@@ Iran's closing nuclear argument @@
Arash
November 23, 2005
Iran's closing nuclear argument
Dr. Kaveh L Afrasiabi
On Friday, November 18, the New York Times published a full page statement of nuclear
intentions by Iran, which will likely serve as a key point of reference in the
on-going debates on Iran's nuclear program.
Titled "Unnecessary crisis - setting the record straight about Iran's nuclear
program", the narrative (see appendix) was subsequently described by CNN as a
"detailed, point-by-point" discussion of the nuclear negotiation process during the
past couple of years. It debunked the myths about oil-rich Iran's lack of need of
alternative sources of energy, defended Iran's negotiation postures and reiterated
Iran's willingness to continue negotiations.
In light of the gravity of the issue and the coming showdown at the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting on November 24, where the US-European Union
coalition will be pushing for Security Council action, it is important to reproduce
the Iranian nuclear statement to provide a modicum of balance in the global media's
coverage of the subject, dominated as it is by a negative image of Iran as
irrational, dogmatic and incapable of rational discourse. The U.S. position is
opposed by the dissenting voices of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, which
prefer an IAEA-based resolution of the contentious issue.
The potency of Iran's nuclear statement lies precisely in its effective debunking of
its negative image, by presenting a detailed and comprehensive argument, backed by
facts, invoking an image of Iran that the West, particularly the U.S., is often
inclined to ignore. This alone, perhaps, may signal a major difference between Iran
and pre-invasion Iraq, that is, Iran's ability, and diplomatic sophistication, to
launch an effective communicative counterpunch vis-a-vis the avalanche of
Iran-bashing discourse, sometimes planted by the powers that be, seeking to
manufacture a global consensus on Iran's nuclear threat.
Interestingly, the latter includes last-minute - with respect to the upcoming IAEA
meeting - "revelations" regarding an alleged Iranian laptop full of sensitive
information about Iran's designs for nuclear warheads. Soon after the publication of
a front-page article in the Sunday New York Times, a review by certain nuclear
experts found that there had been deliberate mistranslation of key words in the
documents found in the "manna from heaven" laptop that was "handed over by someone in
Iran who got it from someone else who is now dead", to paraphrase the New York Times.
This is, of course, the same paper whose editors stoutly defended their erstwhile
journalist who is accused of deliberately misinforming the public about Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction.
The IAEA meeting will likely defer Security Council action, perhaps for another few
months, partly due to the positive nature of the latest report by IAEA chief Mohammad
ElBaradei, which cites significant and "indispensable" progress in Iran-IAEA
cooperation, the resolution of most if not all outstanding questions, and the absence
of even a European consensus, notwithstanding the latest EU declaration calling on
Iran to "fulfill its obligations" to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
when, in fact, it is the Europeans who are skirting their obligations to respect
Iran's NPT rights.
ElBaradei's report, dated November 18, while maintaining that Iran's "full
transparency is indispensable and overdue", nonetheless praises Iran for allowing
additional access to IAEA inspectors, particularly at the Parchin military base, and
for permitting interviews with certain officials not previously interviewed. The
report states that "Iran has been more forthcoming" with providing additional
information; that the agency "did not observe any unusual activities in the buildings
visited"; and that Iran "has continued to act as if the Additional Protocol [to the
NPT] were in effect".
Further, the report clearly states that an environmental sampling collected at a
location where centrifuge components are stored "did not indicate any traces of
nuclear material". This is particularly significant, since it goes to the heart of
the controversy over whether or not Iran has breached its obligations by failing to
report the assembly of centrifuge components, given the IAEA-Iran agreement that
calls on Iran to disclose information on the production of nuclear material 180 days
prior to commencing such activities.
But the poker game will go on, and in the coming days and weeks will perhaps become
even more heated. But regardless of whether or not the issue gets taken up by the
Security Council, the force and potency of Iran's communicative ability, reflected in
its statement in the New York Times, will be hard, if not impossible, to ignore.
Softening positions
Ahead of the IAEA meeting, Indian analysts are seeing indications of a softening in
the stands of a number of countries, writes Praful Bidwai
(http://www.prafulbidwai.net) of Inter Press Service
(http://www.antiwar.com/bidwai/?articleid=8056).
India, which signed a deal with the U.S. in July for the transfer of civilian nuclear
technology, voted along with the U.S. and the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany)
against Iran in September at a meeting of the IAEA's board of governors, preparing
the ground for Tehran's possible referral to the Security Council.
But India has just announced that it would keep the Iran issue within the "IAEA's
jurisdiction" and not send it to the UN. The decision was taken under the weight of
domestic public opinion.
The U.S., meanwhile, has endorsed a compromise proposal made by Russia, under which
Iran would be allowed to convert uranium oxide (yellowcake) to uranium hexafluoride
gas, but not to enrich it. Instead, Russia would enrich the uranium and send it back
to Iran to be used as fuel in nuclear power plants. Indications of a change in
Washington's stand have come from senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
(http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1213).
