THE KADUNA MAFIA [and The Northern Oligarchy] - A Book Excerpt [Chapter 4]
Mobolaji E. Aluko
September 9, 1998
Dear Netters:
On Monday, August 31, 1998, I posted a piece called "MONDAY
QUARTER-BACKING: The Kaduna Mafia [and The Northern Oligarchy] - A Book
Excerpt [Chapter 6]" , being excerpt of a 1987 book edited by two
University of Jos professors Bala J. Takaya & S.G. Tyoden. It introduced
the subject of the elusive Kaduna Mafia as the core of the Northern
Oligarchy, and outlined some of its origins and "modus operandi."
As I continue to use such references to bring some light and heat to
matters of concern to our country, to enlighten Northern and Southern
professors, students, professionals alike, including family members,
friends, foes, ordinary folks and other fixtures alike and motley other
readers, I present a second hopefully more enlightening excerpt, for your
careful study, very careful study.
Enjoy.
Bolaji Aluko
______________________________________________________________________
Chapter 4 of: "The Kaduna Mafia" by B.J. Takaya & S.G. Tyoden
Jos University Press Ltd., 1987
SOCIO-POLITICAL FORCES IN THE EVOLUTION AND CONSOLIDATION
OF THE KADUNA MAFIA
By
B.J. Takaya
____________________________________________________________________
Obviously, for want of a more accurate appellation, Mr. Mvengada Jibo,
then a political correspondent with the New Nigerian newspapers coined the
term "Kaduna Mafia" in reference to the Kaduna-centered group of Northern
Nigerian power elite. [Ref. # 1] Since then, the appellation has
popularly stuck inspite of denials of any group in Kaduna that bears the
characteristics of the Italian (or its American variant) underworld
organisation referred to as the Mafia.
The protest is justifiable in one sense. While the Italian and American
mafia proto-types refer to underworld operators protecting mainly
contraband business interests through sponsored gangsterism in a political
system over which they have no control, the Kaduna-centered referant is
seen as an enigmatic but invisible force manipulating the destinies of the
political system by virtue of its deliberate and strategic placement of
its political system by virtue of its deliberate and strategic placement
of its operatives in control of sensitive positions in the nation's key
institutions like the military, parastatals, government limited liability
companies and ministerial organisations. It is a bureaucratic and
political force acting as an invisible vanguard to protect and advance the
social, political and economic interests of a ruling class which, since
the end of the Second World War, has been constantly threatened by the
possibility of losing a longstanding claim to political leadership and
hegemonic legitimacy in a fast changing and modernizing policy.
The denials notwithstanding, however, the appellation is apt in many ways.
Among other characteristics. Even the Italian and American underworld
operators, referred to a s the mafia, are not known to operate an openly
identifiable organisational structure in the conventional sense. Like the
latter, the existence, aims, membership and operation styles of the
Kaduna-centered group can be understood only as a secret cult phenomena,
the details of which are known only to its godfathers and the inner core
of its membership.
Secondly, there is a ubiquitous quality about the strategy of selection
and utilization of talented personnel for its services. For the Kaduna
group does not necessarily recruit all of its operatives or "gate-ways"
from within the social class whose interests the vanguard is designed to
safeguard. Instead, given the head-start control it already has over
vital governmental institutions, the Kaduna-centered power elite mainly
exploits the self-actualization instincts of talented professionals of all
walks of life to achieve their objectives. Hence those who are knowingly
or unknowingly manipulated by the Kaduna Mafia need not necessarily share
all the values and interests being advanced by the inner core of the
latter. For, as Rufai Ibrahim once noted, "The Kaduna Mafia operates
almost at the same level with the CIA. The CIA could plant something on
the most unusual places, they could get the most unusual people to do
certain things for them." [Ref. # 2]
The Kaduna Mafia may clandenstinely sponsor the use of open violence to
achieve its ultimate aims even though unlike the former, the Kaduna Mafia
is not yet known for hiring lone-range underworld "hit-men" to physically
eliminate marked opponents or enemies. But employing the strategies of
dividing the camp of the enemy", controversies and upheavals may
deliberately be sponsored among social groups like the military, labour
unions, student unions, religious camps, ethnic or tribal groups and
political party hierarchies which may be in dispute over sensitive social
or political issues like census figures, religious issues, inter-personal
disputes among military leaders, intra-party crises, election results,
chieftaincy disputes, land and sundry disputes, or even over religious
issues where such upheavals are capable of polarizing the social groups
while giving them, the mafia, centre-point advantages or opportunities to
serve as the only uniting and stabilizing force. This penchant for
crisis-management while fishing in troubled waters has in fact been aptly
described by one Northern intellectual as the groups strategy of
"management of the turbulous."
