Ballistic Missile Defense for Japan and South Korea???

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Tom Jigme Wheat

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Jun 20, 2011, 1:33:14 PM6/20/11
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Tom Jigme Wheat

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Jun 20, 2011, 3:08:55 PM6/20/11
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On Jun 20, 10:33 am, Tom Jigme Wheat <thomaswheat1...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/
>
> thomaswheat1975

Is the USA going to leave Japan South Korea or Taiwan behind in the
ballistic missile defense review
regarding threats posed by N. Korea and Iran. Also there is no law
that prohibits the sale of ballistic missile technology!!!!!!

also see this link for excerpts from the QDR

http://groups.google.com/group/alt.politics.democrats.d/msg/9abe668f877a5a9c

thomaswheat1975

United States seeks in order to tailor a “phased adaptive approach” to
the unique threats and capabilities in a region.

http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf

regarding discussion archived here:

http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.japan/browse_thread/thread/c3735611abe9a340

and here:

http://groups.google.com/group/alt.politics.democrats.d/msg/9abe668f877a5a9c?

“To implement this new focus on regional architectures, the
Administration will pursue the following initiatives:

1.) Deploy the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which accelerates
the deployment of proven technologies and also promises improved long-
term protection of the homeland.
2.) “Apply “ phased adaptive approaches in other regions by building
on current efforts, with a principal focus on East Asia and the Middle
East. (28)”

“Finally, the Airborne Laser (ABL) program was identified for
restructuring because it had experienced repeated schedule delays and
technical problems since its inception in 1996, and because its
operating concept was not adequately defined. Plans for a second ABL
aircraft were canceled, and the existing ABL aircraft—a highly
modified 747 transport—was retained but shifted to a technology
demonstration program. The Department is examining the implications of
retaining the current ABL aircraft as a high-energy laser research
test bed.”(41)


North Korea, which has demonstrated its nuclear ambitions and
continues to
develop long-range missiles, is of particular concern. Following the
Taepo Dong 1 missile test in 1998, North Korea has conducted flight
tests of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) missile in 2006 and more recently in
April 2009. Despite the most recent launch’s failure in its stated
mission of orbiting a small communications satellite, it successfully
tested many technologies associated with an ICBM. Although the test
launches of the TD-2 in 2006 and 2009 were deemed unsuccessful, we
must assume that sooner or later North Korea will have a successful
test of its TD-2 and, if there are no major changes in its national
security strategy in the next decade, it will be able to mate a
nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system.

One of the benefits of the European Phased Adaptive Approach is that
it allows for a Russian contribution if political circumstances make
that possible. For example, Russian radars could contribute useful and
welcome tracking data, although the functioning of the U.S. system
will not be dependent on that data.

The Administration is committed to substantive and sustained dialogue
with the leadership of Russia on U.S. missile defenses and their roles
in different regions. For example, the United States and Russia have
initiated a joint assessment of the ballistic missile threat, as
agreed to by Presidents Obama and Medvedev at the July 2009 Moscow
Summit. Our goals are to enlist Russia in a new structure of
deterrence that addresses the emerging challenges to international
peace and security posed by a small number of states seeking illicit
capabilities.(34)


Engaging China in discussions of U.S. missile defense plans is also an
important part of our international efforts. China is one of the
countries most vocal about U.S. ballistic missile defenses and their
strategic implications, and its leaders have expressed concern that
such defenses might
negate China’s strategic deterrent. (34)


Although Iran has not stated an intent to
develop ICBMs, it continues to pursue
longer-range ballistic missiles. Iran launched
its Safir Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) in
August 2008 with what it claims was a
dummy satellite. Iran used the Safir-2 SLV to
place the domestically produced Omid
satellite in orbit in February 2009, according
to statements made to the press by Iranian
officials. Despite continued diplomatic efforts
Iran also continues to defy its international
obligations on its nuclear program, further
reducing international confidence in the
nature of its program. These factors only
compound international concerns about the
intent of its ballistic missile program.

