STAR INFORMATION: Diya, Adisa, Bamaiyi Testify on 1997 Coup at Oputa , Tribunal
Mobolaji E. Aluko
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STAR INFORMATION RELEASE
Diya, Adisa, Bamaiyi Testify on 1997 Coup at Oputa Tribunal
by Bolaji Aluko
December 14, 2000
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Oputa Panel, My Involvement in '97 Coup - Diya
This Day (Lagos)
December 9, 2000
Steve Nwosu
Lagos
Chief of General Staff in the late Gen. Sani Abacha regime, Lt. Gen.
Oladipo Diya, on Thursday shed more light on the December 1997 coup,
saying that a group of generals deceived him into believing that a
four-point demand on ways of breaking the political logjam was to be
jointly presented to the then Head of State.
Naming Lt.-General Isha-ya Bamaiyi, Major Generals Bashir Magashi,
Patrick Aziza and Air Vice Mashal Idi Musa as being among the senior
officers who approached him to endorse the presentation of the
demands, Diya said there was no way he could have turned down the
request, especially when it was also said to have the backing of the
General Officer Comm-anding (GOC).
Diya, who opened hearing in petition number 696, his second to the
Oputa commission on human rights violations sitting in Lagos on
Thursday, said he was also meant to understand that turning down the
4-point demand could result in an insurrection that could consume
Abacha, himself and the generals.
He said he did not know he was walking into a plot "sponsored by Gen.
Sani Abacha and aided by Major General Ishaya Bamaiyi, Bashir Magashi,
Patrick Aziza, Air Vice Marshal Idi Musa, Brigadier Sabo, Major Hamza
Al-Mustapha, Major Argungu, Major Mumuni and Sergeant Rogers - all of
the Nigerian Armed Forces".
Diya said the generals had presented him with a list of demands which
had allegedly emanated from the junior officers which, they had
insisted, must be implemented for them to continue to support the
regime.
According to Diya, the four-point demand included: that Abacha
renounced his self-succession bid; that the regime stick to its
earlier pledge of handing over to a democratically elected government
by October 1, 1998; that no officer who had not spent more than three
years in retirement should be allowed to contest in the election and
that no member of the then Provisional Ruling Council should stand for
election.
Pointing out that he did not know that the demand had actually
originated from Idi Musa, and was being peddled around by Aziza, whom
he described as the "Man Friday" in the entire plot, Diya said it
would have been impossible to reach him with such demands if not for
the fact that the Generals used Bamaiyi "who was very close to me.
Diya said he had actually nominated Bamaiyi for the post of Chief of
Army Staff. "He was the only service chief at that time who could come
to my house without an appointment", Diya said, adding that he did not
however know that the COAS was always coming to see him with a tape
recorder.
By allowing himself to be so used, Bamaiyi, Diya said, had belittled
the office of the COAS which had so much awe in the days of Gen. Alani
Akirinade and Lt. Gen. T.Y. Danjuma.
Giving an insight into why Abacha wanted him dead, Diya said his
relations with the then head of state had become strained since the
middle of 1997.
The areas of disagreement, he said, centered around the continued stay
of the military in power, the purported self-succession of Gen. Abacha
and the refusal to promulgate into law, the 1995 constitution after so
much material and man- hours had been committed.
Diya said his views on the said issues were very strong but that he
did not know that Abacha interpreted them to mean insubordination.
He said he later became aware that his relation with Abacha had become
strained, but did not know that the hatred had gone so deep that for
Abacha would want to eliminate him until the bomb incident of December
13, 1997 and his subsequent arrest for plotting a coup seven days
later.
With the benefit of hindsight Diya said the 1997 coup plot was not the
first time that military officers working with Abacha would try to
rope him into a coup plot. Wondering why the resolve was to kill,
rather than retire him, Diya said that at one instance Bamaiyi and
Gen. Ahmed Abdullahi, now retired, tried to talk him into giving an
order for the arrest of Gen.
Ibrahim Babangida, which he later discovered was to serve as cover up
for some sinister plots which had been arranged to fail and for which
he could be made to pay with his life. The former CGS said what saved
him on that occasion was his insistence that Abacha be contacted on
the issue.
On another instance, Diya revealed that a journalist had been sent to
him with a pre-taped cassette to ask him some incriminating questions.
Although the fake journalist was apprehended, Diya said the
investigation of the case was handed over to Idi Musa, whom he alleged
he did not know was a part of the plot. "Idi Musa betrayed me", Diya
said.
On the day of his arrest, which he said was actually effected in the
wee hours of December 21, 1997, Diya said the team, which was led by
Magashi was actually directed to kill him and then report that he died
during the exchange of gunfire occasioned by his resistance.
Diya said he was lucky, however, that he got a tip-off and left for a
friend's place from where he was finally arrested.
Diya said when he was arrested and taken to Mustapha's office, he met
Magashi, Idi Musa, Bamaiyi and Ibrahim Sabo.
Insisting that the 1997 coup was aimed at getting rid of Yoruba
officers.
