Our Embarrasing War Against Drugs
ma...@my-deja.com
(House of Representatives - May 07, 1998)
Congressional Record (07 May 1998)
Without even a passing glance from the mainstream press, new
confirmation of CIA involvement in drug trafficking was
inserted into the public record by Maxine Waters. Waters included with
her testimony an exchange of letters from 1982
between CIA Director William Casey and Attorney General William French
Smith which appears to demonstrate Casey's
knowledge of drug trafficking by CIA assets and his desire to keep this
knowledge away from legal scrutiny.
Congressional Record (07 May 1998) [Page: H2954]
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to take a few minutes to talk
about some of the things that aren't being talked
about enough. The war on drugs has come up several times today. I
think there's some compelling evidence to show
how the culture of obsessive secrecy that is part of covert action
cultivates an actual and implied climate of impunity.
The CIA's Inspector General, Fred Hitz, undertook a massive study
into the CIA ties to drug traffickers. Upon
completion of the first volume of the 600 page report, Hitz
declared that they found `no evidence . . . of any
conspiracy by the CIA or its employees to bring drugs into the
United States.' Then he announced that hardly any of
his findings would be publicly available, casting a long shadow of
doubt as to the scope and conclusions of the
investigation. A second volume is still in the works.
The CIA's credibility when it comes to investigating itself was
further brought into question when Hitz disclosed during
recent testimony before the House Intelligence Committee that in
1982, the CIA and Attorney General William
French Smith had an agreement that the CIA was not required to
report allegations of drug smuggling by
non-employees. Non-employees was explicitly interpreted to include
unpaid and paid assets of the CIA, such as
pilots and informants. The memorandum, dated February 11, 1982,
states `no formal requirement regarding the
reporting of narcotics violations has been included in these
procedures', referring to the procedures relating to
non-employee crimes. I want to compliment the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Waters, for her hard work on this
topic and for obtaining this and other relevant memoranda. I ask
you, though, is this the war on drugs that President
Reagan launched?
Nobody here who advocates cuts to the intelligence budget or
reforming this intelligence system gone haywire doubts
for one second that the U.S. needs reliable information about
exports of Russian missile technology or the trade in
bacteriological warfare technology. I am a veteran and I know how
important intelligence is. But doesn't the above
information illustrate why the integrity of our intelligence system
is in doubt?
The historical record shows that this culture of secrecy too often
undermines our foreign and domestic interests.
In 1989, the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and
International Communications, headed by Senator
John Kerry, found that `there was substantial evidence of drug
smuggling through the war zone on the part of
individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots, mercenaries
who worked with the Contra supporters throughout
the region.' Moreover, U.S. officials `failed to address the drug
issue for fear of jeopardizing the war efforts against
Nicaragua.'
In other words, the drug war was subordinated to the cold war. This
is right in line with what we've learned about the
memorandum of understanding described above. I am inserting into
the Record a list, compiled by the Institute for
Policy Studies, which goes through other examples of the troubling
history of our intelligence agencies.
Congressional Record (07 May 1998) [Page: H2962]
(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, this debate is not what I would like, I say
to the floor managers and chairman and ranking
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, because in
this 5 minutes back and forth, usually we do not get
answered.
Let us understand that the Central Intelligence Agency's relationship
with drug pushers has not even been mentioned here. It
is as if we are in a universe where nobody knows about this except we
read it in the paper or we get a GAO study every
now and then, or somebody writes about Los Angeles and the introduction
of cocaine, which creates a momentary flak. And
then we come here to the annual ritual and what do we have? We have
people saying the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence is one of the most respected bodies in the world system,
not the Congress. It is studied all over the world
because these are sensitive people, understand. They are very sensitive
about this subject. It is all secret. We do not know
what is going on.
We do know that there was $26.7 billion appropriated. And then somebody
snuck into the emergency supplemental
appropriation, fiscal year 1998, an unknown amount of money.
[TIME: 1400]
Rumored, `Oh, never heard of that before.' Okay. Rumored, $260 million.
