A G Noorani: Sid Harth
bademiyansubhanallah
A G Noorani on the Crisis in the BJP
Frontline, July 04-17, 2009
Decline of the BJP
by A.G. Noorani
The party faces two distinct but related crises, organisational and
existential.
VIJAY KUMAR JOSHI/PTI
Senior BJP leaders Arun Jaitley, Sushma Swaraj and Jaswant Singh with
the party’s prime ministerial candidate L.K. Advani (extreme right)
during the launch of the BJP’s IT vision in New Delhi in March.
“When the members drop off, the main body cannot be insensible of its
approaching dissolution. Even the violence of their proceedings is a
signal of despair. Like broken tenants, who have had warning to quit
the premises, they curse their landlord, destroy the fixtures, throw
everything into confusion, and care not what mischief they do to the
estate.”
EVERY word of Junius’ censure on the abrupt resignation from the
Cabinet of the Duke of Grafton, delivered on February 14, 1770,
applies to the political pornography that is the public feuding in the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Not one of the performers has cared a
jot for the party while staging the obscene drama in public, least of
all the erstwhile Prime Minister-in-waiting Lal Krishna Advani and his
ambitious protege Arun Jaitley whom he has tried to anoint as his
successor. Advani, the ace manipulator and survivor, stands stripped
of moral authority. So are his opponents.
In this fight for power, the honours between them are evenly divided.
None of the excuses either side cites for the electoral defeat make
sense. Criticism of a shrill style and advocacy of moderation come
strangely from the shrillest of the lot, Arun Jaitley, who rasps
bitter comments with oracular pauses and was the staunchest supporter
of Narendra Modi in 2002 and since.
Where were Advani’s critics when he was mortgaging the BJP’s future
for immediate gains? Did they not believe in Hindutva, which he has
been propounding since 1989 and whose cause constituted the raison
d’etre of the BJP ever since it was formed in 1980? Where was the
concern for “the future” or for “moderation” when he went on a rath
yatra in 1990 and was privy to the conspiracy to demolish the Babri
Masjid on December 6, 1992, as two courts have found – the Special
Judicial Magistrate Mahipal Sirohi on August 27, 1994, and the
Additional Sessions Judge Jagdish Prasad Srivastava on September 9,
1997. The BJP’s defeat spared the country the humiliation of having as
Prime Minister a man who faced grave criminal charges in the Sessions
Court for over a decade but was able to avoid accountability to it. He
would have been truly “the one and only L.K. Advani”, as a TV anchor
gushingly hailed him.
The party faces two distinct but related crises, organisational and
existential. The first has been brilliantly analysed by Neena Vyas.
“For two or three decades, the party failed to put a younger
leadership in place. That is now the source of great anxiety and also
the cause of a lot of heartburn. Those in their sixties and seventies
are now doomed to become the ‘lost generation’ like Hemingway’s
characters in The Sun Also Rises….
“The change will almost certainly bypass those currently in their
sixties and seventies. It is this fact perhaps that led veteran
partyman Jaswant Singh to make common cause with colleagues Arun
Shourie and Yashwant Sinha to attack the BJP general secretary and
Leader of Opposition in the Rajya Sabha Arun Jaitley at the core
committee meeting in New Delhi on Wednesday [June 10]…. Behind the
counter-offensive lurks the fear that ‘youngsters’ in their fifties –
the list includes Rajnath Singh, Narendra Modi, Sushma Swaraj, Arun
Jaitley, Ananth Kumar and Venkaiah Naidu – will seize the reins of
leadership, leaving the ‘lost generation’ out in the cold. This seems
to have brought together Jaswant Singh (71), Yashwant Sinha (72) and
Arun Shourie (67). Unless they stand, fight, and be counted now, they
would meet the fate of Hemingway’s characters” (The Hindu, June 13,
2009).
The rebel’s ire is not at the lapses, grave as they were. It is at the
defeat. It coupled the dimmed prospects of recovery with the race of
time against their own prospects. They were more sanguine in 2004. Had
the BJP won, all sins could have been forgiven once Advani began
doling out the loaves and fishes of office. As Count Ciano, Italy’s
Foreign Minister and son-in-law of Mussolini, wrote in his diary on
September 9, 1942, “Victory has a hundred fathers, but defeat is an
orphan.”
TWO VIEWS
Two views have emerged within the Sangh Parivar. One advocates a
return to Hindutva. The other, its repackaging. The first comes from
the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) The second comes from the BJP’s
ruling establishment and from sympathisers in the media and academia.
Even some avowed secularists join in this cry. They would have the BJP
emerge as a rightist conservative party with a soft Hindutva to
coincide with their own soft secularism [emphasis added, throughout].
This is what distinguishes them from Nehru’s secularism. He gave
battle to the Parivar. They find common ground with the BJP in
rejection of Nehru’s secularism and his world view, generally.
In-house critics who accuse the BJP of “ideological confusion” betray
their own confusion if not, indeed, intellectual dishonesty, when they
advocate “a non-communal pro-Hindu organisation committed to the ideal
of Hindu unity and renaissance”. It is an oxymoron. Both “Hindutva”
and its synonym “cultural nationalism” are well defined in the Sangh
Parivar’s texts.
M.S. Golwalkar’s Bunch of Thoughts denounces “Territorial
Nationalism” (Chapter X). Everyone born in India is not an Indian. He
must embrace “Hindu culture”. That is a cultural nationalism, that is,
“revert to the truth of our nationalism as an ancient fact and the
Hindus being the national society of Bharat”. He lauded V.D.
Savarkar’s essay Hindutva, condemned secularists and cited three
“Internal Threats” – the Muslims, the Christians and the Communists
(Chapter XII).
You can no more redefine Hindutva to make it acceptable to Muslims or
redefine “cultural nationalism” to make it “inclusive” than you can
define fascism to make it acceptable to democrats or racism to make it
“inclusive”.
VIVEK BENDRE
Advani and former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at a rally to
commemorate the death anniversary of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, the
founder of the Jan Sangh, on June 23, 2004. In 1985, when the BJP took
stock of its abject defeat and Vajpayee was asked whether it marked a
return to the Jan Sangh, he countered, “When did we get away from Jan
Sangh?”
Such pleas are dishonest, not simply ignorant. The Oxford Concise
Dictionary of Politics, edited by Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan,
can cure political illiteracy, not intellectual dishonesty (Oxford
University Press; 606 pages, Rs.345. The Second Edition). Its co-
editor, Alistair McMillan, Research Officer, Nuffield College, Oxford,
defines Hindutva thus: “Translated as Hinduness, it refers to the
ideology of Hindu nationalists, stressing the common culture of the
inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent. The term originated in
Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (1923) by V.D. Savarkar (1883-1966), written
whilst imprisoned by the British. Influenced by the Italian
nationalist Mazzini, Savarkar stresses the need to preserve the
cultural purity of the Hindu nation, and resist the incursion of alien
practice. Modern politicians have attempted to play down the racial
and anti-Muslim aspects of Hindutva, stressing the inclusiveness of
the Indian identity, but the term has fascist undertones.”