Diya said that the other generals were soon released while the Yoruba
officers went ahead to face what he described as a kangaroo trial and
convicted. Of the nine persons who got the death sentence, all but one
were Yorubas.
To buttress his contention that there was no coup plot, Diya said none
of the convicted officers was commanding any troops and that even the
security details attached to him as CGS were supplied by Mustapha
while Major Generals Abdulkarim Adisa and Tajudeen Olanrewaju were
ministers who barely had soldier-guards attached to them.
Further arguing that the alleged coup plot was a total set-up, Diya
said it was curious that the same set of military officers who had
allegedly uncovered the plot were the same ones who constituted the
PRC which reviewed and confirmed the sentences. He said it was a case
of the accuser being the judge in his own case.
He said it was also instructive that Major-Gen. Victor Malu who
chaired the Special Military Tribunal that tried him and other
suspects did so wearing the badge of Gen. Abacha, whom he said was the
"agent provocateur." He wondered why Abacha was not summoned to
testify or be cross-examined.
To further compound the problem, Diya said that the Major General
Chris Garuba Special Investigations Panel (SIP) which investigated the
allegations and saw that it was all a hoax still went ahead to
recommend that he had a case to answer.
He said the military authorities had closed all the chances of the
accused ever getting a fair hearing when his choice of military
lawyer, Gen. Muktar, was turned down while Lt. Col. Amodu was imposed
on him. Even at that, Diya said, discussion with his lawyer had to be
for just one hour on every hearing day and it had to be done in the
full glare of security operatives.
On the ordeal he faced in both Abuja and Jos detention cells, Diya
said that in Jos, he was handcuffed and chained to the ground and had
to sleep on the bare floor for the first two weeks.
He said actual beating and torturing, carried out by Sergeant Rogers,
Bature, among others, actually began after the first public appearance
on February 14, 1998, when he had told the press that the coup was a
set-up targeted at him and asked why for Magashi, Idi Musa, Aziza and
Bamaiyi whom he was earlier told had been arrested, were not
arraigned.
That statement, he said, also compelled the tribunal to bar the public
and the press from the trials. Alleging that Aziza's appointment as
minister shortly before his arrest on December 21 was a compensation
by Abacha, Diya said there was no reason why he would tell Aziza about
a coup and then ask him to brief Bamaiyi since Bamaiyi was closer to
him than Aziza could ever be.
On the alleged coup videos, Diya said they were a collection of views
and scenes from different, and sometimes unrelated, circumstances
which were mischievously cut and edited to achieve a desired goal.
Probably alluding to his confession in the video, Diya admitted to
telling the late head of state that he had endorsed the 4-point demand
and begged that the other Generals whom he still thought were truly
detained should be released so that he (Diya) could take
responsibility for the act since the demand was interpreted to mean a
coup.
Diya regretted that those of them who should have taken full charge of
the affairs of state during the Abacha regime committed a grave error
of giving junior officers too much room to operate.
"We allowed junior officers and sycophants to hijack our government".
Alluding to the enormous powers reportedly wielded by Mustapha, Diya
said he was sure that if Abacha were alive today and were to be
invited to the commission as a witness, Nigerians would have found out
that much probably happened without his knowledge.
At the end of Diya's statement, Oputa reasoned that the commission
would probably not make much progress if it took the evidence of the
witnesses since the day was far gone. He therefore adjourned the case
to continue today.
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X-URL: http://cometnews.com.ng/13122000/nn53001.htm
Comet News
December 13, 2000
1997 coup was real, says Adisa
Abiola: Mustapha to testify in public
By Foluso Ogunmodede and Kunle Adeyemi
FORMER Works and Housing Minister Maj.-Gen. Abdulkarim Adisa said
yesterday that there was actually an attempt to topple the regime of
Gen. Sani Abacha in December 1997.
"Although what Gen. Diya invited me for and told me was that there was
a four-point demand they wanted to present to the Head of State, Gen.
Sani Abacha, of which I asked him if Gen. Abacha did not agree what
will happen; but to me that demand was a coup because if Gen. Abacha
did not agree they will resort to force to overthrow his government,"
Adisa said.
The former minister who was sentenced to death by the Maj.-Gen. Victor
Malu-led Special Military Tribunal (SMT) for complicity in the 1997
coup, said the late Gen. Abacha was his mentor and there was nothing
that could make him speak evil of him or deny him, even in death.
Speaking before the Justice Chukwudifu Oputa-led Human Rights
Violations Investigation Commission yesterday, Gen. Adisa said he
would have disclosed the coup plan to Gen. Abacha but for the response
the late Head of State gave him on the day he was to divulge the plan
and put some preliminary questions to him.
One of the questions he said he asked the late Abacha was the
necessity of unravelling the circumstances surrounding Gen. Yar'Adua's
death in prison because Nigerians should be told something, to which
Gen. Abacha had replied that it was the duty of the Prison authorities
to solve the problem.
Adisa told the commission, which ruled yesterday that Major Hamza
Al-Mustapha should testify in public, contrary to his request, that he
also asked Gen. Abacha to release two very important personalities
from detention.