In East Asia, the United States has a range of cooperative
relationships. Japan is one of our most significant international BMD
partners. The United States and Japan have made considerable strides
in BMD cooperation and interoperability in support of bilateral
missile defense operations. Japan has acquired a layered integrated
missile defense system that includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard
Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire
units, early warning radars, and a command and control system.

The United States and Japan
regularly train together, and our forces have
successfully executed cooperative BMD
operations. One of our most significant
cooperative efforts is the co-development of a
next-generation SM-3 interceptor, called the
Block IIA. This co-development program
represents not only an area of significant
technical cooperation but also the basis for
enhanced operational cooperation to
strengthen regional security. The U.S.-Japan
partnership is an outstanding example of the
kind of cooperation the United States seeks in
order to tailor a phased adaptive approach to
the unique threats and capabilities in a region.(33)

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is also an important U.S. BMD partner. The
ROK has indicated interest in acquiring a missile defense capability
that includes land- and sea-based systems, early warning radars, and a
command and control system. The United States and ROK are working to
define possible future BMD requirements. As these requirements are
determined, the United States stands ready to work with the ROK to
strengthen its protection against the North Korean missile threat. The
United States looks forward to taking further steps to enhance
operational coordination and build upon ongoing missile defense
cooperation.(33)

Regional Threats
Regional actors, such as North Korea in Northeast Asia and Iran and
Syria in the Middle East, have short, medium, and intermediate range
ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. forces, allies, and partners in
regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains security
relationships. North Korea conducted seven widely publicized ballistic
missile launches on July 4–5, 2006. It successfully tested six mobile
theater ballistic missiles, demonstrating a capability to target U.S.
and allied forces in South Korea and Japan. On July 3–4, 2009, it
again exercised its capability to threaten U.S. and allied forces and
populations in South Korea and Japan by launching seven
ballistic missiles. North Korea has developed an advanced solid-
propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). A mobile IRBM is also
under development.

Iran has an extensive missile
development program and
has received support in the
past from entities in Russia,
China, and North Korea.
DIA believes that Iran still
depends on outside sources
for many of the related dualuse
raw materials and
components; for example,
the Shahab-3 MRBM is based
on the North Korean No
Dong missile.

Iran continues to modify this missile to extend its range and
effectiveness. In 2004,
Iran claimed that it tested an improved version of the Shahab-3;
subsequent statements by Iranian officials suggest that the improved
Shahab-3’s range is up to 2,000 kilometers and that Iran has the
ability to mass-produce these missiles. In addition, Iran’s solid-
propellant rocket and missile programs are progressing, and Iran has
flight-tested a new solid-propellant MRBM with a claimed range of
2,000 kilometers. Iran is also likely working to improve the accuracy
of its SRBMs.
Syria also presents a regional threat. It has several hundred SCUD-
class and SS-21 SRBMs and may have chemical warheads available for a
portion of its SCUD missiles. All of Syria’s missiles are mobile and
can reach much of Israel and large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and
Turkey from launch sites well within the country. (6)

Taiwan
]
One regional trend that particularly concerns the United States is the
growing imbalance of power across the Taiwan Strait in China’s favor.
China is developing advanced ballistic missile capabilities that can
threaten its neighbors, and anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
capabilities that can attempt to target naval forces in the region.
China continues to field very large numbers of conventionally armed
SRBMs opposite Taiwan and is developing a number of new mobile
conventionally armed medium-range systems. Moreover, China has
upgraded programs for command and control, communications,
intelligence, and other related force capabilities, and
continues to develop new SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs. These missiles are
key components of Beijing’s military modernization program. Chinese
missiles will be capable of reaching not just important Taiwan
military and civilian facilities but also U.S. and allied military
installations in
the region. (7)

There
is no global norm or treaty banning trade in ballistic missiles (the
function of the Missile
Technology Control Regime is to facilitate ad hoc coordination of
export controls among likeminded exporters who desire to keep
militarily sensitive technologies out of the hands of dangerous
states). (7)