Note the precision and the nuances. He refers to the correct meaning,
the desperate attempts to play it down and to its clear “fascist
undertones”. There is an even more authoritative definition. It is by
the RSS supremo Mohan Bhagwat in a speech at a training camp in
Nagpur, reported by its organ Organiser (June 15). He said: “The only
prescription for all the ills confronting the nation today lies in the
philosophy of Hindutva. It is the bedrock of our national and social
life. It connotes the way of life and encompasses all the faiths and
languages in India…. Hindu and Hindutva represent the cultural
heritage of every Indian irrespective of his way of worship, religious
faith and language. Hindutva encompasses Hindus, Muslims, Christians
and Sikhs in India because it is the national identity of all of us.”
Organiser adds: “Taking a dig at those who prefer ‘Bharatiya’ to
‘Hindu’, the RSS Sarsanghchalak said the ‘Hindu’ does not connote the
mere geographical boundaries of India while Bharatiya has a mere
geographical connotation and cannot define the cultural dimensions
associated with the word ‘Hindu’.
“Giving historical proofs Shri Bhagwat said that those regions where
the Hindu population was reduced to minority or converted to other
faiths, got separated from India in the recent past. Loss of Hindutva
is the main reason behind the recent problems of internal security,
regionalism, separatism, etc. being faced by the country, he said.”
Two features deserve note. First, let alone Indian, even the term
“Bharatiya” is rejected because of its “geographical connotation”. The
cultural dimensions – that is, “cultural nationalism”, only the word
“Hindu” can denote. Secondly, while asserting that Hindutva
“encompasses” all communities, Bhagwat, like Deoras and other RSS
leaders before him, defines the word Hindu in one and the same speech
to mean the majority community – “the Hindu population was reduced to
minority or converted to other faiths.”
It is on such deception that commitments to Hindutva rest. Bhagwat
uttered a brazen falsehood when he said “our doors are open to all”.
The RSS rejected appeals by Jayaprakash Narayan in 1977 and A.B.
Vajpayee in 1979 to do precisely that.
POLITICAL COMPULSION
THE HINDU PHOTO LIBRARY
Advani on his Somnath-Ayodhya rath yatra, which led to the demolition
of the Babri Masjid and inflicted a deep scar on the Indian psyche.
The fact that the falsehoods are uttered under political compulsion
does not mitigate the offence. It only exposes the hypocrisy of the
apologists. That the BJP cannot nurse its core ideological
constituency and also expand its appeal at the same time was
recognised by Advani at the very moment the BJP was founded. He bared
the truth in an interview to none other than the RSS’ organ Panchjanya
(Deepavali 1980). “Advani: No. I do not agree with it for in India a
party based on ideology can at the most come to power in a small area.
It cannot win the confidence of the entire country… neither the
Communist Party nor the Jan Sangh in its original form.
Panchjanya: But by ignoring the ideological appeal will you be able to
keep together the cadres on the basis of these ideals?
Advani: Effort is being made to make them understand. That is why I
want the debate to go on. In this context, some people have criticised
me although even during the Jan Sangh days I used to advocate these
ideas. I have already said that the Jan Sangh was initially built as a
party based on ideology, but slowly it departed from that course.
Panchjanya: The appeal increased to the extent the ideology got
diluted. Wherever the ideology was strong, its appeal diminished.”
Contrast this with what Advani said on the eve of the Somnath-Ayodhya
rath yatra: “Ideologically, I am ranged against all political parties
because of this issue. All political parties think alike.” The issue
was clearly defined. It was not the Ram Janmabhoomi issue. It was a
“crusade in defence of Hindutva and a crusade against pseudo-
secularism.” Its goal is to break from the Nehru-Gandhi ethos and
recast the polity.
It is an error to hold that Advani or the BJP has no core beliefs.
Both have. But since they are not acceptable to a tolerant nation,
dissimulation is necessary. In 1990, inebriated with momentary
success, Advani fondly imagined that he would win the Hindu vote and
acquire a majority which would enable him to acquire the Babri Masjid
by legislation, without a court verdict. The idea has still not been
abandoned. The 2009 manifesto pledged, “There is an overwhelming
desire of the people in India and abroad to have a grand temple at the
birth place of Sri Ram in Ayodhya. The BJP will explore all
possibilities, including negotiations and judicial proceedings, to
facilitate the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya.” The
reference to “all possibilities”, apart from talks and litigation, is
a giveaway.
INCONVENIENT SECULARISM
AFP
Mohan Bhagwat, RSS chief, delivering a speech in New Delhi on March
31. "The only prescription for all the ills confronting the nation
today lies in the philosophy of Hindutva," he said at a training camp
in Nagpur recently.
So confident of success in riding to power on the strength of the
Hindu vote alone was Advani that he declared at Ayodhya on November,
19, 1990, that “henceforth only those who fight for Hindu interests
would rule India”. Secularism was an inconvenience. He complained on
October 2, 1990, that “secular policy is putting unreasonable
restrictions on Hindu aspirations”. That is the Advani which some
people wish he was not. But he very much is just that. Which is why,
on the 50th anniversary of India’s Independence, he wrote for the
party journal, not on a vision for India, but “A Four-Point Appeal to
Muslims of India” (BJP Today, June 16, 1997). He is obsessed with
Muslims. He demands that they should accept Hindu gods such as Ram and
Krishna as “sources of our national culture” but is pained when they
do not. That utterly illiberal document very much represents his “core
beliefs”.
It did not work. Allies, lured by power, helped in 1998, only to drift
apart later. It has been a monumental hoax. Sushma Swaraj exposed it
when she said in Bhopal on April 14, 2000, that the Ram Janmabhoomi
was “purely political in nature and had nothing to do with religion”.
It is foolish to expect the BJP to part company with the RSS. As Nehru
said of its ancestor, the Jan Sangh, “it was the illegitimate child of
the RSS” (The Hindu, January 6, 1952). In 1980, the Jan Sangh members
of the Janata Party had a clear choice when faced with criticism from
its colleagues on the RSS issue. On August 7, 1979, George Fernandes
alleged “a well-organised and smartly orchestrated exercise mounted by
the RSS-Jan Sangh forces for the total takeover of the Janata Party”.
In an obvious reference to Vajpayee and Advani, he wrote: “The
carefully cultivated self-abnegation postures of some RSS-Jan Sangh
leaders were but a flimsy facade for the power grabbing….” A little
over a decade later, he became their staunch ally.
