The irredentist agenda of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dictatorship in Beijing

[Satish]

The CCP dictatorship in PRC is trying to dissuade USA from expressing
support for the twenty something countries which are at the receiving
end of its aggressive pursuit of territorial claims.


The CCP dictatorship in PRC has been aggressively pushing its
territorial claims on twenty some neighbors that include Japan, the
Philippines and Vietnam. The Beijing regime is upset that the these
countries are not succumbing to the threats. Rightly or wrongly, it
blames USA for the "intransigence" of Japan, the Philippines and
Vietnam.


The CCP dictatorship will get into trouble if it tries to bully Japan
even if US doesn't actively to Japan's rescue.

****************

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/how-anti-japan-protests-china-spell-trouble-communist-party


21 August 2012

How Anti-Japan Protests in China Spell Trouble for Communist Party

Over the weekend, anti-Japanese protests erupted in major cities
across China. The noisy demonstrations followed the return of 14
activists who had sailed to Uotsurishima, one of the islands of the
Senkaku chain in the East China Sea. Seven of them landed and planted
a Chinese flag on August 15th, the 67thanniversary of Japan’s
surrender in the Second World War. Tokyo deported the intruders two
days later, after Beijing demanded their release.


The Senkakus, called the Diaoyus by China, have been at the center of
a series of incidents between the two nations in the last several
years. The US returned the islands to Japan in 1972, a year after
China laid a claim to them. Previously, Beijing had, in effect,
acknowledged Japanese sovereignty.

Japan’s release of the Chinese activists had seemed to end the latest
controversy, which threatened to turn ugly after state media had
stoked tensions. When the activists were on their way to the islands
last week, the Global Times, controlled by the Communist Party’s
People’s Daily, ran an editorial stating China would have to send
warships if Japan stopped the Chinese. Soon after, People’s Daily
itself entered the fray with an inflammatory commentary advocating
China’s use of force.

Many Chinese, wherever they may live, vividly recall Japanese crimes
against China in the first half of the last century, and these
attitudes have been passed down from parents to children. In the
People’s Republic of China, however, the Communist Party has
institutionalized this process. Especially since the early 1990s,
authorities have encouraged hatred of Japan with unrelenting
indoctrination in the schools and incessant propaganda in society.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the demonstrations this weekend
reflected an ugly nationalism. Symbols of Japan, like Japanese cars,
were damaged along with Japanese-themed stores. One protest banner
screamed, “Even if China is covered with graves, we must kill all
Japanese.”

The Japanese, however, are not the only ones who have to be worried
about the volatility in Chinese society. In China’s past, anti-Japan
demonstrations have turned anti-government. The reason is simple: the
government does not allow protests against its rule, so the Chinese
take to the streets against the only permitted target: foreigners.
Anger, however, is hard to direct indefinitely.

The Chinese government is a master of containing popular discontent.
The authorities this weekend largely let the street protests run their
course, and many China watchers believe anger will quickly cool as
people finish venting emotions. The weekend expression of anti-Japan
sentiment, most predict, will soon be forgotten.

The party, however, is creating the conditions for further
disturbances. For one thing, it is doing little to relieve pressure in
society, shunning both fundamental restructuring and even cosmetic
change. Chinese leaders, in particular, are allowing corruption to run
out of control.

At the same time, Beijing continues to provoke Japan. It’s not clear
whether China’s officials were behind the sailing of the activists,
who had left from Hong Kong, but Beijing is ensuring continuing
instability by increasing its own probing of the Senkakus. As Major
General Luo Yuan said last week, as he expressed sentiments prevalent
in government circles, “Next time we should send 100 boats to the
Diaoyu Islands.”

We are bound, therefore, to see more Chinese provocations against
Japan and more anti-Japan street protests in China. And in the future,
during one of those disturbances, that rage in society could be
directed against the Communist Party itself.

***************

****************

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/japanese-hoist-flags-on-islands-claimed-by-china-8061621.html

The Independent, UK
Monday, August 20, 2012

Japanese nationalists have upped the ante in a territorial dispute
with China by landing on a group of islands in the East China Sea and
hoisting flags, in defiance of a government ban.

