On Conserrvatism (Re: What were you saying about Orthodox conversions?)
intern
>[posted for Yitzchok Samet (att.att.com!mtdca!ais) ]
>... Most conservatives who bandy the
>term, can't differentiate serious talmudic jurisprudence from the
>extremeley superficial imitation they've been conned into buying.
>
>Yitzchok Samet
This reminded me the joke about the guy who just bought a Lamborghini/Ferrari/
Jaguar/(whatever you want) and is so excited about it that he would like to
make a bracha on it, but he doesn't know which one.
(If you know this joke already, then just skip this msg, sorry)
So he goes to an Orthodox Rabbi and tells him that he got a new
Lamboghini and wants to make a bracha on it. The Rabbi said (inject
some old-world Yiddish accent here): "A Lamborghini? What's a
Lamborghini?", to which the man said: "Oh, thats a FANTASTIC sports
car! It does 0-100 MPH in 5 seconds, and can outrun a
helicopter...(etc.)." The Rabbi said: "Listen, it's very nice that
you're excited about your new car, but I don't think it's appropriate
to make a bracha on a car."
So the man goes to a Convervative Rabbi and repeats his question.
The Rabbi says: "A Lamborghini, eh? That's a nice car. But I don't
think it's appropriate to make a bracha on a car".
So the man goes to a Reform Rabbi and again tells him that he got a
Lamborghini and he would like to say a bracha for it. The Rabbi
exclaims: "A Lamborghini?? Wow, that's GREAT! It does 0-100 MPH in 5
seconds, goes faster than a helicopter (..etc.),
but ..... a bracha?? what's a bracha??"
- Steve -
int...@dasys1.UUCP
--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Steve Faiwiszewski bang : {sun!hoptoad , cmcl2!phri} !dasys1!intern
domain : int...@dasys1.UUCP
Help save a tree: Print on both sides of the paper
Stan Krieger
> In article <19...@devsys.oakhill.UUCP> st...@oakhill.UUCP (steve) writes:
>
> >... Most conservatives who bandy the
> >term, can't differentiate serious talmudic jurisprudence from the
> >extremeley superficial imitation they've been conned into buying.
> >
>
>
> Lamborghini and he would like to say a bracha for it. The Rabbi
> exclaims: "A Lamborghini?? Wow, that's GREAT! It does 0-100 MPH in 5
> seconds, goes faster than a helicopter (..etc.),
> but ..... a bracha?? what's a bracha??"
>
After seeing this anti-Conservative, anti-Reform crap on
this net, I have one thing to ask the "Orthodox".
During the Megillah reading, do you use greggers or other
noisemakers, or did you just bang on your prayerbooks to
make noise?
Nothing in an Orthodox shul makes me more sick that seeing
prayerbooks, with all the holiness and protocol attached to
them, used as simple noisemakers. Anyone who believes
"true" Judaism allows for such behavior has no right to
mock any other valid form of Jewish observance.
It's been 20 years since I davened in the shul my parents
go to, but two things I remember-
1. Kaddish! BANG!
2. Kvite, pliss. BANG!
The BANG! was on a siddur the Gabbi was carrying, not the
podium.
--
Stan Krieger
Summit NJ
Avi Y Feldblum
> After seeing this anti-Conservative, anti-Reform crap on
> this net, I have one thing to ask the "Orthodox".
>
> During the Megillah reading, do you use greggers or other
> noisemakers, or did you just bang on your prayerbooks to
> make noise?
> Nothing in an Orthodox shul makes me more sick that seeing
> prayerbooks, with all the holiness and protocol attached to
> them, used as simple noisemakers. Anyone who believes
> "true" Judaism allows for such behavior has no right to
> mock any other valid form of Jewish observance.
I have been going to "Orthodox" shuls all my life and I do not ever
remember seeing such activity. We have always used groggers or other
noisemakers. (By the way, the custom is only about 400-500 years
old).
> It's been 20 years since I davened in the shul my parents
> go to, but two things I remember-
>
> 1. Kaddish! BANG!
> 2. Kvite, pliss. BANG!
>
> The BANG! was on a siddur the Gabbi was carrying, not the
> podium.
I'm sorry that you had such a poor introduction to orthodox judaism.
In a more serious environment, not only would I not dream of banging
a sidur or chumash on the podium, but I will not even sit down on a
bench if a sidur or a chumash is laying down on the same bench.
During large parts of the prayer it is forbidden to speak, so there
should be no need for the Gabbai to bang anything. I guess I am
fortunate to have such a place to daven in.
Avi
+Listowsky P.
> >
> this net, I have one thing to ask the "Orthodox".
Please address any indignation (justified or otherwise) to the specific
orthodox person(s) you have in mind - not to the entire group.
I fall under the "orthodox" grouping and I resent it when people generalize
and try to prejudge the entire group. This is one reason I hate the
entire "label" concept alltogether.
Just as I'm sure you would not want me to judge you based upon some
random conservative person, just because both of you have the same "label",
I would expect the same courtesy to be extended to us orthodox.
And, I don't expect you to apologize for the actions some conservative
may take, just as I don't think you should hold me accountable for
explaining the actions of every kook in my own grouping.
>
> During the Megillah reading, do you use greggers or other
> noisemakers, or did you just bang on your prayerbooks to
> make noise?
No, this isn't an "orthodox custom". It's just something some people
may do in some places.
I haven't seen it though.
This year I heard the megilla at Yeshiva University, and I must say
it was very nice - and very dignified, not like the scuzzy picture
you paint of "orthodox shuls". Not only was it totally quiet (with
about 800 people present), but even for haman, there was a short
and simple stop for noise making - mostly a little foot stomping.
> Nothing in an Orthodox shul makes me more sick that seeing
> prayerbooks, with all the holiness and protocol attached to
> them, used as simple noisemakers. Anyone who believes
> "true" Judaism allows for such behavior has no right to
> mock any other valid form of Jewish observance.
> --
> Stan Krieger
> Summit NJ
True Judaism does not allow for using siddurim as noisemakers, and none
of my orthodox friends, associates, or family do such a thing. To suggest
that it is an "orthodox thing" is silly.
Of course, not respecting the siddur is not like eating a ham and cheese
sandwich on Yom Kippur, so your siddur smacking gabbai probably wasn't
"excommunicated" for doing so.
I would suggest that you have not seen a good sampling of orthodox
shuls if you believe that they are all loaded with misbehaving hypocrites.
Not everyone who chooses to call themselves "orthodox" is observant. There
is no "orthodox" exam to get in. Usually, you will find principally
observant people in the group though (because, who in their right mind
would want to be orthodox if they weren't sincere about it (-:).
The most sincere, moving, and dignified prayer group I have participated
in was at Yeshivat Kerem B'Yavneh (Israel). You have a group of several
hundred praying in a most spiritually uplifting atmosphere and I found
the experience not only refreshing, but also very rewarding (I was there
for a year). My sister expressed similar sentiments about her experience
at Michlala in Jerusalem.
Phil
Daniel P. Faigin
>I would suggest that you have not seen a good sampling of orthodox shuls if
>you believe that they are all loaded with misbehaving hypocrites. Not
>everyone who chooses to call themselves "orthodox" is observant. There is no
>"orthodox" exam to get in. Usually, you will find principally observant
>people in the group though (because, who in their right mind would want to be
>orthodox if they weren't sincere about it (-:).
The key line in this paragraph is:
>Not everyone who chooses to call themselves "orthodox" is observant.
This, from a person who, by his own admission, falls "under the ``orthodox''
grouping". Why do I point this out? Well....
We have been discussing for a long the time problems that the more observant
Jews have with the less observant practices of the Reform. But now, we see
that there are less-observant Jews within the boundries of "Orthodox".
So what, in actually, is the distinction between the movements? Is it
practice? Hardly, for as we have just been told, you can have non-observant
Jews any in any of the movement. Twice-a-year Jews can be Orthodox,
Conservative, Reform or Reconstructionalist (although I do admit there will be
fewer in the more observant movements, but there will be some). Observant Jews
can be Reconstructionalist, Reform, Conservative, or Orthodox (although I do
admit there will be fewer in the less observant movements, but there will be
some).
The distiction between the movements is not practices but fundamental beliefs;
primarily, the beliefs surrounding the authorship and authority of the written
and oral laws. It is this distinction that is critical, everything else
follows from this.
Daniel
Work :The Aerospace Corp M8/055 * POB 92957 * LA, CA 90009-2957 * 213/336-3149
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Voicemail: 213/336-5454 Box#3149 * "Take what you like, and leave the rest"
Lou Steinberg
> In article <49...@sfsup.UUCP> p...@sfsup.UUCP (+Listowsky P.) writes:
> >I would suggest that you have not seen a good sampling of orthodox shuls if
> >you believe that they are all loaded with misbehaving hypocrites. Not
> >everyone who chooses to call themselves "orthodox" is observant.
>
> The key line in this paragraph is:
> >Not everyone who chooses to call themselves "orthodox" is observant.
>
> We have been discussing for a long the time problems that the more observant
> Jews have with the less observant practices of the Reform. But now, we see
> that there are less-observant Jews within the boundries of "Orthodox".
Well, not quite. The problem here is that there are several meanings
for the term [oO]rthodox: someone who calls himself Orthodox, someone
who belongs to a Shul that has a mechitzah, someone who observes the
mitzvot in the [oO]rthodox manner, etc. There are a similar set of
meanings for the terms Reform and Conservative. The question is, how
readily are the different meanings of such a term separable?
On the one hand, it may not be fair to damn the Reform Movement
because some people show up in Reform synagogues on Rosh Hashannah who
have a Christmas tree in their house in December, just as it is
clearly not fair to damn Orthodoxy for our now-proverbial gabbai who
banged his siddur or for the people who drive to shul on Shabbat and
park a block away. (You can tell what group I belong to from the
wording of the previous sentence. ;-)
On the other hand, there is a principle in traditional Judaism that we
avoid doing things that, by themselves, would be OK, but which might
lead people to do things that are definitely not OK. I think it is
fair to charge a movement with people's actions that, while not in
accord with the official ideology of the movement, are in fact made
more likely by the actions or beliefs of the movement. Thus, since
you are reform and I am orthodox, I think we can both agree (:-) that
it would be fair to ask, "Does the conservative movement's allowing
one to drive to shul on shabbat in fact make it likely that members of
that movement will also drive to the shopping mall on shabbat?" If
the answer is yes, that is a fair complaint about the Conservative
movement, even though driving to the shopping mall is clearly against
official Conservative beliefs.
--
Lou Steinberg
uucp: {pretty much any major site}!rutgers!aramis.rutgers.edu!lou
arpa: l...@aramis.rutgers.edu
Steven Gutfreund
It seems to me this should be pretty simple. Observance is a G-Dly determined
issue. Someone who practices and observes G-D's wishes is a G-Dly person.
Labels such as Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionism are hokum.
Attaching such a label does not fool G-D. Where you pay your dues is not
importatnt to Him. Yes, there are non observant people who attend Orthodox
Shuls. So what?
Observance is doing what G-D wants. And where are you going to find out
what G-D wants? In the Torah, it is the only place he reveals what
his wish is. If one starts by denying that it is G-Ds Torah, and setting
oneself up as the final arbitrator of what is right and wrong,
you are doing what you want, not what G-D wants. It's easier, more comfortable,
and no-one can tell you what you are doing is wrong (because you are defining
good as what you do) but it is not being observant.
Summary: "Practice is the distinguishing factor, labels are not"
--
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Yechezkal Shimon (Steven) Gutfreund sgutf...@bunny.UUCP
GTE Laboratories, Waltham MA sgutf...@gte.com
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Daniel P. Faigin
l...@bearcat.rutgers.edu (Lou Steinberg) writes:
>On the other hand, there is a principle in traditional Judaism that we
>avoid doing things that, by themselves, would be OK, but which might
>lead people to do things that are definitely not OK. I think it is
>fair to charge a movement with people's actions that, while not in
>accord with the official ideology of the movement, are in fact made
>more likely by the actions or beliefs of the movement. Thus, since
>you are reform and I am orthodox, I think we can both agree (:-) that
>it would be fair to ask, "Does the conservative movement's allowing
>one to drive to shul on shabbat in fact make it likely that members of
>that movement will also drive to the shopping mall on shabbat?" If
>the answer is yes, that is a fair complaint about the Conservative
>movement, even though driving to the shopping mall is clearly against
>official Conservative beliefs.
That is some of the problems that I have with the conservative movement. It is
very hard to remain straddling a fence. Reform has attempted to establish a
consistant (even if you don't agree with it) basis for its belief. Ditto for
Orthodoxy, which has always had a consistent, if albeit unyeilding, view.
Trying to have both worlds is dangerous.
Yaakov Kayman
Orthodox, as Orthodox Jews claim to be Shomrei Torah u Mitzvot (observers
of the Torah and commandments). As I have said many times before, men are
imperfect, and therefore so must necessarily be their observance.
Also, what differentiates the less-than-perfect observance of those who
call themselves Orthodox from the other, more modern "flavors" of
Judaism is the realization of their wrongdoing when they do wrong
- instead of trying to (spuriously) claim that the particular (set of)
Law(s) they have just violated is (are) somehow "antiquated" and
therefore no longer necessary, or the mere contrivance of Man, and
therefore no more legitimate than their *own* opinions and
"interpretations".
More importantly, coupled with that sense of wrongdoing is regret for it
and, yet *more* importantly, *ACTION* to stop doing the wrong and start
doing better.
Yaakov K.
--------
Yaakov Kayman (212) 903-3666 City University of New York
BITNET: YZKCU@CUNYVM "Lucky is the shepherd, and lucky his flock
Internet: YZ...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU about whom the wolves complain"
Daniel P. Faigin
>Observance is a G-Dly determined issue. Someone who practices and observes
>where are you going to find out what G-D wants? In the Torah, it is the only
>place he reveals what his wish is.
Let's try this again. What I am trying to establish is a basic understanding
of the differences between the movements. Within Orthodoxy, both the written
and oral laws are considered to be from the hand of G-d. Thus, within
Orthodoxy, they are unchangable, eternally true as written. Contradictions and
arcane rules therein were put there by G-d for reasons that we humans cannot
understand (and we shouldn't try). Thus, within Orthodoxy, you must follow all
mitzvot derived from the oral and written laws because they are G-ds words; to
not do them would be ung-dly. Observance is doing what G-d whats, as G-d writ
it in the oral and written laws.
Conservative, as I understand it, does not hold that G-d writ the oral law
embodied in the Talmud; the Talmud, although possibly of divine inspiration,
was writ by man based on the context of the times; it ( the talmud) must be
reinterpred for todays times. Within Conservative, the written law is still
writ from G-d. Observance and g-dlyness in Conservative is still defined as
doing what G-d wants; it is clear what G-d wants if it was writ in the tanach,
however, if it is an extrapolation of the talmud, it is no longer considered
to be a command from G-d but rather an interpretation of man. Man does not
command.
In Reform, both the written and oral portions are considered to be writ by
man, although they are usually felt to be of divine inspiration. Thus, not
following a "command" in the Torah is not disobeying G-d's will, because we do
not know that what is written is exactly what G-d means. Thus the process of
discerning G-d will continues all the time within Reform. Observance and
G-dlyness are based on the following of actions which are felt within the
movement to be a reflection of G-d will.
We do not know who wrote what. There is no way to determine this. Thus, we
have a matter of belief. You cannot argue with belief. You hold your beliefs
stongly, and I can respect that. It is not valid to say that my actions or
opinions are *wrong* based on *your* beliefs that the Torah is G-ds absolute
word. You can validly say that you feel my actions to not fit within your
belief system. Do you see the difference?
>If one starts by denying that it is G-Ds Torah, and setting
>oneself up as the final arbitrator of what is right and wrong,
Do these parts go together. If I deny that G-d is the direct author of the
Torah, where does the impliction that I am the final arbitrator come from.
I can still hold the Torah as one of my authorities; I just not longer give it
the same power of authority as you do.
The other distinction I have tried to point out over these many weeks is the
difference between right and wrong concerning morals and ethics and human
relations, and right and wrong in the are of ritual practice. I have come to
the personal opinion that the divine inspiration embodied in the oral and
written laws concerning ethics and morals are universal. Many of the rituals,
on the other hand, need to be reinterpreted. Thus, I hold the Torah as
authority on ethics and morals; but I do not hold it as the authority on
ritual. Again, do you see the distinction between the two?
>you are doing what you want, not what G-D wants.
Do I always do what I want? No. Consider: Life would be much more fun if I
violated many of the moral standards of the Torah. Life would be easier.
Cheating, lying, stealing, being cruel... all of these things could make life
easy. However, my ethical and moral beliefs based on G-ds inspiration as writ
in the Torah prohibit me from the easy way to easy street.
Again, we all have differing views of what G-d wants. Since neither of us can
talk to G-d directly, we cannot say who is right or wrong in our beliefs, or
even if we are not both right or both wrong.
> It's easier, more comfortable,
>and no-one can tell you what you are doing is wrong (because you are defining
>good as what you do) but it is not being observant.
I don't know about this. I get lots of people here on the net telling me waht
I do is wrong? (Are you one of them?) As for not being observant, again,
remember that we have differing bases to be observant against. You are
observant in accordance with (IAW) your beliefs I am sure; I am not so
perfect, but I do try to be observant IAW mine.
>Summary: "Practice is the distinguishing factor, labels are not"
Again, I disagree. The labels tend to imply the underlying belief as to what
is the authority. Practice can only be measured in relation to the rules of
the underlying authority.
Arthur S. Kamlet
...
>Again, we all have differing views of what G-d wants. Since neither of us can
>talk to G-d directly, we cannot say who is right or wrong in our beliefs, or
>even if we are not both right or both wrong.
Well, let's consider whether we can talk to G-d directly. I
maintain that I can and do talk directly to G-d. Now I have to
admit I've never heard him talk back; certainly not as described in
the Tanach.
<< Rhetorical Mode On >>
On the other hand, I sometimes wonder if I am unusual in this
regard. All these years talking to G-d, and never once hearing him
talk back to me? What have I been doing with my time? Why do I
continue? Why does it seem to me that Jews, of all people, chosen
by G-d to do all his commandments -- not too easy, some of those
commandments -- don't have two-way conversations with G-d?
Afterall, some famous people, some of them well-known T.V.
preachers, say they spoke with G-d, and G-d spoke to them, and G-d
told them to raise money, and millions of people hear that and say,
"Well, I suppose if G-d told him to raise money I'd better help."
In other words, in today's society, there are millions of people who
don't find it too unusual that someone reports having a two-way
conversation with G-d.
<< Rhetorical Mode Off >>
I believe when we ask what the Torah means, "the answer is no longer
in heaven." As a conservative Jew I take that to mean that people
interpret the Torah; we shouldn't expect G-d to speak to us when we
speak to him.
--
Art Kamlet a...@cbrmb.att.com AT&T Bell Laboratories, Columbus
Daniel P. Faigin
>Practice *IS* the distinguishing factor!
>be Shomrei Torah u Mitzvot (observers of the Torah and
>commandments).
>therefore so must necessarily be their observance.
You have just contradicted yourself. Follow what you said:
Orthodox Jews are men ; assumption
men are imperfect ; [2] given
therefore, their observance is imperfect ; [2]
therefore, they are not completely observant ; defn of imperfect
therefore they are not Orthodox [1]
Note that if you argue that [1] applies only in the case of completely
non-observant Jews (as opposed to less than perfect Jews), then Reform and
Conservative Jews are Orthodox by your definition.
