STAR INFORMATION: Ogundipe and Ojukwu and Gowon in '66: The Tussle for Power on the Road to Aburi
Mobolaji E. Aluko
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December 26, 1999
Netters:
Based again on several questions asked in connection with earlier postings
re-Aburi, some further clarifications from the history books need to be
made:
1. HIERARCHY OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY AS OF JANUARY 1, 1966
I really cannot tell for a fact the ENTIRE hierarchy of the Nigerian
Military as of January 1, 1966, but from various sources, as far as I
could gather, these are the names and their order of seniority:
**Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, GOC, Nigerian Army
*Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari, Commander, Second Brigade
*Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun, Commander, First Brigade
Brigadier Babatunde Ogundipe, Chief of Staff, Supreme HQ
*Colonel Kur Mohammed, Army Chief of Staff
Colonel Bassey
Colonel Robert Adeyinka Adebayo
Colonel Ralph Shodeinde, Commandant, NMTC
*Lt.-Col. Abogo Largema, Commanding, 4th Battalion (Ibadan)
*Lt.-Col. Yakubu Pam, the Adjutant-General
*Lt.-Col. Arthur Unegbe, QuarterMaster-General
Lt.-Col. Imo
Lt.-Col. Hillary Njoku, Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion (Ikeja)
**Lt.-Col. Adekunle Fajuyi
Lt.-Col. David Ejoor
Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon
Lt.-Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, Commanding Officer (Kano)
Lt.-Col. Kurubo
Major Hassan Katsina
* Killed during January 15 Coup
* Killed during July 1966 Coup
These may not have been ALL the officers; one or two orders might be out
of sequence, but essentially I might be 80-95% right.
2. WHY OGUNDIPE DID NOT BECOME SUPREME COMMANDER
About Ogundipe, Ojukwu, and Gowon, let me give you two accounts, one from
the biography of Obasanjo which I have just checked on, and the other from
Kole Omotoso's "Just Before Dawn":
2.A "Olusegun Obasanjo: In the Eyes of Time - A Biography of the African
Statesman" - by Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo
page 101 ff
QUOTE
With Ironsi dead, Brig. Baba Ogundipe, the Chief of Staff, Supreme
Headquarters, was the next most senior officer in the country. But he
realized that the Northern officers had not risked their lives to install
him in power as General Ironsi's successor. Perhaps fearing that the coup
plotters might eliminate him as well, he escaped from the country and
re-emerged later in London where he was appointed Nigeria's High
Commissioner to the United Kingdom.
For three days - July 29 to August 1, 1966 - the nation's blood-smeared
presidency remained vacant. It was an interregnum. While Nigeria waited
in anguish for a leader, Northern officers led by Gowon and [MURTALA]
Muhammed were at the Ikeya Cantonment debating whether or not to lead
their nation out of the union. The intervention of some federal permanent
secretaries, the British High Commission, and the American Embassy in
Lagos, as well as the presence of a few saner and reasonable officers
among them, persuaded the group to allow the North remain within a united
Nigeria. Having grudgingly agreed to a united Nigeria, the officers chose
and installed Gowon, the most senior officer from the North, who had not
participated in the coup, as Nigeria's second military Head of State on
August 1, 1966. The coup planners (the list included Martin Adamu, Shehu
Musa Yar'Adua, Muhammadu Buhari, Pam Nwatkom, Ibrahim Babangida, John
Longham, Garba Duba, Jerry Useni, Ibrahim Bako, Musa Usman and Shittu
Alao) wanted Major Muhammed to be the Head of State. But Muhammed said
Gowon, an affable, good-looking man, should lead it because he was the
most senior - not that he was the most effective or capable, or the most
intellectually-equipped, or the most dynamic or the most knowledgeable -
officer from the North......."
Page 106
...The times were still troubling. The wobbling Nigerian nation could
hardly amuse herself. Nigeria was dying, in bits. Since the coups of
January and July, things had not been the same again. The ship of state
cleaved disastrously on January 15. The crack widened on July 29. The
crack became a frightening gulf. Each new day, the gulf deepened. When
Governor Ojukwu of the Eastern Region heard of Gowon's appointment as Head
of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Nigeria, he said it
was abnormal. His argument was that in the absence of Ironsi, whose death
had not then been officially announced, the next most senior army
officers, Brig. Ogundipe and Col. Bassey, should assume command. Ojukwu,
therefore, refused to recognize Gowon's appointment.