Policy Priorities
In support of presidential guidance, this review has set the following
policy priorities.
First, the United States will continue to defend the homeland from
limited ballistic missile attack. These efforts are focused on
protecting the homeland from a ballistic missile attack by a regional
actor such as North Korea or Iran. Through our continued commitment to
maintain and develop the ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) system,
the United States seeks to dissuade such states from developing an
inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), deter them from using an
ICBM if they develop or acquire such a capability, and defeat an ICBM
attack by such states should deterrence fail. (11)

This primarily means that the Department of Defense will realign
spending away from defenses planned to rely on currently immature
technology, away from technologies that require unrealistic concepts
of operations in order to be effective, and away from technologies
intended to defeat adversarial missile threats that do not exist and
are not
expected to evolve in the near to midterm. These considerations led to
the decisions to “terminate” both the Multiple Kill Vehicle and
Kinetic Energy Interceptor programs and to shift the Airborne Laser to
a technology demonstration program in the FY 2010 budget. (12) free
electron laser????

Both Russia and China have repeatedly expressed concerns that U.S.
missile defenses adversely affect their own strategic capabilities and
interests. The United States will continue to engage them on this
issue to help them better understand the stabilizing benefits of
missile defense—particularly China, which claims to have successfully
demonstrated its own ground-based midcourse interception on January
11, 2010. As the United States has stated in the past, the homeland
missile defense capabilities are focused on regional actors such as
Iran and North Korea. While the GMD system would be employed to defend
the United States against limited missile launches from any source, it
does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian or Chinese
missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic balance
with those countries. (13)

The United States is currently protected against the threat of limited
ICBM attack, as a result of investments made over the past decade in a
system based on Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD). This system
relies on ground-based interceptors at two sites: Fort Greely, Alaska,
and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. By the end of FY 2010, the
United States will deploy a total of 30 GBIs, with 26 at Fort Greely
and 4 at Vandenberg. To enable these ground-based systems to
successfully intercept attacking missiles in the midcourse part of
their trajectory, the United States employs early warning radars in
Alaska, California, Greenland, and the United Kingdom; afloat radar
systems (i.e., Aegis destroyers, Aegis cruisers, and Sea-Based X-band
radar
[SBX]); and a sophisticated command and control infrastructure. (15)

Over the past decade the United States has made significant progress
in developing and fielding essential capabilities for protection
against attack from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. These
capabilities include increasingly capable PATRIOT batteries that
provide point defense against short-range ballistic missiles, the
powerful AN/TPY-2 X-band radar for detecting and tracking ballistic
missiles, and soon-to-be-deployed THAAD batteries for defense against
both short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Sea-based
capabilities have also continued to develop. The Aegis system offers
not only the ability to provide surveillance and tracking of ballistic
missiles but also an upper-tier missile defense capability in the form
of the SM-3 Block IA interceptor. Spaced-based sensors detect
ballistic missile launches and provide data to groundand sea-based
missile defense assets. (19)

However, these capabilities are modest
numbers when set against
the rapidly expanding
regional missile threat.
The Administration took
steps to address this
problem in the FY 2010
budget, by providing
additional money for
THAAD interceptors, for
SM-3 Block IA
interceptors, and for the
AEGIS BMD SM-3 FLIGHT TEST. The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile
destroyer USS Hopper, equipped with the Aegis Weapons System, is shown
launching
a SM-3 while underway in the Pacific Ocean. The missile successfully
intercepted a
short-range ballistic missile launched from the Pacific Missile Range
Facility in
Kauai, Hawaii. This exercise marked the 19th successful intercept of
23 at-sea firings
using the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System.
D E F E N D I N G A G A I N S T R E G I O N A L T H R E A T S
20
Bal l i s t i c M i s s ile Defense Review Repor t
upgrading of more Navy ships to incorporate the Aegis BMD capability.
The President’s Budget request for FY 2011 will further expand these
deployable capabilities. (20)

Near-term Capabilities
Looking to the future of regional defense, DoD is developing
capabilities for deployment in the near term (out to 2015) and over
the longer term. A key objective is to leverage recent successes in
regional missile defense to further expand that capability at low
risk. As part of the solution, DoD will increase the procurement of
proven systems such as THAAD, the SM-3 interceptor, and the AN/TPY-2
radar.