The Jan Sanghis could have either revived the party or emerged with a
new ideology. They practised deception instead, they stole the Janata
Party’s name to cover up a revived Jan Sangh. Vajpayee said in an
interview in August 1980 that the BJP was different from the BJS “in
many ways…. Having tasted power once, we realised that unless we
became a party of the national mainstream and enjoyed support from all
sections, we could not become a national alternative.”
In 1985, when the BJP took stock of its abject defeat and Vajpayee was
asked whether it marked a return to the Jan Sangh, he countered, “When
did we get away from Jan Sangh?” On November 6, 1977, however, he had
said exactly the opposite. “When we joined the Janata Party we had
given up our old beliefs and faiths and there was no question of going
back.” No less revealing was his remark, on July 22, 1985, that “we
wanted to assert our views in the [Janata] government but the
government broke up too soon. Had we been in power for some more time
we would have imparted a new thinking to India’s politics.”
The Jan Sangh was set up in 1951 under a pact between Shyama Prasad
Mookerjee, a Hindu Mahasabhaite and follower of Savarkar, and
Golwalkar. The RSS would provide the cadre. The Jan Sangh would be the
political front.
This is the BJP’s raison d’etre. Why was the Jan Sangh set up in 1951
at all? The Congress continued as a political party after
Independence. So did the CPI. The Socialists broke away from the
Congress in 1948. The Swatantra Party was set up in 1959 as a
conservative party, but a secular one. Regional parties sprang up to
voice regional demands. The Jan Sangh was set up in 1951 to pursue the
communal policies of the RSS. The BJP was formed in 1980 to continue
that line.
Two presidents of the Jan Sangh – Mauli Chandra Sharma and Balraj
Madhok – were booted out by the RSS which also showed the door to one
president – so far – of the BJP, Advani. Speaking to an RSS gathering
in Coimbatore in 1990, Advani said: “While in the case of the BJS the
linkage (with the RSS) was only ideological, in the case of the BJP
the linkage is both ideological and historical. He asked his audience
to realise that ‘the BJP which you described as a good party is good
only because of its associations with the RSS’” (The Telegraph, May
17, 1990).
It is vain to expect men who have lived in bondage to the RSS to
reject its overlordship. A.V. Dicey’s remarks on internal limitations
are apt: “People sometimes ask the idle question why the Pope does not
introduce this or that reform? The true answer is that a revolutionist
is not the kind of man who becomes a Pope, and that the man who
becomes a Pope has no wish to be a revolutionist. Louis the Fourteenth
could not in all probability have established Protestantism as the
national religion of France, but to imagine Louis the Fourteenth as
wishing to carry out a Protestant reformation is nothing short of
imagining him to have been a being quite unlike the Grand Monarque.”
Not surprisingly, on June 1, Advani, Rajnath Singh, Arun Jaitley, Arun
Shourie and Sushma Swaraj repaired to Keshav Kunj, the RSS
headquarters in New Delhi, to meet its supremo Mohan Bhagwat. On June
14, after the civil war had broken out, the RSS ideologue M.G. Vaidya
warned: “If the BJP gives up Hindutva, it will automatically snap its
umbilical cord with the Sangh” – and lose its cadre’s support.
That is where lies and deception have brought the BJP. The Hindu youth
has no taste for the RSS’ mumbo jumbo – that Homer adapted Valmiki’s
Ramayana for his Iliad, Jesus Christ drew his ideas from Hinduism, and
so on. These historical discoveries and many more such figure in
textbooks taught in RSS-run schools (The Telegraph, November 18,
2000). The RSS’ attacks on the decadent culture of the West and such
hold no appeal for the young. It is proud to be Indian and its sights
are set on national progress.
The BJP can neither break from the RSS nor grow up to acquire a
national appeal. It can only exploit certain issues to acquire
temporary political mileage. In the days ahead both crises will become
acute and impart rancour – the organisational as well as the
existential crises. At the national executive on June 20 and 21,
Advani astutely allowed the critics to blow off the accumulated steam
and established his control. It remains to be seen whether the rebels
will acquiesce in the manipulation if he offers them some sops to keep
quiet.
bademiyansubhanallah
...and I am Sid Harth
Sid Harth
Communalism and its impact on India
1997 Montreal Lecture at CERAS
Prof. KN Panikkar
(Following is a summary of a lecture by the renowned historian KN
Panikkar. He was invited by CERAS, a forum of south Asians committed
to the defense of Secularism in the subcontinent and create awareness
about south Asian issues among the people of North America. The
following version of Prof. Panikkar's lecture is unauthorised and
unofficial. We may replace it soon with a properly authorised version,
checked by the author.--ed.)
I thank CERAS and thank you for providing me this opportunity to be
with you this evening to raise certainn issues which I suppose are of
common interest and concern. The sub-continent is in the process of
celebrating 50 years of independence. These celebrations have diverse
and different responses from different groups and agencies in
different regions in the sub-continent. It is obviously not only a
time for celebration for the people of India and Pakistan, but also a
time for self-questioning, introspection and also critically looking
at what happened during the last 50 years. I would say that such a
process is taking place really intensively in India, symbolized by
people in Parliament of India deciding to have a special session of 4
days to discuss about what happened in India during the last 50 years
and the ways in which India will progress in the future.
One very forceful problem, very important one for Indians, for people
of the sub-continent, to talk about and think about when looking to
the future, is the problem of communalism, which is a common concern
in the sub-continent as a whole. But before I get into a discussion of
that, let me recall what happened about a month back in the sub-
continent. Many of you I am sure would have heard about a very
outstanding singer of the sub-continent, Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan. He
passed away. When he passed away, the response in India, the reaction
in India, was extremely touching. Perhaps it was equally if not more
than the response in Pakistan, not only because he was responsible for
giving music concerts and did music for several Indian films, but he
was seen by the Indians as a cultural representative, cultural symbol
of the sub-continent as a whole and he shared the perception of people
in the sub-continent as a whole.
Why I say this is because there is a common share of culture, identity
for people all over. You can go to Pakistan, or India, or in
Bangladesh and you can see how this cultural identity is shared by
people despite political differences, despite even wars, despite even
recent incidents of fighting on the borders. This to my mind is a
significant message. Why I say this is to contrast this with the fact
that there is another phenomenon, which is also commonly shared by
South Asians as a whole, particularly of the sub-continent; and that
is communalism. Communalism is a common phenomenon, common danger, and
all of the sub-continent suffers from it. It is also mutually
inflicted. Something which happens in India immediately influences the
situation in Pakistan, and what happens in Pakistan also influences
India or Bangladesh. So there is a mutuality as far as communalism is
concerned in the sub-continent as a whole.
Now this mutuality, if you look at most proactive experiences that
India had during the post-‘47 period, the destruction of Babri Masjid
on 6th of December 1992, led to communal riots in India, communal
riots in Pakistan and communal riots in Bangladesh. In all the three
countries it led to communal riots primarily because communalism is
irrational. Not only communalism and the communal phenomenon are
coercive in their character, but they are also irrational. It is that
irrationality that you find in the expression and articulation in
December 1992 and January 1993 throughout the entire sub-continent.
