Re: Ho Chi Minh said during fight with the French, "It is better to sniff French dung for a while than to eat Chinese dung all our lives"

[Satish]

On May 14, 9:43 am, rst9 <rst9w...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> The Vietnam syndrome

That might earn you 50 cents from the CCP dictatorship but not much
else.

http://img16.imageshack.us/img16/3928/chineseman.gif ;

You have no mind of your own - your mind is a slave to CCP's
imperialist designs against China's neighbors. You have sold your mind
not for the proverbial "thirty pieces of silver" but for 50 cents per
post from the CCP:

*****************
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/50_Cent_Party

The 50 Cent Party are Internet commentators (网络评论员, 網絡評論員, wǎnglù
pínglùn yuán) hired by the government of the People's Republic of
China (both local and central) or the Communist Party to post comments
favorable towards party policies in an attempt to shape and sway
public opinion on various Internet message boards. The commentators
are said to be paid for every post that either steers a discussion
away from anti-party or sensitive content on domestic websites,
bulletin board systems, and chatrooms, or that advances the Communist
party line.

*******************


rst0/9, you know which side of the bread is buttered. You know enough
of the life under the Beijing regime not to relocate to the land of
your birth to live under CCP dictatorship. You will rather shack up
with your gf in USA and live off US social security checks. But you
have no qualms about turning yourself into a stooge and cheerleader of
the CCP dictatorship in Beijing. Mr. Quisling would have been proud of
you.



PRC is a one-party state. The Communist Party has a monopoly of power.
No other party/opinion is allowed to coexist.

The CCP dictatorship is much like the military dictatorship in
Myanmar. The Military had a monopoly on power. When a General retired
as the top honcho of the state, another General succeeded him.

The CCP dictatorship is no different.

And your step mother knew that too. That is why, as soon as the CCP
captured power in 1949, she had her 11 year old step son (you) flee
Mainland China. You sought refuge in USA with a "father" whom you had
never met before.

BTW, how did your absentee father impregnate your mother? Did he send
his seeds to your mother by courier service?


Before bad mouthing USA, remember, if USA had not taken on Tojo's
Japan, China would have become a part of the Japanese "co-prosperity
sphere".


PRC's colonial claim against all neighbors of the Beijing regime rest
firmly on imperialist actions of the past. It cannot be justified.
Before callingthe kettle black, the pot should look at itself more
critically. The way the CCP dictatorship is advancing its imperialist
ambitions is truly breath-taking. It has taken a lot of chutzpah for
it to carve out that U-shaped claim on the South China Sea for itself.
The whole purpose of the CCP regime's obscene claim is to claim most
of the South China Sea as its territorial waters for the purpose of
usurping the natural resources in the sea and on the sea-bed and under
for itself.

China, for example, has a long history of imperial campaigns against
Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh had led the struggle for many many years against
the French and the USA. But he well knew who were the worst enemy.That
is why he had commented at the height of his fight against French
colonial rulers, "It is better to sniff French dung for a while than
to eat Chinese dung all our lives".

CCP's imperialist campaign against its neighbors well proves how right
Ho Chi Minh was.


http://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/2012/07/31/challenging-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea/

Challenging Beijing in the South China Sea
Hanoi and Manila Take Different Approaches

Vietnam and the Philippines are both angry at what they see as Chinese
bullying in the South China Sea, but Hanoi and Manila are taking
different approaches to the standoff over rival maritime claims.

Vietnam is strengthening military ties with the United States, India,
Singapore, Japan, Australia, and Russia, building what Joshua
Kurlantzick of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations calls a "web of
ad hoc bilateral relationships to shore up their security."

With Vice Admiral Viktor Chirkov in talks to return Russia's navy to
Cam Ranh Bay, Kurlantzick says Hanoi is sending a clear signal to
Beijing that it is not alone in the South China Sea.

"It speaks to Vietnam's utilization of many different partners in
order to back itself up," says Kurlantzick, a Southeast Asia
specialist. "Vietnam is in a stronger position that the Philippines
simply because for years the Armed Forces of Philippines basically did
nothing to upgrade its navy."

Filipino President Benigno Aquino III is trying to catch up, placing
an order for more attack helicopters after China opened a new base in
the Paracel Islands to patrol waters claimed by both Vietnam and the
Philippines.

Now, more powerful countries such as Vietnam are looking to other
solutions after China managed to stymie an attempt to address the
maritime claims through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). But weaker nations such as the Philippines are trying to
broaden the mediation effort by taking the dispute to the United
Nations.


ASEAN or the United Nations

That move has little support in Washington, says Bonnie Glaser, a
senior fellow on China studies at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). She says the Obama administration is
pushing instead for direct code-of-conduct talks between China and
ASEAN.