Last week, Bush met Russian President Vladimir Putin in South Korea and soon after
the meeting, Stephen Hadley said: "We hope that over time, Iran will see the virtue
of this approach and it may provide a way out".
The EU-3 have also backed the Russian-brokered compromise. Iran first rejected the
proposal, but subsequently said it would consider it.
"Evidently, the U.S. and the EU-3 have decided that their hardline stance towards
Iran isn't working", says A K Pasha, professor at the Center of West Asian Studies at
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. "The U.S. is in deep trouble in Iraq, where
its policies have created a deep Shia-Sunni rift. It knows Iran wields great
influence among the Iraqis and can create further trouble for Washington. So it's
willing to revise its earlier tough policy and give a negotiated compromise a
chance".
Russia and China have also made known their opposition to Iran's referral to the
Security Council. In September, they both abstained from voting against Iran, along
with a majority of states of the NAM, a glaringly notable exception being India.
Their hands, as well as those of the NAM, were strengthened by ElBaradei's latest
report.
Differing viewpoints
The main players in the Iran saga all spelt out their positions at a recent meeting
in Helsinki organized by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, writes Milla
Sundstrom of IPS (http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31110).
The meeting, ambitiously named "Solving the Iranian Nuclear Issue"
(http://www.upi-fiia.fi/tilaisuudet/2005/iran.htm), confronted the deadlock over
whether or not Iran is developing its nuclear power program to give it weapons
capacity.
Much of the dispute centers on the NPT of 1970, which Iran says gives signatories the
right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But Iran is under pressure to
open up this program for inspection. The EU-3 have since 2003 tried to persuade Iran
to be more transparent for IAEA scrutiny.
Peter Jenkins
(http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1085325010480),
British representative at the IAEA, said Article IV of the NPT, which guarantees the
right to develop nuclear energy, "cannot and should not be read in isolation".
Article IV was never intended to be "at the expense of the non-proliferation
objective", he said.
"From this it follows, in our view, that the Article IV rights of a state which,
through its own action, bring into question its commitment to the non-proliferation
objective, are compromised until such time as confidence in its commitment to
non-proliferation is re-established", Peter Jenkins said.
Iran insists that it wants fissile material production capability in order to become
self-sufficient in nuclear energy production. Last week it resumed preparation for
uranium enrichment at its nuclear plant at Isfahan, in the face of a directive from
the IAEA on September 24 to halt all enrichment activities.
Dr. Mostafa Zahrani
(http://www.american-iranian.org/pubs/aicupdate/03242005.html#zahrani), director of
the Institute for Political and International Studies in Tehran, pointed to deep
differences in perceptions between Iran and the West. The very idea of the
"international community" is "ethnocentrically Western" in Iranian eyes, and "nobody
buys it in the Islamic world", he said.
Dr. Zahrani pointed out that Iran had signed the NPT, but Israel, the undeclared
nuclear power in the Middle East, had not. Why was it now so important that Iran
adhered to the NPT while nobody criticized Israel, Dr. Zahrani asked.
"In Egypt and in the region in general we are encouraged to acquire nuclear weapons",
he said. Iran sees the U.S. and Israel as the main threats to its security. But he
pointed out the limited potential of an Iranian atomic bomb: it would never be
capable of a second strike.
The reason Iran had not opened up to the IAEA was that it was isolated and needed to
survive, Dr. Zahrani said. He warned the international community against trying to
push Iran too far by threatening use of force. He said there are "powers" within Iran
that would like to see an increase in tension.
But what is the way out of the stalemate?
"You have to know the Iranian people", Dr. Zahrani said. He pointed out that
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who has upset the West on several occasions since
coming to power in June, was elected democratically. The West was on a collision
course with the Iranian people and not just its president, Dr. Zahrani said.
"What the people want is to develop and have technology, and not rely on the
international community, which has isolated and sanctioned Iran earlier", he said.
American neocon George Perkovich
(http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=George_Perkovich) from the
Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said ambiguities in the
NPT were partly to blame. The treaty "never defined what a nuclear weapon was", he
said. The IAEA was tasked to verify that technology was used for peaceful purposes
only, but it had no access to military sites, he said.
George Perkovich said the IAEA board meeting this week will be marked by "a sense
that one can't pretend any more that this should not be reported to the Security
Council".
* Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, holds a Ph.D. in political science from Boston University. He
has completed post-doctoral studies at Harvard University and UC Berkeley, and he has
collaborated with the UN Program on Dialogue Among Civilizations
(http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2001/issue2/0102p54.htm). Dr. Afrasiabi is author
of several books and numerous articles, including "After Khomeini: New Directions in
Iran's Foreign Policy"
(http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0813321158/102-7616745-8791338),
"Iran's Foreign Policy Since 9/11", Brown's Journal of World Affairs, co-authored
with former deputy foreign minister Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003
(http://www.caspianstudies.com/article/Iran's%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf). Dialogue of
Theologies As Dialogue of Civilizations (Global Scholarly Press, forthcoming),
"Communicative theory and theology", Harvard Theological Review, and many articles in
the New York Times, Telos, Brown's Journal of World Affairs, UN Chronicle
(http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2003/issue1/0103p75.html), Middle East Journal,
International Herald Tribune, and the San Francisco Chronicle. He recently
co-authored "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", The Brown Journal of World
Affairs, Volume XII, issue 1, Summer 2005, with [anti-Iran Turkish Prof. Mustafa
Kibaroglu] (http://www.bjwa.org/index.php?issue=12.1). Dr. Afrasiabi teaches
political science at Tehran University.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GK12Ak03.html
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GK23Ak02.html
Appendix: Iran's nuclear statement
(Note: This report is posted verbatim.)
