _also_ exist whether they
| are categorized or not. It's just that that's _all_ that exists. The
| "things" that seem to be collections of phenomena are illusory. (But
| illusion is not a pejorative term for me, a la Gombrich.)
Sure, things-in-themselves can coexist with QM! QM is an
_appearance_, another categorization of phenomena.... And
most of us know, or think they know, that one thing-in-itself
exists, that is, themselves, so why not suppose that a whole
lot of things-in-themselves do the same? One can't prove it,
except through a kind of knowledge which isn't available to
most of us, but consider matter: the only matter we know from
the _inside_ is ourselves. So all the evidence is on one
side.
Of course, I'm using _exists_ with an abyss on one side and
a height on the other. The abyss is the abyss of Buddhism,
and the height is the possibility that _exist_ can mean only
what its etymology indicates, that is, "stands forth",
phenomenizes itself. In that sense only phenomena exist,
because they're an inherent aspect of things-in-themselves.
I call this a "height" because it assumes so much; too much,
maybe, but it commends itself to my animistic prejudices.
gcf:
| > Certainly, the objectification of collections of phenomena
| > take place in an objectifying being, and in the case of
| > humans, since we are highly social, the way in which we
| > objectify things is strongly affected by our social context.
| > But it seems that there is also a biological tendency toward
| > objectification, judging by the behavior of dogs, cats,
| > mice, flies, and other creatures I have observed who share
| > some of our biology and little or nothing of our culture.
| > It is not objectively true that there is a chair in front of
| > you, but there is situation in which you can sit on some-
| > thing or fall over something and which you apprehend through
| > certain familiar phenomena, all of which does not appear to
| > me to be socially determined. You call this a "chair", as
| > it happens.
Andrew Perry:
| If there are things-in-themselves, there are not "collections of phenomena"
| which get "objectified." There are sets of phenomena springing from
| objects which get perceived, but that's not the same thing. Unless by
| "things" you mean "phenomena." Note that the biological tendency you cite
| is epistemologically irrelevant in this context. Hume thought there was a
| biological tendency to interpret events as being causally determined. It
| didn't prevent him from denying the objective existence of causality.
By "thing-in-itself" I don't necessarily mean things like a
chair or a rock. Things-in-themselves seem unlikely to
correspond to our objectification schemes unless they happen
to objectify themselves in the same way, and _these_ things
seem to be complex animals -- human beings, dogs, cats -- if
I step on the cat's tail it lets me know it considers its
tail to be part of whatever goes for "me" in a cat's mind,
which is a kind of object. A chair, on the other hand, does
not agree with our objectification of it -- or disagree. Or
does not appear to.
Gordon Fitch
| # In
| #the case of botany, it was once considered appropriate to
| #study the symbolic associations of plants; now, it isn't;
| #maybe at some point in the future it again will be. In
| #other words, not only does botany not get to to the
| #ultimate reality of the plant, its _Ding_an_sich-ness, but
| #it also excludes many phenomena from consideration, as part
| #of the social procedure of its formation.
bou...@server.uwindsor.ca (Boucher David):
| In my opinion it makes no sense to consider that that which we
| can observe is not at least part of "the ultimate reality of
| the plant".
Why not? (This is not a rhetorical question.)
bouche2:
| I don't believe it would be correct to say that botany excludes
| phenomena from consideration -- rather it defines what is and
| is not considered to be a part of botany. People are still free
| to consider or discuss the symbolic associations of plants as
| much as they like.
Not in a book, seminar, class, term paper on botany as it is
practiced in our institutions of higher learning and
research, except perhaps as insubstantial decor. When I say
"botany excludes" I meant from what it regards as its
domain, not from all scientific attention whatever. The
symbolic associations of plants can still be studied, but
as part of other sciences (e.g. anthropology).
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>Therefore, I do think that Geertz' definition of religion {is} useful, and I
>think that the {fact} that science fits into this definition suggests that we
>should not take such a dogmatic, metaphysical stance against either religion
>or science.
"Physics is not a religion. If it were, it would be a lot easier for us to
raise money." - Leon Lederman
Personally, I still think your definition of religion is so loose that it
includes cooking. There are authorities on cooking, and nothing gets
into the cooking doctrines -- published cook books -- unless cook book
publishers will accept it. The great chefs have most influence on the
cook book literature and what restaurants make, and recipes "work" in
just the crippled sense that you bestow on physical laws in science.
Show me why cooking does not fit your definition of a religion, and if
it does fit, why that does not invalidate your definition. Or Geertz's
definition, too, if you don't call his your own.
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>>matter of interpretation (and disagreement); it *does* deal with
>>predicting the results of observations from the results of other
>>observations.
>
>happens when a machine tells a scientist its metaphysical view of reality.
>a thermocouple, or a flow meter. What the scientist gets {is} nothing but a
>bunch of signs: mathematical signs, graphical signs, numerical signs. Thus,
>observations {are} translated into narrative, just as prophetic experiences
>are translated into scripture. The scientist uses these signs to beget other
>signs, and from these signs, a metaphysical view of reality emerges.
How do you know about the process by which "prophetic experiences are
translated into scripture?!?" You don't have any MORE evidence that
that ever happenned than you have for physical measurements (I would
also argue that the mutual conflicts among prophetic experiences
invalidate each other, given the scope of their claims). However, that
aside, you are now failing to discount prophetic experience the way
you have done for physical measurements.
{snip}
>Yet it {is} people who use the sign "observation". The idea of observation
>{exists} only in the mind of those who observe. You cannot observe
>observation, and science does not define it. It {is} a vague, metaphysical
>idea that science takes for granted.
However, you have never demonstrated that what we mean by the word
"observation" does not exist, independent of the idea. Flexibility
in word meanings does not invalidate words. A lot of recent
research in logic suggests that we may become able to abandon
two-valued, yes-no, exist/not-exist logic for fuzzy logic, in
which the resemblance of things is handled properly. It seems to
me that much of your debate has relied on undercutting other
debaters' reasonable statements with obfuscation.
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
writes...
>Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. (batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov) wrote:
>: Science is not a matter of mere aesthetics. It's...
>
KF>Since when are aesthetics "mere"?
>
When compared with the other things that science encompasses, which are
more universal than aesthetics. However, science does encompass
aesthetics in some sense, too; for example, there are elegant
experiments with great aesthetic appeal.