Suspected a lot more. But nobody knows. And
then this discussion my colleagues have passed off as an open, fair
debate on this subject. Now, if I hear that the CIA is not
perfect one more time, I am going to excuse myself from these
proceedings. Of course it is not perfect. It is awful.
[Page: H2963]
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CONYERS. I will not yield to the gentleman from California. I will
excuse myself from the proceedings after the debate
on this measure is concluded.
But look, we know the CIA is not perfect. But that is not the question.
The question is, how bad are they? `Oh, wow, that is
an insult. We cannot talk like that.' They are not perfect. Why, any
amateur historian knows that we had perfect knowledge
that the Japanese were coming to Pearl Harbor. And a respected Member
of this body gets up and says, well, it was military
intelligence, if it had been stronger. Pearl Harbor is a perfect
example of our intelligence system at work.
Now, the intelligence community failed in Iraq. I mean, for anyone to
suggest that we won the war on intelligence, really they
have not even been listening to the military much less to anybody else.
This committee has done us a great disservice, and then to fight hard
to keep a 5 percent reduction from occurring. Let us
really show them by a two-to-one margin that the American people want
to keep this secret budget going full blast, whatever
it is, and that the American people are approving of this.
Well, I think this does the body a disservice. I do not think that we
should do it. I refer my colleagues to the GAO news
release. `CIA kept ties with alleged traffickers.' And then we come
here and debate about how they have got to do some
more about drugs and we hear, `Let's give them another chance.' Did I
hear that last year, the last year, the year before the
year before, the year before, the year before? Of course. `Let us give
them one more chance.'
Well, I think this is not the way to debate. There is a tangled web of
the CIA's complicity in drug international trafficking that
not one member of the Select Committee on Intelligence has even alluded
to in debate, even referenced. It does not exist.
We are here to get this secret budget through and that is it.
Congressional Record (07 May 1998) [Page: H2955]
A Tangled Web: A History of CIA Complicity in Drug International
Trafficking
[Prepared by the Institute for Policy Studies and inserted
into the
Congressional Record by Rep. Conyers.]
WORLD WAR II
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI), the CIA's parent and sister
organizations, cultivate relations with the leaders of the Italian
Mafia, recruiting heavily from the New York and Chicago
underworlds, whose members, including Charles `Lucky' Luciano, Meyer
Lansky, Joe Adonis, and Frank Costello, help the
agencies keep in touch with Sicilian Mafia leaders exiled by Italian
dictator Benito Mussolini. Domestically, the aim is to
prevent sabotage on East Coast ports, while in Italy the goal is to
gain intelligence on Sicily prior to the allied invasions and to
suppress the burgeoning Italian Communist Party. Imprisoned in New
York, Luciano earns a pardon for his wartime service
and is deported to Italy, where he proceeds to build his heroin empire,
first by diverting supplies from the legal market,
before developing connections in Lebanon and Turkey that supply
morphine base to labs in Sicily. The OSS and ONI also
work closely with Chinese gangsters who control vast supplies of opium,
morphine and heroin, helping to establish the third
pillar of the post-world War II heroin trade in the Golden Triangle,
the border region of Thailand, Burma, Laos and China's
Yunnan Province.
1947
In its first year of existence, the CIA continues U.S. intelligence
community's anti-communist drive. Agency operatives help
the Mafia seize total power in Sicily and it sends money to heroin-
smuggling Corsican mobsters in Marseille to assist in their
battle with Communist unions for control of the city's docks. By 1951,
Luciano and the Corsicans have pooled their
resources, giving rise to the notorious `French Connection' which would
dominate the world heroin trade until the early
1970s. The CIA also recruits members of organized crime gangs in Japan
to help ensure that the country stays in the
non-communist world. Several years later, the Japanese Yakuza emerges
as a major source of methamphetamine in Hawaii.
1949
Chinese Communist revolution causes collapse of drug empire allied with
U.S. intelligence community, but a new one quickly
emerges under the command of Nationalist (KMT) General Li Mi, who flees
Yunnan into eastern Burma. Seeking to
rekindle anticommunist resistance in China, the CIA provides arms,
ammunition and other supplies to the KMT. After being
repelled from China with heavy losses, the KMT settles down with local
population and organizes and expands the opium
trade from Burma and Northern Thailand. By 1972, the KMT controls 80
percent of the Golden Triangle's opium trade.
