India’s role in Afghanistan is encirclement of Pakistan'
PakistanPal
Foundation, traveled to Pakistan earlier this month. He interviewed
Maj Gen Athar Abbas, Director General, Inter Services Public Relations
(ISPR) on the status of India-Pakistan relations, the turmoil in
Afghanistan and Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts. The interview
took place at ISPR headquarters in Islamabad on October 8, 2009.
ORF: What is the Pakistan army's position on the Indo-Pak relations
post 26/11?
Gen Athar Abbas: Can Pakistan, which is in such a mess, afford to open
another front and jeopardise the very foundation of it's security? How
can the State deliberately undermine its security by doing or allowing
the Mumbai terror attack? We have our cup full of problems- internal
security, effects of the turmoil in Afghanistan, NATO surge etc. Both
the states do not exercise the kind of a control that could stop a
group of 10 men from taking initiative on their own. There is no
guarantee against terrorists groups attempting another Mumbai. We can
keep blaming each other, it is a never ending game. Second, the Indian
intransigence about resuming the dialogue process is not helping to
defuse tensions either. It is making South Asia hostage to one
incident. Should we remain hostage to a non-state group?
ORF: How do you read the situation in Afghanistan?
Gen Abbas: We don't want to control Afghanistan by sitting in Kabul.
Afghanistan has historically never been controlled by one power
sitting in Kabul. It is a very fragmented society and is controlled by
warlords. The warlords remain passive when they get something from the
centre. Can [Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar and the Taliban, allegedly supported
by the state of Pakistan through the security establishment, control
Afghanistan by sitting in Kabul? If anyone is subscribing to this
theory then he is ignorant about the history, geography and culture of
Afghanistan.
The campaign in Afghanistan relies excessively on force, while the
political process is beset with shortcomings. There has been a
continuous denial of the due share of the largest ethnic group
[Pashtuns] in the economy, polity and security of Afghanistan. How can
one expect things to normalise when Pashtuns, who comprise 40 percent
of the population, have only a five percent representation in the
Afghan army. They have no control over the ministries that are
basically occupied by the Northern Alliance members. Tajiks comprise
25 percent of the population and yet they have a 56 percent
representation in the armed forces. All those who currently control
Kabul -be it the foreign forces, Northern Alliance or the Panjshiris -
have nothing to offer to the Pashtuns. Is this the right political
approach on the part of the US to over-rely on the use of force? If
the surge indeed takes place, more troops will again create an
impression that disproportionate force is being used against the main
ethnic group [Pashtuns].
ORF: What are your interests in Afghanistan?
Gen Abbas: You see, we have a problem on our eastern border, and we
have valid reasons for our concerns - the history of unresolved
political disputes, water being the latest; the growing Pakistan-
specific offensive capability of the Indian military in the form of a
very offensive doctrine, the validation of which is the continuous
exercising of the Indian military formations and advance weapons
procurements. What we don't want is a threat on our western border. We
want a stable, friendly and peaceful Afghanistan. If this happens, not
withstanding who ever controls Afghanistan, then our concerns are
addressed.
We are concerned by an Indian over-involvement in Afghanistan. We see
it as an encirclement move. What happens tomorrow if the American
trainers are replaced by the Indian trainers? The leadership in
Afghanistan is completely dominated by an India-friendly Northern
Alliance. Northern Alliance's affiliation with India makes us very
uncomfortable because we see in it a future two-front war scenario.
ORF: The Pakistani officials allege Indian involvement in FATA. Can
you justify such claims?
Gen Abbas: I am not very confident about such claims as I don't have
any inside knowledge of this. But the fact remains that when the State
gets locked up in this kind of conflict, they see each other's
vulnerabilities. You're not a good intelligence agency if you do not
exploit these vulnerabilities. We see a vulnerability of ours in FATA
and in Balochistan. And so we fear that India could be exploiting
these vulnerabilities.
ORF: By turning a blind eye at the Haqqani faction in North
Waziristan, one gets an impression that that Pakistan is in connivance
with them.
Gen Abbas: Currently there are limits to what Pakistan can do for
Afghanistan. As the Afghan government and NATO has admitted, they
don't exercise control over 70 percent of their terrain, then what do
you think will happen if the Haqqani group goes back to Afghanistan.
If we take on all the tribal militias, including the Haqqani and the
Waziri groups, and the US leaves Afghanistan tomorrow, then we will be
left alone to face a tribal uprising. We do not want their short term
gain to become our long term pain.
ORF: Could you explain the complexities of the upcoming operation in
Waziristan?
Gen Abbas: There are seven agencies in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) which came into being in 1893. FATA is controlled
by means of the Federal Crimes Regulations (FCR), which stands on four
pillars - FCR (1901 onwards,) the Frontier Corps (FC) which is the
main policing force, the Political Agent who uses the FC to implement
the FCR and the tribal leader or the Malik. FCR relies on collective
responsibility and collective reward. If one pillar falls, then the
entire system collapses.
During the Afghan war against the Soviets [1980-1989] the first
casualty was the Malik, who was replaced by the religious cleric.