Christopher Ogden
> (Since you do not ever seem to be interested in clearly communicating, I
>was not surprised that you did not answer my question about enclosing
>words (conjugations of the word "be") in braces. I will simply assume that
>you are being obfuscatory as usual.)
Sorry, I must have missed the question. It I could, I would cross them out to
signify that by using the word, I don't necessarily agree with the metaphysics
always associated with forms of the word "be". It means a sort of tenative,
half-hearted "be", something that's not part of the english language.
> I don't know why I find these little verbal sparring matches with you
>amusing. I guess, as always, I admire your ability to muddy even the
>clearest of waters. :->
The water is already muddy.
...(lesson in C deleted)...
I'm very familiar with the C, but I don't take that language as a model for
reality. Computers use languages to construct symbolic realities, just as we
do, and furthermore, a computer sees the world as a discreet, deterministic
set of operations on a language. I wouldn't expect that a computer would
provide any insights into the Ultimate Nature of the universe.
> I said, expressed in pseudo-C, "a *symbol can refer to *anything." That
>is, "that which the word 'symbol' refers to" (namely, symbols, which though
>self-referential is not paradoxical) can refer to "that which 'anything'
>refers to."
Now you've added another symbol, the symbol, the "that" in the phrase "that
which 'anything' refers to." So "symbol" signifies "anything" which signifies
"that" which signifies "symbol" again. They're all symbols. How do you know
that there is an independent "that" "out there" in the universe. If you point
to "that" you're using hand signs. If you look at "that", you see a sign. If
you listen to "that", you hear another sign. If you touch "that", you feel a
sign. Since you can't ever look behind the sign, how do you know there is
something behind it?
>You interpreted this as, "a *symbol can refer to anything",
>that is, "That which the word 'symbol' refers to" can refer to the symbol
>'anything'. (You agreed (by omission) that you understood C, so this is
>all your fault, you know. :->) This, though true, is not at all what I
>meant; what standard English usage *insists* that I meant.
Standard english does not insist anything. It's you who insist upon
modeling the universe upon the english language.
> Note that you *did* use the 'dereferencing operator' when it was convenient
>for you to do so, on the word 'symbol'. You want to eat your cake and still
>have it for later. :->
Though I do use words like "symbol" and "sign", you shouldn't automatically
conclude that I agree with any particular metaphysics associated with those
words. It's just that I don't see any way to get around them.
> Why, I was referring to internal mental symbols. Thew subjects were trying
>to apply the mental symbol "3 of hearts" (has 3 red heart-shaped pips) to
>something that it was not appropriate to - a "modified 3 of hearts" (has 3
>black heart-shaped pips). And, because the mental dereferencing gave
>noticeably anomalous results, the subjects had to invent a new symbol to
>account for the anomaly.
I don't understand the point. It's society that says their "mental
dereferencing" was anomalous. I mean, the whole idea of associating numbers
and shapes with colors {is} society's doing. Who says that a little paint on
a piece of paper has to mean anything?
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>|And what {is} observation? Observations {are} narratives. An observation
>|happens when a machine tells a scientist its metaphysical view of reality.
> Machines do not have metaphysical views. The have responses to
> stimuli. This is not metaphysical, its strictly physical.
> What makes you think that machines ( I am assuming you are refering
> to measuring instruments ) have views at all, much less metaphysical
> ones?
Machines see, do they not? Doesn't something that sees have a view? "View"
means to "see". A measuring instrument "sees" temperature, pressure, flow
rate, etc., which are metaphysical ideas; thus, is not the machine's
interpretation of these mystical quantities a metaphysical view?
> No its not. Prophets tell of things not seen (presumably real things
> that are merely unseen -- like God).
Not traditionally. Usually, the prophet sees a vision of some kind, and
narrates the experience to the public.
>Prophets also carry the concept of
> uniqness -- only the 'prophet' can describe things not seen. Machines
> have no personalities -- presumably any variant of the machine can get
> the same results. Prophets being compared to machines is a very bad
> analogy.
Not just one prophet, though. Most religions accept the words of several
prophets (or visionaries). Though followers of a religion don't expect to
receive prophetic truth from a non-prophet, most scientists don't expect to
measure temperature with a pressure transducer, either.
> ...[the scientific] community as
> a whole does its best to disprove data points before accepting them
> as real (i.e. it requires confirmation from research groups).
> Once accepted, the data are not allowed to throw out the current
> blessed model of reality unless an explanatory framework also
> is available that:
> 1. explains all extant facts
And who defines "all"? Who defines "facts"? And what on earth does "all
facts" mean? And who says there is but one way to explain all "facts"?
> 3. correctly predicts the outcome of more experiments whose
> outcomes aren't predicted by prevailing theories.
Who defines "correctly"? Who defines "outcome"? Who defines "aren't
predicted"?
> I am ignorant of "the logical metaphysics of the Enlightment".
That's probably not a good condition to be in.
>|Yet it {is} people who use the sign "observation". The idea of observation
>|{exists} only in the mind of those who observe. You cannot observe
>|observation, and science does not define it. It {is} a vague, metaphysical
>|idea that science takes for granted.--CO
> It is not a vague idea. Observation is the process of watching,
> generally a state change is looked for and found, or not found.
> Both results provide data.
But what is a "state change"? What is "found"? What is "watching"? You are
substituting other symbols for the symbols you can't define any other way. To
observe is to watch. To watch is to observe. An observation occurs when you
observe a state change. When you observe a state change, you have observed
something. These statements are empty and impotent.
> So? Repeatability is essential to proving that you understand the world.
> If it refused to repeat itself, given the same conditions, how could
> you possibly make any reasonable claims to know anything.
Easy: "I hereby proclaim to all women and men throughout the world that
nothing represents True Reality unless it is not repeatable! All
repeatability is hereby proclaimed to be statistical error! (Come talk to me
about my new and improved version of statistics.)" That's how. It's easy.
And if I get enough followers who agree with this metaphysical definition of
reality, that community will consider it a reasonable claim.
> Huh? It would seem that you are saying that scientists don't paste
> factuality on their signifiers. I would argue that it is theists who
> don't paste said reality on THEIR signifiers. After all, the scientific
> method is specifically designed to help us do this pasting....
I think that Eurocentric arrogance is talking here--the metaphysical attitude,
"Western Europeans are right and everybody else is wrong."
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Christopher Ogden
>Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
It seems that science has tried to an-aesthetize aesthetics.
-----------------------------
Christopher Ogden
ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
gerry harbison
>Apparently you {are} unaware of the Doctrines of Science. The scientist
>be-lieves that Law of Universe X applies in all places, times, and conditions.