You go on to say:
>Also, what differentiates the less-than-perfect observance of those who
>call themselves Orthodox from the other, more modern "flavors" of
>Judaism is the realization of their wrongdoing when they do wrong
Who determines what is wrong? This is the key question I have been trying to
establish. Many traditional people on this net have claimed that it is G-d who
determines wrong; not man. I have no problem with this. They then tell me that
I am wrong. But they are not G-d, they are men.
If you hold the Tanach and Talmud as the literal word of G-d, then, yes, I am
wrong *by that definition*. But that is your definition, not mine. If you hold
that the Tanach and Talmud are the works of men who were inspired by G-d, then
I am not wrong, for I have no guarantee that what was written agrees with the
inspiration (and no way to ever determine this). Thus, what is more important
is the overall sense and focus of the inspiration, not the exact words.
>- instead of trying to (spuriously) claim that the particular (set of)
>Law(s) they have just violated is (are) somehow "antiquated" and
>therefore no longer necessary, or the mere contrivance of Man, and
>therefore no more legitimate than their *own* opinions and
>"interpretations".
Note that this is *your* opinion based on your strongly held belief in the
Tanach and Talmud as the word of G-d. I will not argue that you think that
the way I believe is wrong based on your beliefs. I cannot change that; I
don't want to (for to change that, I would have to change your beliefs, and
that is wrong). What I am trying to do is to make clear that there is a basis
for Reform Judaism, that its rituals follow from that basis, that Reform does
not discard without thought, and, most importantly, that Reform is not the
same as the "twice-a-year" or residual Judaism that many think it is.
>More importantly, coupled with that sense of wrongdoing is regret for it
>and, yet *more* importantly, *ACTION* to stop doing the wrong and start
>doing better.
We all do wrong. We all fail in being perfect observers of what we ascertain
to be G-d's will. I am sure there are occasional mitzvot that you fail to
observe; I am the same. This is why every year we are given the change to
return to better observance. This applies to all Judaic movements.
Mark C. Carroll <MC>
]
] It seems to me this should be pretty simple. Observance is a G-Dly determined
] issue. Someone who practices and observes G-D's wishes is a G-Dly person.
] Labels such as Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionism are hokum.
] Attaching such a label does not fool G-D. Where you pay your dues is not
] importatnt to Him. Yes, there are non observant people who attend Orthodox
] Shuls. So what?
Yes, observance is a Godly determined issue. And who are you to tell
me what God wants from me? Isn't that between me and God? That isn't
any of your business, and you have no right to judge anyone for how
they chose to practice.
] Observance is doing what G-D wants. And where are you going to find out
] what G-D wants? In the Torah, it is the only place he reveals what
] his wish is. If one starts by denying that it is G-Ds Torah, and setting
] oneself up as the final arbitrator of what is right and wrong,
] you are doing what you want,not what G-D wants. It's easier,more comfortable,
] and no-one can tell you what you are doing is wrong (because you are defining
] good as what you do) but it is not being observant.
]
Except that we don't necessarily believe that the Torah is written by
God. None of us doubt that is was divinely INSPIRED, but if it is not
actually written by God, then what it contains is only HUMAN
interpretations of Gods will. If the interpretations are made by humans,
then I can interpret for myself without it being wrong.
] Summary: "Practice is the distinguishing factor, labels are not"
]
Labels are certainly not a factor of any kind. But BELIEF, that is
really the distinguishing factor. To judge me by your beliefs is
unjust. To label me, and judge me by my label is unjust. To judge me
by my beliefs are to judge me by who I am, and that's just fine with
me.
] Yechezkal Shimon (Steven) Gutfreund sgutf...@bunny.UUCP
] GTE Laboratories, Waltham MA sgutf...@gte.com
<MC>
--
---------------------- Mark Craig Carroll: <MC> ------------------------
-------- mcca...@topaz.rutgers.edu,...!rutgers!topaz!mccarrol ---------
--"In the beginning, the Universe was created. This has made a lot of --
----- people very angry, and been widely regarded as a bad move." ------
Keith Bierman Sun Tactical Engineering
>primarily, the beliefs surrounding the authorship and authority of the written
>and oral laws. It is this distinction that is critical, everything else
>follows from this.
>
I beg to differ. Possible alternative formulation:
Orthodox : Primacy of the halacha (talumud, classic rabbinic process)
Conservative: Split the difference.
Reform : Primacy of the modern rabbinate.
Reconst. : Primacy of Modercai Kaplan :>
Seriously, I can't find a one liner that is suitable.
My one-liners are, like all such, too short. But the key point is that
it is a difference of how to deal with the Talmud (which is clearly
the work of people, not the alimightly) and foundation of halacha.
The answer to "Who wrote the text of devarim" is highly correlated to
the speakers movement affililation, but it is not the fundamental difference.
Keith H. Bierman
It's Not My Fault ---- I Voted for Bill & Opus
Herman Rubin
> In article <48...@aero.ARPA> fai...@aerospace.aero.org (Daniel P. Faigin) writes:
> >
> >The distiction between the movements is not practices but fundamental beliefs;
> >primarily, the beliefs surrounding the authorship and authority of the written
> >and oral laws. It is this distinction that is critical, everything else
> >follows from this.
> >
>
> I beg to differ. Possible alternative formulation:
>
> Orthodox : Primacy of the halacha (talumud, classic rabbinic process)
> Conservative: Split the difference.
> Reform : Primacy of the modern rabbinate.
This is nonsense. There are cases in which the rabbinate will make a ruling,
but more often they will leave it to the individual. There is no unanimity
among the rabbinate, nor is there a desire to dictate to the individual. If
an Orthodox rabbi is asked for an opinion, it is likely to be given, with at
most a statement of other opinions in the Agadah. A Reform rabbi is likely
to discuss the matter, and of course express an opinion, but point out that
there are many differing opinions. The Torah is divinely inspired, but is
the word of man, and what is there may be the result of man's misunderstanding
of God. Again, I am oversimplifying. There are a few Orthodox rabbis who
will go into the whole megillah on a simple question, but very few will
entertain the idea that the sages overlooked important factors which may
invalidate their entire argument.
The Reform position is that each person must produce the interpretation
appropriate to that person, taking into account the relevant factors. The
primacy is that of the Torah, recognized as being written by the people of
that time, and with the knowledge of that time. What they wrote, and more
so what the authors of later portions of the Tanakh, and the Talmudic rabbis,
is colored by the culture and knowledge of their times.
Ignorance is no sin. You cannot use what you do not know, and neither could
the writers of the Tanakh and the Talmud. But we can use the knowledge of
the physical world, of history and sociology, of language, etc., which they
did not have to come to other conclusions. We find contradictions where they
were unable to for lack of knowledge. We debate the origin of what was obvious
to them. Thus we come up with different answers.
Also, the Talmudic rabbis felt it necessary to develop an Orthopractic, as
well as Orthodox, view to preserve Judaism, where there had been no normative
body before. We can debate, and never answer, whether this was right THEN.
It is not, in my opinion, right NOW.
> Reconst. : Primacy of Modercai Kaplan :>
> Seriously, I can't find a one liner that is suitable.
>
> My one-liners are, like all such, too short. But the key point is that
> it is a difference of how to deal with the Talmud (which is clearly
> the work of people, not the alimightly) and foundation of halacha.
>
> The answer to "Who wrote the text of devarim" is highly correlated to
> the speakers movement affililation, but it is not the fundamental difference.
>
>
>
>
> Keith H. Bierman
> It's Not My Fault ---- I Voted for Bill & Opus
--
Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907
Phone: (317)494-6054
hru...@l.cc.purdue.edu (Internet, bitnet, UUCP)
Francine Storfer
article, most of which I have deleted.]
In article <48...@aero.ARPA> fai...@aerospace.aero.org (Daniel P. Faigin) writes:
>
>The other distinction I have tried to point out over these many weeks is the
>difference between right and wrong concerning morals and ethics and human
>relations, and right and wrong in the are of ritual practice. I have come to
>the personal opinion that the divine inspiration embodied in the oral and
>written laws concerning ethics and morals are universal. Many of the rituals,
>on the other hand, need to be reinterpreted. Thus, I hold the Torah as
>authority on ethics and morals; but I do not hold it as the authority on
>ritual. Again, do you see the distinction between the two?
>
>Daniel
As I understand the above paragraph, Daniel is saying that he holds
the Torah as an authority on ethics and morals, but not on ritual,
i.e. actions. My question, Daniel, is how do you reconcile this
position with the well-established position of Judaism that the action
is the most important thing, that one benefits spiritually by
performing the Mitzvot even without a complete (or sometimes any)
understanding of their purpose?
Fran Storfer
Indeed there is goodness in the worm. - Shakespeare
-------------------------------------------------------------
fr...@boulder.colorado.EDU | !{ncar,nbires}!boulder!frano
Daniel P. Faigin
Storfer) writes:
>As I understand the above paragraph [deleted], Daniel is saying that he holds
>the Torah as an authority on ethics and morals, but not on ritual, i.e.
>actions. My question, Daniel, is how do you reconcile this position with the
>well-established position of Judaism that the action is the most important
>thing, that one benefits spiritually by performing the Mitzvot even without a
>complete (or sometimes any) understanding of their purpose?
First of all, there are ethical/moral actions and ritual actions. Thus, the
Torah is an authority on *some* actions.
As for ritual actions with no understanding for their purpose, these are
allowed within Reform Judaism. They serve to increase the sanctity of one's
life; it is up to the individual, based on their study, to determine if
performing such an action increases the sanctity of their life. For example,
some Reform Jews wear kippahs and tallit during services; some don't. The
distinguishing factor is whether the act intensifies the personal relationship
with G-d.
Daniel P. Faigin
Engineering) writes:
>In article <48...@aero.ARPA> fai...@aerospace.aero.org (Daniel P. Faigin)
>writes:
>>The distiction between the movements is not practices but fundamental
>>beliefs; primarily, the beliefs surrounding the authorship and authority of
>>the written and oral laws. It is this distinction that is critical,
>>everything else follows from this.
>
>I beg to differ. Possible alternative formulation:
>
>Orthodox : Primacy of the halacha (talumud, classic rabbinic process)
>Conservative: Split the difference.
>Reform : Primacy of the modern rabbinate.
>
>(which is clearly the work of people, not the alimightly) and foundation of
>halacha.
My assertion is that the one liners that you state follows from the authorship
question. Thus, in Reform, the modern rabbinate is important because the
authorship question leads to a need for continual reinterpretation. In
orthodox, the halacha is primary precisely because it is the absolute word.
I think we are in violent agreement.
Mark C. Carroll <MC>
]
]Orthodox : Primacy of the halacha (talumud, classic rabbinic process)
]Conservative: Split the difference.
absolute word, but the oral law to be the work of man. They follow the
"classic rabbinic process" according to this interpretation.
]Reform : Primacy of the modern rabbinate.
Wrong again. Reform is the primacy of the individual. Reform believes
in the individuals right to make decisions for himself; the Reform
never tell you what you MUST do, or what you MUST believe.
]Reconst. : Primacy of Modercai Kaplan :>
] Seriously, I can't find a one liner that is suitable.
]
A one-liner for Reconstructionism.. According to a local
reconstructionist Rabbi, it would be "Primacy of the community".
]My one-liners are, like all such, too short. But the key point is that
]it is a difference of how to deal with the Talmud (which is clearly
]the work of people, not the alimightly) and foundation of halacha.
]
You one-liners are, like all such, ridiculous, wrong generalizations.
They are the views that the orthodox usually come up with, when they
can't be bothered to learn what others are about. Anyone who has
seriously looked at Reform would KNOW that we don't consider the
modern Rabinate to be the final word. Anyone who has seriously looked
at Conservative would understand that they are not "straddling the
middle", but trying to follow thier own interpretation. Please, before
you make a generalization about the fundamental concepts of anyone
else, try to find out what it is first.
]Keith H. Bierman
]It's Not My Fault ---- I Voted for Bill & Opus
<MC>
Bruce Krulwich
>>As I understand the above paragraph [deleted], Daniel is saying that he holds
>>the Torah as an authority on ethics and morals, but not on ritual, i.e.
>>actions. My question, Daniel, is how do you reconcile this position with the
>>well-established position of Judaism that the action is the most important
>>thing, that one benefits spiritually by performing the Mitzvot even without a
>>complete (or sometimes any) understanding of their purpose?
>
>First of all, there are ethical/moral actions and ritual actions. Thus, the
>Torah is an authority on *some* actions.
Who makes the distinction between ethical/moral actions (which you say are
considered binding by Reform, or is it just recommended?) and ritual actions??
Who decides which ethical/moral actions are binding and which are just "good
to do" ?? Is all of this up to personal choice??
Bruce Krulwich
Daniel P. Faigin
Krulwich) writes:
>Who makes the distinction between ethical/moral actions (which you say are
>considered binding by Reform, or is it just recommended?) and ritual actions??
It is usually clear by the action in question. Consider the law concerning the
mixing of linen and wool. This is clearly not ethical. Consider the
commandment to not murder. This is clearly ethical. Usually the distinction is
a common societal view, but, yes, it is an individual determination.
>Who decides which ethical/moral actions are binding and which are just "good
>to do"??
Most Reform Jews that I know consider the ethical/moral laws all to be
binding. In any case, they are all "good to do".
>Is all of this up to personal choice??
Personal choice, conbined with study and understanding, is at the center of
Reform Judaism. It is hope that the study and understanding will lead people
to the correct choices.
Sean Engelson
>Krulwich) writes:
>>Who makes the distinction between ethical/moral actions (which you say are
>>considered binding by Reform, or is it just recommended?) and ritual actions??
>
>It is usually clear by the action in question. Consider the law concerning the
>mixing of linen and wool. This is clearly not ethical. Consider the
>commandment to not murder. This is clearly ethical. Usually the distinction is
>a common societal view, but, yes, it is an individual determination.
I.e. ethical laws are those for which I see an obvious ethical reason.
Thus, I could duplicate the reasoning myself, and come up with my own
set of ethical laws (which has been done). Why Torah, then? If
personal ethics are the key, what distinguishes Judaism from Bahai,
say? Or secular humanism?
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Sean Philip Engelson, Gradual Student Make your learning a fixture;
Yale Department of Computer Science Say little and do much;
Box 2158 Yale Station And receive everyone with
New Haven, CT 06520 a kindly attitude.
(203) 432-1239
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Nondeterminism means never having to say you're wrong.
Keith Bierman Sun Tactical Engineering
>
>My assertion is that the one liners that you state follows from the authorship
>question. Thus, in Reform, the modern rabbinate is important because the
>authorship question leads to a need for continual reinterpretation. In
>orthodox, the halacha is primary precisely because it is the absolute word.
>
>I think we are in violent agreement.
I think not. I think it is quite possible for an orthodox jew to doubt
the "authenticty" of the texts. My point is that an orthdox jew must
accept the recorded decisions of the sages (whose votes are often
detailed, there is no implication of divine inspriation for their
votes... the sages invoke logic, they invoke traditions, they invoke
socitial needs, etc.) and, more importantly, the system of halacha itself.
Rabbinic judism (i.e. the halacha as taught by our sages) is a system
which was highly dynamic. I recommend (as usual) Berkovitz's "Not in
heaven" monograph, published in english.
The reform movement does not follow the halachic system at all. This
is not necessarily bad, but it is (IMHO) the real distinction between
the movements. Not the question of textual analysis.
Keith Bierman Sun Tactical Engineering
>Wrong. The conservative movement considers the Torah to be the
>absolute word, but the oral law to be the work of man. They follow the
>"classic rabbinic process" according to this interpretation.
I have read many of the conservative responsa, and grew up in a
conservative schul. From the many sermons, classes, etc. I can assure
you that no one in that schul (nor others I have attended) beleived
that the torah was the absolute word.
Furthermore, the classic halahic process is not followed by the
conservative movement. If they did, the decisions of the conventions
(I forget the proper title of their rabbinic get togther) would be
binding on all the member schuls. They are not. I am far from certain
that it would be better if there were consistent, but the fact is that
they are not.
>
>]Reform : Primacy of the modern rabbinate.
>Wrong again. Reform is the primacy of the individual. Reform believes
>in the individuals right to make decisions for himself; the Reform
>never tell you what you MUST do, or what you MUST believe.
>
Better one liner. I accept the emendation.
>
>]Reconst. : Primacy of Modercai Kaplan :>
>] Seriously, I can't find a one liner that is suitable.
>]
>A one-liner for Reconstructionism.. According to a local
>reconstructionist Rabbi, it would be "Primacy of the community".
Also good.
>
>]My one-liners are, like all such, too short. But the key point is that
>]it is a difference of how to deal with the Talmud (which is clearly
>]the work of people, not the alimightly) and foundation of halacha.
>]
>
>You one-liners are, like all such, ridiculous, wrong generalizations.
>They are the views that the orthodox usually come up with, when they
>can't be bothered to learn what others are about.
My favorite all time rabbi was ordained by HUC, who ran the Hillel at
the university I attended in LA. I grew up in the conservative
movement. I studied in orthodox settings, I have helped build orthodox
communities, and currently am a paid up member of a schul whose rabbi
is a JTS'er. My posting may have been offensive (if anyone was
offended, I hereby apologise). It is simply not possible to condense
an entire world view into a few words. I attempted to move the
discussion towards a different direction (and I may have suceeded). In
my view, the real difference between the movements is functional, and
it is in how they relate to the halacha.... not the bible itself, not
in what is kosher, etc. The question of what is the halacha and how it
evolves is _the_ central issue. All else follows from it, or is simply
not germane (e.g. such as how many authors did devarim have ?).
> Anyone who has
>seriously looked at Reform would KNOW that we don't consider the
>modern Rabinate to be the final word.
I accept your emendation that it is ALL left up to the individual.
This has the same effect as declaring (w.r.t. classic "orthodox"
terminology) everyone to be a rabbi with the stature of Hillel the
elder. This is a defensible position.
> Anyone who has seriously looked
>at Conservative would understand that they are not "straddling the
>middle", but trying to follow thier own interpretation.
Having sat in on serious discussions by conservative rabbis discussing
formal responsa, I can assure you that it certainly sounded like they
were spiting the difference. Since the decisions of local reform and
orthdox rabbis were mentioned and the specifics of the cases
discussed.
> Please, before
>you make a generalization about the fundamental concepts of anyone
>else, try to find out what it is first.
Thanks for the advice, it is quite sound. I applied it some years back
though.
>--"In the beginning, the Universe was created. This has made a lot of --
>----- people very angry, and been widely regarded as a bad move." ------
HHGTG
Chris Redmond
>>>Who makes the distinction between ethical/moral actions (which you say are
>>>considered binding by Reform, or is it just recommended?) and ritual
>>>actions??
>
>a ritual law. Am I allowed to disregard it??
>
> Are there "wrong" choices?? Is there a "minimum
>subset" of the "ethical/moral" Mitzvot that everyone must keep?? What
>distinguishes them??
A suggestion from a non-Jew:
Isn't the "minimum subset" of "ethical/moral" laws, in fact, the
Noachic law? Those are the moral principles, to which all humanity
is subject.
The laws of Judaism, on the other hand, are "ritual" commandments
(unless they are elaborations and applications of the universal
moral laws, to make clear how those laws are to be applied in a
Jewish society and context).