The second part of the solution is to further improve the technology
that has already been developed. At the moment, the SM-3 interceptor
is launched only from sea. In the 2015 time frame, a relocatable land-
based SM-3 system, tentatively called “Aegis Ashore,” will be
available that will make possible better regional coverage by virtue
of its ability to be placed inland. These land-based interceptors will
provide persistent coverage of the areas they protect and will be an
important element of a future regional missile defense against medium-
and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. DoD will also continue to
improve the SM-3 interceptor missile defense capability. By 2015 a
more capable SM-3 missile, the Block IB, will be available. It will
have an improved seeker capability for greater on-board discrimination
and greater area coverage. This interceptor will be deployed both at
sea and on land, with the “Aegis Ashore” system. (20)

summary of nuclear posture review:
While missile defenses play an important role in regional
deterrence, other components will also be significant.
Against nuclear-armed states, regional deterrence will
necessarily include a nuclear component (whether forwarddeployed
or not). But the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in
these regional deterrence architectures can be reduced by
increasing the role of missile defenses and other capabilities.”(23)

Second, the United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach
within each region that is tailored to the threats unique to that
region, including their scale, the scope and pace of their
development, and the capabilities available and most suited for
deployment. This does not require a globally integrated missile
defense architecture that integrates allies into a uniform, global
structure. Instead, the United States will pursue regional structures
sharing common assets that are relevant and robust…(23)

The Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe
The Administration’s approach to missile defense in Europe was
announced in September 2009.

This announcement followed a unanimous recommendation to the President
by the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff that the 2007
plan for European missile defense be revised.

Under this new approach, in Phase 1 (2011 time frame) existing missile
defense systems will be deployed to defend against short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles. Phase 1 will focus on the protection of
portions of southern Europe by utilizing sea-based Aegis missile
defense-capable ships and interceptors (the SM-3 Block IA). This first
phase will also include a forward-based radar, which, by providing
data earlier in the engagement, will enhance the defense of Europe and
augment homeland defense capabilities already in place in Alaska and
California.

In Phase 2 (2015 time frame) our capabilities will be enhanced by the
fielding of a more
advanced interceptor (the SM-3 Block IB) and additional sensors. Phase
2 will include landbased SM-3s in southern Europe, in addition to
their sea-based locations, expanding coverage to additional NATO
allies.

In Phase 3 (2018 time frame) coverage against medium- and intermediate-
range threats will be improved with a second land-based SM-3 site,
located in northern Europe, as well as an upgraded Standard Missile 3
(the SM-3 Block IIA, which is already under development) at seaandland-
based sites. These changes will extend coverage to all

NATO allies in Europe.
In Phase 4 (2020 time frame) an additional capability against a
potential ICBM launched from the Middle East against the United States
will be available. This phase will take advantage of yet another
upgrade to the Standard Missile 3, the Block IIB. All four phases will
include upgrades to the missile defense command and control system.
The United States has been working closely with NATO allies on the
relationship of the
European PAA to the Alliance’s missile defense plans. In addition to
these NATO-wide
consultations, the Czech Republic and Poland, both close allies,
continue to play an important role in our collective missile defense
efforts. (24)

We also see opportunities for cooperation with Russia in the context
of the
European Phased Adaptive Approach, which are discussed in greater
detail in the section titled “Strengthening International
Cooperation.” (24)

The United States and
Japan cooperate in a way that is highly
interoperable, and the nations are
working together to jointly develop a
future system. The United States and
Israel are involved in the coproduction
of the Arrow 2 missile defense system as well as in additional
BMD research and development activities. The United States is also
beginning to work with some partners of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
In short, the
foundations for applying phased adaptive approaches in these regions
are different..(25)