News reports said the 150 nationalists, including several local
government councillors, arrived on a 20-strong flotilla of boats
waving Japanese flags. "The Senkakus are undoubtedly Japanese
territory," a Tokyo politician, Eiji Kosaka, told the Associated
Press.

Tokyo deported a group of Hong Kong activists who waded ashore to the
islands last week on the 67th anniversary of Japan's surrender in the
Second World War, carrying Chinese and Taiwanese flags. The men
returned home to a hero's welcome on Friday.

China and Taiwan have long claimed the islands, which are surrounded
by rich fishing grounds and other natural resources. Japan took
control of the uninhabited territory, known as Diaoyu in China, in the
1890s after winning the Sino-Japanese war. China's Xinhua news agency
reported the first anti-Japanese riots in China since 2010. Protesters
reportedly damaged Japanese cars, restaurants and other properties in
at least eight cities across the country over the weekend.

The dispute started earlier this year when Tokyo's Governor Shintaro
Ishihara announced a plan to buy three of the privately owned islands
from their Japanese owners on behalf of the city. Prime Minister
Yoshihiko Noda has since said that the central government will
nationalise them.

***************

http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/international/20120822/138806

美教授指若為釣魚台交戰　日本恐勝中國
2012年08月22日

美國海軍大學副教授霍姆斯在美國外交雜誌撰文指出，如果中日兩國為釣魚台發生軍事衝突，即使美軍不出面幫日本，日本也會有優勢。

文章中說，如果中日發生軍事衝突，美國有可能介入及支援日本，但是也有可能只有中日交戰。以海軍戰鬥力與艦艇的數量來看，中國佔優勢，但日本的兵器和戰
鬥要員的素質較高。而且，日本如果在釣魚台及周邊島嶼配備地面導彈，將佔到優勢。日本可以集中兵力守護釣魚台，但中國要防衛的海域很廣大，無法集中兵
力。

***************

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/20/the_sino_japanese_naval_war_of_2012?page=0,1

The Sino-Japanese Naval War of 2012
OK, it's probably not going to happen. But if it did, who would win?
BY JAMES R. HOLMES

Lord Wellington depicted the allied triumph at Waterloo as "the
nearest-run thing you ever saw in your life." Wellington's verdict
would describe the likely outcome should Chinese and Japanese forces
meet in battle over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, or elsewhere off the
Northeast Asian seaboard. Such a fight appeared farfetched before
2010, when Japan's Coast Guard apprehended Chinese fishermen who
rammed one of its vessels off the disputed islands, but it appears
more likely now. After Japan detained and deported Chinese activists
who landed on the disputed islands in mid-August, a hawkish Chinese
major general, Luo Yuan, called on China to dispatch 100 boats to
defend the Diaoyus. In an op-ed published Aug. 20, the nationalistic
Chinese broadsheet Global Times warned, "Japan will pay a price for
its actions ... and the result will be far worse than they
anticipated."

This is more than mere posturing. In July, China's East Sea Fleet
conducted an exercise simulating an amphibious assault on the islands.
China's leaders are clearly thinking about the unthinkable. And with
protesters taking to the streets to smash Japanese cars and attack
sushi restaurants, their people may be behind them. So who would win
the unlikely prospect of a clash of titans in the Pacific: China or
Japan?

Despite Japan's latter-day image as a military pushover, a naval war
would not be a rout for China. While the Japanese postwar "peace"
constitution "forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes," the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has
accumulated several pockets of material excellence, such as undersea
warfare, since World War II. And Japanese mariners are renowned for
their professionalism. If commanders manage their human, material, and
geographic advantages artfully, Tokyo could make a maritime war with
China a close-run thing -- and perhaps even prevail.

Past naval wars between the two rivals set the stage for today's
island controversy. During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, a fleet
engagement turned Asia's Sinocentric order upside down in an
afternoon. The Imperial Japanese Navy, hurriedly cobbled together from
imported hulls and components following Japan's Meiji Restoration,
smashed China's Beiyang Fleet, a force widely considered superior in
material terms. The September 1894 Battle of the Yalu River was won by
the navy with superior seamanship, gunnery, and morale. While Japan is
no longer a rising power, the JMSDF has preserved a culture of human
excellence.