Ojukwu's argument, though logical, did not seem to have reflected the
absurd reality of a military coup. Coup plotters decide the helmsmen.
Once a coup is successful, army hierarchy and discipline are worthless as
the bullets expended in the exercise or the constitution of the land which
had been tossed aside. Ojukwu's protest was only logical in an ideal
situation, which a coup is not.....
UNQUOTE
So, in fact, from this account (which I just checked into), Ojukwu was
arguing for either Ogundipe or Bassey.
2.B Let me provide another account concerning Ogundipe, this time from
Kole Omotosho's "fact-ional" book, "Just Before Dawn" (Spectrum Books,
1988):
Page 255 ff
QUOTE
Brigadier Ogundipe was the most senior army officer after the eliminations
of January 1966. When he learnt on the morning of July 29th that there
had been trouble in Ibadan, he tried to bring the situation under control.
He sent Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon who was just resuming duty that
morning as the commander of 2nd Nigerian Army based at Ikeja [REPLACING
LT.COL. HILLARY NJOKU] to go to the barracks at Ikeya and deal with the
rebels since that was where they were operating from. Gowon went.
"Can someone find me Joseph Garba?", bellowed Brigadier Ogundipe. "I
think I'm still supposed to be the chief of staff Supreme Headquarters.
What is going on in this place?"
Some senior officers who were coming and going, trying to find out what
was happening, heard the voice of Brigadier Ogundipe and came to his
office. They were Commodore Akinwale Wey, Alhaji Kam Salem,
Lieutenant-Colonel Anwunah and Major Mobolaji Johnson. They were there
when Captain Joseph Garba came into the office of the chief of staff,
Supreme Headquarters.
"Can you explain what it means when one of your soldiers says he would not
obey me unless you say so? What is going on here? Who is running things
here? Me or you?"
"Excuse me, sir..."
"That is why I called you because I wanted your excuse."
"The fact is...."
"The fact that I know right now, is that if a soldier in this army says he
will not obey me unless his captain told him so then we are finished.
There is no army any more. I should simply throw away this uniform.
Where is the pride of being a soldier, of being an officer if a soldier
would not obey an officer? What have we turned the Nigerian Army into?"
There was no way Joseph Garba could make any explanation under the
circumstances. Brigadier Ogundipe had been traumatized by that one
experience. Captain Garba stood there watching his superior officer,
saying nothing. Finally the brigadier sat down and waved Garba away. He
noticed that the salute he got was for form's sake......
[At a later encounter with Garba, Ogundipe said:]
"Go back and ask them the minimum condition they [THE NORTHERN MUTINEERS]
are prepared to give to stay in Nigeria." Once more, Joseph Garba got
into his Land-rover and drove to Ikeja. As he was leaving, a call came in
from Onitsha. It was Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu, military governor of the
Eastern Region. Ogundipe took the telephone.
"Hello? What's happening? Where is the Supreme Commander [IRONSI]?"
"Nobody knows where the supreme commander has been taken to. He and
Lieutenant-Colonel Fajuyi were arrested in Ibadan yesterday. The northern
troops have staged a counter-coup. They have sent their families back to
the North and they want to break up the country."
"Is it not possible for you to become the supreme commander? You are the
next most senior officer in the army. I will...."
"Forget it! An ordinary soldier would not obey me."
"I will announce my support for you within thirty minutes of your
announcing your take over."
"Listen Ojukwu, forget that. We are at present negotiating with the
coup-makers to find out what they want. Keep in touch."
"Come on!", shouted Ojukwu into the telephone. Brigadier Ogunidpe held
the receiver away from his face. "Take a risk. Shout at them. Go on the
air and say something...."
There was silence from Ogundipe's side. He wast thinking to himself: 'It
is my life on the line not yours.'
[OJUKWU CONTINUED] "....Tell the country you are the next most senior
officer, you do not know where the supreme commander is, but you are
trying to control the situation....Are you still there?"
After a long pause, "Yes, I am here...I will do that."
