`Naxals have still to win the hearts of tribals'
By Sudhir K Singh
The Times of India News Service
KANKER (Chhatisgarh): The Naxalites may seem to have wormed their way
into the affections of tribals living in inaccessible areas of
Koilibera, Keshkal, Kondegaon, and Abujmaar around the Bastar belt in
the last few years. Dispensing quick and easy justice has helped them
to virtually take over the basic functions of the popularly elected
government in these regions. But it is still fear that forces the local
populace to cooperate with them. The battle for the hearts remains
unwon.
The experiences of a 20-year-old Naxalite undertrial, Ashoke Kumar, at
present cooling his heels at Kanker jail makes this evident. Speaking
to The Times of India News Service, Askok said, he was forcibly taken
away from his village at Mindi by members of the Koilibera ``dalam'' in
April 1999. ``Since I had studied till class VII, they gave me the job
of printing pamphlets.'' He was treated well in the beginning, but
scoldings and tongue- lashings became a regular feature thereafter. ``I
was never actually beaten, but meals were given irregularly.'' Anybody
protesting faced the prospect of being summarily shot.
A typical Naxal ``dalam'', he informs, comprises 20 persons, including
women. Normally, only those with basic education are preferred. ``Which
is possibly why I was found suitable.'' He said, he was trained to use
a rifle, and would have graduated to an AK-47 had he remained with them
beyond a year. Positions of leadership, however, are almost never given
to tribals. The commander's slot remains the exclusive preserve of old
reliable of the People's War Group from Telegu-speaking Andhra Pradesh.
Conversations with local police officers also support the notion that,
though the entire Naxalite ``struggle'' depends on co-operation from
the local tribals, the latter are still not trusted.
Ashoke admits that the single-most important reason why the Naxalites
have succeeded in making inroads in these regions is the failure of the
``sarkar'' to solve the problems of tribals. When they first enter a
village, word is spread through local contacts that
``dadaman''(brothers) have come.'' Activists go about knocking at
people's doors with offers to help. Local people are asked, if police
or forest officials have been harassing them. Once the initial ice is
broken, villagers are encouraged to flout the orders of the local
administration (``police sarkar ko khatam karna hai''). Then begins the
imperceptible process of indoctrination when oral briefs are proffered
on the futility of elections in a society where even essential needs
still go unattended. Ashoke argues that since Naxal activists are
normally the only ones ``available'' to attend to the everyday problems
in a tough, unfrequented terrain, some elemental dependence on them is
a natural corollary.
Asked if he would rejoin his old ``dalam'' if given the option, Ashoke
is certain he won't. ``They will kill me thinking I am a police
informer. Besides I don't really like them.''
http://www.timesofindia.com/050900/05indi22.htm
Naxals plan to counter police strategy by mobilising masses
By T Sunil Reddy
HYDERABAD: It is a battle of one-upmanship. While five States have
formed a joint coordination committee to end the Naxal menace, the
People's War Naxalites have also formulated their counter plans.
The Naxals, who believe in the `power through the gun' philosophy, have
also decided to organise masses against the government.
Apparently realising that killings and counter-killings cannot take
them far towards reaching their goal, the PW central committee has
asked its cadre to mobilise people against the economic policies of
both the central and state governments.
"It is time we turn the struggle against the economic policies like cut
in subsidies and price rise into a broad-based political movement. Make
people realise that power can be attained through such political
movements," reads a PW central committee's confidential document.
The 38-page hand-written document, meant for circulation only among the
armed squads of the party, wanted the cadre to take the message up to
the village committee levels. "We should evolve a mechanism to
enlighten the youth, oppressed, women and the villagers that they can
attain political power by continuing the struggle against government
policies.
The PW document said the joint coordination committee (JCC), set up in
June 1998 to tackle the left-wing extremists, had achieved `some
success'. "The creation of JCC helped the extremist-affected States to
exchange information on the Naxalites, conduct joint combing
operations, and finally made the Centre to release more funds and
supply lethal weapons to combat armed Naxals," the document said.