An Unnecessary Crisis: Setting the Record Straight about Iran's Nuclear Program
In a region already suffering from upheaval and uncertainty, a crisis is being
manufactured in which there will be no winners. Worse yet, the hysteria about the
dangers of an alleged Iran nuclear weapon program rest solely and intentionally on
misperceptions and outright lies. In the avalanche of anti-Iran media commentaries,
conspicuously absent is any reference to important facts, coupled with a twisted
representation of the developments over the past 25 years. Before the international
community is lead to another "crisis of choice", it is imperative that the public
knows all the facts and is empowered to make an informed and sober decision about an
impending catastrophe.
1. Systematic Pattern of Denial of Iran's Rights and Its Impact on Transparency
Since early 1980s, Iran's peaceful nuclear program and its inalienable right to
nuclear technology have been the subject of the most extensive and intensive campaign
of denial, obstruction, intervention and misinformation.
a.. Valid and binding contracts to build nuclear power plants were unilaterally
abrogated;
a.. Nuclear material rightfully purchased and owned by Iran was illegally withheld;
a.. Exercise of Iran's right as a shareholder in several national and multinational
nuclear power corporations was obstructed;
a.. Unjustified and coercive interventions were routinely made in order to undermine,
impede and delay the implementation of Iran's nuclear agreements with third parties;
and
a.. Unfounded accusations against Iran's exclusively peaceful nuclear program were
systematically publicized.
As a result, and merely in order to prevent further illegal and illegitimate
restrictions on its ability to procure its needed materials and equipments, Iran had
been left with no option but to be discrete in its perfectly legal and exclusively
peaceful activities. In doing so, Iran broke no laws nor diverted its peaceful
program to military activities. It only refrained from disclosing the details of its
programs. In nearly all cases, it was not even obliged to disclose these programs
under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Therefore, while Iran's rights under the NPT continued to be grossly and
systematically violated, and while major state parties to the Treaty persisted in
their non-compliance with many of their obligations under Articles I, IV and VI of
the Treaty in general, and under paragraph 2 of Article IV vis-?-vis Iran in
particular, Iran nevertheless continued to diligently comply with all its obligations
under the Treaty.
2. Nuclear Technology OR Nuclear Weapons?
a..
A vicious cycle of restrictions on Iran's nuclear program and attempts by Iran to
circumvent them through concealment and black market acquisitions have fueled mutual
suspicions. In this self-perpetuating atmosphere, the conclusion is already drawn
that Iran's declared peaceful nuclear program is just a cover for developing atomic
weapons. But this conclusion is based on two erroneous assumptions, which have been
repeated often enough to become conventional wisdom.
a..
2.1 - Iran Needs Nuclear Energy
a..
2.1.1. Nuclear Energy for an Oil-Rich Country
a..
The first is that Iran has vast oil and gas resources and therefore does not need
nuclear energy. Although it is true that Iran is rich in oil and gas, these resources
are finite and, given the pace of Iran's economic development, they will be depleted
within two to five decades. With a territory of 1,648,000 km2 and a population of
about 70 million, projected to be more than 105 million in 2050, Iran has no choice
but to seek access to more diversified and secure sources of energy. Availability of
electricity to 46,000 villages now, compared to 4400 twenty five years ago, just as
an example, demonstrates the fast growing demand for more energy. And the
youthfulness of the Iranian population, with around 70% under 30, doesn't allow
complacency when it comes to energy policy. To satisfy such growing demands, Iran
can't rely exclusively on fossil energy. Since Iranian national economy is still
dependant on oil revenue, it can't allow the ever increasing domestic demand affect
the oil revenues from the oil export.
2.1.2. US Support for Iranian Nuclear Program
a..
Iran's quest for nuclear energy picked momentum following a study in 1974 carried out
by the prestigious US-based Stanford Research Institute, which predicted Iran's need
for nuclear energy and recommended the building of nuclear plants capable of
generating 20,000 megawatts of electricity before 1994. Now, 30 years later, Iran
aims at reaching that level by 2020, which may save Iran 190 million barrels of crude
oil or $10 billion per year in today's prices.
Therefore, Iran's nuclear program is neither ambitious nor economically
unjustifiable. Diversification - including the development of nuclear energy - is the
only sound and responsible energy strategy for Iran. Even the US State Department was
convinced of this in 1978 when it stated in a memo that the U.S. was encouraged by
Iran's efforts to expand its non-oil energy base and was hopeful that the U.S.-Iran
Nuclear Energy Agreement would be concluded soon and that U.S. companies would be
able to play a role in Iran's nuclear energy projects.