I'm afraid this ain't so. Most scientists avoid belief like the
plague. Most laws of the universe are actually very local in domain,
and we apply them only in their domains. The Second Law of
thermodynamics is very useful when applied to systems on earth, but it
conflicts with many cosmological models. Quantum mechanics and General
relativity conflict on very short time scales. It would be stupid to
believe in either; belief is unnecessary. We apply each one to it's
relevant domain, and are
trying to resolve the region of contradiction (which is orders of
magnitude away from any observable phenomenon, and therefore not an
immediate problem). On a less cosmic scale, we *routinely* use laws
with only limited ranges of application.
> When Jane Chemist uses her instruments to construct a narrative in which she
>measures the heat of mixing of water and ethanol, she assumes that the
>a-morphous, metaphysical symbol--that which her culture has told her to label
>a "number"--will be applicable in all places, all times, and with any
>particular molecules of water and ethanol.
This is an empirical principle called uniformitarianism. It has
empirical evidence behind it. One example: Wohler did an experiment
in the 1820's to see if organically produced urea was the same as urea
produced by synthesis from inorganic sources. The urea proved to be
identical in physcial properties. Uniformitarianism could be
discarded if it proved untrue. It has been in the past, where
necessary. All
water is not the same; some is H2O, some is HDO, and a tiny amount is
D20 (heavy water).
>The Scientific Method operates
>under this metaphysical assumption, concluding that as when the narratives of
>Joe, Martha, Fred, and Julie Chemist in Boston, Taiwan, London, and Mars all
>reach the same mystic conclusions, that Jane Chemist's experiment is
>"repeatable", and the Scientific Community accepts this narrative as absolute
>truth.
Sure, the assumption of objective external reality is a leap of faith.
The alternative is a solipsistic belief in purely local reality, to which
a lot of culture seems to be descending. There is no defense against
solipsism, except perhaps Pascal's wager. If all reality is local and
subjective, which in effect is what you're pushing, then the observed
uniformity of scientific results is emaningless, as is anything else
based on the commonality of mankind. It's possible, or at least not
refutable, but if one really believed this, life would be meaningless
and ugly. So, yes, a belief in science requires an act of faith.
However, a belief in science is *not* science, nor is it even a
scientific assumption. Science itself is not akin to religion; a
belief in the efficacy of science may have some similarity with a
religious belief. One must recognize the difference.
>>: Then, the scientist has to define a dividing line
>>: between the repeatable and the non-repeatable. Does a difference in
>>: results of 1.01 miliseconds mean "unrepeatable", while 0.99 miliseconds
>>: is "repeatable"?
>>: Where is the dividing line? It comes down to an aesthetic judgement.--CO
This is a misunderstanding of scientific methods. Analysis of
measurement error is a much a part of science as measurement error
itself. We can decide on objective grounds whether 1.01 is
equivalent to 1.00.
>Counteranalysis: In making this statement, you {are} assuming that I believe
>that there are actual, real, categories "out there" in the universe between
>which small metaphysical changes cannot "move". In order to have made such a
>"fallacy", I would have to jump logically from the first premise to the
>second premise. However, I don't be-lieve the first premise (In fact, I don't
>even be-lieve the second); however obviously you {do}, be-cause this {is} the
>metaphysical be-lief upon which you base your logical construction. Such
>categories {are} human constructions that vary according to culture and taste.
What's all this hyphenation? is that postmodern?
The only possible counter to this is that you don't know that you're
not
the single example of a massively hallucinating being who has imagined the
entire cosmos. That's solipsism. And it was shown to be pointless
in the 18th century, by the 'metaphysicists of the enlightenment'
If this is all that your philosophy consists of, I suggest that you
try some more amusing delusion. My favorite ones involve members of
the opposite sex, but chacun a son gout!
>The key word here {is} "objective criteria". "Objective" {is} a very
>unobjective idea. Why? Because you can't observe observation. Thus, the way
>we define "objective" is left to culture and taste. According to *your*
>definition of objective, a man with $100 is not rich. By the standards of
>Bangladesh, however, this might not {be} the case. If a woman or a man from
>another culture that does not share your metaphysical ideas about
>"objectivity" were to make some different conclusion than your own, such as
>stating that the man with a billion dollars is poor, you cannot "objectively"
>disprove this conclusion, because you cannot observe the observations that
>allowed this person to make this alternately "objective" conclusion.
The fact that 'objectivity' is an assumption does not require that it
be non-unique. 'Identity' is likewise a logical construct, and
presumably is therefore not objective by your criteria. Yet identity
is unique.
>Counteranalysis: Here once again, you {are} putting metaphysical words into
>my mouth. Never did I say that the argument was "wrong". "Wrongness" {is}
>just as much a metaphysical idea as "rightness", and if I reject one side of
>the coin, believe me, I will reject the other. It is also not {true} that I
>find the consequences unacceptable. I happen to find empiricism aesthetically
>pleasing, and thus I have added this symbol provisionally to my working-bag of
>simulacra. Though I don't accept the idea as Absolute Truth, I don't accept
>it as Absolute Falsehood either.
So you're not a solipsist! So why waste all this time typing?
>One thing you should know {is} that logic is useful only in debunking fellow
>modernists and others who {are} indoctrinated by the metaphysics of the
>Enlightenment.
It's good for doing science, too!
>-----------------------------
>Christopher Ogden
>ogd...@caedm.et.byu.edu
Gerry Harbison/UNL
Gordon Fitch
| >: Science is not a matter of mere aesthetics. It's...
ken...@Hawaii.Edu (Kennan Ferguson):
| >Since when are aesthetics "mere"?
Dave Batchelor:
| When compared with the other things that science encompasses, which are
| more universal than aesthetics. However, science does encompass
| aesthetics in some sense, too; for example, there are elegant
| experiments with great aesthetic appeal.
But what to we mean by aesthetics?
I would define aesthetics as the reaction of one's whole
being toward another being, and thus something more deep
and more primordial that the word is usually given to mean.
(Its trivialization is a measure of our enslavement.)
As a result Christopher Ogden's talk of scientists'
aesthetics preceding and guiding their enterprises make
sense to me. First they intuit the value of making certain
kinds of sentences about phenomena, then they work them
out. Since many of the discourses of science have had no
practical value until long after they were initiated, I
think this kind of motivation is essential.