But regardless of that, the Hindu communalists today hold Muslims of
today responsible for what their co-religionists supposedly did five
centuries ago. Similarly in Pakistan, when the 6th of December
incident took place, the Muslims held the Hindus in Pakistan
responsible for that Hindus in India did. In Bangladesh most of the
Hindus were made responsible, though many of those Hindus, either in
Pakistan or in Bangladesh, were opposed to Hindu communalism. But they
were made responsible just as the Muslims were made responsible in
India. So there is this irrationality, there is this illogical way of
looking at the identity and responsibility of people.
Why I am saying this is because, such community affinity is central to
communalism today in South-Asia. Such an affinity is attributed to
members of communities regardless of where they are, regardless of the
time sequence. And that is in fact central to the way communalism is
functioning in India today. The question that I want to ask you and
the reason for me spending some time with you is to examine how did
such a consciousness emerge among communities in India, in the sub-
continent as whole. What is the process? What is the historical
process responsible for generating such a consciousness?
I say that such a consciousness evolved during the colonial period.
When I say this I would like to make the statement that communalism is
a modern phenomenon. Communalism is something, which emerged during
the 19th century and then intensified during the 20th century. But
when I say that it is a modern phenomenon I do not mean to say, as
many scholars say today, that it is a creation of modernity, that it
is a part of modernity. It is a very fashionable argument these days
in certain circles of social scientists and historians. When I say it
is a modern phenomenon I do not mean to say that the communities,
Hindus and Muslims, communities that I am using for the sake of
convenience, did not have differences of opinion in the past. I also
do not mean to say that there were no conflicts between Hindus or
Muslims or other communities before the second half of the 19th
century.
Firstly, these tensions or communal conflicts were not limited to
Hindus and Muslims. There has been tension, conflict before, between
different communities.It did exist. It did exist did not mean that
communalism as it happened during the late 19th and 20th century was a
phenomenon which is inherited from history. Secondly, once you also
understand the fact that communal riots, as many historians and
scholars have argued, are not necessarily an outcome, a consequence of
communal politics. It is generally said and it is one of the strongest
opinions of the early scholars on communalism that communal riots are
episodic. They are episodic as a result of, as a consequence of, the
communal politics. In fact today or during the last 25-30-40 years,
communal riots have been the beginning of communalisation. One can
find so many examples where there was a new communal feeling, communal
riots start off as a process of communal consolidation and the
communalisation takes place. In many cases this process is externally
induced. This is a very important dimension of the current
communalism.
Let me return to what I was trying to say about the primary
development of communalism during the colonial period. I am not going
to the origins of it but I would say that during the course of the
19th century a process of communalisation of society took place. This
has something to do with the social and cultural regeneration and the
development of social and cultural consciousness in colonial India. If
you look at the cultural regeneration in India during the colonial
period, it was community based and it was within the parameters of
religion. So the religious “communitarian" boundaries within which the
social and cultural regeneration took place. This was an important
factor in the process of communalisation. This consciousness was
"communitarian". It was not communal because “ communitarian “
consciousness transformed itself into communal consciousness. Such
transformation took place during the last quarter of the 19th
century.
I can give you several examples. If you look at what happened in
Punjab or if you look at Uttar Pradesh where a social religious reform
movements became communal oriented movements in the 1880’s and 1890’s.
There are several other factors which were responsible for this
communalisation. Let me isolate two and draw your attention to the
importance of this.
One is in relation to the language. Many of you actually know that in
North India, in Punjab, in Uttar Pradesh, in parts of Bihar and in
Delhi, Urdu was the major language. Urdu was used both by Hindu and
Muslims and there was no distinction. Even in the 1940s and 1950s,
people would not know any other language; that is Hindus would not
know any other language than Urdu. So what was the common language? By
the last quarter of the 19th century there was a demand that
officially Hindi should be the language and there was a demand which
emerged among the Hindus. Slowly and slowly a division took place on
the basis of Hindi and Urdu. Hindi was seen as now the language of the
Hindus and Urdu was seen as the language of the Muslims. It was an
extremely important development. Now this transformation, which
started from the basis of language, led to what later became a so-
called nationalist slogan, that is, Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan. You know
this equation between India and Hindi and Hindushad devastating
consequences. and Urdu then became the language of the Muslims.
Let me take a second example, which was another factor in the
communalisation of Indian society. That is the cow protection
movement, Goraksha andolan. In 1880s and 1890s, there is a very strong
movement all over India for the protection of cows; which is a
legitimate one because corruption came up sometimes in cow protection
societies and of course the argument about the protection of cows was
a given. But when this movement came up, the movement was really not
for pure protection of cows but those who are protecting the cows,
demanding the protection of cows were identified as Hindus and rightly
or wrongly, and more wrongly than rightly, it was believed that the
Muslims opposed the protection of cows. So this protection movement
became once again an issue between the Hindus and Muslims which led to
the largest number of communal riots in India. Beginning from Uttar
Pradesh, down to Gujarat and Maharashtra, the series of these communal
riots between Hindus and Muslims on the pretext that it is the Hindus
that want to protect the cows and the Muslims don’t want to. And this
was a very major issue in the communalisation of society.
The point that I am really trying to make is that there is a process
of communalisation taking place. Let me also say that the national
movement, the anti-colonial movement in India, which as you know was
one of the strongest popular movements anywhere in any colonial
country, had a very great importance as far as Indian society is
concerned. It had a lot of positive aspects. I am saying this because
the Hindu fundamentalists, Hindu communalists in India say that the
anti-colonial movement, anti-colonial national movement was a negative
movement. It wasn’t. Since I am not going to talk about nationalism I
will not go into it but I just want to show that it was said. It had
very, very positive aspects. But at the same time the period of anti-
colonial movement is also the period of communalisation of Indian
society. It is a paradox in many ways but that is very true.
I am tracing it in order to suggest that the emergence of communal
politics in India is a consequence of this communalisation. It is an
important thing to underline this because communalism is not a result
of communal politics. I really suggesting that there is too much
emphasis given by scholars on the role of the colonial state, the role
of the 'Divide and Rule' policy. Not that they did not try it, but
there is something more than the divide and rule policy. Now when I
say this I put it in a fashion that this is an argument, scholarly in
the sense that there is a group of scholars in India who always
counterpose one form of communalism to the other form of communalism.