Is there anybody (among those who accept the moral/ritual distinction)
who would say that the moral obligations of a Jew are different from
those of a non-Jew? But the ritual obligations are very different.
CAR
Arthur S. Kamlet
>I have read many of the conservative responsa, and grew up in a
>conservative schul. From the many sermons, classes, etc. I can assure
>you that no one in that schul (nor others I have attended) beleived
>that the torah was the absolute word.
We spent a weekend with Rabbi Joel Roth recently. He is head of
the Committee on Jewish Law & Standards of the Rabbinical Assembly.
He came as close to an "official" position on Torah written by G-d
as I ever heard.
>Furthermore, the classic halahic process is not followed by the
>conservative movement. If they did, the decisions of the conventions
>(I forget the proper title of their rabbinic get togther) would be
>binding on all the member schuls. They are not. I am far from certain
>that it would be better if there were consistent, but the fact is that
>they are not.
The responsa are permissive not mandatory. That is, by the
responsa, we are permitted to eat gelatin; not required. Permitted
to drive to shul on Shabbat; not required. Permitted to count women
in a minyan; not required. Etc. Each congregational rabbi is
permitted to make the decision for that congregation. (In practice,
the congregation's board has a lot to say, but the "official"
position is that the rabbi is supposed to resign if a congregation
doesn't go along. Rabbi Roth cited cases where the rabbi did
resign, though I don't know if the rabbi had some other reasons for
leaving.
Arthur S. Kamlet
> In article <55...@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> Krulwic...@cs.yale.edu (Bruce Krulwich) writes:
> > Are there "wrong" choices?? Is there a "minimum
> >subset" of the "ethical/moral" Mitzvot that everyone must keep?? What
> >distinguishes them??
> A suggestion from a non-Jew:
>
> Isn't the "minimum subset" of "ethical/moral" laws, in fact, the
> Noachic law? Those are the moral principles, to which all humanity
> is subject.
> The laws of Judaism, on the other hand, are "ritual" commandments
> (unless they are elaborations and applications of the universal
> moral laws, to make clear how those laws are to be applied in a
> Jewish society and context).
I think Bruce was asking a rhetorical question. I think from his
other postings, that he believes it is impossible to know which laws
are ritual and which are ethical, and therefore, he would answer his
own question, "It can't be done." Bruce: If I'm wrong, I'm sorry.
Anyway, I think Bruce is on the right track, and an assumption that
the Noachic laws constitute the minimal set of ethical/moral laws,
whereas "The laws of Judaism, on the other hand, are ritual.."
misses the mark. However, I've heard many people in our society
state very similar positions, so I understand others think that way.
I believe the Noachic laws certainly are ethical and moral laws
which societies should follow. But there are many Jewish laws
which I don't classify as "ritual"; I'd call them "ethical/moral"
Here are a few laws which I believe are ethical, not ritual:
Honoring parents
Prohibition against coveting a neighbor's wife
prohibition against rape
Feeding the hungry
Love of your neighbor
Many readers believe I should not try to distingush ethical vs
ritual laws. But, even if try, as shown above, I still come up
with rather well-known Jewish Mitzvot which are over and above
the 7 Noachic laws. And, I believe reasonable people will agree
they are ethical, as contrasted with ritual, in nature.
Daniel P. Faigin
Tactical Engineering) writes:
>Rabbinic judism (i.e. the halacha as taught by our sages) is a system
>which was highly dynamic.
The key word is "was". Since Talmudic times, it has stopped being dynamic and
has not really continued to change.
>The reform movement does not follow the halachic system at all. This
>is not necessarily bad, but it is (IMHO) the real distinction between
>the movements. Not the question of textual analysis.
Actually, Reform just attempts, in its own understanding (which may differ
from yours) to keep the halachic system dynamic.
Daniel P. Faigin
In article <55...@yale-celray.yale.UUCP>, Krulwic...@cs.yale.edu (Bruce
Krulwich) writes:
>But this [a sample determination of ethics] is YOUR opinion. Suppose I think
>that the law against murder is just a ritual law. Am I allowed to disregard
>it??
Actually, yes. You are allowed to disregard it in Orthodoxy; that is, no one
prevents you from disregarding it. They may not think it is right. You,
however, are ultimately responsible for your own actions; it is you that must
answer personally to the higher authority.
>But what if they [study and understanding] don't [lead people to the correct
>choices]?? Are there "wrong" choices?? Is there a "minimum subset" of the
>"ethical/moral" Mitzvot that everyone must keep?? What distinguishes them??
There are no mandatory requirements; no police to keep everything in order.
There are choices that I may not agree with. There are choices that you may
not agree with. This is true in Orthodoxy as well as Reform. We are all led to
make choices in our practice; neither movement has a "Practice Police". We
all make our choices in the context of our upbringing and family beliefs; we
all must live with the consequences of the choices we make.
Daniel.
Daniel P. Faigin
In article <55...@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> Krulwic...@cs.yale.edu (Bruce
Krulwich) writes:
>Who makes the distinction between ethical/moral actions (which you say are
>considered binding by Reform, or is it just recommended?) and ritual
>actions??
To which, in article <48...@aero.ARPA>, faigin@sunstroke (Daniel P. Faigin)
writes:
>It is usually clear by the action in question.
To which Sean responds:
>Thus, I could duplicate the reasoning myself, and come up with my own set of
>ethical laws (which has been done). Why Torah, then? If personal ethics are
>the key, what distinguishes Judaism from Bahai, say? Or secular humanism?
Why Torah. Simple. Because that is the document that defines a code of ethics
that I believe it. If I want to follow something else, nothing prevents me.
Ultimately, it comes down to a personal decision as to a personal set of
ethics; religion simply provides the base from which to draw those ethics.
Daniel
Sean Engelson
>
>
>In article <55...@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> Krulwic...@cs.yale.edu (Bruce
>Krulwich) writes:
>>Who makes the distinction between ethical/moral actions (which you say are
>>considered binding by Reform, or is it just recommended?) and ritual
>>actions??
>
>To which, in article <48...@aero.ARPA>, faigin@sunstroke (Daniel P. Faigin)
>writes:
>>It is usually clear by the action in question.
>
>To which Sean responds:
>>Thus, I could duplicate the reasoning myself, and come up with my own set of
>>ethical laws (which has been done). Why Torah, then? If personal ethics are
>>the key, what distinguishes Judaism from Bahai, say? Or secular humanism?
>
>Why Torah. Simple. Because that is the document that defines a code of ethics
>that I believe it. If I want to follow something else, nothing prevents me.
>Ultimately, it comes down to a personal decision as to a personal set of
>ethics; religion simply provides the base from which to draw those ethics.
A related question on this topic addressed to Daniel, as well as
anyone else interested in answering: What then is your ontological
basis for an ethical system, given that you (seem to) deny the
existence of any normative ethics? And then, if you in fact espouse
ethical pragmatism, why do you call your beliefs Judaism, rather than
saying that _some_ of your beliefs and practices accord with _some_ of
the beliefs and practices of Judaism?
Bruce Krulwich
>>ethical laws (which has been done). Why Torah, then? If personal ethics are
>>the key, what distinguishes Judaism from Bahai, say? Or secular humanism?
>
>Why Torah. Simple. Because that is the document that defines a code of ethics
>that I believe it. If I want to follow something else, nothing prevents me.
>Ultimately, it comes down to a personal decision as to a personal set of
>ethics; religion simply provides the base from which to draw those ethics.
If you follow something else, is it still Reform Judaism??
The discussion started with a question about necessary conditions within
Reform Judaism. So far all we've seen is (a lot of)sufficient conditions.
Do any necessary conditions exist??
Bruce
Herman Rubin
> In article <48...@aero.ARPA>, faigin@aerospace (Daniel P. Faigin) writes:
>
> A related question on this topic addressed to Daniel, as well as
> anyone else interested in answering: What then is your ontological
> basis for an ethical system, given that you (seem to) deny the
> existence of any normative ethics? And then, if you in fact espouse
> ethical pragmatism, why do you call your beliefs Judaism, rather than
> saying that _some_ of your beliefs and practices accord with _some_ of
> the beliefs and practices of Judaism?
I cannot speak for Daniel. I speak for myself, and I believe that I am
not totally off the mark for many Reform Jews.
The principle is that the Torah is divinely inspired. It is not the literal
word of God. The ethical and moral principles in it are to be considered
close to being God's commandments, to be changed only where there are very
strong reasons to do so. The ritual commandments are there because the
Torah would not have been accepted without such a system; the people of
that age could not imagine God not requiring ritual and sacrifice from
them. In particular, the Oral Law does not have the same status as the
Torah. Minhag is the lowest ranking grounds for legislation.
We are commanded to "have mastery over haaretz." Together with the sages,
I interpret this that we are to learn God's laws governing the operation of
the universe, which we are powerless to alter or disobey, and apply them to
our benefit. We must therefore apply our secular learning to the understanding
of Torah, and to the construction of halakhah and other legislation.
When it comes to the creation story and other "historical" details, even
less remains. The Big Bang theory agrees with some of the Hebrew in
Genesis, but the account is distorted and too abbreviated. I cannot
see the section from Eden to Abraham as being other than mythology, with
undoubtedly some truth in it.
It is possible to be a rational religious Jew. I try.
The Unexpected Tiger
>The responsa are permissive not mandatory. That is, by the
>responsa, we are permitted. . . to drive to shul on Shabbat. . .
Could someone give the reference for this? First of all, I thought that the
responsum (as reported by Kolatch in _The Second Jewish Book of Why_ and in
Rabbi Klein's book) permitted *riding* to shul in a car driven by someone
else, and that driving was still forbidden. Second, this responsum only
affects a subset of Conservative Jews -- ones for whom there is no other
contact with Jewish communal life.
Richard Schultz
There are bad times just around the corner,
There are dark clouds hurtling through the sky
And it's no good whining
About a silver lining
For we know from experience that they won't roll by. . .
Sean Engelson
response to my question on the relation between Torah and ethics:
>The principle is that the Torah is divinely inspired. It is not the literal
>word of God. The ethical and moral principles in it are to be considered
>close to being God's commandments, to be changed only where there are very
>strong reasons to do so. The ritual commandments are there because the
>Torah would not have been accepted without such a system; the people of
>that age could not imagine God not requiring ritual and sacrifice from
>them. In particular, the Oral Law does not have the same status as the
>Torah. Minhag is the lowest ranking grounds for legislation.
Now I guess my question becomes how do you know which laws are just
ritual, and which are ethical? Further, if this is done by means of a
comprehensive analysis and determination of the ethical system
undelying the Torah, how can you know if your analysis is correct?
And if not done by such a complete analysis of the Torah's ethical
system, but by rather applying one's personal ethical system to the
analysis of Torah laws, how can Torah be said to be the true source of
ethical guidance?
Bruce Krulwich
>In article <55...@yale-celray.yale.UUCP>, Bruce Krulwich wrote:
>>But this [a sample determination of ethics] is YOUR opinion. Suppose I think
>>that the law against murder is just a ritual law. Am I allowed to disregard
>>it??
In article <48...@aero.ARPA>, faigin@aerospace (Daniel P. Faigin) replied:
>Actually, yes. You are allowed to disregard it in Orthodoxy; that is, no one
>prevents you from disregarding it. They may not think it is right. You,
>however, are ultimately responsible for your own actions; it is you that must
>answer personally to the higher authority.
You are both confusing issues and avoiding the question I asked. Just because
I have the physical ability to kill someone doesn't mean that Orthodoxy allows
me to. In fact, traditional Judaism says "no you may not kill." Obviously I
have the ability to (ie, free will), if I didn't then the commandment would be
pointless, wouldn't it?? In spite of free will, however, Judaism says "you
may not kill," "you are not allowed to kill," etc.
My question, again, is whether I am allowed according to Reform Judaism to
_disregard_ the law against Murder if I feel that it is a "ritual law."
>>But what if they [study and understanding] don't [lead people to the correct
>>choices]?? Are there "wrong" choices?? Is there a "minimum subset" of the
>>"ethical/moral" Mitzvot that everyone must keep?? What distinguishes them??
>There are no mandatory requirements; no police to keep everything in order.
OK, fine. That doesn't keep traditional Judaism from saying things are wrong
and are prohibitted. If Reform Judaism doesn't prohibit murder (out and out,
regardless of its "ritualness") then what DOES it do??
Bruce
Bruce Krulwich
>In article <96...@sun.Eng.Sun.COM>, k...@fatcity.Sun.COM (Keith Bierman Sun
>Tactical Engineering) writes:
>>Rabbinic judism (i.e. the halacha as taught by our sages) is a system
>>which was highly dynamic.
>
>The key word is "was". Since Talmudic times, it has stopped being dynamic and
>has not really continued to change.
I disagree. Can you give examples of things that changed that you don't think
would today?? How about things that would change today within the "dynamic
system" you suggest??
Bruce Krulwich
Arthur S. Kamlet
> In article <52...@cbnews.ATT.COM> a...@cbnews.ATT.COM (Arthur S. Kamlet) writes:
>
> >The responsa are permissive not mandatory. That is, by the
> >responsa, we are permitted. . . to drive to shul on Shabbat. . .
>
> Could someone give the reference for this? First of all, I thought that the
> responsum (as reported by Kolatch in _The Second Jewish Book of Why_ and in
> Rabbi Klein's book) permitted *riding* to shul in a car driven by someone
> else, and that driving was still forbidden. Second, this responsum only
> affects a subset of Conservative Jews -- ones for whom there is no other
> contact with Jewish communal life.
>
> Richard Schultz
I will cite the best reference I am aware of. I have previously
posted lengthy quotes from this responsum, and received numerous
criticism to the effect that these were fraudulant rabbis who were
misusing Halacha. That is not why I am posting this article. I am
responding to a request for a reference. I am sure those who do not
accept driving on Shabbat will still not accept it. Fine.
The draft responsum appears in "Tradition and Change - The
Development of Conservative Judaism" Rabbi Mordecai Waxman, Editor
The Burning Bush Press, New York, 1970. It was written by Rabbis
Morris Adler, Jacob Agus, and Theodore Friedman, and is titled
"A Responsum on the Sabbath."
In most of the paper, they use the term riding, and not driving.
However, at one point they say "As a matter of fact, on the basis of
the strictist interprretation of the law, riding would not be
prohibited on the Sabbath in a public vehicle driven by a non-Jew."
They go on to discuss riding in general, then. I have heard several
conservative rabbis state that this means that driving yourself is
also permitted. My rabbi walks, but permits others to drive.
Further, "When attendance at services is made unreasonably
difficult, without the use of an automobile, such use shall not be
regarded as being a violation of the Sabbath."
Again, I have heard several conservative rabbis agree this means each
person must make a personal decision as to what "unreasonably
difficult" means in each case.
Daniel P. Faigin
writes:
>reason for being] basis for an ethical system, given that you (seem to) deny
>the existence of any normative [i.e., related to prescribed norms or
>standards] ethics?
Here, Sean has attempted to hide the insult in his question by using big words
that only go to show his lack of attention to the discussion. I have inserted
some dictionary definitions to make his question clear.
Sean has just accused Reform Judaism of having no prescribed norms or ethics.
That cannot be further from the truth. As has been pointed out MANY time,
Reform Judaism holds to the ethics and moral commandments delineated in the
Tanach; these are not changed unless compelling reasons are found. Reform
leaves the following of the life- and year- cycle ritual up to the discretion
of its adherents; decisions of ritual are to be made after appropriate study.
I am getting extremely tired of where this discussion is heading. After what
started out to be a reasoned explanation of what Reform Judaism stands for and
where it differs from Orthodox, we now have had yet another illustration of
the fact that Orthodox (or, I should say some members of Orthodoxy), think
they they have the right to determine what *is* Judaism, what can call itself
Judaism, what is the right practice, and what is the wrong practice, and who
is to be accepted for their beliefs, and who is to be condemmed for their
beliefs.
Some display of tolerance for others. As my wife has said in a prior article,
we are being told to get out, as opposed to "do unto others...".
>And then, if you in fact espouse ethical pragmatism, why do you call your
>beliefs Judaism, rather than saying that _some_ of your beliefs and practices
>accord with _some_ of the beliefs and practices of Judaism?
Who determines what is Judaism -- man or G-d? What give some human the right
to say that what I *believe* is not Judaism? I do what I understand to be
G-d's will, and let G-d judge.
Are you willing to let G-d have the final word on what Judaism is, or you?
>And receive everyone with a kindly attitude.
I guess we're not everyone. :-(
SVS
>
> Orthodox : Primacy of the halacha (talumud, classic rabbinic process)
> Conservative: Split the difference.
> Seriously, I can't find a one liner that is suitable.
>
> it is a difference of how to deal with the Talmud (which is clearly
> the work of people, not the alimightly) and foundation of halacha.
>
My one-liner view is:
Orthodox: Halacha is absolute and immutable.
Conservative: Interpret Torah in historical context.
Reform: Ethics and morality supersede ritual law.
Reconstruc.: Primacy of the congregation and community.
----
David Ellis
Digital Equipment Corporation -- BXB1-1/D03
85 Swanson Road, Boxboro MA 01719 -- (617) 264-5073
Usenet: {ucbvax,allegra,decvax}!decwrl!ultra.dec.com!ellis
ARPA: ellis%ultr...@decwrl.dec.com
Daniel P. Faigin
>Orthodoxy allows me to.
Let me phrase it another way. Orthodoxy may not agree or condone your actions,
but it does not physically prevent you from doing them. Thus, it is up to your
free will to decide whether or not to go along with the Orthodox viewpoint.
>My question, again, is whether I am allowed according to Reform Judaism to
>_disregard_ the law against Murder if I feel that it is a "ritual law."
No. Do you have trouble distinguishing ritual from ethics and morals? Many of
the Orthodoxy appear to question me as if they do. They seem to think murder
is a "ritual" law, and ask what happens if I do it.
Let me give you some information:
ethic 1: the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty
and obligation 2a: a set of moral principles and values 2b: a theory or system
of moral values.
moral 1a: or or relating to principles of right and wrong in behaviour. 1b:
expressing or teaching a conception of right bevaiour 1c: conforming to a
standard of right behaviour 1d: sanctioned by or operative on one's conscience
or ethical judgement 1e: capable of right and wrong action (syn) MORAL,
ETHICAL, VIRTUOUS, RIGHTEOUS, NOBLE mean conforming to a standard of what is
right and good. MORAL implies conformity to established sanctioned codes or
accepted notions of right and wrong. ETHICAL may suggest the involvement of
more difficult or subtle questions of rightness, fairness, or equity; VIRTUOUS
implies the possession or manifestation of moral excellence in character;
RIGHTEOUS stresses guiltlessness or blamelessness and often suggest the
sanctimonious; NOBLE implies moral eminence and freedom from anything petty,
mean, or dubious in conduct and character
ritual (1570) 1: of or relating to rites or a ritual: CEREMONIAL 2: according
to religious law or social custom
ritual (1649) 1: the established form of a ceremony; specif: the order of
words prescribed for a religious ceremony 2a: ritual observance; specif a
system of rites 2b: a ceremonial act or action 2c: any formal and customarily
repeated act or series of acts.
rite: 1a a prescribed from or manner governing the words or actions for a
ceremony 1b: the liturgy of a church or a group of churches 2: a ceremonial
act or action
Boy, it's clear to me the difference between ethics and ritual. Murder is
certainly not ritual, at least in Judaism. There is no ceremony involving
murder; no customarily repeated acts involving murder.