He felt their continued incarceration would continue to affect the
government's image, but Gen. Abacha turned deaf ears to his
suggestion.
Gen. Abacha, according to Adisa, had promised to release some people
from detention and had set up a committee to consider the gesture, but
he eventually threw the committee's report into the dustbin.
When Gen. Adisa reminded him of his promise, Gen. Abacha had refused
to actualise it. "And that was why I did not tell him again that there
was a coup plan," he said.
Unknown to him, Adisa said Gen. Abacha had secretly sent some people
to him to find out whether he was aware of the coup plan, but he had
refused to disclose the coup plan to the secret investigators.
Lt.-Gen. Oladipo Diya has consistently maintained that there was no
coup in 1997 and that what was to be hatched was a four-point demand
which Gen. Ishaya Bamaiyi, Gen. Patrick Aziza, AVM Idi Musa and
Maj.-Gen. Bashir Magashi introduced to him as the demand of junior
officers. This, Diya said, he supported wholeheartedly.
Gen. Adisa was replying to questions posed to him by his lawyer after
he had read his petition before the commission last week.
In the petition, Adisa alleged that he was dehumanised by a team of
soldiers led by Major Argungun who came to arrest him in respect of
the 1997 coup.
He said he had a brutalised leg as a result of the way he was handled
by the security agents, adding that two major operations had been
carried out to correct his sight.
Besides, his two plots of land in Ikoyi and Asokoro had been
confiscated by the Federal Government and re-allocated to the former
Chief Security Officer to the late Head of State, Major Hamza
Al-Mustapha.
On Abacha's self-succession bid, Gen. Adisa claimed that he was never
at any point privy to it, and even if he did, he could not have openly
acted otherwise.
Despite his innocence, he said, he was still labelled as Abacha's
chief campaign officer "although I have challenged them to bring
evidence."
Asked about his relationship with Al-Mustapha, Adisa said that the
former Chief Security Officer was indeed a courageous officer, and he
would remain so for ever.
"He respects me a lot and I am not one of those he can shakara," Adisa
said.
He held the likes of General Ishaya Bamaiyi, Ibrahim Sabo and AVM Idi
Musa in high esteem, saying that they were his close friends and he
would not have cause to doubt their sincerity.
But he said Gen. Diya was a senior officer to whom he was not very
close in their days in the military.
Chronicling the 1997 alleged coup, Gen. Adisa told the commission that
he was drawn into it by the former Chief of General Staff (CGS),
Lt.-Gen. Diya who expressed the desire of other officers to present a
four-point demand to Gen. Abacha.
Gen. Adisa said, however, that he did not know the originators of the
alleged four-point demand.
He said: "I do not know the originators of the four-point demand but I
was briefed by Gen. Diya. "Abacha was not expected to refuse the
demand and that should he refuse, he would have been forced. My
involvement in the whole thing was just nine days before I was
arrested."
Commenting on the alleged coup, Gen. Adisa said he was thereafter
referred to Gen. Bamaiyi for further briefing which, according to him,
he was not privileged to know before his arrest.
"I look at it as a coup because it was an intention to force the
C-in-C to accept the four-point demand. Although I never believed them
because within me, it will not work and this made me to disengage from
their plan. I did not even pay any attention to it," he said.
Gen. Adisa, who refused to comment on the relationship between the
late Head of State and Gen. Diya before the bomb blast of December 13,
1997 at Abuja Airport, said he was not operating from Aso Rock and
hence what transpired between them remained exclusively the Villa's
affairs.
He specifically denied giving N50,000 to Major Ishiaku for funding the
coup.
According to Gen. Adisa, it is ridiculous in the first instance to
give such an amount to a Nigerian Major to keep surveillance on
another officer. "The money (N50,000) I gave to Major Ishiaku was
meant for waza. There was nothing to hide. Na condition make crayfish
bend, I am an artillery bomber. And when this boy was arraigned with
us, he was discharged and acquitted as nothing incriminating was found
on him," he said.
After Adisa gave his evidence, he was immediately cross-examined by
Bamaiyi's lawyer, Mr. Yakubu Maikyau.
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BAMAIYI TELLS HIS STORY; SAYS DIYA FUNDED 1997 COUP
(Wednesday, December 13, 2000)
I have read the petition written by Gen. Diya and I cannot help but
sympathise with Diya's lack of grace, to accept full responsibility for
what he not only conceived but also translated into action. This he did by
contacting/recruiting officers in that regard, designing and funding,
amongst other things, the execution of his conception. And I do state that
whereas it remains incontrovertible that Gen. Diya conceived, initiated
and funded the December 1997 aborted coup, the alleged breaches of Gen.
Diya's fundamental rights by me, are not only contestable but did not
exist at all. Furthermore, contrary to the allegations that the 1997
December coup, was a mere set-up in order to humiliate Lt.-Gen. D.O. Diya
and others who are referred to by Gen. Diya in his petition as "... my
ethnic grouping within the army...", the coup was in fact initiated by
Gen. Diya, who independently and personally co-opted officers from his
ethnic group for the coup.