That is, you have both minority communalism in India and majority
communalism in India. This way of looking is very dangerous. In fact,
the majority communalism is a much more dangerous than the minority
communalism. What these scholars do when they counterpose this is
suggest that Hindu communalism is a result of Muslim communalism. The
1920s in India is the period in which Hindu communal assertion became
formidable. The ideological elaboration of Hindu communalism was very,
very strongly attempted during this time. Then the scholars asked this
question: why did this happen? According to them this happened because
the Muslims became very aggressive during this time. The Khilafat
movement of 1919-1920 and in some of the fights, which took place
during this period and subsequently, were responsible for Hindu
communalism. I want to say that this is an absolutely wrong
interpretation of communalism. Because what happened in the 1920s and
in 1905-06, etc., is, as I said earlier, a result of the
communalisation process, equally the Partition of India in 1947.
Without going into the politics of that, I could say it was the final
expression, articulation of this communalisation process. It is not
because of the result of the failing of a political leader or the
insistence of another political leader that Partition in 1947 took
place. There is a historical process in Indian society, which became
very intense during the 20th century, which led to the Partition of
India in1947.
To my mind it is quite unfortunate that it is a part of the discourse
on 50 years of independence. The entire media was obsessed with the
question of Partition. If you look at media then you will find the
whole focus was on Partition and not on the historical process that
led to the Partition. Anyway Partition is very significant.
Significant in many ways, not because it is one of the greatest
tragedies that Indian society had experienced—the sufferings that are
entailed, and the whole trauma that it created in1946-1947 and 1948,
but to me it is a political marker in the history of India. In the
evolution of India, and all the countries in the sub-continent is a
very major political marker and more importantly today it is a symbol
for further communalisation.
One believed for a very long time that Partition would end communalism
in India, particularly because the way in which the constituted
assembly of India between1948 and 1950 faced the question of Indian
nationhood. But unfortunately today it has become a major symbol of
communalisation of Indian society. The majority communalism uses it as
a rationale and justification. This, using it as a rationale and
justification, is done in many ways. For instance, what is being
argued today by majority communalism in India is that Partition is the
handiwork of Muslims. Who is responsible? The question of Hindu
communal forces in this is often overlooked. That is why I said this
media attention of Partition unfortunate because in all of these
pieces of writing that appear in media today the question that is
ultimately asked is: "who was responsible for it?" And the answer that
many come up with: "Yes, the Muslims are responsible for it." The
entire leading upto this disaster is glossed over. The second and more
dangerous preposition is if the Muslims have done it once, that they
will do it again. India will be further partitioned, particularly
because, as the Hindu communal argument goes, Muslims are still there
in large number and their population is 'growing faster'.
One of the most popular argument is the argument for akhand Bharat, a
unified India. The reality in the sub-continent is that politically
there are three sovereign independent States and this cannot be
ignored at all. You do not really undo it. But what the Hindu
fundamentalists want, based on the Partition lesson, is to undo this
and establish what we call akhand Bharat.
If you look closely at what happened in the sub-continent during the
last 50 years, the ruling classes of all three countries use
communalism as an ideology of their politics. In many cases and many
times the most important ideology of the ruling class politics has
been communalism, both within the countries as well as without, that
is the relations between different countries. This is a very important
point because it was operative not only internally but in relation
between different States. Internally let us look at this. I will just
take the example of India. In India, if you will take the recent
example of the demolition of Babri Masjid. the Masjid was demolished
by a group of Hindu fundamentalists, Hindu communalists, but the
Indian State is equally responsible for it. Indirectly though, the
Indian State was responsible because their policy towards that was one
of isolation, indifference and to some extent of corruption. Right
from the time when it really occurred, the State in many ways was
isolated and corrupted. As early as 1947, from the first time when an
idol of Rama was put inside the mosque. I went through the
correspondents of Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, with Govind
Ballabh Pant who was the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. Nehru was
enraged, as anything should happen. He said that it should be removed
immediately. But the government did not move anything. It is exactly a
repetition of that which happened in 1989 and1991-1992. So internally
they are using communalism as an ideology of their politics.
So the State is using communalism, and as a result of that India or
Pakistan or Bangladesh also come into this in their mutual politics.
You have seen whenever this is an internal crisis in any of these
countries, there is always speculation in the media about possible war
between India and Pakistan. Many politicians who really do not have
support base will use this bogey of the communal State (India being
seen as a Hindu State, Pakistan is a Muslim State) in order to re-
enforce their power. So the sub-continent, the relationship as a
result of that is based on such media perception and protection. Given
that, the last ten years have been a period of intensification of
communalism, particularly in India. Communal politics, the politics of
the majority communalism gain strength.
I am saying this in regards to intensification of communal politics in
India to suggest to you the way in which this intensification has
taken place, to suggest the manner in which communalism,particularly
the majority communalism has succeeded in advancing further. It is not
through the ordinary ways of electoral politics. A way that they have
tried to advance in Indian politics is not through the normal manner
of campaigning politically during the election itself. The attempt on
the part of the communal parties has been to establish power, social
power, at different levels of society by working through local
organizations, working through local, cultural and social
organizations. Starting from education to any area like environment,
women, local history societies and so on and so forth. It is true that
in various levels of society they have tried to establish their
power.
Let me give you two examples. Some 20 years before they decided to
write the history of India. What they were doing is creating new
history. Some years ago they decided to write a history of each
district of India. They appointed three member teams for each
district. Nobody knew about it. I at that time didn’t know about it.
Today, of course, last year they had their national convention. So you
imagine when history for each district being written, that is a
history which will be available to everybody. You can imagine the
havoc that this kind of fake history will play in coming years. The
second very important area for them is education. Today they run
15,000 schools in India, and for different age groups. You can imagine
if in each year, from these 15,000 thousand schools, a hundred
students come out and out of these hundred 50% are ideologically
brainwashed. This is what is happening in Hindu society every year.
These were only two examples. There are several other. Basically their
project is establishing what they call as cultural nationalism in
India. That is really a re-interpretation of Indian Nation, an Indian
Nation which is based on culture, which is Hindu culture, and in which
others have no place now. So the territorial notion of culture, the
question of democracy and secularism which India inherited in the
cultural movement, are only the legacies of the national movement.
They want to remove all the legacies of the anti-colonial struggle; in
that way the idea of a cultural nationalism based on religion, based
on Hindu religion is being attempted.
Now, to my mind, this has very major implications for the sub-
continent as a whole because this will undeniably lead to continuous
tension. Communal States which will come into effect as a result of
such an effort will only foster major antagonisms. So the possibility
of or the implication of a communalism for the sub-continent is
disastrous from the point of view of development, disastrous from the
point of view of peace, disastrous from the point of view of
prosperity, because the attention of the State, of this communal
State, will obviously be based on much more antagonism than it is
otherwise.
Let me, before I end, ask this question: "If this is what communalism
is attempting to do in the sub-continent, what are the prospects?" One
possible answer to that is the creation of secular action in the sub-
continent, and the creation of secular action not in the manner in
which it has taken place in the past, but in a new way. Anti-communal
secular activity in India is as old as communalism itself. What was
always attempted was reactive action, demonstrative action. The agenda
was set by communal forces and the secular activists had been marching
for peace and signing statements and so on and so forth. But nothing
has happened. Communalism is not dead and they have used different
ways of advancing in further. This actually means that new ways will
have to be thought of for similar action and participation.