In order to distinguish ethical/moral acts from ritual, one must be able to
differentiate actions that relate to right and wrong, good and bad, from those
that are merely words and formal acts. I can make this distinction. I wonder
about some of my attackers out there, who continue, repeatedly, to ask
questions such as "[am I] allowed according to Reform Judaism to
_disregard_ the law against Murder if I feel that it is a 'ritual law.'?"
>OK, fine. That doesn't keep traditional Judaism from saying things are wrong
>and are prohibitted.
No problem there; I never claimed to be a "traditional" Jew.
>If Reform Judaism doesn't prohibit murder (out and out,
>regardless of its "ritualness") then what DOES it do??
I just showed you that it does prohibit murder. As for what else it does, I
strongly suggest that you read some of the reference material I have referred
to on this net, that you talk to some Reform Rabbis, that you (gasp) attend a
Reform Shabbat service, that you see Reform in action.
My words cannot convince you, no matter how I try. I have tried to open many
doors, but the hinges on some are rusted shut, and I didn't bring the right
oil.
Daniel
Sean Engelson
>writes:
>>A related question on this topic addressed to Daniel, as well as anyone else
>>interested in answering: What then is your ontological [i.e., related to
>>reason for being] basis for an ethical system, given that you (seem to) deny
>>the existence of any normative [i.e., related to prescribed norms or
>>standards] ethics?
>
>Here, Sean has attempted to hide the insult in his question by using big words
>that only go to show his lack of attention to the discussion. I have inserted
>some dictionary definitions to make his question clear.
I used these `big words' to clarify my meaning, obviously, they have
done otherwise. My intention was not to insult anyone, but to try to
get an answer to something I don't understand about Reform philosophy,
at least as I understand it. Before I rephrase my question, I'd like
to apologise to those who were offended, and mention that I am
grateful to those who take the time to answer my questions. Hopefully
it will promote greater understanding.
My question is as follows. Does Reform susscribe to the notion that
there is an objective system of ethics, i.e. one that holds
universally for all people? If so, where does the principle that was
mentioned here of personal choice to do that which is ethical in your
own eyes fit in (I may be misstating the position, be assured it is
from lack of understanding, not maliciousness)? If not---that is,
there is no objective system of ethics and morality handed down from
on high---then two questions arise. The first is, how can you say
that such Torah laws as not wearing wool and linen together are _not_
ethical in nature, and that the law against murder is? What is your
criterion for judgement? The second question; this position would
seem to require as a philosophical base a form of ethical pragmatism,
i.e. ethics spring from practical considerations, as in "If I hurt
him, then he'll hurt me back, so I shouldn't hurt people." If this is
in fact the case, then how can one say that one's personal view of
pragmatic ethics is in accord with G-d? One answer would be to say
that G-d's ethics are those of pragmatism, but then why is there a
Torah in the first place?
I'm trying to ask some serious questions here; I am not trying to
offend anyone. If I occasionally do, it is because I am not nearly a
perfect writer, not because I intended to.
Steven Gutfreund
Date: 25 Mar 89 20:46:32 GMT
]What type of actions are you talking about. The way you have phrased your
]response, it is as if you are talking about actions that will lead to _direct_
]personal gain. But this is not the purpose of mitzvot. Mitzvot lead to a
]spiritual gain; spiritual gain can be shared. I act in a manner so as to
]increase the spirituality and sanctity of my life, and of the world around me.
]That means doing things I don't always like to do. That's part of the bargain.
]I don't think that anyone can argue with the question that people interpret
]things according to their own subjective biases. That's a part of life; my
]experiences color who I am. But as for selection of mitzvot I combine my own
]learning on the subject with the interpretations of others. There are many
]things in this world that I consider to be absolutely good or absolutely bad.
]They are probably the same as yours, coming out of the same culture and
]traditions.
All two party actions follow the same basic outline that I have stated
previously. The requestor makes a request. The respondee replies to that
request. If the respondee decides that he will interpret the requestors
request according to what he feels is good for the requestor, the respondee
is acting for his own purposes. Ah yes, the respondee must clarify what is
ambiguous in the request. But this type of interpretation is not cover doing
something directly contrary to what the requestor act.
Now let's put this back in context: G-D has made requests. These are called
mitzvot. When one subjectively re-interprets these requests, all actions
supposedly performed for "shared spirituality" are bankrupt. There is
spirituality in what G-D requests, and there is no spirituality in what goes
contrary to these requests. If, in one's subjective opinion, the request is
vague
one must go for further clarification in the sources which reveal the request.
If Reform has taken a a-priori position that there are no such sources, that
there are only human texts, that is not my problem. Without any source of
revelation of G-D's will one has boxed oneself into a corner where there can
never be any objection to the claim that one is only acting according to one's
own whishes. One may claim it is "sanctimonious" (I really detest these
anglo-saxonisms and like to twist them sometimes) but in truth there can
be no proof that this has anything to do with objective reality. G-D exists,
made objective demands (not subjective) and by throwing out the Torah, one
is not going to have any way of obtaining a clue as to the objective requests of
G-D.
] Yea, we all feel we should be free to decide whatever we wish is good and
] bad.
]
]But I'm not free. I have the guidance given me in the Torah, which is of
]divine inspiration, wherein is described what proper moral and ethical
]behavior is. Somehow you are losing the distinction between the exact
]specifics of ritual practice and worship, and the specifics of ethical
]behavior. Reform continues the process of interpretation on the former;
]the latter appears to be unchanging truths that do not call for
]reinterpretation.
There is no guidance when one can re-interpret the Torah and make it
stand on its head to say the exact opposite. (BTW: There can be no
separation between acts. G-D is concerned with everything we do,
not just what goes on in the shul. This can be continued as a side-issue).
]
] No-one should tell us that we should keep Shabbos, Kosher, etc. I
] have my own concience and should follow it (Libertarianism).
]
]Reform is a product of the age of enlightenment and reason in Germany in the
]1700s-1800s. As such, appeals to reason and conscience are important. The
]movement appeals to its members to take actions that increase the sanctity of
]their lives. We all follow our consciences, if we make the wrong choice, it
]will be made clear to us later.
You're calling me irrational. Is this the way you argue with people who hold
different opinions than you w.r.t. CS issues? Don't you every find that you
had less knowledge than your opponent? I am quite familiar with the
Reform/Conservative positions having grown up in (and been a dedicated
proponent) of most of their Philosophy. I now have more information and find
their logic specious.
]In article <67...@bunny.UUCP> sg...@bunny.UUCP (Steven Gutfreund) writes:
]>Observance is a G-Dly determined issue. Someone who practices and observes
]>G-D's wishes is a G-Dly person. Observance is doing what G-D wants. And
]>where are you going to find out what G-D wants? In the Torah, it is the only
]>place he reveals what his wish is.
]
]Let's try this again. What I am trying to establish is a basic understanding
]of the differences between the movements. Within Orthodoxy, both the written
]and oral laws are considered to be from the hand of G-d. Thus, within
]Orthodoxy, they are unchangable, eternally true as written. Contradictions and
]arcane rules therein were put there by G-d for reasons that we humans cannot
]understand (and we shouldn't try). Thus, within Orthodoxy, you must follow all
]mitzvot derived from the oral and written laws because they are G-ds words; to
]not do them would be unG-dly. Observance is doing what G-d what's, as G-d writ
]it in the oral and written laws.
Here is a prime case of re-interpretation to the point of falsehood. It is
absolutely not true that Frum Jews believe the that the Torah is a) full
of contradictions b) can't be understood. This is a real bubbah meisah.
It is incumbent on a person to understand Torah. Contradictions only exist
if one has naive theories. What appears to a contradiction to Newtonian
Physicists is not a contradiction to Einstinian physics. What you are calling
contradictions are actually key clues that your pre-Newtonian theory of Torah
is out of date.
]>If one starts by denying that it is G-Ds Torah, and setting
]>oneself up as the final arbitrator of what is right and wrong,
]
]Do these parts go together. If I deny that G-d is the direct author of the
]Torah, where does the implication that I am the final arbitrator come from.
]I can still hold the Torah as one of my authorities; I just not longer give it
]the same power of authority as you do.
You are reserving the right to interpret the mitzvot the way you want. In
effect, the situation is like the if the U.S. Supreme Court could rule that
equality is really inequality and there were no other branches of the government
to restrain it.
--
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Yechezkal Shimon (Steven) Gutfreund sgutf...@bunny.UUCP
GTE Laboratories, Waltham MA sgutf...@gte.com
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Steven Gutfreund
Engineering) writes:
@ >Furthermore, the classic halahic process is not followed by the
@ >conservative movement. If they did, the decisions of the conventions
@ >(I forget the proper title of their rabbinic get together) would be
@ >binding on all the member schuls. They are not. I am far from certain
@ >that it would be better if there were consistent, but the fact is that
@ >they are not.writes@
@ The responsa are permissive not mandatory. That is, by the
@ responsa, we are permitted to eat gelatin; not required. Permitted
@ to drive to shul on Shabbat; not required. Permitted to count women
@ in a minyan; not required. Etc. Each congregational rabbi is
@ permitted to make the decision for that congregation. (In practice,
@ the congregation's board has a lot to say, but the "official"
@ position is that the rabbi is supposed to resign if a congregation
@ doesn't go along. Rabbi Roth cited cases where the rabbi did
@ resign, though I don't know if the rabbi had some other reasons for
@ leaving.
Art, I think you might be missing the point. If a scientist derives by deductive
means a conclusion from currently accepted theory. Then, if his deductive logic
is correct, his conclusion is equally BINDING on all scientists everywhere. If
the reasoning is correct it is universally true.
The same applies with the halachic process. There is an objective set of axioms
and theory (the Torah). Conclusions that are rigorously logical do not apply
only to one congregation but to all. Conclusions that are not rigorously
logical, do not even apply to one congregation. This is a binary condition.
Either the responsa is a correct logical derivation or not. Actions cannot be
locally permitted for one congregation and not for another. Trying to operate in
such a mode is like trying to say that the laws of physics are different in my
shul. There is only one
possible objective reality.
Furthermore, allowing the congregation board to decide halacha is like forming a
committee of hair dressers, salesmen, real estate agents, and physicians to
deduce the laws of physics. Physical laws are deduced by physicists, and
halachic laws by those skilled in halacha. Thus, if the hair dressers .... have
detailed knowledge and skills in physics, then fine, they can deduce the laws of
physics. If the congregation board has the same expert training in halacha, let
them decide halacha, but in practice I rarely see them having any more knowledge
of halacha than the average physician has of quantum mechanics.
Herman Rubin
> response to my question on the relation between Torah and ethics:
>
< >The principle is that the Torah is divinely inspired. It is not the literal
< >word of God. The ethical and moral principles in it are to be considered
< >close to being God's commandments, to be changed only where there are very
< >strong reasons to do so. The ritual commandments are there because the
< >Torah would not have been accepted without such a system; the people of
< >that age could not imagine God not requiring ritual and sacrifice from
< >them. In particular, the Oral Law does not have the same status as the
< >Torah. Minhag is the lowest ranking grounds for legislation.
>
> Now I guess my question becomes how do you know which laws are just
> ritual, and which are ethical? Further, if this is done by means of a
> comprehensive analysis and determination of the ethical system
> undelying the Torah, how can you know if your analysis is correct?
> And if not done by such a complete analysis of the Torah's ethical
> system, but by rather applying one's personal ethical system to the
> analysis of Torah laws, how can Torah be said to be the true source of
> ethical guidance?
There is a saying, "Two Jews, three opinions." Nevertheless, I think that
there will be little disagreement about what is ethical and what is ritual.
And what is so bad about some disagreement? There are considerable
disagreements between different branches of Orthodoxy.
How can you know that halakhah is a correct interpretation of Torah?
Of course I cannot know that I am correct. With any reasonable reading
of the Torah, I know that the Torah is not literally correct. And the
Torah is not a complete source of ethical guidance. There are ethical
situations not covered by either Torah or halakhah. There are ethical
situations about which the Talmud has quite diverse opinions by respected
sages.
Moses was not God. Our sages were not gods. I have no difficulty in
accepting my lack of certainty. But are you that much more certain?
With complete knowledge, there is nothing more to learn.
Daniel P. Faigin
>there is an objective system of ethics, i.e. one that holds
>universally for all people?
I cannot say "univerally for all people", for even if I wish it were true, I
cannot speak for *every*one. However, *I* think that Reform Judaism does
subscribe to the notion of a univeral set of *ethics* for all Reform Jews.
>If so, where does the principle that was
>mentioned here of personal choice to do that which is ethical in your
>own eyes fit in?
I never said anything about personal choice about that which is ethical. I
talked about personal choice involving that which is ritual, that which
increases the personal sanctity of the relationship between a single human and
G-d. *I* think that the *ethical* rules should always apply between living
creatures on this planet (I was going to say between humans, but they also
apply to how one treats animals).
>If not---that is,
>there is no objective system of ethics and morality handed down from
>on high---then two questions arise.
There is, but I'll answer the questions anyway.
>The first is, how can you say
>that such Torah laws as not wearing wool and linen together are _not_
>ethical in nature
wool and linen together is not an issue between living being. It doesn't
affect my relationship to you.
>and that the law against murder is?
Murder affects someone else.
>What is your
>criterion for judgement?
Hopefully, it is clear by now. Ceremonies are one thing. What I put in my
mouth and the blessings I say are ritual. How I interact with those with whom
I share this planet is ethical.
>The second question; this position would
>seem to require as a philosophical base a form of ethical pragmatism,
>i.e. ethics spring from practical considerations, as in "If I hurt
>him, then he'll hurt me back, so I shouldn't hurt people." If this is
>in fact the case, then how can one say that one's personal view of
>pragmatic ethics is in accord with G-d? One answer would be to say
>that G-d's ethics are those of pragmatism, but then why is there a
>Torah in the first place?
Ethics are not always pragmatical, because good and evil, right and wrong, are
not pragmatic.
I hope this helps.
Mark C. Carroll <MC>
]there is an objective system of ethics, i.e. one that holds
]universally for all people? If so, where does the principle that was
]mentioned here of personal choice to do that which is ethical in your
]own eyes fit in (I may be misstating the position, be assured it is
]from lack of understanding, not maliciousness)? If not---that is,
]there is no objective system of ethics and morality handed down from
]on high---then two questions arise. The first is, how can you say
]that such Torah laws as not wearing wool and linen together are _not_
]ethical in nature, and that the law against murder is? What is your
]criterion for judgement? The second question; this position would
]seem to require as a philosophical base a form of ethical pragmatism,
]i.e. ethics spring from practical considerations, as in "If I hurt
]him, then he'll hurt me back, so I shouldn't hurt people." If this is
]in fact the case, then how can one say that one's personal view of
]pragmatic ethics is in accord with G-d? One answer would be to say
]that G-d's ethics are those of pragmatism, but then why is there a
]Torah in the first place?
]
I don't believe in any sort of "objective" set of ethics, but I also
don't believe in pragmatic ethics. There is some sort of quality to
the universe: You can call it good/evil, or beauty/ugliness, or
whatever you chose, but it some quality that defines the world and our
actions. The "right" action is the action that we believe to be most
"good", or most "beautiful", or whatever term we use. The "correct"
ethics are the rules which make us do whatever will maximize the
"good", or the "beauty". A good ethical rule isn't good because it's
pragmatic; it's good because it makes the world a better place.
]I'm trying to ask some serious questions here; I am not trying to
]offend anyone. If I occasionally do, it is because I am not nearly a
]perfect writer, not because I intended to.
]
Same goes for me; I realize that a lot of what I say may come off
somewhere between sacriligious and downright evil to some of the more
fundamentalist folks out there, but I'm just trying to explain what I
believe. If it comes off reading "You orthodox are a bunch of scum",
believe me, that's not what I meant to say.
]----------------------------------------------------------------------
]Sean Philip Engelson, Gradual Student Make your learning a fixture;
<MC>
--
=| Mark Craig Carroll: <MC> |=
=| mcca...@topaz.rutgers.edu,...!rutgers!topaz!mccarrol |=
=| "Your only obligation in any lifetime is to be true to yourself" |=
=| -Richard Bach,_Illusions_ |=
Daniel P. Faigin
>continues on about how we are supposed to follow these requests]
This assumes you believe that what is written is literally G-ds request.
I have already pointed out that Reform does not believe this. They may be
viewed as guides, but not absolute requests.
>If Reform has taken a a-priori position that there are no such sources [to
>clarify requests], that there are only human texts, that is not my problem.
Then why do we continue to fight about it. There are only human texts, human
interpretations. These can both be divinely inspired. Divine inspiration is
everywhere. Our lives are given divine guidance along the right path. Do you
think I would be having this discussion with you if G-d hadn't wanted me to
learn more about where each movement stands? Why do you respond back?
>and by throwing out the Torah, one is not going to have any way of obtaining
>a clue as to the objective requests of G-D.
When have I said that Reform throws out Torah?
>(BTW: There can be no
>separation between acts. G-D is concerned with everything we do,
>not just what goes on in the shul. This can be continued as a side-issue).
It should be noted that this is the Orthodox position, not an absolute
certainty. Orthodoxy holds that you cannot separate ethical from ritual acts.
They are entitled to their views, and I respect them for that. Were that I was
shown the same consideration.
>You're calling me irrational. Is this the way you argue with people who hold
>different opinions than you w.r.t. CS issues?
No. You are not irrational. Orthodoxy is rational within its framework, just
as Reform is rational within its framework. It's just that our frames don't
fit together exactly.
>Don't you every find that you had less knowledge than your opponent?
Many times. I admit it again here. I don't know everything. I don't know a lot
about the Orthodox and Conservative positions. I do know Reform positions, but
even there, I don't know it all.
>I am quite familiar with the
>Reform/Conservative positions having grown up in (and been a dedicated
>proponent) of most of their Philosophy. I now have more information and find
>their logic specious.
I don't. We're different. That's life. No prob.
>You are reserving the right to interpret the mitzvot the way you want. In
>effect, the situation is like the if the U.S. Supreme Court could rule that
>equality is really inequality and there were no other branches of the
>government to restrain it.
Reality check here. We are talking about religion here. Everyone is entitled
to their own personal beliefs. Law only applies where there is a state
government. Jews were both a state and a religion in the past. Now, they are a
religion that co-exists with a culture built over many years. You may say that
Israel is a Jewish state. Nonsense. Israel is a political state on land that a
Jewish state once existed on. It is a state where Jews can live, and some are
even free to practice Judaism as they understand it. But the Torah is not law
is Israel; there is an Israeli government that makes the law. It is a state
for Jews, not a Jewish state.
Micha Berger
>> Keith Bierman writes:
> >Rabbinic judism (i.e. the halacha as taught by our sages) is a system
> >which was highly dynamic.
>
> The key word is "was". Since Talmudic times, it has stopped being dynamic and
> has not really continued to change.
Halacha was restricted at several points. The basic rule is any Law book
that is accepted by the vast majority of the Observant Rabanit (as opposed
to the Sadducees, the Karaites, and the Reform) becomes aythoritative.
Thus, the Mishna is permanent. So is the Talmud. The Shulchan
Aruch (which was accepted by the Sepharadim) with the Mapah (the RaMaH's
additions for Ashkenazim).