Kelly Hall
> Machines see, do they not? Doesn't something that sees have a view? "View"
> means to "see". A measuring instrument "sees" temperature, pressure, flow
> rate, etc., which are metaphysical ideas; thus, is not the machine's
> interpretation of these mystical quantities a metaphysical view?
Umm, no. Consider the ubiquitous Bourdon tube guage. The presure in
the sensing line increases, the coil of pipe untwists, and the
mechanical twisting movement turns the little needle. At no time did
the machine 'see' anything in a metaphysical realm. The machine
simply acted in accordance with the laws of physics. No world view,
no higher symbology - just physics.
What kind of machines are you talking about that have some sort of
'metaphysical view'? We (people) can interpret the little needle
turning in any way we like (temperature might be going up, or water
level, or flow rate, what have you).
The sensor doesn't do much besides make it more convenient. It
doesn't 'see' the system, nor does it attach any meaning to any
parameters it might be involved in.
> Not just one prophet, though. Most religions accept the words of several
> prophets (or visionaries). Though followers of a religion don't expect to
> receive prophetic truth from a non-prophet, most scientists don't expect to
> measure temperature with a pressure transducer, either.
Ahh, but I *can* measure temperture with a pressure transducer. Ever
here of pv=nrt? I can even measure mass and volume with a yardstick.
> And who defines "all"? Who defines "facts"? And what on earth does "all
> facts" mean? And who says there is but one way to explain all "facts"?
> Who defines "correctly"? Who defines "outcome"? Who defines "aren't
> predicted"?
Who defines 'pointless' and 'redundent'? People, your readers. Who
else?
> But what is a "state change"? What is "found"? What is "watching"? You are
> substituting other symbols for the symbols you can't define any other way. To
> observe is to watch. To watch is to observe. An observation occurs when you
> observe a state change. When you observe a state change, you have observed
> something. These statements are empty and impotent.
Says you. They also happen to be useful in the real world. Why can't
you speak in concrete examples instead meta-abstractions?
> Easy: "I hereby proclaim to all women and men throughout the world that
> nothing represents True Reality unless it is not repeatable! All
> repeatability is hereby proclaimed to be statistical error! (Come talk to me
> about my new and improved version of statistics.)" That's how. It's easy.
> And if I get enough followers who agree with this metaphysical definition of
> reality, that community will consider it a reasonable claim.
So you will count the claim as 'accepted' if the people who believe it
consider it reasonable? Sounds like you've been reading "Tautology
Today" too long.
> I think that Eurocentric arrogance is talking here--the metaphysical attitude,
> "Western Europeans are right and everybody else is wrong."
Oh, this is a political correctness argument. That explains it all.
Since science is good at predicting behavior in the real world, and
other systems aren't, we must cast science aside, in the interest of
being fair. Other belief systems, no matter how useless and
ineffective, are just as valid as science. Failure to cast aside
science is a trademark of Western European ethnocentralism and thus is
a legacy of our male-dominated, minority oppressive culture.
Whew. Now that we've got *that* settled I can psychically levitate
myself home and work on my perpetual motion machine, free from the
symbological bondage of the laws of thermodynamics.
Kelly
--
Kelly Hall ::= ha...@bert.cs.byu.edu <P>
<A HREF="http://lal.cs.byu.edu/people/hall.html"> Info </A> <P>
GAT d? p--- c+++ !l u++ e++ m+ s+/+ !n h* f g+ w+ t@ r@ y+
Håvard Fosseng
> And what {is} observation? Observations {are} narratives. An
> observation happens when a machine tells a scientist its
> metaphysical view of reality.
If machines have "methaphysical views of reality", none of them have
so far communicated this to me, or to anyone who has in turn told me.
Furthermore: Are you implying that there is such a thing as "a
non-metaphysical view of reality"? This would -- as far as I can see
-- be a contradiction in terms. Also, what is your definition of a
"view of reality' -- metaphysical or otherwise? Without spelling out
the conventional definition, some kind of mental process is obviously
a prerequisite.
> It's like when prophets tell their disciples how the universe Really
> Is. Only in this case, the prophet {is} a computer connected to a
> pressure transducer, a thermocouple, or a flow meter.
A number of people do science without pretending that science tells
them how the "Universe Really Is", much less that their instruments
do. Insofar as these people do science, such belief is not an
integral part of science.
> What the scientist gets {is} nothing but a bunch of signs:
> mathematical signs, graphical signs, numerical signs. Thus,
> observations {are} translated into narrative, just as prophetic
> experiences are translated into scripture. The scientist uses these
> signs to beget other signs, and from these signs, a metaphysical
> view of reality emerges.
A few lines ago (in the first line by you quoted in this posting) you
claimed that observations *were* narratives, now you say that they
"get translated into" narrative. Which is it? If you don't wish to be
constrained by the "Enlightenment metaphysics" that you should stick
to one definition of a term in one context, I feel you should have
said so at the start. This convention is ingrained enough that people
*will* assume you follow it unless they have some definite reason not
to, which is likely to waste a lot of time. The above paragraph does
not to me seem to imply that observations are narratives which get
translated into other narratives.
Could you please explicate your postulated similarity between
scientific model-making and the writing down of prophecies?
By your last sentence, I assume you mean that scientists believe that
there is some observer-independent "underlying structure" connecting
our sensory impressions, *and* that the models of science can -- at
least in principle -- achieve some kind of one-to-one mapping to this
structure. (I take "a metaphysical view of reality" to mean: A
conception of how "reality REALLY is".) I have previously stated that
a number of scientists I know don't think so. Why do you maintain that
scientists in general do?
> If you are looking for me to construct absolutist metaphysical
> signs, you're looking in vain.
I'm asking you to name the game *you're* playing, since it appears to
be quite different from what most of play. Specifically, I want to
know some of its rules, preferably those most different from those of
the games conventionally played on the net.
> Logic {is} nothing more than the manipulation of metaphysical ideas
> and signs according to the rules of a particular game invented by
> Descartes and other metaphysicists.
What is your definition of "metaphysics"? Conventional definitions
imply that logic is *not* metaphysics, since it doesn't claim to state
anything about "the real world". The a-logical hypothesis that logic
is a useful tool for interacting with what we perceive as "the world"
is *not* part of logic.
Logic predates the enlightenment. Does the name Aristotele ring any
bells?
> Sure, I'll use logic in deconstructing your metaphysical biases, but
> you must realize what logic {is}, and that logic cannot be used to
> refute dogs, cats, any symbols, narratives, or any discourse unless
> that discourse was constructed by someone using the rules of the
> logic game. Furthermore, a person will only agree with your logical
> debunking if s/he accepts the logical metaphysics of the
> Enlightenment.
