Agence Global
August 23, 2006
Iran's Diplomacy in
Action
Dr. Abbas Maleki
Dr. Kevah Afrasiabi
After months of delay in responding to the
package of incentives offered by the UN Security Council's Permanent Five plus
Germany [known as the "P-5" (Permanent-five), also mockingly called the "H-5"
(Hereditary-five), to highlight the anachronism of their status in a world that
aspires to democracy: Britain, France, Russia, China and the U.S.
http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp ], Iran has
submitted a detailed and comprehensive response that puts the diplomatic ball
squarely back in the court of the P5+1.
While rejecting the UN's demand
for an immediate halt to its uranium-enrichment activities, Iran's response
still leaves the door open for serious negotiations, and perhaps an acceptable
resolution of the nuclear showdown for all parties.
By agreeing to put
the issue of suspension of enrichment activities on the table and to commence
the talks immediately, Iran has sent a strong signal that the internal debate
between power centers in Iran's leadership has ended in favor of voices of
moderation seeking a mutually satisfactory resolution of the nuclear standoff
with the West. It will be a pity if Washington overlooks this opportunity for a
fair negotiation with Iran, especially considering the details of Iran's
response.
Iran has, expectedly, sought clarification on a number of issues,
including the following:
* The incentive package mentions respecting
Iran's rights under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), yet the only NPT
articles mentioned are "Articles I" and "Articles II", pertaining to
non-proliferation, and not "Article IV", pertaining to a country's "inalienable
right" to acquire nuclear technology;
* Iran wants firm guarantees on the
proposed offers of nuclear assistance, such as the sale of light water reactors
to Iran, as well as a secured nuclear fuel supply;
* Iran seeks
clarification on the status of U.S. sanctions which presently prohibit those
offers of nuclear and technological assistance to Iran: Is the United States
willing to lift some if not all of those sanctions?
* The package's
promise of an Iran-EURATOM cooperation agreement needs to be fleshed
out;
* The package's brief reference to security and its hint of Iran's
participation in a "regional security" arrangement needs further clarification;
and,
* The timeline on the promised incentives, including the economic
and trade incentives, has to be made specific.
Furthermore, Iran's
response indicates that Iran is willing to re-adopt the IAEA's Additional
Protocol and to take the steps toward legislating it as part and parcel of a
final agreement.
Meanwhile, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali
Larijani, has declared Iran's willingness to use its influence in Lebanon for an
Israeli-Hizbullah prisoners' exchange, reminding the world of Iran's stabilizing
role.
Clearly, given the tight interplay between the nuclear issue and
Iran's political identity, no one should be surprised that Iran's leaders have
opted against committing political suicide by giving in to international
pressure and suspending the nuclear fuel cycle. But, far from rejecting this
demand, Iran's response makes rather clear its feasibility as a result of the
proposed talks, which Iran is willing to commence immediately, particularly if
Iran's abstract rights under Article IV of NPT are explicitly recognized by the
P5+1.
In light of the rights-sensitive Iranian public, Tehran will
seriously entertain suspending the fuel cycle if and when it feels vindicated as
a matter of principle, in a manner which creates conditions conducive to the
idea of suspensions. A face-saving solution appears in which Iran could decide
against implementing as an abstract right hitherto thwarted by the
P5+1.
And now the UN Security Council, which had given Iran until the end
of August to halt its nuclear fuel cycle, has a unique role to play either as
spoiler or catalyst with respect to the opportunity afforded by Iran's response
-- to put the genie of Iran's nuclear crisis back in the bottle. Already Kofi
Annan is directly involved in intense negotiations with Tehran, and, indeed,
resolving the nuclear row may turn out to be one of the enduring legacies of the
departing Secretary General.
Should the United States and its UN envoy,
John Bolton, decide to ignore this opportunity and push for UN sanctions against
Iran, despite the positive dimensions of Iran's offer, the stage will be set for
a full-scale international crisis.
* Dr. Abbas Maleki was born
in Tehran in 1957. He received his B.Sc. and M.S.
in Mechanical and Industrial Engineering from Sharif (Aryamehr) University of
Technology in Tehran. He has a Ph.D. in Strategic Management from
the High University for Strategic Sciences,
and in 1998, he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate from the Kazakh Academy of
Sciences. He is an Assistant Professor at Sharif
University of Technology and has taught such diverse subjects as Change
Management in MBA programs, Iranian Foreign Policy, the Iranian Revolution,
and Iran and its Neighbors. He has served as
Director General of the International Institute for Caspian Studies, IICS (http://tinyurl.com/zdvwd) since 1997 and as
Cultural Advisor to the Chancellor of Sharif University of Technology since
2004. He is a Member of the Board of Directors for the Islamic Culture
Publishing Organisation and Deputy for International Affairs in the Office of
the Grand Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani. He has been the Director of the
International Relations Research Department at the Center for Strategic Research
and Advisor to the President of the National Academy of Art in Iran since 2000;
he has held the post of General Manager of Petropars Institute for Oil and Gas
since 2004 and that of Collaborator in the Task Force on the Caucasus in the
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels since 1999; he is a Member
of the Editorial Advisory Board for "Iran & the Caucasus", a Member of the
Editorial Board, "Raahbord (Strategy) Journal", Center for Strategic
Research (CSR), Tehran, and has been Member of the Editorial Board for "Central
Asia and The Caucasus Journal" (Central Asia and the Caucasus Information and
Analytical Center, Sweden) since 2001. Professor Maleki
has published widely on matters of strategic thinking, economics, international
relations, Iranian foreign policy, and Iranian gas and oil policies. He
has also published and presented extensively, both in Iran and abroad, on the Caspian Sea and
Region, Central Asia and the
Caucasus, and Islam and Iranian culture. At Harvard University (http://tinyurl.com/hp2r4), he is working on
energy security, emerging energy dialogue between the Middle
East and East Asia,
the Caspian Sea legal regime,
and Persian Gulf collective
security.
* Dr. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, holds a Ph.D. in political science from Boston
University. He has completed post-doctoral studies at Harvard University and UC
Berkeley, and he has collaborated with the UN Program on Dialogue Among
Civilizations (
http://tinyurl.com/e4q4r). Dr. Afrasiabi is author
of several books and numerous articles, including "After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy" (
http://tinyurl.com/dyg67),
"Iran's Foreign Policy Since 9/11", Brown's Journal of World Affairs,
co-authored with former deputy foreign minister Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003 (
http://tinyurl.com/74bun [PDF]). Dialogue of Theologies As Dialogue
of Civilizations (Global Scholarly Press, forthcoming), "Communicative theory
and theology", Harvard Theological Review, and many articles in the New York
Times, Telos, Brown's Journal of World Affairs, UN Chronicle (
http://tinyurl.com/7faxb), Middle East Journal, International Herald
Tribune, and the San Francisco Chronicle. He recently co-authored "Negotiating
Iran's Nuclear Populism", The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XII, issue
1, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu (
http://tinyurl.com/aze2v). He is also author of "Iran's Nuclear
Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction" (
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1419630393/). Dr. Afrasiabi teaches
political science at Tehran University.