At the Special Investigation Panel (SIP) convened by Gen. Abdulsalami
Abubakar (who was then the Chief of Defence Staff) who later set up the
Special Military Tribunal presided by Gen. Victor Malu (the present Chief
of Army Staff) which convicted Gen. Diya and others for the coup attempt,
I stated the truth about the coup attempt. I will restate the truth of the
facts as they were including the antecedents, in order that Nigerians will
enjoy the full benefit of this public hearing and know the truth about the
coup. I was never arrested and could not have been arrested for reporting
a coup. Every officer in the Nigerian Army is aware that once you know or
hear about a coup and report it, you have no case to answer on the coup
and you can not be arrested in connection with the coup you have reported.
Gen. Diya is fully aware of this position and I should add that in this
particular case, no GOC was arrested.
It all started when I was the Commander of the Lagos Garrison Command in
1995. It was then my responsibility to receive and see off Gen. Diya, the
then Chief of General Staff whenever he came to Lagos, most of which were
at the weekends and public holidays. When I became the Chief of Army Staff
in March 1996, Gen. Aziza took over the command of the Lagos Garrison
Command, and was therefore responsible for receiving Gen. Diya at the
airport whenever he went to Lagos. It was during one of such visits in
1997, as reported by Gen. Aziza, that Gen. Diya invited Gen. Aziza to
drive in the same car with him, and Gen. Diya started discussing the coup
and instructed Gen. Aziza to speak to me about it. At this time, I was on
tour of the Second Mechanised Division of the Nigerian Army, which ended
at the Artillery Brigade, Abeokuta in September 1997.
On the Saturday after I returned to Lagos from the tour, Gen. Aziza came
to my official residence to speak to me on the instruction of Gen. Diya,
about removing Gen. Abacha from power. As soon as Gen. Aziza informed me
about his discussion with Gen. Diya, I contacted the ADC to late Gen.
Abacha, then Lt.-Col. Abdullah and asked him to book an appointment for me
with the C-in-C, late Gen. Sani Abacha. I flew to Abuja on Sunday but was
unable to see Gen. Abacha until the following day being Monday. I reported
to Gen. Abacha as expected of every officer, and suggested that Gen. Diya,
Aziza and myself be called by the Commander-in-Chief to discuss the matter
such that whatever grievances might have existed could be resolved.
Gen. Abacha, however, rejected my suggestion because according to him that
was not the first time Gen. Diya planned a coup against him, but rather,
asked me to meet Gen. Diya as requested by him. I then went to meet Gen.
Diya in his office and after paying compliments, told him that Gen. Aziza
had discussed his message with me. He, Diya restated his grievances as he
reportedly did to Gen. Aziza, and spoke about how he was kept out of the
scheme of things and concluded that there was a need to remove Gen. Abacha
from office. After all, he said, "Gen. Abacha has a terminal illness" and
added that, "when the old man goes, you boys should not forget to maintain
the hierarchy." Gen. Diya had earlier at the Presidential Villa whispered
the same thing to me and I am aware he did to Gen. Aziza as well. I
thereafter reported to the then Commander-in-Chief, late Gen. Abacha of
Gen. Diya's position and he directed me to keep track of Gen. D.O. Diya
until he has completely unfolded his ploy.
As earlier indicated, my first contact with Gen. D.O. Diya on the coup was
on 26 September 1997 in his office. I went to inform him that Maj.-Gen.
P.N. Aziza had spoken to me based on the discussion they had while he was
in Lagos. I then suggested that it would be better if the three of us,
Gen. D.O. Diya, Maj.-Gen. P.N. Aziza and myself met to enable us discuss
the issue properly. He agreed and Maj.-Gen. P.N Aziza and myself met him
in his house one evening in Abuja, for further discussions on the change
of government. My next meeting with Gen. D.O. Diya was in his office
sometimes in October 1997. This time, he spoke at length on how he had
been sidelined and how the Commander-in-Chief had become selfish and would
not listen to advice from those who should have advised him. He also
accused the C-in-C of personalising government, as he did not even allow
the PRC to carry out its functions. Gen. Diya then came out to reiterate
the need for a change and believed that once the change was effected, the
hierarchy must be maintained which meant he would become the
Commander-in-Chief. Then he showed concern about getting the cooperation
of General Officers Commanding (GOCs). I told him that the GOCs would not
be a problem because I could convince them.
Our next meeting was in the CGS's (Chief of General Staff) office.
Although we did not discuss much because the CGS had not contacted
Maj.-Gen. A.T. Olarenwaju (who was already in touch with the CGS on the
issue) so that the three of us could meet. I was later asked to get in
touch with Maj.-Gen. A.T. Olarenwaju and we subsequently met with the CGS
in his guesthouse at Asokoro in Abuja. Not much was discussed at this
meeting which was rescheduled for another date. We then met in Lagos on 1
December 1997 in Maj.-Gen. A.T. Olarenwaju's house, which meeting was
also attended by Maj.-Gen. P.N. Aziza. At this meeting Maj.-Gen. A.T.
