Fw: The Genesis Of My Ordeal - Lawan Gwadabe
Uzo Okafor
-----Original Message-----
From: Nubi Achebo <ki...@wwa.com>
To: ne...@FreeNigeria.ORG <ne...@FreeNigeria.ORG>; naij...@esosoft.com
<naij...@esosoft.com>
Date: Friday, September 18, 1998 3:24 AM
Subject: The Genesis Of My Ordeal - Lawan Gwadabe
>The Genesis Of My Ordeal
>
>September 14, 1998
>
>Lagos - A former principal aide of General Sani Abacha, Nigeria's former
>military leader, recounts how he was arrested in 1995 for a treason he
never
>committed. Still spending a 25 year jail term in Gboko Prison, in Nigeria's
>middle belt, Lawan Gwadabe, a colonel traces the genesis of his ordeal in a
>first person narrative.
>
>"Towards the end of General Babangida's regime, General Abacha started
>cultivating my friendship. Prior to that time, I hardly visited him and
>General Babangida for eight years; I was not close to him. Such was also
the
>case with most of the officers, the so-called "IBB boys." I was then the
>Colonel-General of the Lagos Garrison Command. Between May and July 1993, I
>was surprised with the frequency General Abacha called Brig.-General
>Abdulkareem Adisa who was then my commander to send for me. Initially he
>told me that he was aware of my efforts in the rehabilitation of the family
>of the late Brig.-Gen. Ibrahim Bako and that he would want to help. I
became
>very sceptical because in the Army we have never known Gen. Abacha to care
>for the welfare of soldiers, let alone helping the family of an officer who
>died in December 1983. I wondered why?
>
>Any time Gen. Abacha called me to the Defence Headquarters, he won't have
>anything substantial to tell me. I began to suspect that he might be up to
>something. In the meantime, the election of June 12, 1993, was approaching
>and we used to hold meetings in Gen. Abacha's guest house in Ikoyi,Lagos,
to
>appraise the situation in the country, the conclusions of which both
>Generals Abacha and Akilu would convey to then president.
>
>There was, at the last meeting after the two parties held their primaries,
a
>protracted debate on security reports that the two parties used money
>massively at the primaries both in Jos and Port Harcourt. There were two
>schools of thought at the meeting. The security reports apparently did not
>convince most of the officers present at the meeting. Because if indeed,
the
> security agencies discovered such massive bribery, there was a machinery
to
>have the primaries stopped. And, since it was not stopped, it was deemed to
>be a weak report. The officers further stressed the general impatience of
>the Nigerian populace for a return to democratic rule. The second school of
>thought was that, allowing the primaries to stand on a foul foundation
would
>not augur well for the kind of democracy we were looking for.
>
>After the protracted meeting on the pros and cons and taking into
cognisance
>the credibility of the military as a whole, the majority of the officers at
>the meeting opined that the security reports should be ignored and the
>election allowed to hold on June 12. Though understandably, there were some
>officers who thought a double standard was being created because the first
>primaries were cancelled on that basis. Brig.-Gen. Akilu left for Abuja to
>brief the president on the mood of the meeting that night. While General
>Abacha, who chaired the occasion went to Abuja the following morning to
give
>his own version. We generally understood there was further bickering
[though
>we were not there] among the most senior officers, before the president
gave
>the go- ahead to Prof. Humphrey Nwosu to conduct the elections.
>
>In July 1993, Gen. Abacha called me to his office to commend the work I
have
>done to establish the Lagos Garrison Command, because he was briefed that I
>had to move mountains with the help of IBB to get the place established.
>Gen. Abacha never wanted the formation established in the first place. He
>was not aware that the president briefed me. Then
>the catch: that since the election, Gen. Babangida had changed his attitude
>to him and that he, Babangida, had ordered for his telephone lines to be
>bugged. I rejected that assertion and urged that he should go to Babangida
>and ask him, but I concluded that whoever briefed him must have been
>planning some mischief and that I didn't believe his story. I told him how
>everybody had to stick together in the crisis, which the very senior
>officers created for us. The General was shocked about my defence of
>Babangida and my outspokenness on the general situation.
>
>When I left the Defence Ministry, I went to Lt.-Col. Dasuki and discussed
>this latest encounter with Abacha and we all wondered what was going on. I
>decided to go to Abuja and enquire from the president whether something was
>amiss. He assured me there was nothing. The following day Gen. Abacha
>instructed Brig.-Gen. Adisa to again send for me. I went to the ministry
and
>the General was already waiting for me. He went through the same ritual and
>told me categorically that he was instructing me to go and organise the
>burning of the monitoring centre of wire taps and communications which the
>president uses. (For security reasons, I withheld the address of the
>monitoring centre, but it is in Ikoyi). I was visibly shocked. I collected
>myself, and told him that I didn't understand. He repeated the same orders
>to me. I told him flatly that it was impossible and that in the interest of
>peace, I won't let the president know this because it would be a disaster.
>Gen. Abacha was a permanent conspirator; the only luck was that he was not
>endowed with a good IQ. He was using the avenue of our constant meetings to
>turn all of us against Gen. Babangida, but he was never able to succeed.
>This was the beginning of the deep-seated hatred he had for all of us. So,
>when eventually, the Interim Government was put in place, naturally I had
to
>be the first 'disobedient' officer to go. He directed that I should be
>posted to the National Guards then totally in a shambles. I refused to tell
>anybody the reasons for my movement, but it was Abacha's idea to distance
me
>from the troops. I was uncooperative in Lagos and dangerous.
>
>The Abacha Administration
>With the tacit non-cooperation of the South-West for the Interim
Government,
>it was just a matter of time before it collapsed. In fact, the clamour for
>its demise came vociferously from virtually everywhere in the country.
>Clearly, the military had a problem on its hands.
>It, therefore, devolved on the same military team that has been working
with
>IBB to devise an orderly solution to the crisis at hand. I was summoned to
>Lagos and directed to attend the meetings. Not only that, Gen. Abacha found
>it convenient to ask Brig.-Gen. Ahmed Abdullahi to pacify me and seek my
>cooperation. Ahmed reminded me of how important I was to the group and
that;
>they would need my national contact and experience. I assured Abdullahi
that
>I had nowhere better than Nigeria and that I would do anything for the
>National interest. From the start, there were tensions between some
officers
>who were on the side of Abacha and those of us known to be
Babangida'sfriends.