"The United States doesn't view this as a U.S./China issue," Glaser
says. "Taking it to the U.N. would make it seem like a U.S./China
issue because none of the other permanent Security Council members
really have any stake in this issue at all."

"The Philippines is throwing everything at the wall because they are
in the weakest position and they want to see what sticks," Kurlantzick
says. "You have senior Philippine national security officials coming
repeatedly to the U.S. and asking for certain types of upgrades. You
have them sort of trying to maneuver the U.S. into confirming that
because of our relationship with them in the past, the South China Sea
would come under that" Mutual Defense Treaty.

Though weaker militarily, Kurlantzick says the Philippines has a more
open and democratic political system than Vietnam and is less
susceptible to public anger over Chinese aggression.

"Certainly President Aquino has taken some strong steps, and he is not
going to back down on certain issues. But at the same time, it's a
much more mature political system," Kurlantzick says. "So I think
public pressure works a number of different ways, and the government
is less straightjacketed by nationalistic tendencies because its
legitimacy can rest on a number of different foundations."

With regular, carefully-guided Sunday protests against China in both
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, the Vietnamese government is trying to
stay ahead of public opinion at a time when Glaser says nationalist
sentiments are running high in Vietnam, the Philippines, and China.

"This has certainly become imbued with a sense of, 'These are our
rights.' It has become a very sensitive issue," Glaser says. "On the
blogosphere all over China, Chinese citizens, netizens, are calling
for their government to defend their interests. And I do believe that
the Chinese leadership is very wary of being seen as too soft and not
protecting Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity."

This is especially so as Washington makes its "Asia Pivot" in military
strategy, repositioning Marines and aircraft carrier task forces in
the Pacific.

Washington's 'Asia Pivot'

"Countries are worried about U.S. staying power, about whether or not
there will be a counter-weight to China," Glaser says. "We are trying
to say, 'Yes. We will be there to ensure peace and security in the
region.' It's problematic because we don't want to embolden other
countries to engage in a confrontation with China."

To the extent that they do, Glaser says that would be an unintended
consequence of the Asia Pivot.

"Perhaps some of the actions taken by the Philippines might not have
been taken if this series of events had taken place at a time when the
United States was not seeking to refocus on Asia.

"When we are asked by President Aquino to say something more
forcefully about how we will defend the Philippines if it is attacked,
this puts the U.S. in a very difficult position," the CSIS regional
expert says. "We don't want to leave the Philippines in a weak
position. But at the same time we don't want to tell the Philippines,
'We've got your back.'"