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
Given the symbiotic cooperation between the British and the emirate ruling
class in the north, it is a historical irony that the same emirate
beneficiaries of the N.A. [Native Authority] political arrangement that
would find it necessary to evolve Mafia-like strategies to protect and
advance their political interests even before the dismantling of British
colonialism. For the same British colonialism, which succeeded in
entrenching the emirate rulers' firmer and wider control over the North,
also eventually planted the seeds of their possible overthrow through a
proposed democratization process.
At least six discernible contextual forces gave rise to the birth of the
Kaduna Mafia, some of which were external to the Nigerian socio-political
system. The first was the emergence and dominance of a new socialist
thinking in Britain which, by the end of the second World War, had become
a political force. The force culminated in the coming to power of the
first British labour party government in 1945.
Besides their struggle to restructure and humanize the British society,
the Socialist movement, known as the "Fabian Society", also took a strong
anti-imperialist stance. They held the view that Britain had a moral
obligation to improve the moral and political conditions of its colonies
by allowing the evolution of political structures that would give
opportunities to all indigenes of the colonies to participate in their own
government and, in particular, to make local government the bedrock of
democracy and efficiency. This greatly influenced thinking in the labour
party such that the labour government had to evolve and declare a policy
towards British colonies in Africa and Asia in similar veins. The policy
sought, among others, to:
"develop the colonies and all their resources so as to enable their
peoples speedily and substantially improve their economic and social
conditions and as soon as may be possible to attain
self-government.To us, the colonies are a great trust and their
progress towards self-government is a goal towards which His Majesty's
Government would assist them with all means in its power.
They should go as fast as they show themselves capable of going."
[Ref. # 4]
The local government institution was the primary seed-bed for this new
"democratization" drive. Thus, in July 1947, the British Labour
government presented a report full of hind-sights and indicative of future
policy orientations. The report, titled "The Colonial Empire (1933 -
1947) stated inter-alia:
"It is now recognised that the political progress of the territories is
dependent on the development of responsibility in local government,
that without some local government, a democratic political
system at the centre is not possible, and that, if social services are
to be built up and expanded, there must be efficient organs of local
government directly representative of the people to operate and control
them." [Ref. # 5]
The second contextual factor that precipitated the evolution of the Kaduna
Mafia related to global forces towards self-determination following the
declaration of the "Atlantic Charter." The charter was signed By both the
British and the United States Governments in 1941, the spirit of which got
more firmly embodied in the United Nations Charter of 1945. Although the
declarations primarily addressed themselves to the need of dismantling
colonialism, the acceleration of the process entailed raid relaxation of
colonial policies towards the training of local manpower for wider
governmental responsibilities. Educational and technical skills had to be
expanded rapidly for the services of the Federal, regional and local
government bureaucracies. This meant the opening of opportunities for
non-emirate personnel in the affairs of government in the North. In
consequence, as N.U. Akpan noted, this process:
"resulted in the influx of 'expatriate native' into other tribal areas.
The direct result of this was the expansion of cosmopolitan towns,
people by different communities. In some of these
towns (like Kaduna) the 'stranger' populations were considerable
compared with indigenous natives, and normally comprised traders,
people in various forms of employment, professional And even
retired people who decided to settle in the locality permanently..It
would be definitelyunfair - indeed impossible - to exclude these people
permanently from having a say in the day to day conduct of affairs in
the communities where they had so much at stake and were bound to
be affected by the actions and decisions o f the authority in control
of the area. The only way to give them the direct say in local affairs
was to given them representation on local councils, and this Meant
relaxation in the principles and tenets of "local government by
indigenous traditional authorities." [ Ref. # 6]
It is in fact noteworthy that the lower echelons of the civil service in
the North was mainly peopled by semi-skilled labour from the southern
parts of the country.
These therefore also directly threatened the core of the policy of
indirect rule and the N.A. system for, besides introducing the influence
of the southern elite into the North, rapid education also led to the
emergence of Northern intelligentsia from outside the emirate ruling
classes. The latter, in turn, quickly reinterpreted the call for
self-determination in local terms and began to call for democratization
and dismantling of the emirate N.A. system to give them participation in
local government affairs irrespective of their birth and social classes.
