The Root Causes of Fundamentalism
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The Root Causes of Fundamentalism
Case Study: The Rise and Decline of Islamic Fundamentalism in Iran
Introduction
This paper argues that the root cause of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism,
to a large extent, has been foreign interference in domestic politics, which
affected the other aspects of societal life in Muslim countries, as it is
the case in Iran. The industrial countries, particularly the US have had
crucial interests in the region especially in protecting the flow of oil and
controlling its price. Hence, for national governments of oil producing
countries, being independent, pursuing their national interests, and having
cooperative relations with the West have always been controversial. In Iran
for instance, foreign manipulations in the central government level, have
always led to chaos in the society. It is a common saying in western
politics that 'left and right fight and moderate wins'. This is because the
majority of people prefer a peaceful settlement between the two extreme
wings and vote for the middle. In Iran, during the cold war, the right was
supported by the US against the communist left backed by the USSR.
Therefore, both superpowers were in agreement against any moderate liberal
or nationalist democratic settlement. This was evidently the case in the
coup led by the CIA and the British intelligent service in 1953 against
Mossadeq who was a democratically elected prime minister (Risen, 2000).
Surprisingly, the Todeh Party at the time, as the biggest political
organisation under the Kremlin's influence, run campaigns against Mossadeq
as well. Consequently, in the absence of a strong liberal democratic
political movement, right wing took control of the 1979 revolution and
established a religious fanatic regime. This paper argues that the only
strategic solution to Islamic fundamentalism in Iran is political reform and
democracy. The September 11 terrorist attack, perhaps gives us this simple
lesson to realise that the cost of reform and democracy in the Muslim world
is far less than the destructive issues created around fundamentalist
movements. To explore the complexity of this argument a multiple research
methodology is used based on normative choices, with two basic assumptions.
First, 'what is the Islamic fundamentalism' and 'where it has come from',
and second 'how this happened in Iran' and 'how it can be resolved'. A
multilevel of analysis is used to analyse the historical, ideological,
political, economic, and socio-cultural sources of the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism and Khomeini in Iran. The effort has been made to be
selective among the numerous explanations and simplify them. As the selected
explanations could be affected by personal barriers, any type of
self-reference criterion is strongly avoided. The theoretical explanations,
developed in the first part, will be elaborated broadly and supported
evidently in the case study, which brings to light the chronological
sequence of important events in Iran since 1950. Finally, the urgency of
reform in Iran and the chance of reformers for success will be discussed.
Definitions:
According to Wikipedia (2002), fundamentalism:
"refers to a Protestant Christian movement which originated in the United
States in the early 20th century, opposed to the teaching of evolution and
modernism. This movement called themselves 'Fundamentalists' because they
sought to return to what they viewed as the 'fundamentals' of their
religion. The term has since been extended by analogy, to include similar
movements in other religions, especially Islam".
Armstrong (2002) contends that "fundamentalism is a kind of monolithic
movement expressing the same kind of ideas as ideals". In short, religious
fundamentalists are adhering to absolute ideas and ideals which are almost
irrelevant to the real world (of relativism) that everything is relative.
George Joffe (1998), a British scholar of Islamic fundamentalism, believes
that it is a much misunderstood phenomenon. He contends that Islamic
movements have been depicted by media reports of revolutions and bomb
attacks around the world. Therefore, as Young (1998) writes:
"You only hear about these movements when in fact they do something which
catches the media eye. Therefore, perhaps, the image we have of the Islamist
movements as being solely violent is in itself misleading".
Defining fundamentalism should be explored through multi-principle analysis.
Multilevel of analysis:
To comprehend the concept of fundamentalism, it should be discussed within
five different human science principles of historical background,
ideological, political, economic, and socio-cultural contexts.
Fundamentalists across all nations and faiths are likely to follow the same
patterns, but depending on the above mentioned circumstances, in different
time.