Olarenwaju expressed displeasure at his removal as minister and promised
to handle the disconnection of telephone communication in Lagos and Abuja
using some NITEL staff. He also mentioned the fact that he had made
contact with one German who promised to ensure that the German government
recognised the new government once the change was effected. He did not
mention the German's name. He also promised to contact Colonels Madza
and Jando (Arty officers) to join the group.
It should be noted that as soon as Maj.-Gen. A.T. Olarenwaju contacted the
officers, Col. Madza, as expected of every loyal officer, insisted on
seeing the Commander-in-Chief which he did through the Chief of Defence
Intelligence, AVM Idi Musa. This action was responsible for the exemption
of Col. Madza from the coup trial and similarly other officers who pledged
their loyalty with the C-in-C, whereas Col. Jando who was contacted and
accepted to participate without any attempt to report what was ordinarily
an act of rebellion, was tried, found guilty and convicted by the
tribunal.
The next meeting with the CGS and Maj.-Gen. A.T. Olarenwaju took place on
the 6th of December, 1997. During this meeting the decision to remove the
C-in-C was finalised and the C-in-C was to be arrested in Enugu during the
opening of the 1997 Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Annual/Training Conference
on Monday, 8th December 1997 in Enugu. Maj.-Gen. B. S. Magashi was to
handle the operation in Abuja using the Commanding Officers of 3 and 81
Guards Battalions (CO's 3 and 81 Gds Bns). For this reason, I left
Maj.-Gen. B. S. Magashi in Abuja while I proceeded to Enugu for the
conference. Note should, however, be taken that all these plans were made
known to the Presidency at every stage in consonance with military
practice which fact is very well known to Gen. Diya, who in his petition
also affirmed that Gen. Abacha ".... was indeed fully briefed every inch
of the way from the first moment to the last.
We met again in the CGS's office on 11 December, 1997. On this occasion
I had to leave Enugu for Abuja to find out the next plan of action since
the C-in-C did not attend the conference in Enugu. It was at this meeting
that other options were suggested. The CGS was bitter that no alternative
plans were made in case the C-in-C did not go to Enugu. I told him that
the C-in-C gave us all assurance that he was going to attend the
conference. He then gave me other options which he said he had discussed
with Maj.-Gen. A. K. Adisa and Maj. Fadipe and that they were later
relayed to Lt.-Col. M. Garba, Commanding Officer 3 Guards Battalion. Note
that I was not aware that Gen. Adisa had been part of Diya's plan until
Diya himself told me and thereafter we met with Gen. Adisa at Diya's
instance to discuss on the change of government.
At another meeting of 13th December, 1997 attended by Maj.-Gen. B. S.
Magashi, Maj.-Gen. A. K. Adisa and myself at Gen. Adisa's house, Gen. A.
K. Adisa assured us of the loyalty of some body guards, especially Maj.
B.M. Mohammed. He confirmed that he had contacted Maj. B.M. Mohammed who
was to get other bodyguards in the villa to assist. Gen. Adisa also
confirmed that Maj.-Gen. A.T. Olarenwaju was to contact some Arty officers
to coordinate the operations. The largest meeting was that of 14 December,
1997. This was attended by Lt.-Gen. D.O. Diya, Maj.-Gen. A. K. Adisa,
Maj.-Gen. B. S. Magashi, Lt.-Col. M. Garba CO 3 Gds Bn, Lt.-Col. Ribah CO
81 Gds Bn, Maj. Fadipe and myself. At that meeting it was agreed that all
the General Officers Commanding (GOCs) were to be informed and additional
funds were to be made available.
Eventually Two Million Naira was provided by Lt.-Gen. D. O. Diya through Maj.
Fadipe to Lt.-Col. M. Garba CO3 Gds Bn.
THE PLANS (OPTIONS).
Since the C-in-C did not attend the COAS Conference in Enugu, other
options as suggested by Gen. Diya and Gen. Adisa, were ECOWAS meeting in
Lome, NIIA Dinner in Sheraton Hotel, Jummat prayers and D-day. The C-in-C
was to attend ECOWAS Summit in Lome on the 17 December, 1997. He was to be
overthrown as soon as he left Abuja Airport. The CSO, NSA and Comd Gds Bde
were to be arrested at the airport on C-I-C's departure and the change
of government immediately announced. The Presidency was accordingly
informed of this plan and the C-in-C did not travel out of the country.
Since the C-in-C did not travel to Lome, we were informed that he was to
attend a dinner in Sheraton Hotel on 19 December, 1997. The plan here was
to assassinate the C-in-C on his way back from the dinner. In this case
Maj.-Gen. A. K. Adisa had contacted Commanding Officer 3 Gds Bn to provide
soldiers and 4 RPGs to shoot the C-in-C's vehicle on his way out of
Sheraton Hotel. The soldiers were to ensure that the C-in-C did not
escape. The C-in-C did not attend the dinner. There was also a plant o
assassinate the C-in-C on Friday 12 December, 1997 on his way to or back
form the Mosque, or during the Jumma'at prayers. In fact this plant o
assassinate the C-in-C was dropped because of the high casualty that was
bound to occur during this operation.