Brigadier Ogundipe did broadcast throughout the country declaring a state
of emergency for Lagos, Abeokuta and Ibadan, and saying that things would
soon return to normal.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu got back to Brigadier Ogundipe as soon as he had
listened to the broadcast at 2:30 pm.
"That is not what I meant! I meant something strong. Say you are
stepping into Ironsi's shoes and that's it!"
Brigadier Ogundipe just listened. Not getting satisfaction, Ojukwu
dropped the telephone. Later that evening, Brigadier Ogundipe recorded
another message to the nation calming everyone and saying there was now no
cause for alarm since everything was under control.........
Lieutenant-Colonel David Ejoor telephoned from Benin wanting to know what
was going on. The chief of staff [OGUNDIPE] told him what he had told
Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu.
"Why haven't you taken over them?"
The chief of staff explained the situation.
"But I am sure the rest of the members of the Supreme Military Council
would support you."
"Thank you David but it is no use. We'll keep you informed or you'll find
out what we work out with the coup makers."
When the phone call was over, Brigadier Ogundipe took a piece of paper and
wrote a letter of resignation from the army and sent it to the Ministry of
Defence. He then drove to his house......
[AT A LATER DATE...]
......The telephone rang. Murtala Muhammed picked it up, then turned to
Yakubu Gowon.
"It's Ojukwu. He wants to speak to you." Murtala covered the mouthpiece,
looked at Gowon directly and said:
"Now, I want to know every word he says to you before you reply."
The others [IN THE ROOM IN ADDITION TO GOWON AND MURTALA MUHAMMED:
JUSTICE MOHAMMED BELLO, SHITTU ALAO OF THE AIR FORCE, BUBA USMAN OF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE] nodded in agreement. Gowon could be kind, he was
not the kind of ruthless person who should deal with these people, thought
Murtala Muhammed. The only way to ensure that he did not make any
commitment which they could not accept was to monitor every word that he
had to say. The telepone conversation was therefore very slow. Ojukwu
was recording the conversation.
"What is going on?", Ojukwu asked.
Gowon narrated the incidents of the last few days as innocently as
possible, using the passive tense to maintain ambiguity.
"The other ranks mutinied and deaths have occurred. The supreme commander
and the military governor of the West were arrested and nothing is known
of their whereabouts."
"So what is being done? The most senior officer is Brigadier Ogundipe let
him step in and restore order until we find out what has happened to the
supreme commander."
"That is out of the question."
"Why?"
"The boys who organized the revolt insist that they want the North to go
separate."
"Well?"
"That I should step in as head of state and supreme commander of the armed
forces."
"You can take over Lagos but definitely not in the East."
"I have already been in contact with all the other members of the Supreme
Military Council and they agree that I should take over."
"That is impossible! There are other senior officers in the army, in the
armed forces."
Including the armed forces, the line of succession would have been
something like this: Commodore Wey, head of the Nigerian Navy; Brigadier
Ogundipe who had already resigned from the army; Colonel Adeyinka
Adebayo who would have been as unacceptable as Ogundipe;
Lieutenant-Colonel Bassey, Lieutenant-Colonel Imo, Lieutenant-Colonel
Njoku who would be anathema to the mutineers. Then came in alphabetical
order, Lieutenant-Colonel David Ejoor, Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon and
Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu. Both Gowon and Ojukwu had been
promoted to the level of Lieutenant-Colonel on the same date of 1 April,
1964.
"Listen, " Ojukwu continued, "if you want to take over simply as chief of
staff of the army and only as such in Lagos, so that you can bring the
situation under control, I shall cooperate with you so that Ogundipe or
whoever is next in seniority can assume power."
"As I said earlier, " Gowon replied, "the other governors have agreed to
my take over."
"But there is no governor in the West," answered Ojukwu.
"All the same, I have talked to someone who can answer for the West and he
agrees with my taking over."
"I do not recognize you as supreme commander," insisted Ojukwu.
"I am making a statement to the nation later tonight anyway." Ojukwu
dropped the telephone and switched off the tape recorder. He got up and
lit a cigarette. There was no way he would recognize Gowon as head of
state and supreme commander. That would make nonsense of military
discipline. Moreover, if he withheld his recognition of Gowon as head of
state and supreme commander of the armed forces, he may win concessions
for himself and his own people. But it was so difficult to accept Gowon
as head of state. Whatever happend he would ensure that he was in charge
as far as the East was concerned and thuse preserve a power base. Gowon
could do what he liked in Lagos.