Historical Background
After the World War One, British Empire divided the Ottoman Empire into
spheres of influence. Hence, colonisation brought profound changes in both
political and social structures and gave rise to different responses from
the local Muslims, like - some organised armed resistance, some used
political pressure, some attempted to adapt western influence by copying the
west, modernising the economy and reforming the state. But all these
strategies ended with failure. Islamic revitalisation was part of that
resistance, first started by Jamal-al-Din Asad-Abadi who outlined the basis
for radical Islam or Islamic fundamentalism. He strongly argued against the
idea of Muslim national states and called for a pan-Islamic state and the
unification of all countries within the Islamic world. This was an
absolutely utopian approach towards the problem facing the colonial
countries and then followed by the establishment of Ikhwan al Muslimin
(Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1929. (Bland, 1994).
Modern fundamentalism is rooted in the writings of Mawlana Mawdoodi of
Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb of Egypt in the 1960s calling for the return to the
traditions of Islam. (Joffe, 1998). The same dreams of establishing an
Islamic Empire was then followed by Khomeini. He rejected a parallel between
his doctrines and the fundamentalism propounded by some Muslim dissidents.
He never described himself as fundamentalist and often said that Islam is
not for 14 centuries ago but for all time. (Viorst, 1989)
Ideological context:
Fundamentalism has been a process of religious resurgence (Armstrong 2001).
But fundamentalism was the matter of defeat, because when people are fearful
and threatened, they tend to accentuate the aggressive aspects of Islam and
disregard those that speak of compassion and justice. This type of
reactionary reference to religion by fundamentalists can be understood when
one considers the disaffection of millions of Muslims in the Middle East,
whose grievances extend from hating to see their natural resources and much
of their wealth go to the Western countries, to seeing their culture has
been despoiled by the world wide influence of American culture. For Muslims,
where the cause and cure of even domestic issues are out of their hand to
act upon through democratic process, they end up with extreme response which
takes the form of violence.
Armstrong (2001) says "when people feel that their backs are to the wall and
they're fighting for survival, they can, very often, turn to violence". This
type of violence has been institutionalised by fundamentalist regime of
Iran. Ayatollahs, for instance, say to the person who is being asked to blow
himself up with dynamite that they will go straight to heaven. As people
only under the name of higher cause are ready to kill one another, by
characterizing their enemies as satanic, Mullahs can justify hatred and even
mass slaughter. Fundamentalist terrorists, hence, at the extreme end, seek
to wash the impure world with the clean blood of innocent victims. Despite
the fact that taking the life of others is against the tenets of most
religions including Islam, terrorism has become the state backed as a tool
of expanding the influence and shielding the power. Fundamentalists receive
huge benefits from war in which they can pretend terrorists as freedom
fighters. (Ogivie, 2001)
In real world, however, religion is not all about hating but also loving
each other. The main conflict has always taken place between the two phases
of most religions: love and hate. Wallis (2002) calls it the conflict
between cynicism and hope. Armstrong (2001) argues that "we in western
societies regard ourselves as a compassionate, tolerant society that
respects the rights of others". We have this because of "the Abrahamic
religions, from all three of these faiths" (Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam). Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen (2002) claims that
'Western detractors of Islam have little to say about Islam's traditions of
tolerance, which has been at least as important historically as its record
of intolerance.' In the case of Iran, the main forces of opposition to the
fundamentalist regime (both liberals and left wing) have been Muslim
themselves.
Political:
Islam as a religion embraces one billion nominal believers in around thirty
nations. During the last decade, the idea of creating the Islamic state
through reviving the caliphate or Imam, where the religious leader is the
ruler, was attractive in Muslim countries. This was partly due to the
historical failure of secular political programs, distrust of the US and the
collapse of communism. This has been clearly the case in countries such as
Afghanistan, Algeria, Turkey, and Egypt. But as a dominant power,
fundamentalist regimes can only be found in a few countries like Iran and
Sudan (Young, 2001).