>Even before the final take over by Gen. Abacha, there was some suspicion
>between the two camps. For example, committees were formed to map out the
>way forward based on the clamour by the public on what the military should
>do. On an occasion Brig.-Gen. David Mark, Lt.-Col. Dasuki and myself had
>cause to go and caution Abacha on certain matters regarding military
>postings. He summoned his own group and gave them a contrary briefing. To
>our surprise, the following day, Col. Dasuki and I were in my house when
>Gen. Ishaya Bamaiyi and Said came looking all worked-up. I asked them what
>the matter was? Bamaiyi told us that they had reports that we had switched
>plans, that we wanted to take over the Interim Government and deny Gen.
>Abacha the leadership. We all laughed because it was ridiculous. Later on,
I
>understood they were coming
>directing from Gen. Abacha's house. Obviously at his instance. This pattern
>of behaviour was to characterise our relationship throughout. In fact, that
>is why General Babangida's group had to go regardless of the damage to the
>Armed Forces.
>When eventually Gen. Abacha became the head of state he called Brig.- Gen.
>Abdullahi and I to his office in Dodan Barracks and said that he would need
>my help in the new administration. That I should realise that he didn't
know
>anybody and, therefore, would rely on my kind of contact to help him
>succeed. He said I should forget what transpired before. I told Abdullahi
>that I would not want to work personally with Gen. Abacha, but to support
>the new regime was a must for the Armed Forces. My objection was overruled
>.They said t the C-in-C wanted me to work with him as his Principal Staff
>Officer (PSO). Gen. Abacha reiterated that he trusted my judgement and that
>I must assist him.
>Even before the administration took off, we had our first crisis. Without
>consulting either myself, David Mark, Sambo Dasuki and the others, Generals
>Abdullahi, Gumel, M.C. Ali, Bamaiyi, and Olanrewaju met at Abacha's house
>one evening and decided that all the Babangida's group should be retired,
>including myself. But I understood Abdullahi said since the C-in-C had
>decided to work with me as his PSO for the take off of the administration,
>my name should be deleted. Others present said I should go after all I was
>the "staunchest of the Babangida boys." A compromise tabled by Gen.
>Olanrewaju was accepted to allow me to work with the regime till December
>1994 after which I should be retired. Abdullahi told the meeting that they
>needed me because of my contacts within the country, but it should be kept
>secret.Unknown to all of us that that was what happened at Gen. Abacha's
>house.
>Brig.-Gen. Fred Chijuka was summoned at 8 p.m. and given the hand- written
>list of the officers for him to go to the Nigerian Television Authority,
>(NTA), to get it announced during the 9 p.m. Network News. Unfortunately
NTA
>was not used to doing business that way. Someone in NTA's Newsroom called
me
>that there was one Brigadier who came from Gen. Abacha with a list of those
>to be retired. I told him it was impossible because if it were so, I should
>be aware of it, because it was not long that I spoke to Gen. Abacha. I
asked
>that they should delay the news whilst I sought confirmation.
>I drove to Gen. Abacha's house only to be told he had driven out in the
>company of Ahmed Abdullahi and others. I immediately sensed what was amiss.
>I went to the guest house; they were not there. In order not to delay the
>Network News unnecessarily, being a new regime, I rushed home and called
NTA
>that I was unable to get Gen. Abacha, but they should make Chijuka sign an
>undertaking and then go ahead. That was how my colleagues were retired
>totally out of tune and character with military procedure.
>The following morning, I went to see David Mark and we went over the
>matters. I told him I was submitting my resignation. He told me it would be
>unwise at that moment, because the way he saw things they can frame me up.
>Therefore, I should be careful. Sambo had gone to Sokoto, but he called me
>and I briefed him. He told me the people were not sincere and that I could
>now confirm all the doubts we had about them. In fact, prior to that, when
I
>was still at the LGC, I made an attempt to reconcile both Col. Abubakar
Umar
>and Col. Dasuki with Gen. Abacha in order to bury the schism that erupted
in
>1987 regarding Gen. Abacha's misuse of funds for the Nigerian Army. It was
>then it dawned on me that I was truly in a vicious cycle. If I didn't work
>wholeheartedly they would think I was sabotaging Gen. Abacha.
>At one stage I contacted Gen. Babangida suggesting that I wanted to quit
the
>Army. He advised me against it. So, I decided to stay on and slug it out
>obviously with people who hated my guts, but are forced to
>accommodate me because of my intellect. That was how the Abacha
>administration took off.
>
>Programmes
>
>After the wave of retirements, I became virtually a loner. In one of the
>suggestions Sambo and I advanced, we recommended the formation of the PRC
as
>the highest ruling body. This was derived from the PRC we constituted in
>1985 to run things, before General Babangida took over. Then, there was to
>be a steering committee, something like the brain- trust of the C-in-C. I
>became a member/secretary of the steering committee. At our maiden meeting,
>the committee directed that I should come up with programme of events for
>the government for deliberations. Some members had other assignments to
>carry out.
>I decided to do a lot of extensive consultations and finally within a week
I
>was given, I pounded up a very comprehensive programme which I presented to
>the steering committee. To my surprise; not a single item was changed or
>added. It was adopted. I remember Gen. Gumel commented that they were
>impressed, because they knew I had 'a flair for this kind of jobs.' It was
>this programme which constituted the basis for the Abacha administration.
It
>consisted, among other things, the discussion and the resolution of the
June
>12 issue; the panels to be set up to look into organisations and
parastatals
>that would enhance the revenue base of the country and the setting up of
the
>PTF. I stated why General Babangida rejected it when we first mooted it on
>the grounds that Nigeria had the money to do the job that was wanted
without
>putting extra burden of taxation on the people. There were also the setting
>up of the Constitutional Conference Commission to make the work of the
>constitutional conference easier by drawing up an agenda based on the
>perceived injustices and marginalisation in the land; the constitutional
>conference; the sanitation of the banks due to rampant crash; the
>resuscitation of the War Against Indiscipline and so on.
>Based on these suggestions, Gen. Abacha directed that both Lt.-Gen. Diya
and
>myself should be responsible for their implementation. Hence the
>coordination between our two offices. But that was also the beginning of my
>problems as they began to think I was arrogant and began to feel powerful
>because of doing my duty.
>When I realised that truly Abacha did not know people as he earlier told
me,
>together with Ahmed Abdullahi we embarked on extensive contacts with both
>the political class and the elites. As a matter of fact, most of those who
>eventually became ministers, I made contact with them and arranged for them
>to meet Gen. Abacha. Diya, Abdullahi and myself worked upon the final list
>of the ministers.