In the fourth place, this period was marked by the arrival, in Northern
Nigeria, of younger and more progressive British colonial administrators
who were not only sympathetic to the call for democratization by the
educated Nigerian elite but also were more committed to its
implementation. As Professor A.D. Yahaya observed:
"At the Zaria Provincial level, for instance, British junior officers
were openly associating with the indigenous population and showed
enthusiasm in the development of participatory
institutions in lcoal government..The Zaria provincial administration
had a team of young and committed officers who regarded themselves as
members of an A.D.O. union. The union was an informal group of
like-minded officers who shared a common attachment to the area and to
the people they administered. On their own initiative, they stimulated
local development and intervened in the N.A. to ensure that justice was
done in the interest of the common man." [Ref. # 7]
Although A.D. Yahaya had opined that these "like-minded" officers found
themselves in Zaria by sheer chance, they were nevertheless behaving
according to the spirit of the new British "Fabian" movement back at home
and being greatly encouraged by some senior colonial officers like Sir
Bryan Sherwood-Smith who later served as the Lieutenant Governor of
Northern Nigeria at Kaduna, 1952-57. For he, thinking in the same line
with his younger officers in the provinces, was determined to accelerate
the process of democratization by giving more attention to, and taking
action against, blatant abuses of office by the emirate rulers. He in
fact effected a decisive shift away from the traditional "see no evil"
stance of British resident political officers vis-`-vis emirs; a policy
which had hitherto left the citizen with no avenue of redress against
oppression. As Yahaya himself noted earlier:
"The first step taken by the (Northern) Regional Government in
bringingabout political changes in Northern Nigeria was to dismantle
the edifice of indirect rule. The greatest effort towards this end
Coincided with Sherwood-Smith's service as Governor of Northern
Nigeria(1952-57) at the end of which he emerged as one of the greatest
opponents of chiefly power in the emirate system. Each
year during his term of office was a marked clamp down on the N.A., in
which senior emirs orhighly-placed (emirate) officials were deposed,
convicted or dismissed on proven illegal Administrative practices."
[Ref. # 8]
This new spirit in the British-emirate relations in the north was
interpreted by the emirate ruling class as a "handwriting on the wall"
that signalled their demise from the position of power unless they
themselves evolved new survival strategies to check the obvious trend. In
this connection, perhaps the greatest Causes of souciance to the Northern
ruling class were seen as the two other resultant developments already
mentioned in passing, namely the presence of a large number of southern
Nigerian labour force with bureaucratic skills already occupying and (next
to expatriates) dominating the lower echelons of the Northern regional
civil service departments as well as the rising number of educated and
enlightened non-emirate Northern elements who were already calling for
reforms in the local government system and getting organised for
democratic activities.
Already, several professional, cultural and tribal associations had
emerged by 1948. Their aims and objectives invariably reflected their
desires for revolutionary changes in Northern Nigeria. While some called
for the scrapping of both the emirate rulership and the N.A. systems which
were seen to be anachronistic and reactionary in a modern polity, others
yearned for the creation of more states out of Northern Nigeria. Most of
these associations formally became political parties and political
movements by the end of 1948. Such sub-national political parties
included the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) which emerged out
of the Northern Teachers Association, the Borno Youth Movement (BYM)
running side by side with the Borno State Union (a cultural movement for
the creation of a Borno region out of Northern Nigeria) and the United
Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) which brought together several ethnic unions
from the predominantly non-muslim areas of the Plateau, Benue and Kabba
provinces that shared common sentiments against the rape of their pride
and independence by the British-Emirate N.A. symbiotic arrangements.
Later, these Northern political parties were to invariably ally with
Southern-led national parties. For instance, the NEPU formed an alliance
with the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (formerly National Council
of Nigeria and the Cameroons, NCNC), while both the UMBC and the BYM
separately entered into alliances with the Action Group (AG). These
alliances pitched their camps to mainly challenge the Northern Peoples
Congress (NPC) which represented the political interests of the emirate
establishments in the North.
Thus the great challenge, nay, threat, which the emirate aristocracy had
to face when revolutionary political parties and associations began to
emerge in the North during the terminal phase of British colonialism was
the strong possibility of their being thrown out of power through
democratic electoral processes. Three other factors strongly suggested
this possibility. First, the emirate aristrocracy was numerically too
thing on the ground to risk a popular contest for power. Secondly, the
record of their performance under the N.A. system was such that nobody
associated with that corrupt and oppressive system could win any
democratically conducted election where the "talakawa" (commoners) class
was given a fair and free chance to select an alternative leadership.
Thirdly, a consistent initial effort to ban popular political activities
and associations even among the regional and native administration
employees failed to suppress the rising tide of anti-N.A. feelings. For,
by the end of 1948, almostall the professional and cultural associations
and movements like the Northern Teachers Association (NTA), the Middle
Zone League, the Berom Progressive Union, the Borno StateUnion, the
"Samarin Kano" (Kano Youth Movement), the Mutanen Arewa a Yau (Northern
Peoples Association), etc. had by and large become political associations
preparing for democratic electoral challenges against the emirate status
quo. The social backgrounds of the star leaders of such associations
were, in the main, non-aristocratic. Some even had slave parental
backgrounds, while others were either from non-muslim Middel-belt and
communities or from the Borno sphere of Northern influence. They had
already identified themselves as vocal critics of the indirect rule and
N.A. systems. They comprised men like Sa'ad Zungur, Aminu Kano, Ibrahim
Imam, R.A. B. Dikko, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Pastor David Lot, Yusuf
Maitama Suler, Joseph Tarka, etc.