Each time one of these books was accepted, it marked the end of an
era. Thus, an Amorah (the generations between the Mishna and the Talmud)
doesn't have the Authority to Argue with a Tanah. A Rishon (pre-Shulchan
Aruch) can't argue with an Amorah., and an Acharon (post-S.A.) with a Rishon,
without another person of that era for support. Once the Mishna was
accepted, all Tanaic questions were resolved, or recorded that practice still
went either way. Similarly, a Tanaic opinion that wasn't supported by an
Amorah in the Talmud has no effect on practice.
Within each era, or questions that were not discussed in earlier
eras (e.g. electricity), one can argue with ones pears, and even have
differing practices. It is only once a practice becomes universal that it
becomes immutable law.
Also, the Talmud isn't just Rabinic Law. It is mostly concerned
with Biblical Law that had no clear interpretation.
> Actually, Reform just attempts, in its own understanding (which may differ
> from yours) to keep the halachic system dynamic.
Actually, according to your statements, to add dynamics to the system.
We already agreed that Reform broke the system that defines Halacha.
Why then are you still posting that Reform works within a Halachic framework?
Micha
--
Micha Berger
Disclaimer: All opinions expressed here are my own. The spelling, noone's.
email: ...!cmcl2!phri!dasys1!aj-mberg Aspaklaria Publications
vox: (718) 380-7572 73-32 173 St, Hillcrest, NY 11366
+Saal S.
> Moses was not God. Our sages were not gods. I have no difficulty in
> accepting my lack of certainty. But are you that much more certain?
> With complete knowledge, there is nothing more to learn.
> Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907
There is a big difference between complete certainty and complete
knowldege. I am completely certain that physics is an area of
study. I certainly do not have complete knowledge of it. I am
completely certain that G-d, the Torah, Halachah, etc exist. I
am equally certain that I have far from complete knowledge of
any of them. Implying that [Oo]rthodoxy equates the two is
slanderously incorrect. However, to answer the question, yes, I am
completely certain that my belief in G-d, as eloquently stated by
Maimonides' Thirteen Principles, is correct.
--
Sam Saal ..!attunix!saal
Vayiphtach HaShem et Peah HaAtone
avi.y.feldblum
:In article <55...@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> enge...@cs.yale.edu (Sean Engelson)
:writes:
:>A related question on this topic addressed to Daniel, as well as anyone else
:>interested in answering: What then is your ontological [i.e., related to
:>reason for being] basis for an ethical system, given that you (seem to) deny
:>the existence of any normative [i.e., related to prescribed norms or
:>standards] ethics?
:Here, Sean has attempted to hide the insult in his question by using big words
:that only go to show his lack of attention to the discussion. I have inserted
:some dictionary definitions to make his question clear.
I will disagree with you here, Daniel. I do not think Sean is hiding an
insult in his question. There is a fundimental question that is being
discussed here. In the philosophic community it appears to be agreed
that there is no way one can "PROVE" that any action is either good or
bad. One needs to either postulate or mutually agree to a system of
ethics in order to have a framework in which to discuss what is good and
what is bad. Judaism over the last two thousand years, and orthodox and
conservative judaism today, has accepted the Torah to be the literal
word of G-d. This then defines an absolute basis for a system of
ethics/morality. With this postulate, we KNOW what is to be defined as
good and what is to be defined as bad. At least many
orthodox/conservative jews will agree that we have no independant method
to prove that those things that the Torah says are good are indeed good.
We accept this as a logical result of our postulate that the Torah is
the literal word of G-d, and that G-d is the appropriate " " to
establish what is good and what is bad.
The problem some of the orthodox (and maybe conservative) have with the
position that Daniel is presenting is as follows: You state that the
Torah is inspired by G-d, and therefore is to be used to determine what
actions are good and what are bad (have I understood you correctly on
this point?). However, the Torah is the work of men, and the true
meaning of G-d's message is clouded by this layer of human authorship.
In addition, a purely ethical message was impossible at the time the
Torah was inspired, and a ritual portion was included as well. (Was this
ritual portion inspired as well, or is this an addition of the human
medium for this message? Either Daniel or Herman made reference to this
ritual being needed at the time, but it was unclear to me where it
originated from.) At the current time, (some/much/all) of this ritual
portion is no longer (obligatory/relevant). It is therefore necessary to
examine the Torah through some filtering mechanism to ascertain what are
the correct actions to take. This filtering mechanism is fundamentally
left to the individual to determine what actions s/he feels are
consistent with what G-d wants us to do. The above represents my
understanding of what has been presented here by members of the reform
movement. If this is incorrect, then what comes next will likely be
incorrect as well.
The question Sean raises is that if the filtering mechanism is left to
the individual, and basic assumption concerning the validity of the text
is that it has been clouded by a layer of human authorship, then it
becomes the individual filtering mechanism that becomes the basis for
what is to be your ethical/moral code as well. If something in the text
is not consistent with your filtering mechanism, then it can be
relegated either to the portion of ritual, or having been corrupted by
the human authorship. Bruce tried to determine if there is a portion of
the text that is viewed to be binding, and if so how was that portion
decided. After a statement such as "Reform Judaism holds to the ethics
and moral commandments delineated in the Tanach", Daniel continues
"these are not changed unless compelling reasons are found." We have
here two problems: how to determine what are ethical/moral commandments
vs. ritual commandments; and even once they are determined, they are
still subject to examination if "compelling reasons", what I am calling
the filtering mechanism is in contradiction to them.
:I am getting extremely tired of where this discussion is heading. After what
:started out to be a reasoned explanation of what Reform Judaism stands for and
:where it differs from Orthodox, we now have had yet another illustration of
:the fact that Orthodox (or, I should say some members of Orthodoxy), think
:they they have the right to determine what *is* Judaism, what can call itself
:Judaism, what is the right practice, and what is the wrong practice, and who
:is to be accepted for their beliefs, and who is to be condemmed for their
:beliefs.
Actually, I think this has been relatively flame free, compared to
net.history flaming conventions. You have made available to the net some
of the thoughts, ideas etc. of the reform movement. You have tried to
show how they differ from what you call the orthodox movement. Some of
us believe that there has existed a thing called judaism which can be
historically examined over about the last two thousand years. We find
certain fundamental assumptions in this judaism, what someone (Micha, I
think) calleds meta-rules or meta-laws. They describe the underlying
postulates of the structure, and the methodology by which that structure
evolves. In previous postings, you have basically agreed that the reform
movement has drastically changed or removed these meta-rules. The
question then is what does the word Judaism mean to you. This is a
semantic issue, although highly emotionally charged. I accept your right
to call it judaism, but at the same time claim my right to say that it
does not match my definition of the term.
:>And then, if you in fact espouse ethical pragmatism, why do you call your
:>beliefs Judaism, rather than saying that _some_ of your beliefs and practices
:>accord with _some_ of the beliefs and practices of Judaism?
:Who determines what is Judaism -- man or G-d? What give some human the right
:to say that what I *believe* is not Judaism? I do what I understand to be
:G-d's will, and let G-d judge.
Judaism is a word. What is judaism is determined by the consensus of the
people who use that word to have some given meaning. We all agree (I
think) that only G-d knows what his will is. Many of us BELIEVE that he
made his will known to us through the Torah. We disagree on how he did
this. Sean's point I think is that the term Judaism has had an agreed
upon definition for the last two thousand years. If reform gives
ultimate precedence to the filtering mechanism, or "compelling reasons",
then is it in fact a form of ethical pragmatism that starts with the
beliefs and practices of what Sean calls Judaism, and then selects some
subset of those to be the beliefs of the movement?
Avi Feldblum
a...@pruxe.att.com
Lou Steinberg
> Isn't the "minimum subset" of "ethical/moral" laws, in fact, the
> Noachic law? Those are the moral principles, to which all humanity
> is subject.
One of the Noachic laws is not to eat a "limb" from a living animal,
that is, an animal must be fully dead before you start removing parts
to eat. Is this so clearly an "ethical/moral" law rather than a
"ritual" law? Note that stunning the animal so there is no pain is
not enough - it has to be dead.
--
Lou Steinberg
uucp: {pretty much any major site}!rutgers!aramis.rutgers.edu!lou
arpa: l...@aramis.rutgers.edu
Arthur S. Kamlet
I'm not sure the scientific model should be equated with the
Halachic model. Was Hillel usually right and Shammai usually wrong?
Or was there political power at work there? Who knows?
Why are there decisions which are accepted as Truth by some but not
by others? If Halacha generated conclusions which must be accepted
by All, there wouldn't be Permissive decisions, and you would have
an argument that Conservative Jews should not be dealing with
permissive decisions.
But there are decisions that are accepted one way by one orthodox
group, and a diffenent way by another orthodox group. Just as there
are decisions accepted one way by one conservative group and another
way by another.
Must a couple try to have at least 1 boy and 1 girl; or at least 2
children? Answer: Some rabbis folow Hillel; others folow Shammai.
Others, as Rabbi Danziger explained here, do not believe we should
be thinking in terms of "at least 2" period.
Is rice allowed to be eaten on Pesach? Answer: Some follow ....
(Up until about 1950) Was polygamy permitted? Some followed ...
Is it permitted today to add t'chelet to tzittit? Some follow ...
While we are all required to give tzedakkah, we are Permitted to
give up to 20% of what we have. Some choose to give less, some
more, up to 20%.
Kiddusin begins by listing three different means, any one of which
is Permitted .....
Some of the above may fall into the category of Chumrah, others not.
Feel free to ignore any of the above which you classify as such.
My point is that both Halachah and rabbinical rulings may, indeed,
permit something. I have not heard any convincing argument that a
rabbinical ruling is valid only if it leaves no leeway, no room for
permission or discretion to enter.
-----
I have heard several cases where people seeking a posek for a
particular question will go "posek shopping" -- not a nice
practice, but done because some poskim have a reputation of following
one way, others follow another way ...
>Furthermore, allowing the congregation board to decide halacha is like forming a
>committee of hair dressers, salesmen, real estate agents, and physicians to
>deduce the laws of physics. Physical laws are deduced by physicists, and
>halachic laws by those skilled in halacha. Thus, if the hair dressers .... have
>detailed knowledge and skills in physics, then fine, they can deduce the laws of
>physics. If the congregation board has the same expert training in halacha, let
>them decide halacha, but in practice I rarely see them having any more knowledge
>of halacha than the average physician has of quantum mechanics.
We agree here. As I said, a rabbi should resign if he cannot make
his rulings stick.
By the way, Columbus is among the larger of the boonies; all of our
shuls have at least one full-time rabbi. Among the
smaller boonies, it is quite common to have no rabbi at all, or a
visiting rabbi from the "big city" who may conduct services, but
cannot really have the influence of a full time congregational
rabbi. In such cases, the board really does decide all matters for
the congregation.
Lou Steinberg
> Isn't the "minimum subset" of "ethical/moral" laws, in fact, the
> Noachic law? Those are the moral principles, to which all humanity
> is subject.
One of the Noachic laws is not to eat a "limb" taken from a living
animal. An animal must be fully dead before you start cutting pieces
off. Note that preventing pain by, e.g., stunning the animal is not
enough. Pain or no pain, the animal must be dead. It is not so clear
to me that this would be considered an "ethical/moral" law rather than
a "ritual" one.
Mark C. Carroll <MC>
]]response,it is as if you are talking about actions that will lead to _direct_
]]personal gain. But this is not the purpose of mitzvot. Mitzvot lead to a
]]spiritual gain; spiritual gain can be shared. I act in a manner so as to
]]That means doing things I don't always like to do.That's part of the bargain.
]]I don't think that anyone can argue with the question that people interpret
]]things according to their own subjective biases. That's a part of life; my
]]experiences color who I am. But as for selection of mitzvot I combine my own
]]learning on the subject with the interpretations of others. There are many
]]things in this world that I consider to be absolutely good or absolutely bad.
]]They are probably the same as yours, coming out of the same culture and
]]traditions.
]All two party actions follow the same basic outline that I have stated
]previously. The requestor makes a request. The respondee replies to that
]request. If the respondee decides that he will interpret the requestors
]request according to what he feels is good for the requestor, the respondee
]is acting for his own purposes. Ah yes, the respondee must clarify what is
]ambiguous in the request. But this type of interpretation is not cover doing
]something directly contrary to what the requestor act.
I have several problems with this.
First of all: I do not accept that what you consider to be the law is
necessarily what God wants. I believe that it's a mans interpretation
of what God wants. As such, it is subject to my interpretation as
well.
Secondly, I don't agree with your entire concept of the two-party
relationship. You seem to look at religion as being very much like a
business contract: I act in my own interests. Any action I take is an
action strictly for my own personal profit. Well, I see religion as a
loving relationship. If I love someone, what I do with/for them, I
certainly benefit from. So does the person I love. When I do something
to express my love, I do it for myself, and for the other. It's not
just for me; it's for US. When I perform a religious act, I do it for
myself, AND for God. I do it for the relationship between us; for the
love that I have for God, and that God has for me.
]Now let's put this back in context: G-D has made requests. These are called
]mitzvot. When one subjectively re-interprets these requests, all actions
]supposedly performed for "shared spirituality" are bankrupt. There is
]spirituality in what G-D requests, and there is no spirituality in what goes
]contrary to these requests. If, in one's subjective opinion, the request is
]vague one must go for further clarification in the sources which
]reveal the request.
]
The sources of further classifications are the writings of men. It's
only thier interpretation. It may be VERY, VERY important, but still,
it's the interpretations of men. I should study them, and consider
them, but I can not allow those long-dead men to make my decisions for me!
]If Reform has taken a a-priori position that there are no such sources, that
]there are only human texts, that is not my problem. Without any source of
]revelation of G-D's will one has boxed oneself into a corner where there can
]never be any objection to the claim that one is only acting according to one's
]own whishes. One may claim it is "sanctimonious" (I really detest these
]anglo-saxonisms and like to twist them sometimes) but in truth there can
]be no proof that this has anything to do with objective reality. G-D exists,
]made objective demands (not subjective) and by throwing out the Torah, one
]is not going to have any way of obtaining a clue as to the objective
]requests of G-D.
But there is a source of revelation: The Torah. The IDEAS of the
Torah, not the WORDS. WORDS are for men; IDEAS are for God. The words
are the creations of man;it's up to me to try to see the ideas that
are hiding behind the words. I've got to try to find those ideas for
myself. It's too important to say "Oh, someone much smarter than me
found THE answer 500 years ago". The same idea can have different
significance in different contexts. Maybe, 500 years ago, 1000 years
ago, some things had significant meaning, but don't anymore. And maybe
things that didn't mean anything then are terribly significant today.
I've got to decide what is significant to me for myself.
]] Yea, we all feel we should be free to decide whatever we wish is good and
]] bad.
]]
]]But I'm not free. I have the guidance given me in the Torah, which is of
]]divine inspiration, wherein is described what proper moral and ethical
]]behavior is. Somehow you are losing the distinction between the exact
]]specifics of ritual practice and worship, and the specifics of ethical
]]behavior. Reform continues the process of interpretation on the former;
]]the latter appears to be unchanging truths that do not call for
]]reinterpretation.
]There is no guidance when one can re-interpret the Torah and make it
]stand on its head to say the exact opposite. (BTW: There can be no
]separation between acts. G-D is concerned with everything we do,
]not just what goes on in the shul. This can be continued as a
]side-issue).
As a quick note to the aside: Of course so. To act religious in front
of a congregation is not to be religious. Religion is a part of how we
act, 24 hours a day.
And noone wants to "twist" the torah. But it is subject to
interpretation. The orthodox view seems to be that only THEY are
allowed to interpret; the rest of us take thier word as law. They
spend years studying the classic interpretation, and then accept it
without every wondering "Is this right?". They try to limit the world
to ONE way of seeing things. They make the world a very closed, ugly
place. To me, to try to limit peoples ability to think and decide for
themselves is the most horrible crime in the world. I will not
participate in any religion that tries to do that, and you try to tell
me that Judaism does. Sorry, that's not the way we all see it.
]You are reserving the right to interpret the mitzvot the way you want. In
]effect, the situation is like the if the U.S. Supreme Court could rule that
]equality is really inequality and there were no other branches of the
]government to restrain it.
The supreme court COULD do that. It would be up to the people to
decide that they were wrong, and the law was unjust, and force people
to see it in a different way.
To me, I can sum things up in a simple metaphor:
Who is the better citizen: The man who watches a black man be
punished for being black, because it's the current interpretation of
the law, or the man who goes to jail himself for breaking the law to
defend the human rights of that man? The second man IS BREAKING THE
LAW. He is going against hundreds of years of legal judgements. But he
is doing the only thing that he can believe is right.
Sean Engelson
>Krulwich) writes:
>>Just because I have the physical ability to kill someone doesn't mean that
>>Orthodoxy allows me to.
>
>Let me phrase it another way. Orthodoxy may not agree or condone your actions,
>but it does not physically prevent you from doing them. Thus, it is up to your
>free will to decide whether or not to go along with the Orthodox viewpoint.
But what will the Reform `authorities' do if you kill someone? Or
perhaps engage in unethical business practices? The issue here is not
one of crime and punishment, it is one of saying "this action is
wrong" even though I won't throw in jail for it, versus "this act is
OK, it's your personal choice." Where does Reform sit here?
>>My question, again, is whether I am allowed according to Reform Judaism to
>>_disregard_ the law against Murder if I feel that it is a "ritual law."
>
>No. Do you have trouble distinguishing ritual from ethics and morals? Many of
>the Orthodoxy appear to question me as if they do. They seem to think murder
>is a "ritual" law, and ask what happens if I do it.
>
>Let me give you some information:
It is my experience that on the net dictionary definitions are most
often brought into an argument to confuse an issue by focusing on
precise terminology, rather than the questions being raised. But
let's see what's happening here...
... definitions elided ...
>Boy, it's clear to me the difference between ethics and ritual. Murder is
>certainly not ritual, at least in Judaism. There is no ceremony involving
>murder; no customarily repeated acts involving murder.
Even given this definition of ritual, why then does Reform permit the
eating of meat with milk? Or having sex with a niddah? These aren't
ritual acts, characterised by customarily repeated actions? Perhaps
better terms would be `easily understood' and `not easily understood'
laws?
>In order to distinguish ethical/moral acts from ritual, one must be able to
>differentiate actions that relate to right and wrong, good and bad, from those
>that are merely words and formal acts.
The use of the word `merely' here seems to imply that we Orthodox Jews
do a bunch of actions that have no meaning. This is not true. All of
the mitzvot from the seemingly most important to the strangest,
`ritualistic' act, has its purpose, and serves to bring a person
closer to G-d and full humanity.
As a note here, there is a principle that Chazal mention, that of
`mitoch shelo lishma, ba lishma', that is `from performance of an act
without full understanding or motivation, one arrives at appreciation
and proper motivation' (translation mine). This reflects a deep
psychological truth, that people cannot fully appreciate that which
they do not experience. Even if we do not fully understand some of
these `words and formal acts', if we perform them willingly, and with
the intent of trying to understand them, we will gain a measure of
understanding, if not of their intent, at least of the way they bring
us closer to G-d and happiness.
>I can make this distinction. I wonder
>about some of my attackers out there, who continue, repeatedly, to ask
>questions such as "[am I] allowed according to Reform Judaism to
>_disregard_ the law against Murder if I feel that it is a 'ritual law.'?"