>I also went to Chief M.K.O. Abiola twice to open up dialogue for the
>resolution of the annulment of the election. At that time there was genuine
>will to address the issue. I gave the Chief my word and based on my two
>meetings and briefings to Abacha, MKO visited him. Subsequently, talks
about
>the resolution of June 12 started with Brig.-Gen. Abdullahi leading the
>government side. I knew there were meetings, including one in London.
>Abdullahi never briefed the steering committee. I suspected foul play. But
I
>never questioned what they were doing until one midnight when MKO phoned me
>to tell me that any government that would send Ahmed Abdullahi to discuss
>this matter was not serious. I pleaded with the Chief to give me time to
get
>things back on track and get back to him. When I enquired from Abdullahi
>what the matter was, he said they agreed on certain things Chief Abiola was
>to do, but the Chief seemed reluctant to do them. I asked him what was the
>government to do in return? He never told me. Both himself and Abacha
>started playing the June 12 card close to their chests. I am not sure
>whether Diya was briefed either. In fact, besides my brief which, I was
>policing with tenacity of purpose, the affairs of government started
>becoming rudderless. As small as the steering committee was, it was
>dividedinto
>three. I was the only neutral face there. It was not a good omen.
>It became clear that we needed a lot of work to reconcile the situation. I
>decided to use my initiative to reach out to Chief Enahoro. Obviously with
>MKO out of the country, Chief Enahoro came along with Chief Cornelius
>Adebayo. We had our discussion and made them to see the C-in-C. I reach out
>to the North and briefed Alhaji Liman Ciroma, Adamu Fika, Sunday Awoniyi,
>and Mahmoud Tukur and linked Gen. Abacha with Alhaji Liman Ciroma for
>consultations. I contacted Chiefs Ojukwu, Sam Mbakwe and Iwuanyanwu and
>arranged for regular contacts with Gen. Abacha for him to have the feel of
>the aspirations of the polity.
>My main aim all the time was to advise Gen. Abacha to reach out to the
>mainstream of the populace. The credibility of the regime rested on
>adherence to promises made, resolution of the June 12 crisis, and a genuine
>return to democracy. Obviously my constant sermon was misplaced, but I
never
>knew what Gen. Abacha plans were, because he never mentioned them.
>Gradually I began to notice some irritations with my kind of style of work.
>Lt.-Gen. Diya started complaining that I was usurping his work and the
>senior cabal even started accusing me that I was working as if I was the
>head of state. It was then some people began to sponsor articles in
>newspapers, magazines, calling for the curtailment of my power. Several
>times, I had to ask the General whether there is anything I was doing
wrong.
>He would tell me I was doing very well. So I never bothered with the
>rantings of my senior officers who were expecting me to do
impossiblethings.
>I was beginning to feel that there's something wrong with the members of
the
>steering committee. Everybody seemed to be scheming against the other. I
>decided to maintain my neutrality. The members of the steering committee
>were General Sani Abacha –Chairman; Lt.-Gen. Oladipo Diya – V/chairman;
>Major -Gen. Chris Ali – Member; Major-Gen. I.D. Gumel– member; Major-Gen.
T.
>Olanrewaju – member, Brig.-Gen. A. Abdullahi – member; Major-Gen. P.
>Aziza -member; Major-Gen. B. S. Magashi -member; Col. Lawan Gwadabe
>–secretary.
>If you relate to where all the members are today, then you will have a fair
>idea of what I mean. The entire committee members had vengeance all the way
>against virtually everybody. A condition of mind that could never give room
>for rationality in any action, let alone taking political decisions for a
>country like Nigeria. It became clear to me that I was just a bloody
>outsider, who had to be there, to make them look good.
>I was also working with various think tanks both in the North and the
South.
>I initiated the April 1994 conference on the way forward conducted by Arewa
>House. When I convinced the organising committee to invite Gen. Obasanjo,
to
>give the keynote address, I had to go to a great length to have the General
>to reschedule his visit to Arusha, Tanzania, because of the interest
>ofNigeria.
>But unknown to Gen. Obasanjo, Gen. Abacha objected to his being invited as
>the keynote speaker. I had to advise that it was too late to change Gen.
>Obasanjo and insisted that he should be allowed to bare his mind. He is
>experienced and he is the only person who could tell us our problems in the
>face without fear or favour. I told Abacha that Gen. Obasanjo is a blessing
>to Nigeria with his global respectability.
>I sent an aircraft to bring the General through Abuja en-route Kaduna. I
>virtually imposed that courtesy call on Gen. Abacha, but I never told
>General Obasanjo these aspects of my constant guerrilla warfare. They had
>about an hour's discussion. Abacha solicited Gen. Obasanjo's support
because
>of his reputable standing. Gen. Obasanjo wanted to know the programmes and
>the date of return to democracy. He opined that military regimes are
>unacceptable worldwide. Gen. Obasanjo indicated that he could only put his
>weight behind a framework of
>programmes that can convince the international community of the intention
of
>the regime to genuinely hand over. This session did not go down well with
>Gen. Abacha, since he was even biased before General Obasanjo's arrival.
>After Gen. Obasanjo had left, Abacha warned me not to continue to apply
>pressure on him. That I didn't know "those people." He said it was they,
who
>sent him to Chad, so that he could be killed. That Obasanjo didn't like
him.
>I pleaded that as head of state, he should have a big heart to forget the
>past and be accommodating. Clearly, I was beginning to become an irritant.
>Somehow I always managed to get him to do some work, most of the times very
>reluctantly.
>Shortly after the Obasanjo incident, both Generals Diya and Abacha proposed
>that I should combine my job with that of Director of Customs Service. Or
go
>to the Customs fully because of the situation there. I rejected the
>proposals on the ground that we had only gone half way into our programme
>and that there was a lot to do, that I would simply waste my talents at the
>Customs. But the C-in-C and Diya insisted that I go. That gave me the
>impression that either they had no appreciation for what I was doing for
>them, or they were fed up with me. As such, the earlier I left, the better
>it would be for their designs. My plan for my movement to the Customs
>Service was killed when both Chief David Attah, Chief Press Secretary and
>the Personal Secretary to the C-in-C Alhaji Sarki Ibrahim, went to him to
>say that I was virtually the engine of the government that if he allowed me
>to go, he would regret his actions before he backed down. Eventually,
>Major-Gen. Samuel Ango got the job.
>After this incident I became frustrated and really wanted to leave the
State
>House. Most frustrating was that Abacha never cared for channel of
>communication. He was never a respecter of time. In fact, he acted as if
the
>whole world must wait for him. He was quite incapable of articulating his
>own position on any subject. Even when such positions were made available
to
>him, he was usually devoid of any understanding. Working with him as PSO
was
>the most-frustrating thing that I have ever done. Abacha hadn't a clear
>grasp of the problems of Nigeria despite all his years of tutelage under
>IBB. His highest interest was money. He was obsessed with making money and
>yet he was always ruthless in denying others even their basic entitlements.