If a rerun of the Battle of the Yalu takes place, how would Japan's
navy match up against China's? This is admittedly an improbable
scenario. A straightforward China-on-Japan war is doubtful unless
Beijing manages to isolate Tokyo diplomatically -- as wise
practitioners of limited war attempt to do -- or Tokyo isolates itself
through foolish diplomacy. Barring that, a conflict would probably
ensnare the United States as an active combatant on the Japanese side.
War is a political act -- "statesmanship directing arms," as naval
historian Alfred Thayer Mahan puts it -- but let's discount politics
for now and look at the prospects of war in strictly military terms,
as a contest between Chinese and Japanese sea power.

In raw numerical terms, there is no contest. Japan's navy boasts 48
"major surface combatants," ships designed to attack enemy main fleets
while taking a pounding themselves. For the JMSDF these include
"helicopter destroyers," or light aircraft carriers; guided-missile
destroyers equipped with the state-of-the-art Aegis combat system, a
combination radar, computer, and fire-control system found in
frontline U.S. Navy warships; and an assortment of lesser destroyers,
frigates, and corvettes. A squadron of 16 diesel-electric submarines
augments the surface fleet. Juxtapose this against the PLA Navy's 73
major surface combatants, 84 missile-firing patrol craft, and 63
submarines, and the bidding appears grim for Japan. China's navy is
far superior in sheer weight of steel.

But raw numbers can be misleading, for three main reasons. First, as
strategist Edward Luttwak has observed, weapons are like "black boxes"
until actually used in combat: no one knows for sure whether they will
perform as advertised. Battle, not technical specifications, is the
true arbiter of military technology's value. Accurately forecasting
how ships, planes, and missiles will perform amid the stresses and
chaos of combat thus verges on impossible. This is especially true,
adds Luttwak, when conflict pits an open society against a closed one.
Open societies have a habit of debating their military failings in
public, whereas closed societies tend to keep their deficiencies out
of view. Luttwak was referring to the U.S.-Soviet naval competition,
but it applies to Sino-Japanese competition as well. The Soviet Navy
appeared imposing on paper. But Soviet warships on the high seas
during the Cold War showed unmistakable symptoms of decay, from
slipshod shiphandling to rusty hulls. The PLA Navy could be hiding
something as well. The quality of the JMSDF's platforms, and its human
capabilities, could partially or wholly offset the PLA's advantage of
numbers.

Second, there's the human variable in warfare. In his classic account,
The Naval War of 1812, Theodore Roosevelt explained the U.S. Navy's
success in single-ship duels against Britain's Royal Navy as a product
of quality ship design and construction and superior fighting prowess:
in other words, of material and human factors. The latter is measured
in seamanship, gunnery, and the myriad of traits that set one navy
apart from others. Mariners hone these traits not by sitting in port
and polishing their equipment but by going to sea. JMSDF flotillas ply
Asian waters continually, operating solo or with other navies. The PLA
Navy is inert by comparison. With the exception of a counter-piracy
deployment to the Gulf of Aden that began in 2009, Chinese fleets
emerge only for brief cruises or exercises, leaving crews little time
to develop an operating rhythm, learn their profession, or build
healthy habits. The human edge goes to Japan.


And three, it's misleading to reduce the problem solely to fleets.
There will be no purely fleet-on-fleet engagement in Northeast Asia.
Geography situated the two Asian titans close to each other: their
landmasses, including outlying islands, are unsinkable aircraft
carriers and missile firing platforms. Suitably armed and fortified,
land-based sites constitute formidable implements of sea power. So we
need to factor in both countries' land-based firepower.

Japan forms the northern arc of the first island chain that envelops
the Asian coastline, forming the eastern frontier of the Yellow and
East China seas. No island between the Tsushima Strait (which
separates Japan from Korea) and Taiwan lies more than 500 miles off
China's coast. Most, including the Senkakus/Diaoyus, are far closer.
Within these cramped waters, any likely battleground would fall within
range of shore-based firepower. Both militaries field tactical
aircraft that boast the combat radius to strike throughout the Yellow
and East China seas and into the Western Pacific. Both possess shore-
fired anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and can add their hitting
power to the mix.