A TARGETED ELITE
The all-round attacks on the emirate system was, in a sense, also direct
attacks on an inner class of the Katsina college educated emirate
rulership elites. Who are they?
In an earlier bid to strengthen the symbiotic British-Emirate power
arrangements, the colonial administration had evolved a rather ludicrous
educational policy which primarily sought to train the children of the
ruling classes for governmental responsibilities in the N.A. system.
Hence, reported Resident Arnett in 1920, for instance:
"The provincial schools were started primarily for the sons of
Chiefs, and officials sent their sons by the emir's order." [Ref.
# 9]
Reports a colonial educator, Hans Vischer, on the progress made in this
direction:
"The object of this school (in Zaria) is to train the sons of chiefs
with a view to (making) them physically and mentally better fit to
assist the Government in the administration of the country." [Ref. #
10]
This is because as Sir James Currie asserted earlier:
"If indirect rule is to be truly tribal, we must educate from the top
down, and not as in southern Nigeria from the bottom upwards." [Ref. #
11]
This education policy might however not be unconnected with the feelings
of Northern emirs themselves, which were later succinctly expressed by
those of Kano and Kotangora at a conference of chiefs of Northern
provinces in 1938. Said the emir of Kano among other things:
"Association with children of common people would be inclined to
inculcate the outlook of the peasant." [Ref. # 12]
Similarly, in his own outlook, the emir of Kotangora felt that:
"the character of the chief's children was adversely influenced by
association with the childre of the ordinary people." [Ref. # 13]
Thus three types of government provincial schools emerged in the North.
The first was designed to train the children of the ruling class; the
second, drawing its pupils from the children of the "mallamai" (koranic
scholars), prepared their products as teachers for the chiefs' children's
schools; the "pagan schools" were the third type and were designed as
craft schools to train the children of commoners as artisans.
This classification roughly repeated itself at the secondary school level,
though placing more emphasis on zonal and religious characteristics.
Notes John N. Paden:
"The 'North' was viewed by the colonial administration as comprising
three zones - muslims, christians and pagans. Schools were set up
accordingly. In the muslim zone, however, a major effort had to be
undertaken to bring students from the Hausa-speaking emirates into
contact with the "Arab and Kanuri races" of Borno. Ahmadu Bello, and
others, were to be the experiments in this regionalisation." [Ref. #
14]
Katsina College (which later became Kaduna College after its transfer to
the regional headquarters, and later became Government College, Zaria, on
its final transfer to Zaria, before the name was changed to Barewa
College, Zaria was thus the first and foremost among such higher schools
designed to train the children of emirate rulers. Another was opened at
Bauchi for muslims, while one each were opened at Toro, for pagans, and at
Omu (Ilorin province) for christians.
This educational and school admission apartheid which initially denied
access into Katsina College to the children of the non-ruling class was,
however, largely de-emphasized later in favour of rapid educational
development. But a proviso was entered: that such other children of the
non-ruling classes as may be trained in this or other similar schools may
not seek to occupy the major administrative positions (reserved for the
ruling class) under the N.A. system. Said the colonial director of
education for the Northern provinces, F. M. Urling Smith, for instance:
"It was, and is, my wish that pupils for the training colleges should
not necessarily be drawn from the ruling classes, but from pupils at
the provincial schools, whatever their rank, provided that they show
promise, that their parents are willing for them to enter and that
they are not going to be required later to fill the hereditary posts
under the Native Administration." [Ref. # 15]
Administrative research findings (by M.G. Smith) in respect of the Zaria
N.A, by S.F. Nadel in respect to Bida N.A. and by C.S. Whitaker, Jr. in
respect to Gwandu and Biad [Ref # 16] later proved the extent to which
this proviso was adhered to in the recruitment of personnel for N.A.
posts. By and large, positions carrying policy decision responsibilities
were filled by personnel drawn mainly from the respective ruling families
of these emirates while the products of the primary and post-primary
schools who did not have royal or ruling class backgrounds were either
restricted to classrooms as teachers or got employed in the auxilliary
manipulative cadres of the N.A. establishments, e.g. as typists or
clerical officers.
This pattern similarly repeated itself in the political and administrative
outfits of the Northern regional government at Kaduna. By the provisions
o f the 1946 Richards Constitution which came into effect on January 1,
1947, two legislative chambers were created for Northern Nigeria; a
Regional House of Assembly and a Regional House of Chiefs (serving as an
upper legislative house.) In each house, however, the members
(representing the emirate areas) were drawn from the ruling class, being
solely nominated by the native authorities in each province from among its
own members only. The House, in turn, sat jointly to select from amongst
themselves nine members, made up of four from the House of Chiefs and five
from the House of Assembly, to represent the North, for the first time, in
the National Legislative Council of Lagos.