>
>My Posting
>
>We were in this situation of no war no peace, when the C-in-C left for the
>Non-Aligned meeting in India. In his absence, Maj.-Gen. M.C. Alli, then
>Chief of Army Staff (COAS), summoned me to Lagos and told me that the
C-in-C
>had directed that I should be posted out of Abuja. I demanded to know
>whether there was something I did that was wrong. He said no, that it was
in
>line with my career planning. That it appeared I had "done too many
>political works" that I needed a command. Because one day if it comes to
the
>question of higher appointments, commands held would count. M.C. Alli knew
I
>never bought the bullshit he was telling me. I asked him whether he was not
>a military governor before and whether that militated against his becoming
>COAS? And, at any rate, I wanted to correct him and asked whether my posts
>as Colonel-General and Commander, National Guards were not political jobs,
>but I got the message loud and clear. I told M.C. Alli since they had
>started with me, he should watch out because he may be the next victim of
>the hatchet guys. I got my marching orders to The Gambia and left the COAS.
>Obviously, the steering committee had met somewhere, and their December
>deadline to sack me had passed, and they are looking for a nice way to lay
>it on me. The funny thing is that I was always aware of what they were
>doing. When Gen. Abacha returned, I did not mention the issue of the
posting
>to him. He too did not talk to me about it. I decided to write my handing
>over notes and when Col. Kwembeh was posted in, an
>obvious choice of M.C. Alli, I did not inform the C-in-C until the day I
was
>handing over. I introduced the new officer and told the C-in-C that I was
>finally taking my leave. Gen. Abacha became embarrassed and asked my
>reliever to go out. Then he was pretending to me that, that was not the way
>to leave the State House and that we must discuss before I go. He said
>further that my posting had become politicised, that all his ministers and
a
>lot of emirs were phoning him to protest my posting. That even the officer
>Alli posted to him was not the person he wanted. When he finished I told
him
>that when I joined the Army, I signed to serve anywhere.
>Going to The Gambia was perfect and I promised him that I would project the
>image of his government in my work. He insisted that that's not the way I
>should leave, that we must see the following day. The following day was May
>Day. After the parade, I came and took leave of him amongst his service
>chiefs deliberately and left. He expected to see me in the evening, but I
>left for the airport straight to Lagos. Since my responsibility had nothing
>to do directly with the C-in-C, I limited my visits and reports to the DHQ
>and reported to the Chief of Defence Staff. I totally boycotted all the
>members of the steering committee including the C-in-C. That finally was
for
>them the opportunity they were looking for. The day I returned from The
>Gambia was the day Maj.- Gen. Gumel and Abdullahi directed Maj.-Gen. Onoja
>to retire me on the orders of the C-in-C. Onoja, being my friend, thought
>that was unusual since such orders must come from Gen. Kazir who was then
>COAS. Gumel said I boycotted all of them because I was posted, as such I
>must be having the C-in-C in mind. Therefore, I must go.
>Of course, I am never one to go down without a fight. I told Onoja to hold
>his fire, that I would get to the bottom of this intrigue first. I went to
>Ahmed Abdullahi who was a party to the intrigues and dragged him to
>Bamaiyi's house. Bamaiyi called Aziza to join us and I narrated what Gen.
>Onoja told me. I demanded to know why I should be paid that way despite my
>devotion. In fairness to Bamaiyi and Aziza they were not aware of the plans
>to retire me.
>As it turned out the plan was between Gumel, Abdullahi and Magashi. They
>simply felt I was bad trouble, so I should go. Ahmed Abdullahi then
launched
>into a tirade that I ganged up with IBB to marginalise him. That he would
>not forgive particularly me and Sambo Dasuki. To cut a long story short, I
>advanced superior argument to show Abdullahi that he was the architect of
>his own downfall. After over two hours, we resolved to go and see Gumel.
>Gumel told me he was not happy the way I treated Abacha, that my actions
>showed that I had him in mind, but that they would see what they could do
>about the matter.
>I left them and went straight to Gen. Abubakar. I told him why I had to
>avoid them since I left Abuja: that national interest was not their
>philosophy, only the art of settling scores with imaginary enemies. I
>briefed Gen. Abubakar about the nonsense that I had to endure since I left
>Abuja and demanded to know whether I was the only officer left in the Army
>that worked with Babangida, because that was the crux of the matter. Gen.
>Abubakar calmed me down and promised to speak to the C-in- C. He swore he
>was not aware of the matter, but that he would do something about it. He
>directed that I should see him in the office. Gen. Abubakar called Abacha
>and took my matter up. Abacha then told him that Gumel, Abdullahi, and
>Magashi came to him to say that it was the consensus of the meeting that I
>should be retired. Of course, Gen. Abubakar was not a member of the
steering
>committee, although I briefed him. Gen. Abacha said Abubakar should speak
to
>them.Gen. Abubakar summoned Gumel and Abdullahi and told them he had
contacted
>the C-in-C over my matter and he wanted them to proceed straight to the
>C-in-C from his office to go and undo what they did
>about me. They went to Abuja but didn't tell us what transpired between
them
>and Abacha..However, before they left Abuja, the ADC to C-in-C phoned Gen.
>Kazir to inform him that Gen. Abacha had directed that my posting as
>Brigade-Commander to 21 Armoured Brigade be effected.
>This was the genesis of my problems. I was not in any way connected with
any
>coup. My arrest and subsequent charge with coup-plotting was discussed in
>the office of Maj.-Gen. Gumel, who was then Chief of Defence Intelligence
>with Major-Gen. Olanrewaju, who was my GOC, in attendance, and Gen. Ishaya
>Bamaiyi and Gen. Patrick Aziza. They concluded that this was finally the
>opportunity to finish me, where no senior officer could rise in my defence.
>Before I finally returned from The Gambia, I came for routine consultations
>with Gen. Abubakar as CDS and General Ikupolati, the Chief of Operations
>when the coup in The Gambia took place.
>Being the COAS, it was my responsibility to safeguard Sir Dauda Jawara.
>There was an American Naval ship there on training visits where the
>president took refuge. I found a link to the ship through the American
>government. I spoke to Jawara and promised we shall get back to him.