There are two ways in which one has to think about what could be done
or what is necessary to be done in each State and the other in term of
the relationship. Let me briefly say what many people in India are
trying to do and thinking about, that is to create a secular movement
which addresses itself to grassroots level problems and create what is
known as, what is called, secular communities at local levels. These
secular communities will not necessarily be involved in anti-communal
activities but creating secular consciousness by taking up problems
which are closer to the every day life of people, whether it is
sanitation or the cleanliness or water or environment, for whatever
they are. It is only through those secular communities a secular
consciousness can be created. Understanding of this is that
communalism is going to be a long term problem. Fire fighting is not
sufficient or it will not be very effective.One has to think about
actions which are with a long term perspective and long term
strategies. In India, there are several groups which are involved in
such activities. I will say that during the last ten years, as I said,
communalism intensified itself, but it is also a time when there is a
re-assertion of secularism in India. I don’t know if any of you have
asked this question as to why in 1996 BJP could not remain in power
despite forming the government. No party was orepared to support. It
was not because these parties were great secularists. Many of them are
not, many of them wont even like to be clearly identified as secular,
but what these parties did in 1996 is the reflection of the assertion
of secularism in Indian society. It is a very clear reflection of
that. So certain processes have taken place and it is necessary really
to build upon this, and that is the area which is open.
Secondly, we have what is known as the “people to people contact". One
way in which it could be widened is to establish contact and
collaboration between different groups. In all the three countries,
that is, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, there are groups working like
that, professional groups, voluntary groups, etc. For instance, there
could be collaboration or some sort of coming together of the
teachers, the lawyers, the doctors, peasants, workers and so on and so
forth. I recall about 14 years back I met some Bangladesh scholars. We
discussed the possibility of a social science forum for social
scientists of all the three countries. At that time I happened to be
the dean of the school of social sciences at the Jawaharlal Nehru
University and so they asked me to take the initiative and send faxes
to social scientists in all the three countries. Their response was
everybody wanted such a forum so that the issues could be discussed
frankly and in depth.
I think such moves are necessary to widen the scope so that at some
time, maybe not tomorrow, maybe not after five years, but maybe after
25 years or 30 years, the people would say that this is not acceptable
to us because we understand what are the basic issues in the sub-
continent.
I would end by making two points. One is that the peace and prosperity
of the sub-continent depends upon the elimination of
communalism..Secondly, and more importantly to my mind, communalism is
anti-democratic. It is unimaginable that there can be a democracy in a
communal State. So it is not just religious communalism; and demand
for secularism is not only a demand for the unity or harmony among
Hindus and Muslims. It is a much greater problem in the sub-continent,
it is much more wider as far as the the growth of democratic culture
is concerned. Thank you very much.
Sid Harth
*Nature of Threat to Indian Democracy*
*Ram Puniyani*
(Book under review, Fascism and Communalism: Considerations-Sandeep
Pendse,
Center for Education and Documentation, Mumbai and Bangalore,
ced...@doccentre.com), pages-167, Rs. 240)
Those concerned about the rights of the weaker sections of society,
those
wanting to preserve the democratic space for the struggles of the
exploited
sections of society have been burning midnight oil to understand the
turn of
events from the decade of 1980s. How come the language of rights has
been
hijacked to the one of identity, how come the social movements have
been
pushed back and religious identity is ruling the roost? Yes, one is
talking
of the phenomenon of rise of RSS combine in the social space, the
phenomenon, which started coming up by using Ram Temple issue and is
currently riding on the chariot of Amarnath shrine and Ram Sethu!
There have
been multiple contributions trying to understand this RSS combine,
what is
it, a cultural phenomenon, a religious phenomenon or a political one.
And if
political, what type of politics does it represent. The book under
review is
one of this genre, which has been thoroughly researched and presented
with
clinical precision. Author's labor, depth of understanding on the
issue is
remarkable, despite the fact that he does leave out some of the major
aspect
of the phenomenon unaddressed.
What does the book argue? It takes the RSS combine head on and
analyses it
as a communal outfit, which had roots of Fascism and now its fascist
fangs
are trying to stifle the liberal space, and is manipulating the
social
culture in a retrograde manner to create a modern society with
medieval
values and social relations. The efforts of this combine has resulted
in a
social milieu in which, though the "Narendra Modi, Praveen Togadia
brand of
communalism may be deniable and unpopular but a soft Hindutva has
become
prevalent in the country. This soft Hindutva could be dangerous as it
always
harbored the possibility of ultimately being soft towards hard
communalism
too…" (P.1) One notices that the infiltration of RSS progeny in
practically
all areas of society and state structure has created a social common
sense
and orientation which already has the deeper elements of Hindu Nation.
The
orthodox, conservative social norms have got broad acceptability and
this
forms the base of the Right Wing Hindutva politics. By eighties the
rise of
newer middle classes and the accompanying values, created the ground
for
Rath yatra which was to be the nodal point for the rise of BJP from
an
obscure party to the major contender of political power in the times
to
come.
Advani led demolition of Babri mosque, as per him "a symbol of shame
for
Hindus", was followed by massive violence against Muslims and further
culminated in the first major blasts in Mumbai. This also paved the
way for
BJP's coming to power a few years later. It put forward the concept
of
cultural nationalism, a form of elite Hindu nationalism, by passing
the
democratic Indian Nationalism, a product of freedom movement. This
Hindu
nationalism is a form of ethno- centric nationality based on mythical
homogeneity, tilting towards race based nationalism. In fascism the
divide
is "…between republican democracy and narrow definitions of
nationality and
nationalism. Take Savarkar's attempt to define Hindu in terms of
Pitrabhumi
(fatherland) and punyabhumi, (holy land). The struggle is both to
include
and exclude. The ultimate identity for him is on the basis of 'bonds
of
blood'." (p13) the idea is to include every one except Muslims and
Christians, made sharply clear by RSS ideologue M.S. Golwalkar.
The demonization module developed by RSS and assisted globally by US
imperialism is so widespread that today terrorism is supposed to be
synonymous with Muslims and after every bomb blast many of them are
picked
up by police indiscriminately and tortured to no end. The 'success' of
RSS
type politics can be gauzed by the fact that in the Hindu Rashtra of
Gujarat, Muslims have been relegated to the status of second class
citizens.