Why *must* I? Aren't we all just playing games here? What if those
games where that happens don't amuse me? :-)
Seriously, since you don't play our game, why should we listen to you?
The fact that you continue to argue seems to imply that you can either
make arguments that will be compelling by the standards of our games,
or convince us to play other games. What are -- in your game -- the
reasons why I shouldn't simply decide to start playing a game called:
"Ogden's arguments don't apply to *my* world, and there's no reason in
the world why any halfway sane person should listen to him."?
Is there -- by the rules of your game -- you could be "proven wrong"
(or the closest equivalent in your game)?
> Yet it {is} people who use the sign "observation". The idea of
> observation {exists} only in the mind of those who observe. You
> cannot observe observation, and science does not define it. It {is}
> a vague, metaphysical idea that science takes for granted.
What is your definition of "a metaphysical idea"? Observations aren't
necessarily claimed to say anything about "The Really Real".
Could you please clarify the statement "You cannot observe
observation"? It seems readily evident that I can observe that I have
done something that I categorize as "making an observation", and
observe that other people communicate that they have done so, or do
things that I categorize this way. Thus, I guess this isn't what you
mean.
> Yet still the metaphysical beast is biting your leg. Even a
> "limited" metaphysical idea of repeatability {is} still a
> metaphysical idea. Here, you use the vague, mystical signifiers
> "space", "time", "fairly well", and "observations" to construct a
> universal truth-o-meter that, though it might not apply to all parts
> of the universe, it at least represents Absolute Truth in a
> partucular, metaphysically-defined "corner" of the universe.
A "universal truth-o-meter" that "might not apply to all parts of the
universe"? Is it universal, or isn't it? I what way does the statement:
"The differences between what this model predicts we should observe
and what we have observed are what we have decided to regard as
"small"." invoke any knowledge of "The Really Real"?
> Like any word game, to play the Game of Logic, you have to agree to
> the rules. The rules of the Logic Game {are}, you must create
> metaphysical signifiers, clothe them in an aura of factuality, and
> manipulate them to beget other, somewhat altered signifiers. But
> when someone is unwilling to paste factuality on her/his
> metaphysical signifiers, manipulating those signifiers doesn't
> subsequently produce any higher version of Reality. It's the old
> Garbage-in, Garbage-out theory.
By conventional definitions of "logic" and "metaphysics", logic
neither "creates metaphysical signifiers" nor "clothes them in an aura
of factuality". I *really* need your definition of metaphysics.
Håvard Fosseng
Please don't mix your comments to my statements with those to
Christopher Ogden's.
> |In article <HAAVARDF.9...@boson.uio.no> haav...@fys.uio.no (Hvard Fosseng) writes:
> |>...Whether quantum theory deals with "reality" is a
> |>matter of interpretation (and disagreement); it *does* deal with
> |>predicting the results of observations from the results of other
> |>observations.
>
>
> That quantum mechanics deals with reality is indisputable: it is not
> a work of fiction. Whether or not the theory satisfactorily explains
> the reality is in debate.
My apologies for sloppy wording. QM corresponds to the results of
experiments. What this says about its relation to "the really real"
isn't knowable. (Not that it matter for practical purposes.)
> |>If your argument is not a logical one, just what is it? (By my
> |>worldview) A discussion must -- to have any hope of reaching a
> |>conclusion -- have some common ground between the participants. Part
> |>of the conventional common ground of the net is: An argument has to
> |>hang together logically, and a lot of effort go into trying to show
> |>that some conclusion follows from some premises other
> |>participants/readers are assumed to share. If this isn't the basis for
> |>your conclusions: what is?
>
> Huh? I get the distinct feeling that theists disregard logic, so I
> turn the question around to you. Why don't you belief logic applies
> to God?
Huh? :-) What makes you think I don't?
> |>Science rests on a normative definition of what constitutes an
> |>observation (even if this isn't spelled out explicitly), and science
> |>concerns itself with observations _in_this_sense_of_the_word_. What --
> |>if anything -- people in general refer to by the term is strictly
> |>speaking irrelevant.
>
> In WHICH since of the word?
There are a lot of things some people describe as "observations" that
science doesn't normally make its business. "Observations" of contact
with <deity>/extraterrestrials/beings_from_other_dimensions spring to
mind. Alternatively, you could say that science concerns itself with
some subset of the observations made in the world.
benjamin franz
: |>
: |> I disagree as to your first sentence. There is a difference between
: |> accepting the results of science as being not in conflict with religious
: |> tenets and making science part of the religious tenets. It is the
: |> difference between believing that you can own a car and still be religious
: |> and believing you *must* own a car to be religious. I don't know of any
: |> religion that has made belief in science a tenet of the faith.
: |>
: I have been trying to point out in this thread that there are lots
: of mainstream religions in this country whose doctrine refuses to
: form tenants that oppose scientific results. To that extent, they
: embrace science, and would talk about blackbody radiation the same
: way anybody else would. There is a large and active literature about
: what religion *is* about given that it isn't about science.
Interesting. I did not know that. Is it in an explicitly pro-active sense of
actively embracing science and accepting its conclusions, or the negative
mode of the God of the Gaps? This is an important distinction.
: |> By trying to claim the predictive power of science for religions that have
: |> decided that science is not in conflict with their faith, you commit the
: |> error of claiming someone else's work as theirs. Science does not make its
: |> predictions *because of* those religions - it is just not in conflict with
: |> them. That is like claiming because you don't think owning a car is a sin,
: |> you are responsible for the invention of the car. More than passive
: |> acceptance is required to claim it as theirs.
: I didn't claim the work as being that of the church's, anymore than
: I'd claim it of historians. Yet, historians and church members would
: both be able to claim use of the predictive power of science, embracing
: the attitudes of science towards those problems, if they were to participate
: in discussions of topics such as blackbody radiation, or chemical reactions,
: or any other question upon which science bears. In this sense, I have
: not tried to claim the predictive power of science for religions, and
: I object to that interpretation being ascribed to my statements.
Hmmm. I am a bit confused. My initial statement was that religions did not
posses the physical predictive power of science and this was one way to
distinguish a science from a religion. Your response, as I understood it,
was that any religion that had accepted science could claim that predictive
power (forgive me for not quoting you exactly - I have forgotten the exact
wording you used). This was a statement about the *religion* not its
members. If you wished to say that members of a religion can use science
and make good predictions using it - of course. But that is different from
what I understood you to say - which is that the *religion* had the
predictive power because of acceptance of science.