There are some asymmetries, however. PLA conventional ballistic
missiles can strike at land sites throughout Asia, putting Japanese
assets at risk before they ever leave port or take to the sky. And
China's Second Artillery Corps, or missile force, has reportedly
fielded anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) able to strike at moving
ships at sea from the mainland. With a range estimated at more than
900 miles, the ASBM could strike anywhere in the China seas, at
seaports throughout the Japanese islands, and far beyond.

Consider the Senkakus, the hardest assets to defend from the Japanese
standpoint. They lie near the southwestern tip of the Ryukyu chain,
closer to Taiwan than to Okinawa or Japan's major islands. Defending
them from distant bases would be difficult. But if Japan forward-
deployed Type 88 ASCMs -- mobile, easily transportable anti-ship
weapons -- and missile crews to the islets and to neighboring islands
in the Ryukyu chain, its ground troops could generate overlapping
fields of fire that would convert nearby seas into no-go zones for
Chinese shipping. Once dug in, they would be tough to dislodge, even
for determined Chinese rocketeers and airmen.

Whoever forges sea, land, and air forces into the sharpest weapon of
sea combat stands a good chance of prevailing. That could be Japan if
its political and military leaders think creatively, procure the right
hardware, and arrange it on the map for maximum effect. After all,
Japan doesn't need to defeat China's military in order to win a
showdown at sea, because it already holds the contested real estate;
all it needs to do is deny China access. If Northeast Asian seas
became a no-man's land but Japanese forces hung on, the political
victory would be Tokyo's.

Japan also enjoys the luxury of concentrating its forces at home,
whereas the PLA Navy is dispersed into three fleets spread along
China's lengthy coastline. Chinese commanders face a dilemma: If they
concentrate forces to amass numerical superiority during hostilities
with Japan, they risk leaving other interests uncovered. It would
hazardous for Beijing to leave, say, the South China Sea unguarded
during a conflict in the northeast.

And finally, Chinese leaders would be forced to consider how far a
marine war would set back their sea-power project. China has staked
its economic and diplomatic future in large part on a powerful
oceangoing navy. In December 2006, President Hu Jintao ordered PLA
commanders to construct "a powerful people's navy" that could defend
the nation's maritime lifelines -- in particular sea lanes that
connect Indian Ocean energy exporters with users in China -- "at any
time." That takes lots of ships. If it lost much of the fleet in a
Sino-Japanese clash -- even in a winning effort -- Beijing could see
its momentum toward world-power status reversed in an afternoon.

Here's hoping China's political and military leaders understand all
this. If so, the Great Sino-Japanese Naval War of 2012 won't be
happening outside these pages.

****************


The CCP dictatorship is playing a very divisive policy by single-
mindedly pursuing its colonial ambitions in the South China Sea. It is
verily a "splittist" trouble maker trying to split countries like
Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei of their economic
zones 200 miles into the South China Sea through bullying and naked
intimidation.

http://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2012/08/02/a-bold-stand-in-the-south-china-sea/

A Bold Stand in the South China Sea
By James R Holmes

In the Q&A session following my lecture in Paris, a gentleman from the
Chinese Embassy asked whether the United States—by pushing for a
negotiated settlement to the maritime territorial disputes roiling the
South China Sea—is encouraging weak Southeast Asian countries to take
stances they might not otherwise take in the face of overwhelming
Chinese power. Implication: Washington has made itself a silent
partner of the Philippines, Vietnam, and other claimants. I allowed
that yes, American diplomacy might be emboldening them. That seemed to
please him.

But I hastened to add that it’s a good thing if Manila, Hanoi & Co.
feel confident enough to stand up for what is clearly theirs. That
didn’t please him at all.

I have come to believe we are testing a proposition in the South China
Sea—whether might makes right. The maritime territorial claims fall
into two classes. Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef, and the “oil
blocks” off Vietnam are utterly clear. Like all coastal states, the
Philippines and Vietnam exercise complete jurisdiction over natural
resources in the waters and seabed within 200 nautical miles of their
shores. These disputed geographic features fall under their
jurisdiction notwithstanding squishy, and lamentably commonplace,
press reports indicating that Manila and Hanoi “regard” (or
“consider,” or “claim”) them as part of their exclusive economic
zones. They regard them as such because they are.