Basically what you seem to be saying is that the Torah was analysed to
extract its ethical underpinnings, and then provided one keeps within
that ethical framework, one can do whatever one wants. I'd be
interested in seeing those analyses. If, on the other hand, you take
modern ethical philosophies (such as those of the Enlightenment), and
attempt to fit Torah law into them, and then discard as `mere ritual'
those laws which don't fit this a priori ethical system, I should say
that this is contrary to the scientific method. One should not
develop an explanation of the data by pushing the data into your
favorite, predetermined theory.
>>If Reform Judaism doesn't prohibit murder (out and out,
>>regardless of its "ritualness") then what DOES it do??
>
>I just showed you that it does prohibit murder.
I'm still unclear on this. Does it mean that it says "murder is wrong
and you shouldn't do it"? If so, then driving on Shabbat is
prohibited by the Orthodox in exactly the same way. If it's something
more, what is it?
>My words cannot convince you, no matter how I try. I have tried to open many
>doors, but the hinges on some are rusted shut, and I didn't bring the right
>oil.
I think that it's difficult because we both have preconceptions of the
questions that the other will ask and the answers they will give, and
often respond to the questions we _thought_ they asked, rather than
those that they did. I think we should have patience, and realise
that eventually, we may converge to a mutual understanding.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Sean Philip Engelson, Gradual Student Make your learning a fixture;
+Saal S.
> To me, I can sum things up in a simple metaphor:
> Who is the better citizen: The man who watches a black man be
> punished for being black, because it's the current interpretation of
> the law, or the man who goes to jail himself for breaking the law to
> defend the human rights of that man? The second man IS BREAKING THE
> LAW. He is going against hundreds of years of legal judgements. But he
> is doing the only thing that he can believe is right.
> =| Mark Craig Carroll: <MC> |=
When chosing a metaphor to illustrate a point, it is undoubtedly
best to consider the audience. If you are trying to convince
someone of something, using a metaphor that insults your audience
is highly counterproductive. The insensitivity to your audience
demonstrated by the use of this totally inappropriate (and
inaccurate) metaphor leads me to conclude that it is nothing more
than a personal statement of your distaste for anything but the
type of Judaism that you claim as your own, or it is a
demonstration of your distance from, and lack of knowledge of,
classical, Halachic, Torah Judaism.
Yaakov Kayman
>
>In article <2092YZKCU@CUNYVM> YZ...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (Yaakov Kayman) writes:
>>Practice *IS* the distinguishing factor!
> [1] >Non-observant Jews cannot be Orthodox, as Orthodox Jews claim to
> >be Shomrei Torah u Mitzvot (observers of the Torah and
> >commandments).
> [2] >As I have said many times before, men are imperfect, and
> >therefore so must necessarily be their observance.
>
>You have just contradicted yourself. Follow what you said:
> Orthodox Jews are men ; assumption
> men are imperfect ; [2] given
> therefore, their observance is imperfect ; [2]
> therefore, they are not completely observant ; defn of imperfect
> therefore they are not Orthodox [1]
>
Wrong. Orthodox Jews are, as human beings, by their nature, imperfect.
Their aspiration, to which they strive BY ACTION, is to ever more perfect
observance. As Orthodox, they know - AND ADMIT - when their observance
falls short of the mark. They, unlike Reform or Conservative Jews (or the
ideologues of those movements, at any rate), do not attempt to ration-
alize THEIR SHORTCOMINGS away by positing that this or that Halakha is
"no longer appropriate" or "merely the word of some (misguided?) man",
etc. when in fact all they are trying to do is somehow justify NOT DOING
G-d's will.
>Note that if you argue that [1] applies only in the case of completely
>non-observant Jews (as opposed to less than perfect Jews), then Reform and
>Conservative Jews are Orthodox by your definition.
>
Maybe by YOURS, perhaps. When Reform and Conservative will RECOGNIZE that
their DEVIATION from legitimate Halakha (Rambam,Shulchan 'Aruch, Mishnah
Berurah, etc.- type) is WRONG, and will attempt correction of that devia-
tion, rather than their rationalization, then and only then may they be
legitimately called Shomrei Torah U MItzvot (observers of G-d's Torah and
G-d's COMMANDMENTS, or "Orthodox", if you prefer).
>You go on to say:
>>Also, what differentiates the less-than-perfect observance of those who
>>call themselves Orthodox from the other, more modern "flavors" of
>>Judaism is the realization of their wrongdoing when they do wrong
>
>Who determines what is wrong? This is the key question I have been trying to
>establish. Many traditional people on this net have claimed that it is G-d who
>determines wrong; not man. I have no problem with this. They then tell me that
>I am wrong. But they are not G-d, they are men.
>
>If you hold the Tanach and Talmud as the literal word of G-d, then, yes, I am
>wrong *by that definition*.
I do, and there have been hundreds, or thousands of legitimate Torah
sages throughout the millenia who back me up. There's a big difference
between an author and a scribe who actually may write the author's words.
G-d is the author of the Torah, both written and oral.
>But that is your definition, not mine.
And just who have you got to back you up besides apologists for their own
non-observance and/or non-acceptance of Torah?
>If you hold that the Tanach and Talmud are the works of men who were
>inspired by G-d, then I am not wrong, .... itten agrees with the
See my remark above about authorship. If you deny G-d's authorship of the
Torah (not speaking now about who may have actually put the words down on
the parchment or whatever), you would probably be classed as an apikores.
To actually be an apikores (denier), though, rather than an 'Am HaAretz
(Jewish ignoramus), you would have to first be a legitimate Torah scholar
and *then* deny G-d's authority (or authorship of Torah, as an example).
>
>...We all do wrong. We all fail in being perfect observers of what
>we ascertain to be G-d's will. fail to
^^^^^^^^^^^^
HERE is where Orthodoxy sharply diverges from the Reform and Conserva-
tive movements. Torah provides us with very specific principles for
expounding upon Torah and for deriving Halakha. Judaism is just as
the golden Menorah of the Temple was. Just as the menorah had to be
constructed out of one solid block of gold, so that all branches and
ornaments were part and parcel of the original block, with no admixture
of foreign material to be used as solder or such, so Judaism never looks
outside Torah for explanations of Torah. Of Torah it is said "Turn it
over and turn it over, for all is in it". Torah was G-d's blueprint for
the creation of all that is. Why would I ever want to look outside for
its explanation? Honest Torah study, or reliance upon those Torah sages
who have done so, is how we may ascertain G-d's will. There is no other
way.
>...return to better observance. This applies to all Judaic movements.
True, but ONLY when all movements know and accept the true nature of
better observance.
>
>Daniel
Yaakov K.
--------
Yaakov Kayman (212) 903-3666 City University of New York
BITNET: YZKCU@CUNYVM "Lucky is the shepherd, and lucky his flock
Internet: YZ...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU about whom the wolves complain"
#! rnews 387
Relay-Version: Version 1.7 PSU-NETNEWS 5/20/88; site PSUVM.BITNET
Posting-Ve
Mark C. Carroll <MC>
]> Who is the better citizen: The man who watches a black man be
]> punished for being black, because it's the current interpretation of
]> the law, or the man who goes to jail himself for breaking the law to
]> defend the human rights of that man? The second man IS BREAKING THE
]> LAW. He is going against hundreds of years of legal judgements. But he
]> is doing the only thing that he can believe is right.
]
]> =| Mark Craig Carroll: <MC> |=
]
]When chosing a metaphor to illustrate a point, it is undoubtedly
]best to consider the audience. If you are trying to convince
]someone of something, using a metaphor that insults your audience
]is highly counterproductive. The insensitivity to your audience
]demonstrated by the use of this totally inappropriate (and
]inaccurate) metaphor leads me to conclude that it is nothing more
]than a personal statement of your distaste for anything but the
]type of Judaism that you claim as your own, or it is a
]demonstration of your distance from, and lack of knowledge of,
]classical, Halachic, Torah Judaism.
Is the metaphore totally invalid?
Let's take a close look at the behavior of the Orthodox of the net
lately.
How many times have you insulted people for being Reform? How many
times have you accused the Reform of ignorance, merely because you
assume that the Reform are ignorant? How many times have you made
statements about how terribly wrong the way we live is, merely because
we are Reform. How many times have you JUDGED us, merely for being
reform.
The comparison becomes even closer if we go to Israel, and look at the
extremely conservative Israeli orthodox sects. These are people who
riot in front of movie theaters in the name of the law.
Isn't that Bigotry, in the name of the law? Bigotry based not on skin
color, but on belief, but bigotry none the less. It's cruel, and it's
inhuman. The way you judge is a disgrace to humanity. But it's OK,
because ITS THE LAW.
This is all a lot more extreme than I really believe. But I see things
heading towards the point where it will be worse than my most horrible
nightmares. The sheer judgementalism I see happening here - the whole
mentality of "If it's not MY way it's wrong", or "If it's not MY way,
it just play", or "If it's not MY way, it's not real" - it amazes me.
I've been trying to explain the way I feel, and all that happens is
I'm ignored, and insulted. My philosophy of life is mocked. My
religion is called false. I'm told that I'm really just selfish. All
because I dare to disagree.
Open your minds, people. There IS more than one RIGHT way. You're
going to have to accept that. It would all be very nice to go back a
few hundred years, and have all of Judaism be the same, but it's NOT
going to happen. You've got to learn to accept that people are going
to decide for themselves. Your judgementalism accomplishes only one
thing: to chase us away. I don't believe that that is what you want.
<MC>
--
=| Mark Craig Carroll: <MC> |=
Daniel P. Faigin
writes:
>But what will the Reform `authorities' do if you kill someone? Or
>perhaps engage in unethical business practices? The issue here is not
>one of crime and punishment, it is one of saying "this action is
>wrong" even though I won't throw in jail for it, versus "this act is
>OK, it's your personal choice." Where does Reform sit here?
Almost all Reform authorities (where I assume you mean the Reform Rabbinate)
will say the actions are wrong. The reason that I say "Almost all" instead of
"all" is that I cannot *guarantee* what every member of the Reform rabbinate
will say; I personally believe that ALL will say it is wrong.
>Even given this definition of ritual [customarily repeated acts], why then
>does Reform permit the eating of meat with milk? Or having sex with a
>niddah? These aren't ritual acts, characterised by customarily repeated
>actions? Perhaps better terms would be `easily understood' and `not easily
>understood' laws?
Maybe a better definition is acts between men (in the generic sense of the
term "men") vs. acts between oneself and G-d? The only person I affect by
keeping or not keeping Kosher is myself; if it adds meaning and depth to my
personal relationship with G-d, then I do it -- if I see it as meaningless
ritual, then I don't. This is a viewpoint that disagrees very strongly with
the Orthodox position (and angers many). I doubt that I am eloquent enough to
explain its basis well enough (tho' I have tried).
>The use of the word `merely' [as in the phrase "merely words and formal acts]
>here seems to imply that we Orthodox Jews do a bunch of actions that have no
>meaning. This is not true. All of the mitzvot from the seemingly most
>important to the strangest, `ritualistic' act, has its purpose, and serves to
>bring a person closer to G-d and full humanity.
I do not deny that these acts have meaning for you. I do not deny that
sometimes "meaningless" acts do have a purpose of bringing one closer to G-d
(e.g., increasing the sanctity of ones relationship with G-d). I don't think
one can increase one's humanity, but that's a semantic twaddle.
What happens, as I understand it, is that in Reform, people select which of
the ritual acts they will follow. They make this choice based on their
understanding, study, and their determination of what improves their
relationship with G-d.
This may seem wrong to you. You may be right. But I cannot change what Reform
does, I can only change my practice. I try to explain what I believe, what I
believe Reform believes, so that you may gain better understanding of those
you disagree with.
Daniel P. Faigin
>I will disagree with you here, Daniel. I do not think Sean is hiding an
>there are any normative practices]. There is a fundimental question that is
>being discussed here. In the philosophic community it appears to be agreed
>that there is no way one can "PROVE" that any action is either good or bad.
>One needs to either postulate or mutually agree to a system of ethics in
>order to have a framework in which to discuss what is good and what is bad.
I will readily admit that I am not an expert, or even knowledgable in
metaphysical and philosophic arguments. I don't understand all the words (but
I look them up), and I am not an expert in this area. I work with Computer
Security, not religion. Thus, at this point, I leave it to my Reform bretheren
on the net more versed in these areas to take up the philosophical side of
this discussion.
>The question Sean raises is that if the filtering mechanism is left to
>the individual, and basic assumption concerning the validity of the text
>is that it has been clouded by a layer of human authorship, then it
>becomes the individual filtering mechanism that becomes the basis for
>what is to be your ethical/moral code as well.
Unfortuately, ethics *always* comes down to individual decision. I once worked
for a large commercial defense contractor. With the increasing emphasis on
ethics in the workplace, they began to have intense classes in "ethics". I had
one instructor who said something that sticks with me:
I can't teach you ethics; you learn ethics as you grow up and your
ethics do not change. I can teach you complience with the rules of
our industry
I cannot, Reform cannot, Orthodoxy cannot, ... teach you ethics. We are
taught ethics by are parents. Religion can, however, help dictate the rules of
what is and isn't ethical behaviour. Now, what is ethical in one religion (for
example, polygamy in Mormanism) is unethical in others. That is life. Both
Reform and Orthodox derive there original basis for ethical norms from Torah.
But they do differ on what is ethical; for example, Orthodoxy considers all
laws to be ethical, whereas Reform does not. That is life; we on
soc.culture.jewish cannot change this.
The final arbitrator on ethics in *this* world is society; ethics are
hard-coded (as it were) by societies laws. Thus, what might be ethical (again,
polygamy in Mormanism) is illegal. In the United States, societies laws are
derived from the Judeo-Christian ethic, which is derived, again, from the
Torah. Thus, societies laws pretty much agree with Judaic ethics.
The ultimate arbitrator of what is ethical is G-d. However, unlike society,
G-d does not arrest you when you violate the rules of conduct. We do not know
how, or even whether, G-d metes out ultimate punishment, or what acts are
important. On the latter point, the Orthodox members of this net will point
out that you can determine importance of laws via various mechanism -- fine.
But we have no absolute guarantee, no one has ever come back to confirm (that
*we* believe in :-)) to tell us that our believes go along with what G-d says.
It is a matter of faith.
Faith. That is really what we are discussing. Omitting the questions of
culture or nationhood, Judaism is a faith. It is something that gives people
comfort, gives them something to believe it, provides a mechanism to guide one
along lifes path. It provides year cycle and life cycle rituals to help keep
family together. But it is a faith, strengthened by personal belief.
We can sit and argue fine points of ritual law. But this does nothing to
increase faith.
>You have made available to the net some of the thoughts, ideas etc. of the
>reform movement. You have tried to show how they differ from what you call
>the orthodox movement. Some of us believe that there has existed a thing
>called judaism which can be historically examined over about the last two
>thousand years. We find certain fundamental assumptions in this judaism, what
>someone (Micha, I think) calleds meta-rules or meta-laws. They describe the
>underlying postulates of the structure, and the methodology by which that
>structure evolves. In previous postings, you have basically agreed that the
>reform movement has drastically changed or removed these meta-rules. The
>question then is what does the word Judaism mean to you.
To *ME*, Judaism is a faith that believe is the one G-d as described in the
Torah, that follows the basic ethical principles laid out in the Torah. It is
a faith this is concerned about its fellow man, and about the future of this
precious world. Even the death of one is painful, in Judaism. It is a faith
that has associated with it a rich, beautiful, and sometimes painful history.
>This is a semantic issue, although highly emotionally charged. I accept your
>right to call it judaism, but at the same time claim my right to say that it
>does not match my definition of the term.
Thank you very much. This is precisely the point I have been trying to make.
>Judaism is a word. What is judaism is determined by the consensus of the
>people who use that word to have some given meaning. We all agree (I
>think) that only G-d knows what his will is. Many of us BELIEVE that he
>made his will known to us through the Torah. We disagree on how he did
>this.
I couldn't agree with this more.
>Sean's point I think is that the term Judaism has had an agreed
>upon definition for the last two thousand years.
Actually, there have been movements that have disagreed in the past. But there
is a common core of what makes them all "Jewish".
>If reform gives ultimate precedence to the filtering mechanism, or
>"compelling reasons", then is it in fact a form of ethical pragmatism that
>starts with the beliefs and practices of what Sean calls Judaism, and then
>selects some subset of those to be the beliefs of the movement?
This may very well be the case; I am not familiar with "ethical pragmatism"
enough to determine if it is so. In Reform, it does all come down to the
individual.
Ari Gross
>I am doing less work in driving three miles to the Temple than if I walked
>two blocks. I consider driving three miles to a friend's hous as less work
>than walking two blocks for the same reason.
Sorry, but the logic does not wash.
Is the Torah commanded by G-d or isn't it?
This is the first question you have to deal with. If it is not of divine
origin then NOTHING in it is BINDING. Real simple. It follows from this
that one could then ignore everything in it, and/or become a heretical
Jew, and/or marry a non-Jew, and/or chant Hari, Hari, Hari-Krishna at
the nearest airport.
Now let's consider the other side. The Torah is G-d's divine revelation
to man of His will.
It then must certainly follow that not everything in the Torah is for
logical or humanistic reasons that man can comprehend. This is the distinction
that tends to be made in reading the Torah between "mishpat" and "chok".
Would the reason for the red Heifer be logical ? Is taking the 4 minim ,
e.g., lulav, etrog, ... for logical or humanistic reasons ? Is the Torah
injunction of putting on tefillin something that has only NOW become outdated,
in your view, but at that time was actually a remedy for stomach upset ?
(Of course today with better-cooked food and Pepto-Bismal ..... ).
Consider the injunction on shabbat of "lo te'vaaru", not to kindle a fire
on shabbat. Certainly, when the Torah was written it was understood that
as far as comfort is concerned, one might be far more comfortable lighting
up a fire and sitting cozely next to the warm glow of the blaze than by
refraining from lighting it and sitting all shabbat long in the freezing,
frigid, numbing cold. Yet, lighting a fire on the Sabbath was prohibited.
So if one CHOOSES to accept the validity of the Torah, simple rationalizations
to avoid/eliminate LAWS found to be difficult to keep are not sufficient.
If one CHOOSES to reject the Torah's validity, all of your rationalizations
are unnecessary.
> Like the inheritance problem,
>the problem of almost effortless operation of a machine for travel was not
>considered before the problem arose.
>Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907
Not considered by whom? Man, G-d ? Does not compute.
Ari Gross
Columbia University Computer Science
a...@cs.columbia.edu
Herman Rubin
> > Daniel P. Faigin writes:
> >> Keith Bierman writes:
> > >Rabbinic judism (i.e. the halacha as taught by our sages) is a system
> > >which was highly dynamic.
> > The key word is "was". Since Talmudic times, it has stopped being dynamic and
> > has not really continued to change.
>
> Halacha was restricted at several points. The basic rule is any Law book
> that is accepted by the vast majority of the Observant Rabanit (as opposed
> to the Sadducees, the Karaites, and the Reform) becomes aythoritative.
Obviously, any legislation is authoritative to the group that accepts it.
> Thus, the Mishna is permanent. So is the Talmud. The Shulchan
> Aruch (which was accepted by the Sepharadim) with the Mapah (the RaMaH's
> additions for Ashkenazim).