: |>
: |> I am for sure not aware of any religion that consistently applies the
: |> scientific method to examining its own core dogmas (that could, however,
: |> just be my parochialism). Note - I am not saying indivduals do not, but
: |> that the religions as a whole do not. The Catholic Church, for example, is
: |> unlikely to look at all favorably on application of modern scientific
: |> standards of evidence to the question of whether Jesus even existed at all.
: Its interesting that you've picked this one. Meier, who wrote "A Marginal
: Jew," which as been one of the recent books on the historical Jesus problem,
: takes a distinctly Roman Catholic position on the question. Crossan, E. P.
: Sanders, etc, are other people who have looked at the question in just the
: way you're arguing for.
Thank you for the references, but I am not sure that this is actually in
line with what I said. Did the RCC approve of these investigations, or were
these investigators *who happened to be Roman Catholic*?
: |> The Mormon's don't like close examination of the few fragments of "Reformed
: |> Egyptian" they retain that Joseph Smith is supposed to have translated.
: |> Creationists really don't like critical examination of the accuracy
: |> of Genesis as a historical record.
: |>
: This too depends on which "Mormon's." The church in Utah is rather
: conservative. Even so, there are those at BYU who don't act as
: appologists for their faith -- at least not in the conservative guise
: that the Utah church prefers.
This seems a good current events example of how the church opposes research
into its founding actually. There has been quite the stir here in Salt
Lake over the recent ex-communication of several people over historical
research the church objected to and the denial of tenure to other persons at
BYU, apparently over doctrinal problems the church had with those
instructors teaching. The evident application of "thus far and no farther"
to research into issues relating to LDS dogma has threatened BYU's
accreditation many times over the years.
What I am trying to say (in too many words ;-) is that while *individuals*
are sometimes willing to question the fundamental dogmas - the *church*,
as an organization, is opposed to any such questioning. Speeches by top level
LDS church leaders in the last several years regarding the "danger" of
intellectuals are still fresh in many peoples memories here.
: There's another group in Missouri that
: is much more liberal in the way they talk about their faith. They
: figure that it doesn't really matter how the whole thing started;
: what has become important to them is the faith-life they've built up
: since then.
I do not know that much about the RLDS church, so my ability to comment is
limited except on those areas where I believe the two churches overlap.
Neither the LDS or RLDS churches are apt to take kindly to requiring
scientific levels of evidence on things like the existence of god.
: |> I am not very familiar with non-Christian religions so you may be able to
: |> find non-Christian religions that *do* examine core dogmas with a strongly
: |> critical eye. But I am not aware of any, and I think I can reasonably argue
: |> that religions shy away from examining core dogmas because of the not
: |> insignificant chance the core of their religion is flawed (inferred
: |> from the number of religions with incompatible core beliefs - they
: |> can't *ALL* be correct).
: Religions don't deal with scientific objectivity. They can say things
: that don't have to be consistent with other religions, nor even do
: they have to be entirely self-consistent. Some Christian sects to
: question their core beliefs. For example, many Christian theologians
: are very happy to look at biblical stories as myths, and very seriously
: discuss what element of spirituality such myths are trying to communicate,
: and how through archetypes and symbols that communication is to be achieved.
: Some people have been so impressed about myths and symbols as a way of
: looking at bodies of information, that they've turned around and applied
: it to science saying science is "merely" a collection of myths and symbols
: (Feyerabend is in this group).
I am somewhat leery of taking this statement at face value. Are the
theologians placing the very existance of a God (the fundamental dogma of
Judaism, Christianity and Islam) on the table here for critical examination
(and possible rejection)? Or are they only placing the Bible as literal
history on the table? One is virtually a concession of the agnostic/atheist
positions to my mind, while the other is a "god of the gaps" or
perhaps a "god without effect" approach to Christian theology (neither
of which I understood be an accepted position by Christian
theologists).
: |>
: |> Science thrives on re-examining core beliefs - that is where its
: |> power shines the most: the ability to completely re-invent itself on
: |> finding a cherished belief was wrong.
[...]
: Of course this is what science is supposed to be like, and usually is.
: Science is also a social activity. Since the rules of objective observation
: require repeatability, it is almost impossible to define what science
: talks about without including some of the social and cultural elements
: as well. Whether you like Feyerabend (who is rather radical), or the
: paradigm picture (who only liked to talk about radicals), science cannot
: avoid dealing with this kind of question.
I am not sure what question you are posing here. Could you be more explicit?
On objective observation, how does the requirement for repeatability cause
inclusion of social and cultural (presumably subjective) elements?
: I believe the issue that started all of this had to do with a rather
: common modern definition of religion. The definition happened to
: include science, as well as almost any other complex human cultural
: institution.
True. And it seems to me that this is a Bad Thing (tm). If the definition
manages to include many clearly *non-religious* human activities as being
religious - it is overly broad. It needs to be refined down to include
religions *without* including non-religious activity.
Rather than defining religion - I think it defined the idea of a belief
system. While religions are belief systems - belief systems are not
necessarily religions nor is science in particular (while a belief system) a
religion.
: The original poster wanted to know how science what would
: distinguish science from religion. Obviously, it isn't social structure.
: The issue of re-examination of doctrine won't do it either. Most of
: the activities you've ascribed to science apply to religion too. The
: real differences, or the thing that makes science science is something
: very different.
: Science is built around a set of social rules designed to filter out
: stuff that wouldn't reflect the objective world. In the process of
: doing so, it creates mathematical positivism, operationalism, and a
: bunch of other ism's from which it must be concluded that the most you
: can ultimately talk about are the results of experiments, and the
: theoretical constructs within which those results are interpreted
: (Bridgeman's operationalism...). In that sense, you never really get
: to talk about reality... just experiments and things that have been
: ultimately defined in the context of those experiments.
I can buy that. Science is _by definition_ concerned with the world of
objectifiable, measurable events. It does not, and cannot, concern itself
with "ultimate" reality. But - within those constraints - it remains the
most powerful predictor known. And those constraints are by no means
chaffing. The experiments are in the domain of *anything you can do with
external reality*. This is not a narrow scope.
: In the extreme
: case, some folks have said that is all the reality there is (thus
: denying their own conciousness since my conciousness isn't observable
: by others -- just secondary evidence of it, such as eye movement and
: dialogue).