The net effect of all these was to make the political and administrative
activities to become exclusive ruling family affairs. It was a closed
system in which one had to be , somehow, related to the emirate ruling
families to be politically relevant. But the hour of change had come.
The post-war "wind of change" had blown over even Northern Nigeria. The
expanded educational programmes had extended educational opportunities to
a large number of young non-emirate Northerners who, in addition to the
southern elite and enlightened world-war veterans, naturally demanded for
structural changes and democratization at a time the Fabian socialist
philosophy was predominant in British thinking and policies.
Thus, by 1948, the Northern emirate establishments were virtually under
siege. Almost all the educated non-emirate Northern elites, even if
divided into diverse socio-political camps and interests, shared at least
one sentiment in common: the desire to dismantle the N.A. system.
Towards this effect, social processes had, by the end of that year assumed
a strong tempo when the professional, technical and cultural associations
had virtually all declared themselves as political associations.
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES
To survive the power in the foreseen new political dispensation, the
emirate elite had to devise new strategies and tactics. It had to involve
hard thinking, political calculations and long-range strategic planning.
The inner circle of the privileged Katsina College (KC) products, with
the backing of their emirate godfathers and their years of
politico-administrative experience, were however more than well prepared
for this. It is the set of strategic responses and behaviours adopted by
this group of Northern power elite that gave rise to a new culture of
political and institutional manipulations in the game of Nigerian power
politics which is now commonly perceived and allegorically referred to as
Mafia strategies. What historical, social and political conditions did
they have to manipulate to achieve this?
The first factor in the evolution of the Kaduna Mafia was one prominent
personality, the late Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. After
graduating from Katsina College, he became a teacher in Sokoto Middle
School. But as the son of a former district head of Rabah, Ibrahim, he
was appointed as the District Head of Rabah in 1925, in succession to a
cousin who died that year. He traced his descent to the Muhammad Bello
Fodio lineage, after whom he changed his name from Ahmadu Ibrahim Rabah to
Sokoto when Sultan Hassan died in 1938. His narrow defeat by the then
Sardauna of Sokoto, now Sultan Abubakar III, was however said to have
created uneasy relationships between the two, inspite of the latter
conferring his former title of "Sardauna" on Ahmadu Bello and making him a
senior councillor. But after a series of political tribulations
(including imprisonment) ostensibly resultant from the poor relationships
between him the new Sultan, Ahmadu Bello became more at home with the
Kaduna crowd of Katsina College products who were by then representing
their various emirates in the Northern regional administration. The first
major step in the national political career however started with his
nomination into the Northern House of Assembly in 1949 to replace a Sokoto
N.A. senior councillor, the Magajin Rafi, Waziri Abbas, whose death left a
vacancy in the Assembly. Given his rare political experiences, leadership
aptitude and ruling family background in the scheme of Northern emirate
leadership. Predictably, he became the doubled-edged sword as a
modernisation instrument needed by the emirate tradition if its
beneficiaries had to remain politically relevant. He, together with his
Katsina college colleagues, thus had to work out strategies that would
satisfy new socio-political conditions that would not only make them
remain politically relevant in the foreseen "new Nigerian" political
dispensation but also remain firmly entrenched as its principal actors.
The Kaduna group's first strategy was to hijack the leadership of the
strongest political movement which already had a headstart in popular
political mobilization in Northern Nigeria, the "Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa",
JMA (i.e. Northern Peoples Party), which later became the Northern Peoples
Congress (NPC). The JMA was an amalgam of the several cultural and
professional associations mostly formed in 1948. Notable among these were
the Zaria-based "Jami'iyyar Mutanen Arewa" formed and led by the late Dr.
R.A. B. Dikko and the Kaduna-based "Mutanen Arewa a Yau" (People of the
North Today) formed and led by one Mallam Rafi. On their amalgamation,
Dr. Dikko, a Christian Medical Doctor, became its first prescient while
while Mallam Rafi became the Vice-President. At the 1951 meeting, the
association was declared a political party, preparatory to that year's
first democratic general elections into the Northern House of Assembly
under the 1951 Macpherson Constitution. Prior to this, the Katsina College
Old Boys Association (formed in Kaduna, 1939) had began to espouse the
idea and strategy of "one North" to stem the tide of political revolution
that could divide their ideal Northern region into several camps of
socio-political influences.