Through
>my series of meetings at the DHQ, we resolved to restore the ousted
>president. Gen. Abubakar asked that I apprised the C-in-C. I phoned him in
>Abuja and gave him a detailed brief. I also contacted the ship and told
>Jawara to expect Abacha's call. I also urged the C-in-C to speak to
>President Clinton and assure him that Nigeria would do something. At my
>prompting, Gen. Abacha pledged that Nigeria would restore democracy in The
>Gambia. Both Clinton and Jawara were pleased.
>The DHO issued directives to AHQ to prepare operational order for the
>restoration of president Jawara. Luckily the fifth battalion was ready for
>its rotation visit to Liberia. It was logical that I lead it to The Gambia
>to finish the job. Preparations were made and the service chiefs went to
>Abuja to brief the C-in-C. They (service chiefs) went and sabotaged the
>plans. I was told by M.C. Alli that it was not our business to restore
>democracy being a military regime. I was surprised that Gen. Abacha
couldn't
>remember the promises he made. In short, the C-in-C and his service chiefs
>left both Jawara and myself in the cold.
>At the DHQ, Major-Gen. Adisa told me that 'my friends' were not happy that
I
>was to lead the operations, that after all I was everything during the Gen.
>Babangida's government and moreso must I also add being a hero on top? He
>pleaded that I should not quote him. That was how a plan I perfectly worked
>out was killed because no one wanted me to shine. When I finally returned
>from The Gambia I decided to go and see Gen. Abacha myself. I briefed him
>once again and called his attention to the implications of aborting the
>mission. To my greatest surprise, he told me the service chiefs did not
give
>him the true picture of things on the ground and the extent of the
>preparations we made. He was even categorical that it was M.C. Alli who
>misled him. I told the C-in-C that on account of his failed promise to
>restore the democratic government of The Gambia, no Western country would
>take him seriously again nor his efforts at a transition to democracy
>because he lied to President Clinton .
>The head of state then told me that since I left the State House "nothing
>positive" had happened; that he didn't like the staff they brought to him.
>He finally said he would like me to come back to my office. I was shocked.
>But I thanked him and told him I was happy he still thought I could
perform,
>but that I would rather go and command my brigade. I promised that
>anything - papers or any proposition — he wanted I could always write and
>send Lt.-Col. Maina, one of his cousins in the brigade. General Abacha told
>me that "my friends," meaning the members of the steering committee, always
>came to him with complaints about me, as if he didn't know me.
>
>That for the eight years we served in
>the Babangida caucus, he knew my capabilities. That sometimes people
mistook
>my outspokenness for something else. That I should forget the recent post
>and please always get in touch with him from Yola. He finally insisted that
>I must visit all the offices to salute all my staff. That any time I had
>some papers to write for him, I should not allow the members of the
steering
>committee to know. He also said he had sacked M.C. Alli for these kind of
>activities and the remaining one (meaning Diya) he was watching him. I have
>been a victim of Abacha's intrigues for long, I listened to his jazz and
>left to take over my command in Yola. I made sure nothing connected me with
>them again. I was doing my work under Maj.-Gen. Olanrewaju who hated my
guts
>like hell, with no incidents, until they sent a presidential jet to bring
me
>to Jos.
>
>The Arrest
>
>On 26 February 1995, Brig.-Gen. M.L. Yusuf,the Colonel-General of the 3
>Armoured, Division,Jos, called me at 3 p.m.and told me that the COAS had
>directed that my attention was needed at the HQ in Jos, for a meeting on
the
>Bakassi situation. I quickly snapped back that I don't see how my brigade
>was related to the Bakassi situation, with the advise that he should
>cross-check his information properly. Yusuf then said: "Sir, these are the
>orders and the aircraft that brought the GOC from Lagos has left for you.
>That was how I deduced it was, of course, no Bakassi matter, but something
>funny. Since my conscience was clear, I called my staff officers and
briefed
>them and ordered the brigade intelligence officer to carry the Brigade
>commander's maps for us to travel to Jos for a meeting. When the aircraft
>eventually came, I didn't even wait to break my fast, we left for Jos. Upon
>arrival I was received normally and lodged at the guest house at Rayfield.
>It was the following day that soldiers surrounded the guest house.
>I became worried after two days when the GOC or the military administrator
>did not show up. I sent for my cousin, Alhaji Sanusi Mato, and told him
>something funny was going on, that I was here and nobody told me what was
>going on. I told him to go to Yola and pick my green bag in my room, and
>hand it over to my wife. I had my money from The Gambia inside. That
wasall.
>I also told him to tell my wife that as far as I was concerned this must be
>some big mistake. What even it was, nobody should be worried. Because I was
>hundred per cent sure of myself.
>Then when I insisted, the GOC began to send Lt.-Col. Hassan, the commanding
>officer of military police and Lt.-Col. O. Akiode, commanding officer of
the
>intelligence, to be visiting me. They themselves said they heard only
>rumours of arrest of officers for a coup plot. I told them it must be a
>joke. I was worried whether my officers in the brigade were up to
something.
>Akiode even told me that my brigade intelligence officer had gone back
toYola.
>After a week Lt.-Col. Akiode went to Lagos. He was very sympathetic over
the
>situation.He promised that whatever his findings on the situation was, he
>would let me know. When Akiode came back, obviously he didn't tell me the
>whole story, but I was not dumb. He said Brig.-Gen. S. Mukhtar, who was
then
>at DMI, explained to his officer that my arrest was due to my frequent
>movement on pass. That as far as he knew that was what I was to explain,
>that if I could defend my movements he believed there was nothing. Akiode
>told him that I never used to move out of the Division without the
>permission of the GOC. Brig.-Gen. Mukhtar said if that's the case, he
should
>tell me not to worry.
>
>However, Akiode later found out from the boys that the case at hand had
>nothing to do with me, but that there were some people high up there who
>wanted me implicated at all costs.He said, after the exercise he would
>disclose to me who the senior officers were. I was even surprised that
>Akinyode added, "Sir, please after this situation is over, you
>should just think of leaving the Army." Definitely Akiode knew what I did
>not know. He kept telling me that he was 100 per cent sure I was innocent,
>but he won't go any further. I always knew by God that I had never done
>anything.
>
>Similarly, my wife met Maj.-Gen. Moukhtar, who was then my friend.He told
>her that it was my GOC, Maj.-Gen. Olanrewaju, who ordered that I should be
>arrested and that so far, there was no further briefing on me from the GOC.
>At the security group, Apapa, Col. J. K. Olu was happy when my name was
>shortlisted among the people to be arrested. Though, there was nothing on
>me, yet he directed a file be opened for me and that my Ikoyi house should
>be searched. The house was searched by four officers. Only one old memo I
>wrote to president Babangida was what they took. From the officers
>themselves, uptil May 1995 that was the only paper in my file.