> Each time one of these books was accepted, it marked the end of an
> era. Thus, an Amorah (the generations between the Mishna and the Talmud)
> doesn't have the Authority to Argue with a Tanah. A Rishon (pre-Shulchan
> Aruch) can't argue with an Amorah., and an Acharon (post-S.A.) with a Rishon,
> without another person of that era for support. Once the Mishna was
> accepted, all Tanaic questions were resolved, or recorded that practice still
> went either way. Similarly, a Tanaic opinion that wasn't supported by an
> Amorah in the Talmud has no effect on practice.
This is where we disagree totally. The Torah provides for additional
divine inspiration through the prophets. It does not tell us how to
decide the status of prophetic announcementsl; that is up to us.
I do not see why an Amorah or a Rishon or an Acharon cannot point out
that, due to ignorance, a Tanah was totally wrong. We must distinguish
between what is divinely inspired and what is human legislation to implement
it. The formal marriage and divorce procedures fall in the latter class.
The principles behind them should be in the former class.
But the idea that the sages, no matter how devout, could promulgate that
subsequent generations could not override the judgment of earlier sages,
is, in my opinion, ancestor worship, and hence prohibited by Torah. The
Great Assembly did not have the moral right to take the political position
that there could be no more prophets. I cannot see why God would cease to
inspire prophets because the Tanakh was put into codified form.
>
> Actually, according to your statements, to add dynamics to the system.
> We already agreed that Reform broke the system that defines Halacha.
> Why then are you still posting that Reform works within a Halachic framework?
It is too long since halakhah was totally reexamined. Closing the Mishnah
was an arrogant mistake. We are as entitled to legislate a prosbul as Hillel
was. We have more things to consider, and changes are not to be made lightly.
--
Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907
Herman Rubin
> In article <48...@aero.ARPA>, faigin@sunstroke (Daniel P. Faigin) writes:
> >In article <55...@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> Krulwic...@cs.yale.edu (Bruce
> >Krulwich) writes:
[Much of article deleted.]
> But what will the Reform `authorities' do if you kill someone? Or
> perhaps engage in unethical business practices? The issue here is not
> one of crime and punishment, it is one of saying "this action is
> wrong" even though I won't throw in jail for it, versus "this act is
> OK, it's your personal choice." Where does Reform sit here?
What does the Torah say about these? In the case of the killing of a person,
the killer could flee to a city of refuge. If the investigators decide that
the killing is not murder, the miscreant is not allowed to stay in the city of
refuge, so the "avengers of blood" can kill him.
In the case of the one engaging in unethical business practices, it was a civil
matter. Civil courts are the oldest; it is not a matter of punishment, but
recompense. The above indicates that murder was treated the same way in the
Torah; the relatives of the victim can kill the murderer, as the closest to
recompense that could be obtained.
These are both treated as civil crimes, not religious crimes. The court in
neither case decrees punishment.
> .......................
> Even given this definition of ritual, why then does Reform permit the
> eating of meat with milk? Or having sex with a niddah? These aren't
> ritual acts, characterised by customarily repeated actions? Perhaps
> better terms would be `easily understood' and `not easily understood'
> laws?
Why does Orthodoxy extend the prohibition of a pagan ritual to not eating
chicken with milk? Sometimes Hebrew can be maddeningly unclear, but not
here. The Torah prohibition is limited to its customary translation. It
is, in my opinion, the Orthodox who have allowed custom and unseemly zeal
to stretch the Torah almost beyond recognition.
Most ancient religions considered both sex and blood to be connected with
religion. The Torah makes both of these defiling, meaning that if either
sex or contact with blood (except in carefully prescribed manners) occur,
the person is not permitted to undertake certain rituals without being
first cleansed. Sex was considered partially a religious act, and in
many primitive religions, menstrual blood is particularly defiling. This
prohibition can therefore be considered partially hygienic and partially
ritualistic. The hygienic aspects may be considered moral, but any
moral argument would be based on the health aspects. Few Orthodox Jews
base their medical practices on halakhah; it is not pride to say that
we know better.
> I'm still unclear on this. Does it mean that it says "murder is wrong
> and you shouldn't do it"? If so, then driving on Shabbat is
> prohibited by the Orthodox in exactly the same way. If it's something
> more, what is it?
The Orthodox interpret driving on the Sabbath as a violation of Sabbath rest.
Now I personally consider Sabbath rest to be possibly the greatest innovation
by the Jewish religion. It is not to be taken lightly. But I consider that
I am doing less work in driving three miles to the Temple than if I walked
two blocks. I consider driving three miles to a friend's hous as less work
than walking two blocks for the same reason. Like the inheritance problem,
the problem of almost effortless operation of a machine for travel was not
considered before the problem arose. It only arose recently.
> >My words cannot convince you, no matter how I try. I have tried to open many
> >doors, but the hinges on some are rusted shut, and I didn't bring the right
> >oil.
>
> I think that it's difficult because we both have preconceptions of the
> questions that the other will ask and the answers they will give, and
> often respond to the questions we _thought_ they asked, rather than
> those that they did. I think we should have patience, and realise
> that eventually, we may converge to a mutual understanding.
May I suggest that we Reform have attempted to be somewhat more tolerant?
If you feel that the correct interpretation of the Torah is according to
Orthodox halakhah, I may consider you wrong, but I will not argue that
you are not thereby Jewish, nor will I consider your marriages, divorces,
and conversions to be false.
Reuven M. Lerner
>Is the Torah commanded by G-d or isn't it?
>
>This is the first question you have to deal with. If it is not of divine
>origin then NOTHING in it is BINDING. Real simple. It follows from this
>that one could then ignore everything in it, and/or become a heretical
>Jew, and/or marry a non-Jew, and/or chant Hari, Hari, Hari-Krishna at
>the nearest airport.
Hey, hold on just one moment! Just because I don't think that the
Torah (or Talmud, for that matter) was given by God doesn't meen that
it isn't binding. I consider it to be very binding, and constantly
worry about violating the laws in it. Something doesn't have to be
divine in order to respect it...take the United States Constitution,
for example. It obviously wasn't written by God. It was written by
men -- educated, intelligent men, but men nonetheless -- and I try to
abide by its rules as much as possible.
The Torah is much, much more important to me than the Constitution.
But does that necessarily mean that I believe it is God's divine word?
Not at all.
Of course, if you consider Orthodox practice as the only true
execution of God's word, then you are right. I don't practice halacha
according to the Orthodox. But I am offended that you would go so far
as to say the next step is intermarriage and Hari Krishna chanting!
>Now let's consider the other side. The Torah is G-d's divine revelation
>to man of His will.
>
>It then must certainly follow that not everything in the Torah is for
>logical or humanistic reasons that man can comprehend. This is the distinction
>that tends to be made in reading the Torah between "mishpat" and "chok".
>Would the reason for the red Heifer be logical ? Is taking the 4 minim ,
>e.g., lulav, etrog, ... for logical or humanistic reasons ? Is the Torah
>injunction of putting on tefillin something that has only NOW become outdated,
>in your view, but at that time was actually a remedy for stomach upset ?
>(Of course today with better-cooked food and Pepto-Bismal ..... ).
I don't understand the reasons for everything in the Torah. But I
*do* put on t'fillin (nearly every day). I don't understand the red
heiffer; I don't need to, since we don't have a Beit Hamikdash. I
don't understand why we use arba minim, but I buy and use them (as
opposed to many of my Orthodox friends, who didn't see it as a
priority).
>
>Consider the injunction on shabbat of "lo te'vaaru", not to kindle a fire
>on shabbat. Certainly, when the Torah was written it was understood that
>as far as comfort is concerned, one might be far more comfortable lighting
>up a fire and sitting cozely next to the warm glow of the blaze than by
>refraining from lighting it and sitting all shabbat long in the freezing,
>frigid, numbing cold. Yet, lighting a fire on the Sabbath was prohibited.
True. And kindling a fire is still prohibited. But in my opinion,
120-Volt light bulbs weren't.
>
>So if one CHOOSES to accept the validity of the Torah, simple rationalizations
>to avoid/eliminate LAWS found to be difficult to keep are not sufficient.
>If one CHOOSES to reject the Torah's validity, all of your rationalizations
>are unnecessary.
You demand that "accepting the validity" of the Torah means accepting
it as God's unchanging, divine word. I feel that the Torah is
important, holy, and beautiful, as well as valid. But I can't accept
your theological argument.
Bruce Krulwich
>I do not see why an Amorah or a Rishon or an Acharon cannot point out
>that, due to ignorance, a Tanah was totally wrong. We must distinguish
>between what is divinely inspired and what is human legislation to implement
>it. The formal marriage and divorce procedures fall in the latter class.
>The principles behind them should be in the former class.
OK, you obviously feel that "due to ignorance, [some] Tanah was totally
wrong." Obviously you have some reason to believe this. Can you please post
an example of a Tanaic decree that was "totally wrong due to ignorance" that
resulted in an aspect of practice today?? I'm sure you'll agree that if you
can't do so then you don't have a basis for your claim.
Bruce Krulwich
Bruce Krulwich
>I am doing less work in driving three miles to the Temple than if I walked
>two blocks. I consider driving three miles to a friend's hous as less work
>than walking two blocks for the same reason.
All around the world there are millions of definitions of "work." Certainly
the definition of "work" for the purposes of taxes is different from the
definitions of "work" used in physics. Each of these is different from the
definition of work for the child labor laws, etc. It would be pretty silly
for me to tell the IRS that I don't consider freelance programming to be
"work" because I enjoy it so much, and it would be pretty silly for my to tell
a physicist that no "work" is being done lifting a pencil because it isn't
hard for me to do.
Likewise, there are many definitions of "work" in traditional Judaism. In
Hebrew they are "Melacha," "Melechet Avodah," and maybe others. In practice,
there are distinctions between what is prohibitted on Shabbat, Holidays,
intermediate days of Holidays, minor Holidays, etc.
To say that you disagree with the notions of "work" that are used in Halacha
is fine. To say that "this isn't work" is as silly as telling the IRS that
programming for money isn't work. Melacha, Melechet Avodah, and other
Halachic definitions of "work" are just that: definitions. Disagree if you
will, but don't deny that they exist.
Bruce Krulwich
Reuven M. Lerner
>under the heading of boneh (building), actually. But in any case,
>there is no disagreement that lighting a light bulb _is_ considered
>lighting a fire according to the definition of the Torah. In fact,
Sorry to burst your bubble, but there *is* disagreement about whether
lighting a light bulb is considered lighting a fire according to the
Torah. My rabbi (and many other Conservative rabbis) say that it is
not. Other Conservative rabbis say that it is like a fire, and will
not use electricity on Shabbat.
> In fact,
>there are poskim who hold that electric lights can be used for a
>Chanuka menorah. However, most poskim do not hold this way, mainly on
>the grounds that you are not directly lighting the lights (it's
>gramah), and thus does not fulfill the mitzvah, although in sha'as
>hadchak (time of need) I think you should do it, without a bracha,
>since you still accomplish pirsumei nisa (publicising the miracle).
Since I don't believe electricity is fire, I won't use a light bulb
for anything requiring fire. This includes Shabbat, Yom Tov,
Havdalah, and Chanuka candles. You can't have it both ways; either
electricity is fire, or it isn't.
---
Reuven
Sean Engelson
>In article <10...@bloom-beacon.MIT.EDU> reu...@athena.mit.edu (Reuven M. Lerner) writes:
>>True. And kindling a fire is still prohibited. But in my opinion,
>>120-Volt light bulbs weren't.
>
>that opinion; he holds that completing an electric circuit is only
>rabbinically prohibited, thus not like lighting a fire (Sinai, '65).
>Rabbi Untermann as Chief Rabbi of Israel permitted use of a microphone
>on Shabbat to a shul in South Africa (this was later retracted).
This is true, in fact completing an electric circuit (I believe) comes
under the heading of boneh (building), actually. But in any case,
there is no disagreement that lighting a light bulb _is_ considered
lighting a fire according to the definition of the Torah. In fact,
there are poskim who hold that electric lights can be used for a
Chanuka menorah. However, most poskim do not hold this way, mainly on
the grounds that you are not directly lighting the lights (it's
gramah), and thus does not fulfill the mitzvah, although in sha'as
hadchak (time of need) I think you should do it, without a bracha,
since you still accomplish pirsumei nisa (publicising the miracle).
Disclaimer: I am _not_ a gadol hador (ain't that the truth!), so all
the above should not be regarded as authoritative halachic psak.
Miriam Nadel
>for a large commercial defense contractor. With the increasing emphasis on
>ethics in the workplace, they began to have intense classes in "ethics". I had
>one instructor who said something that sticks with me:
> I can't teach you ethics; you learn ethics as you grow up and your
> ethics do not change. I can teach you complience with the rules of
> our industry
>I cannot, Reform cannot, Orthodoxy cannot, ... teach you ethics. We are
>taught ethics by are parents. Religion can, however, help dictate the rules of
>what is and isn't ethical behaviour. Now, what is ethical in one religion (for
>example, polygamy in Mormanism) is unethical in others. That is life. Both
>Reform and Orthodox derive there original basis for ethical norms from Torah.
>But they do differ on what is ethical; for example, Orthodoxy considers all
>laws to be ethical, whereas Reform does not. That is life; we on
>soc.culture.jewish cannot change this.
I would disagree that Orthodoxy considers all laws to be ethical. I think a
more accurate description of the Orthodox position would be that we cannot
assume that a law doesn't have an ethical basis because we're not wise enough
to second-guess G-d. But I would assume that few, if any, Orthodox Jews
would consider a law like shatnes to be "ethical" (indeed, some of the more
New Age types who fall more or less into the Conservative movement would be
more likely to accept an explanation like the one I heard from a friend that
wool and linen just give off vibrations that conflict in some way).
At any rate, that's a minor quibble. What I think Daniel touches on is
a bigger issue that really goes the other way - namely is there a notion of
ethics beyond halacha? How do we use halacha to make decisions about
ethics? What if we have some ethical principle that seems to violate
halacha? (For example, I once heard a Conservative rabbi say that excluding
women from a minyan isn't ethical and, since halacha must be ethical, it
can't be halacha.)
One other side issue, since Daniel mentioned how we learn ethics, is the
question of how we evaluate ethical development. Some years ago I had a
roommmate who was doing research in this area (it's the sort of question
developmental psychologists are very interested in) and she said that the
psychological community identifies at least 7 stages of moral development.
What distinguishes the stages isn't the conclusions one reaches when
confronted with an ethical dilemma, but the methodology one uses to reach
those conclusions. A typical example of the type of problem they discuss is
whether you would steal the only supply of a rare drug in order to save the
life of one of your parents. Does your answer change if the supply of the
drug was earmarked for research into better ways of producing it? What
if the scientist who created the drug was just trying to get more money for
it than you could afford? There isn't a "right" answer to a question like
this but how you answer it is indicative of how you think about morality.
Young children are likely to say that stealing is wrong, plain and simple.
A more sophisticated line of reasoning holds saving a life as a higher moral
good that offsets the wrong of stealing. (And could go on to saving the lives
of many vs. saving one life, but might also balance immediate need over
possible future need). I'm not really interested in discussing this particular
question here, but I am interested in how we would put the halachic notions
of ethics into this framework.
Miriam Nadel
--
Watch Jeopardy April 14th!
mhn...@gryphon.COM <any backbone site>!gryphon!mhnadel
Miriam Nadel
>religion. The Torah makes both of these defiling, meaning that if either
>sex or contact with blood (except in carefully prescribed manners) occur,
>the person is not permitted to undertake certain rituals without being
>first cleansed. Sex was considered partially a religious act, and in
>many primitive religions, menstrual blood is particularly defiling. This
>prohibition can therefore be considered partially hygienic and partially
>ritualistic. The hygienic aspects may be considered moral, but any
>moral argument would be based on the health aspects. Few Orthodox Jews
>base their medical practices on halakhah; it is not pride to say that
>we know better.
>
I'm picking up on this primarily because I think it's illustrative of one
of the disconnects between different segments of the Jewish community.
Herman interprets these laws as being partially hygenic and partially
ritualistic, but I think a more appropriate way of interpreting them is
as symbolic. I can make a moral argument (indeed, I intend to do so, or
more accurately to summarize an argument which has moral overtones) which
has nothing whatsoever to do with health. (I should note that this
assumption that *any* moral argument would be based on health aspects is
why I'm responding to this.)
Sex and blood are intimately associated with life. The particular things
which make one "impure" are menstruation (for women) and nocturnal
emissions (for men). What else has the same effect? Contact with a
dead body. This is where the explanation lies. The requirement for
mikveh in those instances is a recognition of the loss of potential life.
It's symbolic of the high regard Judaism has for life and the perpetuation
of life. In that sense it teaches a moral principle.
(By the way, the basic argument in the previous paragraph was written very
eloquently in an article by Rachel Adler, a Conservative woman, but is
virtually universally accepted among the Orthodox.)
Ari Gross
>Hey, hold on just one moment! Just because I don't think that the
>Torah (or Talmud, for that matter) was given by God doesn't meen that
>it isn't binding.
If it was not given by G-d then why should it be binding on you???
> I consider it to be very binding, and constantly
>worry about violating the laws in it.
Why???
If you are at a red light by an intersection on a desolate road
in the middle of the Nevada desert and there were no other cars in sight
for miles around, would you go through the light? I know I would. Do I believe
the law of the land is holy, to be obeyed at all times? Not really.
(only as far as the Torah commands me to keep the law of the land
since "dina d'malchuta dina", which I don't think applies in the
case I just cited).
> Something doesn't have to be
>divine in order to respect it...take the United States Constitution,
>for example. It obviously wasn't written by God. It was written by
>men -- educated, intelligent men, but men nonetheless -- and I try to
>abide by its rules as much as possible.
Every self-respecting citizen obeys most of the rules of his country
most of the time (some of the people perhaps obey it all of the time,
but definitely not all of the people all of the time since I know
at least one counterexample). Does that mean he is in awe of the laws
or has this incredulous respect for the constitution of his country?
I doubt it. The constitution of the U.S. is an important document
as it protects our freedoms; alas written by mortal men. I obey the law
of the land for one simple reason (aside from any religious reasons
I might have for obeying the law); I want everyone else to do the same
so that my rights will be protected and total anarchy won't ensue.
If I lived in Canada would I care about the U.S. Constitution? Not
much.
> The Torah is much, much more important to me than the Constitution.
Why is it more important than the Constitution? Explain?
>But does that necessarily mean that I believe it is God's divine word?
>Not at all.
Then go out to MacDonald's and have a cheeseburger. Why all the
nonsense and hardship of finding kosher meat (eating at the
kosher dining hall,...) ? If some men wrote down 4,000 years
ago that I had to keep a whole set of Laws, why would I want to
listen to what they said in 20th century America? Go out and have
a good time, assimilate; unless,........ and this is a big unless,
you enjoy your Jewishness. This is true of many Conservative Jews.
They love Hava Nagillah, Bnei Brith, UJA, Israel. It does not, however,
give you a theological leg to stand on.
> Of course, if you consider Orthodox practice as the only true
>execution of God's word, then you are right. I don't practice halacha
>according to the Orthodox.
There is no "halacha according to the Orthodox"; it is a misnomer.
There is only one halacha. BTW, there are divergent views in the
Orthodox community on just about every topic in halacha imaginable.
There is no monolithic view; on the contrary, there is probably a greater
divergence of opinion than in Conservative circles.
>But I am offended that you would go so far
>as to say the next step is intermarriage and Hari Krishna chanting!