Hence in 1951, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and others of his
special KC group, decided to join the JMA and the strategy of leadership
hijacking began. The process was completed at the Jos convention in
April, 1954 when, thanks to the political scheming, lobbying and
log-rolling commitments of the former emir of Kano, Muhammed Sanusi (then
Ciroma of Kano), the Sardauna of Sokoto was elected the president of the
NPC, inspite of popular opinions which hitherto favoured Abubukar Tafawa
Balewa.The Jos conference was fully attended by theNorthern emirs in
person. The scheming for the hijack that went on before and during the
convention however so disgusted and frustrated some of the early leaders
of the NPC that they severally and jointly broke away and formed other
rival associations and parties. Among these were leaders like the late
Mallam Aminu Kano, Sa'ad Zungur and Ibrahim Imam.
The second strategy of the Kaduna emirate rulers, now firmly in control of
the strongest political party in the region, was to float a bogey of
Southern domination of the North. This later became a strong campaign
weapon against other Northern parties and movements like the NEPU, the
UMBC and the BYM which allied with Southern based NCNC and AG parties.
Thirdly, the Kaduna power elite appeared to work towards the creation of a
new and reformed Nigerian caliphal political domain based mainly on the
"Daular Usmania" (dan Fodio caliphate) design but, for obvious reasons,
emphasizing the common socio-religious value systems and characteristics
of the Borno and Sokoto traditions. It is suspected that this strategy
was a product of several distinct factors. In the first place was the
personality clash between the Sardauna and the Sultan. While still deeply
respecting that office, Ahmadu Bello would rather to create an alternative
base and image for himself as he awaited his possible turn for the
Sultanship. The second factor was the desire to accommodate the interests
of the KC NA colleagues from the Borno sphere of influence. The third was
the need for political modernization and administrative centralization as
approaches to the reform of the emirate system. It is noteworthy that
Northern muslim radicalism as championed by Aminu Kano, Sa'ad Zungur and
Ibrahim Imam were mainly directed against non-islamic aspects of
governmental practices and corruption exhibited by the emirs and their NA
administrative machinery at the emirate levels. In the case of Ibrahim
Imam, the traditional aversion to the prominence enjoyed by the Sokoto
sphere of influence over Borno was also a prominent factor (hence the call
for a Borno state.) The fourth was the need to retain, consolidate and
exploit islamic sentiments to enhance political legitimacy from the
northern muslim followership. For by the advent of the British, as
observed in the previous chapter, the claim of islamic leadership happened
to be the only strong factor that still justified the continuation of the
numerically thin emirate class as hegemonic rulers over the masses of the
northern muslim communities.
Thus in the Daular Usmania calculus, Kaduna must assume a new role as the
"new Sokoto" towards which emirs as well as their Nas must be made to
look for political and governmental direction. To ensure this, provincial
commissioners (of minister status) were appointed. The North became more
tightly controlled from Kaduna, and some major NA functions and powers
were transferred to the Regional government. This, inspite of open
demonstrations of objections from prominent emirs like Muhammadu Sanusi of
Kano. But such dissenting emirs were threatened with depositions. As a
result, a law on appointment and deposition of chiefs and emirs also had
to be enacted or updated to firmly entrench the locus of power in Kaduna.
In the long run, however, the emirs generally came to see this strategy as
necessary, though painful, changes to enhance their class unity and
thereby protect the "Northern interest". Some, especially the Sultan,
would regard these moves as Ahmadu Bello's grand strategy for his awaited
sultanship.
In fact, as JN Paden was to observe later:
"If the Sardauna had become Sultan, he probably would have "modernized"
the offices of Magajin Gari and Waziri (with less ceremony) and
provided real ceremony in other areas. He might have tried to set up
the Sultan of Sokoto as head of state of Nigeria, perhaps rotating
with the Alafin of Oyo, the Oni of Ife, the Shehu of Borno, plus
traditional leaders in Onitsha and Benin." [Ref. # 17]
He may be right, albeit a retrospection.
The fourth strategy of the Kaduna group of KC elites revolved around the
use of the machinery of government as a tool for political consolidations.
Much as the oppressive nature of the NA machinery was the cause of the
popular resentment against the emirate ruling class, its machinery had to
be relied upon to repress the revolutionary influences and followerships
of the opposition parties, namely the NEPU, the BYM and the UMBC which had
invariably concluded alliances with southern parties to challenge the NPC.
Thus the NPC had to fall back on negative approaches like the use of the
NA police, the Alkali courts, the NA prisons and "haraji" (taxes)
instruments to stem the tide.
The fifth strategy was that of institution-building and control of the
bureaucracy. Having gained the control of both the machinery of central
administration and party, the regional government, under the Sardauna,
embarked on the creation and rapid expansion of other public service
establishments to accelerate the pace of modernization. A marketing
board, an investment house, a bank, a radio/television house, a newspaper,
a university, a polytechnic and host of other institutions of higher
learning were among the early priorities.