When other options failed, the option of seizing the Villa, arresting the
Chief Security Officer (CSO), Commander Guards Brigade, National Security
Adviser (NSA) and storming the Villa was finally agreed upon and the D Day
was put for 20/21 December, 1997 and the H Hour was on hearest of the
CSO.I came into Abuja on this day with Maj. Gen. B. S. Magashi in order to
play our supposed roles in the plan y General Diya to effect the Change of
Government. On arrival we preceded to CGS house where the CGS invited Maj.
Fadipe to brief us on he operation. I then asked for the speech to enable
General Magashi read through and rehearse, because as at that time General
Magashi who was assigned the role of announcing the coup, for reasons
stated hereunder, had not seen the speech. General Diya informed us that
the speech was ready but that he was making some corrections.
We left for my then official residence at Forte IBB Barracks with Diya
promising to send the speech as soon as he was through with T he
corrections. At about 6.00 p.m. on 20/12/97 Major Fadipe come to brief us
(General Magashi and myself) on the developments and we asked about the
coup speech. He went back to Diya's residence, collected the speech and
brought it to General Magashi. Major Fadipe gave the H Hour as being on he
arrest of the CSO and wanted to know how best to get the CSO and Comd Gds
Bde. I told them that I was going to invite them to come and see me, then
Maj. Fadipe and his team were to arrest the two officers. Maj. Fadipe
informed us that he had arranged gas that would make the officers Sleep
Off to make the arrest easier. I then connected them with my Security
Officer Capt. UM Bature who knew where the two officers were to be invited
to. The CSO was however warned to remain in the Villa and not leave the
villa for any reason. Maj. Fadipe and his boys were later arrested by t he
CO3 Gds Bn and Capt. UM Bature.
Funding for the Coup was provided by Lt. Gen. D. O. Diya and Maj. Gen. A.
T. Olarenwaju as follows:
*A total of $60,000:00 (Sixty thousand US Dollars) in $50,000:00 (Fifty
thousand US Dollars) Travellers Cheque denomination and $10,000:00 (Ten
thousand US Dollars) Cash were provided by Lt. Gen. D. O. Diya to me on
1st December, 1997 in Gen. Diya's office. The money was meant for
distribution to General Officers Commanding (GosC) to change to naira for
officers and soldiers that were to be on standby as RCA.
Two million naira (N2,000,000:00) was provided by Lt. Gen. D.O. Diya as
additional funds for RCA because the operation was delayed as a result of
the failure of the C-in-C to go to Enugu. The money was given to Lt. Col.
M. Garba CO 3 Gds Bn through General Diya's security officer, Maj.
Fadipe.
Maj. Gen. A.T. Olarenwaju provided a total sum of N1.5 million (one
million five hundred thousand naira). He first provided N500,000:00 (five
hundred thousand naira) to me in Abuja on 28 November, 1997. The money was
collected by Capt. U.M. Bature, and counted by Maj. Gen. I.D. Gumel, Maj.
Gen. B. S. Magashi, Capt. U.M Bature and myself. He later gave the sum of
one million naira to Maj. Gen. P.N Aziza in Lagos. Maj. Gen. P.N. Aziza
sent the money to me on 5th December 1997. All these monies were available
in the same denomination and sum as given to various people and were
presented as exhibits at both the special investigation panel and special
military tribunal.
When the plan reached an advanced stage, Lt. Gen. D.O. Diya wanted to find
out how we can get officers, especially the General Officer Commanding to
accept the plan. I told him as earlier mentioned that we had no problem
with the GosC. He therefore wanted to know who would make announcements in
different parts of the country. He suggested that Maj. Gen. B. S. Magashi
be recruited for the operation in Abuja. He told me why we needed Magashi
in the group and some of the reasons were:
Magashi is from Kano and would be useful in making a broadcast in Abuja as
most Northerners would accept him.
He commanded the Guards Brigade and could easily get the support of
officers and soldiers of the Brigade.
As a Muslim, he was most likely to get the support of majority of Muslims
in the North.
Based on these considerations Lt. General D. O. Diya directed that Major
General B. S. Magashi be contacted and I arranged a meeting between the
two of them where General Magashi assured General Diya of his willingness
to participate in the change of government. The two officers met several
times in my absence. General Diya also suggested that Lt. Col. M. Garba
Co. 3 Gds Bn be recruited because he also hails from Kano, Maj. General B.
S. Magashi was asked by Diya to talk to Lt. Col. Garba. Lt. Col. Garba's
soldiers were to be sued in Abuja. The commanding officer (CO) was then
directed to report to Lt. General D.O. Diya early on the 8th of December
1997 when the C-in-C was expected to have travelled to Enugu to ensure
that important installations were taken over by his soldiers.
The CO and Lt. General Diya held meetings while I was in Enugu, while Maj.