2.1.3. Nuclear Fuel Cycle
a..
Producing fuel for its nuclear power plants is an integral part of Iran's nuclear
energy policy. While domestic production of fuel for this number of nuclear power
plants makes perfect economic sense, Iran's decision should not be judged solely on
economic grounds. Having been a victim of a pattern of deprivation from peaceful
nuclear material and technology, Iran cannot solely rely on procurement of fuel from
outside sources. Such dependence would in effect hold Iran's multi-billion dollar
investment in power plants hostage to the political whims of suppliers in a tightly
controlled market. Furthermore, it is self evident that the time-consuming efforts to
gain the necessary technology and develop the capability for fuel production must
proceed simultaneously with the acquisition and construction of nuclear power plants.
Otherwise constructed plans may become obsolete in case of denial of fuel without a
contingency capacity to produce it domestically.
2.2. Iran Does Not Need Nuclear Weapons for Its Security
a..
The second false assumption is that because Iran is surrounded by nuclear weapons in
all directions - the U.S., Russia, Pakistan and Israel - any sound Iranian
strategists must be seeking to develop a nuclear deterrent capability for Iran as
well.
It is true that Iran has neighbors with abundant nuclear weapons, but this does not
mean that Iran must follow suit. In fact, the predominant view among Iranian
decision-makers is that development, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons
would only undermine Iranian security. Viable security for Iran can be attained only
through inclusion and regional and global engagement. Iran's history is the perfect
illustration of its geo-strategic outlook. Over the past 250 years, Iran has not
waged a single war of aggression against its neighbors, nor has it initiated any
hostilities.
Iran today is the strongest country in its immediate neighborhood. It does not need
nuclear weapons to protect its regional interests. In fact, to augment Iranian
influence in the region, it has been necessary for Iran to win the confidence of its
neighbors, who have historically been concerned with size and power disparities.
On the other hand, Iran, with its current state of technological development and
military capability, cannot reasonably rely on nuclear deterrence against its
adversaries in the international arena or in the wider region of the Middle East.
Moreover, such an unrealistic option would be prohibitively expensive, draining the
limited economic resources of the country. In sum, a costly nuclear-weapon option
would reduce Iran's regional influence and increase its global vulnerabilities
without providing any credible deterrence.
There is also a fundamental ideological objection to weapons of mass destruction,
including a religious decree issued by the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran
prohibiting the development, stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons.
3. Negotiations with UK, France and Germany (EU3)
a..
3.1. Iran's Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures
a..
In October 2003, Iran entered into an understanding with France, Germany and the
United Kingdom with the explicit expectation to open a new chapter of full
transparency, cooperation and access to nuclear and other advanced technologies. Iran
agreed to a number of important transparency and voluntary confidence building
measures and immediately and fully implemented them.
a.. It signed and immediately began full implementation of the Additional Protocol;
a.. It opened its doors to one of the most expansive and intrusive IAEA inspections;
a.. It provided a detailed account of its peaceful nuclear activities, all of which
had been carried out in full conformity with its rights and obligations under the
NPT;
a.. It began and has continuously maintained for the past 2 years a voluntarily
suspension of its rightful enrichment of Uranium as a confidence building measure;
a.. It further expanded its voluntary suspension in February and November 2004,
following agreements with EU3 in Brussels and Paris respectively, to incorporate
activities which go well beyond the original IAEA's definition of "enrichment" and
even "enrichment-related" activities.
3.1.1. Resolution of Outstanding Issues
a..
Iran has worked closely with the IAEA, during the course of the last two years, to
deal with the issues and questions raised about its peaceful nuclear program. All
significant issues, particularly those related to the sources of HEU (Highly Enriched
Uranium) have now been resolved. Indeed, except for few mostly speculative questions,
nothing more remains to close this Chapter
3.1.2. No Indication of Non-Peaceful Activity
a..
The Agency's thorough inspections of Iran have repeatedly confirmed Iran's assertion
that no amount of inspection and scrutiny will ever show the slightest diversion into
military activity. The Director-General confirmed in Paragraph 52 of his November
2003 report that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared
nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons
programme." After one more year and over a thousand person-days of the most rigorous
inspections, the Director-General again confirmed in Paragraph 112 of his November
2004 report that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for,
and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities." This
conclusion has been repeatedly reaffirmed in every statement by responsible
authorities of the IAEA.