Fundamentalism, like the twentieth-century fascism, rejects liberal
democracy and proposes a clergy ruling class. Fundamentalists have been
described as authoritarian proclaiming a loyalty to sacred texts and to the
goal of creating a religious state. Fundamentalist regimes are tied to
political conservatism, and prejudice. Some may describe them as
totalitarian, because religious laws should be applied to all aspects of
life. If secularisation calls for the separation of religion and politics,
here we have the resacralisation of politics and the politiscation of
religion. (Young, 2001)
The September 11 terrorist attack has brought to light this serious lesson
that religious fundamentalism is a global issue and requires a collective
solution. After the attack there were many references to 'attacks on freedom
and democracy', something that few people in the Middle East have
experienced much of, worth to remind us Palestinian refugees who have had no
home for the last fifty years (Young, 2001).
It is a common saying that democracies do not fight each other, hence
promoting peace and democracy can be an optimal response to Islamic
fundamentalism and global terrorism. This has been the dream of the majority
of Muslim, specially the younger generation who are inspired by the Western
democracy and its achievements but criticising its foreign policies of
'double standard'.
Economic:
Radical Islamic movements have also been nourished by economic
globalisation. The experience of over-exploitation by colonial powers has
been extended through economic globalisation. This has widened the gap
between rich and poor with consequent increase in class conflicts. For many
industries in Islamic countries the world economy is too big and competitive
to operate efficiently and survive without state protection. This has
intensified by many states attempting to join free market that has resulted
in many socio-political problems. The majority of Muslim countries spend
more than 30 percent of their export earning on debt servicing (Azad, 2001).
The impact of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises has created
growing resentment among workers and middle class youth who are deprived of
jobs and career prospects. The growing spread of poverty, fatal disease,
civil crimes, drug trafficking and corruption are also among the major
incentives that Islamic fundamentalists groups are provoking reaction and
public support.
Socio-Cultural:
Fundamentalist movements also present a persuasive critique of late
capitalist culture. They criticise the Western values of materialism,
selfishness, tolerance for uncontrolled sexualities, demoralisation, decline
of family ties, and urban crime. The fundamentalism rejection of modernity
is not necessarily of modern technology but of the ideals of individualism,
voluntarism, pluralism, and the equality of women. For instance, under
fundamentalist regimes, specific regulations have been issued to control the
public appearance of women through dress codes and the segregation of the
sexes in public. Further it formally limits women's legal rights and their
freedom in public life (Hallahmi, 2001).
In the West, conversely, religion, which once used to be uniform,
collectivistic, public, ascribed and inherited is now pluralist,
individualistic, privatized, achieved and often freely chosen matter. The
possibility of choice and preference is a modern phenomenon and interpreted
as a result of privatisation. Modernisation, however, does not occur
accidentally and cannot be copied from the west over night. In many Muslim
countries, with traditional culture and economy, religion is still a matter
of birth rather than choice.
Meanwhile, in some parts of the Muslim world, the modernisation process has
been so rapid that secularism was often experienced not as a liberating
movement, but as an assault upon faith. For example, when Ataturk was
bringing modern Turkey into being, he abolished all the Sufi orders and
forced them underground. Hence, all men and women were obliged to wear
Western dress. In Iran, Reza Khan (the father of the shah) used to send
soldiers into the streets with bayonets, taking women's veils off and
tearing them to pieces in front of their eyes. In Egypt, President Nasser
had imprisoned thousands of members of the Muslim brotherhood, many without
trial and often for handing out leaflets or attending a meeting. Sayyid Qutb
went into the camp as a moderate. But after 15 years of hard labour,
watching the brothers being executed or being subjected to mental or
physical torture, he came to the conclusion that secularism was a great
evil. Qutb was executed by President Nasser in 1966. These happened in
societies where the vast majority of the population had no idea of modern
institutions or teachings and only a few elite had benefited of Western
education (Armstrong, 2001). Some scholars term this kind of approach to
modernisation as "secular fundamentalism" (Wallis 2001).