1950
The CIA launches Project Bluebird to determine whether certain drugs
might improve its interrogation methods. This
eventually leads CIA head Allen Dulles, in April 1953, to institute a
program for `covert use of biological and chemical
materials' as part of the agency's continuing efforts to control
behavior. With benign names such as Project Artichoke and
Project Chatter, these projects continue through the 1960s, with
hundreds of unwitting test subjects given various drugs,
including LSD.
1960
In support of the U.S. war in Vietnam, the CIA renews old and
cultivates new relations with Laotian, Burmese and Thai drug
merchants, as well as corrupt military and political leaders in
Southeast Asia. Despite the dramatic rise of heroin production,
the agency's relations with these figures attracts little attention
until the early 1970s.
1967
Manuel Antonio Noriega goes on the CIA payroll. First recruited by the
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in 1959, Noriega
becomes an invaluable asset for the CIA when he takes charge of
Panama's intelligence service after the 1968 military coup,
providing services for U.S. covert operations and facilitating the use
of Panama as the center of U.S. intelligence gathering in
Latin America. In 1976, CIA Director George Bush pays Noriega $110,000
for his services, even though as early as 1971
U.S. officials agents had evidence that he was deeply involved in drug
trafficking. Although the Carter administration
suspends payments to Noriega, he returns to the U.S. payroll when
President Reagan takes office in 1981. The general is
rewarded handsomely for his services in support of Contras forces in
Nicaragua during the 1980s, collecting $200,000 from
the CIA in 1986 alone.
MAY 1970
A Christian Science Monitor correspondent reports that the CIA `is
cognizant of, if not party to, the extensive movement of
opium out of Laos,' quoting one charter pilot who claims that `opium
shipments get special CIA clearance and monitoring on
their flights southward out of the country.' At the time, some 30,000
U.S. service men in Vietnam are addicted to heroin.
1972
The full story of how Cold War politics and U.S. covert operations
fueled a heroin boom in the Golden Triangle breaks
when Yale University doctoral student Alfred McCoy publishes his
ground- breaking study, The Politics of Heroin in
Southeast Asia. The CIA attempts to quash the book.
1973
Thai national Puttapron Khramkhruan is arrested in connection with the
seizure of 59 pounds of opium in Chicago. A CIA
informant on narcotics trafficking in northern Thailand, he claims that
agency had full knowledge
of his actions. According to the U.S. Justice Department, the CIA
quashed the case because it may `prove embarrassing
because of Mr. Khramkhruans's involvement with CIA activities in
Thailand, Burma, and elsewhere.'
JUNE 1975
Mexican police, assisted by U.S. drug agents, arrest Alberto Sicilia
Falcon, whose Tijuana-based operation was reportedly
generating $3.6 million a week from the sale of cocaine and marijuana
in the United States. The Cuban exile claims he was a
CIA protege, trained as part of the agency's anti-Castro efforts, and
in exchange for his help in moving weapons to certain
groups in Central America, the CIA facilitated his movement of drugs.
In 1974, Sicilia's top aide, Jose Egozi, a CIA-trained
intelligence officer and Bay of Pigs veteran, reportedly lined up
agency support for a right-wing plot to overthrow the
Portuguese government. Among the top Mexican politicians, law
enforcement and intelligence officials from whom Sicilia
enjoyed support was Miguel Nazar Haro, head of the Direccion Federal de
Seguridad (DFS), who the CIA admits was its
`most important source in Mexico and Central America.' When Nazar was
linked to a multi-million-dollar stolen car ring
several years later, the CIA intervenes to prevent his indictment in
the United States.