"Soon after the the JCC was formed, the anti-extremist operations in
the Naxalite-dominated areas received a fillip. The police
administration in all those States -- Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Bihar -- was able to eliminate top-ranking
leaders, alongside inflicting death blows to the armed squads."
However, the PW leadership did not stop from praising the police and
their operations. It advised the party cadre the measures they required
to take to counter the police strategies.
Wholly devoting four pages for the purpose, the document released by
the PW central committee on June 1, 2000 asked its armed squads to
involve the people to counter the elite anti-extremist police
force. "There is a need to set up the village defence committees at
every place of our dominance. The committee members will provide
necessary protection to armed squads moving in the villages," it said
while noting that the work so far in that direction was not sufficient.
Stating that the PW central committee members, Nalla Adi Reddy, Y.
Santosh Reddy and Seelam Naresh were killed by the police after
obtaining specific information about their hideout, the document asked
the cadre to develop a wide-ranging network of informants, consisting
of people from all walks of life to sustain the underground movement.
The PW has already reorganised the squads in North Telangana and
Dandakaranya areas by spurning up the regular dalams into local
guerrilla squads (LGS) and special guerrilla squads (SGS), each
consisting five and 12 members respectively. While the LGS will move in
a small area and organise the party activities, the SGS will form part
of the action teams in the district. It intends to take the idea to all
places where its squads are operating.
Enthused by the success of the party operations, which include raiding
police stations, killing targets and ambushing the police teams, the PW
leadership has launched a special drive to recruit more youth into the
party fold.
http://www.timesofindia.com/120300/12indi5.htm
Naxal-hit Bastar finds a new mantra
Gurmukh Singh
BASTAR: India watch out! Bharat is waking up. And the Prime Minister's
Office is keeping tabs on this development! The nation's most backward
district of Bastar, which is larger than the Philippines or Switzerland
in size and is the epicentre of Naxalism, is transforming itself
through a new mantra: Self-help.
The spark for the mantra came from the state government's landmark
decision to delegate `absolute decision-making' powers to tribals under
the 73rd amendment. And the newly-empowered 90 per cent tribal
population are flexing their muscle against exploitative forest
contractors and middlemen by organising themselves on various platforms
in this largely forested, beautiful district.
The result: haats, bardan samitis, total literacy campaigns, van dhan
schemes, women's thrift societies, solar electrification and marketing
cooperatives for their produce.
Taking note of this trend, the PMO has ordered a study of the
initiative for its possible replication in the rest of the country.
Various agencies, including the Sumitra Foundation, Unesco, WHO and
Unicef, are moving into the area to speed up transformation in these
backwaters of Madhya Pradesh.
In fact, the $100 million Sumitra Foundation, set up by Unesco special
adviser Madanjeet Singh, is kicking off its SAARC-wide solar clinic
mission from Binta hamlet in this district.
Under the programme, about 100 solar clinics will become operational in
the district by November. ``Each clinic, manned by a doctor and a
nurse, will have a solar system, refrigerator, television and a
computer to give pre-programmed prescriptions. The clinic TV will be
used for imparting lessons to school students. Our aim is to kill many
birds with one stone - health, education, entertainment, awareness, and
maintenance training,'' says the Paris-based Madanjeet Singh.
UNICEF is running 3,000 anganwadis under the literacy mission named
Padhna, Wadhna Sikho. As part of this mission, the ancient gurukul
system has been resurrected to popularise literacy. ``A guru will be
picked up by the villagers themselves and given a dakhshina of Rs 100
each by his shishyas,'' says district collector Pravir Krishn.
Torch-light processions, street-corner plays and folk music shows have
become the daily feature in the district where every hut has been
plaster with slogans like Badhna hai toh padhna sikho.
For its part, the World Bank is funding 75 malaria detection centres.
