Primakov's Style
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Primakov's Style
by Alexander Golts
September 17, 1998
Alexander Golts is a correspondent for Itogi Magazine.
The Russian Duma's practically unanimous confirmation of Yevgeny Primakov
as the prime minister somewhat confused many Russian observers. The
problems our home-grown pundits are facing are quite understandable:
Everyone expects these analysts to make clear forecasts about the policy of
the new chairman of the Cabinet, particularly economic policy.
It is duplicitous of observers to claim they have insufficient information:
Since the end of the 1980s, Primakov has been at or near the center of the
political stage. Still, being afraid to make any definite predictions, most
analysts concentrated on retelling the rich biography of the new premier.
A product of the foreign policy elite
Primakov is the subject of hundreds of articles. The majority of the
authors, domestic as well as foreign, stress the fact that Primakov is a
classic representative of the old Soviet elite, with its unwillingness to
seek compromises, its suspicions about the West and its imperial ambitions.
Allegedly he is "anti-Western" by nature, so quite understandably he has
sympathy for authoritarian or dictatorial regimes, which in the first place
came to life as a result of the Soviet Union's struggle for world domination.
Also, Primakov usually played advocate for those whom the West views as the
sources of all evil: Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, former Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. However, in light of
those alliances , how can one explain Primakov's friendly relations with
people who shape the foreign policy of the leading Western countries --
including the tough U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright?
In reality, to understand Primakov's personality, one must consider not his
past offices but the fact that he is one of the most brilliant
representatives of not simply the Soviet party and government elite, but of
its foreign policy echelon. Unlike most of the party regulars who were
easily transferred from economic to propagandist to international offices,
Primakov has excellent professional skills and knowledge concerning
particular countries.
When in the spring of 1996 I asked the Foreign Ministry boss how the fight
for the president's office -- which at that time was going full blast --
affected the country's foreign policy, Primakov in a somewhat challenging
manner answered that it did not affect it at all. "Russia," he said,
"pursues its foreign policy not according to some considerations of the
current moment, but on the basis of its historic role, its potential. And
this is primarily the huge intellectual potential of the country.
"We have significant natural resources, big population, large territory,"
he continued. "That's why I don't agree at all that Russian foreign policy
should be limited to any particular region or should depend on any
particular event."
Such views are not unusual. The same school of thought (some call it
"political realism") includes former U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger and former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. One
probably could say that Primakov's hero -- the 19th century foreign
minister Alexander Gorchakov, who headed Russian diplomacy after the
country's defeat in the Crimean War and who in 20 years managed step by
step to cancel all unsuitable treaties -- belonged to that school, too.
One pole in a multi-polar world
Today, when Russia can boast neither economic prosperity nor military
might, Primakov's idea of a multi-polar world (which President Boris
Yeltsin likes so much) is actually nothing but a modern interpretation of
the concept of political realism. The theory is based on the belief that an
alliance of several "poles" could outweigh the attraction of the most
powerful pole, the United States. Primakov probably believes such policy
would give Russia certain room to maneuver.
Therefore, it is no coincidence that without refusing "strategic
partnership" with the leading Western states, the head of the Russian
Foreign Ministry still insists on the need for "trusting" partnerships with
the largest developing countries such as China and India. Those countries
have problems that are not the same as Russia's. Because they have similar
illnesses (like outbreaks of separatism), they could understand Russia's
difficulties -- grounds for developing a joint position on key
international issues.
Also, if you agree to see the world as a multi-polar place, Russia is
guaranteed to be one of the poles. This gives certain moral rights (the
formal right is secured thanks to membership in the U.N. Security Council)
to actively interfere in any international issue, from the Iraqi crisis to
the Balkan one.
But there is another explanation, too, for Primakov's support of
engagement. Because of special relations with countries that today are in
isolation, Moscow gets some opportunity to influence their policy, albeit
in a limited way. And this has special value for our Western partners
during crises.
The left-wing opposition to Yeltsin's government -- as well as liberal
critics of Primakov -- have seen in Primakov's activities only attempts to
stick it to Americans. The opposition liked that.
In addition, Primakov looks just like the successor to former USSR
President Andrei A. Gromyko should: a man of advanced age with puffy face,
clearly not in particularly good health. Add to this his ability to use
meaningless phrases when speaking publicly, and you have a relic of the
Soviet empire beloved by the opposition.
This is reiterated by the fact that Russia's Western partners are not
particularly fond of the experienced and stubborn negotiator, who even in a
weak position is capable of saying "no." Take Primakov's endless
discussions with American diplomats concerning the Russian-Iranian
cooperation in nuclear energy.
Common-sense economic policy
Of course, it is true that solving Russia's economic problems is much more
difficult than solving foreign policy ones, even the ones it faces now. If
international affairs gave the opposition an opportunity to show its
patriotism, the inevitable tough economic measures would directly affect
the interests of those who lobby for financial and industrial groups. But
Primakov undoubtedly has enough skills to get the Duma to approve even very
tough measures.
However, this will happen only if Primakov believes in the measures
himself. Obviously, he will not limit himself to the role of political
cover for some economic expert acting as a vice premier, as Grigory
Yavlinsky hoped. "I never was a 'marriage-breakfast general,'" Primakov
said to Yeltsin according to certain rumor, "and I am definitely not going
to be a marriage-breakfast dummy."
So one probably should not pay too much attention to the fact that
Communist Yuri Maslyukov has been promised the job of first vice premier
and that Victor Geraschenko became director of the Central Bank. Even if
they decide to go for some sharp turns in economic policy, they first must
convince Primakov, the man for whom it would be difficult to deny common
sense.
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