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Beijing regime's bullying in South China Sea strains relations with Vietnam
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Satish
May 22, 2013, 10:57:34 AM5/22/13
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http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/17/south-china-sea-disputes-strain-vietnam-china-relations/
East Asia Forum
May 17th, 2013
South China Sea disputes strain Vietnam–China relations
Since 1991, comprehensive Vietnam–China relations have developed but
remain constrained by the South China Sea (SCS) disputes.
What makes the disputes highly relevant for future bilateral relations
is that they have proven intractable, leaving the possibility of an
eventual solution a matter of almost infinite uncertainty.
The intractability of the disputes is rooted in their complicated
nature as well as setbacks in possible settlements.
First, both countries’ claims, especially those regarding the
sovereignty of the Paracels and the Spratlys, are grounded in each
country’s historical evidence. The assessment of the validity of this
evidence is both complicated and painful, but it is not impossible if
both sides submit themselves to a jointly agreed competent arbitration
authority. However, China has always refused to seek international
arbitration regarding its SCS disputes, precluding an important option
for permanently solving the disputes peacefully.
Second, international legal rules governing the arbitration of
maritime claims in the case of the SCS disputes are controversial and
not well-defined. This is due to the different views on the status of
features forming the two archipelagos and their maritime entitlements.
In its joint submission with Malaysia to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf in early May 2009, Vietnam implicitly held
the position that features in the two archipelagos do not qualify as
islands, thus having no exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental
shelf of their own. But in its Note Verbale to the UN Secretary
General protesting the joint submission, China held the position that
at least a number of features in the SCS are qualified as islands and
entitled to their own territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf.
These differing views can be settled by an arbitrational process. But
as the judgments offered by such a process are likely to be based on
the interpretation of Article 121 of the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), rather than concrete evidence, not only China but
also Vietnam may feel discouraged from taking that path for fear of
being disadvantaged.
Third, the dispute is made ever more intractable by the nine-dotted
line that China has been using to assert its claims, the meaning and
legal basis of which China has never clarified. China’s above-
mentioned Note Verbale added some light to China’s claims and the
meaning of the line but failed to completely make it clear.
The Note Verbale asserted that China not only had ‘sovereignty over
the islands in the SCS and the adjacent waters’ but also enjoyed
‘sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters’. The
terms ‘adjacent waters’ and ‘relevant waters’ are ambiguous, leaving
one to wonder whether these waters correspond to those defined under
the UNCLOS or whether they refer to the entire water column enclosed
by the nine-dotted line. As the nine-dotted line cuts deep into
Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf, the ambiguity around its meaning
makes it difficult to define clearly the disputed areas and further
strains efforts to manage and settle the disputes.
Due to the disputes’ intractability, various incidents in the SCS have
made bilateral relations ‘warm outside but cold inside’. The most
recent notable ones include the cutting of a Vietnamese seismic survey
ship’s cable by Chinese maritime surveillance vessels within Vietnam’s
EEZ in May 2011, China’s offering of nine blocks within Vietnam’s EEZ
to international bidders in June 2012, and the firing on a Vietnamese
trawler by a Chinese patrol ship near the Paracels in March 2013.
Incidents like these have generated incessant tensions between the two
countries. In Vietnam, following the cable cutting incident, anti-
China demonstrations broke out, and Vietnamese leaders have spoken
strongly against China’s aggression. In China, for example, following
the firing incident in March 2013, the Global Times ran an op-ed
stating that ‘the Philippines and Vietnam would face more troubles if
they choose to seek fierce confrontation with China’.
One useful way to see how constant the SCS disputes present themselves
as an irritant to bilateral relations is to look at statements issued
by the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) spokesperson. For
example, in 2012, bilateral disputes, such as China’s unilateral
fishing moratorium, featured prominently in 20 out of 49 press
releases and statements of the MOFA spokesperson throughout the year.
If the frequency of the mention of SCS disputes in MOFA statements is
used as a barometer for Vietnam-China relations, then these disputes
are the most important factor shaping the mood for the relations; and
that mood, at least over the last five years, has been going from bad
to worse. So, if not carefully managed and eventually resolved, the
disputes will continue to put the substantive cooperative ties between
the two countries in other fields at great risk.
East Asia Forum
May 17th, 2013
South China Sea disputes strain Vietnam–China relations
Since 1991, comprehensive Vietnam–China relations have developed but
remain constrained by the South China Sea (SCS) disputes.
What makes the disputes highly relevant for future bilateral relations
is that they have proven intractable, leaving the possibility of an
eventual solution a matter of almost infinite uncertainty.
The intractability of the disputes is rooted in their complicated
nature as well as setbacks in possible settlements.
First, both countries’ claims, especially those regarding the
sovereignty of the Paracels and the Spratlys, are grounded in each
country’s historical evidence. The assessment of the validity of this
evidence is both complicated and painful, but it is not impossible if
both sides submit themselves to a jointly agreed competent arbitration
authority. However, China has always refused to seek international
arbitration regarding its SCS disputes, precluding an important option
for permanently solving the disputes peacefully.