UNQUOTE
3. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The above accounts show that Ogundipe was not as passive as always
depicted, but recognized rather wisely that the odds against him in the
face of implacable (and overwhelming number of) coup-makers from the
North, in the face of an implied threat of bolting the country, was
insurmountable despite Ojukwu's far-away (and Ejoor's weak "me-too")
assurances. Ringing in Ogundipe's head must have been the a re-collection
that Ironsi who was not part of the January 1966 coup and yet became Head
of State had most probably been eliminated. He did not want to be a second
casualty of the same story-line: coup non-participant, coup beneficiary,
counter-coup victim. Furthermore, he must have remembered two Yoruba
idioms, which say that:
(i) "he whose head is used to crack open a coco-nut is most unlikely
to ever drink of its sweet juice or eat the fruit."
(ii) "if you die fighting to claim a lost item (not yours) that you
merely found, what then do you expect the real owner of the item
to do?"
Some would call those Abiola-ic "proverbs of cowardice."
On the other hand, Ojukwu seemed to harbor a pathological mental-block
against Gowon's ascension to supreme commander; his principled and
logical position appeared too idealistically rigid in the face of the
unusual situation on the ground.
This adversarial position between Gowon and Ojukwu in July/August 1966,
among other reasons, prepared the way for Aburi six months later - and
secession and war five-seven months after Aburi.
Facts are stubborn.
Bolaji Aluko
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Magnus
I feel vindicated. Facts are stubborn as you say and I still feel Ojukwu
felt that Gowon was so down the line that it is absurd for him to be the
SMC. There was support for Ogundipe from the East, the MW. There was no
Military governor for the West at the time. But there were two southern
votes against Gowon. But, Bolaji, what about all the talk about the North
seceding? And Quincy, your man, would tell me that Nigeria is indivisible
and any talks of seceding was an act of war? Me I no know how people de
think attimes.
Where were Cols. Bassey and Shodeinde at this time? The argument that
coupist control does not hold water. If that is the case why was Ironsi at
the head instead of Nzeogwu/Ifeajuna? Recall that after the first wave of
insurrections, Nzeogwu and Co. met with some resistance within the military.
They were told in no uncertain terms that they had to hand over to Ironsi
who happened to be the highest ranking officer. They had to and they did.
My friend, you can see therefore that Ojukwu asking Ogundipe to take over
and not recognizing Gowon is not out of some dreamed out excuses you people
put up today. It had been done earlier to Nzeogwu.
We understand that the West was overwhelmed by the presence of soldiers of
Northern extraction but can't somebody stand up say something. The whole
West just cannot be afraid of the Northern soldiers. You had your support
from the East and Midwest, the three others who made up Nigeria. The North
would have had no option but to either secede or yield to the majority
opinion, period. You may well know that it has been this long since they
started pounding their chests that they were born to rule and that they ONLY
decided what happened in Nigeria. You gave it to them. See where we
all are now?
Rgds,
Magnus
----- Original Message -----
From: Mobolaji E. Aluko <mal...@scs.howard.edu>
To: <Naij...@egroups.com>
Cc: Nigerian NewsGroups <akwa-cr...@lists.stanford.edu>;
<annang...@egroups.com>; IgboNet <igbo...@lists.cc.utexas.edu>; Rivnet
<RIV...@siue.edu>; <yorub...@onelist.com>
Sent: Sunday, December 26, 1999 9:00 PM
Subject: STAR INFORMATION: Ogundipe and Ojukwu and Gowon in '66: The Tussle
for Power on the Road to Aburi
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> ....The times were still troubling. The wobbling Nigerian nation could
> .......The telephone rang. Murtala Muhammed picked it up, then turned to
Mobolaji E. Aluko
Nwoke'm Magnus:
Please, after a civil war, one million deaths and now almost 30 years of
collective national sulking, nobody should talk about being vindicated.
There have been too many roads taken that led to blind alleys and deep
gorges in our country, and too many roads not taken that could have led to
a better ending.
I have no idea where Col. Bassey and Col. Shodeinde were at this time. It
appears that Col. Shodeinde took over as Commandant of NMTC from Nzeogwu,
so his seniority in this list may be questionable; his title listed here
may have been a later conferment. I shall investigate where they both were
and get back to you.