Traditionally the Malik would lead the tribe in offensive excursions
as well as on defensive missions. The mullah had a very insignificant
place in the tribal culture. What the Soviet War did was that it
alleviated the position of the mullah. And it was not the Soviets but
the Americans who converted the Afghan `freedom struggle` into a holy
religious war. Somehow they got in their mind that it would create an
atmosphere of more ferocity, would attract foreign fighters and it
would give them an advantage in the power calculus. The motivation
that would come along with the religious element would act as force
multiplier. They brought religious literature from Nebraska and
elsewhere in Pashto language. They encouraged the madrasas, pumped
enormous money into the system and alleviated the status of mullah. By
then Maliks had been left far back.
The US invasion of Afghanistan again agitated the tribes and motivated
them to resist the occupation. The money is not coming from the West,
it is coming from drugs trade, extortion, kidnapping, donations from
the Gulf and out of our own charity systems. And again the religious
leader has gained ascendancy. It benefits him when the area remains
mobilised for violence. It is already a violent society, but when you
give it the shape of an external threat, it helps you mobilise
support.
We are there since 2001, we have conducted many operations. Whenever
the present operation happens, [Pakistan Army launched Operation Rah-e-
Nijat, the much awaited assault on South Waziristan, on October 16] it
will be targeted against the Baitullah Mehsud faction. In 2007 he
formed Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and they have acknowledged
their involvement in more than 80 percent of terrorist acts inside
Pakistan. They also have the support of very fierce foreign militants
- the Uzbeks, Chechens, Arabs trainers and a sprinkling from North
Africa. This is the centre of gravity of the Pakistan Taliban and has
been identified as the enemy number one.
Since last year, we have conducted operations in Bajaur, Mohmand, and
Khyber and now we have encircled South Waziristan. The State has been
expelled out of the Mehsud areas for over two years now. They have
taken all the forts, check posts, expelled the FC and have created a
State of their own. For two months the military has blocked all entry
and exit points. The strategy will be to crack the hardest nut, it
will be a fierce fight. Aerial bombing is continuing. In-fighting
between the various tribes is taking place. So why go early, why not
wait and allow conditions to become more conducive.
The most crucial question is on which side the Mehsud tribe stands at
the end of the day. A fair assumption is that they are fed up with the
total lack of development, schools, health centres and a viable
political process. They want economic activity to start. The youth of
the area has not seen anything but violence for three decades. There
is lack of everything. You name it and it is lacking - governance, for
instance, and that is where we all have failed. We never brought
development to FATA. But you cannot have the political process until
you create space through military action.
The end we visualise is the control of the area which is in possession
of Hakimullah Mehsud's group, and in the process kill as many as
possible and flush out the rest. They will inevitably flow to
neighbouring Orakzai and also Afghanistan. Owing to the difficult
terrain, it is hard to completely seal the area. When we occupy these
areas, it would radiate vibes around -when you have one badmash in the
mohalla, and you have identified him as the bully and have taken care
of him, consequently the other middle sized ones adjust their
position. So we foresee this happening. You break the main network so
the others realize that it will be futile to resist the changed
reality.
ORF: Gains made by security forces in Swat are encouraging indeed.
But, given that the operation was overdue for more than two years,
experts cry foul about state complicity with the Taliban in the past
two years.
Gen Abbas: This goes to show that the State can do when it gets
serious. It was serious earlier also but sometimes the environment
dictates certain decisions. At that time we had a problem of public
support - at the local level the support was there, but at the
national level, the scene was divided. But now there was over-whelming
support for the military operation. Earlier, a series of misjudgments
took us in the wrong direction.
In the first case, doubts arose over why the army let Mullah Fazlullah
escape in the first place in 2007. The fact is that the army was
ordered to withdraw to facilitate the elections in February 2008. You
have to understand that the army lost 37 of its own. You don't lose
officers and men when you are playing a double game. Secondly, in the
second phase of the operation, the army ran into serious difficulties.
After the 2009 peace deal between the government and the militants,
the military withdrew; it was ordered to remain restricted to its
camps and lost the liberty of action. The army units were restricted
to the vicinity of their camps. The rest of the area was with the
Taliban. So the entire area was divided among the Taliban and the army
presence. This created an impression among the local population that
the Taliban and the army were both ruling in connivance without
realising that we were trying to work out a deal. The military was
under the civilian government. The government wanted the military to
remain restricted to the camps and not retaliate. This created the
impression that the army and the Taliban were in league with each
other. Sometimes, the locals approached us asking for help. But we
could not go as the army was lacking in resources to make pickets etc
which further added to the misconception.
ORF: What steps are being taken to reintegrate surrendered militants
into society?
Gen Abbas: We present the militants to the police, the local councils
and committees that we have formed. They decide on the category -
white, grey or black. Those under the white category are let off after
signing indemnity bonds in police stations. Those falling under the
grey and black are taken to the courts. Reintegration is not the
responsibility of the army. It is the civilian government's
responsibility. We have made a rehabilitation centre for teenage
suicide bombers to de-radicalise them. But this is at a very small
stage. Reintegration of ex-combatants is the task of the civilian
government and I'm afraid at the present it is a non starter. They
have to do it on war footing.
Article Source : http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/html/interview/interview.html