3.2. Broken Promises and Expanded Demands by the EU3
Regrettably, Iran received very little, if anything, in return for its transparency,
cooperation and voluntary suspension of the exercise of its legitimate and
inalienable right. The European negotiating partners, pressured by the US, instead of
carrying out their promises of cooperation and open access, have repeatedly called
for expansion of Iran's voluntary confidence building measures only to be
reciprocated by more broken promises and expanded requests:
a.. The October 2003 promises of the EU3 on nuclear cooperation and regional security
and non-proliferation was never even addressed.
a.. The February 2004 written and signed commitment by the EU3 to "work actively to
gain recognition at the June 2004 Board of the efforts made by Iran, so that the
Board works thereafter on the basis of Director-General reporting if and when he
deems it necessary, in accordance with the normal practice pertaining to the
implementation of Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol" was violated,
even though Iran had in fact carried out its part of the deal by expanding its
suspension to include assembly and component manufacturing. Instead, the EU3 proposed
a harsh resolution with further unjustifiable demands in June 2004;
a.. The EU3 never honored its recognition, in the Paris Agreement of November 2004,
of "Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under
the Treaty, without discrimination."
a.. In spite of its repeated and publicized claims, the EU3 never offered, throughout
the negotiations process, any meaningful incentives to Iran, other than empty and
demeaning "promises" of "consideration" of "possible future cooperation".
4. The Paris Agreement
a..
In November 2004, following extensive negotiations, Iran and EU3 agreed on a package
that has become known as the Paris Agreement. The objective of the Paris Agreement
was to "to move forward" in "negotiations, with a view to reaching a mutually
acceptable agreement on long term arrangements. The agreement will provide objective
guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. It
will equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic
cooperation and firm commitments on security issues."
The Paris Agreement envisaged that "while negotiations proceed on a mutually
acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements," and "to build further confidence,
Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to
include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities."
At the same time, the EU3 recognized "that this suspension is a voluntary confidence
building measure and not a legal obligation" as well as "Iran's rights under the NPT
exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without
discrimination."
The Paris Agreement rested on the premise that the purpose of the Agreement was
reaching mutually acceptable long term arrangements and that suspension was a
temporary measure for as long as negotiations were making progress. The Agreement
further envisaged specific mechanisms to monitor and assess progress.
4.1. March Report: Lack of Progress
a..
In March 2005, in accordance with the Paris Agreement, senior officials from Iran and
the three European countries were mandated to make an assessment of the progress that
had been achieved. The reports of over three months of negotiations by the working
groups, created by the Paris Agreement, made it evident that while there was every
prospect for reaching a negotiated solution based on the Paris Agreement, and while
Iran had made many significant and far-reaching proposals benefiting both sides, the
EU3, faced with extraneous pressure, were simply trying to prolong fruitless
negotiations. This policy, in addition to its devastating impact on mutual trust, was
detrimental to Iran's interests and rights as it attempted to superficially prolong
Iran's voluntary suspension by dragging the negotiations.
It also became evident that despite repeated requests by Iran from EU3
representatives to present their proposals and ideas on the implementation of various
provisions of the Paris Agreement to the working groups, the European three did not
have the intention or the ability to present its proposals on "objective guarantees
that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes [and] equally … firm
guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on
security issues" as called for in that Agreement.
In short, it became evident that after massive pressure from the United States in the
winter of 2005, the EU3 had conceded to unilaterally altering the Paris Agreement
into solely an instrument of de-facto cessation of Iranian peaceful enrichment
program, in violation of the letter and spirit of that Agreement.
4.2. Iran's Proposals
a..
In February 2005, Iran suggested to the EU3 to ask the IAEA to develop technical,
legal and monitoring modalities for Iran's enrichment program as objective guarantees
to ensure that Iran's nuclear program would remain exclusively for peaceful purposes.
While one member of EU3 accepted the suggestion, unfortunately the lack of consensus
among the EU3 prevented resort to the IAEA as an authoritative and impartial
framework for solving the impasse.
On March 23, 2005, in a clearly stated desire to salvage the Paris Agreement, Iran
offered a collection of solutions for objective guarantees suggested by various
independent scientist and observers from the United States and Europe. The package
included:
1. Strong and mutually beneficial relations between Iran and the EU/EU3, which would
provide the best guarantee for respect for the concerns of each side;
2. Confinement of Iran's enrichment program, in order to preclude through objective
technical guarantees any proliferation concern:
a. Open fuel cycle, to remove any concern about reprocessing and production of
plutonium;
b. Ceiling of enrichment at LEU level;
c. Limitation of the extent of the enrichment program to solely meet the contingency
fuel requirements of Iran's power reactors;
d. Immediate conversion of all enriched Uranium to fuel rods to preclude even the
technical possibility of further enrichment;
e. Incremental and phased approach to implementation in order to begin with the least
sensitive aspects of the enrichment program and to gradually move to enrichment as
confidence in the program would be enhanced;
3. Legislative and regulatory measures
a. Additional Protocol;
b. Permanent ban on the development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons through
binding national legislation;
c. Enhancement of Iran's export control regulations;
4. Enhanced monitoring
a. Continued implementation of the Additional Protocol; and
b. Continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the conversion and enrichment
facilities to provide unprecedented added guarantees.
4.2.1. EU3 Inability to React
a..
Extraneous pressure had resulted in the absence of any desire or ability by EU3 to
even consider any "objective guarantee" as called for in the Paris Agreement and
instead to maneuver to achieve a de-facto cessation of Iran's lawful activities. This
extraneous political element precluded even a serious review by EU3 of these
independently worked out proposals, which continue to have the most credible
potential of providing a basis for allaying all reasonable concerns.