It’s very easy. Get out a map. Take a compass, set the diameter to 200
nautical miles, place one end on the west coast of Luzon, and swing a
circle out into the South China Sea. You will notice that Scarborough
Shoal lies well within your circle. Repeat the procedure for western
Palawan, and you get the same result for Mischief Reef. The same goes
for the sectors of the Vietnamese EEZ where Beijing wants to auction
off oil exploration rights. In short, Beijing is deploying superior
power in an effort to repeal basic geometry and clearly written treaty
law. Learn to love Big Brother, Southeast Asia.

True, Vietnam recently passed a law reaffirming its claim to
sovereignty over the Spratlys and Paracels, which lie amid the South
China Sea and belong to the second, more ambiguous category. But even
if we interpret Hanoi’s actions in the worst possible light, it is
simply refusing to ratify the results of a 1974 naval battle in which
Chinese forces pummeled a South Vietnamese flotilla and grabbed the
Paracels. It rejects a status quo imposed by force.

If U.S. intervention fosters negotiations over the status of the
archipelagoes while heartening coastal states to defend the plain
language of the law of the sea, The Naval Diplomat says: so be it.


****************

China's broad territorial claims have no legal merit, and the U.S. is
the only power strong enough to push back.


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443537404577578953575891264.html

Wall Street Journal
August 10, 2012


The Bully of the South China Sea

Last Friday, a U.S. State Department spokesman stated that Beijing's
recent decision to upgrade tiny Sansha City in the disputed Paracel
Islands to a "prefecture-level city" and establish a military garrison
there runs "counter to collaborative diplomatic efforts to resolve
differences and risk further escalating tensions in the region." That
muted protest was just the excuse Beijing wanted to play a round of
Down With American Imperialism. The Foreign Ministry called in a U.S.
Embassy official for a tongue-lashing Saturday. State-run media also
went to town, telling the U.S. to "shut up" and stop "instigating"
conflict in the region.

Why the irruption of ire? Partly it's because Beijing's various
factions need to look tough on sovereignty issues ahead of the
upcoming Party Congress. The Congress will pick the next generation of
Party leaders.

But another reason is that China's aggressive behavior in the South
China Sea has caused a backlash among its neighbors and hardened their
determination to resist Chinese bullying. Instead of admitting its
mistake, Beijing wants to treat the U.S. as the "black hand" that is
poisoning its relations with Southeast Asia. This may have a purely
propagandistic purpose, but the danger is that the Communist Party
will now fixate on America as its regional enemy.

***
In a 2000 white paper, Beijing claimed that the source of its
"indisputable sovereignty" over the Spratly Islands, the most
important features in the South China Sea, is imperial China's
historical record as "the first to discover and name the islands as
the Nansha Islands and the first to exercise sovereign jurisdiction
over them."

This basis is disputed. China may have some of the oldest surviving
maps of the area, but aboriginal, Malay, Indian and Arab traders
traversed these seas before Han Chinese began their explorations. And
the maps produced by China and other countries from ancient times
through the 20th century show the islands as uninhabited dangers to
navigation, not destinations under anyone's sovereignty.

Militarist Japan, ironically, is the true origin of China's claims. As
the great scholar of the Chinese diaspora Wang Gungwu noted recently,
World War II-era Japanese maps that showed the entire South China Sea
as a Japanese lake were the first serious claim to sovereignty over
the islands.

A second irony is that the People's Republic's current claims date to
a 1947 map issued by the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek,
which drew a u-shaped line of 11 dashes around more than 90% of the
South China Sea. Mao's regime republished that map with a simplified
nine-dashed line after it routed the nationalists, claiming the sea as
China's "historic waters."

Beijing continues to use this map to justify its claims, although it
alternates between arguing that its claims rest on the U.N.'s Law of
the Sea treaty, which it signed and ratified in 1996, or otherwise on
territorial rights that predate the treaty. Whatever the case, Beijing
acts as if it owns all of the sea within the line, last year
condemning Vietnamese exploration of areas that fall both within the
"territorial" line and Vietnam's coastal exclusive economic zone, or
EEZ.