>
>In Abuja, on 26 February 1995, Major Al-Mustapha went to my official
>quarters with the ADC to then first lady. They took my two cars and cased
>away all my files and brief cases. Col. Kwembeh, who took over from me as
>the PS0, came after Al- Mustapha had looted my clothes, books, etc. He
stole
>some electrical cables kept in my custody in the garage. I did not pack out
>of my Abuja quarters because MC Alli said as secretary of the steering
>committee, I would be required to come for meetings from time to time, so I
>should leave my place as it was. Not to disobey orders, I left my things as
>they were.
>
>As for my two cars, I understood Al- Mustapha kept one for himself and gave
>the 505 which was a gift given to me by one of the Southern African leaders
>to Maj.-Gen. B.S. Magashi. They did so because the two of them had already
>concluded that I was going to be killed. Even from the very first day I was
>arrested, I was adjudged guilty of what they planned for me! From the
>beginning, it was quite obvious that I was not connected with anybody.
There
>was no offence, the fact was that they just wanted a convenient way to
>eliminate me.
>
>Lt.-Col.Maina, from my brigade, was summoned by Gen. Abacha three days
after
>I was arrested. He berated Maina, who was with me in Yola, for not knowing
>that I was planning a coup. Maina outrightly told him that it was a lie
>since I had always told him of the mischief members of the steering
>committee had been planning against me. The C-in-C then told him to go back
>and put his ears to the ground. Maina came back and met my brigade in a
>mourning mood. Because that was the first time in the history of the Army
>that a Brigade- Commander, a popular one for that matter, would be accused
>of plotting a coup without any officer or soldier in his brigade getting
>involved. Nobody in my brigade was interrogated, mentioned, or arrested.
The
>officers and soldiers knew it was a blatant lie. I was later told the
entire
>brigade and their families prayed for me throughout the period.
>
>Surprisingly, during the trial, I saw Lt.-Col. Maina defending his
>course-mate-Major Obalisah, who,was implicated by a cousin of Abacha simply
>because he (Obalisah) refused him the use of the telephone in Maina's house
>where Obalisah was squatting in Lagos. Obalisah was also accused of
>expressing reservation that he was not promoted. I watched how Maina
>defended his friend, all to no avail.
>
>Then, during the break, he came to see me, looking very morose. I asked him
>not to worry, that God loves the truth and as such we are not going to be
>killed. He told me after Abacha had lambasted him in February, that he was
>surprised the the General still sent for him to apologise for that. That
the
>interim report had been submitted, that totally I was not involved in
>anything. I was shocked. So I asked Maina how come I was being tried with
>these people? He told me he himself was surprised on the situation. But he
>promised me that on his way he would stop in Abuja to express his shock.
>Knowing Maina I am sure he did that.Investigations
>During the investigations, I was virtually the last officer called after
>they had finished with everybody. Throughout the interrogations, no
officer,
>or any civilian mentioned that he had met me or that I had spoken to him or
>her about any coup plot. All the hullabaloo about Gwadabe leading a coup
>vanished just like they manufactured it.
>
>The Special Investigation Panel (SIP), by this time, was really desperate
>about my issue. I heard that there was confusion at the DMI because they
>feared for what would happen for arresting me for no just cause. They then
>decided to begin the interrogation of Major A. S. Umar, my former ADC. He
>was interrogated well over 15 times – yet no way. My cousin, Sanusi, was
>interrogated 16 times – yet no way. He told them I never discussed any plot
>with him. Lt.-Col. Santuraki asked me what I allegedly told my cousin I was
>going to do in 1996? Sanusi told them I was reading, preparing for the War
>College or Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies. Nobody
>throughout the interrogations, connected me with anything or anyone.
>
>Out of sheer desperation, the investigation panel Team A said I was
>uncooperative with them. They would be reading fake statements to me
>purporting that that was what the others said, I would deny and they bring
>them to face me. I didn't even know 95 per cent of the officers arrested.
>Then the panel accused me of trying to show that I was smarter than them
and
>that I was always speaking like Shakespeare even though, they said, the
same
>Army trained us. They said they would teach me a lesson in order for me to
>cooperate with them. At a stage, Lt.-Col Santuraki passed a note to
>Commander Appollo from Maj.-Gen. Mujakperuo for his permission for me to be
>taken for torture, because I was not cooperating.
>
>I was then taken to the torture chamber by a team led by ACP Hassan Zakari
>Biu.Others were S/Sgt Saleh Birma, CPL Dominic Ayu A, L/CPL Awo, and two
>other sergeants. Their instruction was to tighten the handcuffs on my left
>hand and block the blood vessel from supplying. By the time we arrived at
>the torture chamber, after almost an hour's drive, my left hand had become
>useless.
>
>When we alighted from the vehicle, the officer balked to me that: 'You will
>either die with honour or tell the truth.' With my already dead hands, the
>cuffs were removed from the front and my hand cuffed from the back. My legs
>were tied together like a cow ready for slaughter. Then the ropes on my
legs
>were drawn up suspending me on my head, but without touching the ground.A
>few minutes later, the ropes were further drawn up, this time levelling me
>up.Then the soldiers spread me on a rack even while my legs were tied and
my
>hand cuffed to the back. A long pole was then inserted between my arms from
>the shoulders, thereby suspending me like an eagle.
>
>Annoyingly ACP Zakari Biu came to my side, asking whether I was ready to
>talk about the coup plot ? I then told Zakari Biu,' I have told you all
that
>you needed to know in the Team A. You were there and that is the truth. I
>know nothing about a plot nor who's up to anything.' Thereafter he started
>the typical interrogation nonsense, went over the same story, mentioning
>Gen. Kazir as my friend. All kinds of senseless questions. When I got tired
>I kept quiet.
>
>We kept going over the same questions and we did not make any progress.
Then
>Biu said if I agreed to write how to overthrow the government they would
>bring me down. That I should accept I know something about the alleged coup
>so as to prevent further suffering. This I refused. Meanwhile, my hands
were
>dead, my legs had no feelings. Matter of fact, what I could remember
>functioning in my body was only my brain. I kept quiet. Normally, the
>torture chamber regulation was for only 45 minutes, but ACP Zakari Biu said
>since I was not cooperating with them they will make me to suffer the more
>.Truly, they left me there- spread like a helpless eagle for 2 hours and 45
>minutes.