Even Iran's further good-faith effort on April 29, 2005 to salvage the process by
suggesting the negotiated resumption of the work of the UCF- which had never had any
past alleged failures, and is virtually proliferation free - at low capacity and with
additional confidence building and surveillance and monitoring measures was rejected
outright by EU3 officials without even consideration at political level.
4.2.2. Prelude to Breakdown in Nuclear Talks
a..
Iran replied to such intransigence with self-restraint to ensure that no opportunity
was spared for an agreed settlement. In a ministerial meeting in Geneva in May 2005,
Iran agreed to extend the period of full suspension for another two months, in
response to a commitment made by the EU3 ministers to finally present their
comprehensive package for the implementation of the Paris Agreement by the end of
July or early August 2005, that is nearly nine months after the Agreement.
Iran made it clear in Geneva that any proposal by the EU3 must incorporate EU3's
perception of objective guarantees for the gradual resumption of the Iranian
enrichment program, and that any attempt to turn objective guarantees into cessation
or long-term suspension were incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Paris
Agreement and therefore unacceptable to Iran.
4.2.3. A Further Compromise Suggested by Iran
a..
Eager to salvage the negotiations, in a further message to the ministers, Iran
offered the most flexible solution to the EU3 as they were finalizing their package:
a.. Commencement of the work of Esfahan plant (UCF)
a.. At low capacity,
a.. Under full scope monitoring,
a.. Agreed arrangements for import of the feed material and export of the product;
a.. Initial limited operation at Natanz following further negotiations on a mutually
acceptable arrangement, or
a.. Allowing the IAEA to develop an optimized arrangement on numbers, monitoring
mechanism and other specifics;
a.. Full scale operation of Natanz:
a.. Based on a negotiated agreement;
a.. Synchronized with the fuel requirements of future light water reactors.
4.3. EU's Package: Too Many Demands, No Incentives
a..
Against all its sincere efforts and maximum flexibility, on 5 August 2005, Iran
received a disappointing proposal. It not only failed to address Iran's rights for
peaceful development of nuclear technology, but did not offer anything to Iran in
return. It even fell far short of correcting the illegal and unjustified restrictions
placed on Iran's economic and technological development, let alone providing firm
guarantees for economic, technological and nuclear cooperation and firm commitments
on security issues. While Iran had made it crystal clear that no incentive would be
sufficient to compromise Iran's inalienable right to all aspects of peaceful nuclear
technology, the offers of incentives incorporated in the proposal were in and of
themselves demeaning and totally incommensurate with Iran and its vast capabilities,
potentials and requirements.
4.3.1. Extra-Legal Demands of Binding Commitments from Iran
a..
The proposal self-righteously assumed rights and licenses for the EU3 which clearly
went beyond or even contravened international law and assumed obligations for Iran
which have no place in law or practice. It incorporated a series of one-sided and
self serving extra-legal demands from Iran, ranging from accepting infringements on
its sovereignty to relinquishing its inalienable rights.
It sought to intimidate Iran to accept intrusive and illegal inspections well beyond
the Safeguards Agreement or the Additional Protocol. It asked Iran to abandon most of
its peaceful nuclear program. It further sought to establish a subjective,
discriminatory and arbitrary set of criteria for the Iranian nuclear program, which
would have effectively dismantled most of Iran's peaceful nuclear infrastructure,
criteria that if applied globally would only monopolize the nuclear industry for the
Nuclear-Weapon States.
4.3.2. Vague, Conditional and Demeaning Offers to Iran
a..
The proposal had absolutely no firm guarantees or commitments and did not even
incorporate meaningful or serious offers of cooperation to Iran. It amounted to an
elongated but substantively shortened and self-servingly revised version of an offer
that had been proposed by EU3 and rejected by Iran in October 2004 even prior to the
Paris Agreement. This indicated that there was no attempt on the part of EU3 to even
take into consideration the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement in their
proposal.
This point is further illustrated by the fact that the proposal never even mentioned
the terms "objective guarantees", "firm guarantees" or "firm commitments", which were
the foundations of the Paris Agreement. Instead it tried to replace "objective
guarantees" with termination of Iran's hard gained peaceful nuclear program, and
replace "firm guarantees and firm commitments" with vague, conditional and partial
restatements of existing obligations.
In the area of security, the proposal did not go beyond repeating UN Charter
principles or previously-made general commitments. Worse yet, the proposal even
attempted to make EU3's commitment to these general principles of international law
optional, partial, and conditional by prefacing the segment with the following
statement: "The EU3 propose that, within the context of an overall agreement, this
section could include, inter alia, the following mutual commitments in conformity
with the Charter of the United Nations."
Another example is the negative security assurances provided in the proposal by the
nuclear-weapons states of the EU3. The proposal offered the mere repetition - only by
UK and France -- of a universal commitment already made by all nuclear weapon states
in 1995 to all NPT members. It even made the application of that commitment to Iran
contingent on an overall agreement by stating "Within the context of an overall
agreement and Iran's fulfillment of its obligations under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United Kingdom and France would be
prepared to reaffirm to Iran the unilateral security assurances given on 6 April
1995, and referred to in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995)."