Resolving the ambiguity about how China makes its claims is more than
an academic question. For the U.S. it matters because about a third of
the world's trade passes through the South China Sea, and freedom of
navigation is a vital U.S. interest. China's neighbors also care,
since they are most immediately confronted by what they term Beijing's
"creeping assertiveness."

Even if all the disputed islands belong to China, the area of water
they control under maritime law would be relatively small. Only a
handful of the islands are capable of sustaining human habitation,
which is required to claim a 200-mile EEZ, and some of those would be
circumscribed where they overlapped with the EEZs generated by other
countries' coastline. Rocks and shoals only generate a 12-mile radius
of territorial waters at most.

This raises another demonstrably false claim made by Beijing—that
Southeast Asian nations accepted its rights to the islands until the
1970s, when potential oil and gas reserves were discovered. Not so:
The 1947 map was a matter of international dispute at the time.

It was only after the hydrocarbon discoveries that China began
bullying its way into the islands. In 1974, the People's Liberation
Army launched a surprise attack and ejected (South) Vietnamese forces
stationed on the Paracel Islands. In 1988, the PLA again surprised the
Vietnamese on Johnson Atoll in the Spratlys. Beijing seized Mischief
Reef from the Philippines in 1994 without a fight.

Now Beijing accuses its neighbors of stirring up tensions. But in June
it staged its biggest provocation since 1994: putting up for bid oil
exploration blocks that lie within Vietnam's EEZ and overlap with
blocks that Vietnam has already leased. This is especially threatening
to Vietnam because China is no longer dependent for such contracts on
multinational companies, which shy away from the risk of military
conflict around their rigs. The state-owned China National Off-shore
Oil Corporation is developing its own deep-sea exploration platforms,
a new way for Beijing to mark its claims.

Meanwhile, Beijing is also using its navy and militias to escalate the
tension. During the standoff with Manila over the Scarborough Shoal in
May, nearly 100 fishing boats were inside the atoll at one time,
according to the Philippine government. Last year, its vessels cut the
acoustic cables on two Vietnamese exploration ships—much as they tried
to do to the USNS Impeccable in 2009. And in June, China's Defense
Ministry announced it had started "combat ready" patrols in waters
claimed by Vietnam.

To Beijing's mind, being able to make outlandish territorial claims
and violate international law at will is the prerogative of a great
power. That was certainly the message Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
delivered at the Asean Regional Forum in Hanoi in July 2010. He
described the South China Sea as a "core national interest," and he
followed that up by saying, "China is a big country and other
countries are small countries, and that is just a fact."

So it's no wonder that Southeast Asian nations that 40 years ago
looked to the U.S. to halt the spread of communism are now asking
Washington to help push back against Chinese encroachment. The wonder
is that Beijing seems surprised that it is again isolated in the
region and surrounded by U.S. allies. But as China's power grows, some
of China's neighbors realize that the window of opportunity for a
unified response that will change Beijing's behavior is closing.

***
The best chance of avoiding a nasty showdown is a strong U.S.
response. Washington has maintained its own ambiguity toward the South
China Sea, saying it takes no side in the dispute but has a national
interest in the peaceful resolution.

That's fine as far as the islands and the small areas of territorial
waters around them. But Beijing has shown that it has no interest in a
negotiated settlement and will use force to claim and dominate the
entire South China Sea if it can. Washington needs to call out the U-
shaped line as the travesty of international law that it is, and state
clearly that it will fight to keep the sea lanes open.

*****************

[rst0]

Satish, the small time crook and thief with a dozen aliases,
instead of making up lies and posting lies on soc.culture.china,
go to school and learn something.

You have proven yourself to be a crook and thief by the many aliases
you have in the past.
No company would hire you, the only work you could find are the low
level jobs you are doing now. You work the second shift, from 6PM to
2AM, low level job, most likely, work as a bar tender.

And get out of that filthy ghetto apartment you are living in.
And just to show how bad the place is,
the iron gate is locked on 116th Street blocking off all traffics
on a city street.