APRIL 1978
Soviet-backed coup in Afghanistan sets stage for explosive growth in
Southwest Asian heroin trade. New Marxist regime
undertakes vigorous anti-narcotics campaign aimed at suppressing poppy
production, triggering a revolt by
semi-autonomous tribal groups that traditionally raised opium for
export. The CIA-supported rebel Mujahedeen begins
expanding production to finance their insurgency. Between 1982 and
1989, during which time the CIA ships billions of
dollars in weapons and other aid to guerrilla forces, annual opium
production in Afghanistan increases to about 800 tons
from 250 tons. By 1986, the State Department admits that Afghanistan is
`probably the world's largest producer of opium
for export' and `the poppy source for a majority of the Southwest Asian
heroin found in the United States.' U.S. officials,
however, fail to take action to curb production. Their silence not only
serves to maintain public support for the Mujahedeen,
it also smooths relations with Pakistan, whose leaders, deeply
implicated in the heroin trade, help channel CIA support to the
Afghan rebels.
[Page: H2956]
JUNE 1980
Despite advance knowledge, the CIA fails to halt members of the
Bolivian militaries, aide by the Argentine counterparts,
from staging the so-called `Cocaine Coup,' according to former DEA
agent Michael Levine. In fact, the 25-year DEA
veteran maintains the agency actively abetted cocaine trafficking in
Bolivia, where government official who sought to combat
traffickers faced `torture and death at the hands of CIA-sponsored
paramilitary terrorists under the command of fugitive
Nazi war criminal (also protected by the CIA) Klaus Barbie.
FEBRUARY 1985
DEA agent Enrique `Kiki' Camerena is kidnapped and murder in Mexico.
DEA, FBI and U.S. Customs Service
investigators accuse the CIA of stonewalling during their
investigation. U.S. authorities claim the CIA is more interested in
protecting its assets, including top drug trafficker and kidnapping
principal Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo. (In 1982, the DEA
learned that Felix Gallardo was moving $20 million a month through a
single Bank of America account, but it could not get
the CIA to cooperate with its investigation.) Felix Gallardo's main
partner is Honduran drug lord Juan Ramon Matta
Ballesteros, who began amassing his $2-billion fortune as a cocaine
supplier to Alberto Sicilia Falcon. (see June 1985)
Matta's air transport firm, SETCO, receives $186,000 from the U.S.
State Department to fly `humanitarian supplies' to the
Nicaraguan Contras from 1983 to 1985. Accusations that the CIA
protected some of Mexico's leading drug traffickers in
exchange for their financial support of the Contras are leveled by
government witnesses at the trials of Camarena's accused
killers.
JANUARY 1988
Deciding that he has outlived his usefulness to the Contra cause, the
Reagan Administration approves an indictment of
Noriega on drug charges. By this time, U.S. Senate investigators had
found that `the United States had received substantial
information about criminal involvement of top Panamanian officials for
nearly twenty years and done little to respond.'
APRIL 1989
The Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International
Communications, headed by Sen. John Kerry of
Massachusetts, issues its 1,166-page report on drug corruption in
Central America and the Caribbean. The subcommittee
found that `there was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through
the war zone on the part of individuals Contras, Contra
suppliers, Contra pilots, mercenaries who worked with the Contras
supporters throughout the region.' U.S. officials, the
subcommittee said, `failed to address the drug issue for fear of
jeopardizing the war efforts against Nicaragua.' The
investigation also reveals that some `senior policy makers' believed
that the use of drug money was `a perfect solution to the
Contras' funding problems.'
JANUARY 1993
Honduran businessman Eugenio Molina Osorio is arrested in Lubbock Texas
for supplying $90,000 worth of cocaine to
DEA agents. Molina told judge he is working for CIA to whom he provides
political intelligence. Shortly after, a letter from
CIA headquarters is sent to the judge, and the case is dismissed. `I
guess we're all aware that they [the CIA] do business in
a different way than everybody else,' the judge notes. Molina later
admits his drug involvement was not a CIA operation,
explaining that the agency protected him because of his value as a
source for political intelligence in Honduras.
NOVEMBER 1996
Former head of the Venezuelan National Guard and CIA operative Gen.
Ramon Gullien Davila is indicted in Miami on
charges of smuggling as much as 22 tons of cocaine into the United
States. More than a ton of cocaine was shipped into the
country with the CIA's approval as part of an undercover program aimed
at catching drug smugglers, an operation kept
secret from other U.S. agencies.
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