And please note that all available indication was that the West was in
ABSOLUTELY NO MILITARY POSITION to take on a major conflict at that point.
The position of the MidWest (the military hierarchy there was dominated by
Igbo officers) was then taken to be the position of the East, and the
East, being the major protagonist at this point, was suspect..
Also, please note the difference between the two coups: The coupists of
January 15 (Nzeogwu and co.) FAILED in their effort to sustain the coup in
the image that they dreamed of, and were in no position to dictate the
leadership, even though it fell on the most senior officer who was so much
more senior than every one else; on the other hand the coupists of July 29
(Murtala Muhammed and co.) SUCCEEDED in the plot, and were in a much
better position to dictate who should lead the country. Let us be frank.
I believe that it was this difference that Ojukwu failed to appreciate,
because he simply could not imagine a man called Gowon who he was better
educated than, and promoted to the same rank of Lt.-Colonel on the same
day being called his "Supreme Commander." I stronlgy believe that it was
MORE a personal thing than a principled position - but I may be wrong, for
I have been known to be wrong.
But let me return to this point that I have made several times now: NO
NIGERIAN ELECTED ANY OF THESE MILITARY CHARACTERS as our leaders then and
since, and you and I arguing over who should or should not have led is
really unnecessary. If both coups should not have occurred in the first
instance, why should you and I butt heads over who should have led the
nation? Is there honour among thieves? Bearing in mind that there were
no more massacres between Aburi and Biafra's secession, was this a
necessary prelude to war?
Finally, I always urge my Ndiigbo compatriots to sit back and reflect on
the events from January 15, 1966 to May 30, 1967 and see whether there
were roads taken and roads not taken that could have led to a different
outcome. Furthermore, they should ask where Ojukwu's OWN PERSONALITY
determined certain outcomes, and be honest to admit that there were points
when certain actions of his were not INEVITABLE.
None of this would take away from the bravery of declaring the secession,
or the gallantry of Biafrans during the war, nor should it be taken as
insulting the dead and the wounded, both psychological and physical. It
just simply means that certain outcomes could have been avoided, and that
ALL of us should learn from such a history.
Enough said.
Bolaji Aluko
> > arguing for either Ogundipe or Bassey..
> > was going on.. The chief of staff [OGUNDIPE] told him what he had told
baba bamisaiye
Ironsi and Colonel Fajuyi ? I've read of the circumstances of their death
but not of the major participants in it. None of the books seem to shed
light on this also. Who were the principal actors of that first and second
coup, and if possible the roles they played ?
----- Original Message -----
From: Mobolaji E. Aluko <mal...@scs.howard.edu>
To: Magnus <mekw...@flash.net>
Cc: <Naij...@egroups.com>; Nigerian NewsGroups
<akwa-cr...@lists.stanford.edu>; <annang...@egroups.com>; IgboNet
<igbo...@lists.cc.utexas.edu>; Rivnet <RIV...@siue.edu>;
<yorub...@onelist.com>
Sent: Monday, December 27, 1999 9:26 PM
Subject: [Naijanet] Re: STAR INFORMATION: Ogundipe and Ojukwu and Gowon in
'66: The Tussle for Power on the Road to Aburi
>
>
> Nwoke'm Magnus:
>
>
> Please, after a civil war, one million deaths and now almost 30 years of
> collective national sulking, nobody should talk about being vindicated.
> There have been too many roads taken that led to blind alleys and deep
> gorges in our country, and too many roads not taken that could have led to
> a better ending.
>
> I have no idea where Col. Bassey and Col. Shodeinde were at this time. It
> appears that Col. Shodeinde took over as Commandant of NMTC from Nzeogwu,
> so his seniority in this list may be questionable; his title listed here
> may have been a later conferment. I shall investigate where they both were
> and get back to you.
>
> And please note that all available indication was that the West was in
> ABSOLUTELY NO MILITARY POSITION to take on a major conflict at that point.
> The position of the MidWest (the military hierarchy there was dominated by
> Igbo officers) was then taken to be the position of the East, and the
> East, being the major protagonist at this point, was suspect.
>
> > > was going on. The chief of staff [OGUNDIPE] told him what he had told
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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