> Regarding Iraq and Afghanistan, are we telling ourselves -- and
> believing -- the same false story we told in 1975?http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-snepp-lessons-of...
> U.S. military and civilian personnel rush to board a Marine helicopter
> during the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon on April 29, 1975.
> (Neal Ulevich / Associated Press)
>
> By Frank Snepp
> May 5, 2013
> Thirty-eight years ago last week, I was among the last CIA officers to
> be choppered off the U.S. Embassy roof in Saigon as the North
> Vietnamese took the country. Just two years before that chaotic rush
> for the exits, the Nixon administration had withdrawn the last
> American troops from the war zone and had declared indigenous forces
> strong enough, and the government reliable enough, to withstand
> whatever the enemy might throw into the fray after U.S. forces were
> gone.
>
> That's the same story we told ourselves in Iraq when we pulled out of
> that country in 2011. And today, as American troops are being drawn
> down in Afghanistan, we're hearing variations on the same claims once
> again. Yet security remains so fragile in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
> it is impossible not to worry that we are deluding ourselves and that
> we failed to learn the most important lessons of Vietnam.
>
> One major ingredient of both the Afghanistan and Iraqi experiments was
> the use of American dollars to buy off insurgents, wean them from
> their Al Qaeda or Taliban suitors and win the indulgence, however
> grudging, of the leadership in Kabul or Baghdad. Such payments may
> help ensure a lull in the violence to allow U.S. forces to withdraw.
> But the enduring fallacy of such tactics was made clear in Vietnam.
>
> The strategic hamlet and pacification programs of the early and
> mid-1960s featured U.S. operatives fanning out through the countryside
> to buy the quiescence of village and hamlet chiefs. But in the end,
> the only thing that this money purchased was a continued Balkanization
> of the political landscape. The local beneficiaries, including special
> police and paramilitary units, identified with their American bagmen,
> not with Vietnam's central government, and the government in turn
> remained suspicious of their loyalties. The moment U.S. dollars and
> protection were withdrawn, the central government cracked down,
> destroying whatever calm existed.
>
> Such an adjustment is now going on in Iraq, where reports are mounting
> of Shiite vengeance against Sunnis. In Afghanistan, the "stabilizing"
> effect of U.S. forces and money is belied by a ragged security picture
> throughout the country and the resurgence of warlords.
>
> In the last year and a half, as the Obama administration has staggered
> into its Afghan end-game, armed American drones and special commando
> operations have replaced the expensive counter-
>
> insurgency template designed by Army Gen. David H. Petraeus. But the
> resulting campaign of targeted killing may not be an improvement
> because it contains the same ghastly flaws the Phoenix program had in
> Vietnam. The Phoenix program, a de facto assassination operation run
> by the CIA and U.S. military and carried out by provincial Vietnamese
> units, helped put the Viet Cong on the ropes temporarily, by
> eliminating many of their most experienced fighters and political
> operatives.
>
> But for all this, the North Vietnamese went on to win. In the end,
> Phoenix drove people into the arms of the enemy by killing civilians.
> The cause was often imperfect intelligence from local sources more
> interested in settling personal scores than in taking out the real
> enemy. News reports suggest that today's drone program suffers from
> similarly tainted targeting, as do periodic security sweeps that
> continue to deliver Taliban and Al Qaeda suspects to allied detention
> centers.
>
> Another problem in Vietnam was our choice of bedfellows. By the time I
> chauffeured the fleeing President Nguyen Van Thieu to Ton Son Nhut air
> base in late April 1975, some of us in the embassy had come to realize
> that political or military stability could not coexist with corrupt
> local leadership. But the last American ambassador to Vietnam had made
> allowances for Thieu and bent intelligence to cover his faults. In
> both Iraq and Afghanistan, we have continued to choose our allies
> unwisely and tolerate their corruption.
>
> Richard Holbrooke, who until his death in 2010 was Obama's special
> advisor for Pakistan and Afghanistan, wrestled with another lesson
> from the Vietnam War, one he learned as a young pacification
> specialist in the Mekong Delta and a diplomat in Saigon. It was this:
> A war can't go well if the enemy is able to move in and out of the
> country safely thanks to sanctuaries in adjacent countries.
>
> In Vietnam, he'd seen how the Viet Cong slipped into the south easily
> through Laos and Cambodia, which may have been why Holbrooke labored
> so diligently to persuade the Pakistanis to break off their enabler's
> role in the Afghan insurgency. But the tribal borderlands, along with
> factions of Pakistani intelligence, remain wellsprings of support for
> the Taliban and its fellow travelers in Al Qaeda. Even Osama bin Laden
> was able to find a safe haven in Pakistan for years.
>
> During my own 5 1/2 years in Vietnam, as a CIA analyst, interrogator
> and operative, I learned another relevant but bitter lesson: Truth
> does not easily survive the pressures of American troop draw-downs or
> shifts in policy. The last commanders and intelligence officers on the
> parapets of a fading U.S. commitment invariably try to put a good face
> on things, however little cause for optimism there is.
>
> There had been plenty of warning that South Vietnam was going to fall
> by the time it did on April 29, 1975. But denial and wishful thinking
> prevented us from adequately preparing for the safety of the many
> Vietnamese who had cast their lot with us. Their cries of panic over
> CIA radios on the last day still tear at my conscience.
>
> What haunts me most as the U.S. pullout continues in Afghanistan is
> the fate of the locals who have trusted our assurances. Let us hope,
> as the agency's Saigon station chief wrote in his last message from
> the embassy, that we have learned enough of history not to repeat it.
>
> Frank Snepp is a Peabody-award winning investigative journalist and
> the author of two CIA memoirs.
>
> Copyright (c) 2013, Los Angeles Times

[rst0]

Satish, why must you lie and post lies on soc.culture.china?
You don't know what it means to be a man, and understand less of being
a human.
You are an animal.

Satish, all you do is making up lies to post on this forum.
Why don't you go and post at soc.culture.indian.
That is where animals like you belongs.


Satish is a crazy filthy dirty ugly dark-skinned stinky Indian with
twisted warp-minded lunatic lying son-of-a-bitch at it again,
making up lies about others. He has absolutely no idea what the
hell he is talking about. He has no knowledge or understand the
meaning of “sin”.

Go rape and kill more Indian women. That is about all you dumb asshole
can do.

Satish, the filthiest dirtiest god-damnest liar and the most twisted
warp-minded
lunatic son-of-a-bitch in the world.

Satish has slanted eyes, slanted brain, and
slanted twisted lunatic warped mind.

Satish has crooked buck teeth and crooked backs, and bowlegged pig-
headed skunk.
Satish can't even walk straight, let alone see straight.
Ignorant liar & fool like you, Satish, persists being ignorant fool &
liar.