It can be argued that religious pluralism and pursuing multifaith policies
are the best social response to religious intolerance in the today's
mainstream cosmopolitan society. Fundamentalist movements, like any other
religious or ideological extremities, can also be modernized. Radical
Islamic groups in countries like Jordan, Yemen and Egypt are gradually
becoming absorbed into the mainstream of democratic politics. For Islamic
governments now, it is a matter of survival to distance themselves from the
radical ideology. This has been proved in the case of Iran, which once
seemed to be thrown off modernity.
Case Study: Iran
The Rise and Decline of Islamic Fundamentalism in Iran
Iran is one of the world's few theocratic republics, in which the political
system is under significant control by the dominant religious system of the
country. Iran's leadership consists of three main elements: the spiritual
supreme leader "faqih", with huge power including control of the Judiciary
and commanding the Defence forces; the executive, consisting of the office
of the President; and the legislature, consisting of the parliament (Majlis)
and the Council of Guardians. This system is not a purely religious system
rather it is a combination of Shiite tradition with the west-ministerial
system of representative democracy. This mixture has created unstable and
inefficient ideological, political, economic, and socio-cultural
arrangements. This further depicts the confrontation between opposing
interpretations of Islam - fanatic fundamentalism versus a modern and
democratic. These controversies have been the source of conflicts between
the people and their religious rulers over the past two decades. This has
been substantiated in the growing splits within the mullahs' camp and the
recent defeat of hard liners in the presidential and parliament elections.
Over time, the power and influence of the mullahs has declined while the
people and their democratic values and institutions have been empowered.
Before addressing the process and causes of the rise and decline of Islamic
fundamentalism in Iran, we need to comprehend the similarities and
differences of fundamentalist Islam in Iran and elsewhere.
Similarities and Differences between Islamic fundamentalism in Iran and its
neighbouring countries:
The appeal of Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalism to other Muslim nations is
limited because of two following reasons:
1. Iran is predominately Shia Muslim, unlike other fundamentalist movements
such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Libya, Sudan, or Pakistan which are
predominately Sunni, thus, the Iran model does not represent all
fundamentalist movements.
2. In Iran, the Shia clerics or mullahs assumed control of the government
combined with the western style of representative democracy. While for
countries such as Libya and Syria, the model of fundamentalism is combined
with a model of socialism.
Despite these disparities, the movements share several characteristics and
common grounds:
1. They all justify the movement and claim for power based on the principles
of Islam. This helps them to strengthen their base of mass support;
2. They share the tendency toward economic and political isolationism, based
on the rejection of Western influence;
3. Their antagonistic foreign policy and state sponsorship for exportation
of the revolutionary ideology, notably in the form of terrorism. By
advocating such a policy, fundamentalist states create a bond with other
fundamentalist groups and states to create a political bloc that increases
their capabilities to influence both regional and international relations
(Etheridge, 2001);
4. They all reject modernity and its associated democratic values of
individualism, voluntarism, pluralism, and the equality of women.
The process of Rise:
During the Cold War the Western powers welcomed the formation of an Islamic
front against Communism through the creation of a "Green Belt" of Islamic
allies in the Middle East. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were
major parts of such a belt and they had a variety of intelligence links with
the U.S. (Azad, 2001). The religious sentiments and anti communism
incentives were crucial measures, in these countries, when recruiting for
their intelligent agencies. According to Bland (1994) the University of Salt
Lake City, which is run by the fundamentalist Mormon Church has long been
the favorite recruiting ground for both the CIA and the FBI. This is
especially important for many of the Middle Eastern countries, in which
intelligent forces play crucial role in making decision on national
strategic issues. Nevertheless, the religious tendencies of intelligent
agencies could have significant impact in the way they treated religious
fundamentalism through out the region. For instance in the case of Iran,
before the 1979 revolution, the Shah's secret police (SAVAK) arrested a
large number of Islamic fundamentalists. But the regime always treated them
much better than secular and Marxist political activists. Although many
genuine democrats and leftists were killed by the SAVAK, the fundamentalists
survived and were able to eventually bring down the Shah and took over the
Iranian revolution.