Modernisation was however interpreted within the context of the philosophy
of "gradualism" by which, as a sixth strategy, the management of such new
institutions were transferred from the expatriate personnel, hired to
initiate them, into the hands of carefully selected and trained northern
emirate elites. It is in fact noteworthy that while this was going on ,
the North chose to also apply the philosophy of gradualism even to the
question of independence, towards which it was not in a hurry inspite of
agitations for self-government by southern elites. Moreover, as some of
the emirate and pro-emirate elite gained experience in the central civil
service and other wings of public institutions, they were increasingly
deployed to fill the Northern quota on Federal establishments. This went
side by side with the careful selection and encouragement of young school
levers of Northern origin to join the officer ranks of the army, the
police, and the customs in a bid to fill Northern quota in Federal
institutions with those who would best protect the "Northern interest."
The seventh was the development strategy in which the politically relevant
north had to take priority. Road networks, public institutions and
industries had to be carefully located not necessarily according to
economic optimality but in a way that best reflected the "Northern
interest." Moreover, political and economic patronages had to fall into
the same pattern Individuals for high offices had to be carefully screened
for loyalty and relevance. Economic patronages, like the granting of
licenses as Government Licencing Buying and Supply Agents (LBAs), the
award of contracts and the granting of government credit facilities to
individuals, went by similar considerations not only to avoid the
possibility of "rewarding the enemy" in traditional opposition party areas
but possibly, to also prevent the emergence of political heroes or strong
political financiers from non-relevant northern communities. In
consequence, perhaps, almost all the strong traditional opposition areas
of the north, except Kano, Funtua and Zaria NEPU areas could not benefit
from much government development projects, even if to demonstrate to their
peoples that opposition does not pay.
The eighth strategy however involved the principle of rewarding the
faithful and punishing the enemy on an individual basis. For this
purpose, the practice of appointing "gateways" or "rulers of their own
people" was brought into practice. By this policy, pliable individuals
from politically difficult, or not easily penetrable areas, were
personally developed, their qualifications and popularity notwithstanding.
These "gateways" were se as informants and as government representatives
who liaised between the government and party with their own communities.
They visibly enjoyed economic and political privileges on personal basis
even if their efforts didn't yield much political dividends to the ruling
party. On the other hand, strong opponents, no matter their popularity,
were at the same time singled out, hunted down and embarrassed or punished
on usually frivolous N.A. Police charges. All these were aimed at
ensuring that the homes of the enemy were divided and put in disarray.
Finally, the Kaduna group had to present the north as a single, united
monolith that was not only trying to hold its own out within the Federal
set-up but also as being the determinant of progress for the country.
This, it was hoped, would create a political band-wagon effect to
penetrate the rest of the country. For if the Northern emirate leaders
were seen as the sole spokesmen of the vast and numerically strong North,
the rest would have to curry their political favours to enable them
benefit from Federal Government patronages.
Negatively oriented as most of the Kaduna group's strategies were, they
succeeded in practical terms such that by the time the leader of the group
the Sardauna of Sokoto was assassinated on 15th January, 1966, the
Northern emirate elite had not only assured themselves of firm control
over the North but had also assumed a dominant role in dictating the pace
and direction of political events in Nigeria.
THE CONSOLIDATION PHASE
In this chapter, our main purpose has been to trace, in historical
perspectives, the conditions that led to the emergence and consolidation
of a Northern Nigerian Political Mafiosi.
We have seen that the Katsina College special category of Northern elites,
the British mentored products of the NA system trained as heirs to the
Northern emirate rulership class, responded to both external and internal
forces of democratization through a series of subtle strategic responses,
the first of which was the hijacking of the first major Northern political
party on which they rode to retain the control of the machinery of
regional administration. This first generation of emirate elite, led by
Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, thus became the first crop of the
Kaduna Mafia, backed by their godfathers, the emirs.
After the first military coup of 1966, however, the second crop of the
mafia, the bureaucratic technocrats, emerged to fill the Political
leadership vacuum created by the death of the Sardauna and the removal of
his close cohorts from the political scene. This collection of young
bureaucratic elites of Northern origin, the beneficiaries of the Kaduna
group's institution-building strategy, emerged as the champions of the
"Northern interest." To outside observers these young bureaucrats most of
whom used to serve as the "Premier's Office boys" might have appeared
nebulous and faceless. But they were not without a common goal reference:
the protection and advancement of their own emirate class interests which,
for obvious political reasons, they generally mask as "the Northern
interest." In fact while their older mentors, the Northern political
leaders of the First Republic who had then been forced underground by the
1966 military coup, together with their emirate godfathers, felt so
hopeless and despondent to have even entertained the idea of secession
from the Federal Republic in the early days of General Yakubu Gowon's
search for a constitutional solution to the country's socio-political
problems, the yong bureaucrats perceived the future differently. Being
already in control of sensitive positions in the Federal and regional
bureaucracies, they felt that the dissolution of Nigeria into separate
entities was neither in their own interest nor that of the North. Hence
"to keep Nigeria one (was) a task that must be done", given the Gowon
military leadershipin which their advice could be heeded as being
representative of an enlightened Northern interest. This, even if it
meant granting peripheral opportunities to more northerners of non-emirate
origins to participate in government policy-making.