>
>Nobody ever survived such long period. At a stage they removed the pole
>across my shoulders and loosened the rope. I was then flapped with my head
>down. I
>heared Hassan Biu said that since I was annoyed it was better they let me
>die. After two hours, the soldiers started quarrelling among themselves
that
>the torture was too much for me and that I should be brought down. Tempers
>were high. I was listening to them. Reluctantly,Hassan Zakari Biu handled
>the ropes and the soldiers took me for dead, because in actual fact
>everywhere in my body had collapsed. I was then dumped on the floor of the
>vehicle. My hands were swollen and the cuffs had gone deep into my flesh as
>if to cut through. The whole situation had gone beyond pains. I closed my
>eyes, and listeneed to the unfolding drama. The soldiers were very angry at
>Zakari Hassan Biu and his people. When the vehicle moved, the soldiers with
>the exception of the wicked staff sergeant, Birma, decided to put all their
>feet under me for comfort. Two of them actually cried.
>
>By the time we got back to the SIP, I was almost completely paralysed. The
>following day, I could not move any limb. I had to be carried to the
toilet,
>my body was really paralysed this time. One of the soldiers or officers in
>the SIP leaked the information to the BBC the following day. Abuja panicked
>when they heard I was paralysed. Conscience was beginning to worry some
>people because they knew I did not commit any offence. An order later came
>from Abuja to order a stoppage to the torture. Thereafter, Lt.-Col Moghbe,
a
>physiotherapist, was assigned to work on me. I was too determined to be
>paralysed.
>
>After 54 days of therapy, I started recovering the use of my right side.
>Then later the left side. I had to learn how to write all over again,
learnt
>how to walk with the help of crutches and endless exercises. In fact, God
>wrought His magic on me. Even Lt.-Col. Moghbe was amazed at my recovery. I
>told him that was simply the triumph of the will. It was a harrowing
>experience, though. All the effort to break my spirit failed because even
>the perpetrators knew full well that it was all a farce, a monumental
>charade.
>
>When they couldn't break my spirit and seeing that I was gradually
>recovering, the same team A now barged into my room. They said I had not
>said anything and had not cooperated. They then brought one military doctor
>who injected me on my right hand. I went wild and fainted. But within
>minutes I recovered, laid still to catch what was going on. The doctor was
>crying, shouting 'Jesus, Jesus.' The doctor thought I had died. Then
>Lt.-Col. Santuraki tried to exhibit bravado. In calming the doctor, he
asked
>him not to worry and that even if I die, Maj.-Gen. Mujakperuo-chairman had
>sanctioned it. The doctor was not convinced yet, but they were all scared.
>It was after this day that the SIP devised the means of getting Col. Fadile
>to frame me, because up till then, there was nothing on me and according to
>them it was embarrassing.
>
>The Framing Plot
>
>After more than three months and torture with nothing found to suit Abacha
>and the steering committee's designs on me, the SIP resorted to blackmail
>and wickedness. Abacha then directed that everybody must be charged for
>treason. Col. Bello Fadile himself inform me that ACP Zakari Biu told him
>that, 'We desperately need something on Gwadabe, you have to help us and
>cooperate with us.' I never forgot these words.
>
>Gen. Mujakperuo also had a session with Col. Fadile threatening that if
>Bello wanted to survive, then he should include myself, and Generals
>Obasanjo and Yar'Adua in the frame-up story. Mujakperuo cajoled Bello that
>if he implicated us, there would be grounds to try us and the officers
under
>investigations can survive. That was the deal. From that day, the SIP told
>him about the three of us.
>
>On a particular midnight, they assembled the two of us and then read a
>three-page statement. They called it confrontation. I was not allowed
>to ask Fadile questions, but when they read the agreed three- page
>statement, he agreed with everything that was allegedly what transpired
>between me and himself. It was the stage they wanted for their propaganda.
>Lt.-Col. Santuraki told me, that Col. Fadile was more credible to them than
>myself and that whatever he said against me was the correct thing that took
>place between us. After Fadile finished concurring with them, they asked
him
>to go.It was at this juncture that they threatened me, without any fear of
>God,
>that if I did not accept Bello's submission, Abuja had given them the
>permission to arrest my mother and my wife to be charged along with me.
>
>These people, I realised, were desperate. Because during the day time, I
saw
>Bamaiyi, he came to see the chairman. One of the soldiers told me he came
to
>ask why up till then they had had nothing on Gwadabe? I guessed that
>informed the hastily-organised midnight confrontation.
>
>It was bad that I was framed-up. To bring my family in would be a disaster.
>I decided to coast along with them, hoping that the SMT would be a citadel
>of justice. But, as it was, it didn't make any difference to the determined
>kangaroo court. Despite Col. Bello's repudiation of the three-page stuff,
>Gen Aziza simply said his tribunal would take judicial notice of the
matter.
>When Lt.-Col. Shuaibu, the prosecution crown witness, came to give
evidence,
>he was asked about me.He told them he was surprised to see me there and
that
>throughout his meeting with Fadile my name never came up. Even when the
>prosecution linked me with Lt.-Col. Sambo Dasuki, surprisingly Shuaibu
>defended us vigorously that we had no connection whatsoever. Unfortunately,
>nobody seemed to know, with the exception of Gen. Aziza, that I was being
>prosecuted by the steering committee along with Gen. Obasanjo and Yar'Adua.
>Our case was fixed even before we were arrested.
>
>One interesting thing to note was that during my trial as accused No. 2,
the
>prosecution lawyer, which was all an arrangement, asked ACP Zakari Biu,
>'Please, how do you assess the accused?' Biu then replied, 'With the
profile
>of Col. Gwadabe and his exposure, I believe he is capable of doing anything
>in the world.' And, then he went on to say there was no need to jail me,
>because in Ghana someone came out to take over the country. In fact, it was
>so bad that Aziza had to stop the proceedings and ordered the recorders to
>expunge Biu's statement from the records. That showed the sheer desperation
>to convict one soul – that of Col. Lawan Gwadabe. It was indeed, a shameful
>charade. It was the nadir of the military. After the SMT,the stage was set
>for the regime to instill fear into the people. If people like us could be
>dealt with, who is there to challenge the regime?
>
>During the SIP proceedings, two of my course-mates were on the panel. Cols.
>Sule Ahman, and Umaru Mohammed. They visited my room when I was
>recuperating, ostensibly to persuade me to talk. They said Abacha briefed
>them that one Alhaji Lawal Idris, who was supposedly to be a friend of
>myself, Sambo and Ahmed Abdullahi, was the one who informed him(Abacha)
that
>the three of us were planning coup. I laughed, because I knew the officers.