In the area of technology cooperation, it failed to include even an indication - let
alone guarantees -- of the EU3 readiness to abandon or ease its violations of
international law and the NPT with regard to Iran's access to technology. For
instance, while under the NPT, the EU3 is obliged to facilitate Iran's access to
nuclear technology, the proposal makes a conditional and ambiguous offer "not to
impede participation in open competitive tendering." And far from the generally
advertised offer of EU cooperation with Iran in construction of new nuclear power
plants, the proposal generously offered to "fully support long-term co-operation in
the civil nuclear field between Iran and Russia."
In the area of economic cooperation, the proposal only included a conditional recital
of already existing commitments and arrangements. While most of the document amounted
to general promises of future considerations, even specific offers went no further
than conditional expressions of "readiness to discuss." Two examples may be
sufficient in this regard: "The EU3 would continue to promote the sale of aircraft
parts to Iran and be willing to enter into discussion about open procurement of the
sale of civil passenger aircraft to Iran." Or, "the EU3 and Iran, as well as the
Commission, would discuss possible future oil and gas pipeline projects."
This proposal made it self-evident that negotiations were not "proceeding" as called
for in the Paris Agreement, due to EU3 policy of disregarding the requirements of
that Agreement, reverting to their pre-Agreement positions, and prolonging a
semblance of negotiations without the slightest attempt to move forward in fulfilling
their commitments under the Tehran or Paris Agreements. This protracted continuation
was solely designed to keep the suspension in place for as long as it takes to make
"cessation" a fait accompli. This was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Paris
Agreement and was not in line with principles of good faith negotiations.
In short, the proposal, read objectively in the context of the negotiating history of
the Paris Agreement as well as its letter and spirit, clearly illustrates the total
abandonment of that Agreement by the EU3, who have conveniently accused Iran of the
same.
4.3.3. Minimal Reaction from Iran
a..
After such a long period of negotiations and all that Iran had done and continues to
do in order to restore confidence as well as the flexibility that Iran has shown,
there was no pretext for any further delay in the implementation of the first phase
of Iran's proposal, by limited resumption of UCF at Esfahan, which has been free from
any past alleged failures, and is virtually proliferation free. In this context, Iran
informed the Agency of its decision to resume the uranium conversion activities at
the UCF in Esfahan and asked the Agency to be prepared for the implementation of the
Safeguards related activities in a timely manner prior to the resumption of the UCF
activities.
4.4. Who Violated the Paris Agreement?
a..
According to the Paris Agreement, "the suspension will be sustained while
negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements."
It also envisaged a mechanism for assessment of progress within three months. In the
meeting of 23 March 2005, it was clear that there had been no progress over the
preceding three months. As a clearly-stated attempt to salvage the agreement, Iran
made its March 23rd proposal in terms of a package of objective guarantees.
The refusal of the EU3 to even consider that package coupled with their behavior in
the course of the negotiations, their August 2005 proposal and their repeated
statements during the time of the presentation of that proposal and since then made
in abundantly clear that under pressure from the US following the Paris Agreement,
the EU3 had decided to unilaterally change the nature of the Paris Agreement. This
amounted to a breach of the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement as well as the
principle of good-faith negotiations.
The EU3 negotiating posture and the empirical evidence of lack of progress had in
fact removed any onus from Iran to continue the suspension. However, Iran decided to
maintain the suspension of all enrichment related activities and resume only the UCF
process, which is by definition a pre-enrichment process. Therefore, the assertion
that Iran broke the Paris Agreement is a self-serving and factually false
proposition. In fact, the reverse is the case.
5. Iran Goes the Extra Mile for a Negotiated Solution
a..
The Islamic Republic of Iran has always wanted to ensure that no effort is spared in
order to reach a negotiated resumption of its enrichment activities. It, therefore,
engaged in good faith and intensive negotiations with the EU3 and other interested
delegations during the Summit of the United Nations in September 2005 in order to
remove obstacles to the resumption of good-faith and result-oriented negotiations in
accordance with established rights and obligations under the NPT. In this context,
Iran responded positively to a proposal which would have removed any concern about
the continued operation of the UCF in Esfahan at lower capacity for a specific period
to allow negotiations to reach results. Iran also agreed to resume negotiations with
the EU3 and to consider all proposals that had been presented.
Furthermore, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his address to the
General Assembly on September 17, 2005, made yet another far reaching offer of added
guarantee by inviting international partnership in Iran's enrichment activities.
While the President reiterated that Iran's right to have fuel cycle technology was
not negotiable, he presented the following confidence-building positions and
proposals in his statement:
a.. Readiness for constructive interaction and a just dialogue in good faith;
a.. Prohibition of pursuit of nuclear weapons in accordance with religious
principles;
a.. Necessity to revitalize the NPT;
a.. Cooperation with the IAEA as the centerpiece of Iran's nuclear policy;
a.. Readiness to continue negotiations with the EU3;
a.. Readiness to consider various proposals that have been presented;
a.. Welcome the proposal of South Africa to move the process forward;
a.. Acceptance of partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in
the implementation of uranium enrichment program in Iran which engages other
countries directly and removes any concerns.