The Shah's oppositions were sourced from three major ideological frameworks:
Islamists (left and right), Marxism, and Nationalism Front ( or liberals).
SAVAK's violent tactics prevented the left and the nationalism movement,
from having a significant social presence especially after the coup launched
by the CIA against Mossadeq in 1953. Hence, only fundamentalists' leadership
survived.
The next political uprising was in 1960-61 following an economic crisis when
the Shah introduced the White Revolution programme of agrarian reform
combined with education and health measures. Land reform was viewed as a
threat to vagf (endowed) property which served as an important source of
income for the mullahs (Viorst, 1989). They joined with sections of the
feudal landowners to organise a campaign against the reforms -not from a
revolutionary standpoint, but rather from a purely reactionary one.
Khomeini's first criticisms came to the surface when he accused the Shah of
abandoning Islamic precepts in favour of imperialism, but his criticism
remained within the confines of the establishment. He merely protested
against the Shah's excesses. In 1964 he was banished to Turkey, but was then
permitted to relocate in the Shi'ite holy city of Najaf in Iraq, where for
the next 15 years he shaped the 'valayate-faqih' (religious state) doctrine.
In exile he delivered lectures on Islam and called on the whole religious
establishment to move with him against the Shah. Only at this point Khomeini
emerged as an anti-Shah leader.
From 1963-73 Iran politically and economically was relatively stable with
steadily rising oil revenues enhanced economic growth. In 1973-74, oil
prices quadrupled, and Iran's oil revenue increased from 5 billion dollars
to 20 billion dollars a year. Rapid economic development was accompanied
with the concentration of capital in a few hands. Forty-five families
controlled 85 percent of the largest companies in 1974 (Azad, 2001).
Capitalist development had also created a mighty working class in Iran, and
thereby completely transformed the class balance of forces.
The Shah made the biggest political mistake in 1975 by establishing the
Rastakhiz (Resurgence) party and compelled every individual, and the few
remaining political parties to become part of it. From then on he completely
closed down every rays of light in the landscape of Iran's politics.
The second wave of uprisings began in the early 1970s, which remarked with
the armed struggle of guerilla groups including the two largest groups, the
Mojahedin-e Khalgh-e Iran (Muslim) and Fada'iyan-e Khalgh-e Iran (Marxist).
The majority of their members were from the intelligentsia and their main
recruiting domain was the universities. Between 1971-1977, university
students became increasingly involved in political activities and organized
a number of large demonstrations. These activities popularized the
anti-government culture and provided practical experiences that became
important in the following years. In 1975 a large number of both group's
members were arrested and their leaders were executed by SAVAK.
By 1977, the increasing number of street demonstrations finally forced the
Shah to change his prime minister to liberalize the situation. This further
radicalised the movement. The confrontations resulted in many casualties
with mourning for each martyr precipitating another demonstration. Yet the
more he did, the more isolated he became. In late 1978 huge street
demonstrations were calling for the Shah's abdication. The strikes of the
oil workers, in particular, paralysed the regime. The Shah had nowhere to go
for help but to Washington. In January 1979 he fled to the West. Two weeks
later, Khomeini returned home in triumph. (Viorst, 1989)
Fundamentalists in Power:
Khomeini moved very tactfully at first. He appointed Bazargan (the
representative of the Liberty and National Fronts) as the prime minister.
Despite the boycott of the referendum by radical groups, the Islamic
Republic of Iran was born in March 1979. Soon Khomeini used anti-America
slogans to kill the revolution. In November, he sent his supporters to seize
the U.S. embassy and held 52 hostages, which popularised anti-American
feelings to mobilise mass forces behind the IRP (Islamic Republican Party).
He, at the same time, utilised some Bonapartist tactics to concentrate power
at the top and to isolate liberals. On November 5, Bazargan who found
himself in disagreement with the Council of Revolution and Khomeini over
major issues such as human rights and foreign affairs -mainly with regard to
the idea of exporting the Islamic Revolution and hostage crisis- offered his
resignation to Khomeini.