This terrorism, whatever be its causes, has come as a great boon to
the
agenda of RSS as by now every act of terror, irrespective of the
culprit,
polarizes the community along religious lines. Pendse is on the dot
when he
points out that "RSS… saw itself as an ideological organization. Its
aim
always and quiet openly was the total reconstruction of the Indian
society
and creation of a new man. This aim was to be achieved in line with a
Hindu
ideal and a Hindu vision so that ultimately a Hindu nation should be
created. This should not be confused with the aim of Hindu theocracy
or a
medieval regime based on Brahminical rituals. It is a dream akin to
fascist
vision of reconstruction of society. In all its aspects. The
governmental
power of BJP was for the RSS merely an instrument towards this aim."
RSS combine achieves it 'brilliantly' by a division of labor. RSS does
the
core planning, BJP is its political chessboard, VHP expresses
religiosity in
its blunt form and Bajrang dal acts as storm troopers. Pendse does
well to
include the life and style of party manager Pramod Mhajan, who was
killed by
his own brother, for reasons which could never be known, contrasting
his
life with the spartan life of a swayamsevak (RSS volunteer). How this
political formation can fit different people and use them for its
political
agenda becomes clear from this.
The case of Gujarat, which was groomed as the ideal Hindu state, the
first
Hindu Rashtra, where the middle class, money order economy is
paramount, the
incident of Godhra while publicized as a pre planned attack by
"Muslims"
reminds one of the Reichstag fire, the date being the same, 27th Feb,
may be
just coincidental but it does indicates the methods of fascist
politics,
irrespective of the country where they come up.
Pendse does a brilliant job in bringing out the similarities and
differences
between the Delhi massacre of Sikhs in 1984 and the anti Muslim
pogrom
conducted by RSS combine in Gujarat. The argument proffered by RSS
Combine
and some others that Congress and BJP are two sides of the same coin,
as
Congress also massacred Sikhs, is well answered by him. He correctly
points
out that in case of anti Sikh pogrom, leaders of the government or the
party
did not justify the call for continuation of violence, administration
did
not participate in that, the government was surely guilty of confusion
and
inaction for two full days but Congress did not term the Sikh
community as
enemy community, and Congress did not initiate or continue any covert
and
overt communal campaign against this community.
While author tries to examine whether RSS combine is a Hindu communal
organization or a fascist one, he totally ignores and bypasses the
parameter
of fundamentalism, which must be considered while trying to understand
this
organization. As a matter of fact there are various serious scholars
like
Achin Vanaik who characterize RSS combine more as a fundamentalist
organization. This omission in otherwise sharply formulated arguments
in the
book is very jarring. He is precise in pointing out that its ideology
is
that of Hindu primacy and supremacy, its central credo is rejection of
the
idea of equality of all communities, pluralism and multiculturalism.
It is
reactionary because it rejects the class identity, sticking only to
religious identity. Minority communalism is reactive and defensive
and
majority communalism is aggressive and has the traits of fascism. This
is
what Nehru pointed out while saying that while both communalisms are
dangerous, the one of majority is more dangerous as it can manifest
as
nationalism and abolish democracy while minority communalism at worst
can
sound separatist. He harps more on ethnicity and imagined nationalism;
how
come RSS combine is fascist while harping mostly on religious
identity! More
is needed to elaborate his formulation on this.
Pendse's meticulous analysis fails to deal with gender and caste
issues
involved in the politics of Hindu right. He misspells Rashtra Sevika
Samiti
as Rashtriya Sevika samiti. It is symbolic. While men are nation
themselves,
women are mere servants of this Hindu nation. He should have explained
why
the word swayam is missing in women's organization? Of course he makes
a
correct point that since male swayamsevaks were expected to remain
celibates, to have women amongst their midst would have distracted
them from
the 'noble goals' for which they were being groomed. As such the major
cause
of RSS, Muslim League type of formations coming up during freedom
movement
was that the upholders of feudal values of caste (dalits being the
slaves
tied to land) and gender inequality (women being property of men)
were
coming under threat due to the transformation of caste and gender
relations
which were integral part of the freedom movement. This does require a
serious look in Indian context. If we see the rise of the Hindu right
is
preceded by the ascendance of dalits and women into the social space
during
the first three decades of the republic. The articulation of women's
movement during the decade of seventies was one of the triggers for
elite
males to tilt towards this political tendency. The other factor being
the
dalits coming to occupy some positions in society. The major violence
unleashed against Muslims and Christians by RSS combine was preceded
by its
anti dalit attacks in 1980 and against OBC in 1986, both mainly in
Gujarat.
It is the change of strategy which led it to use these dalits as their
foot
soldiers and attack the minorities, killing two (or more) birds with
a
single stone. Pendse, despite this limitation in his analysis, is at
his
brilliant best while elaborating the fascist traits of RSS. It is
worth
having a serious look at this section by all those who should make
the
strategies to promote human rights and strengthen democracy.
Secularism, its practice in India, had always been wrought with
serious
flaws, giving the ground to Advani's ilk to coin and popularize the
word,
pseudo secularism. As Nehru had correctly pointed out that his
greatest
problem is to walk-on the path of secular values, constitution's
values, in
a society in the grip of religion. "The state in India did not
remain
resolutely separate and distant from religion. It only tried to
remain
'neutral' in the sense of not playing any favorites and actually
doting on
all religions." (p.93) Only thing which can be added to this correct
diagnosis is that since the society was mainly dominated by Hindu
practices
and the state machinery started getting infiltrated by communal
elements,
the Hindu practices started getting the official status, breaking
coconut at
inaugurations, pictures of Hindu deities in police stations and other
official places and organization of Dashra pujas and Satyanaryan pujas
in
the public organizations became a norm at most of the places.
Author's observation that secularists are reactive and thus limit
themselves, though correct does not give a total picture. Yes, they
have
failed to project that secularism is a desirable total alternative to
the
needs of the nation. What also needs to be added is that with the
decline of
Socialist states, decline of workers movement, and lack of
coordination
between different social movements, the projection and carrying out
of
struggle to preserve secular values has become difficult. There is
hardly a
broad realization about the threats of fascist communal politics, till
quiet
late. The secular elements have been protesting in the aftermath of
the
communal violence and then going to slumber as if the problem is over.
The
systematic outlining of the tasks for secular values in contemporary
context, their necessity for the very preservation of human rights has
not
been realized. The result is that social movements working in
different
arenas of political life are focusing in their own area of
specialization
and the core aspect of preservation of democracy, secularism has been
taken
up only by a handful of activists, whose efforts are not more then a
drop in
the ocean. Spreading awareness about the myths based on history and
contemporary issues does have crucial importance, all the same this is
just
the beginning of the work in this direction and miles more remain to
be
covered.
The questions raised in the book require broader debate and the need
to take
on the threats to our democracy is much more urgent than apparent from
the
efforts of the human rights activists. Whole progressive movement, has
to
gear up and ensure that warding off of the threat of communal fascism
has to
be the integral and core part of all the social movements, be they of
the
one's of dalits, workers, women, adivasis or religious minorities. The
book
not only meticulously outlines the threat this identity based politics
poses
but also raises questions; whose answers do have the potential of
building a
proper secular movement. Needless to say the human rights movements,
democratic movement needs to engage with the issues raised in the book
which
surely is a result of painstaking work and qualifies as a significant
contribution on the issue.