Thus while the first crop of the Mafia were a British-mentored children of
traditional rulers, the second crop were the British-trained technocrats
who, though drawing mainly from the same stable, gained power through
selective higher educational and professional attainments which enabled
them to be in key bureaucratic positions in the first place.
The political tension and fracticidal situation, as well as the
diffuseness of the locus of power, created by the civil strife ensuing the
first and second military pusches of 1966 however created the need to
review, revise, strengthen, or devise new strategies of bureaucratic and
political manipulations for their group survival. Political developments
were taking place faster than the policy of gradualism envisaged.
Political and administrative leadership had shifted and coalesced onto the
arena of bureaucratic technocracy: the military and other public
bureaucracy. There wasn't enough supply of Northern technocrats from the
emirate aristocracy to man the Northern quotas in key federal
institutions, especially the disciplined forces. The focus of economic
power was still located in the South. The Gowon military administration
had suddenly opened up access to non-emirate Northern elites and Southern
minorities to participate in the art of policy-making and governance,
thanks to the creation of more states which broke up the Northern
geographical political monolith into several power bases and, thereby,
weakened the emirate rulership might and influence.
In the face of all these, what must the new political mafia do? The first
was the need for continued projection of the North as a single monolith
with common interests so as to mask the real values and interests of the
original core ruling class from public visibility. Hence the need to
retain the philosophy of "one North" and the protection of the "Northern
Interest," the breakup of the vast region into six states
notwithstanding. Hence, the Interim Common Service Agency (ICSA) became
less "interim" than the policy originally intended if only to provide a
common forum for continued Northern fraternization. It is in the light of
this that the defunct Benue Plateau State's governor J.D. Gomwalk became
the villain of the Northern press for being the "black sheep" of the one
North fraternity. He created separate institutions in direct rivalry to
those of the ICSA; a newspaper house; a television house, a Marketing
Board, a campus of the South-based University of Ibadan, which later
evolved into the University of Jos, etc. [SIDE NOTE: GOMWALK WAS LATER
EXECUTED ALONG WITH BISALLA, DIMKA AND 36 OTHERS IN THE 1976 COUP THAT
KILLED MOHAMMED AND BROUGHT ON OBASANJO. 23 OF THE EXECUTED WERE FROM
PLATEAU STATE, 7 FROM KADUNA STATE, 4 FROM GONGOLA, AND 1 EACH FROM BORNO,
KWARA, OGUN AND BENDEL. ONE OF THE EXECUTED'S STATE COULD NOT BE
IDENTIFIED. 35 OF THEM WERE CHRISTIAN (INCLUDING BISALLA, DIMKA AND
GOMWALK) AND 4 WERE MUSLIM. THEIR EXECUTIONS WERE CONFIRMED BY
OBASANJO'S SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL]
Secondly, while retaining the objectives of the inner core of Northern
emirate leadership elite, there was the need to widen the recruitment base
of the Mafia on relatively universalist self-actualisation interests of
both the bureaucratic technocracy and the political and business elites.
This, in a bid to recruit the sympathies and services of talented
non-emirate and even Southern elites in all sectors of public life,
particularly in the forces, the universities and the media. This was to
be achieved by "catching them young" at the most promising stages of their
career drives through a strategy of selective development and mentorship
(by influential mafiosi leaders or their "gateway" associates_ with or
without such young officers being aware of their being cultivated to be
"used for a purpose." The young officers may in fact only be made to get
the feelings of belonging, "arrival", or success in their career
undertakings, i.e. a fostered feeling of being in power deriving from the
false sense of relevance and belonging to the club of a new Nigerian
ruling elite.
Thirdly using the vast number of public personnel so recruited and the
bureaucratic machinery in their control, there was the need to make
selective information inputs into governmental policies (irrespective of
the regime) to advise or misadvise governments into taking decisions that
best enhanced the interests of the inner core of the new mafia. Through
the same channels, signals may be sent to hostile members of government
threatening the possibilities of being ousted from power.
The Fourth strategy is the ongoing attempt by the mafia to convert
prestige and political gains into economic power by floating business
enterprises....[rest of chapter missing.]
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