Second, international legal rules governing the arbitration of
maritime claims in the case of the SCS disputes are controversial and
not well-defined. This is due to the different views on the status of
features forming the two archipelagos and their maritime entitlements.
In its joint submission with Malaysia to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf in early May 2009, Vietnam implicitly held
the position that features in the two archipelagos do not qualify as
islands, thus having no exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental
shelf of their own. But in its Note Verbale to the UN Secretary
General protesting the joint submission, China held the position that
at least a number of features in the SCS are qualified as islands and
entitled to their own territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf.
These differing views can be settled by an arbitrational process. But
as the judgments offered by such a process are likely to be based on
the interpretation of Article 121 of the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), rather than concrete evidence, not only China but
also Vietnam may feel discouraged from taking that path for fear of
being disadvantaged.
Third, the dispute is made ever more intractable by the nine-dotted
line that China has been using to assert its claims, the meaning and
legal basis of which China has never clarified. China’s above-
mentioned Note Verbale added some light to China’s claims and the
meaning of the line but failed to completely make it clear.
The Note Verbale asserted that China not only had ‘sovereignty over
the islands in the SCS and the adjacent waters’ but also enjoyed
‘sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters’. The
terms ‘adjacent waters’ and ‘relevant waters’ are ambiguous, leaving
one to wonder whether these waters correspond to those defined under
the UNCLOS or whether they refer to the entire water column enclosed
by the nine-dotted line. As the nine-dotted line cuts deep into
Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf, the ambiguity around its meaning
makes it difficult to define clearly the disputed areas and further
strains efforts to manage and settle the disputes.
Due to the disputes’ intractability, various incidents in the SCS have
made bilateral relations ‘warm outside but cold inside’. The most
recent notable ones include the cutting of a Vietnamese seismic survey
ship’s cable by Chinese maritime surveillance vessels within Vietnam’s
EEZ in May 2011, China’s offering of nine blocks within Vietnam’s EEZ
to international bidders in June 2012, and the firing on a Vietnamese
trawler by a Chinese patrol ship near the Paracels in March 2013.
Incidents like these have generated incessant tensions between the two
countries. In Vietnam, following the cable cutting incident, anti-
China demonstrations broke out, and Vietnamese leaders have spoken
strongly against China’s aggression. In China, for example, following
the firing incident in March 2013, the Global Times ran an op-ed
stating that ‘the Philippines and Vietnam would face more troubles if
they choose to seek fierce confrontation with China’.
One useful way to see how constant the SCS disputes present themselves
as an irritant to bilateral relations is to look at statements issued
by the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) spokesperson. For
example, in 2012, bilateral disputes, such as China’s unilateral
fishing moratorium, featured prominently in 20 out of 49 press
releases and statements of the MOFA spokesperson throughout the year.
If the frequency of the mention of SCS disputes in MOFA statements is
used as a barometer for Vietnam-China relations, then these disputes
are the most important factor shaping the mood for the relations; and
that mood, at least over the last five years, has been going from bad
to worse. So, if not carefully managed and eventually resolved, the
disputes will continue to put the substantive cooperative ties between
the two countries in other fields at great risk.
beware of New Wakalukong fresh on board
May 22, 2013, 11:34:44 AM5/22/13
to
Chinese want every thing in SE ASIA
On May 22, 9:57 pm, Satish <sk.c...@gmail.com> wrote:
> http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/17/south-china-sea-disputes-stra...
On May 22, 9:57 pm, Satish <sk.c...@gmail.com> wrote:
> http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/17/south-china-sea-disputes-stra...
rst0
May 22, 2013, 1:12:59 PM5/22/13
to
Well, Vietnam put up a good fight against the U.S.
It's time to put up a good fight against China.
Show your resolve against China as you had against the U.S.
It's time to put up a good fight against China.
Show your resolve against China as you had against the U.S.
OLD CHINK LEE KUAN YEW , a HaKKa migrant
May 23, 2013, 11:36:45 AM5/23/13
to
WE CHINESE ,
after our SUCCESSFUL TAKE OVER of Singapore ,
we CHINESE must take over ASEAN
after our SUCCESSFUL TAKE OVER of Singapore ,
we CHINESE must take over ASEAN
rst9
May 23, 2013, 12:03:36 PM5/23/13
to
On May 23, 8:36 am, "OLD CHINK LEE KUAN YEW , a HaKKa migrant"
19th century.
The saying now is: 21th is China's century. It's a well-known fact.
<voivodv...@gmail.com> wrote:
> WE CHINESE ,
> after our SUCCESSFUL TAKE OVER of Singapore ,
>
> we CHINESE must take over ASEAN
Correct. Just like the British in the 18th Century, America in the
> WE CHINESE ,
> after our SUCCESSFUL TAKE OVER of Singapore ,
>
> we CHINESE must take over ASEAN
19th century.
The saying now is: 21th is China's century. It's a well-known fact.
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