6. Abuse of IAEA Machinery
a..
Regrettably, the EU3, pressed by the United States, adopted a path of confrontation
in the September 2005 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. In clear violation of their
October 2003 and November 2004 commitments, the EU3moved a politically motivated and
factually and legally flawed resolution in the IAEA Board of Governors, and together
with the United States and using all their combined diplomatic and economic leverages
imposed it on the Board through an unprecedented resort to voting rather than the
previously unbroken practice of consensus.
6.1. No Legal or Factual Grounds for IAEA "Findings"
The imposed resolution makes a mockery of the proceedings of the Board of Governors
by rehashing alleged failures that had already been dealt with in the November 2003
Board. At that time, despite the existence of ambiguities and serious questions on
important issues such as the source of HEU contamination, "findings" of
"non-compliance" or "absence of confidence" in the exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran's program were impossible.
The Board refrained from making such findings in 2003 not because of a now-claimed
"voluntary restraint" by EU3, but because such were factually and legally impossible
due to the nature of failures - which were solely of technical reporting character --
and also because of the fact that the Director-General had specifically stated in his
November 2003 report that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously
undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a
nuclear weapons programme."
It is ironic that after two years of cooperation, over 1200 person/days of intrusive
inspections, resolution of nearly all outstanding issues particularly the foreign
source of contamination, and after repeated reiteration of the finding of
non-diversion including the conclusion in the IAEA November 2004 report that "all the
declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material
is not diverted to prohibited activities," the imposed resolution discovered ex post
facto that the failures "detailed in Gov/2003/75 [the aforementioned report of
November 2003] constitutes non-compliance."
6.2. The Real Story: Pressure to Deny Iran's Inalienable Rights
While the resolution attempted to create a convenient - albeit false - pretext of
these alleged and old reporting failures for its so-called "findings", it is
abundantly clear that the reason for production of this resolution was by no means
those alleged failures, but instead the resumption of Iran's perfectly legal and
safeguarded activities in Esfahan.
In this context, it must be underlined that all States party to the NPT, without
discrimination, have an inalienable right to produce nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes. As this right is "inalienable", it cannot be undermined or curtailed under
any pretext. Any attempt to do so, would be an attempt to undermine a pillar of the
Treaty and indeed the Treaty itself.
Iran, like any other Non-Nuclear-Weapon State, had no obligation to negotiate and
seek agreement for the exercise of its "inalienable" right, nor could it be obligated
to suspend it. Suspension of Uranium enrichment, or any derivative of such
suspension, is a voluntary and temporary confidence-building measure, effectuated by
Iran in order to enhance cooperation and close the chapter of denials of access to
technology imposed by the west on Iran. It is not an end in itself, nor can it be
construed or turned into a permanent abandonment of a perfectly lawful activity,
thereby perpetuating, rather than easing, the pattern of denial of access to
technology.
The suspension of Uranium enrichment has been in place for nearly two years, with all
its economic and social ramifications affecting thousands of families. The EU3 failed
to remove any of the multifaceted restrictions on Iran's access to advanced and
nuclear technology. In a twist of logic, it even attempted to prolong the suspension,
thereby trying to effectively widen its restrictions instead of fulfilling its
commitments of October 2003 and November 2004 to remove them.
As the IAEA Board of Governors had underlined in its past and current resolution,
suspension "is a voluntary, non-legal binding confidence building measure". When the
Board itself explicitly recognizes that suspension is "not a legally-binding
obligation", no wording by the Board can turn this voluntary measure into an
essential element for anything. In fact the Board of Governors has no factual or
legal ground, nor any statutory power, to make or enforce such a demand, or impose
ramifications as a consequence of it.
7. The Way Forward: No Coercion, Good-Faith Negotiations
a..
The recently imposed resolution on the IAEA Board of Governors is devoid of any legal
authority, and any attempt to implement it will be counter-productive and will leave
Iran with no option but to suspend its voluntary confidence building measures. The
threat of referral to the Security Council will only further complicate the issue and
will not alter Iran's resolve to exercise its legitimate and inalienable rights under
the NPT.
At the same time, Iran is determined to pursue good-faith interaction and
negotiations, based on equal footing, as the centerpiece of its approach to the
nuclear issue. A diplomatic and negotiated framework is the desired approach for a
successful outcome and Iran is ready to consider all constructive and effective
proposals.
Iran welcomes consultations and negotiations with other countries in order to
facilitate the work of the Agency and calls on the EU3 to replace the course of
confrontation with interaction and negotiation to reach understanding and agreement.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to non-proliferation and the elimination of
nuclear weapons, and considers nuclear weapons and capability to produce or acquire
them as detrimental to its security. Iran will continue to abide by its obligations
under the NPT and will continue to work actively for the establishment of a zone free
from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.