Uh - no. I can deny *your* consciousness - not my own. And this is a
little bit misleading as well. Again, within the context of experiment, I
can make *predictions* about your behavior based on the hypothesis that
you do possess consciouness. It is a bit like postulating electrons. I
*cannot* prove electrons exist. I can provide evidence for them,
however, via a theory that correctly predicts things that are
consequences if they *do* exist.
: Some scientists suggest there might not really be any order below the
: level of experiment and that its all myth anyway, but are happy to keep
: doing science. So what? The technology that has been built on it
: can support phone systems and Nintendo. I tend to think that's
: one thing that distinguishes science from religion :-). On the
: other hand, I don't think the question is as simple as you'd like it
: to be.
Possibly not. But, for now, that it "can support phone systems and Nintendo"
(ie. it WORKS, empirically speaking) seems to be a strong contender for a
distinguishing characteristic.
Gordon Fitch
harb...@unlinfo.unl.edu (gerry harbison):
| ...
| Sure, the assumption of objective external reality is a leap of faith.
| The alternative is a solipsistic belief in purely local reality, to which
| a lot of culture seems to be descending. ...
I've seen this contention several times here and there, so
I'm going to call you on it. I don't see the assumptions of
objective external reality and solipsism as exhausting
possibility, but you seem to, so can you explain why?
Gordon Fitch
| >|And what {is} observation? Observations {are} narratives. An observation
| >|happens when a machine tells a scientist its metaphysical view of reality.
bo...@ief.itg.ti.com writes:
| > Machines do not have metaphysical views. The have responses to
| > stimuli. This is not metaphysical, its strictly physical.
|
| > What makes you think that machines ( I am assuming you are refering
| > to measuring instruments ) have views at all, much less metaphysical
| > ones?
OGDEN:
| Machines see, do they not? Doesn't something that sees have a view? "View"
| means to "see". A measuring instrument "sees" temperature, pressure, flow
| rate, etc., which are metaphysical ideas; thus, is not the machine's
| interpretation of these mystical quantities a metaphysical view?
| ...
I find this debatable. Of course, it depends on what we mean
by "see." If "see" means to take in certain phenomena, then a
telescope sees; in fact, the cylindrical piece of cardboard
around which paper towels are wrapped, used as a toy telescope
by a child, sees. But if "see" also means modeling visual
phenomena, then telescopes and other instruments, mostly, do
not see. However, if we attach them to a computer they may
"see" in the larger (and I think more common) sense of the
word. What has happened is that we have projected a part of
our linguistic procedures into a mechanical device which
enacts them. Is this metaphysical? Maybe, but it does not
require much of an opinion about what underlies anything,
only the observation that certain linguistic procedures seem
to have the property of regularly ordering certain pheno-
mena. That this is a nice thing to do is certainly an aes-
thetic response, but I would hesistate to call it metaphy-
sical. It seems like a rather loose use of the word.
Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988
>Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. (batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov) wrote:
>| >: Science is not a matter of mere aesthetics. It's...
>
>ken...@Hawaii.Edu (Kennan Ferguson):
>| >Since when are aesthetics "mere"?
>
>Dave Batchelor:
>| When compared with the other things that science encompasses, which are
>| more universal than aesthetics. However, science does encompass
>| aesthetics in some sense, too; for example, there are elegant
>| experiments with great aesthetic appeal.
>
>
>I would define aesthetics as the reaction of one's whole
>being toward another being, and thus something more deep
>and more primordial that the word is usually given to mean.
>(Its trivialization is a measure of our enslavement.)
>As a result Christopher Ogden's talk of scientists'
>aesthetics preceding and guiding their enterprises make
>sense to me. First they intuit the value of making certain
>kinds of sentences about phenomena, then they work them
>out. Since many of the discourses of science have had no
>practical value until long after they were initiated, I
>think this kind of motivation is essential.
I think the sense of the word aesthetics here is of preferences,
as opposed to necessity. Cranks make up pseudo-scientific
"theories" based on their ideas which they create imaginatively
AND cannot bear to test and reject. Real scientists subject
their theories to test and the theories that fail of necessity
are abandoned. The cranks are merely acting on aesthetics,
but the true scientists are being rational, and I suggest
paying heed to a higher discipline.
Stephen Posey
[deletia]
>_appearance_, another categorization of phenomena.... And
>most of us know, or think they know, that one thing-in-itself
>exists, that is, themselves, so why not suppose that a whole
>lot of things-in-themselves do the same? One can't prove it,
OTOH, how do you KNOW you exist? Have you ever tired to track down "I"? If
you think you've found it, who's doing the observing? It seems to lead to an
infinite regression of aparent observers.
[bride of deletia]
>
>Of course, I'm using _exists_ with an abyss on one side and
>a height on the other. The abyss is the abyss of Buddhism,
>and the height is the possibility that _exist_ can mean only
>what its etymology indicates, that is, "stands forth",
>phenomenizes itself. In that sense only phenomena exist,
>because they're an inherent aspect of things-in-themselves.
>I call this a "height" because it assumes so much; too much,
>maybe, but it commends itself to my animistic prejudices.
Is the Void emptiness or repleteness? The Buddhists would likely say that the
Void is beyond any such characterization.
[son of deletia]
>I step on the cat's tail it lets me know it considers its
>tail to be part of whatever goes for "me" in a cat's mind,
>which is a kind of object. A chair, on the other hand, does
>not agree with our objectification of it -- or disagree. Or
>does not appear to.
This behavior can be attributed to "hard wiring", invertibrates respond
similarly with little in the way of a complex nervous system. It's also easy
to create a simple electric circuit that will do something aparently similar,
so what does this demonstrate? Does the insect have an experience of "me"?
does the circuit?
>--
>
> )*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
I'm new to the list, if I've missed the point here, apologies.
-* Stephen *-
Stephen Posey
S...@uno.edu
University of New Orleans
Dmitri Manin
>Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
>| #not only does botany not get to to the
>| #it also excludes many phenomena from consideration, as part
>| #of the social procedure of its formation.
>
>bou...@server.uwindsor.ca (Boucher David):
>| In my opinion it makes no sense to consider that that which we
>| can observe is not at least part of "the ultimate reality of
>| the plant".
>
>Why not? (This is not a rhetorical question.)
>
Let me try too.