On November 15, 1979 the final draft of the new constitution was published.
The main objective was allocating the extreme power to the Faqih (the
supreme religious leader) who is not an elected official. The faqih, as the
political and religious leader of the country, is Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces and secret services and head of the judiciary. He further has
the power to dismiss the President.
By the early summer of 1980 all political opposing groups had to go
underground. Khomeini also launched a campaign to "export" the revolution to
surrounding Muslim countries. His provocations of Iraq in 1980 helped start
a war that lasted eight years (1980-1988) and cost a million lives. The war
ended only after America intervened to sink several Iranian warships in the
Persian Gulf. Khomeini described the seize-fire as "more deadly than taking
poison." (Viorst, 1989)
The last event of this period, which delineated the antagonism between the
ruling clerics and the opposition, was the explosion of two bombs in the
headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party on June 28, 1981. The People's
Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMO) accepted the responsibility. Most of
the 74 dead were right-wing leaders. This event and the expansion of
Iran-Iraq war were the government's main arguments to use institutionalized
violence against the opposing groups.
After the war ended in 1988, Khomeini, in an effort to rally his demoralized
supporters, issued the fatwa condemning to death the Pakistanian born
British writer Salman Rushdie for his novel The Satanic Verses. Although
Khomeini died a few months later the fatwa lived on and became a source of
bitterness between Iran and the West.
The Khomeini regime backed the Hamas and Hizbullah fundamentalist wings as a
means of diverting attention from the internal tensions in Iran and
preventing peace in the Middle East. The irony is that before the
revolution, this kind of organisation was financed by the CIA and the
Israeli Secret Agency Mossad, in order to split the working class of the
Middle East along religious lines. (Azad, 2001)
The Prospects of Reform:
Khomeini was succeeded by Ali Khamenei who also has rejected of
modernisation continuing the country's economic isolation and resulting in a
stagnant economy from which Iran has yet to recover. High levels of
unemployment, a lack of foreign investment and low oil prices contributed to
the decelerated economy. The country's antagonistic foreign policies limited
foreign investment. In response, a faction within the regime created a
prospect of reform. Led first by former President Rafsanjani and then
followed by the current president Khatami, the movement aimed to attract
foreign investment and recover the country's economy by moderating its
fundamentalist principles and its support for foreign fundamentalism and
terrorist groups.
However, Tehran's new focus on the economy has created tension between the
regime's hard-line and moderate factions. The student demonstrations
signified the beginning of a new stage in the Iranian revolution. The
reformist faction led by Mohammed Khatami is afraid to tackle the
reactionary mullahs represented by the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The factional
fighting at the top reached a critical stage in the 1997, 1999, and 2000
presidential and parliamentary elections that led to huge losses for hard
liners. The clashes between student protesters and security forces in July
1999 resulted in a wave of violence that threatened to topple the entire
clerical regime. The chance for unrest remains high in the most notorious
Islamic republic. (Etheridge, 2001)
Nevertheless, the regime of the ayatollahs, after more than two decades in
power, has exhausted itself and entered into a state of terminal crisis. The
split within the mullahs' camp and their recent defeat in elections
indicates the beginning of a new process. The masses, once again angry with
the mullahs' hypocrisy and corruption, are beginning to stir. The student
demonstrations and the massive victory of the "reformers" in the general
elections are indications of a fundamental change in the situation.
Contrary to the reactionary dreams of Khomeini, history has never proceeded
in accord with any subjective plan or the preconceived ideas of individuals,
least of all if these ideas have an entirely reactionary character. Although
fundamentalists took advantage of the crying contradictions in the society
and mistreated unconsciousness of the masses, the great majority of Iranians
who have only just awakened are striving to find the road to either
political reform or another progressive revolution. It is the task of the
Iranians new generation to study the lessons of the past and draw the
necessary conclusions, goals and objectives toward building their future.