Iran's diplomacy in action
Arash
August 23, 2006
Iran's Diplomacy in Action
Dr. Abbas Maleki
Dr. Kevah Afrasiabi
After months of delay in responding to the package of incentives
offered by the UN Security Council's Permanent Five plus Germany [known
as the "P-5" (Permanent-five), also mockingly called the "H-5"
(Hereditary-five), to highlight the anachronism of their status in a
world that aspires to democracy: Britain, France, Russia, China and the
U.S. http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp ], Iran has submitted a detailed
and comprehensive response that puts the diplomatic ball squarely back
in the court of the P5+1.
While rejecting the UN's demand for an immediate halt to its
uranium-enrichment activities, Iran's response still leaves the door
open for serious negotiations, and perhaps an acceptable resolution of
the nuclear showdown for all parties.
By agreeing to put the issue of suspension of enrichment activities on
the table and to commence the talks immediately, Iran has sent a strong
signal that the internal debate between power centers in Iran's
leadership has ended in favor of voices of moderation seeking a
mutually satisfactory resolution of the nuclear standoff with the West.
It will be a pity if Washington overlooks this opportunity for a fair
negotiation with Iran, especially considering the details of Iran's
response.
Iran has, expectedly, sought clarification on a number of issues,
including the following:
* The incentive package mentions respecting Iran's rights under the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), yet the only NPT articles
mentioned are "Articles I" and "Articles II", pertaining to
non-proliferation, and not "Article IV", pertaining to a country's
"inalienable right" to acquire nuclear technology;
* Iran wants firm guarantees on the proposed offers of nuclear
assistance, such as the sale of light water reactors to Iran, as well
as a secured nuclear fuel supply;
* Iran seeks clarification on the status of U.S. sanctions which
presently prohibit those offers of nuclear and technological assistance
to Iran: Is the United States willing to lift some if not all of those
sanctions?
* The package's promise of an Iran-EURATOM cooperation agreement needs
to be fleshed out;
* The package's brief reference to security and its hint of Iran's
participation in a "regional security" arrangement needs further
clarification; and,
* The timeline on the promised incentives, including the economic and
trade incentives, has to be made specific.
Furthermore, Iran's response indicates that Iran is willing to re-adopt
the IAEA's Additional Protocol and to take the steps toward legislating
it as part and parcel of a final agreement.
Meanwhile, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, has declared
Iran's willingness to use its influence in Lebanon for an
Israeli-Hizbullah prisoners' exchange, reminding the world of Iran's
stabilizing role.
Clearly, given the tight interplay between the nuclear issue and Iran's
political identity, no one should be surprised that Iran's leaders have
opted against committing political suicide by giving in to
international pressure and suspending the nuclear fuel cycle. But, far
from rejecting this demand, Iran's response makes rather clear its
feasibility as a result of the proposed talks, which Iran is willing to
commence immediately, particularly if Iran's abstract rights under
Article IV of NPT are explicitly recognized by the P5+1.
In light of the rights-sensitive Iranian public, Tehran will seriously
entertain suspending the fuel cycle if and when it feels vindicated as
a matter of principle, in a manner which creates conditions conducive
to the idea of suspensions. A face-saving solution appears in which
Iran could decide against implementing as an abstract right hitherto
thwarted by the P5+1.
And now the UN Security Council, which had given Iran until the end of
August to halt its nuclear fuel cycle, has a unique role to play either
as spoiler or catalyst with respect to the opportunity afforded by
Iran's response -- to put the genie of Iran's nuclear crisis back in
the bottle. Already Kofi Annan is directly involved in intense
negotiations with Tehran, and, indeed, resolving the nuclear row may
turn out to be one of the enduring legacies of the departing Secretary
General.
Should the United States and its UN envoy, John Bolton, decide to
ignore this opportunity and push for UN sanctions against Iran, despite
the positive dimensions of Iran's offer, the stage will be set for a
full-scale international crisis.
* Dr. Abbas Maleki was born in Tehran in 1957. He received his B.Sc.
and M.S. in Mechanical and Industrial Engineering from Sharif
(Aryamehr) University of Technology in Tehran. He has a Ph.D. in
Strategic Management from the High University for Strategic Sciences,
and in 1998, he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate from the Kazakh
Academy of Sciences. He is an Assistant Professor at Sharif University
of Technology and has taught such diverse subjects as Change Management
in MBA programs, Iranian Foreign Policy, the Iranian Revolution, and
Iran and its Neighbors. He has served as Director General of the
International Institute for Caspian Studies, IICS
(http://tinyurl.com/zdvwd) since 1997 and as Cultural Advisor to the
Chancellor of Sharif University of Technology since 2004. He is a
Member of the Board of Directors for the Islamic Culture Publishing
Organisation and Deputy for International Affairs in the Office of the
Grand Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani. He has been the Director of the
International Relations Research Department at the Center for Strategic
Research and Advisor to the President of the National Academy of Art in
Iran since 2000; he has held the post of General Manager of Petropars
Institute for Oil and Gas since 2004 and that of Collaborator in the
Task Force on the Caucasus in the Centre for European Policy Studies
(CEPS) in Brussels since 1999; he is a Member of the Editorial Advisory
Board for "Iran & the Caucasus", a Member of the Editorial Board,
"Raahbord (Strategy) Journal", Center for Strategic Research (CSR),
Tehran, and has been Member of the Editorial Board for "Central Asia
and The Caucasus Journal" (Central Asia and the Caucasus Information
and Analytical Center, Sweden) since 2001. Professor Maleki has
published widely on matters of strategic thinking, economics,
international relations, Iranian foreign policy, and Iranian gas and
oil policies. He has also published and presented extensively, both in
Iran and abroad, on the Caspian Sea and Region, Central Asia and the
Caucasus, and Islam and Iranian culture. At Harvard University
(http://tinyurl.com/hp2r4), he is working on energy security, emerging
energy dialogue between the Middle East and East Asia, the Caspian Sea
legal regime, and Persian Gulf collective security.
* Dr. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, holds a Ph.D. in political science from
Boston University. He has completed post-doctoral studies at Harvard
University and UC Berkeley, and he has collaborated with the UN Program
on Dialogue Among Civilizations (http://tinyurl.com/e4q4r). Dr.
Afrasiabi is author of several books and numerous articles, including
"After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy"
(http://tinyurl.com/dyg67), "Iran's Foreign Policy Since 9/11", Brown's
Journal of World Affairs, co-authored with former deputy foreign
minister Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003 (http://tinyurl.com/74bun [PDF]).
Dialogue of Theologies As Dialogue of Civilizations (Global Scholarly
Press, forthcoming), "Communicative theory and theology", Harvard
Theological Review, and many articles in the New York Times, Telos,
Brown's Journal of World Affairs, UN Chronicle
(http://tinyurl.com/7faxb), Middle East Journal, International Herald
Tribune, and the San Francisco Chronicle. He recently co-authored
"Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", The Brown Journal of World
Affairs, Volume XII, issue 1, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu
(http://tinyurl.com/aze2v). He is also author of "Iran's Nuclear
Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction"
(http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1419630393/). Dr. Afrasiabi teaches
political science at Tehran University.