>I then put a question to them whether with all what they know of me, I
could
>do what I was being accused. I also charged them to fear God. In fact,
>almost simultaneously the twosome told me actually they were sure I didn't
>do anything. I then said; ' Now, why don't you tell them?' Col. Ahman then
>said that Abacha had heard too many stories and that he had made up his
mind
>and that even if they say there's nothing he won't believe them. That
>confirmed my suspicion.
>
>At the SMT after the verdict, the prosecution lawyers were all crying. We
>asked them why? 'You guys did a good job.' Some of them openly confessed
>that it was all lies. My two mates on the SMT then came to bid me farewell,
>and that I should realise the whole thing was political. I thanked them.
>
>Victimisation of my Family
>
>When the SIP was getting nowhere with my investigation, they took my wife
to
>our home in Kaduna. Besides stealing my money, they carried away all my
>documents which were never used for the trial. The balance of money they
>declared and the goods they carted away have been held at the DMI
since1995.
>I have written a series of petitions to Gen. Abubakar. Despite his
>directives to the COAS to release my things, it was to no avail.
>When the SMT pronounced its verdict which the PRC confirmed in October
1995,
>General Bamaiyi took soldiers to my 16 Alexander Road, Ikoyi residence and
>removed three Peugeot cars from the house. Agreed one was a security car
>belonging to the government, the other two I had them since when I was in
>Minna. They were personal. He also did not allow my wife to take a single
>item of my personal effects. All furniture and machinery were not bought by
>government. They were my personal effects. I understood Bamaiyi was nursing
>grudges against me and Ahmed Abdullahi, because when Abacha directed that
we
>should share the assets of the National Guards, Abdullahi and I did not
give
>him a vehicle. Whereas General Abacha personally approved the distribution
>of the vehicles/equipment to the Armed Forces and the Police. Somehow I
>always fell a victim of Gen. Bamaiyi's misplaced aggression. He hated Gen.
>Babangida for some inexplicable reasons for which I am always the fall guy.
>But the Almighty Allah is never unaware of what the wicked do.
>When Bamaiyi exhibited his brinkmanship on my family, my wife wrote a
letter
>of protest to both Gen. Kazir and Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar attaching the
>inventory of the confiscated items. Naturally the two service chiefs were
>enraged. Gen. Abubakar directed in a letter that Gen. Bamaiyi should
release
>my personal effects to my family. Bamaiyi, uptill today, never bothered to
>respond. Everything my family had to do since October 1995 they had to
start
>from the scratch. And, in fact, their continued harassment only stopped
with
>the advent of Gen. Abubakar as Head of State.
>
>Last year, when my wife imported two containers of plastic coolers to eke
>out a living, the DMI, Brig.-Gen. Sabo and Col. Frank Omenka, with orders
>from their boss, Major Al-Mustapha, impounded the containers and fabricated
>reports that my wife was a NADECO agent and she was suspected of
>importingarms.
>I was furious. I had to write Gen. Abubakar a letter. If they want to kill
>us, it was same they did. Despite a clean report of finding signed by Gen.
>Samuel Ango, director of the Customs Service, after they inspected it, Col.
>Frank Omenka kept the two containers for six months.
>
>Finally, in very angry mood, Gen. Abubakar directed the COAS to release the
>containers because the madam took all the papers to him to see. It was just
>another occasion for the abuse of power and abuse of privilege. Reluctantly
>Brig-Gen. Ibrahim Sabo summoned his officer, Col. Omenka and Major Mashi
and
>directed them to release the containers. It took Omenka two weeks to
>implement the DMI's order with all the attendant losses.Transfer to Gboko
>On 28 December 1995, Lt-Cols. Frank Omenka and Stephen, Commanding Officer,
>19 Battallion, Ikeja, came to the Kirikiri prisons to check the report in
>FAME magazine where it was indicated that I had renovated the mosque and
>that everybody was happy. After going to the mosque, the two colonels
>visited me in the hospital where I was nursing my leg. They directed that
>the Deputy Controller of Prison should deny that there was any renovation.
>That nothing should be done to make me popular. Of course, the DCP ignored
>them. He did not see the reason why they would jail a person and yet not
>leave him alone. The entire inmates were angry.
>
>On 16 January 1996, an order came that the DCP should discharge me from the
>hosptial even if I had not recovered to the cell. The order came from
>Brig-Gen. Sabo of the DMI, who was also my course- mate, based
>on the reports of Lt-Cols. Stephen and Omenka. I had nothing to do, but to
>endure the iniquities with a desperate tenacity. I have resolved to shame
>the oppressors all the way.
>
>Gen. Diya said to a group of friends on 6 January 1996 that I am the most
>dangerous officer among those jailed. That I had to remain there or the
>regime would be in trouble. That I was the last 'IBB spy' in the
government.
>That I have no hope before 1998. My observation is that Diya must be
echoing
>Abacha's thoughts. It was then that I learnt of their plans to transfer me
>from Lagos, because they believed that I was in contact with most embassies
>and that was why sanctions were being imposed.
>
>True to their words, on 6 February 1996, seven vehicles came with armed
>troops and whisked me to Dodan Barracks. Dr. Yakasai gave me an injection
>that sent me to sleep and they took me to the airport. Half way to Abuja, I
>woke up. When we arrived Abuja they spoke to Al- Mustapha, telling him of
>our arrival. We proceeded by road to Gboko, arriving at 3 a.m.
>
>On 7 February 1996, Mr. Ajudua, a friend, who was detained under Decree 2
>was summoned by Maj.-Gen. Mujakperuo to the HQs of military police in
Apapa.
>They set up the SIP gadgets, video camera and all. He was interrogated on
>what he knew about me and what plans I was making in the prisons.
Mujakperuo
>told him that they had reports I was receiving embassy officials on visits.
>Who are they and what were we discussing? Fred denied any knowledge. He
told
>them I had accpeted my fate and left everything to God.
>
>Mujakperuo told Fred if he agreed to confirm that some embassy officials
>visited, he Mujakperuo, would mention that he Ajudua had been cooperating
>with their officers. He promised that the Inspector- General will release
>Ajudua. Fred said he was happy with his lot under decree 2; that he would
>not do anything for freedom.
>
>"TheNews 21 September, 1998
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
adeb...@tcd.ie
> >Major -Gen. Chris Ali - Member; Major-Gen. I.D. Gumel- member; Major-Gen.
> T.
> >Olanrewaju - member, Brig.-Gen. A. Abdullahi - member; Major-Gen. P.
> >interrogated 16 times - yet no way. He told them I never discussed any plot