You state that there might exist something about/in/by/above the
flower, that is in no way whatsoever connected to the phenomena we can
observe, or will be able to observe at any time in the future. There
is, and will be, no way to get a slightest hint of the existence of
this soul of the flower (whatever you mean by existence - doesn't
matter here).
Then what sense does it make to say that it is the soul _of_ the
flower? Indeed, it has no connection with the flower that we observe,
by the above. Or, if it had, we could eventually find it out and learn
something about it, right?
You are free to invent things that can't be learnt of, but what reason
do you have to associate them with observable things?
Dmitri Manin
>They're all symbols. How do you know
>that there is an independent "that" "out there" in the universe. If you point
>to "that" you're using hand signs. If you look at "that", you see a sign. If
>you listen to "that", you hear another sign. If you touch "that", you feel a
>sign. Since you can't ever look behind the sign, how do you know there is
>something behind it?
Now, wait a minute. {If} "I" "see" a house [hmmm... should've I put
quotes or braces?], do I see a symbol? I thought I'd see an object. I
mean, the _symbol_ "house" and any specific _occurrence_ of "house"
are quite different. Indeed, I know how many windows "my house" has or
the house I'm looking at. But how many windows does "house" have
(nice feature of English these articles)? Isn't it obvious that the
house that you see, can't be a symbol, because it posesses a certain
number of windows, while symbol "house" doesn't?
Symbols exist only in speech/thinking. Even letters H-O-U-S-E on your
terminal screen are _not_ symbol. They are but patterns of pixels.
It's only your mind that singles them out (as an object), and recalls
the corresponding symbol "house".
So you never can feel, touch, or see a sign. Just objects which make
your mind recall signs. Quite the contrary to what you write.
Heinrich Kummert
>From: batc...@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov (Dave Batchelor, Space Phys. Data Facil. 301/286-2988)
>Subject: Re: The Church of Science
>Date: 4 Feb 1994 21:12 EDT
>Summary: Ogden should take a trip to his own dream-universe
>In article <s8%@byu.edu>, OGD...@caedm.et.byu.edu (Christopher Ogden) writes...
>>In article <CKpEs...@uwindsor.ca> bou...@server.uwindsor.ca
> (Boucher David) writes:
>>>My universe would be more esthetically pleasing to me if had 100
>>>billion dollars, possessed the power to read minds and to teleport
>>>myself to distant galaxies, and was living in a menage a trois with
>>>Sharon Stone and Whitney Houston. Please tell me how I can "construct
>>>my own reality" such that all these things will be as real and solid
>>>as this keyboard I am typing on.
>>
>CO>Obviously this universe is *not* aesthetically pleasing to you, because you
>>are ruled by another signifier, "touchability". According to your
>>self-constructed world, Sharon Stone and Whitney Houston are not real unless
>>you can touch them, and 100 billion dollars is not real unless you can see the
>>money somewhere, or at least have the capability of touching it by withdrawing
>>it from a bank and touch it. And even if you could have it both ways, keeping
>>your "touchability" signifier, yet at the same time construct a universe with
>>the signifiers "Sharon Stone", "Whitney Houston", and 100 billion dollars. I
>>doubt that such a universe would truly be aesthetically pleasing to you,
>>because most humans like to suffer.
Okay, this is where I'd like to object, please. I have a definite model
about *me* and so far, I can absolutely assure you that *I* DO NOT like to
suffer. And no, I wouldn't be bored! But I see that you have a point later
on, where you state that you need suffering so you can compare it to
happiness. The only way to solve this contradiction is that I might have a
wrong idea of myself - pretty much to what Alan Watts was saying all the
time. Strange, isn't it?
Regards,
Alex.
Gordon Fitch
| > ...
| >most of us know, or think they know, that one thing-in-itself
| >exists, that is, themselves, so why not suppose that a whole
| >lot of things-in-themselves do the same? One can't prove it,
| OTOH, how do you KNOW you exist? Have you ever tired to track down "I"? If
| you think you've found it, who's doing the observing? It seems to lead to an
| infinite regression of aparent observers.
I don't have any difficulty believing in my own existence,
although it's true I can't prove it, even to myself, without
pretty much assuming it in the first place. I believe the
kind of knowledge one has of one's own existence is called
"unitive knowledge" among those who hack religion and
theology -- that is, there is a direct connection or
identity of knower, knowing, and thing known. This
knowledge, however, doesn't include objectification of
oneself in the context of the world; that's something else,
self-consciousness.
An additional point: if I don't exist, then there is No
Problem. No one is writing this article, and you're not
reading it.
gcf:
| >
| >Of course, I'm using _exists_ with an abyss on one side and
| >a height on the other. The abyss is the abyss of Buddhism,
| >and the height is the possibility that _exist_ can mean only
| >what its etymology indicates, that is, "stands forth",
| >phenomenizes itself. In that sense only phenomena exist,
| >because they're an inherent aspect of things-in-themselves.
| >I call this a "height" because it assumes so much; too much,
| >maybe, but it commends itself to my animistic prejudices.
| Is the Void emptiness or repleteness?
As they'd say in alt.buddha.short.fat.guy -- yes.
| The Buddhists would likely say that the
| Void is beyond any such characterization.
Correct. What I mean is that (as you observe above) for
Buddhism, even unitive knowledge is ultimately and maybe
proximately delusion; as are all these words. But, as I
want to play the game, I avoid this realization, and thus I
do not go into the abyss, and thus you have this article to
read.
gcf:
| > ...
| >I step on the cat's tail it lets me know it considers its
| >tail to be part of whatever goes for "me" in a cat's mind,
| >which is a kind of object. A chair, on the other hand, does
| >not agree with our objectification of it -- or disagree. Or
| >does not appear to.
| This behavior can be attributed to "hard wiring", invertibrates respond
| similarly with little in the way of a complex nervous system. It's also easy
| to create a simple electric circuit that will do something aparently similar,
| so what does this demonstrate? Does the insect have an experience of "me"?
| does the circuit?
We don't know, because we aren't insects or circuits. It is
my guess that all that exists "has" or "is" a kind of
consciousness, because of the single piece of matter I know
about from the inside, and also because I can't figure out
how it (consciousness) could come into being otherwise. So
insects and even trees could experience things according to their
ability.
However, in the case of the cat, even if it were not
conscious or willful, and even if its reactions were
entirely hard-wired, we could still say that a kind of
objectification had been set up in the wiring. I just
wanted to point out that we humans and our machines are
not (to appearance) the only objectifiers in the world,
and that some objectification of which we are aware is
not social.