Perhaps the most important derives from the fact that
regional demand for U.S. BMD assets is likely to exceed supply for
some years to come. Although the missile threat is developing at
different rates in different regions, overall it is developing
rapidly. Today there are thousands of ballistic missiles and hundreds
of launchers in countries other than Russia, China, the United States,
and NATO members; roughly 90 percent of those missiles have ranges
less than 1,000 kilometers. Against this threat, the United States
currently has only a few hundred defensive short-range interceptors
deployed in multiple regions.(26)

To implement this new focus on regional architectures, the
Administration will pursue the following initiatives:

To implement this new focus on regional architectures, the
Administration will pursue the following initiatives:

1.) Deploy the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which accelerates
the deployment of proven technologies and also promises improved long-
term protection of the homeland.
2.) Apply phased adaptive approaches in other regions by building on
current efforts, with a principal focus on East Asia and the Middle
East.(28)


3.) Deploy the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which accelerates
the deployment of proven technologies and also promises improved long-
term protection of the homeland.
4.) Apply phased adaptive approaches in other regions by building on
current efforts, with a principal focus on East Asia and the Middle
East.(28)

In March 2007, the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) was
established, bringing
together senior DoD executives (and also representatives of the
Department of State and National Security Staff) to review and provide
guidance for missile defense.

In September 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued innovative
guidance to allow the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, the
combatant commands, and other
directorates within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
participate in and influence
the development of the Missile Defense Agency’s annual program plan
and budget
submittal. (37)

Further, the Deputy’s guidance provided guidelines for
responsibilities and authorities for resource execution as the
developing elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
reach maturity and are transitioned to the Military Departments for
operation and support. The guidance, termed the BMDS Life Cycle
Management Process, was used to develop the Missile Defense Agency’s
inputs to the President’s Budget for FY 2011. (37)

The Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program was one such troubled program.
The MKV was
intended to be deployed on midcourse interceptors, like the ground-
based interceptor, so that one interceptor could address complex
countermeasures by identifying and destroying all lethal objects in a
threat cluster. However, the MKV technology was not maturing at a
reasonable rate. Since continuing to develop those technologies
required to demonstrate MKV effectiveness would have been time-
consuming and costly, the Department chose to terminate the MKV
program and invest in other approaches.(40)

The Defense Department also terminated the Kinetic Energy Interceptor
(KEI) program. The KEI mission was designed to counter advanced
ballistic missile threats by intercepting missiles in the boost phase
of flight. KEI was neither affordable nor proven, could not be
integrated into existing weapons platforms or systems, and did not
conform to the strategy of focusing on emerging regional missile
threats. As a result, it grew in cost from $4.6 billion to $8.9
billion, the development schedule continued to slip, and the average-
unit production cost grew from $25 million to more than $50 million
per interceptor. In addition, the KEI’s size meant that any existing
operational platform would need significant modifications to host it.
(40)

Thomas Jigme Wheat

unread,
Jun 20, 2011, 3:30:30 PM6/20/11
to
also this link regarding discussion of how increased US domestic Oil
Production will not lower oil prices since US only has 2 percent of
the world's reserves. US Real Estate market and the role of
derivatives in the market collapse are also discussed.

http://groups.google.com/group/alt.politics.democrats.d/msg/65389faaa5d00230?

thomaswheat1975

On Jun 20, 12:08 pm, Tom Jigme Wheat <thomaswheat1...@gmail.com>


wrote:
> On Jun 20, 10:33 am, Tom Jigme Wheat <thomaswheat1...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> >http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/
>
> > thomaswheat1975
>
> Is the USA going to leave Japan South Korea or Taiwan behind in the
> ballistic missile defense review
> regarding threats posed by N. Korea and Iran. Also there is no law
> that prohibits the sale of ballistic missile technology!!!!!!
>
> also see this link for excerpts from the QDR
>

> http://groups.google.com/group/alt.politics.democrats.d/msg/9abe668f8...


>
> thomaswheat1975
>
> United States seeks in order to tailor a “phased adaptive approach” to
> the unique threats and capabilities in a region.
>

> http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%...
>
> regarding discussion archived here:
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.japan/browse_thread/thread...
>
> and here:
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/alt.politics.democrats.d/msg/9abe668f8...

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