..and I am Sid Harth
Sid Harth
From: "Gengis Khan" <Gengis_...@yahoo.com>
Date: 1999/04/08
Subject: RSS Parivar - by Kuldip Nayar Rediff onthe Net, April 8, 1999
Kuldip Nayar
Growing Differences
Families fall apart. Differences crop up. The cohesion over the years
begins
to wear out. It is, therefore, no surprise to see the gulf developing
among
the members of the RSS Parivar. But is this real or a facade? That is
the
question.
Madan Lal Khurana tried to raise the debate before resigning from the
Cabinet. He said the Parivar members -- he called them pseudo-Hindus
-- had
given a bad name to the Vajpayee government. He said they had created
an
atmosphere of animosity against the minorities. The whip of discipline
shut
up Khurana. But he had already raised a pertinent discussion.
"If I were to say something, I would have to resign from the party,"
Khurana
told me a few days ago. I had asked him whether he would make the
explanatory statement, which the outgoing minister was entitled to
do.
Although he did not spell out the pressure, it is an open secret that
he was
quietened by BJP chief Kushabhau Thakre, who is an ardent follower of
the
RSS.
Khurana has not mentioned officially which members of the RSS Parivar
he had
in view. But he has otherwise made his unhappiness over activities of
the
Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the two fanatic members of
the
RSS Parivar, clear. This still does not explain why he would have to
leave
his party, the BJP, if he were to name them or talk about their work
in
detail.
Whatever else it may suggest, it does indicate that the RSS does not
allow
Parivar members to criticise one another in public. This does not mean
that
the differences can be papered over. But as RSS ideologue
Govindacharya said
some time ago that "the understanding between the government and them
(meaning the Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad) will come
through
talks."
He would have sounded credible if the differences had been
ideological. But
they are not over Hindutva, which the BJP owns as enthusiastically as
other
Parivar members do. The differences relate to what the Bajrang Dal and
the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad have been doing to harass and hound the
Christians
out. In fact, the burning of a missionary and his two children was the
last
straw on Khurana’s back.
Understandably, the BJP has to be equivocal in putting the blame on
the two
Parivar members because of its relationship with the RSS. But there is
no
reason why the BJP's allies, political parties who have secular
credentials,
should feel shy of saying that the VHP and the Bajrang Dal have
whipped up
communalism. True, the person to give a new edge to communalism and
spread
it to the countryside was L K Advani, now home minister. The results
of his
rath yatra through northern India some eight years ago are still
visible.
And today he is busy propagating the virtues of secularism in a
pluralist
India.
The fact that the coalition constituents have not come out openly
against
the Bajrang Dal and the VHP gives the impression that they are riding
two
horses at the same time. They do not want to lose their seat in the
government by openly saying, something which the queen been, the RSS,
may
not like. On the other hand, they are keen on telling their voters,
particularly the minorities, that they have not compromised with
communalism
in any way. This is merely shadow boxing. Had they been serious, they
would
have asked the BJP to denounce the two organisations by name. At lest
Commerce Minister Ramakrishna Hegde of the Lok Shakti had the gumption
to
blame the Bajrang Dal and the VHP for damaging the image of the
Vajpayee
government. But he too stopped at that. He did not dare to say whose
support
was behind the two organisations.
The recent RSS conclave at Lucknow focussed on the Christians as if
their
community was doing nothing except bringing tribal Hindus to its fold.
Who
converted whom and how is a topic, which we can discuss till the cows
come
home. The question is: Why have the Bajrang Dal and the VHP taken up
the
task of 'reconversion to Hinduism?' Could it not be at the RSS
bidding?
It is difficult to imagine otherwise because both organisations are
nothing
but the creation of the RSS. The BJP has developed an entity of its
own over
the years and the RSS has, for reasons best known to it, left the
party
alone. It is also possible that the RSS does not want to upset the
applecart
of the BJP-led coalition, which has a common agenda to pursue.
Hitting at the Christians has, however, evoked unfavourable opinion
everywhere. The country’s reputation for tolerance has been damaged
considerably. The RSS could not have used the BJP for the purpose.
The
Bajrang Dal and VHP fitted the role as they did not care about
breaking the
law or skulls.
What is disconcerting is that Khurana, after making some noises, has
fallen
silent. Even Vajpayee, after bemoaning the excesses committed against
Christians, gave a clean chit to the guilty Gujarat government. This
is the
tragedy of liberals in the BJP.
Is the RSS following a dual policy, one expressed through Vajpayee’s
condemnation, the other of bludgeoning Christians through the Bajrang
Dal
and the VHP to deter them from their missionary work. But the larger
question is: Will the RSS allow Vajpayee to govern without
interference? The
manner in which the Bajrang Dal and VHP are egged on by the RSS to
behave
irresponsibly shows it wants to maintain its pressure on Vajpayee.
Basically, the BJP faces a situation similar to the one it did in 1979
when
its predecessor, the Jana Sangh, was part of the Janata Party. The
Jana
Sangh refused to sever its ties with the RSS, although it had given
an
undertaking to Jayaprakash Narayan, the founder of the Janata Party,
that it
would do so. How could the Jana Sangh, the tail, wag the body, the
RSS? It
has a long-term policy to make India a Hindu Rashtra and convert
Hinduism
into a monolithic religion.
The liberal lot in the BJP is willing to go along with the philosophy
of
Hindu chauvinism. But it does not like the efforts to polarise the
nation
through forcible reconversions and the attack on the minorities. The
liberals seem to have realised that the destruction of pluralism may
well
end up in the destruction of India.
The real target of Hindu fundamentalists is Vajpayee. He is trapped,
but not
tamed. Once in a while he shows his own self to convey that he does
not like
all that the RSS is doing. Still it is difficult to imagine that he
will
ever revolt against the RSS or establish a separate identity. The RSS
appears to have convinced the liberal segment, including him, that
its
groundwork has brought the BJP to power. The fact is that the RSS
would not
have made any headway if Vajpayee had not been available to it.
History may one day record that Vajpayee destroyed the liberals within
the
BJP by staying quiet or giving full reins to hardliners like L K
Advani and
Murli Manohar Joshi. There is no doubt that the RSS is strong enough
to
establish its authority. One, however, fails to understand what glory
Vajpayee is seeking before joining issue with the RSS. Were he to
challenge
Hindu fundamentalists, he would become an alternative to the Congress
because his personal image is still high. If he dithers, as he has
been
doing, he would certainly go downhill. This may mean the death of
liberalism
in the BJP.
Kuldip Nayar