General B. S. Magashi remained in Abuja during part of the Chief of Army
Staff Conference, to supposedly ensure that things were put in place. The
commanding officer 81 Gds Bn was also recruited as part of the group to
effect that change. General Diya also introduced to me a man in his house
who he said was a retired NITEL staff (Engineer A. A. Adebanjo) and was to
disconnect telecommunication systems in Abuja on the D day. He also said
he was keeping the man in his house so that he did not leak the plan. This
man was arrested in Diya's house and subsequently tried for the coup.
One unfortunate aspect of the plan was that, there was no reason for the
change of government beside personal issues and open hatred for the person
of the C-in-C by General Diya I asked several questions on the objectives
of the change and got no reply from Lt. General D. O. Diya. All questions
on foreign support were also avoided. It was very clear therefore that the
reasons and objectives for the intended change of government were only
known to Lt. General D. O. Diya.
In addition to all these, it was unknown to Generals Magashi, Aziza, and
myself, that Generals D. O. Diya and A. T. Olarenwaju had planned to
eliminate us immediately we had concluded playing our various roles
assigned to us by General Diya in the coup. General Aziza was scheduled to
be killed in Lagos whereas General Magashi and myself were to be killed in
Abuja, and the killings were to be presented to the public as incidental
to a shootout between tops loyal to late General Abacha, and we "the
coupists". In my case, one warrant officer Coker attached to General D. O.
Diya who with others were assigned the responsibility of eliminating me,
were arrested and disarmed by my security men led by Captain Bature inside
my then official residence at Forte IBB Barracks, Abuja. General Aziza is
in the best position to say how he escaped being killed in Lagos.
It is clear that the desire by General D.O. Diya to become the
Commander-in-Chief was no respecter of any thing or person perceived to be
a stumbling block on his path. His quest for power at all cost, made
General D.O. Diya to be at home with coup-staging that not only did he
initiate the coup to unseat albeit unsuccessfully, late General Sani
Abacha, but also organised for our elimination unsuccessfully too, all in
the process of executing his own coup. Who else could be a better
"master-minded and executioner" than Diya himself? In fact Diya's
resolve in ensuring that we have heeded to his persistent warning and
reminders that "I rely on you boys, - don't forget to maintain the
hierarchy" engendered his subsequent ploy to eliminate us in order that we
did not live to as much as contemplate refusing him his position in the
hierarchy.
I really wonder if General D. O. Diya would have done what General
Abdulsalam Abubakar did if he (Diya), had succeeded in his coup and
subsequent coup-in-coup. Inspite of General Diya's desperation as
exhibited above, I have been astonished at some statements credited to
General D. O. Diya to the effect that I was to be the head of state if the
coup had succeeded. This is rather ridiculous. What then would have been
General Diya's fate if I became the head of state? Would General Diya,
who was then a Lt. General and I a Major General, retire voluntarily to
let me be the head of state? Or was he going to be a minister under my
supposed regime? What would have been Diya's post in the new government?
General Diya claims in his petition that, those found guilty of treason
with the exception of Colonel Jando were from the same ethnic group i.e.
Yoruba and that none of such persons was a commander of troops and as such
could not have staged a coup. I must state that this statement is most
ridiculous to say the least. The officers he claims are form his ethnic
group, confessed to being parties to the coup plot all of whom were
recruited by General Diya. Also, on the issue of troops, General Diya
consistently emphasised the need to recruit officers who had troops under
their command. He made available money to be shared for the up keep of the
troops during the operation.
Aside from this, General Diya's claim of non-command of troops is most
unfounded. Reference is made to the 1966 coup. Major Chukwuma Kaduna
Nzeoguw, who led the coup was an instructor at the Nigerian Military
Training Centre (NMTC) where he had no command of troops. He was able to
use soldiers in Kaduna to stage a successful coup. In the 1990 Orkar's
coup, Major Orkar did not bring soldiers to Lagos and Major Mukoru and Lt.
Colonel Nyam were staff officers who had no command of troops. Yet, they
were able to mobilise soldiers for their coup.
On the issue of the 1997 coup vis-a-vis the violation of Human Rights, I
did not arrest General Diya, neither did I detain him, nor was I part of
the panel that investigated the coup. I was also not a member of the Court
martial that tried Diya. I did not torture, harass, assault or humiliate
General Diya.
I was in General Diya's house on his invitation to discuss his coup plot
and the fact that I recorded the conversation between General Diya and
myself was completely in order. Apart from the fact that it was done on
the instruction of the late C-in-C, it was necessary for the purpose of
briefing him on the progress of Diya's coup. The records of what General
Diya did, is now very much available should there be any need for a study
of same. Note that it is not Diya's complaint that what was recorded was
not what he uttered."
Apart from Diya's petition before this commission, wherein he alleged
that he was set up in the coup because he differed with Abacha on: The
continued stay of the military in governance, making the 1998 hand over
date uncertain and General Abacha's self-succession plan; I do not know
of any records where Diya had challenged Abacha's self-succession. If I
may ask, what were the specific actions done by General Diya in opposition
to General Abacha's self-succession bid? or, where if any, was General
Diya accused by General Abacha's government as being antagonistic to
Abacha's desire to remain in office perpetually? That General Diya
opposed General Abacha or was "sidelined" because of his alleged
opposition to General Abacha's self-succession bid has always remained
merely in his imagination.