Sorry, just trying to make a point. Sometimes you have to throw in a
little hyperbole here and there.
But seriously, Conservative have done
poorly at retaining their flock. This is not true among the Orthodox.
I think that is because most Conservative Jews are not really conservative
because they like the theology the movement espouses. Rather, they
want to have some affiliation with a synagogue that still has a semblance
of the traditional service they grew up with (e.g., Orthodox shteibl
in Pinsk). In any event, this does not transfer over to their kids,
unless they are "b'shita" committed Conservative Jews (such as the
Conservative Rabbi of a shul).
>True. And kindling a fire is still prohibited. But in my opinion,
>120-Volt light bulbs weren't.
In your opinion. Your in good company since Rabbi Goren also maintains
that opinion; he holds that completing an electric circuit is only
rabbinically prohibited, thus not like lighting a fire (Sinai, '65).
Rabbi Untermann as Chief Rabbi of Israel permitted use of a microphone
on Shabbat to a shul in South Africa (this was later retracted).
Point is, there is a diversity
of opinions in the Religious Community. I prefer to use the term
religious as opposed to secular. Names like Orthodox, Conservative,
and Reform tend to just confuse the issue. The algorithm I use for
religious is: do they believe in the 13 articles of faith (see Maimonides,
Peirush Mishnayos, Ch. 10 for a complete listing). These 13 principles are
contained in many siddurim at the end of shacharis (not sure if they're
in the conservative editions).
Among these 13 principles:
"I believe with complete faith that the entire Torah now in our hands
is the same one that was GIVEN to Moses."
"I believe with complete faith in the coming of the Messiah, and even
though he may delay, nevertheless I anticipate every day that he
will come"
So I don't think whether one believes electricity is prohibited on the
Sabbath is the issue or not. The issue is whether one believes in the
principles that are the foundation of the Jewish religion.
>You demand that "accepting the validity" of the Torah means accepting
>it as God's unchanging, divine word. I feel that the Torah is
>important, holy, and beautiful, as well as valid. But I can't accept
>your theological argument.
Why do you say holy? Would you say that the Constitution is holy?
I guess your not a Maimonides enthusiast. Oh well.
Funny how so many Conservative halachic responses quote the
Rambam as a source for their opinions. I guess its like winnowing
out the wheat kernels from the chaff, i.e., throw away what you don't
want to hear about.
Yaakov Kayman
>
>Open your minds, people. There IS more than one RIGHT way. You're
>going to have to accept that. It would all be very nice to go back a
>few hundred years, and have all of Judaism be the same, but it's NOT
>going to happen. You've got to learn to accept that people are going
>to decide for themselves. Your judgementalism accomplishes only one
>thing: to chase us away. I don't believe that that is what you want.
>
and Halakha to be the sole legitimate method of determining G-d's will
would confer legitimacy upon any way of life that denies these tenets?
Why should I, as an Orthodox Jew, in effect do exactly the same things
the non-Orthodox do, namely to say "well, they're going to do these
things (drive to shul on Shabbat, intermarry, etc.) *anyway*, so why
not just declare them legitimate?" Closed-mindedness? I think not!
Let's say, rather, that it's refusal to compromise Torah's truth for
the sake of convenience, personal or otherwise.
No,sir. There is only *ONE* *right* way. It's called doing what G-d
wants, and the only legitimate way we mortal Jews have of determining
what G-d wants is via His Torah, and the Halakhic method put in place
by that Torah.
Do you find that difficult to live with? Surprise! SO DO I, SOMETIMES,
but I don't make excuses for my failures when it comes to following
G-d's commandments, and I sure as Hell don't proclaim myself right when
Jewish scholars point out to me that Torah says otherwise!
The fact is that most people who call themselves other-than-Orthodox do
not have intensive Torah study in their background. This comes as no
surprise, as it's a lot of work, and in many cases, a lot of money, and
there are many Orthodox whose Torah-study background is less than inten-
sive. The Torah has to be mighty important to a person before he/she
devotes time each and every day to its study (women, btw, don't have this
obligation), or several thousand dollars per year for yeshivah tuitions,
when in most settings acceptable secular education exists in the public
school systems and costs nothing. BTW, houses in Orthodox areas are also
generally more expensive, and the Orthodox pay those prices rather than
be in an area outside walking distance from a shul.
The word is *COMMITMENT*.
Without intensive Torah study, one cannot be truly Jewishly knowledge-
able, and without being knowledgeable, one cannot be adequately
observant. This is not to say that since Torah scholars are few, all
others should remain lax or non-observant. One should observe, but
should also always strive to improve, and above all, whether out of
(Jewish) ignorance or desire for convenience, one should never try to
justify shortcomings by trying to make up new realities, in which those
shortcomings are considered innocuous or even laudable.
Do you consider it pushing you away when I say you ought to learn Torah
in order to make a more Jewishly-informed choice? I will not declare
Torah, which I know to be truth, wrong in order to keep you. You have
no right to expect this. First go study - from someone for whom Torah is
not some antiquated museum piece, or something kept on a shelf and taken
down only on "special occasions"- and then there will be what to discuss.
So Jews have strayed from the truth during the "last few hundred years"?
So let them come back! The Torah is waiting for them, and the Jews who
hold it dear have places, both in their hearts and in the yeshivot, for
them. We Orthodox reach out to them, as I'm trying to reach out to you.
What we can't do is take the first step for them, or turn *our* backs on
Torah.
> <MC>
Steven Gutfreund
> What happens, as I understand it, is that in Reform, people select which of
> the ritual acts they will follow. They make this choice based on their
> understanding, study, and their determination of what improves their
> relationship with G-d.
>
> This may seem wrong to you. You may be right. But I cannot change what Reform
> does, I can only change my practice. I try to explain what I believe, what I
> believe Reform believes, so that you may gain better understanding of those
> you disagree with.
>
performs to "bring oneself closer to G-D, enhance sanctity" etc, are two
party acts. You cannot decide for yourself what these acts are, you must
take into account G-D's wishes. It cannot be based on "they make this choice
based on THEIR understanding, study and determination of what improves
THEIR relationship with G-D". G-D exists as an objective reality and has
concrete objective wishes, i.e. HE is not a personal subjective fantasy.
If everyone could interpret for themselves what the objective wishes of
G-D are, and that interpretation would be "true" - then one could also
believe that everyone (regardless of knowledge of medical science) could
interpret the objective laws of biology and medicine and have that
hold true for the individual.
--
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Yechezkal Shimon (Steven) Gutfreund sgutf...@bunny.UUCP
GTE Laboratories, Waltham MA sgutf...@gte.com
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Jonathan
This is a follow-up to what Mark Carrol writes, although at the moment the
closest refernce I have is the following:
In article <12...@l.cc.purdue.edu> c...@l.cc.purdue.edu (Herman Rubin) writes:
>May I suggest that we Reform have attempted to be somewhat more tolerant?
>If you feel that the correct interpretation of the Torah is according to
>Orthodox halakhah, I may consider you wrong, but I will not argue that
>you are not thereby Jewish, nor will I consider your marriages, divorces,
>and conversions to be false.
>--
>Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907
As far as I am concerned, there is a major misconception in the above
statement. I do not think the point is whether we (the [oO]rthodox) consider
the [rR]eform marriages, divorces and conversions valid. The [rR]eform
movement has made a number of fundamental changes in what is considered
the minimum requirement for a valid divorce and conversion. The way you view
Halcha and the Halachic process, it is perfectly acceptable, the way we
view it it is unacceptable. Thus we are at an impasse. We cannot accept as
valid the [rR]eform's acceptance of a civil divorce as valid based on Dina
D'Malchusa Dina because (as far as we are concerned) is an invalid usage
of the concept.
Yet, as has been stated numerous times before, it is the [oO]rthodox who
are being blamed for destroying the unity of the Jewish people. So,
instead of trying to work out a halachic solution to the problem (which
we might find acceptable) you claim that we don't accept it beacuse we do
not want to recognize the [rR]eform movement. This is a patently
absurd connection, but one that is thrown about so often on the net, that
it has become accepted.
I do respect your right to live life as you please, follow any set of
Halacha (or subset thereof) that you please. I do NOT 'JUDGE' you, or
the movement. That does NOT mean I (or [oO]rthodoxy in general) must
accept as valid the [rR]eform interpretation of Halacha.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey Klein BITNET: PROJ15@YUSOL
York University, Toronto UUCP: !uunet!utai!utcsri!yunexus!yuyetti!asst-jos
Standard Disclaimer:
This is MY opinion, not York University's!!!
Mark C. Carroll <MC>
time and again in this newgroup is that someone bases an entire
argument on "If you take my beliefs as the law, you're wrong". I admit
that this has happened on both sides of the arguments. Anyway, try
looking at what you're saying. We're all intelligent people, and
should be able to make a better argument then "A is true; therefore,
A is a true." Anyway, on to the meat of the post:
In article <2130YZKCU@CUNYVM>, YZ...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (Yaakov Kayman) writes:
] In article <Apr.7.15.51....@topaz.rutgers.edu>, mcca...@topaz.rutgers.edu (Mark C. Carroll <MC>) says:
] ]
] ]Open your minds, people. There IS more than one RIGHT way. You're
] ]going to have to accept that. It would all be very nice to go back a
] ]few hundred years, and have all of Judaism be the same, but it's NOT
] ]going to happen. You've got to learn to accept that people are going
] ]to decide for themselves. Your judgementalism accomplishes only one
] ]thing: to chase us away. I don't believe that that is what you want.
] ]
] Why would it occur to you that anyone who holds Torah to be G-d - given
] and Halakha to be the sole legitimate method of determining G-d's will
] would confer legitimacy upon any way of life that denies these tenets?
] Why should I, as an Orthodox Jew, in effect do exactly the same things
] the non-Orthodox do, namely to say "well, they're going to do these
] things (drive to shul on Shabbat, intermarry, etc.) *anyway*, so why
] not just declare them legitimate?" Closed-mindedness? I think not!
] Let's say, rather, that it's refusal to compromise Torah's truth for
] the sake of convenience, personal or otherwise.
]
Listen to what you're saying, and listen to what the liberals have
been saying all along. Neither the Reform nor the Orthodox have EVER
made the argument "Well, they're going to do these things anyway, so
why not just declare them legitimate?" If you'd open your mind and
listen to what we say, you'd realize that any of the Serious Reform or
Conservative would condemn that reasoning as quickly as you would.
None of us who are serious are acting for the sake of convenience. We
are acting for honesty, and conscience. Would I be a better Jew if I
performed Mitzvot that I considered to be wrong? I don't believe I
would. I'm living the only way I can live and retain respect for who
I am. Should I sacrifice that for you? I'm not saying that there is
anything wrong with the way you chose to live. All I'm saying is that
for ME, it's wrong. It's obviously right for you, and I respect that.
Why can't you find it in yourself to have the same respect for me?
Take some time, and read the article Sam posted last week about
Serious Judaism. It might be enlightening. (By the way, if anyone is
interested, I have a Latex'ed version of that article. The local
printer choked on the formatting, so I redid it in Latex.)
] No,sir. There is only *ONE* *right* way. It's called doing what G-d
] wants, and the only legitimate way we mortal Jews have of determining
] what G-d wants is via His Torah, and the Halakhic method put in place
] by that Torah.
]
If that's what you believe, that's fine. But it's not what I believe!
Now, if you take the assumption that the Torah is word for word
exactly waht God wants, then fine: you are correct. But there is no
evidence to support or deny that claim. So, if you hope to convince
me, you're going to have to go beyond the simple argument "I believe
this is true, therefore, everything that this implies is true". Simple
logic. You're argument is "A -> B". You state "A", as a true
assumption. I don't. So from your perspective, you are correct. From
my perspective, you haven't made any argument.
] Do you find that difficult to live with? Surprise! SO DO I, SOMETIMES,
] but I don't make excuses for my failures when it comes to following
] G-d's commandments, and I sure as Hell don't proclaim myself right when
] Jewish scholars point out to me that Torah says otherwise!
]
Jewish Scholars are only men. I am under no obligation to accept thier
interpretation over my own. You may call me pretentious, but you must
admit that the interpretations of other men are not any more binding
on my life than my own.
] The fact is that most people who call themselves other-than-Orthodox do
] not have intensive Torah study in their background. This comes as no
] surprise, as it's a lot of work, and in many cases, a lot of money, and
] there are many Orthodox whose Torah-study background is less than inten-
] sive. The Torah has to be mighty important to a person before he/she
] devotes time each and every day to its study (women, btw, don't have this
] obligation), or several thousand dollars per year for yeshivah tuitions,
] when in most settings acceptable secular education exists in the public
] school systems and costs nothing. BTW, houses in Orthodox areas are also
] generally more expensive, and the Orthodox pay those prices rather than
] be in an area outside walking distance from a shul.
] The word is *COMMITMENT*.
]
This is a typical example of the judgementalism that I hate so
deeply. I can name quite a few who identify themselves as orthodox who
don't devote 1/10th the time to study that I do. And still, I identify
with the liberal movements. I also live in a home whos location was
chosen because of the proximity of a temple, and the strong Jewish
presence in the immediate area. And yes, we payed quite a lot more
money to live in this area. And yet, we are are members of the liberal
movements. My parents spent thousands of dollars a year to get me a
good Jewish education.
] Do you consider it pushing you away when I say you ought to learn Torah
] in order to make a more Jewishly-informed choice? I will not declare
] Torah, which I know to be truth, wrong in order to keep you. You have
] no right to expect this. First go study - from someone for whom Torah is
] not some antiquated museum piece, or something kept on a shelf and taken
] down only on "special occasions"- and then there will be what to discuss.
]
This is again, the typical closemindedness. No member of the Reform
or Conservative movements would ever say that you don't have to devote
time and study to Torah. We would be as quick to condemn anyone who
said that as you! We do keep the Torah close to our hearts! We just
chose to interpret it differently. In my home, every bookshelf has a
Chumash. Every one is frayed from frequent and constant use. The
orthodox have no monopoly on Love for the Torah. Noone asks you to say
the Torah is wrong. None of us would ever dare to say that! What we
say is that we have the right to try to decide what God meant for
ourselves.
] We Orthodox reach out to them, as I'm trying to reach out to you.
] What we can't do is take the first step for them, or turn *our* backs on
] Torah.
]
Noone - not from any movement of Judaism, from the most liberal Reform
or Reconstructionist to the most conservative, literal Orthodox would
ever suggest to you that you turn your back on Torah. All anyone
wants is for you to open your mind to what we're saying.
] Yaakov Kayman (212) 903-3666 City University of New York
<MC>
--
=| Mark Craig Carroll: <MC> |=
Philip Resnik
>In article <Apr.7.15.51....@topaz.rutgers.edu>, mcca...@topaz.rutgers.edu (Mark C. Carroll <MC>) says:
>>Open your minds, people. There IS more than one RIGHT way. You're
>>going to have to accept that. It would all be very nice to go back a
>>few hundred years, and have all of Judaism be the same, but it's NOT
>>going to happen. You've got to learn to accept that people are going
>>to decide for themselves. Your judgementalism accomplishes only one
>>thing: to chase us away. I don't believe that that is what you want.
>
>wants, and the only legitimate way we mortal Jews have of determining
>what G-d wants is via His Torah, and the Halakhic method put in place
>by that Torah.
>
>Do you find that difficult to live with? Surprise! SO DO I, SOMETIMES,
>but I don't make excuses for my failures when it comes to following
>G-d's commandments, and I sure as Hell don't proclaim myself right when
>Jewish scholars point out to me that Torah says otherwise!
>
>So let them come back! The Torah is waiting for them, and the Jews who
>hold it dear have places, both in their hearts and in the yeshivot, for
>them. We Orthodox reach out to them, as I'm trying to reach out to you.
>What we can't do is take the first step for them, or turn *our* backs on
>Torah.
I'm one of those people recently described as a "lurker" -- not taking
up a lot of bandwidth with my own postings, but keeping my eyes open with
interest for the varied points of view on soc.culture.jewish. I'm afraid
that I've finally reached the break-even point, and as of this posting
I'll be unsubscribing.
I started subscribing to SCJ because I was interested in Jewish viewpoints,
in discussions of modern Judaism, and, frankly, because I was considering
increasing my level of observance. This after a long period of looking
for the meaning in the practices. A little history serves to explain:
I was raised a Conservative Jew, although not a particularly observant
one. My wife's mother's mother was not Jewish, and we wanted (1) to be
married by the rabbi of my synagogue, a man whom I greatly respect and admire,
and (2) because we wanted for us both, and our children, to be considered
Jewish according to the traditional line of descent, whether or not we
agreed with Reform Judaism's view that either parent's Jewishness determines
the Jewishness of the child. So, we took a "conversion course" together --
she mostly learning, and me mostly relearning. Eventually we concluded the
course, she was "officially" converted, and shortly thereafter we were
married as two members of the Conservative branch of the Jewish faith.
One of the things that the rabbi who taught our course stressed was this:
one can not change one's life overnight. Those who have converted must
become Jewish through a lifelong process. To not keep kosher at all, or
to not keep Shabbat, because one can not do it completely is wrong: better
that one should begin with what one can do, than try a wholesale change
and give up, or not begin at all.
I felt that this applied equally well to me -- not a convert, but a Jew
of relatively little observance who thought he might like to move closer
to observance. And so, bit by bit, I began to see the purpose again --
the times when I davened, I began to feel it had meaning; the times when
Shabbat candles were lit in our home, I felt warm and a part of something.
And I discovered a place where people discuss Judaism all the time --
people most often more knowledgeable than me: soc.culture.jewish. And
so I subscribed.
End of history, and back to the present.
A "lurker" on this newsgroup, I posted once or twice -- I was the one
who initiated the discussion of Maven's delicatessen and kashruth; I was
the one who posted the question about "be fruitful and multiply" and
the question of population control. Some people responded intelligently
and with concern; some people responded tersely albeit informatively;
some people responded mostly in capital letters and exclamation points,
with an air of self-righteous hostility. (And that was e-mail.)
What the excerpts at the top of this posting show is the breaking point.
Although I realize, Yaakov, that you are an extremist, nonetheless you
capture the underlying principle of much of the discussion on this newsgroup.
Some argue with more consideration, some make their points a little less
drastically, but the basic point is still the same. Other posters on
other parts of the Jewish spectrum argue the validity of their positions,
often as vehemently, and ultimately it all comes down to that tete-a-tete:
>>Open your minds, people. There IS more than one RIGHT way.
>No,sir. There is only *ONE* *right* way.
If there is only one right way, then I have nothing more to gain or to
learn from this newsgroup -- I can not turn my life onto that "right" path;
the cost of all-or-nothing is simply too great; the game of go-through-the-
motions-until-they-become-meaningful is just too painful.
If there is more than one right way, then I have nothing more to learn from
this newsgroup -- not because there is no good discussion of Judaism from
that perspective here, but because it is buried in a continuous battle of
self-justification. I get tired reading it, and it accomplishes nothing,
so far as I can tell.
Why have I written this note, instead of simply hitting 'u' for "unsubscribe"?
Partly as a way to think things out, and partly as a message to those who
continue this fruitless and circular discussion: we "lurkers" are out here --
we often come and listen for a while, unseen, and we often go away,
disappointed, not having learned much more than what we started with.
Some agree, some disagree, and a lot of electronic quibbling doesn't
prove anything to anyone.
Philip