``We have mobilised over 20,000 ``bare-foot'' doctors and volunteers to
promote health care,'' says Krishn.
Women sarpanches - all sarpanches in Bastar are tribal - have coined
the concept of women's thrift groups to empower housewives financially.
To root out the cause of tribals' deprivation - the middleman-trader-
moneylender nexus - the tribal Trifed, under its Van Dhan scheme,
directly buys produce from the tribals. ``Till now, this nexus bought
tamarind for Rs 4 kg here and sold it for Rs 30 in Delhi and Rs 250 in
the West Asia. The poor producer didn't get even 10 per cent of the
actual price. The new panchayat Act vests all trading rights in Trifed
which has business worth Rs 50 crore in the last eight months. Out of
this, Rs 47 crore went to the producers - raising their incomes by six
to seven times. They can do barter trade at haat bazars also,'' says
the district collector.
Middlemen, please excuse.
http://www.icm-satp.com/India/Assessment_India.htm
Assessment 2000
Despite projections to the contrary by India's Central Government, the
internal security scenario continues to be problematic, particularly in
Jammu & Kashmir, while insurgencies in the North-Eastern States
continue to fester.
In quantitative terms there was a marginal improvement in India's fight
against these secessionist movements. While 2,268 civilians and
security forces personnel and 1,376 terrorists were killed in 1998, the
figures for 1999 were, 1,966 and 1,521 respectively (these figures are
for the North-Eastern States and J&K only). The worrisome aspect in
this context is the aid that the various insurgent groups continue to
receive from Pakistan, which helps sustain protracted low-intensity
conflicts. Low-key violence, too, continues in other regions of the
country.
J&K continues to be the prominent hot-spot in the country. Even as
Indian security forces have gained an upper hand in the battle against
Pakistan-backed militants, a new dimension witnessed in 1999-2000 is
suicide attacks by foreign militants on military bases in the state.
This was after a downtrend of militant violence witnessed during the
first half of 1999. The June-July 1999 clashes in the Kargil sector
between the Indian army and infiltrators from Pakistan (mainly
Pakistani army personnel and some militants, including mercenaries)
mark a major development in the low-key proxy war being conducted by
Pakistan against India.
The Kargil episode (which is viewed in Pakistan as a wasted golden
opportunity to humble India in J&K) has the potential to encourage a
fresh round of the low-intensity conflict in the region. The shadow of
Kashmir militancy was evident in the hijacking of the Indian Airlines
aircraft IC 814 in the last week of December which was resolved only
after three militants were released from Indian jails and flown into
Afghanistan, from where they returned to Pakistan. Of them, Maulana
Masood Azhar, a Muslim cleric has publicly announced his desire to
intensify his involvement in the Kashmir insurgency, strengthening the
criticism that India is a soft state that is unable to give a firm
response to militant intransigence.
The ground situation indicates that despite government efforts, the
casualties of the J&K insurgency has increased in 1999 as compared to
that in 1998 (2,259 and 2,218 respectively). This development reverses
a declining trend whereby the casualties of this protracted conflict
had begun declining after reaching a peak in 1996 (2,903 killed). More
than a failure of the government's internal security strategies, this
could be an outcome of increased activism by Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI). This activism has manifest itself in ISI-sponsored
terrorist activities which have been spreading from their traditional
zones of Punjab, J&K and the North-East to other regions of the
country, particularly the capital, New Delhi, where several incidents
of bomb blasts and arms seizures have been attributed to ISI agents.
Similarly, there is a growing nexus between the ISI and other terrorist
groups in India. The UP-Nepal border is now a major conduit point aimed
at creating violent disruption in India.