If General Diya as a Senior Officer to me and also the then 2nd in Command
had overtly demonstrated his opposition to General Abacha's policies, I
perhaps would have found a reason to be loyal to him when he suggested a
change of government, but certainly not when he persistently warned that
we "boys must maintain the hierarchy. Apart from General Diya, are the top
echelons of the present Nigeria's political dispensation not the
forerunners in the Adoption of General Sani Abacha as a consensus
candidate? I need not mentioned names in this regard but remain confident
more than ever before that someday history shall vindicate me and others
who sincerely wanted and fought for democracy in our fatherland.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
BBC Thursday, 14 December, 2000, 11:44 GMT
General attacks Obasanjo 'vendetta'
Nigeria's former army chief under dictator General Sani Abacha has accused
the government of pursuing an ethnic vendetta in its investigations of
human rights abuses in the country.
Petitioning the human rights commission in Lagos, Lieutenant-General
Ishaya Bamaiyi, said there was one law for ethnic-Yorubas and another for
ethnic-Hausas.
And he said President Olusegun Obasanjo, himself a Yoruba, was avenging
wrongs committed against Yorubas during the rule of the former military
leader, General Abacha.
He cited the case of the Yoruba militia leader, Frederick Fasehun, who was
last month acquitted of murder after police failed to substantiate the
charges.
Mr Fasehun was involved in ethnic clashes in which more than 100 people
died.
Easy target
General Bamaiyi and some other former army officers face criminal charges
over acts of state terrorism.
Some northern Hausa politicians say President Obasanjo is targeting aides
of General Abacha in his anti-corruption drive and human rights crusade to
avenge his own arrest and imprisonment in 1985 for alleged coup plotting.
But President Obasanjo told the commission when he appeared before them in
early November that he had forgiven all those responsible for his three
years in detention.
Correspondents say that circumstances make the government an easy target
to accusations of ethnic bias because nearly all the security personnel
around General Abacha were northerners, whilst most of the victims of
alleged state terrorism were Yoruba people from the south-west.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALUKO COMMENTARY
----------------
Reading through their accounts before the Oputa panel - of Diya, Adisa and
particularly of Bamaiyi, despite some appearances to the contrary - I am
now fully convinced of one thing: there was a coup attempt PLAN (if not a
coup or a coup attempt) in 1997. The originators, their motives or
trickeries involved in the attempt are quite irrelevant. Abacha indeed
needed to be changed, but these characters were not much better.
A puzzling issue is the following: what time did these "high" military
government officials have left to attend to affairs of state to make the
lives of Nigerians better, when they spent so much time on intrigue? How
could generals kow-tow before majors - and not just shoot the majors off
with one or two bullets and take the next plane out to exile?
What kinds of "yeye" generals are these, paa-paa? What kind of Armed
Forces do we have?
Nigerians MUST be vigilant that these nefarious - and we might add still
largely unrepentant - characters and the military institution which
spawned them NEVER find their way back to governing our country. Those
that remain in Obasanjo's administration - and will still hang around in
subsequent civilian administrations, to cover their own tracks - must be
exposed. Exposing their infantile machinations and raising the collective
disgust of the nation would be a salutary outcome of the Oputa panel
deliberations.
Finally, Bamaiyi's attempt to ethnicize his problem with respect to
President Obasanjo is laughable - but that is Obasanjo's problem. He must
lie on the bed that he makes for himself if "Yoruba" Fasehun's head is
being asked for by Northern politicians in replacement of "Northerners"
Bamaiyi, Mustapha and Mohammed Abacha.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adey Oyenuga
Indeed, there was a "palace coup"... And, if I may add, I
dare submit that Gen. Diya should (now) be man enough
to set the record straight, once and for all.
Unless I'm missing something, I believe that Gen. Diya
had little or no choice but to try and beat Gen. Abacha
at his own game. Apart from resigning from the number
two position - and heading back to his "save haven" in
Odogbolu - his best option was to fight back. And back
then, I mean, the way things were, he (Diya) would be
stupid not to use the "sword" against a sword-wielder.
All in all, I hope these "yeye" soldiers will shed more
light on what actually took place in the so-called PRC.
That is, in relation to the late Chief MKO Abiola. [We
were told - I believe by Diya - that the PRC approved
the "release" of Chief Abiola (four times) but someone
decided to toss these "approvals" into the "dustbin"]. I
also hope that the so-called PRC will shed more light
on the role played by Gen. Abubarkar during:
(1). Abiola's case.
(2). Obasanjo's case.
(3). Yar'Adua's case.
Adey.
emman
nearly a third of the senate? As long as votes can be bought, generals have more
money to buy such votes - or, if you like, more money to influence the elections
should they (the generals) decide that direct involvement would be too dirty and
much below their starch-shirt dignities. Now, we know why education was
virtually marched into the mud during some military administrations. A vastly
illiterate population can be easily duped out of its inheritance of democratic
rights!