The North-East, too, continues to be in turmoil even as more evidence
of linkages between insurgent groups and the ISI emerges. While
insurgency in Mizoram has largely subsided, security forces continue to
battle with terrorism in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura. Despite
a cease-fire between the security forces and several insurgent groups
in Nagaland there have been reports of violence. In a major development
the General Secretary of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland--
Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) <Nagaland/Terrorist%20Outfits/NSCN-IM.htm>
Thuengaling Muivah was arrested in Bangkok on January 19, 2000 for
travelling from Karachi on a false passport. This may prove to be a
setback to the negotiations currently underway between the government
and the NSCN-IM as the Karachi visit raises suspicions on the
intentions of the NSCN-IM. At a time when Indian troops were battling
in Kargil, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) <Assam/Terrorist%
20Outfits/ULFA.htm> was involved in providing details of troop
movements to Pakistani intelligence. Also, the ULFA assassinated a
State Minister.
Several initiatives made by the government in 1998 and the first half
of 1999 to herald peace in strife torn areas are yet to fructify. While
Assam saw a major decline in civilian and security personnel casualties
during 1999 as compared to those in 1998 (291 and 603 respectively)
there was an increase in the number of terrorists killed (212 and 180).
The same was the case in Nagaland, while there was a marginal rise in
civilian and security forces casualties in Tripura.
The Cost of Terrorism: Civilian and Security Forces Killed
Degree of Success in India's Fight Against Terrorism: Terrorists Killed
The example of resolving insurgency through dialogue in Mizoram is yet
to be replicated in the others States of the region.
Punjab, too, is a unique case in India's internal security scenario
where a combination of political revival and effective law and order
measures ensured the termination of a secessionist movement which had
at one point threatened the territorial integrity of India. The fact
that this was achieved in the face of sustained support to militancy
from Pakistan makes the normalisation process notable. There were no
casualties in Punjab in 1998 or 1999. However, there have been isolated
instances of terrorist groups attempting to revive the Khalistan
movement, attempts which have been unsuccessful.
In 1999, banned armed radical left groups, Naxalites, continued to
perpetrate violence in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh (AP) even as they have
spread their activity into Madhya Pradesh (MP). Naxal activity was
primarily aimed at disrupting the poll process during the run-up to the
general elections. While Bihar was the worst hit, polling in AP, too,
was affected by the Naxal threat. The run-up to elections to the State
Legislature in Bihar in February 2000 saw renewed violence by Naxal
groups, particularly on the polling day, February 12 in which 17
persons including 12 police personnel where killed.
Clashes between the various factions of Naxal groups and private armies
continues in Bihar; sympathisers of the warring groups bore the brunt
of the violence. There were several major massacres in 1999. Two such
massacres occurred on January 25 and February 12, claiming 22 and 12
victims respectively, which included women and children. 12 more were
killed in another massacre perpetrated on November 17, 1999. In AP the
police notched up a success against the main Naxal group, the Peoples
War Group (PWG) when they killed three of their top leaders on December
1, 1999 allegedly an encounter. The PWG, claimed that these leaders
were arrested in Bangalore, brought to AP and shot dead in cold blood,
in retribution unleashed a violent wave of arson, landmine and bomb
attacks. In 1999, the PWG had killed a total of 2,213 persons.
In its latest attack, the PWG used a landmine explosion to kill an AP
Minister, the first in the State, and three of his security personnel
on March 7, 2000. Earlier on, they had killed a former Speaker of the
State Assembly. Indicating the spread of Naxal violence from the
traditional pocket boroughs of Bihar and AP, the Transport Minister of
MP, Lakhiram Kanwre, was killed on December 15, 1999 by the People's
War Group in retaliation for the killing of their three leaders. This
was followed by two major ambushes on police parties killing 22 in MP
(February 20, 2000) and seven in AP (February 18, 2000).
The situation in Tamil Nadu unlike most other violence prone regions
discussed above, shows signs of improvement. Unlike the period between
1996-1998, when communal clashes in the State (particularly Coimbatore)
had threatened to blow-up into large-scale communal strife and there
were reports of Islamic militant organistations growing in strength,
the situation has now been effectively contained with no major
incidents reported in 1999.
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